Interreligious Studies

Suhadi

# "I Come from a Pancasila Family"

## A Discursive Study on Muslim-Christian Identity Transformation in Indonesian Post-Reformasi Era

LIT

"I Come from a Pancasila Family"
A Discursive Study on Muslim-Christian Identity Transformation in Indonesian Post-Reformasi Era

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. mr. S.C.J.J. Kortmann,
volgens besluit van het college van decanen
in het openbaar te verdedigen op dinsdag 28 januari 2014
om 10.30 uur precies

door
Suhadi
geboren op 13 september 1977
te Kediri, Indonesië

Promotor:
Prof. dr. Frans Wijsen

Copromotor:
Dr. Wening Udasmoro, Gadjah Mada Universiteit, Yogyakarta

Manuscriptcommissie:
Prof. dr. E. Venbrux
Prof. dr. K. Van Nieuwkerk
Prof. dr. H. Beck (University of Tilburg)

"I Come from a Pancasila Family"
A Discursive Study on Muslim-Christian Identity Transformation in Indonesian Post-Reformasi Era

Doctoral Thesis

to obtain the degree of doctor
from Radboud University Nijmegen
on the authority of Rector Magnificus prof. dr. S.C.J.J. Kortma
according to the decision of the Council of Deans
to be defended in public on Tuesday, Janary 28, 2014
at precisely 10.30 hours
by

Suhadi
born on September 13, 1977
at Kediri, Indonesia

Supervisor:
Prof. dr. Frans Wijsen

Co-supervisor:
Dr. Wening Udasmoro, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta

Doctoral Thesis Committee:
Prof. dr. E. Venbrux
Prof. dr. Van Nieuwkerk
Prof. dr. H. Beck (University of Tilburg)

Suhadi

# "I Come from a Pancasila Family"

# Interreligious Studies

edited by

Prof. Dr. Frans Wijsen
and
Dr. Jorge E. Castillo Guerra

This series is published by the
Centre for World Christianity
and Interreligious Studies
at Radboud University Nijmegen

Volume 6

LIT

Suhadi

# "I Come from a Pancasila Family"

## A Discursive Study on Muslim-Christian Identity Transformation in Indonesian Post-Reformasi Era

LIT


*Map of Indonesia*


*Map of Java*

| | |
|---|---|
| LJ | *Laskar Jihad* (Jihad Militia Force) |
| LUIS | *Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta* (Surakarta Islamic Paramilitary Troops) |
| MTA | *Majlis Tafsir Al-Qur'an* (Quranic Interpretation Council) |
| MUI | *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (Indonesian Ulama Council) |
| MMI | *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (Indonesian Mujahedeen Council) |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| NU | *Nahdlatul Ulama* (Ulama Awakening) |
| PAI | *Persatuan Arab Indonesia* (Union of Indonesian Arab) |
| PAN | *Partai Nasional Indoenesia* (Indonesian Mandate Party) |
| PBB | *Partai Bulan Bintang* (Crescent Star Party) |
| PBI | *Persekutuan Baptis Indonesia* (Indonesian Baptist Alliance) |
| PD | *Partai Demokrat* (Democratic Party) |
| PDI-P | *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan* (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle) |
| PDS | *Partai Damai Sejahtera* (Peace and Welfare Party) |
| PGI | *Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia* (Communion of Churches in Indonesia) |
| PGPI | *Persekutuan Gereja-gereja Pentakosta Indonesia* (Association of Pentecostal Churches in Indonesia) |
| PII | *Persekutuan Injili Indonesia* (Indonesian Evangelical Fellowship) |
| PKB | *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (The National Awakening Party) |
| PKI | *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Indonesian Communist Party) |
| PKK | *Persatuan Keluarga Berencana* (Family Planning Union) |
| PKMI | *Partai Kaum Masehi Indonesia* (Indonesian Christian Party) |
| PKS | *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Justice Welfare Party) |
| PKU | *Pusat Kesehatan Umum* (Center for Public Health) |
| PMP | *Pendidikan Moral Pancasila* (Pancasila Moral Education) |
| PNI | *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Party) |
| POSYANDU | *Pusat Pelayanan Terpadu* (Center for Integrated Service) |
| PPKI | *Persatuan Politik Katolik* (Political Unity of Indonesian Catholics) |
| PPP | *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (United Development Party) |
| RT | *Rukun Tetangga* (Neighborhood Association) |
| SARA | *Suku, Agama, Ras, dan Antar-golongan* (Ethnicity, Religion, Race, and Inter-group) |
| SMS | Short Message Service |
| SKB | *Surat Keputusan Bersama* (Joint Decree) |
| STAIN | *Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri* (State Academy of Islamic Studies) |
| TAF | The Asia Foundation |
| UIN | *Universitas Islam Negeri* (State Islamic University) |
| UNS | *Universitas Sebelas Maret* (Sebelas Maret University) |

# Foreword

In 2013 it is 15 years ago that the era of Indonesian *Reformasi* started. The transformation from the New Order political regime to the *Reformasi* political regime was marked by riots and violence in which religious (and/or ethnic) identities played a role. In some regions of Indonesia thousands of people, Muslims as well as Christians, died. Reconciliation has been achieved resulting in the absence of bloody conflicts between the two parties. However, as was voiced by the research participants in this study, feelings of suspicion are still around. In some specific cases they explode into severe tensions. Moreover, more conversation and dialogue are needed to reach mutual understanding. For this reason I hope that this study will contribute to enhance of inter-religious understanding between Muslim and Christian.

Many individuals have contributed in one way or another to the study which culminated in this book. I would like to thank all of them. But because of lack of space only few individuals will be mentioned. First of all I would like to thank all the research participants in Solo (Surakarta) who voluntarily involved themselves in the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Some of these discussions were held in participants' houses. Next, I also want to thank my two field research assistants, Muhammad Ishom and Andita Hayuningtyas who worked very hard to organize twenty-four FGDs.

An important person to whom I would like to express my deepest gratitude is my supervisor Prof. Frans Wijsen, Radboud University Nijmegen (RUN), the Netherlands, who has made me a part of his innovative project on the narrative study of religion. He guided my thinking and writing and helped me in non-academic affairs. Moreover, my special respect goes to my co-supervisor Dr. Wening Udasmoro, Gadjah Mada University (GMU), Indonesia, who not only gave fruitful suggestions for the revision of this work but also inspired me to finish this study. Additionally I would like to express my gratitude to Ms. Marcelle Manley who improved the English language in which this book is written.

For conducting this study I am indebted to Prof. Irwan Abdullah, the former director of Graduate School GMU who was willing to sign a Memorandum of Understanding between the Graduate School and the Faculty of Religious Studies at RUN, which is now part of its Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies. I extend this gratitude to Prof. Hartono and Prof. Suryo Purwono (the director and the vice-director of the School) and to Dr. Zainal A. Bagir (the director of Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies at the School) who supported my study and offered to set me free during my period of study.

