Leaving Your Mark
Policy Entrepreneurs Setting the Agenda in the IJsselmeer Area
Leaving Your Mark
For Arie and Jansje
For Paulien
Leaving Your Mark: Policy Entrepreneurs Setting the Agenda in the IJsselmeer Area

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‘Where there is no vision the people perish.’
Proverbs 29:18
(King James Version)
Figure 1.1: The IJsselmeer area encompasses the entire former Zuiderzee and has a surface of more than 2,000 square kilometres. It has the largest freshwater lake in the northwest of Europe. Today, the area has several lakes: the IJsselmeer (around 1,200 km²), the Markermeer-IJmeer (around 750 km²) and the corner lakes (Veluwe) (around 75 km²). The largest supply of water (70 per cent) comes from the Rhine basin through the river IJssel. Also part of the area is the Province of Flevoland, which consists of the polders of Eastern Flevoland, Southern Flevoland and the Noordoostpolder. The Wieringenmeerpolder and Afsluitdijk, which demarcate the IJsselmeer from the Wadden Sea, are also considered part of the IJsselmeer area. Another landmark is the Houtribdijk, which separates the IJsselmeer and Markermeer-IJmeer (Beleidsnota IJsselmeergebied 2009–2015, 2009, p. 8).
1.1 Introduction

Cornelis Lely had a dream—change the Netherlands by closing off the Zuiderzee with a large dam and creating new land, rising out of its waters within. In 1891, he gave voice to his dream by drafting a plan; however, it would take over 27 years before the plan was accepted by the national government. Within his lifetime, he witnessed the beginning of this largest and most ambitious infrastructural endeavour ever initiated by the Dutch—the Zuiderzee Works—but did not live to see it finished. This water engineer clearly left his mark in Dutch history and is remembered as the visionary who accomplished what not many deemed possible at the time—transforming a whole sea into a freshwater lake with polders of new land within. This triggers the following questions: how did Lely achieve this, and what can we learn from his story?

Lely was not the first to propose such a plan. In 1667, Hendrik Stevin first developed plans to close the Zuiderzee, with the goal of preventing the hinterland from ever flooding again. Although this was an ambitious plan, it was impossible to complete with the technology available at that time. Moreover, the Zuiderzee was an important trading route on water for the Dutch, and closing it off would be disastrous for the trading market. Two centuries later, around 1850, the issue returned to the agenda due to changing circumstances. First, the Zuiderzee had lost its international status as a trading route because of a newly created canal from the Zuiderzee to the North Sea. Second, the Dutch population was growing, and land was lost after Belgium revolted in 1830. Third, due to the industrial revolution, more powerful steam-run mills were produced and used to successfully drain some lakes in the Zuidplas. This gave new life to the development of plans for turning water into land in the Zuiderzee, as a whole or in part. Numerous plans were created by engineers from private firms and by Rijkswaterstaat—the Directorate-General for the Public Works and Water Management Department of the then Dutch Ministry of Water Trade and Industry. However, most initiatives did not receive support from the national government because they were deemed too unrealistic, unnecessary and expensive, or were put on the political agenda at the wrong time due to issues such as Cabinet crises or other concerns. This changed when a lobby organisation, called the Zuiderzeevereniging, was founded in 1886. This group—with representatives of provinces, local municipalities, water boards and private notables—had the goal to set an agenda to transform the Zuiderzee.

The group commissioned the relatively unknown water engineer, Lely, to take the lead in developing a plan. Lely and his associates conducted research on the alternatives and possibilities to transform the Zuiderzee. He established a public campaign, wrote papers and gave lectures to raise awareness. In 1891, he finally presented his plan—known as ‘Plan Lely’. The plan impressed many and gen-
erated some public support, but not enough for the plan to be accepted. However, in the same year, Lely became the Minister of the Dutch Ministry of Water Trade and Industry, and sought for his plan to be approved as an Act. He formed and chaired a state commission that had the task of judging his own plan. Unsurprisingly, in 1894, this commission developed a report advocating Plan Lely as a matter of national interest that should be implemented by the state. Unfortunately for Lely and his supporters, the Cabinet lost power and the Cabinet that replaced it had other priorities. In 1901, Lely again became Minister for the Dutch Ministry of Water Trade and Industry; however, due to his plan’s large costs, opposition to the plan was growing. In response, Lely changed the plan by proposing construction of smaller polders in order to meet the financial constraints. Plan Lely was close to being accepted; however, again, a Cabinet change prevented it from reaching a final decision. In 1913, Lely became minister for the third time, but now on the condition that his plan would be supported. Despite objections from the Ministry of War—which viewed the Zuiderzee as a part of the national defence system—the plan received considerable political support.

Ultimately, fortunately for Lely, two events helped push his plan onto the agenda and receive approval (Bosch & Van der Ham, 1998; Peys & Koetzier, 1985; Van der Ham, 2007). First, in 1914, World War I diverted the attention of the national government to more urgent matters. However, because of the Netherlands’ neutrality in World War I, it was cut off from some important trading relationships with neighbouring countries. As a result, the Dutch faced food scarcity because the country was unable to self-sustain. Thus, Lely framed his plan as the solution to the problem of food scarcity because the newly created polders would offer room for additional agricultural land. Second, the Dutch suffered from a flood of the Zuiderzee in 1916 that caused considerable damage deep into the country. In response, Lely emphasised that closing off the Zuiderzee would reduce the risk of future floods. Subsequently, the parliament accepted Lely’s plan and, on 13 June 1918, the original draft of the Zuiderzee Act was signed by the Dutch queen. After 27 years, the Dutch finally started working to realise Lely’s dream.

Lely’s story provides numerous lessons. It indicates that people can make a difference and make radical change occur. Lely had a dream that he translated into an ambitious, yet feasible, plan that offered solutions to pressing problems, and he mobilised the public, politics and policymakers to adopt his plan. His perseverance also proved crucial, with giving up being much easier than continuously trying to change the government’s agenda. However, this story also shows that change is not only reliant on individual design, but also influenced by contextual factors that can act as both a constraint (such as the Cabinet changes or lack of financial resources) and an oppor-
tunity. For example, the crises caused by World War I and the 1916 Zuiderzee flood helped Lely align his plan with these events; it seems unlikely that Lely’s plan would have succeeded if these events had not occurred to create a sense of urgency.

1.2 Research focus
The present study focuses on change agents, such as Lely, who strategically seek to set the agenda for or against policy change. It focuses on the area that Lely—literally and figuratively—placed on the map: the IJsselmeer area. The Zuiderzee is known today as the IJsselmeer area and is a clear result of Lely’s efforts.

The creation of the IJsselmeer and polders generated an open playing field for numerous actors with different plans, ideas and policies. The Zuiderzee had been an empty space or institutional void before the Zuiderzee Works commenced. The creation of new ground, nature, agricultural land, cities, a province and more produced opportunities for actors to project their ideas onto the area. This led to innovations and experiments in engineering, agriculture, spatial planning, city design, infrastructure, water management and even socialisation and colonisation practices by the national state, who would only allow farmers to live in the polder if they met certain social value standards for this brave new world (Van der Ham, 2007).

While further examination of these innovations and experiments would be interesting in future studies, the current research does not focus on the agents behind these historical changes, but rather on those agents who sought to set the agenda during the last decades by advocating and opposing plans to change the IJsselmeer area.

The main research question addressed by this study is how actors strategically seek to set the agenda within the context of the IJsselmeer area. To answer this question, the agenda-setting process will be reconstructed. In particular, I will examine how actors frame the problem at stake and the solutions, and manoeuvre their way through the policy process by networking with others to create support for, or against, policy change. I consider the change agents involved and their actions as examples of policy entrepreneurship, and define a policy entrepreneur as an actor who advocates and strategically seeks to change or oppose policy (Kingdon, 1984). The overall hypothesis is that policy entrepreneurs, by employing strategies, can set the agenda.

On one side, there is the policy entrepreneur with his or her set of strategies, and on the other side, the agenda is believed to be influenced by the policy entrepreneur’s strategies. As Lely’s example indicates, policy entrepreneurs are constrained or enabled by the institutional context in which they operate, depending on the issues involved. Therefore, although this study adopts an agency perspective, the context is not neglected. However, this study will examine
Chapter 1: Introduction

The context primarily from the perspective of the policy entrepreneurs involved.

The main goal of this research is to gain a better understanding of the relationship between policy entrepreneurs, who employ certain strategies, and the dynamics of agenda setting. Although policy entrepreneurs increasingly receive attention in political and social sciences, understandings of their strategies to pursue policy change is still limited (Brouwer & Biermann, 2011; Mintrom, 2000; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Pralle, 2009; Roberts, 1998; Roberts & King, 1991; Sheingate, 2003; Zahariadis, 2007). For example, Mintrom and Norman (2009) note that there is still room for further conceptual development and empirical research concerning policy entrepreneurship, including policy entrepreneurs’ strategies. They state that there is also need for further study of the interactions between policy entrepreneurs and their specific policy contexts (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). Therefore, when studying the relationship between policy entrepreneurs and agenda setting, I take into account the context as perceived by the policy entrepreneurs.

The present research is different from other studies on policy entrepreneurship because it studies not only the stakeholders at the national governmental levels—such as members of parliament, political leaders and so forth—but also discusses the strategies employed by local and regional policy entrepreneurs (cf. Carter, Scott & Rowling, 2004; Doig & Hargrove, 1997; Thompson, 1994; Uslaner, 1978; Weissett, 1991). Moreover, the policy entrepreneurs empirically studied include people from within the political system, such as local aldermen, as well as policy entrepreneurs acting from outside on behalf of their own interest or that of their interest groups (Bakir, 2009; Oliver, 2004). Further, while most studies on policy entrepreneurship only discuss policy entrepreneurs in favour of policy change, this study also analyses the opponents of policy change (Bakir, 2009; Crow, 2010). The case studies reveal that numerous actors seek to influence the area by setting the agenda to change policy or prevent policy from occurring. Finally, as detailed in the next chapter, this research builds on the available literature on policy entrepreneurship, while also expanding its focus by studying theories on agenda setting. It also includes other theoretical frameworks to enrich knowledge on the framing and networking strategies employed by policy entrepreneurs. There is particular focus on the former because empirical studies of policy entrepreneurship tend to focus on networking strategies, rather than framing strategies (Brouwer, 2013;
Brouwer & Biermann, 2011; Huitema & Meijerink, 2009b; Mintrom & Norman, 2009). The distinction made here between framing and networking is for heuristic purposes, rather than to present yet another new or better way of categorising types of strategies (Brouwer, 2013). The next chapter presents the theoretical foundation of this study in full detail.

1.3 Thesis outline
As aforementioned, the next chapter discusses the theoretical frameworks used in this research to analyse the strategies that policy entrepreneurs employ to set the agenda. Chapter 3 elaborates on the research strategy, introduces the research design and selected case studies, and accounts for the data collection and analysis methods. Chapters 4 to 7 discuss the four conducted empirical case studies. Chapter 4 presents the first case study on the Second Delta Committee, which tried to set the agenda for water safety and climate adaptation in the Dutch Delta and, among other things, suggested to raise the water level of the IJsselmeer. Chapter 5 discusses the policy entrepreneurs who pushed for change in the nature policy of the Netherlands, triggered by developments in the southern part of the province of Flevoland. Chapter 6 presents an analysis of policy entrepreneurs who advocated or opposed plans to build an infrastructural connection—either a bridge or tunnel—through the Markermeer-IJmeer, and make outer-dike urbanisation possible. Chapter 7, the final empirical chapter, focuses on a case study of policy entrepreneurs who advocated or opposed plans to create a wind park next to the dikes of the Noordoostpolder, close to Urk. Chapter 8 presents the conclusion of this research and discusses its main findings.

Figure 1.3: A statue of Cornelis Lely on the Afsluitdijk, the IJsselmeer’s sealing dam, made by Mari Andriessen in 1954. Photo: Bayke de Vries.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
'When you take stuff from one writer it’s plagiarism, but when you take from many writers it’s called research.'
Wilson Mizner
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the theoretical framework for the empirical case study analysis. The first step is to introduce the agency perspective taken and then review theories on agenda setting with regard to the role of agency. Next, the central concept of policy entrepreneurship is explained—the origin of entrepreneurship, the significance of policy entrepreneurs and the personal characteristics of policy entrepreneurs. Subsequently, the strategies that can be employed by policy entrepreneurs are presented. These strategies are grouped into framing and networking strategies.

2.2 Structure and agency
Many have struggled with the relationship between structure and agency (Giddens, 1986; Hay, 2002; Hodgson, 2004; Sewell Jr, 1992) and I have neither the ambition nor the skill to resolve this debate. Nonetheless, I have to account for the agency perspective taken in this study. I contend that humans are inventive and have the capacity to create, recreate and procreate. However, humans are constrained by context, which is natural, physical, cultural and institutional. This is called the ‘paradox of agency’, in which people are deeply conditioned by and dependent on the continuity and stability of the social systems, while also capable of creating and changing these systems through both conscious and unconscious effort (Battilana, Leca & Boxenbaum, 2009; Seo & Creed, 2002; Sewell Jr, 1992; Westley & Antadze, 2010). Thus, the interplay between structure and agency is complex and contingent on the local context (Oborn, Barrett & Exworthy, 2011).

To better understand structure, and not be blinded by this study’s focus on agency, I studied various accounts of institutions and their constraining effects on the policy processes, such as the traditional and new ‘historical’, ‘rational choice’ and ‘sociological’ institutionalisms (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Lindblom, 1959, 1968, 1979; March & Olsen, 1989; North, 1990; Ostrom, 2007; Peters, Pierre & King, 2005; Scott, 2008; Thelen, 1999). However, I found that these frameworks, due to their focus on the structuring effect of institutional factors—such as rules, norms, patterns, legal systems and bureaucracies—often tend to offer a very static notion of the policy process by focusing on the gradual development of policy and leaving little room for change induced by agency (John, 1998). These frameworks are especially helpful for those wanting to explain stability and incremental change over a longer period.

As stated in the introductory chapter, I prefer to look at the dynamics of the policy process and the interplay of various actors, and thus chose not to focus on explaining stability or change over a longer period. Hence, I focus on one of the most dynamic aspects of the policy process—agenda setting (Pralle, 2009). Precisely because of this focus, I studied various key theories on agenda setting to determine which kind of role is assigned to agency (Araral, Scott, Howlett,
Ramesh & Wu, 2012; Bachrach & Baratz, 1963; Birkland, 2011; Bovens, Hart & Twist, 2007; deLeon, 1999; Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2003; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; May & Wildavsky, 1978; Moran & Rein, 2009; Teisman, 2000; Van de Graaf & Hoppe, 1992). Thus, before discussing agency in further detail in terms of policy entrepreneurship, it is important to first attain a better understanding of the role of agency in the policy process, and agenda setting in particular.

2.3 Theories on agenda setting
Agenda setting scholars are interested in why certain issues emerge on the political agenda, while others are neglected. As explained below, this does not automatically include the need to incorporate agency in the model, perspective or framework on agenda setting. The following sections discuss various theories on agenda setting and examine what is considered the role of agency in agenda setting.

2.3.1 Social gap theory
A first approach to agenda setting is to consider it an autonomous and automated process filling a gap. The logic is that a performance gap between a perceived and socially preferred situation will automatically lead to attention from decision-making authorities. The magnitude of this gap is deemed decisive for whether or not an issue will receive agenda priority and lead to policy change (De Vries, 2003; Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2003). The magnitude of the gap can increase due to changing societal norms and standards, or worsening of the current situation. An underlying assumption is that the longer a problematic situation persists, and the more structural it becomes, the sooner governmental actors are likely to pay attention to it (De Vries, 2003). Numbers and figures that highlight important issues—such as increased employability, crimes committed or immigrants entering the country—can pressure the national government to take action to prevent situations perceived as undesirable.

Downs’s (1972) ‘issue attention cycle’ provides an application of this thinking because Downs argues that a key domestic problem ‘suddenly leaps into prominence, remains there for a short time, and then—though still largely unresolved—gradually fades from the centre of public attention’ (p. 1). According to Downs (1972), this cycle has five stages. The first is the pre-problem stage in which the problem already exists, but has not captured much public attention. This changes in the second stage of alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm (Downs, 1972, p. 39), in which the public suddenly becomes aware of the problem and pressures political leaders to solve it. In the third stage, the public begins to realise that problem solving has its costs. The fourth stage is a gradual decline in public interest because people become discouraged, bored or threatened by thinking about the problem, and, as a result, the focus of attention wanes. Moreover, by this stage, it is likely that another issue has entered stage two of its cycle. The fifth
and final stage is the post-problem stage, in which the issue has finally been replaced ‘at the centre of public concern [and] moves into a prolonged limbo—twilight realm of lesser attention or spasmodic recurrences of interests’ (Downs, 1972, p. 40). Downs argues that not all issues or social problems will travel through the entire issue attention cycle because, to do so, they must meet certain conditions. An example of such a condition is that problems need to be ‘dramatic and exciting to maintain public interest’ (Downs, 1972, p. 42).

Downs’s systemic view of the agenda-setting process is emblematic for the general structural and functional conceptualisation of the nature of ‘social problems’ as objective and subject to social systems (Schneider, 1985). The existence of social problems are regarded ‘the direct products of readily identifiable, distinctive and visible objective conditions’ (Hannigan, 2006, p. 63). Therefore, in this systemic perspective on agenda setting, agency hardly plays a role other than providing decision makers with information about conditions that may lead to societal unrest.

2.3.2 Systems approach
Easton (1957, 1965) offers a systemic view of the political life, including the policy process and agenda setting. Easton (1957) speaks of political life as a system of activity, with interactions between political actors and all kinds of institutions that influence ‘the way in which authoritative decisions are formulated and executed for society’ (p. 384). Interactions that do not relate to the authoritative allocation of values for society are regarded external variables in the environment of the political system (Miller, 1971, p. 198). The environment is linked to the political system by a conversion process of inputs into outputs. Inputs, consisting of public demands and support shaped by their environment, are transformed through the political system into outputs, consisting of decisions and actions, such as laws, programmes and policies. Easton (1957) argues that outputs, ‘in turn, have consequences both for the system and for the environment in which the system exists’ (p. 384), thus creating a feedback loop of information and actions. The transformation of inputs into outputs takes place within the black box of politics and bureaucracy, which unfortunately remains largely sealed and unanalysed.

Easton (1965, pp. 87–99) stresses the importance of what he calls ‘gatekeepers’, political actors and institutions that filter public demands within or at the boundary of the political system. Many demands fail to pass through the gatekeepers’ filtering, which is essential for the political system to survive. Easton (1957) views the political system as almost like a biological organism that ‘is subject to constant stress from its surroundings to which it must adapt in one way or another if it is not to be completely destroyed’ (p. 386). Stress can occur if disturbances from outside the system threaten the system’s capacity to self-sustain and continue to produce outputs. The political system might also over-
load or stop functioning if, for instance, the inflow of demands is too heavy and/or the inflow of support is too light (Miller, 1971, p. 200). The gatekeeper is in a position to regulate the flow of information that runs through the political system, and can control the opening and closing of communication channels (Pettigrew, 1972). Thus, the most important form of agency in Easton’s model is the gatekeeper. Others wanting to set the agenda must go through or bypass the gatekeeper, but have little to no capacity or locus of control to direct the flow of information themselves. Thus, the role of agency is minimised.

2.3.3 Barrier model
With their barrier model of agenda setting, Bachrach and Baratz (1963, 1970) try to open the sealed black box of policymaking offered by Easton. In contrast to Easton’s function of the gatekeeper, Bachrach and Baratz argue that there is more than one barrier to overcome before a demand or issue leads to policy change. The first barrier is ideological, based on the dominant pattern of community values. A problem must be identified and recognised as a problem, and translated into demands for solutions. A second barrier is institutional because certain procedures and requirements need to be met before a demand or issue is incorporated in the decision making. The third barrier to survive is the decision making, as political actors must decide between specific demands or issues. If a demand or issue does not overcome the decision-making barrier, it is regarded a non-decision. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) describe non-decision making as:

a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process. (p. 44)

The fourth and final barrier is the implementation, as decisions are sometimes modified or not carried out after a decision has been made. Those who want the change policy need to compete with those defending maintenance of the status quo (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970). Both proponents and opponents of change, with their various resources and powers, must try to exploit the critical moments in the policy process to realise or prevent effective policy change. There are differences though, as Bachrach and Baratz (1970) argue: ‘while advocates of change must win at all stages of the political process … the defenders of existing policy must win at only one stage in the process’ (p. 58). Following Schattschneider (1960), they conclude that all political systems have an inherent ‘mobilisation of bias’, and this structural bias favours those actors seeking to defend the status quo (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970, p. 58).
The barrier model has also been applied and theorised differently (Cobb & Elder, 1971; De Vries, 2003; Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2003; Peters & Hogwood, 1985; Van de Graaf & Hoppe, 1992). For example, De Vries (2003) takes a slightly different staged approach to the barriers in agenda setting. De Vries (2003) states that there are barriers between various types of agenda levels. After a perceived problem has been set into collective demands, it must be recognised by the public and placed on the public agenda. De Vries does not define the types of agendas; thus, I follow Pralle (2009) who defines the public agenda as ‘the set of issues that are most salient to citizens and voters’ (p. 782).

The next barrier is the transition of the issue definition on the public agenda to the policy agenda. The policy agenda ‘consists of the issues that are up for discussion in governmental institutions such as legislatures and executive agencies’ (Pralle, 2009, p. 782). The following barrier would be the transfer of an issue from the policy agenda onto the political agenda. The political agenda is ‘the narrower set of issues about which governmental officials are poised to make a decision’ (Pralle, 2009, p. 782). The final barrier, as is the case in the original model, would be the translation of an issue into feasible implementation targets because not all issues about which decisions are made make it through to actual implementation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984).

Unfortunately, the barrier model does not offer a clear image of how issues are dealt with, and by whom. This raises the following questions: How do various groups enforce power, exploit resources and compete over issues to set the agenda if, for instance, public awareness and support is low? How would an actor turn a barrier into an opportunity to set the agenda?

### 2.3.4 Agenda-building perspective

Cobb, Ross and Ross (1976) present an agenda-building perspective on agenda setting. By developing the insights offered by Easton (1957, 1965), Bachrach and Baratz (1963, 1970), Cobb and Elder (1971) and others (cf. Dahl, 1961; Schattschneider, 1960), they wanted to further understand the process by which demands of various groups are translated into issues considered for decision making—defined as ‘agenda building’. In addition, they wanted to explain variance across different types of political systems, thus focusing more on the role of agency in the agenda-setting process (Cobb et al., 1976, p. 126). Cobb et al. (1976) argue that the agenda-setting process is far from automated, although issues generally do follow the same ‘careers’ of issue initiation, solution specification, expansion of support and entrance to the political—or formal—agenda. The manner in which the issues are dealt with varies depending on the model of agenda setting taken, and the issues’ career stages need not to be sequential—for example, ‘issue entrance’ may precede ‘expansion of support’ (Cobb et al., 1976, p. 132).
Cobb et al. (1976) distinguish three different models: the ‘outside initiative’, ‘mobilisation’ and ‘inside access’ models, which are, respectively, typically found in egalitarian societies, hierarchical societies and societies with a high concentration of wealth and status (cf. Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 135). They argue that societal actors, in an egalitarian society, that have no direct access to the policy or political agenda need to initiate and raise public support from the outside in order to articulate grievance and set the public agenda — this is the ‘outside initiative’ model. If sufficient public support has been achieved, actors can pressure decision makers to seriously consider an issue for the political agenda. Decision makers or actors with political agenda access, in a hierarchical society, who want to set the agenda will most likely consolidate policies if both political and public support is high enough, but if they would want to change policy and support is low a mobilisation of the public is deemed necessary — this is the ‘mobilisation’ model. Thus, the mobilisation model offers a mirror image of the outside initiative model because actors try to expand the issue from the political to the public agenda, by mobilising the public (Cobb et al., 1976, p. 132). Alternatively, decision makers or privileged societal actors, in a society with a high concentration of wealth and status, who already have access to the political agenda do not need much public support to initiate agenda setting from the inside — this is the ‘inside access’ model. These actors would rather ‘try to limit the issue expansion to the public because they do not want the issue on the public agenda. Instead they seek a more “private” decision within the government’ (Cobb et al., 1976, p. 135). Inside groups try to attract support from carefully selected likeminded groups, and bargain behind the scenes to reach an agreement on an issue or proposal. These actors are most likely not to succeed in setting the agenda and changing policy if opposing groups effectively oppose and set the public agenda to their advantage.

In short, agency is deemed important in this agenda-setting perspective because it can strategically define issues and expand support, in competition with other actors and issues. However, the different styles of agenda setting are determined by the general nature of the political system (Cobb et al., 1976; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003).

2.3.5 Punctuated equilibrium framework
Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993) punctuated equilibrium framework assumes that, at a policy system level, long periods of stability and policy monopolies in policy communities are punctuated by moments of abrupt, significant perturbations or change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005; Meijerink, 2008; Pralle, 2003; True, Jones & Baumgartner, 2007). The observation is that political processes are usually stable and incremental, but sometimes change radically, and the punctuated equilibrium framework seeks to explain this (True et al., 2007, p. 155). The claim is that stability is caused by the limited ability of actors to handle more than one or two issues at a time, within
a specific policy subsystem. Over time, these issues or policy images—
defined as ‘the manner in which a policy is characterised or understood’
(True et al., 2007, p. 176)—become institutionalised and incrementally
develop into dominant policy monopolies that, by themselves, dampen
pressure for change (True et al., 2007, p. 159). However, monopolies do
not last forever; thus, the challenge for agency is to both undermine the
present policy image and receive attention for others to set the agenda.

The competition among conflicting policy images, which also di-
rectly relates to interests, could result in newly fashioned or rede-
defined policy images that change policy monopolies. Agents wanting to
achieve this need to try to gain support for their policy image. Shopping
for venues, which will be discussed in detail later, is regarded an impor-
tant strategy for agents to attract support from others for the preferred
policy images (Meijerink, 2008). Therefore, despite systemic patterns
and mechanisms of stability and change, agency does have discretion-
ary attributes.

2.3.6 Advocacy coalitions framework
Sabatier’s (1988) advocacy coalitions framework places coalitions
and interactions at the centre of explaining agenda setting and policy
change (Meijerink, 2005; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Sabatier, 1988,
2007; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007b; Wei-
ble, Sabatier & McQueen, 2009). According to the advocacy coalitions
framework, one to four advocacy coalitions can be distinguished with-
in a policy domain or policy subsystem. Parties such as interest group
leaders, agency officials, legislators, applied researchers, journalists
and politicians share a set of normative and causal beliefs and show a
non-trivial degree of coordinated behaviour to realise their objectives
and policy proposals. Coalitions are built and formed around deep core
beliefs, policy core beliefs and secondary beliefs that are connected to
shared problem definitions at different levels from the core.

At these different levels, agents have the possibility to direct
change. In order to effect this change, they need to translate problems
in words that correspond with the coalition’s beliefs and problem defi-
nitions—either to strengthen internal bonding or to try to bridge be-
tween other coalitions to get others on board as coalition partners. In
addition, a struggle between advocacy coalitions can be necessary for
policy change because it is believed that policy change results from
the conflict and learning of several coalitions seeking change or main-
tenance of a particular policy regime. Furthermore, external shocks to
and internal perturbations within a policy system, often generated by a
crisis or incident, are believed to be needed for radical change to occur
(Sabatier & Weible, 2007b).

2.3.7 Multiple streams model
Kingdon’s (1984, 2002) multiple streams model explicitly focuses on
agents, ideas and policy change (Kingdon, 1984, 2002; Meijerink, 2005;
CONTINUAL CHANGE, RATHER THAN EQUILIBRIUM, IS THE HALLMARK OF AGENDA SETTING

Zahariadis, 2007). According to Kingdon (2002), continual change, rather than equilibrium, is the hallmark of agenda setting: ‘Therefore, a model needs to emphasise development and adaptation, not inertia and stasis’ (p. 227). Hence, Kingdon’s model is concerned with how and why certain issues receive attention at certain times, for which he uses concepts such as policy streams, windows of opportunity and policy entrepreneurship. Kingdon uses a revised version of Cohen, March and Olsen’s (1972) garbage-can model of organisational choice to view agenda setting as taking place in three relatively independent streams: problems, policies and politics (Roberts & King, 1991). In the problem stream, problems are recognised, promoted and discussed publicly. In the policy stream, proposals and solutions are generated by those responsible for drafting them. The political stream is characterised by political processes and events—such as changes in the national mood, election results and changes of administration—that can have powerful effects on politicians’ perspectives of and receptivity to issues. Dynamics internal to each of the streams can serve as an impetus for or constraint on successful agenda setting and policy change (Kingdon, 2002, p. 18). However, effective change is most likely possible when streams converge—due to activity in either stream—and are coupled into a package by change agents—most notably ‘policy entrepreneurs’.

Kingdon defines the critical moment of the three streams colliding as a policy window—also known as a ‘window of opportunity’. As long as the window of opportunity is open, policy entrepreneurs should couple problems with solutions, or vice versa, in such a way as to have their ideas accepted and adopted by political actors. Windows occasionally open predictably, and otherwise open unpredictably, and always for a short period—‘an idea’s time comes, but it also passes’ (Kingdon, 2002, p. 169). The occurrence of windows opening ‘because of some factor beyond the realm of the individual entrepreneur’ (Kingdon, 2002, p. 182) is of importance; however, Kingdon (2002) argues that the most explanatory power of policy change lies with the policy entrepreneur who recognises and quickly anticipates the right moment to couple the streams and ‘strikes while the iron is hot’ (p. 170). Without agency, policy change is unlikely to occur, even if the world is literally shaking. As stated by Mintrom and Norman (2009), ‘In any given instance of policy change, it is usually possible to locate an individual or a small team that appears to have been a driving force for action’ (p. 651). Section 2.4 provides a more in-depth discussion of policy entrepreneurs and their strategies to set the agenda for policy change.

2.3.8 A short résumé
The theories on agenda setting discussed above show an increasingly complex and dynamic perspective on agenda setting. The first theories discussed show an automated and systemic perspective on agenda
setting, leaving limited room for agency, while the latter—especially the multiple streams model—present a highly dynamic and complex view on agenda setting due to the involvement of all kinds of actors. Based on the latter, and on more recent perspectives, I regard it best to view agenda setting not in isolation, but as an ongoing process in which multiple actors try to make their issue more salient than others to gain influence on the agenda setting and leave their mark.

Fortunately, in many of the discussed theoretical frameworks and perspectives on agenda setting, the role of agency has been recognised in terms of:

- gatekeepers filtering and directing the flow of information (systems approach)
- interest groups or political actors overcoming or exploiting various barriers (barrier model)
- outside or inside groups initiating issues and building agendas (agenda-building perspective)
- advocates of policy images (punctuated equilibrium framework)
- coalitions competing for dominance (advocacy coalitions framework)
- policy entrepreneurs coupling various streams (multiple streams model).

The remainder of this chapter builds on the aforementioned theories on agenda setting, while discussing agency in terms of policy entrepreneurship. However, to gain further in-depth knowledge of how policy entrepreneurship works, this chapter also builds on more contemporary studies of policy entrepreneurship (Brouwer, Huijema & Bierman, 2009; Christopoulos, 2006; Mackenzie, 2004; Meijerink & Huijema, 2010a; Mintrom, 2000; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Roberts, 1998; Roberts & King, 1991). These studies, which also depart from Kingdon's understanding of policy entrepreneurship, help discern the strategies employed by policy entrepreneurs to set the agenda, and help understand the relationship between policy entrepreneurs and their contexts of agency and structure.

With regard to policy entrepreneurs and their context, Kingdon argues that policy entrepreneurs are constrained and limited in their repertoire and discretionary power due to contexts. One of Kingdon's (2002) final notes is that:

constraints ... are not absolutes. Instead, they are conditions that make some events highly unlikely and other events more likely to occur. They do impose structure on the system, but it is structure that still allows room for gray areas and unpredictability. (p. 208)

Other researchers have confirmed that policy entrepreneurs can have influence over the course of events and change policy, but are,
at the same time, both constrained and enabled by the policy system in which they operate (Beeson & Stone, 2013; Hammond, 2013; Zhu, 2013). The context ‘shapes the opportunities and the actions open to policy entrepreneurs, but not in a deterministic fashion’ (Mintrom, as cited in Mackenzie, 2004, p. 382). As will be elaborated later, policy entrepreneurs most likely act strategically by identifying and exploiting opportunities and overcoming limitations imposed by their context (Mackenzie, 2004). Similarly, Huitema and Meijerink (2009b) state that policy entrepreneurs need to ‘have a full and thorough knowledge of the institutional system they are working in and know how to use that system’ (p. 388). This does not mean that contextual or institutional differences are irrelevant, as different contexts may offer different opportunity structures. In any case, policy entrepreneurs interpret and—if possible—take advantage of their context to undertake a course of actions that help them reach their objectives effectively (Mackenzie, 2004). Consequently, when studying policy entrepreneurship, it is important to take into account how policy entrepreneurs deal with their context in order to set the agenda to change policies or prevent change from occurring, as discussed in the next section. The following section examines policy entrepreneurship by discussing its origins and characteristics. In addition, two types of strategies are distinguished: framing and networking.

2.4 Policy entrepreneurship

2.4.1 Entrepreneurship

The term ‘entrepreneur’ comes from the French word ‘entreprendre’, which means ‘to undertake’ (deLeon, 1996, p. 496). The French economist JB Say first used the term in 1800 and defined it as an individual or businessperson who ‘shifts economic resources out of an area of lower and into an area of higher productivity and greater yield’ (Drucker 1985, as cited in Brouwer & Biermann, 2011, p. 2). In the 1930s, Schumpeter (1934) used the term to identify innovation—it is the entrepreneur who creates disequilibria to generate innovative change (deLeon, 1996; Kuhnert, 2001; Lewis, 1980; Roberts & King, 1991). Later, Kirzner (1973, 1979) stated that the entrepreneur exploits disequilibria to generate change (Schneider, Teske & Mintrom, 1995; Shockley, Stough, Haynes & Frank, 2006). Bringing these views together, we can regard entrepreneurs as being alert to overlooked opportunities—such as the unfulfilled demand for a new product—and thus keen to innovate by introducing new products, new production techniques or new markets (Sheingate, 2003).

The use of the concept of entrepreneurship in political science can be traced back to Dahl (1961) who described ‘political entrepreneurs’ as political leaders who use their resources to the maximum to create political change (Sheingate, 2003). The adoption of the agency approach in the political domain became important for further study
of change as scholars began to conduct studies on Cabinet members, congressional staff, the executive and members of parliament, and showed that agency had explanatory power for policy and political change (Bardach, 1972; Carter et al., 2004; Christopoulos, 2006; Doig & Hargrove, 1997; Eyestone, 1978; Kuhnert, 2001; Meydani, 2010; Price, 1971; Thompson, 1994; Uslaner, 1978; Walker, 1974; Weissert, 1991). At first, these entrepreneurs—such as legislative entrepreneurs—were regarded as rational, economic calculators who just happened to be in an authoritative position (Schiller, 1995; Shockley et al., 2006; Wawro, 2000). Later, scholars such as Sheingate (2003) highlighted a more voluntaristic and instrumental perspective on entrepreneurs, viewing them as ‘creative, resourceful, and opportunistic leaders whose skillful manipulation of politics result in the creation of a new policy or a new bureaucratic agency, creates a new institution, or transforms an existing one’ (p. 188). As Roberts (1998) states, ‘Entrepreneurial design begins with conscious, deliberate activities of policy actors who have a radically new idea that they want to see implemented’ (p. 115). Schneider and Teske (1992) regard political entrepreneurs as individuals who want to change the direction and flow of politics, making it possible for scholars to not only study heroic figures or leaders, but also ‘a larger class of individuals who help propel political and policy change’ (p. 737).

The above shows that policy entrepreneurship has its origins in business studies and political sciences, which reveals that entrepreneurs are opportunity seekers who want to leave their mark, either in business or politics. The next section introduces policy entrepreneurs as understood in policy sciences.

2.4.2 Policy entrepreneurs

The concept of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ was introduced to policy analysis by Kingdon (2002), who portrays them as ‘advocates for proposals or for the prominence of ideas’ and notes that ‘their defining characteristic, much in the case of a business entrepreneur, is their willingness to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in the hope of a future return’ (p. 122). According to Kingdon, the function of policy entrepreneurs is crucial in the policymaking process, especially in agenda setting. As indicated above, Kingdon views agenda setting in three independent streams that are all governed by their own logic. Sometimes the streams converge, thereby creating the possibility for an issue to gain priority on the agenda. On such occasions, a policy window opens, giving entrepreneurs the opportunity to couple streams and present their own ideas (Olsson et al., 2006).

According to Kingdon, linking streams and setting the agenda may not take place absent skilful coupling or pushing by policy entrepreneurs. Additionally, like surfers waiting for a great wave to come, policy entrepreneurs are influenced by events over which they have no control (Kingdon, 2002, p. 165). However, more recent studies
into policy entrepreneurship show that streams and strategies are interlinked, and policy entrepreneurs can control the sequence of events, or at least seize the opportunity and have influence, giving them an even more central position in the analysis of policy dynamics (Brouwer & Biermann, 2011; Huijtema & Meijerink, 2009b; John, 1998; Olsson et al., 2006; Roberts, 1998). External shocks (Sabatier & Weible, 2007b; Weible et al., 2009), crises (Birkland, 2008; Boin, ’t Hart & McConnell, 2009; Lowry, 2006) or punctuations (True et al., 2007) can be anticipated or even—at least discursively—created (Verduijn, Meijerink & Leroy, 2012).

While building on the aforementioned theories and studies, I need to account for two issues. First, while not extensively discussed in the literature, policy entrepreneurs, according to my understanding, may also strive to preserve the status quo, rather than advocate change (Dery, 2000; Simmons, Yonk & Thomas, 2011). Due to dependence on those in elected positions with authority over the decision-making process, interest groups or various participants outside the government are even more likely to block, rather than promote, agenda issues (Kingdon, 2002). Moreover, they often try to create attention for their issues once the agenda is already set, and from Kingdon's (2002, p. 67) perspective, thus operate more reactively than proactively. If one only looks at the agency in pursuit of change, one may miss important antagonists of changing the status quo. Partly for this reason, I have broadened my understanding of policy entrepreneurship, as introduced in the previous chapter, by including not only strategies aimed at changing policy, but also those aimed at blocking policy (Crow, 2010). Key in all this is that, as I view it, policy entrepreneurs eagerly try to leave their mark on agenda setting. They are well aware of the fact that effectively influencing agenda setting can prove crucial for accomplishing success.

Second, I am mindful of the fact that there are different types of entrepreneurs, such as public (Lewis, 1980; Ostrom, 1965; Roberts & King, 1991; Schneider et al., 1995), social (Westley & Antadze, 2010), legislative (Wawro, 2000; Weisset, 1991), civic (Leadbeater & Goss, 1998), bureaucratic (Teske & Schneider, 1994), institutional (Battilana et al., 2009) and business (Zott & Huy, 2007) entrepreneurs. In my view, the main difference between the different types of entrepreneurship, and policy entrepreneurship, is the object of the desired or opposed change. There have been attempts to distinguish types of entrepreneurs based on positions held (Roberts & King, 1991). However, to differentiate entrepreneurs based on their positions is not particularly useful because, as Kingdon (2002) highlights, an entrepreneur can be any person in any position—a civil servant, expert, interest group, politician or even the head of state. In addition, all types of entrepreneurs display common characteristics and strategies, even though they might differ in their position and focus of desired or opposed policy change (Crow, 2010). Hence, it makes more
sense to differentiate types of entrepreneurship on factors other than position held—notably the entrepreneur’s object.

Now that the policy entrepreneurship concept has been explained, it is important to further examine the role of the personal characteristics of policy entrepreneurs.

2.4.3 Personal characteristics
Alongside a risk-taking attitude, policy entrepreneurs need to exhibit the appropriate skills and motivation to persevere and continue trying to set the agenda. Thus, what are the personal characteristics of a policy entrepreneur? What kind of people are they? In the literature, policy entrepreneurs are often described as opportunistic, alert to the opening of policy windows, assertive, risk taking, persistent, perseverant, competitive, wayward, creative, knowledgeable, innovative and socially skilled to relate to other people’s perspectives and interests. Due to their often highly complex and uncertain environments, they must be able to thrive under uncertainty; be strong in networking; be attentive to building and maintaining relationships with important actors, such as politicians and experts; and be willing and able to learn and reflect on their actions (Christopoulos, 2006; Crow, 2010; deLeon, 1996; Fligstein, 1997, 2001; Kingdon, 1984; Lovell, 2009; Mintrom, 2000; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Roberts, 1998; Roberts & King, 1991; Weissert, 1991). Policy entrepreneurs are not ‘superhumanly clever’ (Kingdon, 2002, p. 183), and thus seldom exhibit all of these skills at the same level. Not all policy entrepreneurs are ‘geniuses struck by the fire of the gods’ (deLeon, 1996, p. 496). Additionally, policy entrepreneurs are not always effective, and often fail before succeeding (Oborn et al., 2011). They can also easily misestimate or misperceive the likelihood of a future window of opportunity (Kingdon, 2002, p. 171). However, as Kingdon (2002, p. 122) notes, all policy entrepreneurs display a willingness to invest resources, such as time, energy, reputation and sometimes money, in the hope of a future return.

However, what exactly drives individuals to partake in this risk-taking endeavour remains unclear. For example, in the political science literature, politicians are often described as self-maximising agents whose only aim is to gain electoral support and remain in office (Arnold, 1989; Schiller, 1995; Shockley et al., 2006; Wawro, 2000). Yet this perspective overlooks people whose prospects for future return may be minimal, but still deliberately persist in policy entrepreneurship. Kingdon (2002) notes that future return may also be described differently: ‘some entrepreneurs simply like the game. They enjoy advocacy, they enjoy being at or near the seat of power, they enjoy being part of the action’ (p. 123). Other motives could be desire for power or the drive to prove oneself superior to others, or even to oneself, ‘as an inter-temporal competi-
tion between future and past selves stemming from the desire of the present self to test self-ability’—that is, self-satisfaction and self-competition (Khalil, 1997, as cited in Kuhnert, 2001, p. 23).

A future return or profit might also be ideological—such as to promote certain values to society or the desire to make a difference in the world (Christopoulos, 2006; Kingdon, 2002; Thompson, 1994). In an interesting study by Arnold (1989) on policy entrepreneurs’ self-interest and moral commitment to aiding the homeless, he argues that these notions do not necessarily rule each other out, but can be both relevant and equally strong, depending on the issue at stake. However, insofar as policy entrepreneurs will even speak about their motives, they may still ‘use frames to conceal their true motives from others whom they are trying to persuade’ (Campbell, 2002, p. 28). In other words, they could simply be saying what others want to hear their motives are, instead of expressing their true motivation (Campbell, 2002). Consequently, it is difficult to regard a policy entrepreneur as either a knight on a white horse, or a wolf in sheep’s clothing (deLeon, 1996).

Although actions can say a great deal about a person’s intentions, I do not study or conduct moral judgement on the policy entrepreneurs’ true motives. Psychoanalysis is not part of this study. A more fruitful approach is to better understand policy entrepreneurship by studying what policy entrepreneurs do since they are most clearly recognisable by their actions (Kingdon, 1984, 2002). Therefore, I will further operationalise the policy entrepreneurs’ strategies to set the agenda to better understand how policy entrepreneurship is put into action.

2.5 Agenda-setting strategies
The main activity of a policy entrepreneur is the employment of strategies aimed at making policy change happen, or preventing change from occurring, by setting the agenda. I regard strategies as courses of actions or sequences of moves available to a policy entrepreneur (cf. Brouwer, 2013, pp. 34-36; Scharpf, 1997, p. 7). This section offers various categorisations and typologies of strategies, and then presents my own conceptual distinctions.

Roberts and King (1991) discuss what policy entrepreneurs actually do in terms of advocating new ideas and developing proposals, defining and reframing problems, specifying policy alternatives, brokering ideas among policy actors, mobilising public opinion and helping to set the decision-making agenda. Inductively, based on their own empirical research, Roberts and King highlight various activities undertaken by policy entrepreneurs, including:

- idea generation activities
- problem framing activities
- dissemination activities
- strategic activities
- demonstration project activities
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Mintrom and Vergari (1996) and Mintrom and Norman (2009) discuss four elements central to policy entrepreneurship and corroborate these with types of strategies. They define these strategies as ‘displaying social acuity’ (seeking and recognising opportunities, and networking), ‘defining problems’ (framing and being socially perceptive), ‘building teams’ (coalition building) and ‘leading by example’ (having assertiveness and commitment). Based on Mintrom’s earlier work, Brouwer and Bierman (2011) argue that strategies can be grouped according to the following four categories:

1. ‘attention- and support-seeking strategies’ in order to demonstrate the significance of a problem and convince a wide range of participants about their preferred policy
2. ‘linking strategies’ because policy entrepreneurs are mostly unable to accomplish their objectives alone and thus link with other parties in coalitions, projects, ideas and policy games
3. ‘relational management strategies’ because the relational factor is critical in policy change trajectories
4. ‘arena strategies’ in order to influence the time and place in which policy entrepreneurs play their policy game.

Brouwer and Bierman (2011) state that, if these strategies are timed correctly, the development of policy streams and their coupling can, to some extent, be influenced and steered. Meijerink and Huitema (2010b) offer an alternative categorisation and distinguish between categories covering strategies for developing and disseminating new ideas within multi-level governance networks; building coalitions; anticipating, manipulating and exploiting windows of opportunities; connecting informal to formal networks; and exploiting, manipulating and/or creating venues.

Overall, although categories may differ, there is much overlap between these different categorisations of strategies. However, Roberts and King (1991) regard ‘strategic activities’ as part of a broader repertoire. As elaborated below, I view policy entrepreneurs’ strategies as central to policy entrepreneurs’ behaviour. All policy entrepreneurs’ activities, tactics or actions are strategic and aimed at setting the agenda and making policy change occur or preventing change from taking place. If there is one thing the policy entrepreneur could not do with a clear mind, it is acting not strategically.
Based on the above different categorisations of strategies, I distinguish between two broad sets of strategies to encompass them all: framing strategies and networking strategies. First, policy entrepreneurs use framing strategies to create what they believe to be a coherent, attractive and convincing framing of the problems at hand, and their deemed possible, desirable and feasible solutions. Second, through networking, these entrepreneurs try to mobilise people, gain support for their vision, and get their vision accepted and implemented. While the first relates to a discursive approach of policymaking that emphasises framing as an empowering instrument, the second emphasises the mobilisation of resources as an important asset of gaining influence on the agenda.

To attain a better understanding of both framing and networking strategies, I expanded my literature research beyond the scope of policy entrepreneurship studies. To discuss the various strategies, I employ the advantage of network theory (Börzel, 1998; Compston, 2009; Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997; Van Waarden, 1992) and post-positivist theoretical frameworks, such as social constructionism (Ingram, Schneider & deLeon, 2007; Yanow, 1996), discourse theory (Hajer, 1995; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Howarth, 2009) and the narrative policy framework (Jones & McBeth, 2010; McBeth, Shanahan, Arnell & Hathaway, 2007; Shanahan, Jones & McBeth, 2011; Van Eeten, 2007). These theoretical perspectives offer additional insight to the strategies employed by policy entrepreneurs, and agency in general, to set the agenda. Below, I first discuss various framing strategies, and then various networking strategies.