Furthermore I would like to devote my sincere gratefulness to some scholars at GMU and at other universities in Yogyakarta such as Prof. Bernard Adeny-Risakotta, Prof. Johannes Banawiratma, Prof. Gerrit Singgih, Prof. Mark Woodward, Prof. Achmad Mursyidi, Dr. Arqom Kuswanjono, Dr. St. Sunardi, Dr. Budi Subanar, Dr. Noorhaidi Hasan, Dr. Nur Ichwan, Dr. Fatimah Husein, Dr. Siti Syamsiyatun, Dr. Jeanny Dewayani, Dr. Dicky Sofyan, Dr. Budiawan, Dr. Syamsul Ma'arif, Dr. Iqbal Ahnaf, Dr. Zuly Qodir, Dr. Hasse J., Mr. Yoyo, and Ms. Emil Karmila after all. I also express my gratefulness to Prof. Merle C. Riclefs and Prof. Gavin Jones as other important scholars who influenced my development as an academician. I would also like to thank two religious leaders in Solo, K.H. Dian Nafi' (Muslim) and Pdt. Uri C.S. Labeti (Christian).

I honour my colleagues and friends at Radboud University Nijmegen such as Dr. Carl Sterkens, Dr. Jorge Castillo Guerra, Prof. Chris Hermans, Dr. Marie-Antoinette Willemsen, Dr. Thomas J. Ndaluka, Fr. Ambrose Bwangatto, Mr. Frans Dokman, Mr. Solomon Dejene, Mr. Handi Widananto, Mr. M. Yusuf, Mr. Tri Subagya, Mr. Cahyo Pamungkas, Ms. Agnes Camacho, Ms. Agnes Nauli, Mr. Ary Samsara, Ms. Jennifer Voss, Mr. Didi Rustam, Mr. Ahmet Kaya, Ms. Fatma Agca, Mr. Ichsan Kabullah, Ms. Miranti I. Mandasari, Ms. Menandro S. Abanes, Ms. Dona Sanctis, Ms. Haryani Saptaningtyas and Ms. Kenei Neipfe. We had inspiring discussions and cheerfulness gatherings. I also thank Ms. Miep Beuving, Mr. Alfred Bollen, Ms. Godelief de Jong, and Mr. Frans Wolswijk who helped me in dealing with various administrative affairs. I keep warm memories of my housemates at the Dominican house and the Catharina house in Nijmegen.

Besides being lecturer at the university, I also got involved in a *pesantren* and in social activism. My special appreciation goes to Kyai Hasan of Mlangi, and three *kyais* from Pandanaran: Kyai Mu'tashim Billah, Gus Jazilus Sakhok, and Kyai Dr. Imaduddin Sukamto. I would also like to thank Mas Farid Wajidi, Mas Hairus Salim, Mas Jadul Maula, Mas Ahmad Fikri, Mas Nur Kholiq Ridwan, Mas Ahmad Shidqi, Mas Budhy Munawar Rahman, Mas Ahmad Suaedy, Mas Luthfi Assyaukanie, and Mbak Elga Sarapung.

My greatest gratitude goes to my father (the late Bapak H. Cholil Shidiq) and my mother (the late Ibu Istianah), my beloved brothers and sisters in Kediri East Java, my parents in law, and my brothers and sisters in law in Blora Central Java. And last but not least I also would like to dedicate my sincere love to my nuclear family – my wife Niswatin Faoziah and to my beloved three kids Bunga Rufaida Adya, Azril Najli Adya and Zanadin Khrisna Adya who were motivating me and patiently accompanied me in accomplishing this study.

# Chapter I
# Introduction

During the election campaign for the governorship of Jakarta in 2012 there were scores of posters bearing the slogan: 'Vote for the leader of the same faith and *aqida*!'[1] Similar messages were proclaimed at Muslim religious meetings and on flyers. They referred to the candidates for the positions of governor and vice governor, Joko Widodo (a Javanese Muslim) and Basuki T. Purnama (a Christian of Chinese descent). Previously Joko Widodo was mayor of Surakarta (Solo). F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo, a Roman Catholic, was vice mayor of that city.

Some Muslims who participated in my research project in Surakarta voiced the same message three years before the Jakarta governor's election campaign. They were worried about the vice mayor of Surakarta being a Roman Catholic. In fact, after Joko Widodo was elected governor of Jakarta Rudyatmo replaced him as mayor of Surakarta. Thus a Roman Catholic now leads Surakarta. Political experts are surprised about the return of religious sentiment to politics, as the membership of Islamic parties is very small. Their votes declined in the last three elections at both local and national level.

In a broader context scholars have recently noted a resurgence of religion more than a century after religion or gods were declared dead. 'God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him,' says a madman who runs into the marketplace one bright morning in Nietzsche's *The gay science* (1882). One recognizes the power of this idea in the course of the 20th century. In another version Hölderlin proclaims that the gods have absented themselves from human affairs (Flood 1999: 221). However, the turn of this century has seen a resurgence. Despite predictions of its decline, religion has revived around the globe. It has not died out in our modern world, as secularization theory anticipated; on the contrary, it is blossoming. Some scholars call the 21st century God's century (Toft et al. 2011).

Most political scientists divide post-independence Indonesian history into three periods: the Old Order (1945-1967), the New Order (1967-1998), and the *Reformasi* era (1998 onwards) (Cribb & Kahin 2004). Under the New Order religion was relegated to private homes, and religious institutions and interreligious conflict were subsumed under the ideology of unity in diversity (*bhineka tunggal ika*). Religious identity did not feature in the political arena.

---

1 *Pilih pemimpin seiman seakidah.*

However, in the *Reformasi* era it has returned to the public domain (Samuel & Schulte Nordholt 2004; Sterkens, Machasin & Wijsen 2007). This socio-religious transformation could cause tension and even conflict between Muslims and Christians, but it could also promote cohesion and solidarity.

This book studies the relation between religious discourse and (the lack of) social cohesion. In this respect Indonesia is an interesting case. It has a long tradition of peaceful co-existence, supported by the ideology of *Pancasila,* which is largely conducive to harmony and tolerance, but it also has a long history of ethnic and/or religious violence and conflict.

Scholars record a series of violent collisions in diverse regions of the country after the collapse of Soeharto's regime in 1998 and the subsequent period of Indonesian *Reformasi.* Muslim-Christian clashes in the Moluccas resulted in about 5 000 deaths, while hundreds of thousands fled to neighbouring regions. In other parts of Indonesia bloody inter-ethnic clashes (e.g. Dayak and Madurese) occurred (Hüsken & De Jonge 2002: 1). Similar conflicts happened in Jakarta, Tasikmalya, Situbondo, Celebes, Lombok and many other parts of Indonesia. In the present era there have been riots and outbursts of violence in Solo in 1972, 1980 and 1998 (Baidi 2010: 18).

In this doctoral thesis I study the religious transformation process in Indonesia after the *Reformasi* era, focusing on Surakarta. More particularly I examine social identity construction through Christian-Muslim relations (research object) from the theoretical angle of communicative practice (research perspective), namely the power of language to make and unmake groups, thereby generating convergence or divergence between Christians and Muslims. The hypothesis is that language use is shaped by and shapes broader social and cultural processes. Following Norman Fairclough (1992: 1), I consider critical discourse analysis to be an appropriate method for studying social change.

## 1 Project framework

Indonesia, with its vast expanse (almost 2 million square kilometres), insular geography, large population and linguistic and ethnic diversity, is predisposed to religious diversity and fragmentation (Goh 2005: 57). In contemporary Indonesian history the two political events that fuelled interreligious fragmentation inevitably happened between Muslims and Christians. They were the 1965 mass killing of hundreds of thousands of people suspected of being members or sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the 1998 *Reformasi* movement which toppled Soeharto's 32-year presidential regime.

After the 1965 massacre Muslims and Christians engaged in fierce competition to proselytize the remaining communist members or sympathizers, *abangan* (nominal) people and adherents of *kebatinan/kepercayaan* (local mysti-

cism/beliefs) in the name of Islamic *dakwa* or Christian mission. After 1965 Indonesian citizens had to choose among five (since Wahid, six) state recognized religions. The following table shows the statistical picture.

Table 1
Percentages of Indonesian population based on religion 1971-2010[2]

| Religion | 1971 (%) | 1980 (%) | 1990 (%) | 2000 (%) | 2010 (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 87.51 | 87.94 | 87.21 | 88.22 | 87.18 |
| Protestant | 7.39 | 5.82 | 6.04 | 5.87 | 6.96 |
| Catholic | | 2.98 | 3.58 | 3.05 | 2.91 |
| Hindu | 1.94 | | 1.83 | 1.81 | 1.69 |
| Buddhist | 0.92 | | 1.03 | 0.84 | 0.72 |
| Confucian | 0.82 | 3.26 | - | - | 0.05 |
| Other | 1.42 | | 0.32 | 0.20 | 0.13 |
| Not answered | - | - | - | - | 0.06 |
| Not asked | - | - | - | - | 0.32 |
| Total population | 118.367.850 | 146.082.023 | 179.247.783 | 201.241.999 | 237.641.326 |

The 1998 *Reformasi* movement encourages free discourse, including freedom of religion or belief, and equality among citizens (Cholil 2010: 120-122). On the one hand it promotes reconciliation between Muslims and Christians after a series of interreligious conflicts in some parts of Indonesia. On the other hand it encourages religious identity construction such as the implementation of Syariah in local districts, the idea of a biblical city, the appearance of Muslim or Christian paramilitaries, acts by religious radicals, the emergence of new waves of Islam and Christianity, and so forth.

In this section I explain the project framework: the concept of *agama*, Islam in Indonesia, Christianity in Indonesia, the relation between Muslims and Christians, and the study of religion in Indonesia. This clarifies the general picture of Muslim-Christian encounters in Indonesia and how to study those relations. I do not explore the history of Muslim-Christian relations, since it has been adequately covered by other scholars (Shihab 1996; Steenbrink 1998; Aritonang 2004; Hussein 2007; Bagir & Abdullah 2011). The discussion is not exhaustive; it merely provides background information.

## 1.1 The concept of agama

In Indonesia Islam and Christianity are classified as *agama* (religion). The old and new systems of local beliefs are categorized as *kebatinan/kepercayaan* (local mysticism/beliefs). The concept of *agama* in Indonesia, like that of religion worldwide, has to do with the creation and preservation of boundaries

[2] Census of BPS 1971, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010.

(Smith 2004; Picard 2011). So we need to clarify the concept of *agama* before we can discuss Islam and Christianity in Indonesia.

Jonathan Z. Smith (1982: xi) writes: 'Religion is solely the creation of the scholar's study.' It is created to further scholars' analytical purposes by way of imaginative acts of comparison and generalization. 'Religion has no existence apart from the academy.' So religion is not some 'thing' that exists 'out there', but is a construct in the scholar's mind. The construction of religious concepts entails a process of 'othering' (Masuzawa 2005: 14).

The notion of religion originated from the Roman worldview. It was appropriated by early Christian theologians, who fundamentally altered its sense and orientation by uprooting it from its 'pagan' framework. To the Romans *religio* was all about *tradition,* a set of ancestral practices evolved by a people and transmitted over generations. Because there are diverse peoples, there are diverse traditions. By claiming to be the true *religio* Christianity contrasted its doctrines with popular practices, which were rejected as false beliefs. This classification into true and false religions marks a semantic change characterized by orthodoxy or orthopraxy (Picard 2011: 1, 3). Here we see the sifting of the meaning of the word 'religio', comparable with that of the word '*agama*' to be discussed below.

The first Christian author who systematically wrote about religion was St Augustine, although the proper translation of 'religion' in his case would be worship (Smith 1963: 28-29). After Augustine the word 'religion' was not much used. In the Middle Ages the word 'religious' referred to monastic life. Religious were members of orders who were distinguished from lay people. Thomas Aquinas used the word 'religion' in this sense. Throughout the Middle Ages, the most religious era in history, no one ever wrote a book about religion (Smith 1963: 30-32).

The modern meaning of the word 'religion' or 'religions' came with the Renaissance and the Reformation (Smith 1963: 32). Whereas Luther's central category was 'faith', Zwingli and especially Calvin adopted the word 'religion' in their book titles. For Zwingli men must not put their trust in false religion (read: church, pope), but in God. For these Reformers the closest English equivalent for true religion would be piety. From the 17th century (the Enlightenment) onwards the meaning changed. Religion was no longer personal devotion but a belief system, and these religions became true or false in an intellectual sense (Smith 1963: 39). There was reification, exteriorization of religion, a development from personal piety to systematic externalization. Thus religion became an entity.

Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1963: 48) concludes that the concept of religion is vague. It has not been criticized much and is used in naïve ways. It may be too vague to meet scientific requirements. Smith suggests dropping the word 'religion' and using the word 'faith' instead. Hence one must question whether

the word 'religion' as a Western construct has analytic value – science must move from a participant's view to an observer's view – and whether the word 'spirituality', so popular nowadays, would not suit the academic study of religion better.

Smith (1963: 63) maintains that Hinduism conceptualizes the beliefs of the faithful in India. The very term 'Hindu' was unknown in classical Hinduism. The word 'Hindi' refers to the great river in the northwest of the subcontinent, known in the West by its Greek transliteration, Indus. The same applies to African Traditional Religion. This was not an indigenous concept but an invention of British missionaries and scholars of religion. Of course, this is not to say that there was not something similar to religion in Africa and Asia. However, African and Asian authors claim that the word 'spirituality' is closer to their ancestral traditions.

The colonial encounter with other peoples broadened the category 'religion' from a very specific meaning located in Christian revealed truth to a generic concept with universal applicability (Fitzgerald 2007). In Indonesia colonial anthropologists and administrators created the category of Indonesian religions. Roughly, the translation of the word 'religion' in *bahasa* Indonesia (Indonesian language) is *agama*.

When the indigenous peoples wanted to preserve their ancestral traditions the Dutch missionaries distinguished between custom ('*adat*') and religion ('*agama*'), the Sanskrit word for 'tradition', teaching or post-Vedic text (Smith 1963: 58-59). Michel Picard (2011: 3) argues that *agama* covers a much narrower semantic field than 'religion'. It is the unusual combination in Sanskrit guise of a Christian view of what constitutes a world religion with an Islamic notion of what defines a proper religion: divine revelation recorded by a prophet in a holy book, a system of law for the community of believers, congregational worship, and belief in one divine Lordship. We may wonder how a Sanskrit loanword heavily loaded with Indic reference could have come to signify an Islamic idea of what 'religion' is about. However, in Sanskrit *agama* signifies 'a traditional precept, doctrine, body of precepts, collection of such doctrines'; in short, 'anything handed down as fixed by tradition' (Picard 2011: 3).