### 2.5.1 Framing strategies

Policy ideas can come from anywhere, are seldom totally new, and often originate from a recombination of known elements (Kingdon, 2002; Sheingate, 2003). Therefore, the critical issue to understand with ideas in policymaking ‘is not where the seed comes from, but what makes the soil fertile’ (Kingdon, 2002, p. 77). Policy entrepreneurs try to make the soil fertile by framing so that their ideas are considered seriously and gain agenda status (Princen, 2007; Rochefort & Cobb, 1993). Framing is regarded as the process through which producers and receivers of messages transform information into a meaningful whole or frame. It demonstrates the way actors link issues to suit their political purposes and visions of future policy directions (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Hence, framing is always influenced by the normative belief system and interests of policy entrepreneurs, and is therefore prone to rhetoric, emotion and manipulation. Policy entrepreneurs know that the skilful framing of an issue as a problem can create awareness, recognition and acknowledgement (Verduijn et al., 2012). It is not only the framing of a problem that can be regarded a strategy, but also the framing of the most effective ways of dealing with the perceived situations—that is, the best suitable solutions from the policy entrepreneurs’ perspective (Allison,
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1971; Birkland, 1998, 2004, 2008; Boin et al., 2009; Lowry, 2006; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Rochefort & Cobb, 1993; Schön & Rein, 1995; True et al., 2007). However, framing can also induce negative emotions, resistance and conflict (Boin et al., 2009; Mintrom & Norman, 2009). The goal for a policy entrepreneur is to ensure that the policy idea or frame he or she favours is adopted without too much opposition (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Stone, 2002; True et al., 2007).

The framing perspective is part of the discursive turn in the social sciences that has gained momentum since the mid-1990s (Dewulf et al., 2009; Dryzek, 1997; Fischer, 2003; Hajer, 1995; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). All these scholars affirm the constitutive role and pertinence of discourses and frames. While a Foucauldian approach emphasises the structuring character of largely hegemonic discourses, framing theories instead focus on the use, performance and effectiveness of deliberate discursive strategies of agency. The latter is mainly the case in policy sciences, where framing is looked on as one of the strategies agency can employ to either fix or alter frames.

In this study, the focus is on the notion of policy frames and framing. It defines framing as ‘to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (Entman, 1993, p. 52). I regard framing as a means for actors to interpret events, their causes and the responsibilities and lessons involved in ways that suit their political purposes and visions of future directions for policymaking. Hence, I do not focus here on ontological and epistemological discussions of discourses and frames (cf. Van den Brink, 2009), but on the way policy entrepreneurs seek to strategically promote a certain policy frame—including meanings given to a problem and its causes, moral evaluation and suggested solutions—while setting the agenda. Interestingly, in the current policy entrepreneurship literature, networking strategies are often elaborately discussed and empirically studied, while framing strategies are not (Brouwer, 2013; Brouwer & Biermann, 2011; Huijtema & Meijerink, 2009b; Mintrom & Norman, 2009). This is a knowledge gap that this study seeks to help fill. Distinguishing the various framing strategies, as discussed below, is the first step towards accomplishing this.

Narratives and stories

Narratives and stories have a constitutive role in policymaking, and are thus often used as framing strategies (Battilana et al., 2009; Fischer, 2003; Steen, 2009; Van der Stoep, 2014). There is no clear difference between what is understood as a narrative or a story; thus, I use them interchangeably (Dicke, 2001; Lejano, Ingram & Ingram, 2013). Stone (2002, pp. 138–145) distinguishes two types of policy narratives or stories: the first focuses on the ‘decline or crisis’, while the second emphasises the need for ‘social control’. The first portrays a situation
as a matter of fate, while the second asks for convincing stories and narratives that appeal for change through political or policy action.

Stories ‘help to identify both the responsible culprits and the virtuous saviours capable of leading us to high ground’ (Fischer, 2003, p. 169), while a storyline is ‘a generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific or social phenomena’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 56). Creating alternative and new narratives or stories, which are actually still linguistic constructions, helps convince an audience of the necessity of political action or policy implications. The primary function of these is that they suggest a unity on which people can rely. One can voice narratives and stories through using rhetoric, symbols and crisis exploitation. These strategies, as discussed in the next sections, help invigorate and spread the policy frame in an appealing manner, and gain support for a political or policy action (Fischer, 2003).

**Rhetoric**

Rhetoric is the art of persuading and influencing people through the use of spoken or written speech (cf. Corbett, 1990; The Free Dictionary, 2011). As such, rhetoric consists of structuring and presenting the arguments made (Gottweis, 2007). The arena in which rhetoric is used most obviously is politics (Riker, 1986), where it can be important in forging or disrupting political coalitions. Rhetoric used by politicians can resemble political manipulation, which has negative connotations (Riker, 1986, 1995; Schneider & Teske, 1992; Teske & Schneider, 1994). However, in itself, the art of rhetoric is a way of telling a story or making a point, regardless of any moral judgement. One could say that it depends on the verity of the content, the reliability of the storyteller, and the storyteller’s intended objective to determine whether the rhetorical strategies are used to inform and persuade, or deceive and manipulate. Howarth (2009) describes rhetoric as follows:

> Politicians use a variety of strategic devices to bring about favourable outcomes ... [I]nventing new actions and political practices that circumvent existing ones; framing and reframing the evaluation of outcomes by others so that actors can improve their prospects of achieving goals; altering the perceptions and character of individual preferences by various rhetorical operations and interventions; and so on. (pp. 318–319)

Examples of rhetorical devices include the use of metaphors (Fischer, 2003; Stone, 2002) via implied comparisons, understanding and presenting one kind of thing in terms of another, and visual means. They also include presenting situations as trade-offs, in which one thing must be decreased for another to be increased. Other rhetorical devices present situations as paradoxes via statements that appear contradictory or absurd, yet may be true (Stone, 2002). As
aforementioned, rhetoric can support narratives or stories in spoken or written speech.

Symbols
Symbols may be helpful in communicating and gaining support for a specific frame. A symbol can be defined as ‘anything that stands for something else’ (Stone, 2002, p. 137). A symbol’s meaning is not intrinsic; meaning is invested in a symbol by those who use it—its meaning is created socially and is thus dependent on how people understand it. An important feature of symbols is their potential ambiguity, since they can refer to more than one thing at the same time (Stone, 2002). As Yanow (1996) states, ‘the power of symbols lies in their potential to accommodate multiple meanings. Different individuals, different groups, may interpret the same symbol differently’ (p. 9). Symbols unite those who share meaning and create distance from those who do not, thus facilitating both identification and demarcation. Symbols can also be used to reduce complex issues into more comprehensible forms (McBeth et al., 2007).

Another possible use of symbols is to characterise opponents of a policy issue. For example, losing groups can benefit from negatively portraying both the issue and the opponents through the use of symbols—or even narratives, storylines and rhetoric (Lejano et al., 2013; McBeth et al., 2007; Stone, 2002). Alternatively, artefacts or physical objects may be used as symbols to represent the frame, problem or solution perception of a specific group. For example, a country’s flag is an object or artefact because it represents similarity and unity, while also creating a difference between countries. Hajer (1995) analyses the politics of the acid rain controversy and notes that the physical phenomenon of dead fish and dying trees were developed into a symbol for the state and pollution of the environment around the world. The acid rain controversy also became emblematic of the discussion between the ecological modernisation discourse and the traditional paradigmatic discourse, both of which framed the acid rain issue differently (Hajer, 1995). These examples illustrate that symbols can also be subject to discussions between advocates of different narratives or stories.

One must keep in mind that symbols—and narratives and stories—provide not only a means to unite or demarcate issues or people, but also enable the synchronisation and transformation of diverse individual motivations, expectations and values into broad bases of support and collective action (Stone, 2002, pp. 157–162). Thus, there is a link here with what later will be discussed as coalition building because, as Stone (2002) argues, ‘symbols allow coalitions where pure material interests would divide people’ (p. 161).

Framing crises and focusing events
Crises are some of the most promising opportunities for advancing policy ideas, and are regarded the most important driver for radical
change (Sabatier, 2007). Crises are ‘events or developments widely perceived by members of relevant communities to constitute urgent threats to core community values and structures’ (Boin et al., 2009, pp. 83–84). A ‘focusing’ event is described as:

an event that is sudden, relatively rare, can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harm, inflicts harm or suggests potential harm that are or could be concentrated on a definable geographical area or community of interest, and that is known to policy makers and the public virtually simultaneously. (Birkland, 1998, as cited in Birkland, 2004, p. 181)

A crisis or focusing event (terms that can be used interchangeably) may create or trigger a ‘window of opportunity’ by dramatically highlighting policy failures (to which governments or other institutions might respond) and provide opportunities for policy learning, or for issues to gain attention and move up the agenda (Boin et al., 2009; Kingdon, 1984, 2002; Lowry, 2006; Wiering & Immink, 2006). As indicated before, this opening of windows creates an opportunity for change agents to link problems and solutions and push certain policy plans. Policy entrepreneurs who seek change try to foresee and exploit the opening of a window and stimulate institutional attention for an issue when no other actors are exploiting the event to raise attention. However, as Kingdon (1984, 2002) states, crises do not automatically equate to policy change. If an event is not picked up by agency—such as to highlight policy failures—to pressure the current policy frame, policy change is unlikely. In this situation, a possible strategy for policy entrepreneurs is to use the crisis as part of rhetoric persuasion or as a symbol that supports a story or narrative. For that reason, crises and focusing events are also prone to rhetoric and ‘framing contests’ (Boin et al., 2009).

Engaging in framing contests
Framing contests are introduced to explain the discursive game that often occurs in the aftermath of a crisis because crises often generate a contest between frames and counter-frames concerning the nature and severity of a crisis, its causes, the responsibilities involved and the implications for the future (Boin et al., 2009). Actors manipulate and fight to have their frame accepted as the dominant narrative in response to the crisis, because a crisis always entails some disturbance of governance as usual. People who want to change the status quo try to defend and strengthen their positions and authority in order to attract or deflect public attention so they can remove old policies and sow the seeds of new ones.
The perceptions of crisis are likely to vary both among and within communities, reflecting the different biases of stakeholders as a result of their different values, positions and responsibilities (Boin et al., 2009). Boin et al. (2009) demonstrate that crises, and all other kinds of windows of opportunity, do not provide sufficient conditions for policy change to occur. Much depends on the way actors interpret, frame and react to crises. Framing and blaming within the framing contest can be a useful tool for critics to focus or absolve blame and for politicians or civil servants in office to accept or deny responsibility. Within the framing contest, it can be useful for status quo players to resist or contain policy change, and for change agents to press for a policy paradigm shift or incremental reform.

**Aligning frames**
While frame contests directly relate to crises, this does not mean that crises are the sole possible cause for framing contests. For example, Benford and Snow (2000) discuss frame contests and disputes as being part of the discursive struggles over frame alignment, in their case, within and between social movement organisations (Benford, 1993; Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow, Rochford, Worden & Benford, 1986).

‘Frame alignment’ is explained as a means and necessary condition to mobilise society. Benford and Snow (2000) distinguish four types of frame alignment: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation.

‘Frame bridging’ is defined as the linking of ‘two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624). ‘Frame amplification’ is ‘the idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624). ‘Frame extension’ is described as the effort to extend the frame beyond primary interests to incorporate issues and concerns that are presumed to be important to potential supporters. If frames do not sufficiently resonate with others, ‘frame transformation’ may be required by changing old understandings and meanings or generating new ones to secure the involvement and support of others (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 625).

With respect to this discussion on the alignment of frames, it is interesting to note that the winning actors would most likely try to restrict the participation or involvement of others. This is defined as ‘issue containment’ and is undertaken by limiting the ‘scope of conflict’. In contrast, the losing actors would try to expand the participation and involvement of others, which is defined as issue expansion (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; Birkland, 2011, pp. 177, 186; McBeth et al., 2007, p. 89; Schattschneider, 1960; Sharp, 1994).

We already note here the relationship and overlap between framing and networking strategies. The issues of containment and expansion go alongside the limiting and broadening of participation and in-
volvement of others in agenda setting. When conducting the empirical analysis of this study, it is important to be aware of disputes, contests or struggles over conflicting policy frames, not only as a reaction to an event or a crisis, but also as a part of the ongoing dynamic process of developing and aligning frames. Additionally, one needs to realise that there inevitably is overlap between both the framing and networking strategies, as discussed below.

2.5.2 Networking strategies
Next to framing strategies, networking strategies are crucial to successfully set the agenda because agenda setting is dynamic and embedded in complex multi-level governance networks. Hence, while policy entrepreneurs are often portrayed as individualists, loners or mavericks (deLeon, 1996), they tend to operate within teams, groups, coalitions or networks because they need to gain support and coordinate their activities aimed at setting the agenda (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2012; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Oborn et al., 2011; Olsson et al., 2006; Roberts, 1998; Roberts & King, 1991; Schlager, 2007). Since ‘there are limitations to what policy entrepreneurs can do on their own’ (Roberts & King, 1991, p. 172) networking and bringing together likeminded actors can open up access to the necessary resources—including physical, juridical, financial and knowledge resources—required in the policy entrepreneurs’ risk-taking pursuit for change (Roberts & King, 1991; Zahariadis, 2007). Policy processes are rarely dominated by a single actor, with multiple actors usually involved (Kingdon, 2002; Roberts & King, 1991). Therefore, entrepreneurs need to forge coalitions with other groups and organisations in order to expand their societal support and bundle the expertise, access and resources of others. In order for policy entrepreneurs to gain influence, they must be involved in managing networks, building coalitions and exploiting venues to acquire the resources needed to advocate ideas and anticipate resistance from others during agenda setting. These three types of networking strategies are discussed below.

Managing networks
Policy entrepreneurs must develop strategies to present their ideas to others. For this reason, they often spend large amounts of time networking in and around different arenas of decision making (Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). Networking enables policy entrepreneurs to understand and anticipate the preferences and worries of other actors. Additionally, it helps policy entrepreneurs shape their arguments to make them convincing and compelling to potential supporters. Through networking, policy entrepreneurs also increase their visibility in policy-making circles, which can be important in building a trustworthy and credible reputation (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). Therefore, policy entrepreneurs invest great effort in relational management and building trust with other actors in a network (Brouwer & Biermann, 2011).
There are many different types of networks. They can be:

- loosely or strongly connected
- homogenously or heterogeneously composed
- ad hoc formed or historically path dependent
- informal or formal
- open or closed to newcomers
- transparent and open, or closed
- comprised of participants with a high or low level of commitment
- emerging, stable or deteriorating (Compston, 2009; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Kickert et al., 1997; Van Waarden, 1992).

It is argued that, without some minimal agreement about what the main policy problems are and how to solve them, networks cannot function (Fischer, 2003, p. 33). After an extensive survey of network concepts, Börzel (1998) concludes that:

they all share a common understanding, a minimal or lowest common denominator definition of a policy network, as a set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals. (p. 254)

Networks may offer a stepping-stone to creating a coalition. Through networking, policy entrepreneurs can gather reliable resources relatively easily and efficiently and seek support to create a coalition (Fischer, 2003). A coalition is ‘characterised by an (implicit) agreement on particular policy ideas or objectives, either because coalition members share similar beliefs or because they are mutually dependent’ (Huitema & Meijerink, 2010, p. 6). In general, networks are much bigger than coalitions, and network members do not necessarily share a common policy idea or primary objective (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Weible, 2007b). One could say that every coalition is also a network, but not vice versa. In short, networks and network management offer opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to build coalitions with other individuals, groups and organisations who share similar beliefs or are mutually dependent.

**Coalition building**

Meijerink and Huitema (2009b) distinguish three types of coalitions. The first type is comprised of those who share certain ideas, beliefs and convictions related to any particular discipline (such as environmental coalitions). The main activity is the advocacy of a particular set of ideas. Ways of knowing (Feldman & Ingram, 2009), sets of story lines (Hajer, 1995), narratives (Lejano et al., 2013) or core and policy
beliefs (Sabatier, 1988) are the binding element that holds all pieces together in a relatively coherent manner. The second type of coalition is a strategic alliance between those who do not necessarily share the same ways of knowing, set of storylines, narratives or core and policy beliefs, but share the same interest. Sometimes policy entrepreneurs manage to convince others who do not necessarily share interests that what will occur is in their interest. This can involve persuading others to accept that the policy entrepreneurs’ vision will serve the others’ (possibly narrow) interests (Fligstein, 2001, p. 114). Therefore, strategic alliances can easily result in what could be called ‘coalitions of convenience’, consisting of actors who may initially seem to have diverging interests, but manage to find common interests (Meijerink, 2005; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Simmons et al., 2011). In these cases, a policy entrepreneur could ask another person or group not to get married, but just to have one last dance (Simmons et al., 2011). The third type of coalition is the primarily resource-dependent coalition. These coalitions involve parties who do not share a binding element, but are dependent on each other to realise (possibly diverging) objectives.

From a policy entrepreneurial perspective, I regard coalition building of primary importance to expand resources (physical, juridical, monetary and knowledge) and gain support for the policy entrepreneurs’ objective. This can be a delicate matter because coalition building is both inclusive and exclusive to actors, and policy entrepreneurs need to decide whom to include and exclude. Who is in and out at certain stages of the policymaking process highly influences the resources and tools available. In addition, the number of participants is important for gaining influence—the more actors involved, the harder it is to gain significant influence within the coalitions; however, if consensus is reached, greater external influence is possible (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2001). The type of actors involved is also of importance because actors with political influence can help change decision making more directly than actors outside the formal arena (Roberts, 1998).

Central to this are resources because the more resources a coalition possesses, the more power the coalition has, and the greater its capacity to set the agenda and change policies or prevent change from occurring. Coalition building also involves formulating a joint goal with potential coalition members and thus negotiating interests and stakes (Sabatier & Weible, 2007b). Policy entrepreneurs most likely aim to gain on certain points, and will need to give in on others. Therefore, policy entrepreneurs and individual actors often manoeuvre and balance between advocacy and brokerage (Kingdon, 1984, 2002). They need to create consensus within a coalition to keep the focus on the ‘preferred’ direction. However, they also need to create linkages with potential coalition members or related coalitions and expand issues. Coalitions or strategic alliances could be made by linking to other issues (Brouwer, 2013; Cobb et al., 1976; Princen & Rhinard, 2006). A policy entrepreneur could create linkages with other problems or
solutions, anticipating that this will generate more attention and mobilise societal and political support for the issue at stake (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; McBeth et al., 2007; Sharp, 1994).

Issue linking may also help break or realign existing coalitions (Sabatier & Weible, 2007b). Double success may be reached if several issues or problems are linked to each other because, if successfully employed, multiple problems might be placed on the agenda simultaneously and generate a win-win situation (Brouwer, 2013). Every coalition partner has some stake in its participation, and will try to gain from the cooperation. However, trying to achieve a win-win situation may lead to stagnation, delay, conflicts and polarisation if a consensus or agreement cannot be reached. A policy entrepreneur can also redefine issues by reducing or substituting linkages to redundant issues to gain a better focus on the main objective of the policy entrepreneur and/or the coalition (Cobb et al., 1976), which I earlier discussed in terms of issue expansion versus issue containment (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; Birkland, 2011, pp. 177, 186; McBeth et al., 2007, p. 89; Schattschneider, 1960; Sharp, 1994). To negotiate consensus within a coalition policy, entrepreneurs sometimes need to contain issues by dropping ideas that could damage their overall goal or relationships and interests, without losing sight of their own primary objectives.

What must be emphasised here is the obvious connection of issue linkage with the notion of frame alignment. Frame alignment, just as issue linkage for coalition building, is a means to attain support from others and possibly cooperate in larger groups. The idea is to bring people together who share similar views, which may mean issue linking or frame bridging, amplifying, extending or transforming. Hence, here one can again see the overlap between framing and networking strategies, as it is believed that framing may enable policy entrepreneurs to make their policy idea or concept relevant to potential supporters and coalition partners.

**Venue exploitation**

Part of networking is the exploitation of different venues—also described as ‘venue exploitation’ (Huijema & Meijerink, 2010; Pralle, 2003; True et al., 2007). This can be divided into venue shopping, venue manipulation and venue creation (Huijema & Meijerink, 2010). With venue shopping, policy actors seek out and attend the most favourable venues to further their issue (Pralle, 2003; True et al., 2007), since agenda setting is undertaken at various venues, each providing different opportunities to particular groups. Thus, policy entrepreneurs will seek out venues at different levels that are most relevant for them to influence the public, policy or politics (Richardson, 2000). Venues can also be manipulated to push forward personal policy ideas at a relevant venue or to air grievances with current policy (Pralle, 2003; Princen & Kerremans, 2008).

Policy entrepreneurs can also create their own venues to sell their
ideas, such as through pilot or demonstration projects and via creating and using symbols (Huitema & Meijerink, 2010; Lovell, 2009). As persuasion is crucial for gaining support, pilot projects can be used to promote innovative ideas in an attractive manner through the policy entrepreneurs’ chosen venue. To prevent a sprawl of shadow networks or alternative venues over which the government has no influence, the government sometimes publicly experiments with settling its own venues (Olsson et al., 2006). Public, private and state actors are invited to interact and discuss policy ideas. Of course, the government hopes this will help create synergy of knowledge and perspectives, thereby leading to possible consensus, support and legitimacy regarding future governmental decisions.

2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has offered a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of the case studies. It has explained the agency perspective taken in this research, and outlined agenda setting, policy entrepreneurship and the framing and networking strategies that can be employed by policy entrepreneurs in their pursuit of setting agendas and either realising or preventing policy change.

In this study, policy entrepreneurs are actors who advocate and strategically seek to change or oppose policy by setting the agenda. The agenda-setting process is highly complex and dynamic; therefore, entrepreneurs need certain skills and motivations to persevere in this risk-taking and demanding venture. Framing strategies can be employed by policy entrepreneurs to raise awareness of perceptions of the issue at stake. By networking, policy entrepreneurs also aim to gather resources because people are stronger together than they are alone. Public and political support is deemed crucial to setting the agenda. The above theoretical review has also made clear that policy entrepreneurs never operate in isolation and thus need to be aware of their context in order to successfully navigate agenda setting. The next chapter presents and explicates the methodical approach used in this study.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
‘There is one thing even more vital to science than intelligent methods; and that is, the sincere desire to find out the truth, whatever it may be.’

Charles Sanders Peirce
Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology

Figure 3.1: Map overview of selected cases:
1: Second Delta Committee
2: Nature Development
3: Almere’s Urban Development
4: Wind Park Noordoostpolder.

Legend

- Village/City
- Province
- Main waterway
- IJsselmeer and Markermeer-IJmeer

Figure 3.1: Map overview of selected cases:
3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the research design and accounts for the choice made to study policy entrepreneurs and their strategies to set the agenda in the IJsselmeer area. As indicated in the first chapter, the main aim of this study is to gain a better understanding of the strategies used by policy entrepreneurs to advocate or oppose policy change by setting the agenda. The methods chosen to study policy entrepreneurship must be ‘shaped to the specifics of the research subjects and their contexts’ (Mintrom & Norman, 2009, p. 661). As explained below, this research considers an in-depth case study approach best to stay close to the policy entrepreneurs within the context of the Dutch IJsselmeer area and better understand their strategies to set the agenda. After discussing the case study approach, this chapter presents the cases selection criteria and the selected four cases. It then accounts for the qualitative data collection methods used to analyse the cases, and concludes with a short outline of the four empirical chapters.

3.2 Case study approach
The case study approach is a research method that, at least within social sciences, is gaining credibility and becoming more commonly used (Flyvbjerg, 2008, 2011; Mahoney, 2007; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006; Yin, 1981, 2009). Case studies are generally the preferred research method when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are posed, an in-depth description and analysis is desired, the researcher has little control over the events, and the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context (Yin, 2009, p. 3). All these conditions apply to this research because it aims to understand how policy entrepreneurs try to set the agenda, and an in-depth description and analysis of policy entrepreneurship is sought. Further, there is no ambition to control or influence policy entrepreneurs in any kind of real-life or artificial setting. Finally, the focus is on the contemporary phenomenon of policy entrepreneurship in the real-life context of the IJsselmeer area.

A case study is defined as ‘an intensive study of a single unit where the purpose of that study is—at least in part—to shed light on a larger class of units’ (Gerring, 2004, p. 342, 2007, p. 20). According to Gerring (2007), the amount of cases is just a matter of degree. Both large-N case studies and small-N case studies have the potential to explain social phenomena. However, there is a difference in methodological design when comparing large-N or small-N cases. Obviously, for large-N case studies, it is often better and more feasible to use data collection methods that produce a lot of quantitative data, such as surveys and statistics. In contrast, when seeking to gain a more in-depth insight via small-N case studies, it is better to use data-collection methods that produce qualitative data, such as face-to-face interviewing and document analysis. Gerring (2007) states, ‘The fewer cases there are, and the more intensively they are studied, the more a work merits the appellation “case study”’ (p. 20). Of course, in comparison, ‘the
more case studies one has, the less intensively each one is studied’ (Gerring, 2007, p. 21).

By conducting a few case studies, this study aims to produce a ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1994) of the policy process and the policy entrepreneurial strategies aimed at changing policy. A detailed and empirically rich description of the case studies will help understand, analyse and possibly explain the dynamics of agenda setting and the role and function of change agency in the IJsselmeer context (Flyvbjerg, 2008). Hence, I want to gain insight into empirical ‘traces’ of policy entrepreneurs’ strategies leading to agenda setting (Bennett & Elman, 2006; Blatter & Blume, 2008; Gerring, 2007). This means that I not only want to understand and identify policy entrepreneurs responsible for employing their strategies and setting the agenda, but I also try to analyse how this policy change process can be explained and generalised (Mahoney, 2007). While the option existed to conduct a single case study, multiple cases enable cross-case analysis (Yin, 2009, p. 156).

By conducting multiple case studies and aggregating and synthesising the findings on the strategies employed by policy entrepreneurs, I may be able to generalise to a ‘larger class of units’ than the context of the case studies themselves—that is, to improve external validity (Blatter & Blume, 2008; Gerring, 2007). However, it must be stressed that external validity via cross-case comparison is not the primary goal of this study, as it would not have been sufficient to undertake a qualitative case study with few cases. A quantitative cross-case analysis between a large sample of different cases would better serve that purpose (Gerring, 2007).

3.3 Case selection
One of the biggest challenges of conducting case studies is to identify the unit of analysis and select the relevant cases (Collier & Mahoney, 1996; Mahoney, 2007; Seawright & Gerring, 2008). The object of the study in this research is policy entrepreneurship in the IJsselmeer area aimed at setting the agenda for policy change or preventing change from happening, which makes the criteria for selecting cases relatively straightforward. I identified two main criteria for selecting the cases.

First, I selected typical cases (Gerring, 2007; Seawright & Gerring, 2008) that concerned the IJsselmeer area. This was partly due to the funder of this research project, New Land Heritage Centre,
which wants to gain a better understanding of the historical, current and possible future developments in the IJsselmeer area. It is also in its interest to make the knowledge and insights produced by this research understandable, applicable and accessible to citizens and the organisation’s governmental, private and societal partners. While I acknowledge that any other area could have been chosen to study policy entrepreneurship, the IJsselmeer area is of particular interest. As the introductory chapter revealed, the IJsselmeer area has undergone a unique transformation in the last 100 years. The history of the area can be characterised by continued innovation and change, as it has always been a nursery for newly emerging ideas, and a space for all kinds of actors advocating plans regarding land reclamation, water management, spatial planning, architecture, agriculture, socialisation, nature development and so forth (Van der Ham, 2007). This makes it an interesting unit of analysis for studying the role of policy entrepreneurs in setting the agenda. In sum, I regarded a substantive link to the IJsselmeer area as one of my conditions for selecting cases, and, because it is a geographical area, it made sense to select cases that had a potential spatial effect on the landscape.

Second, I selected cases in which policy entrepreneurs were important in the process of setting the agenda for policy change or preventing change from happening. Thus, cases had to show the process of agenda setting with the involvement of policy entrepreneurs. However, I did not a priori dismiss issues that were in the process of implementation because the theoretical review of theories on agenda setting already revealed that even policy plans being implemented can be blocked, cancelled or again put on the agenda. This happened with Plan Lely, since one of Lely’s projected polders—the Markerwaard—was never created, and the implementation had been on and off the agenda numerous times (Goverde, 1987). Thus, in the real-life context, the policy process does not need to follow a linear process of sequential stages, and agenda setting can continue to occur even after implementation. Therefore, while focusing on the influence of policy entrepreneurs’ strategies on agenda setting, plans that are being implemented are not disregarded—if policy entrepreneurs have been involved in agenda setting. The following sections account for the four cases selected based on the aforementioned two criteria.

3.4 Four cases
Given the two criteria for selecting cases, I took a very open-minded and flexible approach to selecting cases. To attain an idea of which issues showed potential for further research, explorative interviews were conducted with people familiar with the area and the topics of interest. Additionally, some public events were attended to determine the most important issues in the IJsselmeer area (see the next section). This also helped assess whether cases would fit the above criteria. Subsequently, the following four cases were selected.
The first selected case was the Second Delta Committee—an ad hoc advisory board installed by the Dutch Cabinet in 2007. This committee, which is viewed as a single policy entrepreneur, employed policy entrepreneurial strategies to set the agenda for climate change adaptation in Dutch water management. An important spinoff of the Delta Committee is the Delta Programme, which regards the IJsselmeer area as an important freshwater reservoir for drinking water, industries and agriculture. In the anticipation of climate adaptation, which is to include longer periods of drought and more periods of intensive rainfall—leading to higher river water discharge—the function of the IJsselmeer area is likely to become even more important than it currently is. This is caused in part by the very successful agenda setting of the Delta Committee. Some of the recommendations presented by the committee have already been implemented, or are currently being implemented.

The second case concerns a change in Dutch nature policy. In the 1990s, after a long tradition of nature preservation, Dutch nature policy moved to a new policy concept called ‘nature development’. A relatively small group of policy entrepreneurs played a crucial role in realising this change. They believe nature should not be preserved, but restored through the facilitation of natural processes, and should not refer to a pre-industrial stage from the mid-nineteenth century, but to a pre-human era. A prime example of the type of nature development advocated by this group of policy entrepreneurs is found in the nature area of Oostvaardersplassen, which is part of the IJsselmeer area. As will be explained later, developments in the Oostvaardersplassen played an important role in the agenda setting of the concept of nature development. The case offers an example of mainly successful agenda setting. However, while some of the nature development ideas presented by these policy entrepreneurs have already been implemented or are being implemented, others have been cancelled.

The third case focuses on plans to create an infrastructural connection between the cities of Almere and Amsterdam, and to build houses outer dike in the Markermeer-IJmeer. As the youngest and fastest growing city of the Netherlands, Almere has become important in Dutch spatial planning. The ambition for Almere has become to accommodate the growing Dutch population by creating 60,000 houses and 100,000 work places for 160,000 people, within a few decades (Urgentieprogramma Randstad, 2007). Almere is willing to accommodate this because city development, like outer-dike urbanisation with an infrastructural connection, could serve as an opportunity to give Almere the socio-economic boost it requires. I found four policy entrepreneurs advocating these plans or opting for alternatives to the infrastructural connection. However, the plan for the outer-dike urbanisation and infrastructural connection are being planned in the protected waters of the Markermeer-IJmeer. Hence, I found two policy entrepreneurs employing strategies to block this change and
preserve the Markermeer-IJmeer as it is, as an open landscape. As of 2014, no final decision has been made on the outer-dike development or infrastructural connection between Almere and Amsterdam. This case study offers an example of non-decision making and continued agenda setting without clear winners and losers.

The fourth case concentrates on the plans for the largest onshore wind park in the Netherlands, located in the Noordoostpolder. During the 1990s, farmers in the Noordoostpolder became enthusiastic about wind energy and, over the years, joined together to develop plans for a large wind turbine park along the dikes of the Noordoostpolder. While many actors are in favour of the plans for the wind park, including the local, regional and national government, opposition started to increase in 2008 when the plan was discussed in the national news headlines. I found two groups of policy entrepreneurs with various backgrounds trying to hinder the policy process and stop the realisation of the wind park. Despite this opposition, the proponents succeeded in having their plan accepted for implementation, and the construction of the wind park began in early 2012.

The above description of the four selected cases demonstrates that they all match the criteria stated in the previous section. All cases have a spatial connection to the IJsselmeer area and (potentially) affect the landscape. Further, all cases show policy entrepreneurs trying to leave their mark on agenda setting. The cases provide examples of policy entrepreneurs—both advocates and opponents of policy change—who try to set the agenda with various successes and failures. As indicated in the previous chapter, this study does not systematically operationalise and analyse the various contexts; however, it does take them into account. The cases reveal that the policy entrepreneurs’ context may offer different constraints and opportunities to set the agenda effectively or successfully. Notions of ‘effective’ or ‘successful’ employment of agenda-setting strategies are used interchangeably. Below, the qualitative data collection and analysis methods are presented.

3.5 Qualitative data collection and analysis

The present study is a qualitative research entailing qualitative data analysis. Boeije (2009) describes qualitative research as follows:

> The purpose of a qualitative research is to describe and understand social phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them. The research questions are studied through methods enabling contact with the people involved to an extent that is necessary to grasp what is going on in the field. (p. 11)

In line with this description of qualitative research, I was most interested in understanding—and, where possible, explaining—policy entrepreneurship by analysing how policy entrepreneurs employ strategies to set the agenda for policy change in which they do or do not believe.
I did not place myself in a position to judge whether, for instance, a certain framing perspective is credible or not, and thus whether the wind park should or should not be constructed. However, this does not mean that people—particularly the respondents—did not care about my judgement, with more than one respondent trying to win me over to their cause. Apparently, academics are regarded as credible and important potential supporters.

To analyse the policy entrepreneurs’ perspective and gain more in-depth understanding of what was occurring, I used a multiple, mixed, qualitative data collection model. My data collection methods included semi-structured in-depth interviews, newspaper analysis and document analysis. First, by using various data sources, I aimed to increase what Yin (2009) calls ‘construct validity’ (p. 116). A multiple data collection method gave me the opportunity to cross-verify the data—for example, whether what was said during an interview was supported by official written policy documents, and, conversely, whether what I understood from the documents was supported by the respondents’ interpretations. Such a data collection method is called ‘data triangulation’ because of the various data sources consulted, and ‘methodological triangulation’ because of the multiple methods used in this study (Yin, 2009, p. 116).

Second, by using multiple and complementary sources of data, lines of enquiry can converge. This process of triangulation and corroboration may strengthen arguments made by respondents. It also proves interesting to find any discrepancy between sources of evidence—for example, when a statement made in an interview does not corroborate with what is found in policy documents. If that was the case, I chose to make this discrepancy clear by showing the sources of evidence. Again, it was not my goal to resolve conflicts, but rather to gain in-depth knowledge and understanding of the different perspectives and strategies employed, especially when empirical data offer examples of a framing contest. The following section accounts for the data collection methods used in this research.

3.5.1 Semi-structured interviews
To attain an initial broad understanding of the history of the IJsselmeer area and the current sensitive topics being discussed, I attended public events and conducted six informative and open interviews with experts from knowledge institutes and government agencies. These events and interviews helped better grasp the current sensitive topics and suitable cases for this research. Later, to gather further empirical data about each case, semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with an interview guide. The interview guide was based on a first theoretical operationalisation of the issue at stake and its history, the policy entrepreneurs involved, the strategies employed, the agenda-setting process, and the institutional context relevant to the case study. These interview topics helped provide insights to the
policy entrepreneurs and their strategies to set the agenda within their respective contexts.

Since every new interview—and the data in general—provided me with additional insights to the case, I remained flexible with regard to case-specific subtopics discussed during interviews, while never losing sight of my research focus. To give one example, during the data collection of the Almere case, I found many interesting data about the personal characteristics of both Verhorst and Duivesteijn. I saw the potential to conduct a more detailed study of the personal characteristics of policy entrepreneurs, and some of my interview questions were subsequently focused in that direction. However, for the reasons discussed in the previous chapter, I decided not to include a thorough analysis of the policy entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics. Conducting research is an iterative process providing considerable opportunities for learning.

The selection of the respondents reflected the iterative nature of conducting research. The respondents were selected for a number of reasons. Some were chosen because I kept reading or hearing their names in the media or at various events, and I noted them as potential policy entrepreneurs. Other respondents were suggested to me during the open informative interviews or other interviews. I would always compare suggested respondents with my own list that I had made beforehand. Ultimately, I always made my own assessment of the usefulness or added value of a potential respondent, and would either follow up a lead or leave it be. As described below, not all respondents were policy entrepreneurs, but were people who could provide additional insights to the strategies employed by the policy entrepreneurs, the agenda-setting process, the context and so forth.

The length of the interviews varied from 30 minutes to 2.5 hours. I conducted as many interviews as I deemed necessary to understand the policy dynamics and entrepreneurial strategies. A general rule of the thumb was that sufficient interviews were conducted when, as researcher, I kept receiving the same information repeatedly. The interviews also had a snow-balling effect and proved helpful to gain access to other relevant data, such as documents, policies, reports and hints for contacting new interesting respondents (as discussed above). The respondents were always directly approached by me, via either telephone or email, with a request for an interview. All interviews were conducted at a location convenient for the respondent, and one interview was conducted via telephone. If a respondent gave approval, I recorded the interview. I made notes during the interviews to help me remember and interpret what was being said and meant, and compare it with my theoretical concepts. The recordings and notes also helped
me use quotations during the empirical analysis. I ensured anonymity and did not include the names of the respondents in the text or as a list in the appendix. All respondents were numbered and referred to with codes such as ‘R11’. Since I also conducted a newspaper analysis, I was also able to use quotations from newspaper articles. These quotations are more easily accessible to readers and often better formulated than interview quotations; therefore, I preferred using these quotations than the quotations from the interviews. Draft versions of the empirical chapters were sent to the interviewed policy entrepreneurs in order to check for factual mistakes or misinterpretations on my behalf. In some instances, this led to minor factual revisions.

For the case study on the Second Delta Committee, I based my analysis of the framing strategies on a content analysis of the report and media utterances of the committee and newspaper articles. To gain a better understanding of the networking strategies, I used research on the Second Delta Committee conducted by my colleagues, Boezeman and Vink, in various studies (Boezeman, Vink & Leroy, 2013; Vink, Boezeman, Dewulf & Termeer, 2013). They conducted nine interviews with the people directly involved in the work of the Delta Committee; therefore, I used their work and interviewed one of the authors, Daan Boezeman, to validate the overall conclusions I drafted, especially on the networking strategies.

For the case study on nature development, I worked with my colleague, Huub Ploegmakers, who had undertaken previous research and held eight interviews with various policy entrepreneurs and advocates of nature development (Ploegmakers, 2008). Together, we conducted an interview with one of the policy entrepreneurs to update the findings and insights. I also conducted two interviews with experts on nature development.

For the case study on Almere, I conducted 20 interviews with experts and key people, such as stakeholder representatives, policymakers, governors, aldermen and a member of the Almere City Council. Some of these respondents were policy entrepreneurs. The interviews were held to identify the policy entrepreneurs who, from different perspectives and during several stages, had strategically attempted to set the agenda. Additionally, the interviews helped offer insight to the strategies employed by these policy entrepreneurs. Apart from one policy entrepreneur, Duivesteijn, who was unwilling to provide an interview, I interviewed all the policy entrepreneurs discussed.

For the case study on the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, I conducted 16 interviews with experts and key people, such as stakeholder representatives, policymakers, governors and politicians. Some of these respondents were policy entrepreneurs. I interviewed all policy entrepreneurs discussed in this case study.

To summarise, I used seven transcripts of interviews conducted by a colleague, and conducted a total of 46 interviews myself.
3.5.2 Newspaper analysis
Alongside conducting interviews, I analysed newspaper articles. I searched all digitally available articles from Lexis Nexis—the Dutch database for newspaper articles. Lexis Nexis sources range from daily national newspapers to less frequently distributed local newspapers with a digitally available archive. I searched this database with different search criteria, depending on the issue at stake in each case, and allowed Lexis Nexis to leave out duplicate news articles. I analysed all articles based on my theoretical framework, sought examples of framing and networking strategies employed by the policy entrepreneurs involved, and marked all relevant passages and quotations throughout the articles. I then aggregated all highlighted text to find patterns, construct the policy process, and understand the policy entrepreneurs’ strategies.

For the case study on the Second Delta Committee, I searched for newspaper articles on this committee and selected articles containing the Dutch word ‘deltacommissie’, meaning ‘Delta Committee’, from LexisNet. This resulted in 179 newspaper articles ranging from September 2008, the presentation of the committee’s report, until October 2010, the time of conducting the analysis.

The initial plan for the media analysis of the case study on nature development was to focus on robust green corridors; however, this gave data that were too limited to gain in-depth insight to the policy entrepreneurial strategies. Therefore, I decided to approach the case study differently and focus on the most important advocates of nature development, the authors of the influential ‘Plan Stork’ (De Bruin et al., 1986) and their ideas on nature development. Hence, I searched LexisNet with the key words ‘natuur’ (nature) or ‘natuurontwikkeling’ (nature development), conjoined with the names of the policy entrepreneurs behind nature development: Frans Vera, Fred Baerselman, Dick de Bruin, Dirk Sijmons, Willem Overmars and Dick Hamhuis. This search resulted in a total of 392 newspaper articles available in July 2012 (the time of conducting the analysis) and provided sufficient data to study policy entrepreneurship on nature development.

After a first exploration of the issues at stake for the case study of Almere, three topics clearly emerged: an up-scaling of Almere by outer-dike urbanisation and creating an infrastructural connection between Amsterdam and Almere, alternative ideas on the infrastructural connection, and keeping the Markermeer-IJmeer open as it currently is. A search with keywords including ‘ijmeer’, ‘ijland’ (island in the Markermeer-IJmeer), ‘ijmeerverbinding’ (infrastructural connection), ‘schaalsprong’ (boost) and ‘Almere buitendijks’ (outer-dike Almere) resulted in over 1,000 newspaper articles. After an initial scan, I found six policy entrepreneurs and used the above keywords conjoined with their names to further specify the search for newspaper articles. These policy entrepreneurs were Manja Verhorst, Michael van der Vlis, Jerome Adema, Klaas Breunissen, Arie-Willem Bijl and Adri Duivesteijn.
A total of 269 articles available in October 2012 (the time of conducting the analysis) were selected and included in the analysis.

For the case study on the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, I searched for newspaper articles containing ‘windpark Noordoostpolder’ (wind park Noordoostpolder) or ‘windmolenpark Noordoostpolder’ (windmill farm Noordoostpolder). The search resulted in 587 articles available in June 2013 (the time of conducting the analysis) and demonstrated the activity of more than one policy entrepreneur. I found various people employing policy entrepreneurial strategies, including proponents such as René De Rond, Piet Bootsma, Tjitte de Groot, Pieter Meulendijk, Dirk Louter, Henk Tiesinga, Anne Bliek, Janneke Wijnia and so forth. Opposing people included Leen van Loosen, Jaap Kroon, Harrie Hageman, Herma Coumou, Henk Hoving, Piet Reinders and Berthoo Lammers.

Overall, I studied a total of at least 1,427 newspaper articles. I deliberately say ‘at least’ because I continued to follow the news even when the major component of the empirical data analysis was already complete. If relevant new information arose, I included this in the analysis to be as current as possible, as of early 2014.

3.5.3 Document analysis
With respect to each case, I studied the relevant documents, such as policies, plans, project documents, websites, videos, media utterances, letters, notes of discussions in parliament and much more. I used the documents to check facts and cross-verify arguments made during interviews. However, the main reason for consulting these data sources was to construct and understand the policy process and the strategies employed by policy entrepreneurs. It also helped identify when and how the concept, idea or plan was mentioned, and by whom. Thus, I went as far back as the earliest mention of the ideas, plans and concepts in each case because a case study deserves—if possible—at least a 10-year framework in order to explain successful agenda setting and policy change (Birkland, 2004; Sabatier & Weible, 2007a). The cases revealed that the timeframe for each case study varied due to the different histories or ‘issue careers’ (Downs, 1972) of the issues. In every empirical chapter, before discussing the policy entrepreneurs and their strategies, I present the policies relevant to the issue discussed. The subsequent analyses of the policy entrepreneurs’ strategies to set the agenda demonstrate that the changes in policies are sometimes the effect of policy entrepreneurial actions, while, at other times, these changes are the effect of different causes outside the locus of influence of policy entrepreneurs. As far as the data were available to substantiate it, the empirical case studies reveal whether policy entrepreneurs were driving certain policy changes.

The case study on the Second Delta Committee is relatively recent, with the committee established in 2007 and presenting its report one year later. However, first it is important to discuss and understand the
Dutch history of dealing with water management and climate change in order to put the ideas suggested by the committee into their historical policy context. For example, the name of the ‘Second’ Delta Committee itself is a clear reference to the ‘first’ Delta Committee that was established after the devastating 1953 storm surge. The study of policy documents revealed that the Second Delta Committee has been influential in setting the agenda and changing policy post-2009.

The case study on nature development discusses the policy change from nature conservation to nature development. ‘Nature development’ is to be regarded as the Dutch counterpart of international and European discourses on ‘ecological restoration’ and related concepts, and thus I first discuss these discourses. In the Netherlands, nature development was coined officially for the first time in 1977. Throughout the years thereafter, thanks to the policy entrepreneurs’ efforts, the concept of nature development influenced not only nature policy, but also water management policy. Therefore, I sketched the Dutch history of both nature and water management policy in relation to the concept of nature development.

The case study on Almere concentrates on the agenda setting of outer-dike urbanisation of Almere and an infrastructural connection from Almere to Amsterdam. Both were first mentioned in policy in 1977. In the case study, I present the national, regional and local spatial planning policy on these plans. Some of the policy entrepreneurs discussed have influenced these policy changes.

The case study on the wind park focuses on the plans to build a wind park in the Noordoostpolder. The plan for the wind park was first suggested in local policy in 1998, and later taken over in provincial and national policy. Therefore, before going deeper into the strategies employed by the policy entrepreneurs involved, I present the local, provincial and national policies concerning wind energy in the Noordoostpolder. Some of the policy entrepreneurs discussed have cleverly induced or exploited these policy changes.

### 3.6 Outline of empirical chapters
All the empirical chapters follow a similar outline by first introducing the issue at stake, second discussing the relevant policies, third analysing the framing and networking strategies employed, and finally presenting the case study’s main conclusion regarding the strategies employed and the most important contextual factors. Although this outline is followed in each empirical chapter, the discussion of the framing and networking is presented differently in each case. This was done because it was believed to best fit the case characteristics.

The Second Delta Committee is regarded a single agent policy entrepreneur that acted during a specific, relatively short period; therefore, it made most sense to first discuss the framing strategies and then the networking strategies. There were various advocates of nature development working together over a few decades, which made
it more straightforward to follow the sequence of events and strategies employed as chronologically as possible in three fairly separate periods or topics. Moreover, as the case study on the Second Delta Committee had already begun to make clear, framing and networking strategies overlap, sticking to a strict divide between framing and networking became more complicated for me to structure and present the case study findings, and less easy for readers to follow. The case on Almere showed an increase in complexity as six policy entrepreneurs advocated different ideas on the three main issues at stake that I identified. The six could be best discussed in pairs, related to one of the three issues, and their strategies are subsequently discussed as chronologically as possible. The case on the wind park concerned a clear coalition of convenience of proponents and two coalitions of convenience of opponents from the municipality of Urk and the Noordoostpolder. Therefore, the subsection on the policy entrepreneurs’ strategies is divided into these three coalitions of convenience and discussed as chronologically as possible. More about this is presented in each of the empirical chapters. Below, I briefly present the main outlines of the empirical chapters and account for the various places where the case studies have been published elsewhere.

The next chapter, Chapter 4, discusses the case on the Second Delta Committee, which is regarded as a single policy entrepreneur. After introducing the issue at stake and describing the relevant policies, the framing and networking strategies of this committee are analysed. It is concluded that the agenda was set successfully thanks to the strategies employed by the Delta Committee. This case study was published in four different ways. First, it was published in *Water Alternatives* (Verduijn et al., 2012). Second, it was translated and adjusted to be presented in the year book on the cultural heritage of the Province of Flevoland (Verduijn, 2011). Third, it was published in a revised form as a chapter in an edited volume on water governance as connective capacity (Verduijn, 2013b). Fourth, it was shortened, translated and published in the Dutch professional journal, *Geography* (Verduijn, 2013a).

Chapter 5 presents the case on nature development. After introducing the concept of nature development and sketching the relevant policy developments, the empirical analysis is structured in three topics: the triggers for the new nature development concept; the developing and disseminating of nature development along the major rivers; and the implementation of the ecological infrastructure (Ecologische Hoofdstructuur—EHS), including a robust corridor for nature in the southern part of the province of Flevoland. Based on the empirical analysis, I conclude that the policy entrepreneurs and their strategies were mainly successful in setting the agenda and changing policy from (mainly) nature conservation to nature development in both nature and water management policies. This case study is forthcoming in *Environmental Values* (Verduijn, Ploegmakers, Meijerink & Leroy, in press).
Chapter 6 focuses on the outer-dike urbanisation of Almere and an infrastructural connection from Almere to Amsterdam. First, it introduces the case study, then it describes the national, regional and local policy developments with regard to the plans for the urban development of Almere. The main section focuses on the strategies employed by six policy entrepreneurs. Four of these policy entrepreneurs are in favour of all, or part, of the plan to implement outer-dike urbanisation and build an infrastructural connection. Two of the policy entrepreneurs are against these plans and want to preserve the Markermeer-IJmeer as it currently is. Thus, the structure of the chapter is based on the policy entrepreneurs and the issue for which they stand. This case study is forthcoming in an edited volume on entrepreneurship (Verduijn, in press).

Chapter 7 concentrates on the case study of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder. First, the issue at stake is introduced, after which the relevant developments of local, provincial and national policies on wind energy in the Noordoostpolder are presented. The chapter then focuses on the advocates of the wind park, after which it discusses the policy entrepreneurs opposing the construction of the wind park, in two groups. One group of actors opposing the Wind Park Noordoostpolder lives in the municipality of Urk, while the other group of opposing actors comes from the municipality of Noordoostpolder.
SECOND DELTA COMMITTEE
‘If opportunity doesn’t knock, build a door.’

Milton Berle
Chapter 4: Second Delta Committee

GERMANY  
BELGIUM

Rhine  
Meuse  
Scheldt

Wadden area
IJsselmeer area
Major rivers area
South-western Delta
North Sea Coast

Legend

Village/City
Province
Main waterway

Figure 4.1: The Second Delta Committee's focus areas for the Delta Programme. Adapted and simplified from Veerman (2008).
4.1 Introduction
This chapter’s case study concerns the Second Delta Committee that formulated recommendations to anticipate climate change in water management. The Second Delta Committee has been successful in placing its recommendations on the public, policy and political agenda. Some of these recommendations are currently being implemented. The case study offers a powerful example of successful agenda setting induced by a policy entrepreneur in the absence of a crisis or focusing event that would have clearly demonstrated a need for change in water management policies. Moreover, the committee—partly due to its successful framing and networking strategies—did not face considerable opposition from others. To be able to analyse the strategies employed by the Second Delta Committee, this discussion must begin in the year 2007.

In 2007, the Dutch Cabinet installed the Second Delta Committee, named after its famous predecessor, the Delta Committee, which was established after the dramatic storm surge of 1953 that killed 1,835 people. The Second Delta Committee, chaired by the former Minister of Agriculture, Cees Veerman, was asked to formulate recommendations for strategies for long-term flood protection and freshwater management. The committee subsequently issued its advice in the 2008 publication, Working Together with Water: A Living Land Builds for its Future (Veerman, 2008). The committee’s main recommendations were that the Dutch government should:

- prepare and implement a second Delta Programme aimed at maintaining and improving water safety and freshwater availability
- institutionalise a new Delta Act
- establish a Delta Fund of €1.2 to €1.9 billion extra per annum until 2050 to provide the necessary resources to implement the second Delta Programme
- appoint a Delta Commissioner to supervise the programme’s implementation.

The committee has contributed considerably to awareness of the potential effect of climate change on Dutch water management, and the Dutch national government accepted all its main recommendations (Anonymous, 2008e; Boezeman et al., 2013; Brief van de staatssecretaris van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2008; Haasnoot & Middelkoop, 2012; Van Kalles, 2008a, 2008b; Vink et al., 2013). Unlike earlier committees, the Second Delta Committee did not draft its advice in the aftermath of a disaster—there had been no recent flooding when the committee was installed or when it presented its report. The committee itself is aware of the rather unusual circumstances in which it had to issue recommendations—‘Our Committee’s mandate is therefore unusual: we have been asked to come up with recommendations, not because a disaster has occurred, but rather to avoid one’ (Veerman, 2008, p. 7).
This case study offers no in-depth account of the differences between individual members of the committee, or the process leading to the selection of the committee’s members. Instead, the whole committee is regarded as a single policy entrepreneur and discussed as such. First, this chapter briefly discusses the recent history of Dutch water safety policy, which already points to the effect of the Second Delta Committee on policy change. Second is an analysis of the framing and networking strategies. Third, the case-specific findings are discussed.

4.2 Policy on water safety

The Dutch have a long tradition in dealing with water problems and the changing climate (Haasnoot & Middelkoop, 2012). This has led to well-experienced public authorities, such as Rijkswaterstaat and the water boards (*waterschappen*), and to world-famous knowledge institutes, both public and private, such as the Institute for Water Education, UNESCO-IHE, Deltares, Arcadis and Royal HaskoningDHV (Bosch & Van der Ham, 1998; Wiering & Immink, 2006). The aftermath of the aforementioned storm surge of 1953 reinforced the technocratic approach undertaken by Rijkswaterstaat, and strengthened its role and autonomous position in the field of water management.

On 31 January 1953, the province of Zeeland was unexpectedly confronted with a dramatic storm surge in which 200,000 hectares of land were flooded and 1,835 people died. It had already been concluded by the Dutch Storm Water Committee in 1941 that higher dikes were needed to protect the human-made lowlands in the western parts of the Netherlands during storm surges (Meijerink, 2005). However, this safety issue did not gain attention until the storm surge in 1953. Twenty days after this storm surge, the government established an advisory Delta Committee to determine smart solutions to coastal flooding. The result was a sixfold report called the ‘Delta Plan’ that led to the Delta Act and the implementation and realisation of the Dutch Delta Works. During the decade following 1953, dikes were strengthened and new dams were built to close the estuaries in the province of Zeeland. The Delta Works became the nation’s proudest major public work in its defence against water.

During the 1970s, an ‘ecological turn’ was witnessed within Rijkswaterstaat and the field of water management in general (Disco, 2002). This shift was caused partly by the publication of *The Limits to Growth* (Meadows, Meadows, Randers & Behrens III, 1972) by the Club of Rome, which increased attention on ecology and the limits to industrialisation, economic growth and welfare. In addition, the traditional view on water management was being contested because it was deemed harmful to ecology. With regard to the implementation and realisation of the Dutch Delta Works, this led to the decision to create a half-open, highly innovative, storm-surge barrier construction that would be open at all times, unless another storm surge was anticipated. The ecological turn was also witnessed during part of the
implementation of the Zuiderzee Works (mentioned in Chapter 1) because one of the polders, called Markerwaard, was not implemented due to the involvement of interest groups, such as the Association for Preservation of the IJsselmeer (Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer). Opponents of the implementation of the Markerwaard argued—among other things—that a more holistic perspective on the IJsselmeer was needed, in which ecological and environmental interests would also be taken into account (Goverde, 1987).

The near-flooding of the major Dutch rivers in 1993 and 1995 also contributed to the idea that a new approach to water management was needed, such as giving room to the river, as well as strengthening the dikes (see Chapter 5). In 1993, central parts of the Netherlands faced possible flooding caused by high water in the Rhine and Meuse rivers. Some parts of the rivers already flooded in the province of Limburg, but this did not lead to the breaking of dikes, severe flooding or major evacuations. In 1995, there was again high water and, because the government feared the breaking of dikes and flooding, 250,000 people were evacuated. While the water level lowered and the threat of major flooding disappeared, the government realised that something needed to be done.

Therefore, in 1995, the emergency Delta Act for Major Rivers was introduced to strengthen the dikes, and, in 1996, the ‘Room for River’ policy line was proposed to widen the rivers and create more space for overflow (Beleidslijn Ruimte voor de rivier, 1996). In 2000, the new ‘Committee Water Management 21st Century’ argued that water issues should be prioritised when drafting policies for issues such as spatial planning (Tielrooij, 2000). The Dutch ‘fight against water’ paradigm shifted towards a more adaptive approached labelled ‘living with water’ (Meijerink, 2005; Roth, Warner & Winnubst, 2006). With Al Gore’s 2006 Academy Award winning documentary An Inconvenient Truth, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2007 reports, awareness of climate change grew. This growing awareness of climate change, diversity of approaches to water management and extensive knowledge and experience of the Dutch with water management may explain the demand by the Cabinet Balkenende IV to the Second Delta Committee to develop recommendations on how to protect the Dutch coast and low-lying hinterland against the consequences of climate change (Veerman, 2008).

The National Water Plan 2009–2015 (2009) almost entirely follows the recommendations of the committee. More importantly, as a reaction to the Second Delta Committee’s recommendation, a National Delta Programme and Delta Commissioner became operative at the end of 2009 in anticipation of the associated Delta Act and Delta Fund, which became legally enforced and effective as of 1 January 2012 (Deltawet waterveiligheid en zoetwatervoorziening, 2011). The Delta Commissioner has been explicitly trying to gain civic engagement for short- and long-term actions. For example, in November 2010, the Delta
Commissioner organised the first National Delta Congress (recurring yearly) to which he invited the then Dutch Royal Prince; the Secretary of State; representatives from business, municipalities, provinces, water boards and ministerial departments; scientists; and numerous other actors from society. There was significant consensus between all parties that there was an urgency to join forces, take action and ‘work together with water’. Unsurprisingly, this was also the title of the Second Delta Committee’s report. Currently, the Delta Commissioner and his staff prepared five ‘Delta Decisions’ to anticipate climate change in managing the delta for the long term. In 2015, the government will decide on the Delta Decisions and the implications for further policymaking.

4.3 Framing and networking strategies
In this section, the policy entrepreneurs’ framing and networking strategies are discussed. As there has been no considerable opposition, no opposing policy entrepreneurs are discussed. However, I will substantiate the claim that the committee has successfully set the agenda.

4.3.1 Framing strategies
Adherence to the climate adaptation discourse
According to Second Delta Committee, ‘The Netherlands delta is safe, but preserving this safety over the long term involves action now’ (Deltacommissie, 2008b). The discourse to which the committee adheres and contributes is the climate adaptation discourse. There is a stream of research and literature emerging on the need to adapt to climate change, from the global to the local level (IPCC website, 2013). The logic is that the climate is undeniably changing and that society should adapt to these changes: ‘Climate change is now forcing itself upon us: a new reality that cannot be ignored’ (Veerman, 2008, p. 5). The committee argues that, even if the international communities were to meet the goals set down by the Kyoto Protocol and its successors, and even if greenhouse gas emissions worldwide were to be cut drastically tomorrow, global warming would continue for centuries (Veerman, 2008, p. 45).

The committee states that, ‘The predicted sea level rise and greater fluctuations in river discharge compel us to look far into the future, to widen our scope and to anticipate developments further ahead’ (Veerman, 2008, p. 5). In the committee’s view (Veerman, 2008, pp. 5, 44, 88), the best way for both people and nature to stay abreast of changing conditions involves anticipating natural processes and building with nature, where possible: CLIMATE CHANGE IS NOT FRAMED AS A MATTER OF DISCUSSION, BUT AS A PLAIN FACT THAT SHOULD BE ANTICIPATED
The best long-term strategy to keep the Netherlands safe and a pleasant place to live is to develop along with the changing climate. Moving with and utilising the natural processes where possible leads to solutions that allow humans and nature to adapt gradually. This further affords better opportunities for combined, multifunctional solutions for functions such as constructing infrastructure, reserving land for housing and business parks, using land for agriculture, recreation and nature.

By using the climate adaptation discourse as its starting point, the committee succeeded in raising awareness for its problem definition and solutions. This discourse unites the Netherlands and the global community because climate change is evident both globally and locally. Climate change is not framed as a matter of discussion, but as a plain fact that should be anticipated. Action is deemed urgently needed (Vink et al., 2013).

**Using the story of the delta identity**

The proposed measures for adapting to climate change are supported by a relatively implicit story of the delta identity. Throughout the report, the Delta itself—with its dikes, dams, mounds, sluices and pumping stations—is the symbol of which the Dutch are told to be proud because its mechanisms defend them against water and indicate that they have been able to live, work, invest and recreate in a once vulnerable delta, for centuries (Veerman, 2008). The entire delta system, which is said to be the safest in the world, is presented as a success story—a symbol of which the people can be proud, and that sets them apart from other countries. The committee states:

> One cannot conceive of the Netherlands without water. Through the centuries, and still today, the inhabitants of our delta have made great efforts to struggle from the grasp of the rivers and the sea, and it is this that sets our country apart. (Veerman, 2008, p. 5)

At the same time, this symbol of the Delta is used to remind the people that they also depend on it. In some sense, the committee is trying to communicate a double message—on the one hand, there is no reason for panic, but, on the other, they should feel the urgency to take action. The dike, as a symbol of defence, is used to tell the people these two messages: the dike is safe, but not safe enough. As discussed below, this corresponds with Stone’s (2002) descriptions of the ‘story of social control’ and ‘story of decline and crisis’.

The ‘story of social control’ states that, in terms of water, the Dutch have always been able to ensure that the country is a safe place to live: ‘in our interaction with the water, we, the country’s residents, can ourselves shape the Netherlands of the future—just as our forefathers have always done throughout the centuries’ (Veerman, 2008, p. 97).
Based on the long tradition and experience of living in a delta, the people ‘master the long-term challenge of keeping the Netherlands a safe, attractive country’ (Veerman, 2008, p. 97). They are able to ‘keep the Netherlands a prosperous, safe country with sufficient clean water for humans and livestock: we have the time, the knowledge and the means’ (Veerman, 2008, p. 37). Thus, although the undeniable force of climate change is upon them, it may also offer new prospects, chances and opportunities. If they combine multiple functions, such as water safety, energy production and nature development, they will be able to strengthen the defence system, create new energy and create new forms of nature. Examples of these are multifunctional dikes, tidal systems and ecologically robust riverbanks (Anonymous, 2010a).

The committee wants the people to have this mentality of control and future prosperity:

It is for an attitude like this that the Committee is pleading; let everybody dare to form a clear picture of what we can expect and think ahead to the way we can cope with these challenges. Even better: how can future opportunities be created? (Veerman, 2008, p. 37)

Like their forebears, with their challenging creations—such as the world-famous Eastern Scheldt storm-surge barrier—the people will be able to secure the Netherlands, create new space for living and put the Netherlands on the map again. The committee hopes to open the door for engineering enterprises and for energy production companies to showcase their innovative products and solutions, while also boosting the Netherlands’ image and economy.

The committee also tells a ‘story of decline and crisis’ alongside its story of control. The floods of 1953 remind the people that taking good care of the water defence system remains their responsibility: ‘the disastrous floods of 1953 are still etched into our collective memory’ (Veerman, 2008, p. 7). The Netherlands is home to a rich natural environment and has a wealth of history and culture, which the people cannot run the risk of losing (Veerman, 2008, p. 46). In the committee’s 18-minute film that supports the report (Deltacommissie, 2008a), this story of decline is promoted and supported with the explicit use of symbols. The committee asked Hans Emans Media productions to create this film. Emans had previously made persuasive reconstructions of various crises with deadly casualties in the Netherlands, such as the 2000 fireworks explosion in Enschede, the 2000/2001 New Year’s café fire in Volendam, and the 2005 fire at the Detention Centre Schiphol-East (Marlet, 2006; Van der Steen, 2009). From the committee’s perspective, the choice of this experienced filmmaker was a success because Emans visualised the committee’s frame in a very compelling manner.

The film recalls and frames the flooding in 1953 to warn of the threats of climate change. The film includes original black and white footage
of the flood, with ominous background sounds. Next, the voiceover moves directly to discuss the measures taken by the Dutch government to prevent that flooding from recurring. At the same time, the images smoothly change from black and white to colour images. The video then switches to the present day and discusses today's global warming and climate change. The (near) river floods in 1993 and 1995 in some parts of the Netherlands are recalled to link climate change to the current threat of flooding. While showing the high level of water next to the dikes at that time, the voiceover states, ‘Fortunately, it didn’t come to a catastrophe, but the message was clear [silence for two seconds]’ (Deltacommissie, 2008a). The film then quickly moves to the commissioning of the Second Delta Committee in 2007, and the remainder of the film is devoted to explaining the committee's frame. This is supported with images of the storm in 2005 in New Orleans. The voiceover states, ‘If we don’t anticipate the future, if we do nothing, floods just like this one [emphasising tone] could also hit the Netherlands, causing enormous damage and suffering, and years of disruption of our society’ (Deltacommissie, 2008a). A map is then shown of the Netherlands with the potential flooding effect if no action is taken. This explains and indicates all the critical problems this may cause. The film then states that water also offers significant opportunities, before moving on to the recommendations the committee deems necessary. The video ends by repeating the committee’s main objective: ‘How can we create the conditions that will make this country an attractive place to live, work, invest and recreate, for many generations to come? As far as this committee is concerned, we can start realising those conditions, today’ (Deltacommissie, 2008a).

The use of images, in this specific order, supports the story and image of the delta system that is under threat. The disasters, examples, footage, facts about climate change, ominous sounds and warning pictures create awareness of the urgency and necessity of taking action. The committee aims for the viewer to accept this frame by using a certain climate change and threat rhetoric, vocabulary, argumentation and language in order to convince people to turn the tide of this ‘story of decline and crisis’. However, in the last few seconds of the video, the committee wants to close with a positive message of ‘control’. As the quotation above shows, the committee wants to assure viewers that they have the means available to make the country an attractive place to live, work, invest and recreate for many generations to come.

This story of the delta identity has bound the people together in the Netherlands throughout the centuries. Apart from the crisis anticipation, the people are able to exert control. History has shown that it is necessary to adapt and the country has always been able to do so. The strength of the committee's framing is that it was able—both in the report and video—to support this compelling story. The delta becomes part of the people’s own identity, who all live in this delta and share the same identity: ‘the sea and the rivers have shaped our identity and the
country itself: its nature and landscape, its prosperity and economy, and the way it is governed (the water boards; the polder model)’ (Veer-
man, 2008, p. 5). If the people want to uphold their identity, the delta system cannot be lost to climate change. The delta symbolises their identity. It is as if the committee is saying that no self-appreciating nation or human being would want to lose grip of its identity, and thus the people need to join forces to keep the spirit of the delta identity alive—at least over the coming decade, but preferably throughout the coming centuries. The committee’s own recommendations are presented as the logical next step in this history of living with water. Collectively, the people should embrace the urgent challenges they face in the future.

**Creating a sense of urgency and collectiveness**
The title of the press release was indicative of one of the main conclusions the committee wanted to communicate: ‘Wide ranging intervention for water safety urgent: Decisiveness and investment needed’ (Deltacommissie, 2008b). At the moment, according to the committee, the Netherlands is unprepared for climate change because ‘the flood risk will increase and the freshwater supply will come under pressure if no extra measures are taken’ (Veerman, 2008, p. 29). The committee seems to realise that, in order to push forward drastic and very costly measures, a sense of urgency and collectiveness is needed, especially in times of financial crises. Therefore, the committee keeps reminding the people that the Netherlands faces an urgent, but not acute, threat: ‘for us, the Second Delta Committee, the threat is not acute, but our mandate is nevertheless urgent. There is absolutely no reason for panic, but we must be concerned for the future’ (Veerman, 2008, pp. 5,7). This is included in the report several times:

[The Netherlands must] accelerate its efforts because, at present, even the current standards of flood protection, which are even out of date, are not being met everywhere. In the meanwhile climate is changing rapidly, the sea level is probably rising faster than has been assumed, and more extreme variations in river discharge are expected. In addition, the economic, societal and physical stakes in the Netherlands are great and growing still. The committee warns that a breach in a dike has seriously disruptive consequences for the entire country. (Veerman, 2008, p. 10)

The committee also states that:

[f]lood risk management is a pressing issue right now in a large number of places and will only become more urgent as the sea level
continues to rise, river discharges fluctuate more and more, and as interests that need protection increase in value. (Veerman, 2008, p. 23)

Instead of focusing on the Dutch coast alone, the committee broadened its assignments and, accordingly, its policy recommendations (Boezeman et al., 2013). The committee was appointed by the Cabinet as a Committee of the State, called the Sustainable Coastal Development Committee. Its mandate was to formulate a vision for the long-term protection of the Dutch coast, not the Netherlands in its entirety. However, in the report, the committee proposes an integral approach for the Netherlands as a whole:

The Committee takes a broad view of the coast: it includes the sea and the coastal zone as well as the low-lying hinterland, the interaction with the rivers and the IJsselmeer lake, and the cross-border aspects of the rivers and the coastal zone. This broad interpretation is necessary because, to a great extent, the system forms a single hydrological, ecological and economic entity. (Veerman, 2008, p. 17)

By broadening the frame and viewing the challenges faced by the ‘Dutch Delta’ as a whole, the committee succeeds in making the report and task a matter of national interest of utmost priority.

First, broadening the frame gave the committee room to connect issues and make trade-offs. One example is the recommendation to raise the water level of the IJsselmeer because of the growing need for freshwater in the future, while proposing to return part of the freshwater delta to the open sea at the Krammer-Volkerak Zoommeer in the southwest—Recommendations 8, 10 and 11 in the report. Thus, on the one hand, the proposal is to strengthen the hard line between freshwater and saltwater to maintain and enlarge the freshwater basis of the IJsselmeer, while, on the other hand, the committee suggests a salinity gradient—a transition between freshwater and saltwater—to create new ecological opportunities. The only way to ensure people support this is to create a sense of collectiveness and matter of national interest, whereby regional, local or individual interests have to take a back seat.

Second, the integral approach to regard the Netherlands as a whole gave the committee room to make the challenges faced by the Netherlands an exceptional matter of national interest of utmost priority, and to state that money may not, and cannot, prevent the required action. The committee states that ‘money must not be an impediment’ and that they need a ‘national frame of reference’ to provide money and take action: ‘[t]he Delta Director keeps the Delta Programme on course, creates a national frame of reference, facilitates, and encourages (nationally and in the regions) and, where necessary, is the one
Recommendation 1: Flood protection level

The present flood protection levels of all diked areas must be improved by a factor of 10. To that end, the new standards must be set as soon as possible (around 2013). In some areas where even better protection is needed, a so-called ‘Delta Dike’ concept is promising. These dikes are either so high or so wide and large that there is virtually zero probability that the dike will suddenly and uncontrollably fail. With regard to specific or local conditions, this will require a tailor-made approach. All measures to increase the flood protection levels must be implemented before 2050. Post-2050, the flood protection levels must be updated regularly.

Recommendation 2: New urban development plans

The decision of whether to build in low-lying flood-prone locations must be based on a cost-benefit analysis. This must reveal present and future costs for all parties. Costs resulting from local decisions must not be passed on to another administrative level, or to society as a whole. They must be borne by those who benefit from these plans.

Recommendation 3: Areas outside the dikes

New development in unprotected areas lying outside the dikes must not impede the river’s discharge capacity or the future levels of water in the lakes. Residents/users are responsible for the measures that may be needed to avoid adverse consequences. The government plays a facilitating role in such areas as public information, setting building standards and flood warnings.

Recommendation 4: North Sea coast

Build with nature. Off the coasts of Zeeland, Holland and the Wadden Sea Islands, flood protection will be maintained by beach nourishments, possibly with relocation of the tidal channels. Beach nourishments must be undertaken in such a manner that the coast can expand seaward in the next century. This will provide great added value to society. Sand extraction sites in the North Sea must be reserved in the short term. The ecological, economic and energy requirements needed to nourish such large volumes must be investigated. Post-2050, beach nourishments continue, with more or less sand required, depending on sea level rise.
Recommendation 5: Wadden Sea area

The beach nourishments along the North Sea coast may contribute to the adaptation of the Wadden Sea area to sea level rise. However, the existence of the Wadden Sea area as it is currently known is by no means assured, and depends entirely on the actual rate of sea level rise over the next 50 to 100 years. Developments will have to be monitored and analysed in an international context. The protection of the island polders and North Holland coast must remain assured.

Recommendation 6: South-western Delta, Eastern Scheldt

The Eastern Scheldt storm-surge barrier keeps its function. The disadvantage of the barrier is its restriction of tidal movement and, as a result, the loss of the intertidal zone. This is to be countered by additional sand nourishment from outside (as from the Outer Delta). Post-2050, the lifespan of the Eastern Scheldt storm-surge barrier will be extended by technical interventions. This can be done up to a sea level rise of approximately one metre (by 2075 at the earliest). If the Eastern Scheldt storm-surge barrier is no longer adequate, a solution will be sought that largely restores the tidal dynamics with its natural estuarine regime, while maintaining safety against flooding.

Recommendation 7: South-western Delta, Western Scheldt

This must remain an open tidal system to maintain the valuable estuary and the navigation to Antwerp. Safety against flooding must be maintained by enforcement of the dikes.

Recommendation 8: South-western Delta, Krammer-Volkerak Zoommeer

The Krammer-Volkerak Zoommeer, together with the Grevelingen and possibly also the Eastern Scheldt, must provide temporary storage of excess water from the Rhine and Meuse when discharge to the sea is blocked by closed storm-surge barriers. A salinity gradient (a transition between fresh and saltwater) in this area is a satisfactory solution to the water quality problem and can offer new ecological opportunities. In this case, an alternative fresh water supply system must be developed.
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Recommendation 9: The major rivers area

The programmes ‘Room for the River’ and Maaswerken (Meuse Works) must be implemented without further delays. Subject to cost effectiveness, measures must be taken immediately to accommodate discharges of 18,000 m$^3$/s from the Rhine and 4,600 m$^3$/s from the Meuse. In this context, it will be necessary to conduct negotiations with neighbouring countries under the European Directive on the Assessment and Management of Flood Risks in order to harmonise the measures. Further, room must be reserved and, if necessary, land purchased so that the river system will be able to discharge safely the 18,000 m$^3$/s of Rhine water and 4,600 m$^3$/s of Meuse water. From 2050 to 2100, measures to accommodate the Rhine to discharge 18,000 m$^3$/s and the Meuse to discharge 4,600 m$^3$/s must be completed.

Recommendation 10: Rijnmond (mouth of the river Rhine)

For the Rijnmond, an open system that can be closed in emergencies offers good prospects for combining safety against flooding, freshwater supply, urban development and nature development in this region. The extreme discharges of the Rhine and Meuse will then have to be re-routed via the south-western delta. The freshwater for the Western Netherlands will have to be supplied from the IJsselmeer. The necessary infrastructure will have to be built. Room must be created for local storage in deep polders. Further research into the ‘closable-open’ Rijnmond system should be initiated soon.

Recommendation 11: IJsselmeer area

The level of the lake IJsselmeer will be raised by a maximum of 1.5 metres. This will allow gravity-driven drainage from IJsselmeer into the Wadden Sea beyond 2100. The level of the Markermeer lake will not be raised. The IJsselmeer retains its strategic function as a freshwater reservoir for the Northern Netherlands, North Holland and—in view of the progression of the salt tongue in the Nieuwe Waterweg—the Western Netherlands. Until 2050, measures must be implemented to achieve an elevated water level, which can be done gradually. The aim must be to achieve the largest possible freshwater reservoir around 2050. The measures needed to adapt the lower reaches of the river IJssel and the Zwarte Water to a 1.5-metre higher water level in the IJsselmeer must be investigated. Post-2050, depending on the phased approach adopted, follow-up measures may be needed to actually implement a maximum water level increase of 1.5 metres.
Recommendation 12: Political-administrative, legal and financial

1. The political-administrative organisation of water safety should be strengthened by:
   a. providing cohesive national direction and regional responsibility for execution (ministerial steering committee chaired by prime minister; political responsibility lying with the Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management; the Delta Director for cohesion and progress; regional administrators for interpretation and implementation of the (individual) regional assignments)
   b. instituting a permanent parliamentary committee on the theme.

2. Guarantee funding by:
   a. creating a Delta Fund, managed by the Minister of Finance
   b. supplying the Delta Fund with a combination of loans and transfer of (part of) the natural gas benefits
   c. making national funding available and drafting rules for withdrawals from the fund.

3. A Delta Act will anchor the political-administrative organisation and funding within the present political system and current legal framework. This must, in any case, include the Delta Fund and its supply, the director’s tasks and authority, the provision that a Delta Programme be set up, regulations for strategic land acquisition, and compensation for damages or the gradual loss of benefits due to the implementation of measures under the Delta Programme.

Figure 4.2: The Second Delta Committee’s ‘Twelve Recommendations for the Future’. Adapted from Veerman (2008).
to take decisions’ (Veerman, 2008, p. 79). According to the committee, a special Delta Commissioner, Delta Act, Delta Programme and Delta Fund are needed to support the implementation of the recommendations. In addition, a ministerial steering committee, chaired by the prime minister, should be made responsible for its implementation, and a permanent parliamentary committee must be installed to keep it at arm’s length from the national budget and other funds. According to the committee, this will guarantee the resources needed to ensure flood protection and the security of the freshwater supply, while avoiding trade-offs and competition with short-term policy agenda topics (Veerman, 2008, p. 81). In this respect, the committee links the huge expenses to the costs and benefits of the Zuiderzee Works, which resulted from the flooding in 1953. In this case, there were also complaints regarding the finances of the public works. In fact, both the costs and benefits were many times greater than predicted at the inception of the Zuiderzee Works (Veerman, 2008). By pointing this out in the report, the committee seems to imply that the exceptional goals legitimise the great expenses needed to implement the proposed measures—because nowadays, who could honestly say that the costs of the Zuiderzee Works were not worth the effort?

Crafting a crisis narrative
Prior to commissioning the Second Delta Committee, there had been no disaster, which made it particularly tough for the committee to create the sense of urgency and collectiveness required for drastic measures to adapt to climate change. The committee is well aware of this and states that it:

realises that its message is a difficult one: after a disaster, there tends to be a widespread feeling of urgency that something must be done to prevent a repetition of events ... The general public takes it for granted that government guarantees its protection against flooding, but the public does not see the matter as urgent, or of high political priority. The people of the Netherlands are not apprehensive of a natural catastrophe; the risks of climate change are only gradually becoming manifest and there is a general feeling that effects will only be felt in the distant future. (Veerman, 2008, p. 77)

For this reason, the committee exploits several crises and focusing events to create its own crisis narrative. First, it recalls a number of historical examples in the Netherlands. Second, recent examples elsewhere are named. Third, it points out possible future disasters due to current climate change trends.

First, to create a sense of urgency and urge people to take action, the committee tries to recall past focusing events. The floods in 1916 (Zuiderzee) and 1953 (southwest Delta) are recalled to show the effect of such flooding. The floods are also recalled to highlight the positive
The 1916 and 1953 floods led to radical policy measures to shorten the coastline: construction of the Afsluitdijk (the IJsselmeer’s sealing dam) and Delta Works. Nowadays, the Wadden Sea and Western Scheldt are the only two natural systems that remain open to the influence of currents, tides and waves. Implementing these measures, which were multifunctional and integral, provided major benefits for the freshwater supply (via the IJsselmeer), agriculture (via vast tracts of new land) and flood protection (up to and including Amsterdam). The committee continues that the measures also resulted in the islands in Zeeland being connected to the mainland and each other, and to the development of recreation, water sports and nature reserves (Veerman, 2008).

Second, apart from recalling historic focusing events, the committee also makes a connection to recent disasters around the globe. Although it is almost 5,000 miles away from the Netherlands, New Orleans is mentioned as a focusing example of climate change worldwide, and how that lower delta region was unprepared for climate change (Veerman, 2008). In 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused a tropical storm in which at least 1,464 people lost their lives in the hurricane and subsequent floods (Anonymous, 2010n). The Delta Committee fo-
cuses on the severe economic damage this hurricane caused. Prior to
the Hurricane Katrina disaster, potential damage in New Orleans was
estimated at US$16.8 billion. Following the disaster, direct damage to
houses, government buildings and public infrastructure alone was es-

Third, after recalling historical and recent disasters in its report,
the committee highlights the possible harm caused by flooding and
climate change in the future. For example, it states that an estimated
65 per cent of national wealth is located in flood-prone areas, so that
the wealth potentially under threat is in the order of €1,800 billion.
This gives an impression of the capital that needs to be insured against
flood risk (Veerman, 2008). The committee warns that future flooding
in the Netherlands could result in more severe damage than past and
recent disasters. In this regard, the committee exploits potential dis-
asters as a means of introducing a combination of measurements that
need to be implemented in the Netherlands. The fundamental prem-
ise also adheres to the risk management approach that the first Delta
Committee raised, whereby flood risks are managed by a combination
of measures that reduce the probability (such as high and strong flood
defences) and limit the consequences (such as regulating spatial plan-
ning or zoning, compartmentalisation, early warning, crisis manage-
ment and contingency planning). The committee states that the com-
bination of measures is adjusted to the nature of the potential disaster
and the characteristics of the relevant dike-enclosed area (Veerman,
2008, pp. 41–42). In brief, by exploiting historical and recent crises
and anticipating future disasters, the committee succeeds in creating
a sense of urgency and collectiveness.

4.3.2 Networking strategies
Alongside employing framing strategies, the committee also employed
networking strategies. As explained in the previous chapter, research
conducted by others helped offer insight to the committee’s network-
ing strategies (Boezeman et al., 2013; Van Rijswoud, 2012; Vink et al.,
2013). Vink et al. (2013) show how the committee can be placed in
the recent history of Dutch water management. Van Rijswoud (2012)
discusses the role of the scientists and experts in the preparation of
the report and the media discussion following the advice. Based on
nine interviews with committee members and their secretariat, and a
content analysis of the committee’s report, press releases, media ut-
terances, commissioned background reports and website, Boezeman
et al. (2013) demonstrate how the interaction within the committee,
and interaction between the committee and other actors, shaped the
final policy report and its presentation. Boezeman et al. (2013) present
the Delta Committee as a boundary organisation on the interface of
science and policy, and show how the committee operated to strate-
gically set the agenda and anticipate a warm reception of the recom-
 mendations by the public, policymakers and politicians.
With regard to the networking of the committee during its one-year lifetime from September 2007 to September 2008, I distinguish two kinds of networking strategies, which are discussed below. First, the committee, as a team, was cleverly built and maintained. Second, its external positioning and continued interactions with political, departmental, scientific and public actors was deliberately practised to set the agenda.

Building and maintaining the team
The committee’s chair, Cees Veerman, knows his way around various arenas. He has a political background and was the Minister of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality for the Dutch Christian Democrat Party from 2002 to 2007. He is also familiar with the scientific world; before becoming minister, he was chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Wageningen University and held several affiliate professorships. His link with the water management community was less obvious, but with his many committee, directorate and board memberships, he was more than suitable for the task. Together with a high-ranked official of the then Ministry Transport, Public Works and Water Management, who had become the secretary of the committee, Veerman was free to
select the other eight committee members, and he chose representatives from politics, science, engineering and civil service.

Some of these committee members had the same political affiliation as the majority in parliament at the time. Three of the committee members were active, reputed and renowned scientists in the Netherlands with a multidisciplinary focus, yet with considerable experience in climate science, water engineering, sustainability and agriculture: Pavel Kabat, Marcel Stive and Louise Fresco. The inclusion of these scientists helped Veerman have state-of-the-art knowledge on these issues. It also helped the committee anticipate critique from scientists later on. Member Van Oord, chief executive officer of a leading dredging company, helped connect the recommendations to the water industry and its community. Jaap Van Duijn, with a career in finance and economics, most likely helped assess economic scenarios and calculate budgeting. Andries Heidema is the Mayor of Deventer and a member of the Christian Union—the same political party as the then State Secretary of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. Heidema helped understand the local implications of the committee's recommendations. Ineke Bakker is the former Directorate-General on Spatial Planning at the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, and probably contributed mainly to assessing the implications of the committee's recommendations on spatial planning and environmental policy. Finally, Tracy Metz, an experienced publicist and journalist on spatial issues, completed the team with her expertise.

Another deliberate choice was the composition of the supporting staff of the committee. Eight high-quality and experienced senior civil servants from several departments contributed to the coupling of the issues discussed in the committee with current and upcoming policy plans from their respective departments. Through the membership of people from different networks and communities, the committee granted itself access to various sources of information and support.

Veerman realised that it was not enough to draft a univocal report by just placing people with different backgrounds together in one room. Four meetings were organised to allow everyone to openly share thoughts and ideas on the committee's assignment and goal (Anonymous, 2008g). By organising meetings at Veerman's own farm, and even in the air via a plane flight over the Dutch Delta, the group built its identity and team spirit. The investments in creating shared belief, ownership and team spirit paid off, and Veerman would later state that the committee members became friends and continued to

VEERMAN WAS AWARE THAT, IN THE END, THE CLIENT AND FIRST TARGET GROUP OF THE COMMITTEE WAS POLITICAL IN NATURE

...
meet, even after the publication of the report (Anonymous, 2008g). However, this did not mean that no discussion or conflict arose between the committee members. For example, the recommendation to assign a government commissioner, institutionally distant from politics, was not favoured by one of the committee members. All committee members had the legal right to distance themselves from specific recommendations made by publishing a minority position; however, this would undermine the strategically created harmony and support of the whole group. Eventually, shortly before the presentation of the report, the negotiated majority opinion was agreed on to institutionalise a Delta Commissioner (R40). As a result, the image of a univocal team was well maintained.

Involving a wider network of actors
The committee was well aware of the need to create support both internally and externally. To set the policy agenda, support was needed from the policymakers who had to work with the committee’s recommendations. However, the political agenda was considered equally important. If no solid scientifically legitimate and credible case was made, the advice would have been open to scientific scrutiny and possibly rejected by politics. Additionally, if the water industry was not given workable and feasible solutions, the chances of implementing the committee’s recommendations would drastically decrease. However, if the recommendations were specific and solid, there would be no room for political negotiation. Veerman was aware that, in the end, the client and first target group of the committee was political in nature (Anonymous, 2008g). Therefore, the final report of the committee could best be read as a vision or grand design, rather than a concrete plan with detailed and clear-cut recommendations. This was deliberately done to make the vision all-inclusive, and to secure support among other target groups (R40). Thus, alongside creating a strong team and having access to important resources via committee memberships and personnel, the committee was also keen to involve a wider network of actors.

During the committee’s lifetime, it engaged in ongoing interaction with a wide array of actors. It managed relationships, both formally and informally, with community groups, experts and policymakers from multiple government levels. Workshops, meetings and field trips were organised and advice was sought from consultancy firms, knowledge institutes, scientists and many more. Fifteen background documents, mostly advisory reports, were used to draft the report and present a strong argument. Through the interactions, which Boezeman et al. (2013) describe as a two-way road, the committee also exchanged preliminary ideas. The committee members wanted to be sensitive to areas that should be avoided, and to popular, scientific, policy and political thoughts and ideas. One example of this was the popular idea to construct tulip-shaped islands in front of the Dutch coast to increase
water safety. While this idea was popular among many actors—notably the then Prime Minister Balkenende and Veerman’s own political party, the Christian Democrats—one of the committee members had doubts (R40). Consequently, the committee invested effort in substantiating the argument in the final report to not include the idea for the tulip-shaped islands.

Yet, most policy, institutional and practical recommendations did find enough support within and outside the committee. Due to the committee’s networking and discussing preliminary thoughts with others, the committee dared to use an extreme high-end worst-case scenario with a maximum of 1.3-metre sea level rise by 2100, and even a 1.5- to three-metre sea level rise by 2200 (Veerman, 2008). It would have been more scientifically correct to estimate a sea level rise between 0.25 and 0.85 meter, but the committee’s estimations went well beyond the IPCC’s 2007 global, and the Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute’s (Koninklijk Nederlands Meteorologisch Instituut—KNMI) 2006 regional scenarios for sea level rise. A team of 20 leading national and international climate experts was asked to conduct additional research for the committee. In nine pages of the appendix of the committee’s report, based on the research conducted by these climate experts, the committee attempted to justify the estimated upper limit calculations of sea level rise (Katsman et al., 2009; Veerman, 2008; Vellinga et al., 2008).

Further participation was also sought from the KNMI. The KNMI’s participation was carefully arranged because, without the support of the KNMI, the committee would have difficulty defending its calculations. Additionally, the report was reviewed by a range of critical experts to identify mistakes or blind spots. The continued dialogue with these actors contributed to a form of co-ownership of the committee’s recommendations, helped make the report recognisable for a broad range of actors, and averted strong criticism by actors involved in its making. Overall, I concur with Boezeman et al. (2013) that ‘gradually building, testing and positioning the advice was pivotal in maintaining support after its publication’ (p. 169). Without the external positioning of the committee and contextualising the advice, it would probably not have been enthusiastically received by the various actors.

My media analysis supports the above findings. The committee’s report was accepted warmly by media, politicians and scientists (Anonymous, 2008e; Van Kalles, 2008a, 2008b). This concurs with Boezeman et al.’s (2013) conclusion that the report provoked little opposition, but contrasts the conclusion by Van Rijswoud (2012), who argues that much controversy occurred. In my opinion, Van Rijswoud dramatises by speaking of ‘fierce debate’, ‘political quarrel’, ‘friction’, ‘tension in the Cabinet coalition’ and ‘dispute between scientists’ affecting the credibility of the committee (Van Rijswoud, 2012). I found only serious discussions on the high-end scenario of the sea level rise that the committee used. Some critics claimed that the committee
exaggerated the sea level rise and purposefully neglected the uncertainties that surround predictions about climate change (De Koning, 2008; Hazeleger, 2008; Huisman, 2008; Knip, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Rijcken, 2008; Tamboer, 2008). Surprisingly, among these critics was the head of the KNMI and co-author of one of the supporting research reports who pleaded not to lose sight of scientific scrutiny when translating the committee's recommendations into actual policy (Hazeleger, 2008).

However, given the committee's careful preparation of the calculations leading to the use of the high-end scenario—the expert advice and lengthy appendix—this was no more than anticipated critique and it cannot slightly be regarded as undermining the whole report. Few questioned the composition of the committee because considerable recommendations of the committee included technological solutions regarding coastal engineering (Anonymous, 2008d, 2008i; Huisman, 2008). However, these discussions were instigated by few individual scientists and journalists, and not by other actors (Leroy, 2009; Schreuder, 2008; Warner, 2008; Warner & Vink, 2008). An aspect that elicited little disagreement in politics was the financing of the Delta Programme via the Delta Fund, but not so much whether a Delta Programme was really necessary (Chavannes, 2008). In addition, there was some critique about the need to improve the safety level for all dike-enclosed areas by a factor of at least 10, and some warned that the committee's focus was too much on preventive measures, rather than on the exposure and vulnerability measures commonly used in water engineering (Chavannes, 2008; Warner & Vink, 2008). However, apart from these secondary points, the overall frame presented, problem definition, diagnosed causes, moral judgements and suggested remedies were accepted relatively easily and quickly (Anonymous, 2008e; Van Kalles, 2008a, 2008b). Most importantly, the political target group supported the recommendations and helped set the political agenda.

The Prime Minister at the time said, ‘The government takes on the challenge’ (Anonymous, 2008e), after which he announced the establishment of a Delta Act and Delta Fund: ‘If we take on the challenge wisely, the Netherlands will become stronger through this struggle with water ... [The report] forces us to face facts about what must be done in the Netherlands to maintain water safety’ (Anonymous, 2008e). The Secretary of State for Transport, Public Works and Water Management agreed with the message the committee presented:

we must take action now and not wait for the next disaster. Let 2008 go down in history as the year in which the future of this low country was placed high on the agenda. (Anonymous, 2008b)

Within nine days, the Cabinet presented an official statement embracing the challenges posed by the Delta Committee and announcing the
National Water Plan, *Delta Act*, Delta Programme and Delta Commissioner (Brief van de staatssecretaris van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2008; Nationaal Waterplan 2009-2015, 2009). Most opposition parties in the parliament also accepted the frame of the committee (Anonymous, 2008e). Moreover, there was no opposing coalition of actors who tried to raise attention for a contesting frame. However, it is possible that the advice on the coming Delta Decisions will elicit more controversy (Vink et al., 2013). That remains to be seen, since the Delta Commissioner has already taken a more level-headed and incremental approach, called ‘adaptive delta management’, that avoids short-term drastic measures (Zevenbergen et al., 2013). The Delta Commissioner has also taken time to create co-ownership of the Delta Programme by involving stakeholders in its implementation (Deltacommissaris website, 2011).

With regard to the committee’s reporting and reception, I conclude that this was a great success due to the employed framing strategies. However, as indicated, it cannot be ascribed solely to the committee’s framing strategies, since the composition of the committee, the team building and the external positioning and networking also contributed considerably to its effectiveness in setting the public, policy and political agenda.

### 4.4 Conclusion

This case study shows that a single policy entrepreneur, as the Delta Committee has been regarded, can effectively set the agenda for policy change. No strongly opposing policy entrepreneurs or actors were witnessed. I contend that the committee has been successful in setting the agenda by cleverly exploiting various framing and networking strategies.

The case study revealed that framing strategies were closely related and used in an integrated and intertwined matter. Narratives, symbols, rhetoric and crises were used in cooperation to adhere to the climate adaptation narrative, build on the story of the delta identity, create a sense of urgency and collectiveness, and create a crisis narrative due to the absence of a concrete and recent crisis event. The committee obviously sought an integral, adaptive and flexible approach, given its responsiveness to economic welfare, tourism, nature, ecology, landscape and culture. The facts, examples, figures and images were all presented in such a way as to strengthen the committee’s main assumption and frame that climate change is a pressing issue to which the country must adapt. This resulted in a coherent frame in which water safety and climate change had the highest priority as a matter of national interest that should be protected, at arm’s length, against daily politics. The story of the delta identity, constructed with the ‘story of social control’ and ‘story of decline and crisis’, was convincing enough to set the public, policy and political agenda. It helped resonate with people’s perception of the society’s relationship with water. The result
was a public sense of urgency and a political call for action and policy change. There was significant consensus between all kinds of actors that there is urgency to join forces, take action and ‘work together with water’ (Veerman, 2008).