The word '*agama*' in Indonesia is used widely in public administration, education and theological studies (Islamic, Christian, Hindu, etc.). One state ministry is *Kementerian Agama* (Ministry of Religion) and major national and local laws use the word *agama*. In the educational sector *pendidikan agama* (religious education) is an obligatory course from elementary to university level. One example of how the word '*agama*' is used in Islamic studies is an important book by Amin Abdullah (1996), former rector of UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta: *Studi Agama: Normativitas atau Historisitas?* (Study of *agama*: normative or historical?). It underscores the need to study Islam his-

torically as opposed to mainstream normative Islamic study in Indonesia. By way of comparison, KiSwahili, the national language in Tanzania, prefers to use the Arabic loanword '*dini*' to refer to religion (Wijsen 2007: 21).

If we look at Javanese and Balinese Hindu texts about *agama,* we start to see a shift of meaning. The term '*agama*' in ancient Javanese and Balinese Hindu texts was 'used to refer to a range of texts dealing with moral, religious and legal sanctions and practices' (Picard 2011: 4). The foundation of Hindu law is the notion of *dharma*, which relates both to the natural order of the universe and to the tasks and privileges of each person according to his status (*varna*) and stage of life (*ashrama*) (Picard 2011: 4). In Bali the word '*agama*' retained a sense comparable to that of *dharma* well into the 20th century.

In India the word '*dharma*' changed its meaning among the educated Bengali elite early in the 19th century (Picard 2011: 4). Wilhelm Halbfass (1988: 340) writes that 'the self-definition of Hinduism as a religion, as a *dharma* which confronts and asserts itself against the *dharma* of the Christians ... is largely due to the fact that the missionaries in Bengal laid claim to the concept and the term *dharma*, using it to proclaim Christianity as the true *dharma* (*satyadharma*)'. In its turn, as mentioned by Jan Gonda (1973: 500), the term '*agama*' signifies the religious knowledge of a Brahman, as well as that of a high Buddhist functionary. In adopting the term *agama* Muslim leaders were influenced by Shivaist and Buddhist leaders who had led the way into the archipelago, so did Christian leaders. Nowadays *agama* in *bahasa* Indonesian means religion.

The construction and production of the concept of *agama* was followed by a further process of classification. Following the Dutch anthropologist Snouck Hurgronje, Dutch colonial administrators used *adat* (custom) for 'real' Indonesian folk beliefs as opposed to the (dangerous) *agama*, Islam. The colonialists used the discourse of *adat* to challenge Islam. The opposition of *adat* and *agama* reflects a polarization between *adat* and Islam (Bowen 2003: 50) to further Dutch colonial interests.

Soon after the Dutch surrender in March 1942 the Japanese occupation authorities attempted to win over Indonesian Muslims by means of anti-Western propaganda based on the defence of Islam. To this end they established *Kantor Urusan Agama* (Office for Religious Affairs) (Picard 2011: 4). Several months after the Indonesian declaration of independence in January 1946 the new Indonesian government imitated that policy by creating the *Kementerian Agama* (Religious Ministry), which still exists today.

A presidential decree (no. 1 of 1965) on religious blasphemy triggered a debate on what constitutes contemporary Indonesian *agama*. It states that the living religions of Indonesia are Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. These six religions (*agama-agama*) receive state protection. Other religions such as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism and

Taoism are not prohibited, but they do not receive the same protection as the other six religions. This law is supportive of the world religions, but not of local religions. The local religions – mysticism and spirituality – are classified in the decree as 'sects/organizations of mysticism or beliefs'.[3] Thus in Indonesia the state also plays a role in defining what is *agama* and non-*agama*.

## 1.2 Islam in Indonesia

Islam is considered a pan-Asian religion alongside Buddhism and Hinduism. It represents the beliefs and practices of millions of Asians from Central to South to Southeast Asia, whereas Buddhism is mainly confined to the Far East and Hinduism to the far south (Lawrence 1999: 395). As shown in table 1 above, the percentage of Muslims in the Indonesian population is 87.18. The Indonesian Muslim population is recognized as the largest in the world.

According to historians Marco Polo encountered a Muslim kingdom of Aceh on the north coast of Sumatra in 1292, more than a half century before the landing of Ibn Battutah, the oceanic voyager, in the same region. Tome Pires, the Portuguese explorer, wrote the earliest ethnographic record of Aceh in the early 16th century, in which the rulers of Aceh were described as orthodox Muslims holding power over a large court (Lawrence 1999: 422). Merle C. Ricklefs (2007: 2) writes that the first evidence of Javanese converts to Islam is found on gravestones at Trowulan in East Java, dated 1369 CE.

One of the features that distinguishes Indonesian Islam from Middle Eastern Islam is its complex relationship with local traditions. The history of Islam in Java reflects a 'mystic synthesis' with living local traditions. The Sufi movement was dominant in the early Islamization of Indonesia. By the late 18th, early 19th century religious consensus had been reached on three general characteristics of Indonesian Islam: (a) strong sense of Islamic identity; (b) observance of the five pillars of the faith; and (c) acceptance of the reality of multiple local spiritual forces (Ricklefs 2008: 115). Nevertheless the synthesis has not been stable throughout the history of Islam in Java and different places in Indonesia. Sometimes there was tension between the formal Islamic authorities and representatives of indigenous traditions.

The concept of mystic synthesis signifies acceptance of worldwide Islamic rituals by Javanese Muslims. No longer were the dead cremated, as in the Hindu Javanese era. Now they were buried as Muslims. The archaeological evidence of the Tralaya and Trawulan graves tells us that this had been happening since at least the 14th century. Youths were circumcised as a sign of Islamic identity. Javanese went on *hajj* to Mecca and kept in touch with other Muslims there. Prayer five times per day, the fast and other Islamic rites were practised. Ricklefs (2008: 223-224) does not interpret these transformations as

---

[3] In *bahasa* Indonesia it is '*aliran atau organisasi kebatinan/kepercayaan*'.

rejection of earlier cultural forms or older ideas about the supernatural. Pre-Islamic early Javanese literature was now perceived as Islamic.

If daily religious life and culture reflect a complex relationship between local traditions and Islam, this cannot be said of the law. Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936), a Dutch scholar and advisor of the colonial government, invented an approach to the administration of 'native Muslims' in the Dutch Indies. He suggested a categorical separation of *syariah* from *adat* (custom) in the legal realm. The Dutch colonial government, under the influence of Van Volenhoven and his prominent student B. ter Haar, officially established *adat* law as formal legal policy in the East Indian colonies in 1927 (Feener 2007: 54, 71).

Clifford Geertz (1960), an anthropologist, notes the cultural polarization of Islam and local traditions. He distinguishes between three categories, a very popular distinction in academic circles: *santri, abangan,* and *priyayi. Santri* are Muslims who adhere strictly to the ritual and legal constraints of Islam. They are likely to pray five times a day, fast during the month of Ramadan, give alms (*zakat*) and, if possible, go to Mecca on pilgrimage. For these Muslims Islam is a focal if not definitive part of their lives. *Abangan* are nominal or less orthodox Muslims, whereas *priyayi* are people of a high social class that can follow either *abangan* or *santri* religio-cultural tradition.

More recent analysis by Greg Fealy (2006: 40) divides the *santri* into two subcategories: traditionalist and modernist. The division is primarily based on doctrinal differences, but it overlaps social, economic and political issues. Traditionalists seek to preserve the legacy of medieval Islamic scholarship and tend to be more open to local customs. In practice this requires, first, strict adherence to one of the four classical Sunni law schools and, second, enthusiasm to combine local mystical and spiritual practices with more orthodox aspects of Islam. The largest traditionalist institution in Indonesia is Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, Awakening of Ulama). Other smaller traditionalist organizations include Mathlaul Anwar, Jamiyatul Washliyah and Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti).