To realise this effective employment of framing strategies, the committee was keen to align its framing (Snow et al., 1986). Frame bridging was practised by linking climate change to water safety. Frame amplification was sought by making extensive use of symbols, stories and crisis rhetoric to invigorate the committee’s frame. Additionally, frame extension and broadening was realised by not only focusing on the Dutch flood protection water defence system, but also viewing the issues at stake from a national perspective, which helped create the urgency and collectiveness needed. Frame transformation was sought by boldly recommending setting aside between €1.2 to €1.9 billion yearly, outside the normal governmental budgets, to implement the recommendations the coming decades. Surprisingly, most recommendations were more like a recombination of currently existing ideas on dealing with climate change and water safety, rather than a completely innovative transformative set of ideas: continuing the Room for the River programme, applying sand suppletion, strengthening dikes and so forth. The recombination of currently existing ideas was the result of ongoing interactions, both formally and informally, with community groups, experts and policymakers from multiple government levels. Some ideas were incorporated in the committee’s frame, while other ideas were dropped and considered no-go areas. This would not have happened if the committee had not employed networking strategies.

Therefore, this case revealed that framing in itself was not sufficient to successfully set the agenda for policy change. In addition to its framing strategies, the committee employed various networking strategies. Committee members and supporting staff were carefully selected based on expertise, proven track record and quality, but also on access to various arenas and reputed resources, such as the KNMI. Building and maintaining team spirit and consensus on the task helped the committee create a grand vision and develop abstract, yet sufficiently specific, recommendations that all committee members could support. While there was some disagreement, this did not lead to members publishing a minority position. Alongside team building, the committee was keen to involve a broad array of actors and networks: scientists, policymakers, experts and politicians. Continued interactions took place to tackle conflicts or highlight popular policy ideas and gradually build arguments. Without the committee’s teambuilding and deliberate external positioning, the committee would have had a hard time defending its recommendations in the wake of the publication of the report.

While the framing and networking strategies were crucial in setting the agenda successfully, there were also two important contextual factors. First, the national government acted as an initiator of setting
the agenda, as it drafted an assignment and established a committee. Apart from one high-ranked civil servant who had become the secretary of the committee, none of the other committee members or supporting staff were involved in the founding of the committee. In other words, it seems highly unlikely that any of the committee members or actors involved would have tried to set the agenda on their own. The national government created the opportunity for the committee to set the agenda—a change in the political stream induced and enabled the agenda setting.

Here, one can see the application of the mobilisation model as explained by Cobb et al. (1976) because the decision makers tried to expand the issue of climate change and water safety from the political to the policy and public agendas, and to mobilise various societal stakeholders. Although I do not have sufficient empirical data to support this claim, it seems to have been a deliberate strategy by the national government to lay the ground to implement a national Delta Programme with a Delta Commissioner who will make some crucial Delta Decisions on climate adaptation and water safety in the coming years. Without the support and compliance of various local and regional actors, such as municipalities, provinces, water boards and Rijkswaterstaat, implementation was doomed to fail. As the committee’s recommendations have shown, trade-offs have to be made, whereby a sense of urgency and collectiveness is needed, and regional, local and individual interests have to take a back seat.

The second contextual factor that mattered was—strangely enough—the absence of recent crisis. As has been argued, while this would normally be experienced by a policy entrepreneur as an imposition and constraint, the committee, against the odds, successfully used it to turn the situation to its advantage. The committee exploited the opportunity to frame its own crisis narrative. The committee recalled a number of historical examples and recent examples elsewhere, and pointed out possible future disasters due to current climate change trends. Surprisingly, the crisis narrative was not severely contested and relatively easily adopted by the various recipients. What contributed to this strong presentation of the frame were the visual tools used by the committee. The use of an experienced moviemaker who created a compelling film and helped invigorate the frame of the committee proved helpful in setting the agenda. Here, the phrase ‘a picture is worth a thousand words’ clearly applies because the images presented in the movie helped create a sense of urgency and call for action.

The above success story does not imply that all recommendations of the committee have been followed. The Delta Commissioner responsible for the Delta Programme takes a relatively level-headed approach by not adopting the worst-case scenario presented by the Delta Committee. Additionally, the sense of urgency and effect of climate change are not felt significantly anymore. At the time of writing, European crises, financial crisis, healthcare, employment and other
domestic affairs are being discussed on the policy and political agenda. However, the major and most important achievement and effect of the committee remains to be the agenda setting of institutionalising a *Delta Act*, Delta Fund and Delta Programme with a Delta Commissioner. All of these latter political-administrative, legal and financial recommendations were packed into Recommendation 12. The first 11 recommendations seem to have served as a strategy for setting the agenda and paving the way to implement the aforementioned most influential recommendations.
NA TURE DE VE LO P MEN T
‘What’s the most resilient form of parasite? An idea. An idea has the power to build a city ... to change the world, and re-write all the rules ... and that’s why I need to steal it.

Leonardo DiCaprio in the movie Inception (2010)
Figure 5.1: The drafted plan for the Oostvaarderswold as being part of the Oostvaardersland.
5.1 Introduction
The present case study concerns a small group of policy entrepreneurs who collectively set the agenda for nature development. This group has been successful in setting the public, policy and political agenda and, to a certain extent, changing nature policy from nature preservation to nature development. There has been no considerable public opposition from opposing policy entrepreneurs, although the context did not always favour the effective employment of the framing and networking strategies. Some of the plans presented under the umbrella of nature development have already been or are currently being implemented, while others have been cancelled or altered. To understand the transformation from nature preservation to nature development and the strategies employed by the policy entrepreneurs, this discussion begins in the 1990s.

In the 1990s, after a long tradition of nature preservation, Dutch nature policy gradually adopted a new policy concept called ‘nature development’. Until then, nature policy in the Netherlands mainly focused on preserving natural values as these were known before 1850, when Dutch society underwent large-scale industrialisation, urbanisation and intensified land use (Keulartz, 1999; Keulartz, Van der Windt & Swart, 2004). However, according to a handful of academic researchers and civil servants in the then Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries and the Directorate-General for Transport, Public Works and Water Management, it was time to break with this past.

First, they believed nature should not be preserved, but restored through the facilitation of natural processes. Second, nature restoration or development should not refer to a pre-industrial stage from the mid-nineteenth century, but to a pre-human era. This group argued that human domestication of the landscape has made humankind forget what real or primeval nature was like. Third, areas for nature development should be clearly separated from other, conflicting forms of land use—particularly agriculture. The latter meant a break with practices in which nature preservation was interwoven with other functions. However, the governmental departments then responsible for nature preservation still advocated a conservationist approach, and were not particularly receptive to these ideas. Hence, this small group of individuals sought other ways to place large-scale nature development on the agenda. Eventually, they were relatively successful, with the concept of nature development adopted in policy documents from the late 1980 onwards, and gradually implemented into concrete policy plans as of the 1990s (see below).

Other scholars, ranging from natural sciences, such as (landscape) ecology, to philosophy of sciences, comprehensively discussed the concepts and values of nature development, ecological restoration, creative conservation and the like. In this case study, the scientific background and context of these concepts are briefly touched on. Instead of focusing on the meaning, ontology and methodology of these
concepts, I focus on their advocacy and strategies employed to share these concepts and mobilise support. Earlier accounts of the role of policy entrepreneurs in the water policy domain (De Jonge & Van der Windt, 2007; Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a; Ploegmakers, 2008; see Chapter 4) proved useful because changes in Dutch nature policies cannot be understood without addressing the dynamics within the water policy domain. First, I sketch how the concept of nature development influenced governmental policies and implementation through the past decades. Subsequently, an analysis is made of the policy entrepreneurs’ framing and networking strategies, after which the findings are discussed in the conclusion.

5.2 Policy on nature development

5.2.1 International and European discourses on nature development
‘Nature development’ is regarded the Dutch counterpart of international and European discourses on ‘ecological restoration’ and related concepts. Ecological restoration is defined ‘as the complete structural and functional return of an ecosystem to a pre-disturbance state’ (Adams, Perrow & Carpenter, 2004, p. 1934). It is about assisted recovery to accelerate natural processes by creating conditions that might take years, decades or even centuries to occur without human disturbance (Higgs, 2003). While the history of ecological restoration in the United States dates back as far as the 1930s, its current popularity stems from the mid-1980s (Adams et al., 2004). Since then, ecological restoration has also gained momentum in other regions, such as the United Kingdom (Battershill & Gilg, 1996; Eden, Tunstall & Tapsell, 2000; Sheail, Trewick & Mountford, 1997), Denmark (Pedersen, 2010), Hungary (Lipschutz & Mayer, 1996) and Belgium (Bogaert, 2004; Bogaert & Gersie, 2006). However, the concepts may differ, with ecological restoration sometimes also labelled ‘creative conservation’ (Battershill & Gilg, 1996; Sheail et al., 1997), ‘habitat creation’ (Van der Heijden, 2005) and so forth.

Since ecological restoration and related concepts deliberately oppose traditional ecological preservation discourses, their introduction provoked fierce debate in the academic arena. Two issues were mainly at stake. First was the relationship between restoration and conservation, the naturalness of ‘preserved’ and ‘restored’ nature, and so forth (Bijker, 2004; Birch, 1990; Chapman, 2006; Elliot, 1997; Higgs, 1997; Katz, 1992; Light & Higgs, 1993; O’Brien & McIvor, 2007; Swart, Van der Windt & Keulartz, 2001; Turnhout, Hisschemöller & Eijsackers, 2004; Van der Heijden, 2005). Second, the question was raised whether ‘developing nature’, which appears to be a *contradictio in terminis*, is possible at all (Drenthen, 2009a, 2009b, 2013; Drenthen, Keulartz & Proctor, 2009; Keulartz, van Der Windt & Swart, 2004; Ladkin, 2005). Chapman (2006) refers to the latter debate as the ‘paradox of restoration’ because ecological restoration inevitably urges for human intervention.
The debate in the Netherlands largely echoed these international debates and centred on the opposition between the well-known ‘conservation discourse’ and the newly emerging ‘nature development discourse’. The opposition between these was fuelled by a long-standing debate on the spatial claims that these divergent discourses implied: the interweaving versus the separation of functions, particularly vis-à-vis agricultural land use (Koppen, 2002; Van der Heijden, 2005; Van der Windt, 1995). The conservation discourse takes as a point of reference the cultural landscape of around 1850, which was strongly influenced by agricultural land use (Keulartz, 1999; Van der Heijden, 2005; Van der Windt, 1995). It thereby acknowledges a certain degree of interwoven cultural and natural landscapes. Nature preservation then would entail the restoration of habitats and landscapes, including heaths, chalk grasslands, hedges, trees, ditches and so forth.

The advocates of nature development strongly oppose this pre-industrial, yet agricultural, landscape as a benchmark; they envisage developing nature from a pre-human perspective, with the reference being ‘how nature in the Netherlands might be under the present climatologically and bio-geographical conditions, if ecosystems were not affected by all kinds of cultivation measures’ (Baerselman & Vera, 1989, p. 25). This benchmark asks for careful reconstruction based on historical evidence and unaffected ecosystems in neighbouring countries (Baerselman & Vera, 1989; Helmer, Litjens & Overmars, 1995; Overmars & Helmer, 1998). In any case, it does not tolerate any interweaving with agricultural functions. Rather, it implies the reintroduction of wild animals and (large) herbivores, such as the European bison, other primitive bovines, horses, beavers and wolves. Further, this discourse implies the redesigning of large rivers by removing embankments, digging out clay and gravel depositions, and creating side channels in ancient river branches. As discussed below, the above discourse largely excludes coalitions with any agricultural interests, while leaving opportunities for coalitions in the water management domain.

5.2.2 Nature development in Dutch policy
In 1977, nature development was first mentioned in the Third Memorandum on Spatial Planning—the ‘Memorandum Rural Areas’ (Nota Landelijke Gebieden, 1977). A few years later, nature development became formally acknowledged in the 1981 Nature and Landscape Conservation Plan (Beleidsvoornemen Structuurschema Natuur- en Landschapsbehoed, 1981) that suggested including nature development as a goal for future policy. In 1990, the ‘Nature Policy Plan’ (Natuurbeleidsplan, 1990) considered nature development as a means to create the earlier mentioned EHS—an ecological network of large connected nature areas. In the Nature Policy Plan, and subsequent policy documents, nature development was described as ‘a complex of human interventions in nature and the landscape and regulation of practical activities aimed at desirable ecological development’ (Baerselman & Vera, 1995, p. 7).
In 2000, the next governmental plan, which replaced the 1990 Nature Policy Plan (Natuurbeleidsplan, 1990), was the memorandum ‘Nature for People, People for Nature’ (Natuur voor mensen mensen voor natuur, 2000). This suggested continuing implementing the EHS and making additional robust nature corridors to further improve the mobility and interaction of animal species across Dutch nature areas. The overall EHS was to become the cornerstone of Dutch nature policies for the decades to come, aimed at creating large nature reserves interlinked with green corridors. However, in a context of lower environmental concern and budget cuts, the 2012 ‘Nature Agreement’ (Uitvoeringsafspraken decentralisatie natuur, 2012) between the national government and provinces concluded on a firm devolution of competencies towards the provinces, with a substantially decreased budget, causing a much slower implementation of the ecological network.

Nature development and its accompanying concept of an ecological network also influenced spatial planning policies, as witnessed in the 1988 ‘Fourth Memorandum on Spatial Planning’ (Vierde nota over de ruimtelijke ordening, 1988) and 1993 ‘Policy Plan on Green Spaces’ (Structuurschema Groene Ruimte, 1993). However, the most profound effect of the concept is observed in the area of water management regarding the major rivers. Nature development in the riverine areas was first adopted in the fairly environmentally focused 1989 ‘Third Memorandum on Water Management’ (Derde Nota Waterhuishouding, 1989) and further elaborated in the 1991 ‘Fourth Memorandum on Spatial Planning Extra’ (Stuurgroep Nadere Uitwerking Rivierengebied, 1991; Vierde nota over de ruimtelijke ordening Extra, 1990). In 1996, the government launched a new river policy entitled ‘Room for the River’ (Beleidslijn Ruimte voor de rivier, 1996). This enlarged the total river area by digging side channels and excavating clay and sand deposits in the river floodplains, which became a central part of a new strategy for guaranteeing water safety (Beleidslijn grote rivieren, 2006; Planologische Kernbeslissing Deel 4 Ruimte voor de Rivier 2007; Rooij, Klijn & Higler, 2000). As described below, Room for the River also meant providing room for nature development because the advocates of these convergent discourses forged an influential coalition.

5.3 Framing and networking strategies
This section discusses the framing and networking strategies employed by a small group of individual policy entrepreneurs. The strategies that were employed cover a couple of decades; thus, I have chosen to discuss the course of events and employment of the framing and networking as chronologically as possible. Additionally, by presenting the empirical analysis in this form, the case study invigorates the finding of the previous case study on the Second Delta Committee, which states that framing and networking strategies are often used in an integrated and intertwined manner.
5.3.1 Triggers for a new concept: The Oostvaardersplassen

Vera and Baerselman, two civil servants at the then Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij), were greatly influenced by a sequence of events in the Oostvaardersplassen during the 1970s. This large wetland area emerged quasi-spontaneously after the creation of the Southern Flevopolder. This Oostvaardersplassen area was initially, in 1968, planned as an industrial park. However, it was left alone and not drained due to the lack of investments in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis (Wigbels, 2003). Yet, while policymakers did nothing, birds claimed the area as their summer habitat. The invasion of grey geese particularly proved to be key in this ecosystem, as the geese prevented the area from turning into a swamp forest (Vera, 1988). In addition, dynamic water fluctuations in the lowest area of the polder allowed natural processes to develop, and gave birth to this nature area (Vera, 1979a). These developments delivered evidence that it was possible to create or facilitate nature, and that, under the right circumstances, it was possible for former ecosystems to re-emerge and develop nature (Baerselman & Vera, 1989; Cörvers, 2001, p. 25; Van der Heijden, 2005).

Based on this evidence, in 1979, Vera wrote a public article to reach the policymakers and politicians in The Hague (Pruntel, 2007; Vera, 1979b). The then head of the governmental agency responsible for the polders (Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders—RIJP) was delighted by the article because he hoped it would convince nature conservation organisations to support the plans to create the final polder, the Markerwaard, and build new nature areas there. However, Vera’s article had the opposite effect: it convinced nature proponents that the Oostvaardersplassen were here to stay, whereas the creation of the last polder would do more damage than good to nature. In the article, Vera also framed the Oostvaardersplassen as a ‘unique ecological experiment’ that spatial planning should leave alone (Pruntel, 2007, p. 24; Vera, 1979a). He also undertook a study for the National Forest Service (Staatsbosbeheer) of the possibilities to further develop the ecosystem in the Oostvaardersplassen (Vera, 1980). Throughout the 1980s, Vera continued working for Staatsbosbeheer and the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, strengthening his argument for the Oostvaardersplassen, and starting to collaborate with other policy entrepreneurs (who will be discussed below).

When, in 1986, the Oostvaardersplassen became a state monument and Staatsbosbeheer was made responsible for its management, nature development was the guiding concept (Beheerscommissie Oostvaardersplassen, 1987, 1995). Nature was regarded as a ‘creative power, flexible and resourceful, if we give it space and time’ (Wigbels, 2003, p. 7). While some human intervention was deemed necessary, its management is still largely based on nature’s spontaneous development.
In other words, the Oostvaardersplassen increasingly became the emblematic area of Dutch nature development.

In 1989, Vera and Baerselman launched a proposal for an ecological network—the aforementioned EHS—including current and yet to be developed large-scale nature areas and ecological corridors disentangled from competing forms of land use (Baerselman & Vera, 1989, pp. 45–48). Their report was published by the ministry as an annex document to the 1990 Nature Policy Plan, heralding a formal acknowledgement that placed nature development and the EHS on the agenda. Academia enthusiastically embraced these concepts, as they were the Dutch counterparts of an already ongoing scientific debate, as discussed in the previous section. However, within the ministry, the study elicited discussion. Some stakeholders, including the executive chiefs of department and opposing traditional conservation-minded bureaucrats, considered nature development too radical (De Jong, 1999). Nevertheless, nature development and the EHS were incorporated quite successfully into Dutch policies.

Part of this successful setting of the policy and political agenda could be ascribed to the way these policy entrepreneurs framed the concepts of nature development and EHS in traditionally scientific, modernist and technical terms, deliberately close to the language of the responsible policymakers. For similar reasons, Vera (1995) and colleagues (in Vera’s doctorate thesis) carefully framed and legitimised nature development in scientific and managerial terms as a sound and feasible policy goal. Consequently, they often referred to scientific concepts such as the ‘theory of island biogeography’ (De Boer, Kuindersma, Van der Zouwen & Van Tatenhove, 2008; Keulartz, 1999; MacArthur & Wilson, 1967).

In the final 1990 Nature Policy Plan, nature development was less extensively elaborated than Vera and Baerselman had hoped for, and some of the ideas were taken out (Van der Windt, 1995, p. 205). As an annex, their study was acknowledged, yet presented as exploratory research. As a result, the concept and its proposed separation of nature and agriculture were not fully incorporated in the final policy document. In contrast, some large areas of extensive agricultural land were included in the ecological network, such as 10,000 hectares of ‘agricultural management areas’ (Cörvers, 2001, p. 26; Koppen, 2002).

In summary, rather than substituting traditional preservation with nature development, the 1990 Nature Policy Plan considers nature development a complementary strategy. Against the wishes of Vera and Baerselman, nature conservation would remain the main goal in nature policy. The two entrepreneurs did not hesitate to publicise their discontent. Vera (as cited in Schmit, 2003) later stated in a newspaper article:

In the Nature Policy Plan of 1990, the concept of the ecological network was endorsed, but the principle of division in functions
was neglected. The ecological principles were partly left out, and in regions of the EHS other activities are allowed, such as forestry for timber production, military sites and agriculture. The appealing power of the Nature Policy Plan is currently used to legitimise damage to nature.

Even though the policy entrepreneurs were dissatisfied, I still assess this as a successful setting of the public, policy and political agendas, since the concept of nature development did have a profound effect on Dutch policy and decision making. Within a short time, the EHS became the centrepiece of the Nature Policy Plan (De Boer et al., 2008); was enthusiastically embraced by nature conservation academics; and gave rise to a series of symposia, conferences and scientific publications, followed shortly by the implementation of (parts of) the EHS.

Baerselman remained a civil servant for years and, in 1997, was seconded to set up the new international World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) Large Herbivore Initiative (Van ‘t Hoog, 2010). Vera stayed with Staatsbosbeheer and was partly responsible for the visionary management plans for the Oostvaardersplassen until 2011 (Staatsbosbeheer, 2008). Vera, while critical about the Nature Policy Plan, remained enthusiastic about his ‘love child’—the Oostvaardersplassen (Schreuder, 2005). For example, he stated that, ‘when we are guiding foreign delegations through the area, they always conclude that if nature development is possible within the neatly planned Netherlands, it should be possible in their country as well’ (Van den Berg, 2004). The Oostvaardersplassen would remain the prime example of nature development as advocated by the policy entrepreneurs.
In 2013, a stylistic documentary on the Oostvaardersplassen was broadcast in Dutch cinema and watched by over 100,000 people after one week, and over 600,000 after two months (De nieuwe wildernis website, 2013). The public and most movie critics were amazed by the beauty of the nature in the Oostvaardersplassen (Beekman, 2013; Coevert, 2013) and there were critical reviews and columns in newspapers arguing that the negative effects of developing nature in the Oostvaardersplassen were not given any attention (Schaper, 2013a, 2013b; Schoonen, 2013; Zeilmaker, 2013). Vera (2013) responded angrily and defensively, arguing that the critics did not know what they were talking about. Further, Vera seized the opportunity to make a public plea to nominate the Oostvaardersplassen for a place on the UNESCO World Heritage List (Anonymous, 2013). There is probably not much that would make Vera more proud than getting the Oostvaardersplassen on that list.

5.3.2 Developing and disseminating radical ideas on the major rivers
While Vera and Baerselman were successful in setting nature development on the agenda of nature policy, their biggest success was accomplished in the field of water management—in the management of the major rivers. The idea of nature development along the major rivers dates back to 1985, when the then newly established EO Wijers Foundation issued a landscape design competition for the rivers area. Vera, together with Overmars, De Bruin, Hamhuis, Van Nieuwenhuijze and Sijmons, seized the opportunity to draft and submit ‘Plan Stork’ in their spare time (De Bruin et al., 1986). The name of the plan refers to the habitat of the black stork that once populated the Dutch rivers area (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a). Building on the events in the Oostvaardersplassen, and accompanied by Vera and Baerselman’s action, this plan furthered the concept of nature development, but framed it in the context of landscape design and river management. Plan Stork comprehended a new spatial configuration of the Dutch major rivers area, and was strongly rooted in the realm of nature development, with the Oostvaardersplassen still the emblematic example. The plan essentially aimed to re-naturalise the river floodplains, which had been transformed into agricultural land, but also had a container full of other ideas meant to inspire the public, policymakers and politicians. To give the EO Wijers jury and any other reader an impression of how nature development along the rivers could look, Plan Stork included designs for the major rivers and showed where nature development could be implemented. Additionally, it included pictures of major rivers in Europe to show how the rivers could and should appear. Plan Stork won the competition, which led to a stream of positive responses and became a source of inspiration (see below).

Plan Stork led to a series of pilot projects along the Rhine and Meuse rivers (e.g. Helmer, Litjens & Overmars, 1991; Helmer, Meissner, Overmars & Van Winden, 1999; Helmer, Overmars & Litjens, 1990;
Helmer & Smeets, 1987; Litjens, Helmer & Overmars, 1994, 1996; Litjens, Helmer, Van Winden & Overmars, 2000; Overmars, Helmer & Litjens, 1994; Overmars, Litjes & Helmer, 1990; Van Winden, Overmars & Braakhekke, 2003; Van Winden, Overmars & Litjens, 1998). Simultaneously, these projects created venues where advocates met and discussed nature development and its effects, and where scientific concepts were demonstrated and multiplied onto a larger audience (Anonymous, 2004; Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a). Images of the Oostvaardersplassen as the prime example of nature development were often shown to impress the public with the potential of nature development. Overmars rightly said that the plan and the pilot projects caused a ‘conversational drift’ (LNV website, 2011) among a larger class of individuals in the Netherlands, such as policymakers at municipalities, who also became passionate about nature development.

One example is the city of Arnhem, which commissioned Overmars to develop a plan for the floodplains near the city in line with the Plan Stork philosophy, which would become the country’s first large urban nature development project (Overmars et al., 1990). Overmars subsequently involved others in his endeavour, multiplying the ideas onto other places. Eventually, the collaboration between the policy entrepreneurs resulted in the establishment of the landscape consultancy bureau, Stroming (in English: ‘Flow’), and the related management company association, ARK—as in Noah’s ark. These organisations and their names are not only part of a framing strategy but also of a networking strategy, as resources were shared between them (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a). The policy entrepreneurs translated scientific concepts into policy concepts, and the latter were translated as main fields of expertise and investments of the two companies. All these framing and networking strategies proved highly influential.

However, in addition to the success and considerable support, there was also criticism, not least from the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries. Some politicians were concerned about nature development gaining momentum and leading to developing nature at the expense of agricultural land. Due to the critical mood within the ministry, some of the policy entrepreneurs decided to quit their job at the ministry (De Jonge & Van der Windt, 2007). In contrast, nature development, including its operationalisation in Plan Stork, was endorsed by the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. This support was largely due to the personal interactions between the then Minister Smit-Kroes and De Bruin—the first author of Plan Stork and employee at the ministry (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a; Ploegmakers, 2008). The other authors of Plan Stork deliberately and strategically requested the help of De Bruin because they knew that, if they were to convince the water management sector, they would need the support and involvement of a water expert.

De Bruijn, who had direct contact with Smit-Kroes during several trips abroad, managed to discuss with the minister the policy
entrepreneurs’ ideas on nature development along the rivers (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a; Ploegmakers, 2008). As a result, about six months after Plan Stork was published, the minister announced the decision to puncture a number of river dikes (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a). This attracted a great deal of media attention and surprised both the national and international community. However, the minister was misunderstood by journalists because she was only referring to the summer dikes, which are the lower dikes that are closest to the river, and not—in terms of water safety—the most important winter dikes (Ploegmakers, 2008). Another important event was Smit-Kroes’s visit to the site of one of the few river sand dunes in the Netherlands that were being moved by river managers to support farmers’ interests (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a; Ploegmakers, 2008). De Bruin convinced Smit-Kroes that this was unnecessary, and she subsequently requested that the provincial deputy stop the move. Many regard Smit-Kroes as an ambassador for nature development (De Jonge & Van der Windt, 2007; Ploegmakers, 2008), and her political commitment and support culminated in the aforementioned ambitious and environmentally friendly national river management policy document under the 1989 Third Memorandum on Water Management (Derde Nota Waterhuishouding, 1989) and 1991 Fourth Memorandum on Spatial Planning Extra (Stuurgroep Nadere Uitwerking Rivierengebied, 1991; Vierde nota over de ruimtelijke ordening Extra, 1990).

While the ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management—via its Minister Smit-Kroes—proved an important supporter of the ideas presented in Plan Stork, most traditional nature conservation organisations were initially not particularly enthusiastic about them, like the policymakers at the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries. The exception was the Dutch branch of Bird Life International. Nature development’s unpopularity among traditional nature conservation organisations changed in the early 1990s when the new Dutch WWF chairperson, Nijpels—the former Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment—proposed to focus on the banks of the rivers Meuse and Rhine (De Jonge & Van der Windt, 2007; De Ruiter, 1995; Ploegmakers, 2008). The WWF published the ‘Living Rivers Plan’ in 1992 (Helmer et al., 1992) to further the nature development concept along rivers (De Ruiter, 1995). Living Rivers was an elaboration of Plan Stork, written mainly by members of Stroming. Thus, the policy entrepreneurs increasingly broadened their network and engaged in forging coalitions with others. Non-government organisations (NGOs) such as WWF were among them, rapidly followed by market agencies, such as the clay and gravel industry (fabricating stone from river clay) and the Royal Dutch Touring Club (Koninklijke Nederlandse Toeristenbond—ANWB) (Anonymous, 2004). This was a coalition of convenience, since mineral extraction was now framed as an important financial resource for nature development, whereas earlier gravel extractors had been blamed for spoiling the river landscape (De Ruiter, 1995; Schmit, 1995).
While Plan Stork already included this reframing, Living Rivers elaborated it by providing precise calculations. The ANWB became involved because it forecasted opportunities for new forms of tourism.

Living Rivers was presented while the Boertien committee was at work, which was no coincidence. This advisory committee was installed in 1992 by the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management to overcome the impasse between ‘dike builders’ and river landscape preservationists regarding dike reinforcement (De Jonge & Van der Windt, 2007; Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a; Wiering & Driessen, 2001; Wiering & Immink, 2006). The Boertien committee embraced the Living Rivers suggestions as a long-term contribution to water safety. Nijpels, as a member of this committee, exploited the new venue of the Boertien committee to fully endorse this alternative approach to water safety along the rivers (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a; Ploegmakers, 2008). Even though the committee accepted this Living Rivers/WWF idea, it did not help set the national political agenda until the high waters occurred in the country’s major rivers in 1993 and 1995. These high waters, which resulted in massive evacuations and public attention, created a policy window that resulted in a reframing of water safety, allowing alternative approaches to water safety other than mere dike reinforcements (see Chapter 4).

On 8 February 1995, only two days after the last evacuees returned, Nijpels again suggested the approach presented in Living Rivers as the best way to deal with river floods. Two weeks later, the WWF presented a specific list of locations where water safety enhancements and nature development could operate together, and suggested that the new Delta Plan that was under consideration by politics should not focus solely on strengthening dikes, but encompass the river area as a whole (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a; Ploegmakers, 2008). In the aftermath of the high waters, which are regarded as crises or focusing events, Nijpels and the WWF did not frame the then predominant policy of dike reinforcements as a policy failure, but rather invigorated the benefits of coupling dike reinforcements with nature development (Ploegmakers, 2008). The clever timing and smart framing proved effective, partly because it was combined with networking. The WWF arranged for a visit by the then Dutch Prime Minister Kok to one of the locations featured in their alternative approach (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a; Ploegmakers, 2008). Kok was impressed and suggested incorporating the WWF approach in the new Delta Plan and Delta Act for the Major Rivers, with the main conditions that water safety would not be compromised and the implementation would not cause any delays (Ploegmakers, 2008).

These alternative approaches to the management of the major rivers were institutionalised in the 1995 Delta Plan and Delta Act for the Major Rivers and the 1996 Room for the River policy. In the same period, Rijkswaterstaat had gradually become more receptive to ecological solutions, partly due to an inflow of biologists and ecologists
(see the ‘ecological turn’ discussed in the previous chapter). Water management engineers gradually took a more positive stance on the potential gains in linking water safety and nature development policy (e.g. Luiten, as cited in Feddes, 2012, p. 19). This was partly caused by the policy entrepreneurs’ strategies and the strategic intervention of the WWF (De Jong, 1999; Van der Windt, 1995). However, this is not to say that someone like Vera, who was one of the first pioneers in nature development, was completely satisfied. Vera remained critical about Dutch river policies because, rather than digging out the floodplains, he preferred to relocate dikes in order to create even greater opportunities for nature development (Schmit, 1993; Vera, 1993).

5.3.3 Implementing the EHS and its robust green corridors
Although the Oostvaardersplassen and the riverine areas offer the most outstanding examples of nature development in the Netherlands thus far, the implementation of the ecological network EHS is relevant as well. From 1990 to 2010, successive cabinets embraced the idea to further develop the EHS. However, while the concept is generally perceived as successful (e.g. Willems & De Zeeuw, as cited in Feddes, 2012), the discussion on its interpretation continues, particularly with regard to agriculture. Most advocates of the concept, including Vera, persistently claim that areas designated for nature development should be clearly separated from other forms of land use—notably agriculture (Schimmelpenninck, 2000; Schmit, 2003; Schreuder, 2000; Vera, 1993). Therefore, despite the rather stable policy aimed at both preserving and creating nature in the Oostvaardersplassen and the riverine area, policy implementation in rural areas turned out more problematic.

As indicated in the previous sections, the policy entrepreneurs deliberately engaged in framing and networking to win support for nature development in the Oostvaardersplassen and along the main rivers. With regard to the latter, they even succeeded in reaching package deals with tourist organisations and sand and clay industries to which nature development was presented as a win-win situation. This turned out to be far more difficult in dry rural areas, where it was much harder to find parties who would gain from nature development if agricultural land use remained out of the question. In 1998, new evaluation studies indicated that the ecological corridors, which had been initially proposed in 1990, would not suffice to realise the interaction and mobility across the targeted Dutch nature areas. In response to these evaluation studies, the 2000 Nature for People, People for Nature memorandum (Natuur voor mensen mensen voor natuur, 2000) proposed robust corridors that had to be wider—thus implying even more land use claims—and better protected. As a consequence, the competition for scarce land became fiercer after 2000.

Despite the difficulties, some ambitious local plans built on the idea to create robust nature corridors. Unsurprisingly, one of these plans
related to the greatest symbol of nature development in the Netherlands—the Oostvaardersplassen. Under supervision of the province of Flevoland, Staatsbosbeheer, municipalities, nature organisations and land owners drafted plans to create a robust connection between the Oostvaardersplassen and—via the Horsterworld—the largest Dutch forest area, the Veluwe (MCWStudios, 2010). This connection, called the Oostvaarderswold, would enable the migration of large herbivores (Schmit, 2001; Schreuder, 2001). Together, the Oostvaardersplassen, Oostvaarderswold and Horsterworld were named the Oostvaardersland. The province of Flevoland succeeded in reaching an agreement with the national government on the funding of the project, while ARK issued a report on its strategic development and management. Vera, the alleged godfather of the Oostvaardersplassen, was (of course) also consulted (ARK Natuurontwikkeling, 2010).

In the first years of the twenty-first century, the perspectives for realising the Oostvaarderswold were very promising. However, this changed after 2005, when parliament discussed the necessity and feasibility of the robust corridors, as proposed in the 1990 Nature Policy Plan (Natuurbeleidsplan, 1990) and the 2000 Nature for People, People for Nature memorandum (Natuur voor mensen mensen voor natuur, 2000). Moreover, farmers, who would have to give up their land for the robust corridors, started to protest (Anonymous, 2006a, 2010i; Bogaert & Gersie, 2006; Janssen, 2010a, 2010b; Severt, 2007a, 2007b). The farmers were supported by some members of parliament, such as Schreijer-Pierik—a farmer herself—who complained: ‘Deer get freedom, while farmers are put behind fences’ (Severt, 2007b). Another member of parliament, Koppejan, argued that the most beautiful nature is often agricultural land. This made Vera angry, who stated that it was appalling that this member of parliament ‘dares to demonstrate his ignorance’ (Janssen, 2008). In Vera’s vision, farmers are only doing harm to nature and thus are the last people on earth able to contribute to it.

In 2010, when a new government was installed, the political context changed. Bleker, the newly appointed State Secretary for Agriculture and Nature Management, strongly believed in ‘farmers’ nature’ and the national government no longer wanted to give up agricultural land for nature development (Ariese, 2010; Broer & Vanheste, 2011; Folmer & Piersma, 2011; Van Roessel, 2011; Wams, 2010). This resulted, among other things, in the national government’s withdrawal of financial support for robust corridors, such as the Oostvaarderswold (Anonymous, 2011n; Karimi, 2010). Nevertheless, the province of Flevoland—still a strong supporter of the Oostvaarderswold—wanted to continue with the implementation. Local farmers opposed the provincial plan for the Oostvaarderswold at the Dutch Administrative Council of State, arguing that the plan was no longer financially feasible and should be

‘DEER GET FREEDOM, WHILE FARMERS ARE PUT BEHIND FENCES’
cancelled accordingly. In March 2012, the Council of State ruled in favour of the farmers and assessed the plan as being unfeasible (Raad van State, 2012a). The regional farmers’ association, also one of the opponents, was delighted that the Oostvaarderswold was cancelled, and claimed victory (LTO Noord, 2012). However, the province of Flevoland—with whom the national government had earlier reached financial agreements, and who had put considerable effort into generating support for realising the Oostvaarderswold—was furious, as were most nature organisations and experts (Berentsen & Trappenburg, 2011; Provincie Flevoland, 2012; Tonkens, 2011; Van Roessel, 2011). They all regarded the 2010 to 2011 governmental policy turn a radical discontinuation (Buijs, Mattijssen & Arts, 2014; Dokter, 2010; Janssen, 2010a). Nevertheless, and although in somewhat milder phrasing, the aforementioned 2012 Nature Agreement (Uitvoeringsafspraken decentralisatie natuur, 2012) confirmed the policy change that the EHS would be downscaled (in official terms, ‘reassessed’) and its implementation would be decentralised to the provinces, partly postponed and partly put on hold. The EHS was reframed and no longer aimed at creating new large-scale nature development areas or robust green connections, but rather to preserve what is currently there.

While nature development is still a widely echoed concept as of 2014, its influence is no longer what it was in the 1990s. The changing economic and political context clearly poses new challenges to those advocating large-scale nature development. Nevertheless, policy entrepreneurs are not without engagement, nor employment. Most are still active as applied scientists, landscape architects and consultants on nature development, partly within the aforementioned organisations and partly in newly established consultancy firms and not-for-profit organisations. Thus, most remain passionate about nature development and are still professionally engaged in this field.

A recent reframing and impetus for new networking considers the link between climate change and nature development, as the latter is said to potentially contribute to both the mitigation and adaptation of the former (Klimaatbuffers website, 2012). It remains to be seen whether this reframing will make the concept of nature development as influential as it was in the 1990s.

5.4 Conclusion

The above analysis indicated that a small group of individuals have been important in setting the agenda for nature development and realising policy change by collectively employing framing and networking strategies. The policy entrepreneurs were personally committed (sometimes even willing to risk their jobs), persistent and continuously involved in developing a concept, raising awareness of and commit-
ment to the concept, trying to introduce and translate the concept into feasible policy actions, and mobilising support. Together, the group did a remarkable job of employing framing and networking strategies and setting the agenda on nature policies in the last decades.

In this case study, there are multiple examples of the successful employment of framing strategies. First, the concept of nature development was aligned with the international and European discourses on nature development and concepts alike. However, the nature development concept itself was defined in a different way by not tolerating any interweaving with agriculture land-use functions. In the Netherlands, the introduction of nature development would be regarded a radical new view on how to deal with nature—for example, in respect to other possible land uses. The frame of nature development was amplified by the policy entrepreneurs as an alternative to farmers’ nature—a type of nature they openly despised. The developments in the Oostvaardersplassen served as a trigger in that regard because, according to the policy entrepreneurs, it delivered evidence that it was possible to create or facilitate nature, and that, under the right circumstances, it was possible for former ecosystems to re-emerge. Moreover, it showed what nature would look like without a connection with the traditional farmers’ nature. The Oostvaardersplassen became a powerful symbol for the advocates of large-scale nature development, and the policy entrepreneurs involved continued to refer to this area as the prime example and symbol of how nature could and should appear in the Netherlands. The agenda was successfully set and the policy change followed the policy entrepreneurs’ preference of nature development over nature preservation.

With regard to networking strategies, the case reveals overlap of networking with framing strategies. For instance, while the agricultural sector and its farmers’ nature was portrayed as ‘the enemy’, other sectors were sought out as privileged partners in the design and implementation of the projects. Plan Stork read as the formulation of a frame searching for coalitions with the water, tourism and even sand and clay industries, which demonstrates the practice of frame alignment. The concept of nature development was adopted successfully in policies for the major rivers. The policy entrepreneurs’ suggestion to enlarge the river areas by digging side channels and excavating clay and sand deposits in the river floodplains became a new strategy for guaranteeing water safety in the 1996 Room for the River policy. Moreover, the case study revealed that, due to the policy entrepreneurs’ efforts, nature development also became a sensitising topic, whereby the group of adherents began to grow incrementally from the late 1980s onwards.

The numerous plans and reports on nature development conducted by the policy entrepreneurs’ own management company association, ARK, and the landscape consultancy bureau, Stroming, clearly helped spread the concept of nature development and have it incorporated into local and regional governmental policies. The move by one of the
policy entrepreneurs to win over the support of Smit-Kroes, the then Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, also proved helpful to raise public and especially political support. Alongside the external positioning of the concept of nature development, the policy entrepreneurs were keen to create their own small coalition for nature development. For example, they were keen to settle an effective allocation of tasks. Each policy entrepreneur had his or her own task, matching capacities and locus of influence. There were policy entrepreneurs pioneering, early adopting, translating and popularising, yet I also observed people making business plans, calculating profits for nature and for adjacent sectors, and trying to convince others by adopting their rhetoric and aligning the frame. A lesson to learn here is that policy entrepreneurship need not be an individual endeavour—policy entrepreneurs can work together and rely on others to fulfil a shared common mission.

In short, it seems that a proper and continuously updated combination of framing and networking strategies is a prerequisite for successful agenda setting. However, context also influences the agenda setting because it both enables and constrains the effective setting of the agenda.

First, the case study demonstrated that windows of opportunities—some of which were largely caused by chance—are very helpful in gaining attention for ideas. Yet, policy entrepreneurs have to recognise and seize these moments. The spontaneous developments in the Oostvaardersplassen provided such an opportunity by creating an unintended pilot project and unexpected venue. It also helped convince the public, policymakers and politicians that large-scale nature development was possible, even in the densely populated Netherlands. The establishment of the EO Wijers Foundation was another opportunity that invited people to submit innovative plans. The high waters in the main rivers in 1993 and 1995 provided a third window, allowing nature development to be linked to river management and water safety.

Conveniently, in 1991, the change in chairperson at the Dutch WWF also helped the policy entrepreneurs realise their goals because this organisation became a strong advocate of nature development, focused on creating additional nature areas in the Netherlands, and was willing to provide a large share of the necessary resources in that regard. Moreover, the new chair had become part of the 1992 Boertien committee—a venue that he would exploit to plead for adopting nature development in policy for the major rivers. After the 1995 high waters, he effectively seized the opportunity to frame nature development as an alternative solution to water safety for the major rivers. The support of political heavyweights, such as Nijpels and the aforementioned Smit-Kroes, proved crucial to successfully setting the public, policy and political agendas for implementing nature development. However, whereas the context of water management especially proved to offer
opportunities to set the agenda, the context of nature management proved to be rather constraining in that respect.

Thus, second, apart from opportunities, most of the policy entrepreneurs under investigation here were constrained by their contexts. Within their governmental departments, they often faced path dependency and—at least latent—resistance to policy change. Fully committed to their cause, the policy entrepreneurs proved that they were adaptive by crossing institutional borders and seeking supporters in other spheres, be it other governmental bodies, market representatives or NGOs. However, while the policy entrepreneurs were successful in framing and networking until the second half of the 2000s, the economic and political context changed and placed even more constraints on effectively employing their strategies. The year 2010 was particularly crucial because the need to implement the EHS and Oostvaarderswold, and nature development in general, was questioned. Historically, the agricultural sector has a strong lobby in the Netherlands, and some farmers owning land that would be used for the creation of the Oostvaarderswold were opposed to implementing this robust green corridor. In addition, the 2010 newly established Cabinet changed policy by cancelling substantial financial support to implementing the EHS and projects such as the Oostvaarderswold. Consequently, given the changing economic and political context, it became difficult for the policy entrepreneurs, and other advocates of nature development, to present a convincing argument to remove agricultural land and replace it with nature development areas.

A final observation made in this case study is the inherently ambiguous and tentative nature of any claims on success or effectiveness in setting the agenda. By looking only at the events in the late 1980s and 1990s, one could substantiate the claim that nature development has successfully been set on the public, policy and political agendas. However, the course of events during the last decade reveals that the implementation has been under pressure due to the changing contexts. This could result in assessing the effectiveness of the concept of nature development in a different way, which makes claiming success or failure rather arbitrary. Moreover, an effective agenda setting of nature development in water management is far more controversial than the agenda setting in nature management. The policy entrepreneur, Vera, was also ambiguous in claiming his successes. On the one hand, he was pleased and proud with the results of his own agenda setting, while, on the other hand, he remained dissatisfied with his success because the concept of nature development—as he envisioned—had not yet reached its full potential in the Netherlands (regarding stricter division of land uses and more large-scale nature development areas). A dedicated policy entrepreneur is probably never finished because he or she will always find need for further improvement or implementation of his or her visions and ideas.

6.1 Introduction
ALMERE’S URBAN DEVELOPMENT
‘A bridge too far?’
Cornelius Ryan
Figure 6.1: Several alternatives for the infrastructural connection referred to below. The figure resembles my own simplified interpretation of the various plans and cannot be taken literally. Adapted from Almere’s (2009) vision, Adema’s plan (Adema, 2012; Stichting Almere Beter Bereikbaar, 2011), Van der Vlis’s (2012b)—or Rover’s—plan, and the 2013 State’s Vision on Infrastructure (Rijksstructuurvisie Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 2013).
The following case study concerns the plans to create an infrastructural connection (IJmeerverbinding) between the municipalities Amsterdam and an outer-dike\(^3\) urban area (IJland) in Almere. These plans have been successfully placed on the political agenda, but not yet implemented. Therefore, this case study contrasts the case study discussed in the previous chapter, since the previous case study entailed the concept of nature development being adopted into policy, then implemented, altered or cancelled in some areas. Moreover, while the two previously discussed case studies offered examples of (in many ways) successful policy entrepreneurship, this case study presents a more dynamic process of agenda setting with the active involvement of various policy entrepreneurs adhering to conflicting frames. This chapter discusses the most prominent policy entrepreneurs and their employed framing and networking strategies. To understand the issue at stake, it is necessary to understand the role of Almere in the recent history of Dutch spatial planning.

As the youngest and fastest growing city in the Netherlands, Almere has become important in Dutch spatial planning. In 2007, the national government expressed the ambition to accommodate the growing Dutch population by creating 60,000 houses and 100,000 working places for 160,000 people within a few decades in Almere (Urgentieprogramma Randstad, 2007). Almere is very willing to adhere to this ambition because profound city development, like outer-dike urbanisation, could serve as an opportunity to give Almere the socio-economic boost for which it longs. However, Almere is only willing to comply if the national government supports and allows a more than 25-kilometre infrastructural connection with the Dutch capital, Amsterdam. The Markermeer-IJmeer part of the infrastructural connection, could be a bridge, tunnel or combination of both. There are also several alternative routes suggested; however, all run through the protected waters of the Markermeer-IJmeer. Almere is facing strong opposition because, according to neighbouring municipalities, nature conservationists, action groups and others, outer-dike urbanisation and the infrastructural connection will harm the ecology and pose threats to the environment and open landscape. At present, no final decision has been made on the outer-dike development and infrastructural connection between Almere and Amsterdam.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, it presents a brief overview of the plans for Almere to build houses outer dike and create an infrastructural connection, from the 1970s onwards. The subsequent analysis of policy entrepreneurs and their strategies is at the core of this section. Following this, it discusses the main findings.

6.2 Policy on outer-dike urbanisation and the infrastructural connection

In the 1970s, the Dutch national government founded the Project Bureau Almere to create a long-term spatial planning vision for a new city located in the southern part of the province of Flevoland, next to

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3 Please note that I do not speak of a coastal dike, but a dike next to the Markermeer-IJmeer, enclosing the reclaimed lands (polder).
Amsterdam. The whole province of Flevoland is reclaimed land, created during the twentieth century. As the population of Amsterdam was expected to increase, the long-term goal for this youngest city of the Netherlands (officially founded in 1984) became to accommodate 250,000 people by 2000 (RIJP, 1977). In 1988, in the national government’s Fourth Memorandum on Spatial Planning (Vierde nota over de ruimtelijke ordening, 1988), Almere was assigned to accommodate affordable houses for the whole region. In the years from 1995 to 2010, an additional 40,000 houses were to be built.