By contrast, modernists (reformists) tend to consider the traditionalists' theology and ritual impure and a deviation from authentic Islamic precepts. Modernism as a movement began in the Middle East in the late 19th century and only spread to Indonesia in the early decades of the 20th century. It claimed that the way to revitalize Islam and make it relevant to the contemporary world was to cleanse the faith of impurities and return to the pristine teaching found in the Qur'an and the example of the prophet Muhammad. The primary modernist organization in Indonesia is Muhammadiyah. Other modernist institutions include Jami'yyat al-Islah wal-Irsyad and Persatuan Islam (Fealy 2006: 40). Inheriting the spirit of its early movements in the Middle East (e.g. competition with the Western Christian world), Islamic modernist organiza-

tions in Indonesia tend to compete with Christian organizations in *dakwa,* education and health services.

As the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, NU leaders often claim to have 35 to 40 million members, while the leaders of Muhammadiyah, the second largest one, claim a membership of 25 to 30 million (Fealy 2006: 40). A new survey by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) and the Asia Foundation (TAF) in 2010 gives more convincing information. Respondents were asked whether they were members or sympathizers of traditionalist/ modernist/ other Islamic organizations/ non-members/ sympathizers of any Islamic organization. The survey defines traditionalist organizations as 'NU, Nahdlatul Watan, Al Wasliyah, Perti, etc.' and modernist organizations as 'Muhammadiyah, Persis, etc.'. The result is quite interesting: 55.1% identified themselves as 'traditionalists' and 10.8% as 'modernists'.[4] This might indicate that members or sympathizers of NU (and other traditionalist organizations) in fact far outnumber those of Muhammadiyah (and other modernist organizations).

The tension between modernist and traditionalist Muslims sometimes enters the political field. In the early years of independence NU and some modernist Muslim groups could form and work together in one political party, Masyumi, but soon afterwards NU withdrew from Masyumi and established a new political party. The main cause appeared to have been frustration with modernist domination in Masyumi (Isaacson & Rubenstein 2009: 7).

In the first Indonesian election in 1955 the nationalist party (PNI) got 22.3% of the votes, Masyumi 20.9%, NU 18.4% and the communist party (PKI) 16.4%. So the two Islamic political parties obtained more than 39.3% of national votes. After *Reformasi* in 1998 the votes of Muslim political parties in the 1999 and 2004 elections were much the same as in 1955. The Muslim political parties got 37.7% in 1999 and 38.7% in 2004 (Barton 2010: 134-135). After *Reformasi* Muslim political parties split into two groups: those with an Islamist vision and those with a nationalist (non-Islamist) vision. Non-Islamist political parties such as PKB and PAN have a clear nationalist vision and are open to non-Muslims participation in their administration. Islamist political parties – the three largest being PPP, PK (PKS) and PBB – on the other hand, adopt an exclusive Islamic position to preserve Muslim interests. But the PKS in its turn has followed a more open, moderate line since 2004. Leaders of Islamist political parties promoted the Jakarta Charter (Syariah) in the constitutional amendment in the early 2000s. Some Muslim organizations such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) expressed strong support for Syariah and the Jakarta Charter. When the inclusion of

---

[4] Number of respondents is 1850 in 33 provinces (whole provinces in Indonesia). The survey was conducted in August 2010. It claims the margin of error is ± 3%.

Syariah articles in the national constitution failed, the proponents promoted it at local (provincial, district) level and in some regions they succeeded.

There is no comprehensive database cataloguing all the regional regulations. Robin Bush (2008) records around 78 regional regulations (*perda*) in 52 districts/municipalities (*kabupaten/ walikota*) out of a total of 470 districts/ municipalities in Indonesia that are considered to be 'Syariah influenced'. *Tempo* magazine (6 September 2011) reports more than 150 such regulations spread over diverse regions. They can be classified into several distinct categories: (1) those relating to public order and social problems (prostitution, gambling, alcohol consumption, etc.); (2) religious skills (e.g. reading and reciting the Qur'an) and obligations (e.g. giving *zakat* [alms]); and (3) religious symbolism (primarily Muslim dress, mostly for women) (Salim 2007: 126; Bush 2008: 176).

The orientation to Syariah ideas also features in the economic field, especially the banking system. In the early 1990s Muamalat Bank Indonesia was the country's only Islamic commercial bank. It began trading in May 1992. Then, in 1998, the Indonesian government passed a banking act which facilitates the development of a dual Islamic and conventional banking system by allowing state, private and regional banks, as well as one foreign bank, to offer Islamic banking services. The law defines an Islamic bank as a commercial bank that complies with Islamic law (Syariah), one prohibition being payment of interest (*riba*). Since then Islamic banks have mushroomed. Two other Islamic commercial banks were established in 2008: Syariah Mandiri Bank and Syariah Mega Indonesian Bank. Unlike the Islamic banking units, which are institutional units within an existing conventional bank, the Islamic commercial banks are separate legal entities.

In 2008 there were 26 Islamic banking units and 144 Syariah People Savings and Loan Banks (BPRS, *Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Syariah*). Islamic banking is escalating in Indonesia, but from a low base. The Islamic banks' share of total banking assets was only 1.7% in 2007. But the central Indonesia Bank projects that Islamic banking assets will rise to 10-15% of total banking assets by 2015 (Juoro 2008: 229-231). The Islamic banks are more lenient than conventional banks in providing finance.

The *Reformasi* era is also marked by the re-emergence of *jihad* discourse in the public sphere. *Laskar Jihad* (the *jihad* paramilitary) and *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (Indonesian Mujahidin Council), both using the *jihad* label in their names, were launched in Yogyakarta in 2000. These two groups have great influence in Solo (Noorhaidi 2005; Azka 2009). Why do I call it a re-emergence? Because in fact long before the *Reformasi* era some religious groups also used *jihad* rhetoric in a different sense against the Dutch colonial authorities, as in the Banten peasants' revolt in 1888 (Kartodirdjo 1966) and the *jihad* resolution *(resolusi jihad)* of Nahdlatul Ulama in Surabaya in 1945 (Bush 2009: 42).

After the *Reformasi* era proponents of *jihad* used the term against 'Zionist and Christian' international powers and Indonesian Christians. In the Ambon Muslim and Christian conflict the *jihadist* leaders asked for support (e.g. *fatwa*) from religious authorities in the Middle East. They produced 'a new collective identity as heroes for their religion and fellow faithful and as patriots for their beloved state'. A further complexity is that huge youth *jihadist* movements seem to use the slogan not only to demonstrate their dedication to Islam, but also to express their anger and frustration in the face of rapid modernization and globalization (Noorhaidi 2005: v-vi). This attests the polyphonic character of acts of *jihad*.

In the past decade terrorism and radicalism relating to Islam or Muslims have been a lively issue in Indonesia. Around 240 people died in four major terrorist acts from 2002 to 2005: the bombing of two discos popular among foreigners on the crowded tourist island of Bali in October 2002, the bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003, the bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, and three suicide bombers in a Balinese restaurant in October 2005. In all, seven suicide bombers were involved in those acts, whereas before 2000 it would have seemed implausible (Abuza 2007: 37). Acts of violence, mostly by Muslim paramilitary groups, have been occurring on a massive scale. The targets of violence are places of worship, mostly Christian churches, and Islamic splinter groups such as Ahmadiyah and other more local Islamic groups (Cholil et al. 2009). Syiah followers were attacked by Sunni mainstream groups in Sampang Madura in 2012.