In 2001, with the national government’s ‘Fifth Policy Memorandum on Spatial Planning’ (Vijfde Nota over de Ruimtelijke Ordening, 2001), Almere was again given the task of accommodating an extra 60,000 to 70,000 houses. However, this policy never reached final agreement because the cabinet lost power. In 2006, in the new Spatial Memorandum ‘Space for Development’ (Nota Ruimte, 2006), the national government proposed to further investigate the possibilities to gradually let Almere expand and become fully accessible by motor vehicle and public transport. In the same year, the national government developed a new vision for the northern part of the Randstad region (Noordvleugelbrief, 2006). Urban development of Almere was deemed necessary for up-scaling the whole region, and outer-dike urbanisation was mentioned as a ‘direction for growth’ in combination with an infrastructural connection with Amsterdam over the IJmeer. The idea was that the infrastructural connection would give substance to the image of what was then presented as the twin-city of Amsterdam-Almere. Outer-dike development was deemed necessary to create a high-quality marine urban living and working environment for the upper classes (Noordvleugelbrief, 2006). It was also stated that a new multi-dimensional vision for the Markermeer-IJmeer had to be drafted, in collaboration with stakeholders and government partners.

In 2007, the cabinet developed a vision referred to as ‘Randstad Urgent’ (Urgentieprogramma Randstad, 2007), in which it was stated that the Randstad region risks losing its international status as a metropolis. Therefore, the national government envisioned Almere would further increase its housing capacity. Almere should attain an additional 60,000 houses and 100,000 new work places to accommodate an increase of 160,000 people in the period up to 2030. The Northern Randstad region is expected to need at least 220,000 houses in total, as stated in the 2008 Structure Vision ‘Randstad 2040’. Almere, together with the region, was asked to draft its own vision for the city in 2030 called the ‘Concept Structure Vision Almere 2.0’ (Almere, 2009a). Next to Almere’s vision, a steering committee—representing local, provincial and national governments and a few NGOs—developed a vision to make the ecological system in the Markermeer and IJmeer future-proof (Samenwerkingsverband Toekomst Markermeer IJmeer, 2009). These reports served as input for the ‘RAAM-letter’ (Randstad Urgent Randstad-besluiten Amsterdam–Almere–Markermeer, 2009), which
was presented to the national government in November 2009. In this letter, the cabinet opted for a future vision that included an ecological, infrastructural and urban expansion of the Northern Randstad with a focus on Almere. However, it was stated that further investigation was needed regarding outer-dike development and a possible, yet affordable, infrastructural connection between Almere and Amsterdam.

In 2010, the national government, Almere and the province of Flevoland developed an agreement called ‘IAK Almere’ (Integraal Afsprakenkader Almere, 2010) that confirmed the ambitions stated in Randstad Urgent (Urgentieprogramma Randstad, 2007), the Concept Structure Vision Almere 2.0 (Almere, 2009a) and the RAAM-letter (Randstad Urgent Randstad-besluiten Amsterdam–Almere–Markermeer, 2009). In the agreement, it was decided that the policy process would progress under the programme title ‘RRAAM’ (Rijk-regioprogramma Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer). Together with stakeholders, several ‘Working Programmes’ were started with the aim of providing advice to Minister Schultz van Haegen of Infrastructure and the Environment regarding the 2013 ‘State’s Vision on Infrastructure’ (Rijksstructuurvisie Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 2013). In the 2013 State’s Vision on Infrastructure (Rijksstructuurvisie Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 2013), the minister chose an ‘adaptive’ and ‘phased’ approach based on projected future demands for housing in the region. However, outer-dike development was not viewed as a promising idea because of costs and lack of support. An infrastructural connection was regarded a ‘dot on the horizon’, while decision making was postponed for at least 15 years (Rijksstructuurvisie Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 2013; Urgentieprogramma Randstad: Lijst van vragen en antwoorden, 2013).

6.3 Framing and networking strategies
In this section, six policy entrepreneurs’ framing and networking strategies are discussed. First, I discuss the strategies of two subsequent aldermen for spatial planning in Almere who tried to place Almere’s ambitions on the regional and national agendas. Their main interest is boosting the socio-economic quality of the city by urban development and creating a new infrastructural connection with Amsterdam. Second, I analyse the strategies of two advocates of two different alternatives for the infrastructural connection. Third, I discuss the strategies of two advocates for keeping the Markermeer-IJmeer open. These advocates oppose the plans made by the other actors.

6.3.1 Infrastructural connection and outer-dike urbanisation
Almere and Amsterdam did not always have good interrelations. In the 1980s and 1990s, when Almere was trying to settle the city and build houses as the national government requested, it was not fond of collaborating with Amsterdam—and vice versa. This changed around the time that Almere got Mayor Ouwerkerk in 1998, and Amsterdam was planning to build a new neighbourhood in the IJmeer, called IJburg
Governors from both municipalities realised that collaboration was needed at least on regional issues, particularly given the demand in the Fifth Memorandum on Spatial Planning (Vijfde Nota over de Ruimtelijke Ordening, 2001) for Almere to grow. A growing Almere would lead to more traffic between Almere and Amsterdam, causing subsequent congestion on the only bridge between the cities—the Hollandse Brug. Therefore, in 2003, the Project Bureau Future Almere was founded by the national government, the provinces of Noord-Holland and Flevoland, and the municipalities of Amsterdam and Almere to consider how to develop Almere from a joint perspective (Pots, 2003).

**Municipality of Almere, Arie-Willem Bijl**
In the view of Arie-Willem Bijl, the alderman of spatial planning in Almere from 1999 to 2006, sufficient support for intensive collaboration between Amsterdam and Almere was lacking. He argued that a joint framework on the future of Almere was needed quickly, especially considering Almere’s specific needs. As Bijl framed the issue, Almere had been dominated too long by a traditional perspective on urban development. There had been too much focus on the quantity of houses and population, and on the geographical size of Almere, thereby neglecting the sociocultural dimensions of the developing city. For example, there are few good restaurants, theatres, cinemas or public events bonding the people living in Almere. Most houses, streets and neighbourhoods look alike and are monotonous and lacking diversity. Further, most people, who have moderate incomes, live in Almere and work in Amsterdam, which causes severe traffic jams and daily congestion. For this reason, Almere is also often called a ‘sleepy town’ that lacks social cohesion and an enriching heterogeneous culture (Hoekstra, 2011; Steinmetz, 2007). Therefore, the public image and profile of the municipality is somewhat shallow and vulnerable, and lacks robustness. According to Bijl, Almere faces so-called ‘new town’ problems.

Bijl knew that his own civil servants had been responsible for neglecting the sociocultural dimensions of the developing city, and subsequently sought initially to change the mindset and culture within his own department. Bijl tried to stimulate innovative thinking and attract young, creative and open-minded spatial planners. He also wanted to set the public agenda by including the public, local parties and city council to jointly draft the 2003 ‘City Manifest’ on the future of Almere. The City Manifest expressed the ambition that the people of
Almere want to build a versatile, lively and safe city next to and in the water. A good relationship and connection with Amsterdam was framed as necessary for the city to develop and manage its problems. Bijl asked the renowned headstrong city architect, Koolhaas—who was involved in laying the framework for Almere in the 1970s—and the ambitious city architect, Marcusse, to envision how a connection between the two cities could appear, and to draft an artist’s impression and create a large maquette. Bijl’s counterpart, Stadig—the alderman of Spatial Planning in Amsterdam from 1994 to 2006—was at first not particularly enthusiastic about the idea to connect the cities, either symbolically or physically (R05). To win over Amsterdam and Stadig’s support, Bijl hired a penthouse office on Amsterdam’s city quay, giving a beautiful overview of the Markermeer-IJmeer and Almere’s skyline. The project was called ‘Atelier IJmeer 2030+’, and ministers, majors, experts, administrators, governors, policymakers, experts, politicians, stakeholders and many more were invited to come and see the idea evolve, and provide input and feedback.

This relatively aggressive networking tactic—by using a venue on the other’s territory—proved effective for setting the policy and political agenda of Amsterdam. With Atelier IJmeer 2030+, Bijl won Stadig’s support, who subsequently convinced Amsterdam’s city council and policymakers to support and officially contribute to the idea of an infrastructural connection. The momentum was there, and Almere’s ambitions were successfully placed on the local and regional policy and political agenda. In 2005, this was reinforced when Almere, Amsterdam, the ANWB, Staatsbosbeheer, Nature Monuments (Natuurmonumenten) and the provinces of Noord-Holland and Flevoland—after two years of work—presented a Future Vision for the IJmeer (Stuurgroep Verkenning IJmeer, 2005), in which they unanimously supported the plans to allow outer-dike urbanisation and create an infrastructural connection. The main condition stipulated was that ecology also needed to be taken into account. Unfortunately for Bijl, the national government was lagging behind and inattentive in response to Atelier IJmeer 2030+ and the Almere plans in general. Bijl had failed to secure political support on the national level; thus, it would take until 2006 before Almere’s ambitions were placed on the national political agenda again—by which time, Bijl, after his second term in office, resigned and recommended Duivesteijn as his successor.

Municipality of Almere, Adri Duivesteijn
Adri Duivesteijn became alderman for Almere in 2006, and followed the path that was prepared by Bijl. Before Duivesteijn became alderman for Almere, he had been a member of the city council of The Hague, alderman in The Hague and member of the Dutch Parliament. As shown below, Duivesteijn used his political experience and connections to seek opportunities to place Almere on the national political agenda. When Duivesteijn came to Almere, he was surprised that
the IJmeer waterfront was not fully exploited. He longed to change this and became a strong advocate of outer-dike urbanisation and the infrastructural connection (Anonymous, 2006c; Steinmetz, 2006). While Bijl framed the problem from the perspective of Almere, with its new town problems (see above), Duivesteijn took the continued demand for housing in the Amsterdam metropolis as his primary reference point to frame the issue. According to Duivesteijn, Amsterdam and Almere are expected to attract more and more people, and grow accordingly. Almere is the solution to the national housing problem because it is close to Amsterdam and has sufficient space. Duivesteijn was very willing to comply with the government’s call to accommodate housing in the region and Almere because, as indicated in the introduction of this chapter, profound city development could serve as an opportunity to give Almere the socio-economic boost for which it longs.

However, as Duivesteijn framed it, Almere cannot grow without appropriate infrastructure bringing Almere closer to Amsterdam and making it an attractive place to live. Therefore, in line with the ideas propagated by Bijl, Duivesteijn envisioned giving the city a new skyline, an urban character and an infrastructural connection between Almere and Amsterdam that could serve as a stepping-stone to travel back and forth from Almere to Amsterdam. A Golden Gate—or Östersund-like bridge and landmark—would certainly help make Almere part of the Amsterdam metropolitan area (Huisman, 2008; Van Engel, 2009). Duivesteijn also used the municipality’s financial resources to ask the urban architects of the renowned MVRDV urban architecture bureau to draft the Concept Structure Vision for Almere in 2030 (Almere, 2009a). Duivesteijn used this to visualise and symbolise his vision on the future of Almere, including an infrastructural connection and outer-dike urbanisation (Almere, 2009b, 2009d). However, as will be discussed below, Duivesteijn’s opponents framed his vision for Almere as megalomania and delusions of grandeur (Anonymous, 2006c; Hoekstra, 2011; Huisman, 2008; Steinmetz, 2007).

Alongside framing the issue, Duivesteijn was keen to try and set the public agenda by using various venues—such as public meetings, receptions, formal meetings or informal chats—to pitch and share his story and vision for Almere (Anonymous, 2006b, 2011c, 2011f; Hoekstra, 2011; Huisman, 2009; Steinmetz, 2007; Ten Hooven, 2006). He also networked and exploited his political connections with members of his political party, the Labour Party, members of parliament, ministers, local councillors and so forth to set the political agenda (Anonymous, 2006c; Hoekstra, 2011). He arranged bilateral meetings, invited people to his home, or approached people at various events to win...
over political friends for the Almere cause (R04; Van den Boomen, 2010). His reputation and position as an alderman gave him access to key venues and a podium to share his plans (Anonymous, 2010d).

Duivesteijn’s rhetorical skills, combined with his knowledge and relational skills, helped him pitch persuasive talks, and generated public and political attention. One of the respondents to this study stated, ‘Duivesteijn is a passionate advocate, a real negotiator, with status and power’ (R04). A government representative stated that, '[Duivesteijn] has many entrances, issue knowledge and is very much able to gain attention for Almere and to shape that in an innovative way' (R18). For example, in 2007, when a new Cabinet was installed, Duivesteijn exploited his political connections to gain access to the national political agenda setting. He was able to arrange a meeting with his political party colleague and Minister Cramer of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment to win her over to his ambitions for Almere. Cramer, having other political priorities and just beginning her term in office, indicated that she had no interest in taking up this policy issue at that time. However, Duivesteijn convinced her of the importance of making Almere focal in national policymaking (R12). Within one year, a contract was signed to focus on Almere in national policymaking, and, in 2008, Cramer presented the Almere Principles with Duivesteijn. The governmental RAAM-letter (2009) and IAK (2010) soon followed. Thus, Duivesteijn proved to be very effective in his framing and networking strategies to set the public, policy and political agenda, at least up until 2010.

The year 2010 marked a turning point in the realisation of Duivesteijn’s ambitions. In October 2010, a new Cabinet took office with the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party. The economic crisis was continuing to affect policies, and the new national government was cautious about spending millions on infrastructural projects with a long-term effect. The political stream had changed and Duivesteijn now had to deal with the liberal party member, Schultz van Haegen, who was the Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment. Nonetheless, following the RAAM-letter (2009) and IAK (2010), negotiations were initiated between the national government and Almere to discuss the plans for the northern part of the Randstad region. Duivesteijn used these negotiations to bring the interests of Almere into focus; however, these negotiations did not proceed smoothly.

As he argued before 2010, Duivesteijn stated that if other parties would not agree to build the infrastructural connection, Almere would not comply with the government’s need to accommodate additional houses (Anonymous, 2006c, 2008c, 2009d, 2010b; Huisman, 2008; Schreuder, 2006). By continuously reiterating these threats publicly
and during negotiations, he placed himself in a powerful position. However, he ran the risk of making threats he could not keep because, in the end, it is up to the national government to decide. The relationship between Almere and the national government was put at risk because of these threats and the occasional outbursts of Duivesteijn during negotiations. It has been said by people involved in the negotiations that sometimes Duivesteijn’s temperament took control, which was expressed by thumping the table and threatening to leave the conversation room (R18; Anonymous, 2006c). At one moment, a mediator was even asked to bring both parties on speaking terms because the relationship was so damaged (R18). The mediator concluded that there were cultural differences between the national government and Almere that could explain the clash (R18); however, clashes in personalities may also have contributed to the conflict.

While Duivesteijn’s relationships with political counterparts had grown fragile, he was also sometimes criticised by local Almere City Council members who felt uninformed, and argued that Duivesteijn acted solitarily without accounting for his actions to the city council (Boogers & Drosterij, 2012). His relationship with his own civil servants was also complicated. It was said that he carefully selected the people with whom he wanted to work, and those people shared his ambitions and opinions and tended to think like him (R04). Colleagues who did not align with these were forced away, or left out of free will or due to social pressure (R04; R18). Duivesteijn seemed to remain in control by steering his subordinates. Due to his own expert knowledge, he exerted power by pushing forward his own opinion. This was appreciated by some, while others found it difficult. For example, his civil servants were limited in their discretionary power to negotiate with the national government because the issues discussed sometimes contradicted Duivesteijn’s expressed opinion (R18). As a result, according to a government representative, Duivesteijn, by having too much steering ambition, risked losing power due to his civil servants trying to bypass him (R18). Therefore, Duivesteijn’s tight control seems to have its downsides, such as when taking trust into account.

This image of Duivesteijn aligns with an article in a national newspaper that was based on quotations from people with whom Duivesteijn had worked. The article was given the expressive title: ‘Man with vision, boldness and a drive to work is also a big pain in the neck’ (Anonymous, 2006c). Thus, while Duivesteijn was respected for his passion, ambition, perseverance, daring attitude and willingness to act, he was also—in this article—described as a troublemaker and a pain in the neck who ‘you would rather immure than have a drink with’ (Anonymous, 2006c). Unsurprisingly, Duivesteijn’s relationship with his opponents was also not easy. A representative of one of the
action groups mentioned that he felt ridiculed and marginalised by Duivesteijn: ‘Duivesteijn sets us apart as a negativistic club with whom you cannot talk reasonably ... He tried to corner us by separating the reasonable nature organisations from the unreasonable ones’ (R14; cf. Bezemer, 2009; Meershoek, 2009; Soetenhorst, 2009). Later, I discuss the framing and networking strategies of these opponents in detail.

Ultimately, while Duivesteijn’s framing and networking strategies helped set the public, policy and political agenda, he was unable to have his favoured solutions—the outer-dike development and infrastructural connection—accepted for implementation. Outer-dike urbanisation was taken off the political agenda by Minister Schultz van Haegen in December 2011 because the plan was deemed too harmful for ecology and too costly. However, in the 2013 State Vision for the future of the region, outer-dike urbanisation was not completely removed from the policy agenda, as it was still mentioned as an issue for consideration in the future (Rijksstructuurvisie Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 2013). The minister chose an ‘adaptive’ and ‘phased’ approach based on future developments of the demand for housing in the region.

Decision making on the infrastructural connection was postponed for at least 15 years (Urgentieprogramma Randstad: Lijst van vragen en antwoorden, 2013). Contrary to what Duivesteijn and Almere had aimed for, the minister argued that accommodating additional housing in Almere was a prerequisite for making a decision on the infrastructural connection between Amsterdam and Almere—not the other way around. While Almere had wished that the minister would make an outspoken decision regarding the infrastructural connection through the Markermeer-IJmeer, the minister wanted to maintain alternative solutions for the problems of congestion. The minister framed a new infrastructural connection as a ‘dot on the horizon’ (Rijksstructuurvisie Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 2013, pp. 7, 35, 42). In response to the presentation of the State Vision for the region, Albert de Vries—a member of parliament for the labour party—instigated a motion to pressure the minister to consciously opt for an infrastructural connection through the Markermeer-IJmeer. Minister Schultz van Haegen replied that the infrastructural connection as a ‘dot on the horizon’ can be understood as ‘the alternative preferred’ (12 RRAAM, 2013). Nevertheless the minister wants to conduct new research into the various alternatives in order to make a knowledgeable decision, in due time. This decision will be made only if Almere, compared to the situation in 2010, has built an additional 25,000 houses, which is expected to occur by 2025 at the earliest.

As of February 2013, Duivesteijn is a member of the Dutch senate. He resigned as alderman for Almere because he believed he could not do both jobs. His successor in Almere is a likeminded protagonist for the ambitions of Almere who previously led the Almere Department on Urban Development (Oosterheert, 2013).
6.3.2 Specific routes and character of an infrastructural connection

With the 2009 RAAM-letter, the national government decided to instigate the RRAAM process and reach consensus and gain support for a final governmental decision. From 2010 to 2012, various stakeholders were involved. The setup of the RRAAM process reflected ideas presented by the Dutch Elverding Commission. This commission advised the government to actively involve stakeholders in the early phase of the planning process to shorten its duration and gain wide support as early as possible. Members of the RRAAM steering committee included, among others, the Director-General of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment; Director-General of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation; and aldermen Duivesteijn and Van Poelgeest. Van Poelgeest was Duivesteijn’s counterpart in Amsterdam. Van Poelgeest became, like Duivesteijn, an alderman in 2006.

There was also the ‘RRAAM-work’ (implying the Dutch word for ‘framework’). In the RRAAM-work, only the stakeholder representatives were involved who had a direct link to the area, could support the fundamental principles of the RAAM-letter, and had the capacity
to participate. In the ‘RRAAM network’, a broader range of stakeholders was invited to participate in the discussions. Anyone could join the RRAAM network, including civilians, representatives from municipalities, private companies, expert organisations, nature conservationists, interest groups and others (Notitie Kansrijke Oplossingsrichtingen, 2011). Parallel to this, several Working Programmes were established for different issues. For example, one Working Programme focused on the infrastructural connection, while another focused on the ecological condition of the Markermeer-IJmeer. The open setup of the RRAAM process gave actors the venue and opportunity to lobby, opt for new plans and reflect on ideas. As indicated below, two policy entrepreneurs used it to openly advocate a specific route and character of the infrastructural connection.

**Urban Architect, Jerome Adema**

Jerome Adema, an urban architect and inhabitant of Almere, developed an alternative for the infrastructural connection. He was inspired by the historically famous Dutch engineer, Cornelis Lely, who, in the nineteenth century, drafted a plan to create the largest polders in the Netherlands (see Chapter 1). Aside from the polder in the Markermeer—called the Markerwaard—all other polders in Lely’s plan were created. Adema’s dream was to continue the work of Lely. Thus, in 2002, Adema started drafting a grand design for the IJsselmeer area as a whole, including the IJsselmeer, Markermeer and IJmeer. Part of his plan was to create a large prime swamp, or wetland, in the Markerwaard; a dike from Almere to Edam-Volendam; and a combination of a bridge and tunnel to Amsterdam through the IJmeer. In 2008, during a participatory policy process for the ‘SAMM-project’ (meaning ‘Markermeer Collaboration’), which was started after the Randstad Urgent agreement (Urgentieprogramma Randstad, 2007), he submitted the plan ‘Markermeer Plus’, together with the association Friends of the Markerwaard (Vereniging Vrienden van de Markerwaard, 2008).

The association Friends of the Markerwaard was led by the retired and renowned city architect, Dirk Frieling, who was also the former head of the Project Bureau Almere and the RIJP, and had always advocated the creation of the last polder until his death in 2011. When Adema and Frieling’s plan was not incorporated in the advice by the Markermeer Collaboration for the RAAM-letter, they unsuccessfully networked to raise support from policymakers, governors, politicians and many more. In addition, their renewed plan ‘Markermeer More Worth’ (Frieling & Adema, 2011) did not raise the desired attention. Adema then joined the people behind the citizen initiative Build the IJmeer Bridge (Bouw de IJmeerrbrug, 2011) and founded the association ‘Almere Better Accessible’ (Stichting Almere Beter Bereikbaar, 2011) in October 2010. Undiscouraged by previous failures, Adema seized the opportunity when three private consortia offered suggestions for a bridge over the IJmeer, in September 2011 (R06).
According to Adema, these proposed plans were far too expensive; thus, he submitted a downscaled alternative focused on the infrastructural connection itself, instead of a transformation of the IJsselmeer area as a whole (Adema, 2012). He realised that his initial grand design would never raise the desired support and was an unrealistic goal. Thus, he decided to focus on the infrastructural connection, and his renewed plan was to create a connection located more to the south, closer to the Hollandse Brug. The connection would be partly a bridge and partly a tunnel, with a road and metro line to arrive more to the south in Amsterdam (Adema, 2012; Stichting Almere Beter Bereikbaar, 2011). Adema also suggested creating a new peninsula west of Almere, suitable for housing and tourism. He posited that his alternative would be less expensive than the other alternatives, would serve commuters better, and would have limited effect on the open landscape of the Markermeer-IJmeer because it would be located more to the south and take into account water flows and the quality of the ecosystem.

Adema networked for support from local political parties in Almere. Adema indicated that, while nearly everyone was enthusiastic about his plan, only one political party—Livable Almere (Leefbaar Almere)—dared to publicly support it (R06; R07). Van Duijn, the Almere city councillor for this political party, enabled Adema to present his plan to other parties’ representatives during an open and local public round table (Leefbaar Almere, 2012). The day before, on 18 January 2012, Adema was able to present his plan at a RRAAM network meeting. He succeeded in having his plan considered a serious policy alternative to the plans submitted by the private consortia. While the cost-benefit analysis and effects on nature were not positive, his plan was still considered a serious alternative because of its innovative design and alternative routing. However, in the final RRAAM advice, his alternative was not presented as the preferred infrastructural connection (RRAAM, 2012). In the 2013 State Vision for the region, the minister argued that Adema’s alternative was no longer considered because there was not enough local support, especially from Almere (R39; Rijksstructuurvisie Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 2013). It was deemed too costly, too harmful to nature and too close to the coast of Muiden and Muiderberg. Thus, while Adema succeeded in gaining access to the policy and political agendas—and was able to have his plan presented and considered—he failed to pressure and consolidate his plan higher on these agendas because it was then disregarded.

Pensioner, Michael Van der Vlis
Michael Van der Vlis is an econometrist, pensioner, former alderman for Spatial Planning and Public Transport in Amsterdam from 1978 to 1990, and former head of the ROVER association for public transport travellers from 2004 to 2010. He developed an alternative plan for the infrastructural connection: a bridge with a light rail from Amsterdam Central Station to Almere (Van der Vlis, 2012b). He argued that the
Figure 6.4: A graphic visualisation of Adema’s infrastructural connection. Source: Jerome Adema Architects.
plans presented by the consortia are too technocratic, expensive and unsuitable because they forget that people who travel by metro or tram have different travelling patterns than people travelling by train (Van der Vlis, 2012a). Most people do not enter and exit the metro at the beginning or end of the line, but somewhere in between. In addition, Van der Vlis argued that the main starting point and destination for most travellers is Amsterdam Central Station, not the southern part of Amsterdam, as is stated in the other alternatives.

Thus, Van der Vlis argued that the only option worth pursuing is a direct connection—preferably a bridge, for travelling comfort—between Amsterdam Central Station and Almere Central Station, with sufficient stations in between. According to Van der Vlis, outer-dike urbanisation is absurd, unrealistic and should not be related to the discussion on whether or not an infrastructural connection is necessary because it relates to different problems (housing and accessibility). He argued that Adema’s plan is not a viable option because it does not have enough public support, is too complex and does not incorporate IJburg and a connection to Amsterdam Central Station. Van der Vlis submitted his own plan to the steering committee of the RRAAM process and its members announced that they would consider his plan. However, when he did not hear back from the committee and received an invitation for a meeting to discuss Adema’s plan, he was furious to learn that his plan was forgotten and thus neglected.

He summoned the overall steering committee to consider his plan, and wrote a letter to the responsible minister and to Duivesteijn, whom he knew personally (R11). This ‘top-over’ strategy proved effective because he was invited for a talk, apologised to and promised that his suggestions would seriously be taken into account and assessed (R04). However, in the final RRAAM advice, his alternative did not stand out (RRAAM, 2012). In the 2013 State Vision, the minister did not yet want to make a decision, but stated that Van der Vlis’s alternative would be considered in due time. Thus, Van der Vlis succeeded in gaining access to the policy and political agendas, as his alternative was considered, but he failed to pressure and consolidate his plan higher on these agendas. However, his alternative is not yet completely disregarded and is still considered a viable option for the infrastructural connection.

6.3.3 Markermeer-IJmeer’s open landscape
Breunissen of Friends of the Earth Netherlands (Milieudefensie) and Verhorst of the Angry Swan (De Kwade Zwaan) were not convinced by Almere’s need to urbanise outer dike and build an infrastructural connection. They opposed the change and tried to undermine the framing employed by the proponents. Rather than focusing on the benefits that outer-dike urbanisation and the infrastructural connection would have for Almere, Breunissen and Verhorst focused primarily on
the threats the plans pose for the quality of the open landscape of the Markermeer-IJmeer. Below, these two policy entrepreneurs and their strategies are discussed.

**Friends of the Earth Netherlands, Klaas Breunissen**

When, in mid-2008, Klaas Breunissen—the team leader of a public campaigning division of Friends of the Earth Netherlands—learnt of plans to create an island, build houses outer dike and create an infrastructural connection through the Markermeer-IJmeer, he was triggered to act and mobilise the public. The public seemed to be unaware of the proposed changes and had no idea what was going on, or when they would have the opportunity to voice an opinion. Breunissen questioned the framing implied by the assumption that the demand for housing would grow. However, after Friends of the Earth conducted research, they had to admit that the assumption was justified, but this is not to say that they agreed with the plan to accommodate the housing in the Almere outer dike, or create a bridge or tunnel through the Markermeer-IJmeer. According to Breunissen, there are plenty of alternative options.

Breunissen argued that the daily congestion could be easily solved by increasing the capacity of the current bridge between Amsterdam and Almere. Breunissen also argued that European legislation does not allow the implementation of Almere’s plans, since the European Union (EU) only allows changes to a protected nature area when there is national urgency and no other solutions are possible, given the requirement that nature is appropriately compensated (Anonymous, 2009r; Natura 2000). As Breunissen wanted to have the public informed, he and his team organised public meetings in Muiden, IJburg,

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*Figure 6.5: Campaigning to keep the IJmeer open: ‘Is this going to be your view?’ (Photo: Watersportbank).*
Monnickendam and Almere to facilitate public discussion. Local politicians were invited to join these discussions. Breunissen succeeded in attaining support from all kinds of actors, including nature conservation associations, the Dutch recreational fishery association, the water sports association and local citizens groups. Together, they formed a loosely coupled coalition of convenience because most of these actors did not actively engage in the debate, but were, for example, willing to sign the Pamphlet of Pampus during a public event on the symbolically chosen island Pampus in the centre of the IJmeer. This event was organised by Breunissen and his team. With Friends of the Earth, Breunissen also set up a campaign with the slogan, ‘Keep the IJmeer open’ (‘Houd het IJmeer open’).

Trips were organised for members of the parliament to visit the area, and an original song ‘Tribute to the IJmeer’ was sung with local representatives and engaged citizens to make a statement to the responsible minister and members of the parliament. Further, via campaigning on the streets, distributing pamphlets and advertising with large plates and posters, Breunissen and other concerned actors tried to frame and visualise the effect of a bridge and outer-dike development in order to mobilise people, raise media attention, increase awareness, evoke emotion and gain support. Their main framing strategy was to tell people what they would lose when the plans to build outer dike, together with a bridge, would become real. Partly thanks to Breunissen’s efforts, support was found from neighbouring municipalities, such as Muiden, Hoorn, Edam-Volendam, Waterland, people from IJburg (Werkgroep Stop de IJmeerbrug website, 2009) and the aforementioned stakeholders. Although most of these stakeholders did not actively engage in the discussion, they did oppose the infrastructural connection and outer-dike development.

**Angry Swan, Manja Verhorst**

Manja Verhorst leads the small action group, the Angry Swan. Since 1984, she has lived in the village, Uitdam, part of the municipality of Waterland, nearby Amsterdam and next to the Markermeer-IJmeer, opposite to Almere. Verhorst regards the nature and landscape of the lake as her precious legacy and she campaigns to keep the lake open, for her and future generations (Anonymous, 2009m, 2010h). Due to her passion, personal commitment, tireless efforts and perseverance, she is seen as the ‘guardian of the area’, fighting to prevent harm being done (Anonymous, 2009c). She will continue protecting the open landscape ‘to the end’ (R04; see Anonymous, 2011d).

In 1999, Verhorst started to employ activities when the national government intended to create a sludge deposit in the Markermeer. With the Angry Swan, she mobilised people and instigated a motion in the parliament against this deposit, leading to the cancellation of the
plans (R01). From then on, she has been fighting to defend the area as it is. With varying success, she has tried to boycott plans for a camping site, a yacht harbour, a bicycle path on the dike, windmills and many other issues. This always led to local and regional media attention. During the last years, she has been trying to prevent the Almere plans. Her reasoning is similar to Breunissen—as elaborated above—and it is no surprise that they have been collaborating on the campaign to keep the IJmeer open. Verhorst also formed her own team with Kuit (a Dutch linguist and report analyst) and Kasanmoentalib (a biologist), with whom she has proven effective in raising attention for the Markermeer-IJmeer.

However, the group lacks the expert knowledge and resources to employ extensive activities, such as hiring lawyers, pressing charges and setting legal proceedings in motion. The resources they have are limited because everything is paid by the individuals undertaking the action. Despite these limited resources, Verhorst is keen to exploit every opportunity to be involved in the decision-making process concerning the Markermeer-IJmeer and the area in general. Networking, aided by her natural charm, is one of her main and strongest strategies. She is very sociable and able to make new friends and acquaintances. One respondent stated, ‘She is a great person’ (R08). Her manner of campaigning and activism is respected by friends and foes alike (Anonymous, 2008h, 2009c, 2011b, 2011g).

Verhorst not only shouts from the sidelines, but also tries to be involved in the policy process as much as possible in order to intervene and gain interest in her goal (Anonymous, 2011a). She attends every meeting that is somehow related to this issue, including (for ex-
ample) the public RRAAM meetings. Gathering information is not the only reason she attends; she also tries to be involved in the process by contacting the press, experts, policymakers, governors and politicians (Schreuder, 2009b). At various venues, she always sits in a chair in the second row, behind the invited speakers, and in front of the speaking stand. One respondent said, ‘I have done over 50 talks and she was always there, right in front of me in the second row, and very attentive’ (R08).

Verhorst tries to prepare extensively for the meetings she attends, and to anticipate opportunities—such as approaching people during breaks or lunch to attract their interests and give them a binder with articles and information supporting her argument (Schreuder, 2009b). Moreover, after this initial contact, she feels free to email or telephone people (including myself) to ask advice or share information about the case. Additionally, she invites people to visit her at home, both to have an informal conversations about her beliefs and to give people the opportunity to experience the openness of the Markermeer-IJmeer themselves, from where she lives. She can become angry with people who discuss the Markermeer-IJmeer without ever having visited to experience the lake themselves. For example, when I visited Verhorst for an interview, I was first kindly guided to look at the Markermeer-IJmeer from the dike to experience the open water, view the shoreline of Almere and witness the approaching urbanisation of Amsterdam.

Among her more honourable guests include a chief deputy of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, the Delta Commissioner, scientists, experts, regional representatives, local aldermen, journalists and many more. Schultz van Haegen, the responsible Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment, was also invited to her home. Verhorst wrote the following to Schultz van Haegen:

> Before you make a decision, I would like to stand with you on the dike of Uitdam ... I would like to share this experience with you. Only then, I will have the feeling that I have done everything within my power to defend the IJmeer. (Anonymous, 2011i)

Unfortunately for Verhorst, the minister was unable or unwilling to comply with her request (Anonymous, 2011i). Nevertheless, the minister, like many others, did accept Verhorst’s invitation to connect on the network website LinkedIn.com, which Verhorst also uses to keep track of and expand her social and professional network.

Apart from inviting people to her home and trying to connect online, Verhorst also tries to mobilise the public to influence the policy and political agenda (Anonymous, 2009s, 2011b). During the cold winter of 2008 to 2009, Verhorst drafted a petition against the plans for outer-dike urbanisation (Anonymous, 2009a). Being unable to ice skate herself, she came up with the idea to draft a petition and collect signatures from people whom she assumed loved nature as
well: ice skaters (Anonymous, 2009j). In this petition, for which she collected 22,514 signatures, she argued—just like Breunissen—that, based on European legislation, it was not possible to proceed with Almere’s plans. The EU only allows changes to a protected area when there is a national urgency and no other solutions are possible, given the requirement that nature is appropriately compensated (Natura 2000). Conversely, proponents of the outer-dike development and infrastructural connection argue that these plans would not harm nature or ecology, but would contribute to restoring the ecology. Moreover, to make the decision makers aware of the legislation and value of the Markermeer-IJmeer, Verhorst and her team wrote letters to members of the Dutch Parliament and lobbied with aldermen and mayors from neighbouring municipalities, provincial representatives and local and regional interest groups. Many of these supported Verhorst’s vision to keep the Markermeer-IJmeer open.

Verhorst is unmistakeably dedicated and engaged, which means she receives much praise; however, there is also criticism. According to some respondents, Verhorst is narrow-minded and unable and unwilling to be open to alternative perspectives and arguments. It is said that she has prejudices concerning the plans made by Almere, which she regards as horrific, regardless of their content and detail. A respondent stated, ‘Manja often thinks in spectres. She has prejudices. I then say, “but it [the plans for the IJmeer] could also turn out to be great!”’ (R08). Another respondent from Almere (a proponent of the plans) stated:

For them, only one thing counts: what you see on the horizon. You do not hear from them about how to develop a city where people can live and work. Their perspective is dangerous: ‘How can you make a city of 350,000 people non-existent?’ This is what makes Adri [Duivesteijn] furious. (R12)

Hence, several respondents regarded Verhorst’s interest an example of ‘not in my backyard’ behaviour, and corner her and her supporters as ‘the ladies on the dike’ (R19). Local councillor and initiator of ‘Build the IJmeer Bridge’, Van der Kroef—in clear reference to the people of the Angry Swan—stated: ‘We must not be bluffed by a few people from Waterland who feel that their view is spoiled’ (Van Lieshout, 2009). Verhorst replied to this critique by stating, ‘It is about much more than our own interest. We are talking about an area important for very many people’ (Schreuder, 2009b). However, because Verhorst is also described as ‘mediageil’, which literally means ‘media-horny’, or enjoying being at the centre of attention, she is not necessarily given the benefit of the doubt. Some respondents stated that her campaign...
risks being more about herself than about the issue she supports because—according to these respondents—Verhorst always seems to be seeking to be in the spotlight (R04; R10). In 2011, partially thanks to mobilising her network to vote for her, she was awarded the title ‘Waterlander 2011’ for her merits to the municipality Waterland and the region (Anonymous, 2011b). However, this does not indicate that praise of Verhorst does not hold any meaning, as highlighted by the fact that, in early 2011, Verhorst was awarded the honourable Knight’s Order of Orange-Nassau by the Queen due to her merits for society (Anonymous, 2011d).

Advocacy versus brokerage
While Breunissen, Verhorst and their respective organisations are explicit in their goal to keep the Markermeer-IJmeer open at any cost, associations such as the Environmental Federation (Milieufederatie), Association for Preservation of the IJsselmeer and Nature Monuments are open to negotiate on outer-dike development and the infrastructural connection. Most of these associations still do not prefer human intervention, and would like to see the Markermeer-IJmeer open, but are willing to agree on a package deal. For example, if resources are to be invested in outer-dike urbanisation, there should be an equal investment in revitalising the ecosystem. They acknowledge that there are other interests that need to be considered alongside ecological and landscape quality (R15). The strategic dilemma they face is to either act constructively in the RRAAM policy process—such as pushing forward their own visions—or hinder the process. They decided that it would be better to participate constructively in the RRAAM process from a joint perspective, and this pragmatic approach made them an easier partner for the RRAAM-work than Friends of the Earth and the Angry Swan.

Friends of the Earth and the Angry Swan were not part of the RRAAM-work because they could not fully commit themselves to the three-fold ambition stated in the RAAM-letter (focus on nature/water, accessibility and urbanisation) (R04). Breunissen did not participate in the RRAAM policy process due to budget cuts and other priorities of Friends of the Earth. Verhorst had no direct access to or influence on the decisions made within the RRAAM-work or overall steering committee, but did participate actively in the RRAAM network. However, she did not limit herself to the RRAAM network because, as aforementioned, she seeks to raise attention and awareness of the public value
of the open landscape of the Markermeer-IJmeer, both within and outside the RRAAM process.

6.4 Conclusion
This case study has shown a variety of policy entrepreneurs trying to set the agenda on the plans for outer-dike urbanisation and the infrastructural connection between Amsterdam and Almere. First, two aldermen from Almere became strong advocates of an infrastructural connection between Amsterdam and Almere and, mainly in the case of Duivesteijn, also promoted outer-dike urbanisation to accommodate additional housing, solve problems of traffic congestion, and give the city of Almere the socio-economic boost it desperately needs. Second, two other policy entrepreneurs seized the momentum to advocate a specific alternative for the infrastructural connection. Third, two policy entrepreneurs from interest groups opposed the plans made by the other policy entrepreneurs and advocated to maintain the status quo and keep the landscape open, as it currently is. The conflicting interests and frames presented resulted in a dynamic agenda-setting process because all of the policy entrepreneurs sought to frame the issue to set the agenda and exploit various networking strategies to gather resources and attain support.

With regard to the framing strategies employed, all policy entrepreneurs tried to visualise the problems and solutions. Alderman Bijl framed the issue at stake mainly from Almere’s new town problems and argued that an infrastructural connection would benefit Almere and, to a larger extent, the region. He had set up an atelier and created a maquette to visualise the infrastructural connection and outer-dike urbanisation. Bijl succeeded in expanding support and setting the public, policy and political agendas. However, he did not succeed in instigating a final decision by the national government on the future of Almere, and public and political attention waned. Alderman Duivesteijn altered the frame and successfully aligned it to the national problem of accommodating a demographically changing and growing population in the Randstad region, which was in the interest of the national government. He cleverly linked Almere’s frame to that of the national government and succeeded in placing Almere’s ambitions back on the regional and national policy and political agendas. Both aldermen, though visible in the media, did not seem to invest considerable effort in setting the public agenda, although they did nevertheless attain some media attention.

The policy entrepreneurs from Almere had the local support of the Almere City Council and local stakeholders who expressed their support for Almere’s ambitions in documents such as the City Manifests (Almere, 2003, 2009c). In addition, Almere’s counterpart, the municipality of Amsterdam, became a supporter, particularly of the plan to create an infrastructural connection between the two cities. The two proponents for specific alternatives of the infrastructural connection
framed their options as the best and least costly means to solve problems with regard to issues such as traffic congestion, mobility and so forth. Although these two policy entrepreneurs had more elaborate ideas on the future of the Randstad region and IJsselmeer area, they decided to focus their frame on the infrastructural connection alone to improve their chances of successfully setting the political agenda.

The two policy entrepreneurs opposing these plans framed the issue differently and argued that all the proposed changes threatened the open landscape of the Markermeer-IJmeer. They tried to invigorate the values of an open Markermeer-IJmeer and visualised the potential harm done if the plans of the other policy entrepreneurs were implemented. Whereas other interest groups were open to negotiating a package deal, these two policy entrepreneurs were not. They were only open to agree on a tunnel, rather than a bridge, as an infrastructural connection, if this was really deemed vital for the future of Almere and the Randstad region. As a result, Breunissen did not participate in the RRAAM process, whereas Verhorst did participate but continued to advocate and invigorate the frame of an open Markermeer-IJmeer.

All the policy entrepreneurs exploited networking strategies. Their networking strategies included seizing opportunities and exploiting venues to contact the media, experts, politicians, inhabitants, other stakeholders and—particularly—decision makers in order to gain access to the political agenda and secure political support. However, the case study revealed differences between the various policy entrepreneurs—particularly those already with access to the political agenda setting and those without formal access to the political agenda. The outsiders, Van der Vlis, Adema, Breunissen and especially Verhorst, exploited a broader range of networking strategies than did the insiders, Bijl and Duivesteijn. Most policy entrepreneurs acting from outside engaged in writing letters, drafting petitions, public campaigning, approaching the media, mobilising the public and trying to attend as many venues that were somehow relevant to their issue, while those already with access prioritised networking in political arenas over seeking public support. This corroborates with Cobb et al. (1976), who argue that groups with access to the political agenda are less likely to focus on setting the public agenda than those who do not have that access.

Alongside problems of gaining access, another difficulty faced by policy entrepreneurs from the outside was that they did not have the resources or political power and connections to talk to ministers and decision makers to negotiate different solutions. In contrast, the aldermen could easily use their political network to gain influence over the agenda, and use financial and human resources to conduct thorough research and seek advice. As appointed representatives, these policy entrepreneurs had the opportunity to sit around the negotiation table with national, provincial and local government representatives,
and other key stakeholders, while the outsiders needed to mobilise their informal network to gather resources and try to gain influence on the agenda setting. Thus, people from within the political system had more direct opportunities to influence the political agenda than did people acting from the outside.

Consequently, the strategies employed by the outsiders were much more diverse than those of the insiders, and were mainly focused on setting the public agenda in order to influence the political agenda. Thus, while Kingdon (1984) argues that policy entrepreneurs are not primarily characterised by the formal positions they hold, this does not mean that their formal positions are unimportant. Rather, positional power considerably influences the policy entrepreneurs’ repertoire. Not only do policy entrepreneurs with formal power employ a smaller variety of networking strategies, and can afford and are obliged to do so, but they also seem to have more influence on agenda setting than actors who have no formal power. Those without formal power need to mobilise the public to raise awareness and instigate policy and political agenda setting from the outside. However, this case study has offered a more complex image of agenda setting because it was not only inside or outside access that influenced the policy entrepreneurs' effectiveness in setting the agenda, but also contextual factors.

The first contextual factor was that the political stream changed when a new administration took office in 2010. During Duivesteijn’s first years as alderman, he won the support of the then minister and successfully returned the ambitions of Almere to the national agenda. However, the new liberal minister was unwilling to simply adopt the policy as laid out by her predecessor, due to the changing economic tide and difference in policy priorities. Thus, outer-dike urbanisation was soon dropped and the need for a short-term decision and implementation of an infrastructural connection was also questioned by the new minister. As a result, Duivesteijn had to cope with a changing political stream. Policy entrepreneurs such as Van der Vlis and Adema exploited the changing political stream by opting for cheaper alternatives. They hoped this would convince the national government to seriously consider their alternatives, and they successfully managed to have their alternatives placed on the policy agenda. However, in the most recent State Vision for the region, Adema’s plan was dropped, while Van der Vlis’ alternative remained a viable option for the infrastructural connection. The policy entrepreneurs who wanted to stick to the status quo had hoped for a cancellation of all the plans; however, without a clear decision in favour of outer-dike urbanisation and/or the infrastructural connection, the minister was also unwilling to promise to keep the Markermeer-IJmeer open.

Despite the changing political stream, a second contextual factor influenced the agenda setting. In this case study, the government had a mobilising role, as it initiated the 2010 to 2012 RRAAM process and invited stakeholders to reach a joint perspective on the future of the
region and the plans for Almere. On other occasions, outsiders would have had a difficult time gaining access to the policy agenda, but, due to the open character of the RRAAM process, the policy entrepreneurs were given access and plenty of room to publicly share their frame and find support. Except for Breunissen, all the outside policy entrepreneurs used this venue to share their frames. Duivesteijn, as part of the steering committee, exploited that venue to share his frame; however, he was not personally involved in the RRAAM network that was open to all kinds of actors. He mainly placed his trust in private negotiations with governmental partners to settle a negotiated deal. However, as the case analysis has shown, this proved difficult due to his explicit framing.

A third contextual factor that influenced the agenda setting was the indecisiveness of the national government. Despite—or perhaps precisely because of—the national government’s efforts to create consensus by involving all stakeholders in the RRAAM process, this was a costly and tiresome policy process, especially when considering the years prior to the RRAAM process. After years of agenda setting, no final decision has been made, which—according to Bachrach and Baratz (1970)—can be considered a ‘non-decision’ (p. 44). This has led to a situation in which none of the policy entrepreneurs have to admit final failure or can claim success—except Adema, who saw his plan being removed from the agenda. The recent postponing of the decision by the minister can be framed as a success by the proponents because the infrastructural connection and its alternatives are not off the agenda and will be reviewed in about 15 years. However, this can also be framed as a failure—and thus as a success for the opponents—because, at least for the coming years, no bridge, tunnel or island will be established. Hence, the politics of claiming success or failure and setting the agenda by policy entrepreneurs from all sides is likely to continue until a final decision is made, or until the infrastructural connection and/or outer-dike urbanisation are actually implemented (Huitema et al., 2009, p. 375).

Notwithstanding the contextual factors influencing the agenda setting, all the policy entrepreneurs involved must also blame themselves for not successfully setting the political agenda (if one can speak of ‘success’ in this regard). There have been leaps in public attention for Almere’s problems, yet no continued public or political attention to address these problems (cf. Downs, 1972). None of the policy entrepreneurs has been able to prevent a gradual decline in public interest.
Certainly, proponents signed City Manifests and opponents signed the Pampus Pamphlet and instigated a petition, but the general public did not seem that concerned, and remained relatively passive and disengaged. One could regard this as a contextual factor; however, I argue that the policy entrepreneurs themselves failed to effectively mobilise the public and expand the issue beyond the realm of a selected group of actors interested in the issue. Most people did not seem very concerned about the future of Almere—presumably because the issue had too limited effect on most people's personal lives, and the policy entrepreneurs failed to create a sense of urgency and bridge that gap.

A final observation that must be made for this case study is the apparent importance of the personal characteristics of the policy entrepreneurs themselves for their effectiveness in setting the agenda. Duivesteijn's bold personal approach led to praise, but also seems to have negatively influenced his relationship with other actors, and thus—presumably—also influenced his effectiveness in setting the political agenda post-2010. The same applies to his most direct opponent, Verhorst, who was respected for her personality, persistency and charisma, but criticised for campaigning more for herself than for the issue she supported. I will return to this issue in the concluding chapter because it relates to the way framing the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ influences the agenda setting.

No final decision has yet been made on the future of Almere regarding the infrastructural connection and outer-dike urbanisation. However, the minister's latest response reveals that, although she chooses to postpone decision making and await economic and demographic developments, she is in favour of building the infrastructural connection in 2025. Without a doubt, this will give new life to agenda setting for the future of Almere.
CHAPTER 7: WINDPARK NOORDOOSTPOLDER
When the winds of change blow, some people build walls and others build windmills.’

Chinese proverb
Chapter 7: Wind Park Noordoostpolder

Figure 7.1: Schematic version of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder. Adapted from the draft Structure Vision Wind Energy on Land (Ontwerp-structuurvisie Windenergie op land, 2013).
7.1 Introduction

The following case study concerns the plan to create a wind park in the Noordoostpolder. This plan has been successfully placed on the political agenda and is currently being constructed. Compared to the case study discussed in the previous chapter on the Almere infrastructural connection and outer-dike urbanisation, which is still in the process of setting the political agenda, this wind park’s implementation began in 2012. Up until then, various policy entrepreneurs, both proponents and opponents, were involved in strategically influencing the agenda setting, and the most prominent of these actors are discussed in this chapter. To discuss this case study, it is necessary to go back to the 1990s.

During the 1990s, various farmers in the Noordoostpolder became excited about wind energy. Building wind turbines and supplying wind energy proved a profitable business that provided some welcome extra income. Over the years, entrepreneurial farmers joined arms and developed plans for large clusters of turbines along the dikes of the Noordoostpolder—the Wind Park Noordoostpolder. The group found the required support from the local and provincial authorities; however, the plan did not proceed swiftly due to coordination problems within the group of farmers and with governmental authorities. Neither did it help that locals living in the municipality of Noordoostpolder and neighbouring municipality of Urk started to interfere when they became aware of the plans in 2008. Opposing groups and coalitions were formed and did everything to stop the wind park. These groups argued, among other things, that the wind park would ruin the precious landscape and did not fit into the Noordoostpolder. By 2009, the Dutch national government also became actively involved and supported the Wind Park Noordoostpolder because renewable energy had become an important target of national policy. The inconvenient truth for the opponents was that the wind park would be realised and the policy process seemed irreversible. Not even the highest Dutch Administrate Council of State, on which the opponents had placed their last hopes, ruled in favour of the opponents (Raad van State, 2012b).

In early 2012, the group of early adopters of contemporary wind energy commenced with the construction of the largest inland wind park in Europe. A total of 86 wind turbines will be erected: 48 sited near shore and 38 onshore, with the highest wind turbine having a maximum hub height of 135 metres, and rotor blades with a tipping height of 200 metres (Windenergie langs de dijken van de Noordoostpolder, 2011). The wind park will produce approximately 1.4 TWh annually, with an installed capacity of 429 MW of energy, which is enough to provide electricity for almost 400,000 households. This is roughly the number of households in the provinces of Flevoland and Friesland combined. This case study discusses the various policy entrepreneurs involved in advocating and opposing the wind park. The proponents were the initiators of the wind park—mostly farmers living in the Noordoostpolder.
who wanted to construct the wind park and make a profit, as well as local, provincial and national governments. Among the opponents of the wind park were policy entrepreneurs from Urk—notably, the action group, Urk Briest, and the municipality of Urk. There were also opponents from the municipality of Noordoostpolder—notably, the local action group, Tegenwind; the association, Rotterdamse Hoek; the political party, Our New Society (ONS) Noordoostpolder; and a farmer living next to the dike. Before discussing the various strategies employed by these policy entrepreneurs, I present the policies concerning wind energy in the Noordoostpolder.

7.2 Policy on wind energy in the Noordoostpolder

7.2.1 Local policy

During the 1980s, the first wind turbines in the Noordoostpolder were built by IJsselmij, an energy company on the dikes of the Noordoostpolder. At that time, any individual or firm could ask the local authorities for a permit to build wind turbines on their grounds. In the 1990s, when interest in wind energy was increasing, wind turbines were built everywhere and there was little to no alignment of plans and policies. Being faced with too many individual requests for wind turbines, the municipality council of Noordoostpolder evaluated its policy in 1998 (Zandvoort Ordening en Advies, 1998). Based on this evaluation, the municipality drafted a memorandum to cease granting permits, and appointed the most western part of the polder as the location where people were allowed to develop plans to build new wind turbines in clusters (Gemeente Noordoostpolder, 1998).

In February 1999, a memorandum called ‘Integral Policy for Wind Energy’ was published by the municipality of Noordoostpolder, reinstating the previously set goals (Gemeente Noordoostpolder, 1999). In April 2000, the municipality drafted its ‘Land Use Plan’, in which the policy on not allowing solitary wind turbines was confirmed (Gemeente Noordoostpolder, 2000). In October 2000, the municipality stated that initiators needed to present a project plan on how to proceed. In April 2002, this led to four groups of farmers and one energy company, Essent—which was previously IJsselmij and is now RWE—joining and reaching an agreement to cluster wind turbine plans for a wind park in the western part of the Noordoostpolder (Koepel Windenergie Noordoostpolder, 2002). In October 2002, the municipality council declared that it supported the agreement and the suggested planning process for creating the wind park (Gemeente Noordoostpolder, 2002). In June 2003, the group of initiators, following the agreement, formed an Umbrella Organisation and continued working on the plans to create a large wind park, subdivided into four wind parks. It began conducting research on the feasibility and environmental impact of the wind turbines, as required by the public authorities, and worked on its business case. When, in 2004, the first environmental
impact assessment was finished, neighbouring municipalities were informed and the public was told about the plans via the media (Lakeman & Zijlstra, 2004). Throughout the years, the city council and Council of Mayor and Aldermen of the municipality of Noordoostpolder have always strongly supported the wind park.

7.2.2 Provincial policy
In 2000, with its Land Use Plan (Provincie Flevoland, 2000), the Province Flevoland stated that it would allow new clustered wind turbines along the dikes of the Noordoostpolder. In 2006, the province of Flevoland drafted its new Land Use Plan and followed the policy as set out earlier, concentrating wind turbines and removing current solitary wind turbines by 50 per cent (Provincie Flevoland, 2006). In 2007, the province changed its 2006 Land Use Plan by putting a stop on all new wind parks, except the planned Wind Park Noordoostpolder and in the southern part of Flevoland. In 2008, to give the planning process a boost, the province of Flevoland, together with governmental parties (see next section) established a steering committee with representatives of the Umbrella Organisation and public authorities, including several ministries and the municipality of Noordoostpolder. The neighbouring municipality of Urk was not included in the steering committee because, according to this committee, it had no direct interests. In 2008, the plan for the wind park was to set up 93 wind turbines, with 55 in the water outer dike, with a mast height ranging from 98 to 135 metres and a capacity of 429 MW.

7.2.3 National policy
In 2006, the national Memorandum on Spatial Planning considered the dikes in the Noordoostpolder a possible location for extra wind turbines, as long as this would not create a full fencing of the landscape (Nota Ruimte, 2006). In 2007, the then Cabinet Balkenende IV presented the working programme ‘Clean and Efficient’, which stated that the focus with regard to renewable energy should be on wind energy. An additional 2,000 MW within four years, on top of the then installed energy production of 1,500 MW, was deemed necessary. Offshore, an additional 450 MW was projected (Werkprogramma Schoon en Zuinig, 2007). Due to the new law on spatial planning (Wro, 2008) that came into effect in July 2008, the national government had the legal power to issue Land Use Plans itself. When, in March 2009, changes in the Electricity Act (Elektriciteitswet 1998, 2008) also came into effect, planned wind parks with a capacity over 100 MW would automatically fall under the National Coordination Regulation (Besluit toepassing rijksprojectenprocedure op windenergieprojecten in de Noordoostpolder, 2006; Uitvoeringsbesluit rijksoördinatieerregeling energie-infrastructuurprojecten, 2009). Therefore, the national government could claim the project coordination and decision-making authority, overruling decision making by provincial and local authorities.
In April 2009, following the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations, 1997), the EU issued the European Directive 2009/28/EC (European Union, 2009) on the promotion of using energy from renewable sources, obliging the Dutch government to achieve a share of 14 per cent renewable energy and a CO\textsubscript{2} reduction of 20 per cent by 2020. This meant, at that time, an additional 6,000 MW of wind energy should be installed. Governments were told to draft an action plan to comply with this target. Anticipating the action plan that would be presented in June 2010, the then Minister of Economic Affairs announced in November 2009 that she would take control of the project on wind energy along the dikes of the Noordoostpolder, and provide a subsidy of approximately €1 billion (Nationaal Actieplan Hernieuwbare Energie, 2010; Stimulering duurzame energieproductie, 2009). A subsidy with a maximum of €880 million is to be paid over a period of 15 years to cover the revenues of farmers when the standard energy price rate is below €0.096 per kWh. An additional €116 million is the government’s contribution to the initial investment because of the innovative character of the plan. The Wind Park Noordoostpolder, with its 429 MW wind energy on land, was regarded an important attribute to the government target on reaching the EU requirements. Due to its importance in reaching the government target, other governmental plans—such as the national Water Plan presented in December 2009—supported the allocation of wind turbines in the Noordoostpolder (Anonymous, 2009f; Nationaal Waterplan 2009-2015, 2009).

In March 2010, the Crisis and Recovery Act came into effect, meaning that all large projects on infrastructure and energy, sustainability and innovation needed to be implemented as soon as possible, including the Wind Park Noordoostpolder (Crisis- en herstelwet, 2010). In June 2010, the Minister of Economic Affairs decided to remove seven turbines closest to the border of the municipality of Urk in reaction to the local opposition from Urk and a resolution accepted by the parliament to take Urk’s interest into account (Liberalisering energimarkten: Motie van het lid Zijlstra, 2009; Stimulering duurzame energieproductie, 2010). A new government, installed in October 2010, also set its goal at 14 per cent renewable energy production and embraced the Wind Park Noordoostpolder (Regeerakkoord 2010). In January 2011, the government presented its Land Use Plan for the Wind Park Noordoostpolder (Windenergie langs de dijken van de Noordoostpolder, 2011), and the initiators began constructing the wind park 1.5 years later, in autumn 2012.

In November 2012, another new government was installed, reinstating the goal of complying with the EU Directive on sustainable energy production of 14 per cent. The new government aimed to realise 16 per cent renewable energy production by 2020 (Regeerakkoord 2012). The new ‘Structure Vision Wind Energy on Land’ (Rijksstructuurvisie Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 2013), which was based on the ‘Structure Vision on Infrastructure and Space’ (Structuurvisie Infrastructuur
en Ruimte, 2012), also reinstated this governmental target, of which the Wind Park Noordoostpolder remains an important asset. In August 2013, the national government and over 40 civil society partners—including trade and labour unions, nature conservation associations and NGOs—developed an Energy Agreement on sustainable growth, in which wind energy remained a high priority (Energieakkoord voor duurzame groei, 2013). Overall, additional wind energy remains an important target at all governmental levels.

7.3 Framing and networking strategies
This section discusses the strategies employed by the proponents and opponents of the wind park. To better understand the agenda setting and strategies employed, the policy entrepreneurial strategies are discussed as chronologically as possible. The ideation of the wind turbines in the Noordoostpolder began with a window of opportunity that was exploited by several farmers from the Noordoostpolder. Over the years, this group’s advocates expanded with local, provincial and national partners. However, opposition increased in 2008, when people from the Noordoostpolder and Urk became aware of the plans to create a wind park.

7.3.1 The proponents
The business window of opportunity
In 1994, farmers René De Rond and Piet Bootsma were on a trip to Germany where they witnessed a landscape full of wind turbines. The two entrepreneurs saw a business opportunity to build wind turbines in the Netherlands as well, and, in January 1995, they discussed the opportunities with the municipality of Noordoostpolder. Within three months, all permits needed for two wind turbines on their own lands were granted, and, in October of the same year, the turbines were built. Pleased with their initial success, they longed for more. However, in 1998, the municipality decided to change policy from solitary wind turbines to clustered wind turbines, and they were restrained in their options because new wind turbines could not be built just anywhere. De Rond and some other farmers formed a coalition and developed a plan to cluster wind turbines close to the Noordermeerdijk. However, mistakes were made with the environmental impact assessment report, and their plan was subsequently rejected.

De Rond was not the only farmer to see a business opportunity in wind energy. Farmers Tjitte De Groot and Pieter Meulendijks also began investing in wind turbines in the 1990s. De Groot stated:

We were caught on the lots assigned to us half a century ago. As an entrepreneur you want to do more. You are used to pioneering and you see an opportunity. That is how I got into the business of wind energy. (Anonymous, 2011m)
However, De Groot faced the same barrier as the other farmers in the
polder: the municipality of Noordoostpolder would not allow solitary
wind turbines, but only wind turbines clustered in the western part
of the municipality (Gemeente Noordoostpolder, 1998, 2000). The
various groups of farmers, who were used to taking care of their busi-
ness alone, now had to work together to develop a joint plan (Viss-
cher, 2011a). In 2000, De Rond, Bootsma, De Groot, Meulendijks and
other farmers set up a platform with the various stakeholders in-
volved, including the company Essent, that owned the wind park that
was already there. In 2002, the platform and municipality council of
Noordoostpolder reached an agreement in which it was stated that
the initiators would set up an Umbrella Organisation, jointly write an
environmental assessment report for the permit application and de-
velop a solid business case. An additional requirement given by the
municipality of Noordoostpolder was that it needed to be possible for
the people of the Noordoostpolder to financially participate as well.
In 2003, the Umbrella Organisation was set up with initiators such as
De Rond, who joined the board. Janneke Wijnia, a tax lawyer, became
the secretary for the Umbrella Organisation. The group approached
Henk Tiesinga, who had management experience and a background in
agriculture, to become their chairperson.

Struggling with the ‘forced marriage’
In 2003, when Tiesinga joined, there were five coalition members in-
volved (Kobessen, 2011). The five parties were, at the Noordermeerdijk
inner dike, Windpark Creil BV; at the Noordermeerdijk and Wester-
meerdijk outer dike, Westermeerwind BV; at the Westermeerdijk in-
ner dike, Acousticon Windpark BV and VWW Windpark BV; and the
Zuidermeerdijk electricity company, RWE. Apart from RWE, the three
parties of the inner dike would later partner in NOP Agrowind, which
would conduct affairs on their behalf. These five parties had different
backgrounds and worked together as a coalition of convenience. They
were partly people from the polder, and partly people from outside the
polder. In addition, businesspeople from various companies—at that
time, also Siemens—were involved.

However, there was no real unity between the five parties, with one
insider noting that the Umbrella Organisation was like a ‘forced mar-
riage’ (R29), and another insider remarking that ‘if [multiple] people
are forced to go through one door [at the same time], the doorpost
will wear out’ (R34). The different personalities, cultures and interests
clashed more than once, and the collaboration was not always whole-
hearted (R32). There also consisted different interpretations of the agreement, and legal advice was needed more than once. Negotiation and mediation was required to keep the group of not likeminded people together, but, in terms of content, the group succeeded in settling their issues. One insider noted, ‘A negotiated package deal was agreed upon; however, if one corner would have been taken out, everything would collapse and a great war would commence’ (R32). Though in policy terms still supporting the plans, the municipality kept its distance and regarded it not its responsibility to interfere with the negotiations. The same applied to the province, which was not greatly involved in the process. The direct involvement of these governmental levels changed when Anne Bliek, the new executive provincial representative, came into office in 2007.

Help from above
As stated in the provincial council coalition statement, Bliek made it one of her main targets to reach 60 per cent sustainable energy in the province by 2013. In 2007, she contacted the initiators of the wind park. The group tried to win her support, but she knew they had internal conflicts that first needed to be resolved (R33; Bakker, 2008). Bliek began venue shopping at the national, provincial, and local governmental levels to acquire the four to five hundred thousand of euros required to establish and run a steering committee. In 2008, she succeeded in finding support from the Ministries of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment; Economic Affairs; and Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, which together paid one quarter. Another quarter was paid by the Province Flevoland, one quarter by the municipality of Noordoostpolder, and one quarter by the Umbrella Organisation.

An external project director was appointed, Dirk Louter, and a consultancy firm was contracted to professionalise and improve public communication, and eliminate internal conflicts. However, the farmers still needed extra subsidy to settle a solid business case; thus, they contacted Van der Hoeven—the then Minister of Economic Affairs. In November 2009, high officials of the ministry negotiated with the Umbrella Organisation a national government subsidy of €880 million for exploitation, plus €116 million for investments (R35). At that time, the national government had already taken over coordination because the wind park had become an important project to reach its target of 16 per cent renewable energy supply by 2020. However, the coordination of permit applications and plan development remained the responsibility of the farmers. Thus, the group of farmers still had to invest considerable effort and money to complete the environmental assessments required to apply for the permits to commence construction of the wind park. This proved difficult and troublesome because opposition against the wind park had started to stir up public emotions since 2008. Hearings at the Council of State were just one of the accomplishments of the opposition, as described in the following
sections. While there was help from above from the province, the initiators had to work together and speak with one voice to attempt to achieve their goals (R27).

**Fighting over the public agenda**

As soon as the plan for the wind park was reported in the media in 2008, opposing parties contacted the steering committee to have a say in the policy process. However, the steering committee parties decided they did not want the opposing parties on board, including the municipality of Urk, because they feared that their only goal would be to obstruct the process (R27; R33). While the opponents did not succeed in gaining access to the political agenda setting, they were successful in gaining media attention and using the media as a venue to set the public agenda. The proponents felt that the media were supporting the opposition and the nation’s beloved municipality of Urk, and thus not open to information distributed by the steering committee and Umbrella Organisation (R27; R28). They were concerned that the opponents’ efforts might lead to the wind park being halted (R27; R28; R32). If the decision makers took over the contesting frame of the opponents, realisation of the wind park would become even more difficult.

One of the framing contests concerned the height of the wind turbines, and the way this was visualised by the opposition and addressed by the media (Hulsing, 2011). According to the proponents, the truth was distorted by exaggerating the wind park size and its visualisations, including the ones made by the municipality of Urk. To settle the dispute, the steering committee offered Urk to jointly finance independent research into the visualisations, but Urk was not interested (R27). Therefore, the steering committee decided to initiate the research itself, and subsequently demonstrated that the visualisations of the Umbrella Organisation were correct (Anonymous, 2009e). Further, to win the fight over the public agenda and provide the public with ‘correct’ information, the steering committee organised various information events, including a trip to an existing wind park in Germany that served as a demonstration project (Anonymous, 2009k, 2009l, 2010c, 2010e; Meijer, 2009b; Van Herwaarden, 2010a). Additionally, on Global Wind Day in June 2009, the initiators opened their houses and existing wind turbines for people to visit (Anonymous, 2009o). However, none of the venues set up by the steering committee and Umbrella Organisation were well attended and public interest seemed limited.

Nevertheless, to cultivate some support among the people living in the five villages of the Noordoostpolder—Nagele, Tollebeek, Espel,
Creil and Rutten—the municipality of Noordoostpolder advised the Umbrella Organisation to provide these villages with funding to spend freely, which it will deliver in the amount of €10,000 yearly per village over the coming 20 years (Anonymous, 2010g). Additionally, to compensate the people living next to the dike for their discomfort, De Rond and the other initiators of the inner-dike projects decided to pay for the people’s electricity over the coming 15 years, including the people opposing the project. However, the opponents framed these as payments used to silence the people and stop them appealing at court (Van Herwaarden, 2010f; Yang Yang Chiu, 2010a). De Groot and Meulendijks, of Westermeerwind BV, offered the people living in the area the opportunity to invest money in the two lines of the wind turbines’ outer dike. This was also done to raise public support and allow people to financially profit from the wind park.

Despite their attempts to win over the public, the contesting frames of the opponents proved difficult to refute, even though, according to the proponents, the contesting frames were not supported with evidence. For example, the opponents personally attacked Tiesinga and accused him of misusing his position at the water board to favour the wind park; however, according to the proponents, there was no proof of such actions. Two respondents stated that the opponents were on ‘a warpath’ (R32) and exploited every opportunity to discredit the wind park and the people involved, even if this meant telling untruths and hurting people personally by ‘walking over dead bodies’ (R32; R33). The proponents, including the governmental actors, argued that they would not play the same game and would communicate facts, instead of returning the allegations, even thought it was tempting to ‘throw with mud’ as well (R27; R32; R33). The proponents stated that the opponents found support nowhere and stood more or less alone because they were convinced that everything related to the wind park was negative and damaging. Therefore, the proponents felt compelled to focus on a legal course of action via the Council of State, instead of continuously trying to communicate with the opponents, who could not be convinced of the benefits of the wind park (R29). Thus, ultimately, the proponents were pleased with the legal judgement of the Council of State, which allowed the farmers to begin constructing the wind park.

The ‘beneficial for all’ frame
Throughout the course of events thus far, the proponents had continuously framed the wind park as beneficial for themselves, the region and the nation as a whole. Business, tourism and employment in the region would all profit from the realisation of the wind park (Poelsma, 2008; Van Herwaarden, 2010b, 2013c). Further, the wind park was visualised and pictured in promotional videos and brochures as beautifully fitting the landscape of the Dutch polder (Windpark Noordoostpolder website, 2013). From a broader perspective, the wind park was also
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framed as essential for the Netherlands to comply with the international and European targets on renewable energy (Schreuder, 2009c). Without this wind park, the Dutch would have a hard time achieving their targets. Thus, the proponents framed themselves as ‘idealists’ (R29) who were helping the nation and assisting compliance with the international and European targets on renewable energy.

Despite this, a successful realisation and return on investments were not guaranteed due to the rising opposition; conflicts at the Council of State; and changing regulations with respect to funding, nature, and noise nuisance. Therefore, the initiators also framed themselves as true ‘diehards’ (Van Herwaarden, 2009a, 2009c) who dared to undertake risky endeavours as early pioneers in contemporary wind energy. Farmer Meulendijks stated, ‘We are the adventurous type, otherwise we would have never started with this project ... you need considerable perseverance, but we have never thought about giving up. We wanted to finish it—this is our life’s work’ (Van Herwaarden, 2012d). The proponents continued to frame the wind park as beneficial for the region and whole nation, while the opponents advocated an alternative frame that conflicted with the proponents’ frame.

7.3.2 The opponents from Urk
The policy entrepreneurs who opposed the wind park can be divided into two coalitions of convenience: those originating from Urk and those from the Noordoostpolder. The following sections discuss these coalitions in that order.

Urk fenced with an ‘iron curtain’?
In August 2008, the Urk Briest interest group was established after one of its members, Lucia De Vries—a local freelance journalist from
Urk—read a column by Jan Mulder in a national newspaper (De Vries, 2011b). Mulder warned the 18,000 inhabitants of Urk that they would be fenced with an ‘iron curtain’ of wind turbines if the plans for the wind park were executed (Meijer, 2009a). This alerted De Vries to the effect the wind turbines would have, and, via local media, she began looking for others with whom she could protest against the plans. In Dutch, ‘Briest’ refers to both a ‘breeze’ caused by wind and to the snorting noise made by horses (Langbroek & Vanclay, 2012). Leen Van Loosen was one of the people who responded to De Vries, and became the public spokesperson of the committee, while De Vries was its secretary.

The year 2008 also marked the beginning of a personal quest of Jaap Kroon, who was the major of Urk from 2006 to 2012. He became aware of the effect of the wind park next to Urk when he was informed of the scale of the plan. Kroon began to realise that the planned wind park was not comparable to the current wind turbines on the dike, and thus made it his goal to do everything in his power to prevent the realisation of the ‘industrial’ wind park next to ‘his’ beloved village (Visscher, 2011a). The following sections discuss the various strategies employed by these two policy entrepreneurs from Urk.

**Framing the threat**

Urk Briest, with Van Loosen as its public spokesman, was one of the first policy entrepreneurs who tried to set the public agenda by framing the wind park as a threat to the liveability of Urk (Meijer, 2008). Van Loosen did not buy the ‘beneficial for all’ frame of the proponents because he believed the scale of the wind park and size of the individual wind turbines did not fit the landscape and would be completely out of context beside the picturesque village of Urk. Van Loosen felt strengthened by the then Minister Plasterk of Education, Culture and Science, who had given Urk the status of a ‘culturally protected village’ based on the 1988 Monuments Law (Anonymous, 2009n). This gave Van Loosen the opportunity to amplify his frame and invigorate the values of Urk. He framed Urk as a culturally protected village that should be defended against the threatening ‘iron curtain’ of mega wind turbines as high as the highest tower in the Netherlands (Anonymous, 2009h, 2009v, 2011h, 2011t; Visscher, 2011a; Yang Yang Chiu, 2009, 2010c, 2011b, 2011c).

Van Loosen wanted ‘to show Urk what is lying ahead’ (Anonymous, 2009h), and therefore propagated that ‘if this plan is executed, we will never again see the sun set beautifully in the IJsselmeer’ (Van Herwaarden, 2009d). Along a similar line of framing, Kroon framed the wind park as megalomaniacal and as an ‘iron curtain’ that would ruin Urk’s precious skyline (R26; Anonymous, 2009w; Boex, 2011). Kroon stated, ‘The view of our thousand year old village rising from the water is being destroyed. I cannot find other words to describe it. This project is so huge that it belongs in the North Sea’ (Schreuder, 2009c).
He argued that no one in Urk thought the wind park was a good plan (Anonymous, 2011e; Schreuder, 2009c). Kroon stated that, ‘The 18,000 inhabitants of Urk, including all infants’ were against the wind park (Visscher, 2011a).

**Framing the story of maltreatment**

Van Loosen and Kroon’s astonishment was strengthened by the culturally rooted dissonance between the people of Urk, former islanders and pioneers, who were mainly farmers, coming to the drained polder since 1942 (Langbroek & Vanclay, 2012). Van Loosen stated, ‘The wind turbines are placed on the territory of the municipality of Noordoostpolder, but in the view of Urk. Just like during the draining of Noordoostpolder, we are once again silenced and sidelined’ (Monster, 2009). According to Urk Briest, Urk’s history of being maltreated was continued because its interest was, again, not taken into account (De Vries, 2011a, 2011b; Urk Briest, 2013). Equally disturbing, according to Urk Briest, was the fact that the municipality of Urk had already objected to the plan for the wind park in 2004, but had been uninformed ever since (Anonymous, 2008f, 2009b, 2009x; Visscher, 2011a). For the same reason, Kroon was very frustrated that the Noordoostpolder had chosen...
the location for the wind park next to the dike without Urk’s consent (R26; R36).

Based on these past events, Noordoostpolder’s choice for this location was deemed ‘selfish’ (Meijer, 2009a) and Urk felt maltreated. Kroon stated that the location may be Noordoostpolder’s backyard, but ‘it is Urk’s front yard’ (Yang Yang Chiu, 2011c). According to Kroon, the whole decision-making process on the wind park was ‘undemocratically dictatorial’ (R36) with a dubious role of the governmental parties. Kroon argued that the national government should take a neutral stance and take into account all interests, including Urk’s, instead of working with the initiators of the wind park (R36). Kroon stretched the analogy of the famous cartoon figures, Asterix and Obelix, tireless rebelling against the mighty Roman Empire (R36). Kroon identified himself with the citizens of Urk who, he stated, deserved to be represented against the governmental actors who were ‘bulldozing’ over them (R36). Hence, these opponents not only framed the wind park itself, but also targeted their framing onto (what they claimed were) the unfair actions of other actors and the policy process itself. Moreover, as discussed below, these opponents began to expand the issue framing.
Expanding the issue framing

While Van Loosen and Kroon were successful in setting the public agenda, they were unsuccessful in setting the policy and political agendas. By the end of 2008, they began to realise that arguing that the wind park would ruin the cultural heritage of Urk and that they were maltreated in the policy process, were too insubstantial arguments to convince policymakers and politicians. To strengthen their framing, Van Loosen and Kroon became more knowledgeable on the topic of sustainable wind energy and the issues related to the building of the wind park, and began to expand their initial framing to set the policy and political agendas (Anonymous, 2011h, 2011t; Meijer, 2009a).

For example, Van Loosen and Urk Briest began to argue that the environmental protection status of the IJsselmeer under the European Natura 2000 legislation did not allow any wind turbines in the area. Therefore, when the news came that UNESCO considered listing the polder as part of world heritage, Urk Briest objected (Anonymous, 2010l) and argued: ‘You cannot do both, creating a large industrial area and applying for World Heritage status’ (NovaTV, 2010). In addition, it was believed by these opponents that many birds and bats would die if these turbines—which they named ‘mince mills’—were operating.

While being cautious about questioning the need for additional renewable energy supply, Urk Briest and Kroon did try to set the policy agenda by arguing that wind energy is not as sustainable as the proponents tend to claim (Meijer, 2009a; Mommers, 2011). They argued that policymakers should study alternatives that do not ruin the open landscape of the polder, such as solar energy collectors or smaller wind turbines that better fit the landscape. In addition, alternative locations for the wind park should be reviewed, as these had not been seriously considered by policymakers. Kroon proposed returning to the plan for a park of 225 MW—almost half of what was planned by Minister Van der Hoeven. The wind turbines that had to be realised should not be higher than approximately 80 to 100 metres. Kroon also wanted a radius of seven kilometres around the lighthouse of Urk to remain free of wind turbines. However, preferably, the government should opt for alternative sources of energy, such as solar energy, geothermal heat and biogas, with only minimal wind energy. According to Kroon, this would sufficiently help the government reach the target on renewable energy supply (Anonymous, 2010j; Yang Yang Chiu, 2010b).

Urk Briest and Kroon also argued that the whole wind park would only contribute 0.1 per cent to the national energy consumption, which includes the energy consumption of industry (Anonymous, 2009u). The financial support from the national government for this reason was framed as a waste of public money (Anonymous, 2010p, 2011u; Yang Yang Chiu, 2009): ‘The government is like a family with a small financial budget buying expensive caviar, while neglecting the potatoes, vegetables and other more nutritious products’ (Anonymous, 2009q). Van Loosen warned the government against bringing in a Tro-
jan Horse, as the wind park was ‘too big, too expensive, and controversial’ (Anonymous, 2011q). Other more prominent concerns of Urk Briest were issues related to the health and wealth of the people. The noise made by the wind turbines, the effects of flickering shadow during the day, and the disturbing warning lights during the night were deemed to negatively affect the wellbeing of the people living in the area. Further, the wind turbines were considered bad for tourism and problematic for water sports, fisheries and maritime transportation.

In 2012, when the land was excavated to construct the wind park, Urk Briest began to worry about water safety (De Jager, 2012; De Vries, 2012). Urk Briest framed the dikes as vulnerable to a dike breach, and tried to ensure everyone was aware of this threat by demonstratively appearing wearing life vests at a meeting organised by the Umbrella Organisation (Anonymous, 2009g, 2012a; De Vries, 2012; Meijer, 2009a; Van Herwaarden, 2009b, 2012c).

The networking strategies employed by the opponents from Urk, as discussed below, resembled their divergent framing strategies as they desperately sought to employ multiple networking strategies to raise awareness and set the agenda.

**Mobilising the public**

As was the case with the framing, Urk Briest first sought to set the public agenda. Urk Briest, as befitting an interest group, tried to inform and mobilise local citizens by creatively and playfully organising numerous kinds of activities (Anonymous, 2009h; Anonymous, 2011k; Meijer, 2009a; Van Herwaarden, 2008). On the ‘Urk Day’ event, Urk Briest organised games that involved ‘Throwing Wind Turbines’, the ‘Big Wind Turbine Quiz’ and a limerick competition. It held a slogan contest and sang a self-made protest song during a public event. The group sold protest t-shirts and distributed posters and stickers with their anti–wind turbine logo (Anonymous, 2010a). Maquettes and visualisations of the wind turbines were made to compare the latter with other high infrastructures in the Netherlands. The difference in height with the beloved lighthouse of Urk was also highlighted. Wind turbines within Urk’s skyline, 11 times as high as the lighthouse, were claimed to be unacceptable for the people of Urk. Urk Briest also organised debates with the municipality of Urk (Anonymous, 2009p). The group also attended public meetings organised by the steering committee and municipalities in the region.

It is interesting to observe that Mayor Kroon, who presented himself as the head of the village, also participated in mobilising the public. He attended events organised by the municipality of Urk and opposing groups, and gave speeches to express his concern about the wind park. During one event, he even acted as the choirmaster of a group singing a protest song, which is symbolic for the role he played as a mayor giving voice to the people of Urk (Visscher, 2011b). Kroon also made a short video to express his concern, digital visualisations
of the wind park (Anonymous, 2010r), and a scale model of the wind park that was displayed in the city hall. Kroon took this scale model to a meeting with Minister Verhagen early in 2011. As aforementioned, provoking the most controversy were visualisations shown to the people and presented by the media. According to proponents of the wind park, Urk distorted reality and tried to rouse public indignation (Anonymous, 2010k; Meijer, 2009; Schreuder, 2009c). Kroon acknowledged that he wanted to create a spectacle to convey the message that it was not a regular wind park, but one of the biggest in Europe, being planned for construction right next to Urk. ‘The wind energy sector is exaggerating as well’, Kroon stated, implying a justification of his own visualisations (Mommers, 2011).

**Influencing the political agenda**

Alongside framing and mobilising the public, Urk Briest tried to gain access to the meetings of the Umbrella Organisation and steering committee in 2008, but was told it was unwelcome. This refusal was not appreciated by Urk Briest because it then had to depend solely on the information communicated by the steering committee and the Umbrella Organisation, which Urk Briest did not trust. Therefore, Urk Briest decided to bypass the Umbrella Organisation and steering committee and appeal to the government, ministers, parliament members, province, and national and local political parties, often with an emotional plea to take their interests into consideration. Letters and emails were written to people who had the power to influence the decision (Anonymous, 2009u, 2010p, 2011r; De Vries, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Den Boer, De Vries, Jansen, Lammers & Wiedijk, 2012; Van Herwaarden, 2010g). Additionally, during a visit by Minister Van der Hoev-
en of Economic Affairs, Van Loosen symbolically offered her blinkers to look at Urk’s skyline without being interrupted by the wind turbines (Schreuder, 2009c). More seriously, dressed in Urk’s local costume, a petition against the wind park Noordoostpolder—with over 5,000 signatures—was presented to the Parliamentary Committee on Economic Affairs by people of Urk Briest (Urk Briest, 2011).

Kroon also tried to set the political agenda and gain access to the steering committee as a local public authority, but he and his aldermen were not allowed to join. As a result, this strengthened their frame of maltreatment. Kroon did attain access to the committee’s minutes and his aldermen were allowed to participate in the aldermen consultation sessions prior to the steering committee’s meetings, but this was deemed insufficient for them to be taken seriously as a local counterpart (R23; R27; R33). To overcome the barrier of access to political decision making, Kroon tried various networking strategies to set the agenda on the national political level and bypass the local and provincial governments—who he had publicly accused of not taking Urk seriously and not being open to a fair discussion on the wind park (Anonymous, 2010s, 2011s; Visscher, 2011a). However, according to the proponents, the municipality of Urk and the public had already been informed in 2004. Everyone, including Kroon, had the opportunity to influence and question or discuss the plans. Moreover, according to the proponents, the municipality of Urk had not always wanted to talk or did not respond to requests, despite several attempts to involve them (Anonymous, 2010q, 2011s; Van Herwaarden, 2010d, 2010e; Vragen gesteld door de leden der Kamer met de daarop door de regering gegeven antwoorden, 2011).

Kroon also wrote letters to the responsible ministers and state secretaries (Anonymous, 2010s). He not only directly contacted the responsible minister, but also wrote letters to the political parties in parliament to pressure Minister Van der Hoeven of Economic Affairs to consider other locations for the wind park. Unfortunately for Kroon, the minister was unwilling to consider this option (Van Herwaarden, 2009d). Van der Hoeven made it clear that the only flexibility lay in the way the wind park would be realised, not in where and whether the wind park would be constructed (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2009). While being unsuccessful in changing the minister’s mind, Kroon did succeed in instigating a motion proposed by parliament member Zijlstra to take into account the interest of Urk (Liberaliseringsenergiemarkten: Motie van het lid Zijlstra, 2009). The motion was accepted by the parliament, giving the minister no other choice but to reach out to Urk—as described below.

In the spring of 2010, on behalf of Minister Van der Hoeven, a delegation with high officials met Mayor Kroon to negotiate a package deal and grant Urk compensation. Iconic of the relationship Kroon had with governmental actors, it did not work out well. Kroon had
set high stakes by demanding either no wind park, or a substantially downscaled version, instead of reaching a negotiated deal (Van Herwaarden, 2010e). Kroon chose to prioritise advocacy, rather than brokerage, and thus the delegation did not realise any of its goals. Kroon, while awaiting the procedure at the Council of State, did not want to back down and publicly lose face (R25). Although the minister did not want to substantially downscale the wind park, according to people involved in the negotiation, there was some room for changing the plan or compensating Urk financially (R23; R25; R27). In June 2010, despite the failed negotiation, Minister Van der Hoeven decided to cancel the seven wind turbines most clearly visible from Urk, which Kroon, who was not yet satisfied, described as a ‘step in the right direction’ (Anonymous, 2010t; Van der Meulen, 2010). In 2011, when Minister Verhagen, Van der Hoeven’s successor, came into office, Kroon again tried to instigate a political discussion on the necessity of the wind park, but was unsuccessful because Verhagen wanted to move forward with the plan (Anonymous, 2011e; Van der Walle, 2011; Visscher, 2011a).

**Joining forces to pursue a legal course of action**

As it proved difficult to prevent the realisation of the wind park via the political agenda, Urk Briest, Kroon and the other opponents mentioned below decided to follow a legal course of action. Urk Briest had been keen to follow legal procedures and file complaints and objections to the plan—not only when environmental permits were filed by the initiators, but also when the national governmental took over the coordination and objectors could only turn to the highest administrative Council of State. Urk Briest mobilised and aided people to officially make objections. Online and hardcopy standard templates for complaints were made available, which led to over 500 of the total of 650 complaints (Anonymous, 2009q; Yang Yang Chiu, 2009, 2010c). While Kroon was willing to follow Urk Briest’s example and appeal at court, the new *Crisis and Recovery Act* prevented Urk, as public body, from suing another public body. To stop the wind park, Kroon needed these protest groups to do the suing instead (Anonymous, 2011s; Van der Walle, 2011). Therefore, Kroon decided to financially support Urk Briest and the opponents from the Noordoostpolder with over €90,000 in legal advice. Urk Briest, with limited resources, welcomed the additional financial resources offered by Kroon. Kroon not only supported the resistance in cash, but also personally attended the first hearing at Council of State to morally support the opponents.

After February 2012, when the Council of State decided to reject all appeals, Kroon’s will to protest was broken. One civil servant from Urk declared that Urk ‘could not do the impossible ... At a certain moment you have to quit and take your loss’ (R25). Additionally, Urk needed to consider other interests, such as the workable relationship with their direct neighbour—the municipality of Noordoostpolder—as the dis-
cussion on the wind park began to interfere with issues that were un-
related to it (R25; R36). Kroon, who retired after his term ended in June
2012, and the municipality of Urk, did not participate in the second and
third hearings at the Council of State. From Urk and Kroon's perspec-
tive, the ‘unfair fight’ was over and lost (R25). Urk Briest did partici-
pate in the other hearings, but remained unsuccessful. Van Loosen's
only option was to approach the European Court for Human Rights
However, Van Loosen considered joining local politics and running for
city council membership to trigger change in the political arena and
keep Urk’s cultural heritage on the agenda—the issue with which it all
began.

7.3.3 The opponents from the Noordoostpolder
Due to the rising opposition in Urk, people living in the Noordoostpo-
lider also became aware of the plans for the wind park. Some of the
people started to organise opposition and form a coalition of conveni-
ence because they did not want the wind turbines in their own ‘back-
yard’.

The 2008 ‘wake-up call’ for people living in the Noordoostpolder
Writer and visual artist, Harrie Hageman, and doctor, Herma Coumou,
have lived together next to the dike in the Noordoostpolder for almost
16 years, and were struck by the news on the wind park in 2008. They
had grown accustomed to the wind turbines that had been there since
the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, with the new wind park, they
would be confronted with much larger turbines, as close as 700 me-
tres to their house. Hageman and Coumou decided to form the protest
group, Tegenwind—literally meaning ‘against wind’—to raise atten-
tion and mobilise local resistance. Piet Reinders, a video producer and
manual therapist, lived as close as one kilometre to where the wind
turbines were planned. Reinders used his association, Rotterdamse
Hoek—named after a part of the dike, Rotterdamse Hoek—to fight
the wind park. Berthoo Lammers, leader of the political party, ONS
Noordoostpolder, has sought to prevent the wind park since 2009
because, according to him, the ‘megalomaniacal mastodons’ would
ruin the precious landscape of the Noordoostpolder and fence Urk’s
culturally protected heritage, and thus did not fit the open landscape
of the Noordoostpolder (Lammers, 2010f, 2011h, 2011j; Renes, 2010).
Henk Hoving had his farm next to the dike and was in conflict with the
municipality of Noordoostpolder because they had not enforced the
regulations on the noise nuisance of the current wind turbines, even
though these were permanently violated. Already having bad experi-
ences with the municipality and the construction of wind turbines near
his house, the plan of a few farmers to build new wind turbines along
the dikes came as a shock, and Hoving feared that a new, larger wind
park would worsen the situation of noise nuisance.
Forging a coalition of convenience

Hoving had been fighting the wind park alone for years; thus, he was pleased to hear, in 2008, that others were also against the wind park—notably, Hageman and Coumou of Tegenwind, Reinders of the association Rotterdamse Hoek, and Lammers of the political party ONS Noordoostpolder. Together, they forged a coalition of convenience and decided that each person would have his or her own task and focus. Hoving would focus on the issue of noise nuisance, Hageman and Coumou would prepare the legal procedure at the Council of State, Reinders would focus on the issue of water safety, and Lammers would focus on the policy process within the municipality of Noordoostpolder. The group also collaborated with the opponents from Urk, shared resources and exploited various venues. They also received help from Fred Jansen of the Critical National Platform on Wind Energy (Nationale Kritisch Platform Windenergie—NKPW). Jansen also had knowledge on the issue, and participated in objecting at the Council of State, even though he was not a stakeholder in this particular wind park. Although each of the coalition members had his or her own focus, they all supported the same framing and exploited similar networking strategies. The following sections discuss this coalition’s main strategies.

Improving one’s wealth at the expense of others

One framing strategy of the opponents from Noordoostpolder was to frame the proponents as mainly trying to increase their own wealth at the expense of others. Reinders, Hageman and Coumou argued that the value of their houses would drop due to the plans for the wind park, and that potential buyers would show no interest as soon as they heard about the plan for the wind park (Van Herwaarden, 2013a, 2013b). They were offended when the initiators offered to pay the electricity costs of the people living near the wind farms for the years the wind park existed. While this was a tempting deal for many, Hageman and Coumou framed it as a payment to smother resistance. According to them, the people were intimidated by the initiators and thought they had no choice but to accept. In the meantime, according to Hageman and Coumou, the initiating farmers would increase their wealth with big houses and expensive motor vehicles, while the rest of the community suffered from their wind turbines (Anonymous, 2011m).

Most farmers no longer lived beside the dike, but had moved away to live in the villages. This aroused a feeling of injustice among the people still living there. Even more upsetting for Hageman and Coumou was that the group of farmers would profit from the wind park primarily due (according to them) to illegal state subsidies (Anonymous, 2011u, 2012c). It outraged them that millions of euros of tax money were earned by ‘30 ex farmers/neighbours who see no trouble in the destruction of the wellbeing of hundreds’ (Anonymous, 2011m). However, according to the proponents, these claims were untrue (Kobessen, 2011; Van Herwaarden, 2012e). It was acknowledged that the
farmers would most likely earn a great deal, but the actual return on their investments was uncertain from the beginning. The forecast is a return on investment of eight to 15 per cent, but, according to the initiators, this is still unclear (Van Herwaarden, 2012e). Thus, according to the proponents, the numbers presented by the opponents were exaggerated.

In this regard, the opponents also questioned the usefulness and necessity of wind energy as the best solution for creating a sustainable energy supply. According to Reinders ‘everybody knows’ (R31) that wind turbines are not the solution. It is ‘the green lie’ (R31), says Reinders. The only reason these ‘robber chiefs’ (R31) invest in wind energy is because of the government subsidy and the profit they can make. According to Reinders, they are ‘shady traders’ (R31) who look for every opportunity to make money. In addition, Hageman and Coumou framed the farmers as untrustworthy because they ‘have never spoken the truth on meaningful information’ (Anonymous, 2012b) and, allegedly, exercise manipulating practices. All of these allegations are refuted by the proponents who argue that they have done nothing illegal or unethical and do share trustworthy and transparent information, as long as it does not include sensitive business informative (R27; R28; R29; Hulsing, 2011).

Lammers, who tried to set the local political agenda, was upset about the municipality accepting a ‘bribe’ of the Umbrella Organisation for the five villages in the Noordoostpolder. Lammers claimed, ‘Apparently it is more important [for the council of mayor and aldermen] to please a couple of wind farmers, than to take into account the interests of the citizens of Urk [and the Noordoostpolder]’ (Van Herwaarden, 2011c). Lammers blamed the municipality of Noordoostpolder for failing to serve and defend the local interests (Lammers, 2010f; Van Herwaarden, 2011a). The municipality has been trying too much to comply with the ‘wind mafia’ (Lammers, 2010b, 2011h). According to Lammers, the ‘wind mafia’ play a dirty game by bribing the villages with subsidies and the people with free energy in return for not suing them (Van Herwaarden, 2010c). Moreover, it frustrated Lammers that the initiators would profit from taxpayers (Lammers, 2010a, 2011e; 2011f), which is according to him ‘unscrupulous vulgar self-enrichment’ (Lammers, 2011f).