A 2001 Gallup poll found that in non-Arab countries *jihad* is mostly perceived as fighting opponents of Islam or sacrificing one's life for the sake of Islam/ a just cause. The majority of Indonesians understand it in this way. However, in four Arab states (Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco) *jihad* is mostly interpreted as duty to/ worship of God, with no warlike connotation. In Indonesia, although a majority of Muslims associate *jihad* with violence, an LSI survey (2006) showed that 80% refused to say that the Bali bombing was a form of *jihad*; only 10% did so.

The Gallup poll also showed that the majority in most Muslim countries wants Syariah as a source of legislation. Interestingly, Indonesia and Iran have the lowest percentages (Egypt 66%; Jordan 55%; Indonesia 14%; and Iran 13%). The Wahid Institute (WI) conducted a national survey in Indonesia, which confirmed the Gallup poll finding that the majority (63.3%) refuses to implement Syariah in local governments. Almost the same percentage also wants the government to regulate religious life and things such as the building of houses of worship, marriage and religious education. This last finding indicates that Indonesian Muslims refuse to include Syariah in the existing constitution, but agree to limited state interference in Muslim affairs.

In the *Reformasi* era Islamic 'liberalism' has also grown (Assyaukanie 2002). The most prominent liberal Islamic group is Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL/ Liberal Islamic Network) that was formally established in Jakarta in 2001. Munawar-Rachman (2010) identifies many (but not only) NU and Muhammadiyah young thinkers and activists as the spearheads of Islamic liberal thinking and movements. Some of them – especially the more radical and conservative ones – refuse to be labelled 'liberal', partly because it would entail rejection by Muslim communities. Yayasan Paramadina, an Islamic neo-modernist foundation based in Jakarta, published a controversial book *Fiqh Lintas Agama* (Interreligious Islamic law) (Sirry 2004). It is considered very permissive compared to mainstream *fiqh*. For instance, it permits interreligious marriage that was forbidden by the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI). Ulil Abshar Abdalla, an Islamic liberal activist, was threatened with death by radical Muslims because of his popular article in *Kompas* (18 November 2002). Quite often members of radical and liberal groups are involved in heated, abusive public debates.

### 1.3. Christianity in Indonesia

Christianity is a substantial minority religion which has grown progressively in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. Christianity in Southeast Asia is in many ways a relatively recent phenomenon, the most momentous events taking place from the late 19th century onwards. It has undoubtedly started to have a cultural impact in the Southeast Asian context of late. Its influence is by no means insignificant and it has played quite a major role in shaping some elements of Asian modernity, especially in the areas of education, medicine and social work, and in laying the foundation for large global networks in an era of Asian diaspora and globalization (Goh 2005: 1). As may be seen in table 1, the percentage of Christians in the Indonesian population is 9.87.

The first signs of Christian presence in Southeast Asia date back to the 7th century. Archaeological finds show that there were a number of Christian settlements in the Malay peninsula and parts of Sumatra and Java. However, historians know little about these settlements and they certainly had no lasting influence on Southeast Asian cultural development at that time. Christian mission entered Southeast Asia to make a sustained impact only in the early 16th century. To some extent it was because Christianity went hand in hand with commercial and military interests. The earliest area of Catholic impact in Southeast Asia was Malacca, a harbour which the Portuguese occupied in 1511 (Goh 2005: 1-2).

Catholic influence started after the early Franciscan missionaries came to Sumatra in the 14th century and Portuguese Christian missionaries began to work in Malacca. There was a shift from Portuguese to Dutch mission in 1619, including missionary activities in Java, but the primary motive of the Dutch

was commercial and political (Moffett 2005: 60-61, 214). In their turn they were embroiled in conflicts with local Muslim rulers. The confrontations were triggered by a complex mix of Dutch colonialism, trade and mission.

The Portuguese brought Catholicism to parts of Indonesia in the 16th century, especially in the Moluccas. However, when the Dutch established their dominance over the islands in the 17th century they were intent on suppressing their old enemy, Catholicism. The biggest number of Christians in the 16th century lived in the Ambonese peninsula of Leitimor and on the small Lease islands of Haruku, Saparua and Nusa Laut. Hence the history of the various Moluccan Christian communities begins there, and then moved to the central and northern Moluccas. When Francis Xavier landed at Hative on the west coast of the bay of Ambon in 1546 he was welcomed by Ambonese Christians from a few villages. Some 8 000 Christians lived around Hative and in six other villages. They had requested baptism a few years earlier (1538) when Portuguese stayed among them (Heuken 2008a: 35-36). In 1562 three Dominican missionaries from Malacca launched the first period of their missionary work in Nusa Tenggara, which has continued uninterrupted to the present day (Heuken 2008b: 75).

The first translation of the complete Bible into Malay was the work of Melchior Leijdecker (1645-1701). That translation was used in Protestant circles for almost two centuries, especially in eastern Indonesia. In 1814 the *Nederlandse Bijbelgenootschap* was established in Amsterdam, which soon began to translate and distribute the Bible in various Indonesian languages. Catholics translated the annual series of scripture texts then used in the Sunday liturgy, reproduced in the form of typed or mimeographed documents for use by local clergy and village catechists. During the 19th and early 20th century they were invariably in the vernacular (Prior & Hoekema 2008: 750). These translations of the Bible and scriptural texts into the vernacular were a significant early step in Christian indigenization in Indonesia.

The history of Christian mission started in the eastern parts of Indonesia. More systematic Christian mission in Java came later after William Carey, a missionary from Britain, established the British Missionary Society in 1792 and within a year opened an office in Calcutta, India. From there he organized his mission and sent workers to various corners of Asia, including Java. After consulting Lt Thomas S. Raffles, British interregnum governor of Java (1811-1816), Carey sent William Robinson as the first Baptist missionary to the island of Java. He arrived in Batavia in 1813. The Baptist mission centre in India sent two more missionaries to assist Robinson in 1814 (Sumartana 1991: 9-10).

Two early indigenous (Javanese) missionaries merit mention. The first was Sadrach Surapranata in central Java. He was born circa 1835-1840 with the name of Abbas and he not only received the basic training in reading the Qur'an common among Muslim children, but also studied at several *pesantren*s

(Islamic boarding schools). Possibly his first encounter with Christianity was the Gospel of John in a Javanese version that he obtained from an evangelist who preached a sermon in the marketplace; he came into contact with the Dutch missionary Jelle Selesma in East Java and the Javanese Christian evangelist and mystic Ibrahim Tunggul Wulung near Japara. Sadrach became leader of a more or less independent church that some Protestant missionaries considered rebellious and heretical (Aritonang & Steenbrink 2008: 641). This caused tension and polemics between Sadrach and European missionaries.