Hoving, although using other terms, also argued that the initiators had purposefully not taken into account the interests of the people living in the area. He was initially invited to join the plan for the wind park, but declined, and felt that he was subsequently seen as ‘an enemy’ (R30). Hoving stated, ‘The whole thing was like a military organisation in which people who did not partake were fought as enemies’ (Anonymous, 2011m). Hoving argued that the initiating farmers were solely driven by ‘envy and greed’ and ‘that is a recipe for disaster’ (R30). According to Hoving, the internal disputes regarding financing, allocation of resources and interpersonal grudges were just some of the effects of their desire to increase their own wealth (R30).
‘Manipulating’ the regulations on noise nuisance

Another issue raised primarily by Hoving and Lammers was that the national regulation on noise nuisance had been extended to make this particular wind park possible. This is a rather technical story, but the outcome was that Hoving suggested that the proponents had been conspiring to get the new regulation accepted; however, according to the proponents, this is not true (R28). An Order in Council (AMvB) was prepared at the Ministry of the Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment to change the common decibel noise nuisance norm to the European LDen 47 norm, which was deemed suitable for the Wind Park Noordoostpolder. According to Hoving and the other opponents, this meant an extension of the standard. Instead of granting an all-time maximum, the wind turbines were, with this new norm average, allowed to exceed the limit if it was fairly compensated by quieter times. According to Hoving, this is a useless norm because it is almost impossible to measure an average and enforce this rule (R30). There will never be 24/7 monitoring of the wind turbines, making it easy for wind turbine owners to cheat.

In 2009, the new norm was discussed in the parliament because some members also had concerns. The then responsible Minister Cramer assured them that the norm was neutral and not designed by the Cabinet to allow large wind parks and meet the targets on sustainable energy. When the Cabinet fell in early 2010, the parliament declared the prepared AMvB a controversial topic, meaning that the outgoing Cabinet was not allowed to make irreversible decisions on the issue. However, in April 2010, Cramer’s temporary successor, Minister Huizinga-Heringa, sent a paper to the municipalities in which she announced the new AMvB and advised the municipalities to take note of this coming regulation when preparing wind parks. In autumn 2010, when she was questioned about this, she acknowledged her mistake, but repeated that the norm was neutral nevertheless (Brief van de minister van Volkshuisvesting Ruimtelijke ordening en Milieubeheer, 2010; Verslag van Algemeen Overleg, 2010). On 14 October 2010, the inauguration day of the new Cabinet Rutte, the AMvB—thus a royal decree—was signed and declared in the official state’s newspaper (AMvB windturbines, 2010).

The new Prime Minister Rutte, of the liberal party, had previously been against wind turbines and stated that ‘those windmills do not wheel on wind but on subsidy’ (EenVandaag, 2010), yet he then let the regulation pass (Lammers, 2011j). The initiators, when preparing reports for the wind park, had already taken the new AMvB into account, which came into effect on 1 January 2011. However, with the former norm, the wind park would never have been allowed, according to Hoving and the other opponents (R30). Now that national regulation had changed, Hoving and the other opponents had no other option but to ask the local municipality of Noordoostpolder to enforce a custom-made, stricter norm for the Wind Park Noordoostpolder; however, the
Noordoostpolder rejected their request. Lammers sought to change policy on the regulations on noise nuisance because he believed the municipality had given permits to the Umbrella Organisation based on the anticipated AMvB and Lden norm, but legally had to follow the rules that were still in effect at that time, in 2010 (Anonymous, 2010f; Lammers, 2010d, 2010g). In addition, the responsible Council of Mayor and Alderman had the authority and possibility to work with custom-made noise nuisance regulation, while alderman Poppe of the municipality of Noordoostpolder stated that the Lden 47 noise nuisance regulation was a European standard from which the municipality could not deviate (Lammers, 2011c).

In 2011, Lammers successfully submitted a resolution taken over by the council to demand the Council of Mayor and Aldermen better examine its authority and consider custom-made noise nuisance regulations for the wind park (ONS Noordoostpolder, 2011). Later, the Council of State judged that the municipality did have the discretionary power to deviate from the norm, but could not be forced to use this power. Thus, while Lammers was proven correct, he could not force the municipality to deviate from the norm, and thus depended on the willingness of the municipality (ONS Noordoostpolder, 2013). The Council of Mayor and Aldermen made clear that they were unwilling to change policy. Lammers had also targeted his strategies towards alderman Poppe who, according to Lammers, was incompetent and had lied and misled the city council (Anonymous, 2011p; Lammers, 2012d; Van Herwaarden, 2012a). Finally, a motion by Lammers to demand alderman Poppe’s resignation failed to reach a majority vote in the city council (Lammers, 2012c; Van Herwaarden, 2012b).

Dike safety and the role of the chair of the water board
All the opponents from the Noordoostpolder, including Urk Briest, were concerned with the safety of the dikes if the wind turbines were built. It was feared that the dikes would weaken because of the wind turbines (R31). Reinders and Coumou made a movie about this concern and showed it at a hearing at the Council of State (Reinders, 2013). The role played by the water board, Zuiderzeeland, and especially its chair, Henk Tiesinga, was also questioned by the opponents (Anonymous, 2011j, 2011o, 2011v, 2012a; De Vries, 2012; Lammers, 2011, 2011a, 2011b, 2011d; 2011g, 2011k, 2011l; Van Herwaarden, 2011b). When advising and leading the Umbrella Organisation from 2000 to 2009, Tiesinga was also chair of the water board, Zuiderzeeland, which was responsible for granting the permits needed to construct the Wind Park Noordoostpolder. The water board contracted investigators who cleared Tiesinga’s name and stated that he had acted with integrity and had never misused his position within either forum—but the opponents were not convinced (Yang Yang Chiu, 2011a). For example, Lammers (2011k) stated that ‘wind turbines [are] more important than our safety’.

‘UNSCRUPULOUS VULGAR SELF-ENRICHMENT’
As the opponents feared the risk of dike breakage, they requested all kinds of documents about the issue at the water board, Zuiderzeeland, and at other water boards in the Netherlands. Reinders also approached scientists and experts on the issue of water safety, and asked the Dutch Safety Board to look into the issue. Additionally, he contacted the National Ombudsman for complaining about the water board and the entire Dutch legal constitution, including the Council of State, which he regarded as biased and in favour of the government (Van Herwaarden, 2012c). One might think that raising the issue of water safety was essentially a framing strategy of the opponents, since they would surely not expect the Dutch legal, political and administrative system to allow the construction of a wind park at the expense of risking dike breakage. However, for the opponents, this was a serious concern (R24; R31).

**Networking to set the public and political agenda**
The opponents from Noordoostpolder also employed networking strategies. As aforementioned, they formed a coalition of convenience to raise attention and mobilise local resistance. A great effort was invested in attaining information about the plans for the wind park. Additionally, a public campaign with demonstrations and debates was established, together with Urk Briest. The group also distributed leaflets to inform the people living in the area and helped them file complaints at the Council of State (Anonymous, 2011u). Many of the opponents also wrote letters to the media and local municipalities, councilmen, political parties, provincial deputies, parliament members, ministries and responsible ministers (Anonymous, 2010o; Antwoord op de brief van Stichting de Rotterdamse Hoek te Creil, 2009; De Vries, 2012; Herwaarden, 2012). The opponents also officially objected against the plans at the municipality of Noordoostpolder, and later appealed at the Council of State (Anonymous, 2009i). Additionally, they tried to talk with the initiators themselves and the local authorities, but never came on speaking terms.

However, the decision to move forward with the wind park was already made and the proponents were not open to others at the negotiation table. As was the case with Van Loosen en Kroon, this strengthened the frame that citizens are scorned and not honestly and openly informed about the plans. In one of the many letters Tegenwind wrote, Coumou said, ‘There is complete silence from the side of the governmental actors and initiators; one can speak of a closed bastion’ (Anonymous, 2008a). Hageman and Coumou already distrusted the initiators, but now lost trust in democratic public decision making, the government and the legal system in the Netherlands. Coumou felt that she could ‘have a say, but have no influence’ (R21). The independently operating Council of State was also regarded as ‘simply an extension piece for politics’ (Anonymous, 2012b). As soon as the national govern-
ment supported the plan, the opponents argued that they stood no chance and the fight had become unfair.

In taking the monitoring and controlling task of his council membership seriously, Lammers questioned the conduct of the Council of Mayor and Aldermen on this dossier (Anonymous, 2010m; Lammers, 2012a). He believed the municipality, and the responsible alderman Poppe in particular, had been working behind the council and citizen’s backs to conspire with the initiators of the wind park without questioning the need, necessity and effect of a wind park in the Noordoostpolder (Herwaarden, 2012; Lammers, 2010e, 2012b; Renes, 2010). Lammers used speeches, columns and press releases to emphasise his opinion that the wind park did not belong in the Noordoostpolder, and that the local government should change its policy (Lammers, 2010c, 2011h, 2011i; ONS Noordoostpolder, 2012).

Ultimately, the opponents did not succeed in setting the political agenda against the Wind Park Noordoostpolder. In addition, the legal judgement of the Council of State did not rule in favour of the opponents. Currently, the only hope for the opponents is that the initiators will be unable to finalise the deal financially, and will somehow run out of money. Hence, for now, the most likely scenario is that the wind park will be completed and fully operational by 2016.

7.4 Conclusion
This case study has shown a variety of policy entrepreneurs trying to set the agenda on the Wind Park Noordoostpolder. The proponents became strong advocates of the wind park because they saw a business opportunity and because it helped comply with locally, provincially and nationally set targets on renewable energy. Conversely, people living in the municipalities of Noordoostpolder and Urk tried to do everything in their power to stop the realisation of the wind park. The conflicting interests and frames resulted in a dynamic agenda-setting process because both sides tried to frame the issue to set the agenda, and exploited various networking strategies to gather resources and secure political support.

With regard to the framing strategies employed, it is remarkable that there were two strongly conflicting ways of framing the issue. The proponents tended to focus on the need for a wind park to comply with internationally, nationally, regionally and locally set goals on renewable energy, and on the benefits the wind park would generate for all. In contrast, the opponents focused on the effects of the wind park on their own living environment by framing the wind park as a horrific megalomaniacal threat that would fence the precious landscape of the municipality of Urk and Noordoostpolder in an ‘iron curtain’. Additionally, the opponents felt maltreated in the policy process and claimed they were not taken seriously by the local, provincial and national governmental actors involved.
Both sides used various tools to invigorate these framing perspectives. Visualisations, stories and rhetoric were used to strengthen the frames and gain support. Due to the intense framing and strongly conflicting perspectives, both sides were incapable of reaching common ground, which can be regarded as a dialogue of the deaf—coined by Van Eeten in 1999 (Van Eeten, 1999). All efforts to negotiate, reach consensus or create a better understanding of one another’s viewpoint resulted in strengthening the policy entrepreneurs’ own frame. People could either be in favour of or against the wind park—there was no neutral position. Besides framing the wind park—and thus the issue—differently, it is remarkable to observe both sides blaming and framing each other for not telling the truth or playing the political game fairly and justly. Unsurprisingly, this invigorated the framing contests.

There were limited attempts from both sides to reach a mutual understanding. However, when confronted with allegations, they were either neglected or legitimatised because the opposing side had done the same or worse. The framing contest over the use of symbols serves as an example in this regard. Both sides made graphic visualisations and maquettes of the wind turbines, but accused the other side of exaggeration and subsequently implied—at least in the case of Kroon—a justification of their own exaggeration. Thus, the framing contest fought in the media strengthened the interactional deadlock. Both sides spoke more about each other, rather than with each other to try to create better mutual understanding or agree on a win-win deal. Advocacy was chosen over brokerage, resulting in both parties committing completely to their own causes, and leaving room for only one winner.

Consequently, the Council of State had to settle the dispute, which led to a solo win for the proponents.

Alongside framing strategies, all parties employed networking strategies. The proponents formed a coalition and shared resources. However, while almost all initiators were farmers, there was considerable internal conflict and the collaboration was initially fragile. It seemed as if most issues were eventually resolved, and the initiators together sought and found valuable support from all governmental and political levels—local, regional and national. This gave them the crucial support from the state in pursuing the realisation of the wind park. Retrospectively, the proponents followed the steps of the inside access model (Cobb et al., 1976). They sought early access to the political agenda to instigate a more clandestine decision within the local, provincial and national governments, and attract support from like-minded groups (Cobb et al., 1976, p. 135). Behind-the-scenes agreements were made, resulting in crucial political and financial support from the governmental parties.
It is no surprise that the proponents did not bother setting the public agenda because, until 2008, this was not even needed. However, as Cobb et al. (1976, p. 135) indicate, groups with inside access most likely will not succeed in setting the agenda and changing policy if opposing groups manage to set the public agenda to their advantage. Therefore, the proponents were rightfully concerned when the opponents managed to set the public agenda and tried to set the policy and political and agendas from the outside. The opponents had joined forces and formed coalitions of convenience to gather and share resources and reach out to politicians. The people opposing the wind park had very diverse backgrounds and would, under normal circumstances, not know of each other’s existence, let alone work together. However, because they had a common goal, they found and aided each other by establishing campaigns; writing letters; filing complaints; appealing at court; and sharing arguments, knowledge and other resources. Together, they seized considerable opportunities and exploited various arenas and venues.

Thus, overall, why did the proponents’ strategies prove more effective than the opponents’ strategies? First, context served as a constraint to the opponents and opportunity to the proponents. Many of the circumstances did not favour the opponents. The internationally, nationally, provincially and locally set goals on renewable energy were essential, leaving almost no room for the opponents to change policy in that regard. Further, the Wind Park Noordoostpolder became an important way to achieve those targets. Not even a change in national administration opened a window for the opponents to set the political agenda. Hence, the opponents had to follow a legal course of action to enforce policy change from the outside. For the proponents, the context served as an opportunity to align their frame with governmental policies. They even received help from above when the provincial and national governments up-scaled the plan for the wind park by giving it prominence on the political agendas. However, this does not infer that all of the success of the proponents is attributable to contextual factors because, as previously discussed, they also effectively lobbied for support at all governmental levels. They also had to cope with changing regulations with respect to funding, nature and noise nuisance; however, these barriers were relatively easily overcome.

Second, while context mattered and favoured the proponents, the opposing parties were also responsible for their failure. They became involved in the agenda setting too late to radically change policy. Their timing in 2008 was imperfect because the political agenda had already been set in favour of the proponents, and the opponents subsequently continuously lagged behind the decision making. Moreover, the framing and networking strategies of the opponents were too dispersed and not thoroughly constructed and aligned. Following Benford and Snow (2000), it can be argued that the opponents’ frame amplification and extension were effective to mobilise the public and set the
public agenda, but ineffective to secure support from politicians and governmental actors, such as local (with the exception of Urk’s Council of Mayor and Aldermen), provincial and national representatives. The opponents continuously broadened their frame and linked it to all kinds of issues related to effects on health, water safety, the environment, the landscape, alternatives for wind energy, maltreatment in the policy process and so forth. Soon, every potential argument undermining the wind park was included in the framing, without thorough consideration of the possible effectiveness of these arguments to set the political agenda—although it did prove successful in setting the public agenda, at least locally. Politicians did sympathise with the opponents, but saw no reason to publicly support the idea to stop the wind park, and all the opponents’ arguments were refuted or ridiculed.

Conversely, the proponents timed their strategies effectively and, by the 1990s, had already begun trying to set the political agenda. They established a good relationship with local politics and succeeded in settling internal disputes and establishing a professional Umbrella Organisation that strictly and strategically focused on complying with targets set in governmental policy, creating a solid business case, meeting all legal requirements, and negotiating with governmental actors. The initiators were also effective in finding support from stakeholders and qualified people to help them resolve internal conflict, overcome lack of knowledge and play the political game on their behalf.

This case study has demonstrated that, to effectively set the agenda, various framing strategies not only need to be clearly focused and aligned with each other, but also aligned with networking strategies. Framing and networking go alongside each other and are complementary, but, to be as effective as the proponents in this case, they must be coupled and fine-tuned. Frames have to be thoroughly constructed to raise awareness among decision makers to secure their support. Inside access, political support and skilful framing and networking have proven to be decisive in setting the political agenda. Outside initiation and setting the public agenda to enforce political agenda priority has been an ineffective strategy for opposing policy entrepreneurs. One of the lessons to be learnt here is that successful public agenda setting does not automatically lead to effective setting of the political agenda.

Currently, in 2014, the Wind Park Noordoostpolder is being implemented and there are no indications that it will not be completed. The opponents have ceased resistance and are no longer involved in setting the agenda or obstructing implementation. Moreover, wind energy remains an important target at all governmental levels (Energieakkoord voor duurzame groei, 2013; Ontwerp-structuurvisie Windenergie op land, 2013).

Figure 7.5: The first layer of a wind turbine is put into its place in the Noordoostpolder.
Photo: NOP Agrowind.
God, give me grace to accept with serenity the things that cannot be changed, Courage to change the things which should be changed, and the Wisdom to distinguish the one from the other.

Reinhold Niebuhr
8.1 Introduction
This thesis began with the prime example of policy entrepreneurship, Cornelis Lely, who clearly left his mark on the IJsselmeer area as it is known today. A question was posed about how actors have tried to strategically set the agenda in the context of the IJsselmeer area during the last few decades. This concluding chapter answers this question based on the theoretical framework, this study’s methodological approach and the empirical case studies. The theoretical review introduced the relevant concepts to study policy entrepreneurs, who seek to realise or oppose policy change by setting the agenda. For analytical purposes, a distinction was made between two types of strategies: framing and networking strategies. The methodological chapter accounted for the case study approach and the way data were collected and analysed. The subsequent four empirical case studies revealed that various actors have strategically sought to leave their mark on the area, and sometimes continue to do so.

This concluding chapter first discusses some case study examples of framing and networking strategies to confirm the use of these strategies by policy entrepreneurs. Second, it argues that policy entrepreneurs exploit the use of visualisation by sketching a brighter or more frightening future. Third, it reveals how policy entrepreneurs not only frame the issue at stake differently, but also frame the self and others in terms of motives, behaviour and position in the agenda-setting process. Fourth, it claims that policy entrepreneurs need to cope with the context in which they operate in order to be effective in setting the agenda, as the context can offer both opportunities and constraints. The role of governmental actors proves to be particularly crucial. Fifth, this chapter argues that employing framing and networking strategies in an intertwined and coupled manner is highly effective, but not without risks if not properly executed. This chapter and thesis then concludes with some final remarks.

8.2 Policy entrepreneurial strategies revisited
The first chapter indicated that, although the study of policy entrepreneurship increasingly receives attention in political and social sciences, understandings of the strategies that policy entrepreneurs employ in their efforts to pursue policy change are still limited (Brouwer & Biermann, 2011; Mintrom, 2000; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Pralle, 2009; Roberts, 1998; Roberts & King, 1991; Sheingate, 2003; Zahariadis, 2007). Room remains for further conceptual development and empirical research of policy entrepreneurship and the strategies employed by policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom & Norman, 2009), which is what this study has achieved.

8.2.1 Framing strategies
The theoretical review of the literature described framing as the process by which producers and receivers of messages transform
information into a meaningful whole (or ‘frame’) (Entman, 1993). Information about the problem, its possible solutions and the means deemed necessary to address the problem is framed in a way to advance the favoured projects of policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 2002). Policy entrepreneurs try to ensure that their frame is supported by the public, politics and policymakers (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Stone, 2002; True et al., 2007) or at least try to make their perception of reality more salient than other possible interpretations (Entman, 1993). The theoretical review distinguished various framing strategies that policy entrepreneurs can employ to promote their frames. A selection—though not all—of empirical examples with respect to each framing strategy is discussed below.

First, framing strategies involve the use of **narratives and stories** to convince an audience of the necessity of political action or policy measures (Stone, 2002). The Second Delta Committee adhered to the narrative of climate change adaptation and sharing a ‘story of social control’ that stated that the Dutch have always been able, in their interaction is approaching. Alongside the story of control, the committee also shared the ‘story of decline and crisis’ by recalling historical disasters in water management, and the country’s dependence on the natural environment.

A second framing strategy is the use of **rhetoric**, described as the art of persuading, influencing or pleasing people through using spoken or written speech. The policy entrepreneurs in the case on nature development used rhetoric to distance themselves from the Dutch tradition of nature conservation. They argued that the Dutch people had lost sense of what true nature was like before human disturbance. They argued that increased human intervention leads to less true nature, and pleaded to manage and develop nature with the least possible human involvement.

Another different form of framing is with the use of **symbols**. A symbol is anything that represents something else, and its power lies in the potential to accommodate multiple meanings (Yanow, 1996). Proponents of the infrastructural connection between Almere and Amsterdam presented the connection as a symbol for the relationship between the city of Almere and Amsterdam. Additionally, local actors argued that Almere needed a landmark, such as a bridge, to brand the city. A Golden Gate–like bridge between the two twin-cities would help accomplish this, while also serving as a stepping-stone for future interaction and collaboration between the cities. The fact that symbols can accommodate multiple meanings is demonstrated by the different way the opponents framed the issue. The opponents regarded the bridge and the coupled outer-dike urbanisation plans as a representation of the megalomania and delusions of grandeur of the proponents—a strategy that would do more harm than good for the open landscape of the area.
Further, framing can be used to exploit **crises or focusing events**. Crises or focusing events can trigger a window of opportunity because they often highlight failure in policy and thus create a chance to learn and advance new ways of framing the problem, its solutions and the means deemed necessary to enable the solutions (Birkland, 1998, 2004, 2008; Boin et al., 2009; Kingdon, 2002). A clear example of crisis exploitation occurred when the Second Delta Committee, as a policy entrepreneur, created its own crisis narrative in the absence of a recent crisis. While the committee did not blame anyone in particular, it used the self-created opportunity to develop a sense of urgency because the possible effects of climate change were not felt by the Dutch people, yet—according to the committee—change was needed in anticipation of future crises. As the case study revealed, the committee very persuasively framed the need to anticipate climate change and water management, even though there was no occurrence of a recent crisis prior to the committee’s establishment.

Therefore, to current understandings of crisis exploitation, this study contributes the knowledge that it is not necessary for a crisis to actually occur for an agency—notably, a policy entrepreneur—to set the agenda and change policies. Framing a possible crisis or severe problem can be sufficient to raise awareness. As long as the presented frame aligns with people’s imagination, it has potential power. All the people involved could imagine that the flooding of large parts of the Netherlands would lead to major disruptions and crises because they had experienced flooding in the past and recently witnessed the flooding in New Orleans. However, I hypothesise that, for policy issues without clear links to concrete or actual threats—such as the ageing of a population—it would be more difficult to rely on people’s imagination. As a consequence, it would be more difficult for policy entrepreneurs to raise attention, find support and set the agenda.

Due to the often sudden and unexpected nature of crises and focusing events, their aftermath is often a **framing contest** (Boin et al., 2009). Much depends on the way actors interpret, frame and react to crises by blaming others or denying responsibility and absolving the blame. During the period studied, no crisis related to any of the cases occurred; therefore, I cannot name a case study example of a framing contest in reaction to a recent crisis. However, the 1993 and 1995 high waters did provide the nature development policy entrepreneurs with the opportunity to couple nature development with water safety along the major Dutch rivers. They pointed out that their approach to water safety would provide politicians with a solution that both water managers and landscape preservationists could embrace. The framing contest, as initiated by the adherents of nature development, was not characterised by blaming others, but by positively focusing on possible solutions. This proved to be an effective approach, and, consequently, the framing contest was not very strong.
Surprisingly, the strongest framing contests were found not in reaction to a crisis (such as the 1993 and 1995 high waters in the nature development case) or an anticipated future crisis (such as with the Second Delta Committee). When discussing the use of symbols, I already gave the example of a framing contest between the opponents and proponents of the infrastructural connection and outer-dike urbanisation near Almere. Another framing contest was in the case on the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, where the policy entrepreneurs initiating the plan for the wind park framed the wind turbines as beneficial for the region, while all opposing policy entrepreneurs framed them as causing only negative effects for the people living in the region. This topic will be returned to later; however, for now, we can conclude that the cases revealed that crises are not a necessary condition for framing contests.

A final framing strategy was the aligning of frames, described as a means and necessary condition to mobilise society (Benford, 1993; Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow et al., 1986). This study has proved that frame alignment was a framing strategy used by all the policy entrepreneurs discussed, especially the distinguished, but closely related, frame bridging, amplification and extension. For example, the Second Delta Committee aligned frames by linking water safety to climate change, while the nature development policy entrepreneurs aligned frames by coupling nature development with the management of the major rivers. The Almere aldermen used frame alignment by linking the Almere’s interests to the national need to accommodate additional houses in the Randstad region, while the policy entrepreneurs in favour of the plan proposed alternative routes by limiting their initial elaborate plans to the specific needs expressed during the RRAAM process. Finally, the policy entrepreneurs opposing the Almere plans used the discussion on the future of the region as a stepping-stone to advocate an open Markermeer-IJmeer. The farmers in the Noordoostpolder used frame alignment by coupling a business opportunity to governmental policy changes on renewable energy, and its opponents used frame alignment by linking the creation of a wind park to the negative effects of wind turbines on public health and the environment.

With regard to frame transformation, the policy entrepreneurs discussed in the first two cases advocated frame transformation in water and nature management, while the policy entrepreneurs discussed in the latter two cases did not advocate any large-scale frame transformation. This may be explained by their specific focus on local and regional infrastructural projects, rather than a focus on changing national policy. Nevertheless, as indicated, the aligning of frames...
proved to be a necessary strategy for policy entrepreneurs trying to raise awareness and find supporters. The case studies provided more examples of frame alignment, but it is sufficient here to state that it is an important framing strategy employed by policy entrepreneurs. To align frames effectively, policy entrepreneurs need to be willing and able to be adaptive and flexible in their framing of the issues at stake.

In summary, as the aforementioned examples have revealed, the six distinguished framing strategies are very closely related because any frame can be fit with a story or narrative, substantiated by the use of rhetoric and symbols, and aligned with other frames. Crisis exploitation was not used in every case, but the problematization of a currently undesirable situation did always take place. As the literature on agenda setting has also suggested, policy entrepreneurs will most likely try to frame the current situation as undesirable and problematic in order to promote their own frame. This will be returned to later when discussing the framing of a brighter or more frightening future. As indicated, there was not a strong framing contest by policy entrepreneurs in the first two cases—which also explains their relative success—but there were strong framing contests in the latter two cases. It seems as though issues raise more awareness when framed in terms that directly relate to the living environment of people. Hence, policy entrepreneurs that succeed in doing this effectively are likely to induce strong framing contests and mobilize many supporters.

8.2.2 Networking strategies
The theoretical review explained how networking strategies are crucial to successfully set the agenda within dynamic policy processes (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2012; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Olsson et al., 2006; Roberts, 1998; Roberts & King, 1991; Schlager, 2007). There are limitations to what policy entrepreneurs can achieve alone; therefore, they seek to establish and manage networks to bring likeminded actors together, while also using additional physical, juridical, financial and knowledge resources (Roberts & King, 1991; Zahariadis, 2007). This study confirms the use and importance of networking strategies, and names various empirical examples with respect to each networking strategy.

Policy entrepreneurs try to manage their networks to understand the preferences and worries of other actors, and anticipate any consequences. Network management also helps policy entrepreneurs shape their arguments to make them convincing and compelling to potential supporters. Additionally, managing networks helps build a trustworthy and credible reputation and increases visibility (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). For example, in the case on the infrastructural connection and outer-dike urbanisation of Almere, Verhorst—who leads the action group, the Angry Swan—was keen to manage her network by initiating and maintaining relationships with the media, public, politicians and interest groups. She exploited every opportunity to be informed...
SHE EXPLOITED EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO BE INFORMED OR TO LOBBY FOR HER CASE TO KEEP THE MARKERMEER-IJMEER OPEN

Policy entrepreneurs need others to realise effective agenda setting and thus engage in building teams or coalitions (Huitema & Meijerink, 2010; Meijerink, 2005; Sabatier, 2007; Simmons et al., 2011). In my case studies, I found only examples of coalitions of convenience, and no coalitions that were only resource dependent or were involved in a long-term relationship because of deeply shared core-beliefs. Apparently, policy entrepreneurs prefer coalitions (of convenience) that serve their own ideas, visions and goals regarding the issue at stake. In the case on nature development, a small group of people formed a coalition and shared similar ideas with regard to nature development. The proponents of nature development were also keen to form a strategic alliance with nature conservation organisations, river engineers, the clay industry and tourist organisations. These groups did not share the same policy beliefs, but did have converging interests in the concept of nature development. In the Almere case study, through political manoeuvring, the Almere aldermen found regional and national support; however, it would not be correct to consider the group of supporters a strong coalition because the idea to build houses outer dike was soon dropped and the idea for the infrastructural connection was never fully supported by all regional actors. The case study of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder showed that the initiators of the wind park forged a coalition because they were not allowed to construct solitary wind turbines. While they were forced to work together, they managed to build an effective coalition of convenience. The opponents of the wind park from Urk and the Noordoostpolder also formed coalitions of convenience to share resources and allocate various tasks.

Networking also involves the exploitation of different venues (Huitema & Meijerink, 2010; Pralle, 2003; Princen & Kerremans, 2008; True et al., 2007). Policy entrepreneurs use venues to influence policymaking and sell their own ideas. A specific way to exploit venues is
by establishing pilot or demonstration projects (Huijtema & Meijerink, 2010; Lovell, 2009). The case on nature development clearly displays the practice of venue exploitation by pilot projects. The policy entrepreneurs in this case were keen to use venues to actually show people how nature appears if undisturbed by humans. In addition, in the case on Almere, policy entrepreneurs exploited venues such as Atelier IJmeer 2030+, the public event at Pampus, the RRAAM meetings and so forth. Further, in the case of the wind park, there was exploitation of venues by initiators who organised public events, and opponents who organised debates, demonstrations and numerous other activities to mobilise support.

In short, as the aforementioned examples reveal, the three distinguished networking strategies were important for these policy entrepreneurs to mobilise public and political support for their frame. As expected, based on the literature review, the management of networks and exploitation of venues helped the policy entrepreneurs forge coalitions of convenience and reach a wider group of people.

8.2.3 Strategies confirmed, yet further conceptualisation required
The above indicates that there is sufficient evidence to support the argument that policy entrepreneurs use framing and networking strategies to raise awareness, gain support and set the agenda. However, there is a need to further conceptualise understandings of policy entrepreneurship and framing and networking strategies. Therefore, I want to discuss in greater depth the empirical findings of the case studies.

8.3 Framing by visualising a brighter or more frightening future
As explained in the introductory and theoretical chapters, policy entrepreneurship literature could benefit from empirical analysis of framing strategies because it has a tendency to focus on networking, rather than framing (Brouwer, 2013; Brouwer & Biermann, 2011; Huitema & Meijerink, 2009b; Mintrom & Norman, 2009). For this reason, this section and the subsequent section focus and elaborate on this study’s main insights with regard to framing. The policy entrepreneurship literature, and policy sciences in general, could benefit from the insights offered by the cases discussed in this research.

The policy entrepreneurs discussed were keen to employ framing strategies with regard to information about the problem, its possible solutions and the means deemed necessary to achieve these solutions. Policy entrepreneurs are well aware of the need to align frames; engage in framing contests; exploit crises; and use symbols, rhetoric, stories and narratives. However, the framing of the issue through well-considered speech, symbols and so forth is insufficient to gain attention and raise support. Therefore, policy entrepreneurs often try to convey their frame through visualisations that may prove to be ‘worth a thousand words’. Interestingly, there is no single way to use
framing through visualisations. Rather, there is a diverse set of visual tools available to policy entrepreneurs, including graphical designs, maquettes, photos, images, maps, symbols and much more.

Depending on the resources available and the policy entrepreneurs’ creativity, the possibilities to take advantage of these tools are endless. Nevertheless, based on the conducted case studies, I distinguished two means of framing through visualisations, regardless of the visual tools used. Visualisations are used by policy entrepreneurs to present either an image of a brighter future or an image of a frightening future, which agrees with Stone’s (2002) ‘story of decline and crisis’ and ‘story of control’. Policy entrepreneurs advocating a policy change are most likely to visualise a bright future in which their suggested policy change plays an important role, while policy entrepreneurs opposing the policy change tend to do the opposite and picture a frightening future. Neither group of policy entrepreneurs are averse to exaggerating and ignoring certain facts in order to prove their point through visualisations.

8.3.1 Brighter future

The proponents of nature development were keen to picture a brighter future with nature development being adopted as the primary policy concept. The policy entrepreneurs’ Plan Stork included designs for the major rivers and showed where nature development could be implemented. Additionally, pictures were shown of the Loire river in France to give an impression of how the policy entrepreneurs imagined the rivers could and should appear in a brighter future for the Netherlands. Images of the Oostvaardersplassen as the prime example of nature development were also often used to convey the message that nature development offers a brighter future.

In the case of the infrastructural connection and outer-dike development near Almere, alderman Bijl also used framing visualisations to present a brighter future. An artist’s impression and large maquette were made to envision how outer-dike urbanisation and the infrastructural connection between Amsterdam could look. Many stakeholders were invited to come and see the maquette and the idea evolve, give input, provide feedback and possibly offer support. The subsequent alderman Duivesteijn used graphic designs to picture a brighter future for Almere and the Amsterdam metropolis. Adema, one of the policy entrepreneurs advocating an alternative routing of the infrastructural connection, also used images and visualisations to indicate how his alternative would appear once implemented. I also observed this in the case of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, in which the proponents attempted to visualise the wind park on a drawing board and create graphics to give people the impression that the wind park would not negatively affect their living environment. They wanted to convey that the wind park would fit perfectly with the landscape of the polder, and would benefit all.
8.3.2 More frightening future
The other form of framing through visualisation by policy entrepreneurs is the visualisation of a frightening future, typically employed by policy entrepreneurs opposing policy change. The policy entrepreneurs who established a campaign to keep the Markermeer-IJmeer open made pictures, posters and banners to show how the plans for Almere would ruin the landscape. To enforce this point, one of the policy entrepreneurs invited people to her house next to the Markermeer-IJmeer. This was undertaken so that people could experience the harm the plans for Almere would cause to the location.

In the case of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, graphic visualisations and maquettes were made by the opponents to portray a horrific megalomaniac wind park that would fence off the precious landscape of the Urk and the Noordoostpolder with an ‘iron curtain’. Maquettes and images were used by the opponents during campaigning events, and displayed in the city hall to raise awareness. The mayor of Urk even brought the maquette to a meeting with the then responsible minister. Moreover, the mayor created a video to visualise how the wind turbines would negatively affect the cultural heritage of the village of Urk.

8.3.3 Combining both visualisations of the future
One policy entrepreneur sought to combine both visualisations of a brighter future and a more frightening future. The Second Delta Committee conveyed the two distinctive futures simultaneously. This policy entrepreneur presented a worrying and frightening future by showing video footage of the flooding in 1953, the (near) river floods in 1993 and 1995, and the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 in New Orleans, arguing that such a natural catastrophe could strike the Netherlands at any time. A map was shown of the Netherlands with potential flooding if no action was taken and the worst scenario eventuated. However, the committee did not want to leave the public without hope. Thus, after capturing the attention of the public with the picture of a frightening future, the committee moved forward by stating that the risks caused by climate change can also offer great opportunities. If the Dutch were to anticipate climate change and take into account the recommendations offered by the committee, there would be a brighter future for the country as a safe and attractive place to live, work, invest and recreate for many generations to come.

8.3.4 Summary
Therefore, as indicated at the beginning of this section, policy entrepreneurs focusing on promoting a certain policy change will most like-
ly present their ideas as being part of a brighter future. However, this does not mean that visualising a frightening future—as undertaken by the committee—is ineffective. A frightening future can raise awareness and convince the public that action needs to be taken to change the undesirable or even dangerous status quo. Policy entrepreneurs can use the image of a frightening future as a stepping-stone to frame a brighter future resulting from their solutions. As in the case of the Second Delta Committee, this can be quite effective.

A side note is that using these two kinds of framing is not without risks. For example, I hypothesise that, if the framing of a frightening future is not thoroughly constructed and supported by facts and reality, it will most likely be criticised and ignored—possibly together with the subsequent image of a brighter future. The Second Delta Committee ran the risk of not being taken seriously; however, its frame was thoroughly constructed and discussed with a broad array of external actors before publication. Therefore, the committee was sensitive to no-go areas and employed popular scientific, policy and political thoughts and ideas to construct its frame. While the Second Delta Committee was successful in framing a future through visualisations, the case studies also provide unsuccessful examples. For example, the policy entrepreneurs opposing the Wind Park Noordoostpolder used visualisations that were deemed incorrect. This led to a situation in which the visualisations themselves became subject of the public debate—a framing contest—rather than the issue these opponents supported. Moreover—and this will be returned to later—they were unable to combine and align their framing into a coherent narrative or story to win the support of the decision makers.

8.4 Framing the self and the other
Following the aforementioned finding that policy entrepreneurs are more creative than the policy entrepreneurship literature suggests, I found a variety of ways in which policy entrepreneurs not only framed the issue at stake differently by using visualisations, but also framed themselves and the other actors involved in the agenda-setting process. There is power in the framing of issues; however, this study reveals that there is also a strategy to frame the self and the other. I discovered three ways in which policy entrepreneurs frame the self and the other in terms of motivation, behaviour and position.

8.4.1 Framing motivation
First, policy entrepreneurs tend to present themselves as people with the correct and most sincere motivation. Policy entrepreneurs pose as people with true and unselfish motivations who seek to serve the interest of a larger group of people—a true knight on a white horse. This applies to all policy entrepreneurs, regardless of their goal to either advance or oppose policy change. For example, alderman Duivesteijn argued that he wanted the best for Almere, which is struggling with
new town and congestion problems. From his perspective, everyone would benefit from the infrastructural connection and outer-dike urbanisation. In contrast, Verhorst—leading the action group, the Angry Swan—argued that she, and many others, loved the area and that it should remain unspoiled and open as it currently is—not only for herself and the current generation, but also for future generations.

Alongside this form of promoting one’s own motivation, there is the strategy of questioning the motives of others. People in favour of the plans for Almere argued that Verhorst only cared for her own interests and own view, while neglecting the interests of all the people from Almere, such as those stuck in traffic congestion every day. Similarly, policy entrepreneurs opposing the Wind Park Noordoostpolder argued that the initiators cared only for their own interests, and they blamed them for being motivated by greed, envy and a desire to improve their wealth at the expense of others—like wolves in sheep’s clothing, concealing true intentions. The opposing policy entrepreneurs had a deep feeling that injustice had been done to them and the people living in the area by the proponents who neglected their interests in the policy process. For this, they were dedicated to gaining justice from the local, provincial and national governments to support their interests and the interests of those people who could not or dared not stand up for themselves. In contrast, the initiators saw themselves as entrepreneurs exploiting a business opportunity, not conscious of having done anything wrong. Moreover, they saw themselves as idealists and diehards who were assisting Dutch society by contributing to the governmental and international targets on renewable energy.

8.4.2 Framing behaviour
Second, policy entrepreneurs frame their own behaviour and the behaviour of others. For example, the policy entrepreneur Verhorst argued that she would fight to the end to protect the area, and do everything in her power to accomplish this. She framed herself as sociable and good at making new friends and acquaintances with experts and people from the media and politics. She also enjoyed networking and being involved in the policy process. While many people respected her personality, campaigning and networking, including her opponents, there have also been critiques of her actions. Some people frame her behaviour as an attempt to be in the spotlight, rather than promoting the issue she supports. Alderman Duivesteijn—Verhorst’s most direct opponent—was also appraised for his skills and approach, yet criticised for his boldness and temperament, which seemed to negatively influence his relationship with other actors.

In the case of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, opponents of the wind park argued that the initiators were lying, bribing and intimidating others. Proponents of the wind park rejected this framing and argued that the opponents were not averse to dirty politics themselves. According to the initiators, the opponents were on a ‘warpath’ and
would exploit every opportunity to discredit the wind park and the people involved, even if this meant spreading lies and hurting people personally by ‘walking over dead bodies’ and ‘throwing mud’.

8.4.3 Framing position
Third, policy entrepreneurs frame their own and other people’s positions. Policy entrepreneurs try to gain empathy for themselves and the issue they support by framing themselves as the underdog and the other as the dominant player. The policy entrepreneur Verhorst, opposing the plans for Almere, presented herself as ‘guardian of the area’, personifying and symbolising the protection of the open landscape of the Markermeer-IJmeer. From her perspective, Duivesteijn, with his plans to destroy the Markermeer-IJmeer, must be stopped.

In contrast, Duivesteijn framed himself as representative of the interests of Almere—as the disadvantaged person who was asked by the national government to accommodate the growing population of Amsterdam, but not given the means necessary to comply with this. According to Duivesteijn, without the infrastructural connection and outer-dike urbanisation, Almere would remain handicapped. Interestingly, Duivesteijn also framed his position by stating that Almere not only depended on support from the national government, but also that the national government depended on the compliance of Almere. He framed Almere as an indispensable stakeholder in the government’s desire to increase national housing capacity and give an impulse to the Amsterdam metropolis. According to Duivesteijn, the national government did not have many alternatives in the densely populated Randstad region, and therefore needed Almere to create 60,000 houses and 100,000 working places for 160,000 people during the coming decades.

The policy entrepreneurs involved in stopping the Wind Park Noordoostpolder framed themselves as victims of others’ decision to build the wind park near their homes without their consent. One policy entrepreneur compared himself with the famous cartoon figures, Asterix and Obelix, who rebelled against the mighty Roman Empire. This policy entrepreneur argued that he did not stand a chance against the dominant and dictatorial ruling of the local, regional and national governments. Conversely, the initiators of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder regarded themselves as part of the tradition of pioneers known in the history of the polders, who, with their hands-on mentality and level-headedness, overcame various barriers to come this far. They believed they had earned the chance to complete the Wind Park Noordoostpolder after two decades of advocacy.

8.4.4 Empathy and power
As the above discussion has revealed, a distinction can be made between the framing of the self and others in terms of motivations, behaviour and position. By framing the self in a certain manner, a policy
entrepreneur implicitly or explicitly also frames the other. Inversely, by framing the other, a policy entrepreneur implicitly or explicitly frames the self. Additionally, the framing of motivations, behaviour and position are often interrelated. For example, the framing of one’s motivation to attain justice and of being an underdog or victim legitimises the campaigning, such as the opponents fighting against the Wind Park Noordoostpolder.

I consider framing the self and the other as playing the empathy card. The policy entrepreneurs’ hope is to have people sympathise with them and the issue they support. The case studies have shown that this can be very effective for setting the public agenda; however, it is not effective for setting the policy and political agenda. Decision makers tend to be primarily sensitive to political and substantive arguments, rather than emotional ones. On one occasion, I witnessed a policy entrepreneur openly play a power card, rather than only an empathy card—Duivesteijn, when defending the interests of Almere, argued that Almere is an indispensable stakeholder from which the national government needs cooperation. I hypothesise that the power card can only effectively be played by policy entrepreneurs in a formal position in order to negotiate terms, such as in the case of alderman Duivesteijn.

8.5 Constraining and enabling contexts
All the case studies revealed that contextual factors can both constrain and enable policy entrepreneurs in finding ways to set the agenda. The context offers some challenges for policy entrepreneurs to set the agenda. For instance, policy entrepreneurs need to be well aware of the actors in the context in which they operate. This is the reason that the Second Delta Committee involved a broad array of actors and networks, including scientists, policymakers, experts and politicians. Interactions with these actors helped the committee develop ideas and build arguments others could support.

In the case on nature development, the policy entrepreneurs were well aware of their contexts. This led them to adjust their strategy by framing the concept of nature development differently, and by looking for support from people with backgrounds other than nature development. In the case of the infrastructural connection and outer-dike urbanisation of Almere, the first alderman employed strategies to find support locally and regionally, while the subsequent alderman successfully focused on finding support nationally—at least until 2010, when the political stream changed and a new minister took office. Interestingly, the opposing policy entrepreneurs in the Almere case tried the same. For example, Verhorst tried to network at these different levels, even though...
it was much more difficult for her acting from outside than for policy entrepreneurs acting from inside the political arena, such as the aldermen of Almere.

The case of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder also showed the practice and need for policy entrepreneurs to deal with the actors in their contexts. At first, most policy entrepreneurs advocating the wind park tried to find support from local actors in the municipality of Noordoostpolder. When there was sufficient support locally and the province became involved, they focused on finding support from the province. As soon as it became clear that the province was in favour of the plan for the wind park and the national government took over control, the focused shifted towards the national government. The opponents also tried to win political support to set the political agenda, but were too late and always lagged at least one step behind the proponents (I will return to this later).

As well as knowing who to deal with—in any given context—the position of policy entrepreneurs is important. I agree with Kingdon (1984) that policy entrepreneurs are not primarily characterised by the formal position they hold, yet having a formal position certainly brings many advantages—most notably, inside access to the political agenda, politicians, decision makers and resources, as demonstrated by the aldermen in the case of Almere. However, as the other cases reveal, formal positions are not automatically helpful or necessary. The policy entrepreneurs advocating nature development even had to work around their own department to set the political agenda. In addition, the initiators of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, as outsiders, had no formal position in government, and yet were still able to win the support of the government by cleverly framing and networking. Thus, positional power is not decisive, but knowing who to deal with and what positional power you have contributes to effective agenda setting. Equally important is the anticipation of constraining and enabling contextual factors. I now discuss the various contextual factors that influenced the policy entrepreneurs’ strategies to effectively set the agenda.

The contextual factor that was relevant in the case on the Second Delta Committee from the beginning was the fact that the national government decided to establish the committee. Without the national government, there would not have been a committee trying to set the agenda. The absence of a recent crisis was another contextual factor. With major changes in water management often preceded by natural disasters, it was quite remarkable that the committee managed to set the agenda in the absence of such a recent crisis. While this would
normally be regarded a major constraint, the committee decided to take up the challenge and cleverly and persuasively framed the issue of climate change and water safety in its own terms by drafting a crisis narrative based on historical, recent and possible future examples of crises.

The case on nature development showed that the spontaneous developments in the Oostvaardersplassen provided the policy entrepreneurs the opportunity to convince others that large-scale nature development was possible—even in the Netherlands. The competition issued by the EO Wijers foundation provided the proponents of nature development with another opportunity to raise awareness for their ideas and find support. The high waters of the main rivers in 1993 and 1995 helped the policy entrepreneurs align nature development with river management and frame it as an alternative solution to water safety. However, there were also constraining factors that limited the policy entrepreneurs’ effectiveness in setting the agenda. In the nature development case, there was path dependency and resistance to policy change within the policy entrepreneurs’ own governmental department, and, during the second half of the 2000s, the changing economic and political context. The 2010 newly established Cabinet also withdrew political support for further implementing the EHS, robust ecological corridors and projects such as the Oostvaarderswold.

In the case of Almere, the policy entrepreneurs also had to deal with a changing economic and political context and newly established Cabinet in 2010. This served as a constraint for the proponents of the outer-dike urbanisation and infrastructural connection between Amsterdam and Almere. However, the previous government had already initiated the 2010 to 2012 RRAAM process and involved all kinds of stakeholders to draft a shared perspective on the future of the region and the plans for Almere.

The case of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder revealed that the internationally, nationally, provincially and locally set goals on renewable energy provided the proponents of the wind park opportunities to align their plan with governmental policy, while opponents were limited in that respect. The Wind Park Noordoostpolder had already become an important asset for the various government levels to reach their targets on renewable energy, making it almost impossible for the opponents to change these targets and cancel the plans for the wind park.

In short, all these cases show the importance of contextual factors in terms of both constraining and enabling. In more than one of the above examples, the policy entrepreneurs succeeded in converting an apparently constraining contextual factor into an opportunity to set the agenda. This corroborates the presented description of a policy entrepreneur as an opportunity seeker who is willing to take risks, is eager to persevere and is capable of turning a situation to his or her own advantage. It is not easy for policy entrepreneurs to take a step
back or give up, even if a situation is not in their favour. However, all the studied cases also reveal that one contextual factor is most important: the role and perspective of various levels of government regarding the issue. This emphasises the importance of politics to policy entrepreneurs’ ability to effectively set the agenda (Beeson & Stone, 2013). Retrospectively, I note that the government—notably, the national government—acted mainly in four contrasting roles: initiator, obstructer, facilitator and confiscator.

First, in the case of the Second Delta Committee, the national government acted as the initiator for policy change by instigating a committee and trying to set the agenda for water safety. In the case study on nature development, the national government initially acted as an obstructer of policy change—at first unwilling to accept the concept of nature development. However, due to the policy entrepreneurs discussed, this changed and the national government became an important supporter, especially in the water sector—at least until 2010. In the case of the plans for Almere, the national government operated mainly as a facilitator by establishing the RRAAM project and enabling actors to participate in the policy process. With the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, the national government seized the project by changing policy and exerting its authority, while also collaborating with the initiators of the wind park.

In all cases, the final decision of the implementation of the plan lay with the national government, rather than the local or regional governments. Even when a participatory policy process was established—as with Almere—and even when local and provincial authorities decided to change their policy—as with the wind park—the national government could still change its perspective and intervene. Therefore, policy entrepreneurs are often dependent on the role played by the national government. A major difficulty faced by policy entrepreneurs is that the dominant role played by the national government not only varies across cases, but also over time, which makes it extra challenging to anticipate any changing role of the national government (not limited to the aforementioned four roles) or a new Cabinet taking office. Moreover, as the cases reveal, different roles lead to different opportunities and constraints for policy entrepreneurs to set the agenda effectively.

The fact that policy entrepreneurs are often dependent on the role and perspective of the national government also emphasises the importance of the political agenda over the public and policy agendas. Politicians and government representatives are the actors who can decide whether plans will be seriously considered or implemented, and are thus the most important people from whom to gain support. If policy entrepreneurs want to change policy that has regional or national implications, they should carefully consider the interests and perspectives of the national government. All efforts to set the agenda and change policy from the bottom-up can prove fruitless if the national government rejects the plan. For example, in the case of the
infrastructural connection, the national government has not yet made a decision—which, in Bachrach and Baratz’s (1963) terms is a ‘non-decision’—and thus success can be claimed by both the proponents and opponents of the change.

Conversely, in the case of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, the national government decided that the wind park—even though it began as a local policy matter—was going to be implemented, leaving not much room for further discussing the need and urgency of building the wind park at any governmental level. This proved to be convenient for the proponents because they saw their plan adopted and supported by the national government. The opponents, who had targeted their strategies at local and provincial governmental levels first, then had to compete with the interests of the national government. Unfortunately for the opponents, there existed none of the needed good relationships between them and the proponents, including the governmental actors. Consequently, no meaningful interaction occurred and no consensus was built, which resulted in an interactional deadlock and dialogue of the deaf (Van Eeten, 1999). The efforts of the opponents to pressure the decision makers by first setting the public agenda were shown to fail. This was not because they were unable to set the public agenda, which they fairly successfully did, but because this was not sufficient to gain the support of the governmental authorities—apart from the local support of the municipality of Urk.

These examples lead to the conclusion that the main aim of policy entrepreneurs should not be to begin by focusing on mobilising widespread public support aimed at setting the public agenda, which subsequently should contribute to setting the political agenda (Cobb et al., 1976). Instead, the central priority of policy entrepreneurs must be to employ strategies aimed at setting the political agenda and winning the support of the government at various levels.

8.6 Combining and aligning framing and networking strategies
The present case studies have empirically confirmed the use and power of framing and networking strategies. Policy entrepreneurs realise that they cannot rely on one strategy alone, but need to try to spread their risks and chances of success by employing a broad range of framing and networking strategies. On its own, exploiting the range of strategies available can lead to success; however, if policy entrepreneurs want to have a higher chance of being effective, they need to cleverly combine and align framing and networking strategies. I claim that the more effectively policy entrepreneurs combine and align various strategies, the more successful they will be. In turn, policy entrepreneurs who exploit multiple framing and networking strategies, but are unable to combine and align them, are likely to be less effective in setting the agenda. Below, I name various successful and unsuccessful case study examples.
A successful example in this study was the case of the Second Delta Committee, in which framing and networking strategies were effectively used in an integrated and intertwined matter. Not only were framing strategies (such as narratives, symbols, rhetoric and so forth) cleverly combined and aligned, but strategies such as team building and involving a wider network of actors were also employed. There was continuous interaction between the committee and actors relevant to the issue at stake in order to know how to align their framing to issues important to politicians, community groups, experts and policymakers from multiple government levels. This enabled the committee to be adaptive and gradually create a vision with recommendations many could support. Hence, as has been argued, there was a great deal of consensus on the need to institutionally adapt to climate change in water management, with limited opposition.

Another successful example was the case of nature development, in which a group of civil servants faced inertia in their considered conservative department. Initially, there was no support for adopting the policy entrepreneurs’ radical view on nature. Thus, rather than following command and accepting decisions from their bosses, they sought new opportunities. These entrepreneurs could have stuck to their perspective on nature development and networked to find supporters and build a coalition of likeminded civil servants within their department—after all, they believed that nature development is a goal in itself and should become central to environment and nature policy making. However, instead of focusing solely on nature development, the policy entrepreneurs altered and aligned their framing of nature development with discussions in water management on water safety. An expert in water management subsequently joined the group of policy entrepreneurs and helped draft the award-winning plan to redesign the rivers.

Alongside building an interdisciplinary team, the policy entrepreneurs were keen to frame nature development as also beneficial for the clay industry and tourist organisations. The policy entrepreneurs successfully networked to gain support from the then Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. She took over the framing of nature development as a promising alternative approach to water safety for managing the Dutch major rivers. Thanks to the policy entrepreneurs’ efforts to share the concept of nature development—such as via public speeches and pilot and demonstration projects—the support of the public was also attained. Thus, the policy entrepreneurs’ strategies were carefully considered and effectively combined. The policy entrepreneurs anticipated their circumstances and were willing to adjust their framing and networking strategies accordingly.
However, as the case on nature development also revealed, the policy entrepreneurs were not successful on all occasions, as they failed to effectively set the agenda from the second half of the 2000s onwards. The implementation of the EHS, the Oostvaarderswold and nature development in general was questioned due to the political stream changing. In addition to this changing context, the policy entrepreneurs also have themselves to blame because they failed to undertake for the dry areas what they did so effectively for the riverine areas: adjust framing and networking to find sufficient actors who were willing and able to commit to implementing nature development. The most recent effort to reframe nature development in terms of adaptation to climate change is probably too late to make nature development a political and policy priority for the years to come.

Another unsuccessful example of effectively combining and aligning the full range of framing and networking strategies is the case of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder. The policy entrepreneurs opposing the Wind Park Noordoostpolder did set the public agenda, but failed to set the policy and political agendas. Part of the ineffective employment of various strategies was caused by their amateurism and unclear focus. While the proponents professionalised their actions and acquired the necessary resources and support, the opponents failed to do so. Their involvement in agenda setting came too late and they subsequently always lagged behind the decision making. Additionally, their framing and networking strategies were too dispersed and not thoroughly constructed and aligned. They aligned their framing ineffectively and failed to attain substantive political support. They continuously broadened their problem frame and tried to link all issues that somehow related to the wind park, such as the effects on public health, water safety, the environment, ecology, the landscape, alternatives for wind energy and so forth. Moreover, with their only options involving no wind park at all or severely limited solutions, they did not find support among the decision makers. As a result, their frames were perceived as moving beyond credibility. Further, when one of the opponents, the mayor of Urk, was given the opportunity to negotiate the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, he did not want to budge an inch, even though he was in a losing position—which he believed not to be the case.

Again, the broad problem and narrow solution framing did help raise public awareness and set the public agenda, but decision makers, politicians and the administrative Council of State were not impressed by this framing. As a result, the choice of the opponents to take full risks and allow no room for negotiation left them empty handed. Conversely, the proponents of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder were successful in establishing a professional organisation with a clear focus on complying with formal procedures, meeting all regulations, closing a solid business case and sharing information on the plan for the wind park with whomever it concerned. Moreover, they succeeded in realis-
SIMPLY EMPLOYING THE FULL RANGE OF STRATEGIES CAN PROVE TO BE INEFFECTIVE AND UNREWARDING. THUS, STRATEGIES MUST BE CLEVERLY COMBINED AND ALIGNED IN ORDER TO EFFECTIVELY SET THE AGENDA

8.7 Final remarks
This research has provided a qualitative case study approach on policy entrepreneurship. I have undertaken four in-depth case studies by personally conducting 46 interviews, analysing over 1,427 newspaper articles, and studying numerous documents. I believe this has provided me with substantial data to study policy entrepreneurship, framing and networking strategies, agenda setting and the constraining and enabling effects of contexts. However, there are limitations to this study and its findings, as well as possibilities for future research.

First, it is important to consider the extent to which the research findings are applicable to a larger class of units than the Dutch context of the presented case studies. As has been argued, this was never the main objective of this research, yet it is still debatable whether the same conclusions would be reached elsewhere. I am convinced that policy entrepreneurs in other case studies and contexts revealed in previous research (Brouwer, 2013; Hammond, 2013; Huitema & Meijerink, 2009b; Kingdon, 1984; Zhu, 2013) would generally employ the same types of strategies to set the agenda. There would certainly be interesting differences in how strategies are employed and what priorities policy entrepreneurs would have, but framing and networking strategies must still be employed. As well as focusing only on the Dutch context, this study is limited because it did not problematise or operationalise the various local policy contexts. As this research has hinted, different contexts may provide policy entrepreneurs with different opportunity structures to set the agenda effectively. For these reasons, I suggest that other researchers could focus on these issues and seek to thoroughly compare policy entrepreneurship in various policy domains, countries and so forth.

Second, future studies could focus on policy entrepreneurship during various phases in the policy process. In some cases in this research,
it proved difficult to clearly demarcate the agenda-setting phase from other phases in the policy process; thus, other studies may reveal that there are different types of policy entrepreneurs and strategies required during these different phases, especially when policy entrepreneurs with various capabilities are collaborating and allocating tasks. The nature development case hints in that direction, as I observed actors working as pioneers, early adopters, multipliers, translators and popularisers, yet there were also actors involved in making business plans, calculating profits for nature and for adjacent sectors, and trying to convince others by adopting their languages. Future study on policy entrepreneurship could focus on the phases of the policy process in relation to different types of policy entrepreneurship and strategies. Importantly, as argued in the theoretical chapter referring to Kingdon (1984), one must be careful not to differentiate policy entrepreneurs based on formal positions held, as this is incompatible with the basic understanding of what defines a policy entrepreneur—behaviour, not position.

Third, another interesting issue is the apparent importance of the policy entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics. Although scholars often do present some of the personal characteristics of policy entrepreneurs, as the theoretical framework revealed, they are never thoroughly analysed. Based on observations and presumptions, it is generally believed that policy entrepreneurs need to exhibit certain motivations and skills to pursue policy change or prevent change from occurring. This study does not answer how to systematically study personal characteristics, and how these affect policy entrepreneurs’ strategies. My consideration in this regard was to examine what policy entrepreneurs actually do, rather than who they are or what drives them. However, the latter may be an interesting topic for future study because various policy entrepreneurs in these case studies demonstrated strong personalities and capabilities that were not necessarily helpful for realising effective agenda setting. Moreover, as I have argued, personal characteristics are often also subject to the framing of the self and the other.

Last, I would of course challenge other researchers to empirically study the hypotheses posed in this thesis: Are crises not a prerequisite for radically changing policy? Do policy entrepreneurs make extensive use of visualisations of a brighter or more frightening future as a way to frame issues? Are there differences between the proponents and opponents of policy change in this respect? Do other policy entrepreneurs also frame themselves and other people involved in agenda setting in terms of motivation, behaviour and position? Would any policy entrepreneur be able to successfully play the empathy or power card, or are there limitations when taking into account the formal position of the policy entrepreneur in the policy process? Are the function of context and the role of the national government as significant in other cases as they were in these? Should setting the political agenda re-
ally be considered the number one priority of a policy entrepreneur, rather than first focusing on the public agenda? Does combining and aligning framing and networking strategies prove to be important for policy entrepreneurs operating elsewhere? To what extent does formal positional power influence the effectiveness of employing framing and networking strategies? Are there different types of policy entrepreneurship and strategies required during different phases of the policy process, and does this influence the effectiveness of various strategies? What is the importance of policy entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics and how do these affect the employment of strategies?

I trust that the present study encourages other researchers to continue studying policy entrepreneurship and the role of individuals in agenda setting and policy change. I believe that this study has provided various insights for conducting future studies. At least, as promised in the first chapter, the added value of this research has been to not only study the usual suspects of policy entrepreneurship at national governmental levels, but also to discuss the policy entrepreneurs operating at local and regional levels and contexts. Moreover, this study has given in-depth insights to the strategies employed by both the proponents and opponents of policy change. In addition, it has contributed to a better understanding of networking and, particularly, framing strategies, which, until now, had not been thoroughly analysed in empirical policy entrepreneurship studies.

The present study has examined a variety of policy entrepreneurs—both men and women, amateurs and professionals, insiders and outsiders, winners and losers and ‘people in between’—all with the desire and potential to leave their mark on agenda setting in the IJsselmeer context. The brighter future this study provides is that, given any situation, individuals do have the power to make a difference. As was the case with the prime example of policy entrepreneurship, Cornelis Lely, the effects of people’s efforts to set the agenda may yet require decades to become visible or even be appraised.


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Inleiding
Het doel van dit onderzoek is het verkrijgen van inzicht in de wijze waarop individuen op strategische wijze proberen om hun visies en plannen ten aanzien van het IJsselmeergebied op de agenda te krijgen. Deze individuen worden beschouwd als zogenaamde policy entrepreneurs ('beleidsondernemers'). Een beleidsondernemer is iemand die een bepaald idee of plan propageert en deze op strategische wijze onder de aandacht probeert te brengen van de media, maatschappij, politici en beleidsmakers. Op die manier probeert de beleidsondernemer de agenda te bepalen en acceptatie en implementatie van diens plannen te verzekeren of deze van anderen tegen te houden. Hij kan expert, ambtenaar, politicus, bestuurder, lobbyist, actievoerder of wat dan ook zijn. Het meest kenmerkende aan de beleidsondernemer is evenwel niet diens positie in het beleidsvormingsproces, maar diens onverstoorbare ijver om allerlei middelen, zoals tijd, energie, reputatie en soms ook geld, in te zetten voor het realiseren of tegenhouden van beleidsverandering. Meestal is zo'n persoon vastberaden, doortastend, en bereid tot het nemen van risico's; soms tegen beter weten in maar wel altijd doelbewust.

Strategieën
De beleidswetenschappelijke literatuur laat zien dat een beleidsondernemer verschillende middelen en strategieën tot zijn beschikking heeft om zijn doel te bereiken. In dit onderzoek worden twee typen strategieën onderscheiden: framing- en netwerkstrategieën.

Framing-strategieën worden ingezet om ideeën en plannen zo te presenteren dat deze worden overgenomen door anderen. Op die manier streeft de beleidsondernemer er naar om percepties te beïnvloeden en aandacht en draagvlak te genereren voor zijn frame. Een frame is een ordening van gefragmenteerde informatie in een gestructureerd raamwerk of kader dat duiding geeft aan een fenomeen of een gebeurtenis—in dit geval aan een nog te realiseren (of tegen te houden) plan. In de beleidswetenschappelijke literatuur wordt wel een onderscheid gemaakt tussen het framen van problemen, oplossingen en middelen die nodig zouden zijn om die oplossingen te bewerkstelligen. In dit onderzoek is een zestal framing-strategieën onderscheiden.

Ten eerste kan een beleidsondernemer verhalen benutten waarbinnen zijn ideeën, visies en plannen een plek krijgen. Ten tweede wordt retoriek benut om door geschreven of gesproken woord argumenten te construeren en mensen te overtuigen. Ten derde worden symbolen gebruikt om—soms complexe—ideeën in een eenvoudig te begrijpen en herkennen symbool te vangen. Ten vierde maakt een beleidsondernemer gebruik van crisis exploitatie om zijn visie of plan op de agenda te zetten wanneer een crisis plaatsvindt. Een crisis kan een momentum creëren voor de beleidsondernemer waarop hij zijn idee kan agenderen, bijvoorbeeld als oplossing van de crisis of als
preventieve maatregel voor de toekomst. Om die reden is een beleidsondernemer, ten vijfde, vaak betrokken in een framing contest waarbij verscheidene beleidsondernemers, en mogelijk andere actoren, strijden om de betekenis die wordt gegeven aan een crisis: wat zijn de oorzaken, wat zijn de oplossingen? Op die manier proberen ze de maatschappelijke, beleidsmatige en politieke discussie te domineren. Tot slot trachten beleidsondernemers door middel van frame alignment hun frame te laten aansluiten op of afwijken van de frames van anderen.

Alleen framing is evenwel niet voldoende om een bepaald issue op de agenda te krijgen, omdat het ook nodig is om medestanders te krijgen en draagvlak te genereren. Beleidsondernemers die alleen werken zijn beperkt in hun mogelijkheden en middelen—zoals tijd, energie, reputatie en geld—om plannen op de agenda te krijgen en zullen daarom door te netwerken de medewerking zoeken van anderen. In dit onderzoek is een drietal netwerkstrategieën onderscheiden.

Ten eerste is een beleidsondernemer druk met het managen van verscheidene netwerken om te kunnen anticiperen op belangen van anderen en te bouwen aan relaties. Ten tweede zoekt een beleidsondernemer naar mogelijkheden binnen die netwerken om coalities te smeden met actoren die van elkaar afhankelijk zijn of een gedeeld belang of frame hebben en elkaar zouden kunnen ondersteunen in het realiseren van gemeenschappelijke of complementaire doelstellingen. Ten derde benutten beleidsondernemers verschillende evenementen of fora om ideeën onder de aandacht van andere, voor hen en hun plan, relevante actoren. Zo kan een beleidsondernemer bijvoorbeeld een pilot project initiëren, debatavond organiseren, publiekscampagne optuigen, gemeenteraadsvergadering bezoeken of netwerk borrel langsgaan.

**Onderzoeksaanpak**

Om te kunnen onderzoeken hoe beleidsondernemers opereren in de context van het IJsselmeergebied is kwalitatief empirisch onderzoek gedaan. Dataverzamelingsmethoden betreffen het afnemen van 46 semigestructureerd diepte-interviews, bestuderen van in totaal meer dan 1427 krantenartikelen, en analyseren van relevante beleidsstukken, nota’s, kamerverhandelingen, brieven en cetera. Aan de hand van het theoretisch kader en met behulp van de hiervoor genoemde dataverzamelingsmethoden is een viertal casussen geselecteerd die gerelateerd zijn aan het IJsselmeergebied en waarbij sprake was van beleidsondernemers die proberen of probeerden het beleidsvormingsproces te beïnvloeden—en dan met name de agenderingsfase. De gekozen casussen zijn allemaal ruimtelijk relevant en hebben betrekking op recente discussies over water, natuur, stedelijke ontwikkeling en windenergie in het IJsselmeergebied.
**Casussen**

De eerste casus betreft de Tweede Deltacommissie, een ad hoc adviescommissie die door het Nederlandse kabinet werd geïnstalleerd in 2007. Deze commissie, in dit onderzoek beschouwd als een individuele beleidsondernemer, benutte verscheidene strategieën om klimaatadaptatie in het Nederlandse waterbeheer op de agenda te krijgen. Een belangrijk resultaat van haar invloed betreft de instelling en uitvoering van het nationale Deltaprogramma, waarbij het IJsselmeer wordt beschouwd als het belangrijkste zoetwaterreservoir voor Nederland, zowel nu als in de toekomst.

De tweede casus focust op een kleine groep beleidsondernemers die er in de jaren tachtig en negentig in slaagde om natuurontwikkeling op de agenda te zetten. Tot dan toe was natuurbehoud het leidende principe in het Nederlandse natuurbeleid. Ontwikkelingen in de Oostvaardersplassen speelden een belangrijke rol in het op de agenda zetten van natuurontwikkeling omdat deze volgens de beleidsondernemers lieten zien dat het mogelijk was om natuur te ontwikkelen zonder of met minimale interventies van de mens. Hoewel deze casus toont dat deze beleidsondernemers succesvol zijn geweest in het koppelen van natuurontwikkeling aan het waterbeleid van de grote rivieren, laat hun succes in de rest van Nederland een gemengd beeld zien. Bijvoorbeeld wanneer gekeken wordt naar de implementatie van de Ecologische Hoofdstructuur (EHS) en groot-schalige ecologische verbindingzones als het Oostvaarderswold, dat gepland stond tussen de Oostvaardersplassen en het Horsterwold.

De derde casus gaat over de wensen en plannen van de gemeente Almere om buitendijks te bouwen en een infrastructurele verbinding–brug of tunnel–te bouwen tussen Almere en Amsterdam. Er zijn vier beleidsondernemers die dergelijke plannen verdedigen of een alternatieve route bepleiten voor de infrastructurele verbinding door het Markermeer-IJmeer. Twee beleidsondernemers zijn nadrukkelijk tegen deze plannen en verdedigen het open houden van het Markermeer-IJmeer. Anno 2014 is nog geen definitieve keuze gemaakt voor of tegen buitendijkse ontwikkeling of een infrastructurele verbinding, zodat nog geen duidelijke winnaars of verliezers zijn aan te wijzen.

De vierde en laatste casus betreft het plan om een grootschalig windpark te bouwen langs de dijk van de Noordoostpolder. Een kleine groep boeren is sinds de jaren negentig bezig om deze plannen op de agenda te krijgen. Deze voorstanders van het park ondervonden echter weerstand van inwoners van de gemeente Noordoostpolder en de naburige gemeente Urk toen de media in 2008 de plannen oppikten. Ook in deze casus worden de strategieën van voor- en tegenstanders geanalyseerd. Begin 2012 begon de constructie van het windpark waardoor de voorstanders als meest succesvolle beleidsondernemers kunnen worden beschouwd.

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2 Zie pagina 52, figuur 3.1, voor een overzichtskaart van de vier casussen.
Conclusies
Uit de analyse van de vier empirische casussen is een vijftal conclusies te trekken.

1 FRAMING EN NETWERKEN INDERDAAD VAN GROOT STRATEGISCH BELANG

Ten eerste laat dit onderzoek zien dat beleidsondernemers inderdaad de eerder genoemde framing- en netwerkstrategieën benutten om invloed uit te oefenen op de agendering van hun plannen of het tegenhouden van de agendering van de plannen van anderen. Het onderscheiden van framing en netwerken is nuttig gebleken, ook al werd zowel tijdens de theoretische discussie als de empirische analyse duidelijk dat er veel overlap bestaat tussen deze twee typen strategieën. Ik zal bij elk van de genoemde framing en netwerkstrategieën voorbeelden noemen uit de casussen.

Framing-strategieën
De Tweede Deltacommissie maakte gebruik van verhalen om haar frame kracht bij te zetten. De commissie creëerde het verhaal dat Nederland, met een rijke historie in waterbeheer, in staat is om zich goed voor te bereiden op klimaatverandering. Echter, de commissie maakte ook gebruik van het verhaal dat crisissen in het Nederlandse waterbeheer, zoals de overstroming in 1953 en de bijna overstromingen van de rivieren in 1993 en 1995, ons ieder moment weer zouden kunnen overvallen. De commissie formuleerde daarom een reeks aanbevelingen om Nederland adequaat voor te bereiden op een toekomst met klimaatverandering.

De beleidsondernemers uit de casus over natuurontwikkeling maakten gebruik van retoriek om hun frame kracht bij te zetten dat natuurbehoud als beleidsprioriteit plaats moest maken voor natuurontwikkeling. In hun retoriek maakten zij gebruik van het onderscheid tussen ‘echte natuur’, waarbij geen verstoring is van de mens, en het cynisch bedoelde ‘boerennatuur’, waarbij boeren overheidssubsidies ontvingen om natuur te beheren.

De voorstanders van buitendijkse bebouwing en de brug tussen Amsterdam en Almere gebruikten symbolen voor hun frame. Buitendijkse bebouwing zou figuurlijk en letterlijk moeten dienen als een stepping stone om Almere dichter bij Amsterdam te brengen en vice versa. De brug zou symbool moeten staan voor de verbinding en samenwerking van Almere met de Amsterdam metropolis. Daarnaast zou een Golden-Gate-achtige brug Almere de allure moeten geven van een stad van betekenis die onderdeel is van de Amsterdam metropolis. Zonder een dergelijke verbinding zou Almere ‘gehandicapt’ blijven en zich niet verder kunnen ontwikkelen tot een veelzijdige en sociaaleconomisch aantrekkelijke stad. Het feit dat symbolen ver-
Schillende interpretaties kunnen dragen blijkt wel uit het feit dat tegenstanders van de plannen van Almere in deze symbolen tekenen van grootheidswaanzin en megalomanie zagen die, eenmaal werkelijkheid geworden, meer kwaad dan goed zouden aanrichten.

Het exploiteren van crisissen vond het meest nadrukkelijk plaats in de casus over de Tweede Deltacommissie die succesvol een eigen crisisverhaal creëerde. Dit is bijzonder knap aangezien zich op Nederlandse bodem kort voor de instelling van de commissie geen overstroomingen of andere rampen hadden voorgedaan, terwijl veel wetenschappelijke literatuur veronderstelt dat een crisis een voorwaarde is voor radicale beleidsverandering. Op basis van dit onderzoek kan worden geconcludeerd dat een crisis geen absolute voorwaarde is voor een beleidsondernemer om (radicale) beleidsverandering te realiseren.

Met name in de laatste twee casussen was sprake van framing contests. Hoewel de literatuur veronderstelt dat dit meestal plaatsvindt als reactie op een crisis, hebben deze casussen laten zien dat dit geen vereiste is voor een framing contest. Zo zijn de contrasterende interpretaties van de symbolische betekenis van de plannen van Almere te interpreteren als een framing contest en zijn ook de voor- en tegenstanders van het windpark Noordoostpolder verwikkeld geraakt in een framing contest – waarover later meer.

Frame alignment vond plaats in iedere casus. De Tweede Deltacommissie koppelde waterveiligheid aan klimaatverandering. De voorstanders van natuurontwikkeling koppelden natuurontwikkeling aan de veiligheid van de grote rivieren. Twee voorstanders van de plannen van Almere koppelden deze plannen aan de wens van de overheid om in de Randstadregio de toenemende vraag naar woningen op te vangen. Nadat drie marktpartijen met dure voorstellen waren gekomen voor de infrastructurele verbinding van Almere naar Amsterdam zagen twee beleidsondernemers hun kans schoon om hun plannen te presenteren binnen het beleidsproces omtrent het Rijk- en regioprogramma Amsterdam Almere Markermeer (RRAAM). Volgens hen waren hun plannen aanzienlijk goedkoper en kwalitatief beter. Tegenstanders van de plannen voor Almere hebben de discussie over de toekomst van de metropoolregio benut als kans om de waarde van een open Markermeer-IJmeer op de agenda te zetten. De boeren die het initiatief hadden genomen voor het windpark in de Noordoostpolder hebben hun plannen gekoppeld aan de wens van de overheid om de capaciteit van windenergie in Nederland te verhogen. De tegenstanders koppelden hun framing aan de veronderstelde negatieve invloed van het windpark op hun omgeving en gezondheid. Kortom, frame alignment is een belangrijke strategie gebleken voor beleidsondernemers.

Netwerkstrategieën
De case studies laten zien dat beleidsentrepreneurs veelvuldig gebruik maken van netwerkstrategieën.
Met betrekking tot het managen van netwerken liet de beleids-ondernemer van de Kwade Zwaan, tegenstander van de plannen van Almere om buitendijks te bouwen en een infrastructurele verbinding te creëren tussen Amsterdam en Almere, stevig van zich horen in verscheidene netwerken. Het managen van netwerken op verschillende niveaus—lokaal, regionaal en nationaal—was een van haar belangrijkste strategieën om medestanders te vinden onder burgers, beleidsmakers en politici voor haar plan om het Markermeer-IJmeer open te houden en de plannen van Almere tegen te houden.

In iedere casus was sprake van het bouwen van coalities. Echter, beleidsondernemers bleken in alle gevallen voornamelijk geïnteresseerd in het aangaan van wat kan worden beschouwd als strategische allianties of ‘gelegenheidscoalities’ met een relatief tijdelijk karakter. De beleidsondernemers van het eerste uur in de natuurontwikkelingscasus schrooomden bijvoorbeeld niet om daarbij over disciplinaire grenzen heen te kijken en samen te werken met landschapsarchitecten en wateringenieurs. In breder verband ging de groep zelfs een samenwerking aan met natuurbehoudsorganisaties, de ANWB en de klei-industrie. Met name de samenwerking met de klei-industrie was opmerkelijk omdat die tot dan toe juist werd gezien als partij met weinig oog voor de natuur. Toch waren de beleidsondernemers in staat om de belangen van deze actoren op elkaar te laten aansluiten en synergie te vinden in complementaire doelen.

Het benutten van verscheidene fora en evenementen is eveneens belangrijk gebleken voor beleidsondernemers om aandacht en draagvlak te creëren. Zo hadden de voorstanders van natuurontwikkeling meerdere demonstratie- en pilotprojecten opgezet om burgers, beleidsmakers en politici er van te overtuigen dat het in Nederland mogelijk is om natuurontwikkeling te realiseren. De Oostvaardersplassen waren daarbij steeds het belangrijkste voorbeeld. In de casus over de stedelijke ontwikkeling van Almere zette voormalig wethouder Bijl van Almere, een van de besproken beleidsondernemers, een atelier op aan Amsterdamse zijde van het IJmeer (Atelier IJmeer 2030+) waar verscheidene actoren werden uitgenodigd om de plannen voor Almere te zien ontwikkelen op de tekentafel en in de vorm van een grote maquette. Ook de tegenstanders van deze plannen hebben evenementen georganiseerd om het Markermeer-IJmeer open te houden, zoals het organiseren van openbare debatten en het varen van een rondje om het eiland Pampus (Rondje Pampus) met hun medestanders.

Hoewel de casussen het gebruik van zowel framing- als netwerkstrategieën bevestigen is door middel van theoretisch, en vooral ook empirisch, onderzoek verdere uitwerking en doordenking van deze strategieën gewenst. Dit geldt met name voor de framing-strategieën omdat deze in de literatuur over beleidsondernemers onderbelicht blijven.
Beleidsondernemers framen problemen, oplossingen en middelen om die oplossingen te realiseren, niet alleen in geschreven en gesproken woord, maar ook door het benutten van visualisaties. In elk van de besproken casussen speelden visualisaties een belangrijke rol. De visuele middelen die een beleidsondernemer kan benutten zijn vermoedelijk net zo rijk als de creativiteit van de beleidsondernemer. In de casussen kwamen grofweg twee manieren naar voren waarop het frame werd gevisualiseerd: het visualiseren van een zonnige toekomst of daarentegen het visualiseren van een onwenselijke of zelfs beangstigende toekomst.

Opvallend genoeg lijken voorstanders van beleidsverandering voornamelijk gebruik te maken van het visualiseren van een zonnige toekomst waarin hun oplossingen voor het voorliggende probleem een belangrijke rol spelen. Zo maakten de voorstanders van de plannen voor Almere aantrekkelijke animaties en grafische visualisaties van de boodschap dat deze plannen een positieve invloed zouden hebben op de uitstraling van de regio en Almere. Ook de voorstanders van het windpark Noordoostpolder maakten visualisaties om de boodschap over te brengen dat de windmolens prachtig zouden passen in het strakke landschap van de Noordoostpolder en nauwelijks inbreuk zouden plegen op het open karakter van het landschap.

Het is geen verrassing dat tegenstanders dezelfde plannen framen als onderdeel van een onwenselijke en beangstigende toekomst. Zo maakten de tegenstanders van de plannen van Almere gebruik van afbeeldingen, posters, en banners om duidelijk te maken dat deze plannen het open landschap zouden vernietigen. Tegenstanders van het windpark maakten maquettes, afbeeldingen en video’s om de boodschap te communiceren dat de gemeente Noordoostpolder en Urk zouden worden omheind met een ‘ijzeren gordijn’ van windmolens dat het cultureel erfgoed van Urk zou schaden.

Het voorliggende onderzoek laat zien dat niet alleen ideeën, visies en plannen het object zijn van framing maar ook de actoren die betrokken zijn bij de beleidsvorming. In de casussen kwam naar voren dat beleidsondernemers (al of niet handig) gebruik maken van het frame van zichzelf en de ander om sympathie voor hun standpunt op te wekken. Beleidsondernemer bleken dat te doen in termen van motivatie, gedrag en positie.


Behalve van het frame van motiveringen maakten beleidsondernemers ook gebruik van het frame van gedrag. Verhorst, in de casus over Almere, presenteerde zichzelf als iemand die alles in het werk stelt om haar ideale verwezenlijking. Zij benutte haar persoonlijkheid en sociale vaardigheden om contacten te leggen en te netwerken met mensen die een verschil konden maken. Dit kwam haar echter ook op kritiek te staan omdat mensen haar verweten dat zij door haar gedrag meer zichzelf dan haar belang in de schijnwerpers zette. Ook Verhorst's meest directe tegenstander, Duivestijn, werd geprezen om zijn vaardigheden en aanpak, maar tegelijkertijd bekritiseerd om zijn temperamentvolle gedrag en verbaal felle aanpak. In de casus over

Behalve het framem van motivaties en gedrag, framem beleidsondernemers ook posities. Beleidsondernemer presenteerden zichzelf als de underdog en de ander als de dominante speler. In de casus over het windpark Noordoostpolder namen de tegenstanders van het windpark een slachtofferrol aan en schreven ze de voorstanders en overheidspartijen een dominante positie toe. Een van de tegenstanders kwam met het beeld van de stripfiguren Asterix en Obelix die met beperkte middelen rebelleerden tegen het machtige Romeinse rijk. Op vergelijkbare wijze zouden lokale burgers machteloos staan tegenover de zogezegd ondemocratische en dictatoriale overheidspartijen met wie de voorstanders in zee waren gegaan. De voorstanders konden zich niet in dit beeld vinden en beargumenteerden dat ze altijd binnen de kaders van de wet hadden gehandeld en geen misbruik hadden gemaakt van hun posities.

**4 CONTEXTFACTOREN DIE HELPEN OF HINDEREN**

De casussen maken duidelijk dat, behalve de eigen strategieën, ook contextfactoren bijzonder relevant zijn voor de wijze waarop beleidsondernemers effectief (kunnen) zijn in het beïnvloeden van de agenda. Dit maakt dat beleidsondernemers goed op de hoogte dienen te zijn van de context waarbinnen zij opereren. Zo is het van belang om als beleidsondernemer te weten welke actoren al dan niet relevant zijn voor het behalen van doelstellingen. De Tweede Deltacommissie had bijvoorbeeld vroegtijdig aansluiting gezocht bij belangrijke en toonaangevende beleidsmedewerkers, politici, wetenschappers en experts die input konden geven voor het ontwikkelen van het eindrapport van de commissie.

Vooral in de casussen over Almere en het windpark Noordoostpolder werd het belang van een multi-level aanpak duidelijk. Zo focuste wethouder Bijl van Almere op het creëren van draagvlak op lokaal en regionaal niveau terwijl zijn opvolger zijn aandacht vooral richtte op het nationale niveau. Een vergelijkbare verschuiving van focus was waar te nemen in de casus over het windpark Noordoostpolder waarbij de initiatiefnemers achtereenvolgens draagvlak probeerden te creëren op lokaal, regionaal en nationaal overheidsniveau.

Hoewel een beleidsondernemer niet primair te karakteriseren is door diens al dan niet formele positie in het beleidsvormingsproces betekent dit niet dat formele posities niet belangrijk zijn. Zo bleek dat
de wethouders van Almere als *insiders* veel eenvoudiger toegang hadden tot het formele beleidsvormingsproces en daardoor gemakkelijker in staat waren om te framen en te netwerken dan de *outsiders* uit oppositionele belangengroepen. Dit betekent echter niet dat formele posities per definitie voordelen opleveren of nodig zijn voor beleidsondernemers om plannen op de agenda te zetten. De beleidsondernemers voor natuurontwikkeling waren, als beleidsmedewerkers bij het ministerie, juist beperkt in hun mogelijkheden. Zij werden binnen het departement tegengewerkt en zagen zich genoodzaakt om steun buiten de overheid te zoeken. Daarnaast bleken de boeren uit de Noordoostpolder, aanvankelijk zonder formele toegang tot de politieke agenda, zeer goed in staat om het beleidsvormingsproces te beïnvloeden.

Andere contextfactoren die van belang waren, hebben te maken met—vanuit strategisch oogpunt—fortuinlijke externe ontwikkelingen. In de casus over natuurontwikkeling waren er de spontane ontwikkeling van natuur in de Oostvaardersplassen, de EO Wijers stichting die een prijsvraag uitschreef en de bijna-overstromingen van de grote rivieren in 1993 en 1995, als opeenvolgende kansen om natuurontwikkeling te agenderen. Naast deze helpende omstandigheden, waren er ook beperkende factoren in deze casus, zoals de wijziging in beleidsprioriteiten van het in 2010 aangestelde Kabinet Rutte-I. Mede door de economische crisis nam het politieke draagvlak voor groot-schalige natuurontwikkeling en ecologische verbindingzones af. In de casus over de plannen van Almere hadden deze contextfactoren eveneens invloed op het succes van de beleidsondernemers omdat het politieke draagvlak afnam voor groot-schalige investeringen in buiten-dijkse bebouwing en voor een infrastructuurlijke verbinding tussen Amsterdam en Almere. Dit laat onverlet dat beleidsondernemers zelf actie kunnen ondernemen en situaties naar hun hand kunnen zetten, zoals verscheidene beleidsondernemers hebben weten te doen.

Een van de belangrijkste contextfactoren bleek de rol van de overheidspartijen te zijn, en dan met name de nationale overheid. De houding van de overheid kan van groot of doorslaggevend belang zijn voor het welslagen van de strategieën van beleidsondernemers. Dit maakt dat beleidsondernemers er verstandig aan doen om hun aandacht in eerste instantie te richten op het beïnvloeden van de politieke agenda, en niet zozeer te starten met het trachten te beïnvloeden van de publieke agenda. De besproken beleidsondernemers die daar goed mee zijn omgegaan zijn in elk geval succesvoller geweest in het op de agenda krijgen van hun plannen en ideeën dan zij die dat niet (effectief) deden. Het helderste voorbeeld hiervan leveren de initiatiefnemers van het windpark Noordoostpolder die, zoals aangegeven, op strategische wijze op politiek en bestuurlijk niveau lokaal, regionaal en nationaal draagvlak zochten en vonden. De tegenstanders die sterk hadden ingezet op het beïnvloeden van de publieke agenda, in de verwachting dat dit ook de politiek onder druk zou zetten om beleid te veranderen, bleken uiteindelijk minder succesvol.
COMBINEREN EN AFSTEMMEN VAN FRAMING- EN NETWERKSTRATEGIEËN

De casussen hebben bevestigd dat beleidsondernemers gebruik maken van de verscheidene framing- en netwerkstrategieën. Beleidsondernemers realiseren zich dat ze niet hun aandacht moeten vestigen op een enkele strategie, maar dat zij hun kansen moeten spreiden door de rijke variatie van framing- en netwerkstrategieën zo volledig mogelijk te benutten. Echter, het simpelweg benutten van zo veel mogelijk strategieën kan ook nadelig werken, zoals uit de empirische analyse is gebleken. Een belangrijke factor die de effectiviteit van de strategieën beïnvloedt betreft het op slimme en voor de omstandigheden geschikte wijze combineren en afstemmen van de framing- en netwerkstrategieën. Hoe beter de beleidsondernemers daartoe in staat waren, des te effectiever hun strategieën waren. Dit betekent tevens dat beleidsondernemers er verstandig aan doen juist wel te focussen op enkele strategieën en die goed te combineren en op elkaar af te stemmen, in plaats van beroep te doen op een grote hoeveelheid strategieën. Een van de redenen dat de voorstanders van het windpark Noordoostpolder succesvoller waren dan hun tegenstanders is dat de voorstanders goed in staat waren om zich te richten op enkele zeer effectieve strategieën. De tegenstanders hebben geprobeerd zoveel mogelijk strategieën te benutten, maar bleken niet in staat deze op effectieve wijze te combineren en af te stemmen. De voorstanders hadden bijvoorbeeld al in een vroeg stadium de steun weten te verkrijgen van overheidspartijen terwijl de tegenstanders een moeizame relatie ontwikkelden met diezelfde overheidspartijen. De voorstanders wisten hun frame sterk af te bakenen terwijl de tegenstanders hun frame voortdurend hebben proberen uit te breiden. De strijd tegen het windpark Noordoostpolder begon vanuit de overtuiging dat het windpark niet in de Noordoostpolder hoort en een negatieve invloed zou hebben op het culturele erfgoed van de gemeente Urk. Echter, binnen korte tijd werden daar uiteenlopende onderwerpen aan gekoppeld zoals de veronderstelde negatieve invloed van de windmolens op de gezondheid (waaronder geluidsoverlast, slagschaduw en knipperende verlichting op de windmolens), op de overlevingskans van vleermuizen en migrerende vogels, op de lokale economie, de veiligheid van de dijk, et cetera. Hoewel deze framing een positieve invloed had op het lokale draagvlak tegen het windpark, met name in de gemeente Urk, had dit mede tot gevolg dat overheidspartijen de tegenstanders minder serieus namen. Door de uitspraken van de Raad van State, in het voordeel van de voorstanders van het windpark Noordoostpolder, bleken de argumenten van de tegenstanders in de meeste gevallen ook juridisch geen stand te houden. Het is daarom van groot belang dat beleidsondernemers hun framing- en netwerkstrategieën goed doordenken, combineren en afstemmen om effectief de agenda te beïnvloeden, en dan met name de politieke agenda.
Tot besluit

Deze studie heeft inzicht verschaft in de wijze waarop beleidsondernemers op strategische en effectieve wijze ideeën, visies en plannen op de agenda zetten. Graag moedig ik andere onderzoekers aan om de bevindingen uit dit onderzoek nader te bestuderen en te vergelijken met casussen in andere landen en beleidscontexten. In dit onderzoek is uitsluitend gekeken naar de Nederlandse context, en dan ook nog in bepaalde beleidscontexten en casussen die gerelateerd zijn aan het IJsselmeergebied. Ik ben er van overtuigd dat beleidsondernemers elders dezelfde type strategieën zullen benutten maar daar mogelijk wel anders invulling en prioriteit aan geven doordat de contextfactoren verschillen.

Een andere vorm van vervolgonderzoek kan zijn om nader in te gaan op de rol van beleidsondernemers in verschillende fasen in het beleidsvormingsproces. In dit onderzoek is voornamelijk gekeken naar de agenderingsfase, terwijl beleidsondernemers tevens actief zijn bij de selectie van alternatieven, de besluitvorming, de implementatie en de evaluatie. Hoewel fasen in het beleidsproces vaak niet goed zijn te scheiden, en er vaak overlap is, zou vervolgonderzoek kunnen aantonen dat andere type beleidsondernemers nodig zijn gedurende de verschillende fasen.

Tevens zou het interessant zijn om het relatieve belang van bepaalde persoonlijkheidskenmerken van beleidsondernemers verder te onderzoeken, zoals sociale vaardigheden en de mate van opportunisme, assertiviteit, tegendraadsheid, competitiviteit, et cetera. In enkele casussen kwam het belang van deze kenmerken terug terwijl deze bewust niet het onderwerp zijn geworden van nadere analyse. De reden daarvoor was dat beleidsondernemers primair te typen zijn op grond van wat zij doen, in plaats van wie zijn of welke formele positie zij bekleden. Dit laat onverlet dat in de wetenschappelijke literatuur wel bepaalde essentiële persoonlijkheidskenmerken en capaciteiten van beleidsondernemers worden genoemd maar, vaak gebaseerd op veronderstellingen en observaties, zelden systematisch worden uitgewerkt, geanalyseerd en getoetst.

Tot slot wil ik graag nog de volgende nuancering aanbrengen. Beliedprocessen kunnen chaotisch verlopen en diverse plotwendingen kennen. Daarnaast kunnen beleidsprocessen een gebed zonder eind worden als het bijvoorbeeld heel lang duurt voordat knopen worden doorgehakt. De kans blijft daardoor aanwezig dat wat in dit onderzoek als relatief succes wordt beschouwd later als een falen wordt gezien—en vice versa. Met name in de agenderingsfase, en zeker ook in de overige fasen van het beleidsproces, is nog van alles mogelijk. Het is dan ook nog maar de vraag of men over bijvoorbeeld tien jaar tot eenzelfde analyse en beoordeling van de behandelde beleidsondernemers zal komen als meer bekend is over het verdere verloop van het beleidsproces. In ieder geval heeft dit onderzoek laten zien dat door strategisch te handelen individuen en groepen een verschil kunnen maken en hun stempel kunnen drukken op het beleidsvormingsproces en het IJsselmeergebied, al is dat wellicht maar op kleine schaal of van korte duur.
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SIMON VERDUIJN
AUGUST 2014
thank you.
Pp. 2-3: Naval battle on the Zuiderzee/IJsselmeer in October 1573: Episode from the Eighty Years’ War. Painting: Jan Theunisz. Blanckerhoff (1663); source: Rijksmuseum.nl.


Pp. 110-111: Graphic visualisation of the envisioned robust green corridor, the Oostvaarderswold (Marijnissen, 2011).


Leaving Your Mark: Policy Entrepreneurs Setting the Agenda in the IJsselmeer Area

This book reports on Simon Verduijn’s (1985) PhD research on a variety of individuals who try to leave their mark on the IJsselmeer area, the Netherlands. These individuals are regarded as policy entrepreneurs: people that strategically employ framing and networking strategies to advocate or oppose policy change by setting the public, policy and political agendas. The book discusses relevant literature on policy entrepreneurship, framing and networking strategies, and agenda setting. The empirical research comprises an in-depth study of four cases, involving semi-structured interviews, document study and newspaper article analysis.

The first case selected concerns the Second Delta Committee, which set the agenda for water safety and climate adaptation in the Dutch Delta, and recommended a substantial increase in the water level of the IJsselmeer. The second case concentrates on policy entrepreneurs who pushed for a change in Dutch nature policy, advocating a focus on nature development over nature preservation. The third case considers policy entrepreneurs’ support or opposition to plans to realise outer-dike urbanisation and build an infrastructural connection—either a bridge or tunnel—through the Markermeer-IJmeer. The final case looks at policy entrepreneurs who advocated or opposed plans to create large clusters of wind turbines close to the historical village of Urk.

The study reveals how policy entrepreneurs employ various framing and networking strategies, exploit the use of visualisations, frame issues at stake differently, and frame themselves and others. Insights are also offered into how policy entrepreneurs cope with the enabling and constraining factors of context, with their various strategies, resulting in successes as well as failures.