Sadrach's congregation comprised mainly villagers; most of its members came from an *abangan* (nominal Muslim) background, hence *adat* remained an important part of societal life. In his endeavour to harmonize Christianity and *adat* Sadrach took over many elements of rural Islamic tradition, for example the *paguron* education system with its *guru-murid* (teacher-student) relationship. He preserved such Muslim customs as separate seating for men and women in church and veils for Christian women, and continued to use the terms '*mesjid*' (mosque) for church and 'imam' for its leader. Sadrach also proclaimed Jesus Christ as *Ratu Adil* (Queen of Justice/messiah), a Javanese myth, which aroused awareness and hope of emancipation among the Javanese population (Partonadi 1988: 207, 209). Nowadays Sadrach only has a limited following in central Java, but the idea of his local church is continually revived by some Christian groups.

The second noteworthy pioneer of indigenous mission in Java was Albertus Soegijapranata S.J., the first indigenous bishop in Java. Whereas Sadrach's concern was Christian enculturation in Javanese culture, Soegijapranata focused on fostering nationalism among Indonesian Catholics. Among his popular statements was: 'If we are really good Christians, we should be real patriots. Therefore we feel that we are 100 percent patriotic, since we are also 100 percent Catholic... We should love the state as well, with all of our hearts' (Aritonang & Steenbrink 2008: 705). In 1955, at the proposal of Soegijapranata, the Indonesian Bishops' Conference promulgated a Catholic manifesto that repudiated communism and supported the national Indonesian ideology of Pancasila (Aritonang & Steenbrink 2008: 706). To some extent Christian leaders' advocacy of the national independence movement helped to counteract the identification of Christianity with the religion of the colonizers.

Indonesian Christians have been interested in politics since the early 19th century. In 1923 Javanese Catholics established their own political association, *Pakempalan Politik Djawi* (Association of Javanese Politics), which in 1938 transformed from a socio-cultural movement into a political one entitled *Persatuan Politik Katolik Indonesia* (PPKI, Political Union of Indonesian Catholics). Indonesian Protestants founded the *Partai Kaum Masehi Indonesia* (PKMI, Indonesian Christian Party) in 1930. The party agitated for the autonomy of Indonesia and the need for an autonomous government based on Chris-

tian principles (Latif 2008: 194). So some Christian political leaders had a vision comparable to that of Muslim political leaders: an Indonesia based on their respective religions.

Soon after the declaration of Indonesian independence the Protestants founded *Partai Kristen Indonesia* (Indonesian Christian Party, Parkindo) in November 1945 and the Catholics established *Partai Katholik* (Catholic Party) a month later. In the 1955 general election Parkindo won eight seats in parliament (2.6%) and the Catholic Party six (2.0%) (Intan 2006: 74). The votes for these two Christian political parties decreased in the 1971 general election, leaving them with no significant voice at the national level, until the New Order regime forced them and other political parties to fuse in the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (Indonesian Democratic Party) in 1973.

After the 1998 *Reformasi* Protestant and Catholic politicians established Protestant and Catholic parties, but only the Protestant party, *Partai Damai Sejahtera* (PDS, Prosperous Peace Party), had significant support. In the 2004 general election it obtained 2.14% of the total votes at national level, giving the PDS 13 seats in parliament, but because of new threshold regulations it did not win parliamentary seats at national level in the 2009 general election. Currently the PDS only has seats at local level, especially in areas with a significant Christian population. The establishment of Christian political parties in the *Reformasi* era evoked criticism from Christian themselves. For example, Zakaria Ngelow, a theologian from Celebes, claimed that the founding of Christian political parties revealed theocratic tendencies among Christians (Sirait 2008: 211). However, Christian leaders usually accused Muslim leaders of similar ambitions.

There are three main institutional church orientations in Indonesia: Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox. The number of church institutions or organizations has grown and expanded rapidly since Indonesian independence, especially those of the Protestant churches. In 1993 the Ministry of Religion recorded 275 Protestant church organizations and around 400 Protestant para-churches (Depag 1993).

Protestant churches are classified into six main church organizations or denominations: *Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia* (PGI) for mainstream Protestant denominations such as Calvinist and Lutheran; *Persekutuan Baptis Indonesia* (PBI) for Baptist churches; *Persekutuan Injili Indonesia* (PII) for Evangelical churches; *Gereja Masehi Advent Hari Ketujuh* for Adventist churches; *Bala Keselamatan* for Salvation Army churches; and *Persekutuan Gereja-gereja Pentakosta Indonesia* (PGPI) for Pentecostal churches. The Catholic and Orthodox churches have only one central church organization each: *Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia* (KWI) for Catholics and *Gereja Orthodox Indonesia* (GOI) for Orthodox churches. The PGI, the largest mainstream

Protestant institution, is an umbrella organization comprising 88 synods spread throughout Indonesia.

Pentecostal/charismatic churches have burgeoned since the *Reformasi* era in 1998. At the beginning of the 20th century some Pentecostal missionary agencies from the USA, Australia, South Korea and elsewhere started work in various parts of Indonesia. Nowadays these churches have grown from splinter groups into 'main strength groups' (Prior 2007: 1). Lewis quotes David Barrett, who puts the membership of Pentecostal churches in Indonesia at 1.9 million in 1980. He points out that this is a conservative estimate: the actual number is higher (Lewis 2007: 79).

The Pentecostal churches emphasize direct personal experience of God through baptism in the Holy Spirit, speaking in tongues and divine healing. They often conduct healing services in a public square, which are attended by thousands of people. For instance, a Pentecostal site claims that the healing services in Senayan Jakarta in June 2010 were attended by more than 100 000 people daily (www.mediapemulihan.com). Some new members of Pentecostal churches have a Muslim or nominal Muslim background, but most were probably non-Pentecostal Christians who joined the Pentecostals. This situation sometimes causes friction and conflict between charismatic/Pentecostal and mainstream churches.

Whereas Muslims in many provinces and districts asked for the implementation of Syariah through local government laws after *Reformasi*, only one region asked for the implementation of biblical law and regulations based on Christian communal interest (*Perda*), namely Manokwari province in West Papua. The initiative started in February 2007, when tens of thousands of people met to commemorate the arrival of German evangelists Carl Ottow and Johann Geissler in Mansinam island in 1855. It is a landmark in the Christianization of Papua, popularly known as the Land of the Bird of Paradise. A big banner was displayed publicly, which read: 'Welcome to Bible City'.

The provincial government asked church leaders and academics to confer on proposed bylaws, which resulted in the formulation of 40 articles. Some articles regulated general matters like bans on prostitution and drugs. But there were also prohibitions of headscarves, calls to Islamic prayers, non-church activities on Sunday, and air travel on Christian holy days. Crosses in government offices became compulsory (*Tempo Magazine*, 6 September 2011). This regulation has not yet become law because of controversy among the West Papuans themselves.

It is difficult to prove and there has been no research, but there is a feeling that Christians' economic power is quite disproportionate to their number. A popular book such as *Indonesia Handbook* mentions that 'Christian, in Muslim eyes, is often equated with rich' (Eliot 2001: 961). Andreas A. Yewangoe (2001: 104), a Protestant theologian and leader of PGI, argues that the feeling

is a kind of 'dramatization' and 'generalization'. According to his observations there are many poor Christians in remote parts of Indonesia from Nias to Papua. Based on Yewangoe's brief explanation, the feeling that Christians are rich might be a Javanese bias. Another explanation might be that it was a colonial bias against wealthy Dutch Christians as opposed to poor indigenous Muslims, as well as the current influence of international issues in Islam and Western Christianity.

However, Christians are undeniably the trend setters in the mass media. Both Indonesia's leading newspapers, *Kompas* and *Suara Pembaruan*, are owned and controlled by Christians. *Kompas* was launched in 1965 by some Catholic intellectuals and businessmen and it has become one of the most influential Indonesian newspapers. It employs not only Christians but also Muslims. Prominent Muslim public figures publish their opinions in *Kompas,* such as Said Aqil Siradj (leader of NU), Din Syamsuddin (leader of Muhammadiyah), Azyumardi Azra (scholar of UIN Jakarta), and many others. To some extent *Kompas* plays a role in propagating moderate Muslims voices.

The churches or Christian groups also established good schools and universities throughout Indonesia. The Jesuit congregation started schools for indigenous pupils in the colonial period and has developed them under a central *Kanisius* foundation since 1954. Then, in keeping with the Indonesian development context, it was subdivided into smaller educational foundations spread across huge regions bearing names like *Marsudirini, Pangudi Luhur, Tarakanita, St. Yoseph, De Britto* and many others.

In Papua Catholics manage *Yayasan Pendidikan dan Persekolah Katolik* (YPPK), which has many schools. Chinese Christians established *Badan Pendidikan Kristen* (BPK) in West Java and nowadays it has spread to Bandung, Jakarta and Lampung Sumatera. Yayasan Pendidikan Kristen (YPK) also runs schools in Minahasa. Satya Wacana in Salatiga, Atmajaya in Yogyakarta and Jakarta, Pelita Harapan in Jakarta; Sanata Dharma and Duta Wacana in Yogyakarta are good Christian universities.

## 1.4 Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia

When Dutch missionaries came to Indonesia and introduced Christianity in the 17th century, Muslim communities had long been established in this archipelago. The history of Christians' arrival in Indonesia influences their image and their relations with Muslims. Christianity came from the West as part of the process of colonization, so it symbolized 'colonial religion'. However, Islam was a symbol of the *pribumi* (indigenous people) who were colonized by Western Christianity. The image of Christianity was influenced by the colonialist image (Husein 2005: 264). Decades after the end of Dutch colonial rule that image persists.

Activists of the Indonesian national movement have displayed different political orientations since some years before Indonesian independence. They can be divided into nationalists, socialists, communists and Islamists. The conflicts were most pronounced in debates on the constitutional basis of the state and its legal model (Feener 2007: 54). The Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*) was promulgated on 22 June 1945 and became the preamble to the constitution. It was drafted by a Committee of Nine comprising five representatives from the nationalist faction eager to preserve a state free from religious influence and four from the Islamic faction, who advocated an Islamic state. The leaders of the Islamic faction agreed to withdraw their Islamic state proposal, on condition that the Jakarta Charter included Pancasila and was preceded by seven words in its first *sila* (principle): '*dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*' (the obligation to implement Syariah for adherents of Islam) (Indrayana 2008: 13-14).

The day following independence, 18 August 1945, resistance to the Charter resumed. Christian areas in eastern Indonesia threatened to leave the new republic if the seven words were not scrapped. There were also objections from Balinese Hindu, who insisted on a neutral wording of the first principle of Pancasila (Platzdasch 2009: 109). Finally Mohammad Hatta, a Muslim political leader and co-proclamator of Indonesian independence, proposed deleting the seven words from the draft constitution. Hatta's proposal was accepted, and the constitution was ratified with some amendments (Indrayana 2008: 14). The seven words in the Jakarta Charter were replaced by the phrase '*Yang Maha Esa*', so the first principle became '*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*' (Belief in One Divine Lordship).

Soon after that consensus the first pillar of Pancasila, '*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*', became a polemical issue between Muslim and Christian theologians. The phrase is difficult to translate into theological terms. How did Muslims and Christians understand it? Without the seven words, Muslims tried to give the Pancasila an Islamic meaning by interpreting '*Yang Maha Esa*' as the Islamic concept of monotheism. Hamka, a Muslim theologian, argued that the phrase necessarily renders the Islamic concept of monotheism (*tawhid*). So according to him the first principle of Pancasila derives from the Islamic idea of *tawhid,* which recognizes four other principles (pillars 2 to 5 of Pancasila): humanism, national unity, democracy and social justice. They are also intrinsic in Islamic theology (Mujiburrahman 2006: 118). This interpretation corroborates the view that Indonesian state ideology is based on Islamic theological principles.

For Christians, on the other hand, the word *'Ketuhanan'* (Lordship) permits the interpretation of the first pillar of Pancasila in terms of the religious pluralism of the country. Helmut Rosin, a Protestant missionary of Swiss origin working in Indonesia, argues that unlike the word '*Tuhan*' (God), '*Ketuhanan*'

is a vague term referring not to God as such, but to something divine (*yang ilahi*) and divine power (*kuasa ilahi*). Rosin concludes that 'it cannot be denied that the formulation of *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* is a compromise between Islamic, Javanese, and modern assumptions of religion that in turn opens opportunity opportunities for various interpretations' (Mujiburrahman 2006: 119). In addition Driyarkara, an Indonesian Jesuit scholar, maintains that the Pancasila state is a secular state in the sense that it is not a manifestation or embodiment of religion, but it is not secular in that the state is not opposed or indifferent to religion. He writes: 'We acknowledge one risk, that is, the Pancasila state will sometimes pay less attention to religion and sometimes wants to intervene more than it deserves' (Mujiburrahman 2006: 121).

To reduce tension among Indonesian intellectuals on the national ideology Soekarno introduced the hybrid ideology of nationalism, *agama* and communism (Nasakom). He assumed that such a compromise could unite nationalist, religious (Islamic) and communist groups for the sake of the revolution and the nation-building agenda. That is why the Ministry of Religion, according to Nieuwenhuijze's analysis, positioned itself as a de-confessionalizing mechanism which removed the sharp edges of exclusiveness (Ichwan 2006: 15, 75).

Some Muslims such as the *Darul Islam* or *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (DI/TII, Islamic State or Indonesian Islamic Army) movement tried to make Islam the state ideology. The Indonesian government clearly perceived political Islam as a serious threat to the future of a diverse Indonesian society, and made numerous efforts to limit, if not restrain, its activities (Husein 2005: 227). Under the Old Order and for roughly the first two decades of the New Order the state firmly repressed Islamic political emergence. Instead Pancasila became the most effective ideological tool for government to manage national diversity in regard to *suku* (ethnicity), *antar golongan* (intergroup), *ras* (race) and *agama* (religion), popularly abbreviated to SARA. In the late 1970s Pancasila featured more and more prominently in rhetoric and in the early 1980s the New Order regime imposed it as *azas tunggal* (the sole basis) of all socio-political – including religious – organizations.

Islamic and Christian organizations had to change their ideology or organizational base in order to give Pancasila a prominent place. Big Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah and Christian organizations like the Indonesian Council of Churches (PGI) could not escape from this political policy. As a result Islamic and Christian mainstream organizations received complaints that they were being replaced by 'the civil religion of Pancasila' (Steenbrink 1998: 328). Ultimately only a few religious organizations dared to resist that policy. They were mainly small Islamic groups which eventually went underground.

The first Muslim-Christian conflict after the 1965 communist massacre happened in Makassar on 1 October 1967. Muslims attacked several churches,

damaging the furniture, following the conversion of many people to Christianity and increased Christian public activities in Makassar. This incident prompted the Minister of Religion and the Minister of Domestic Affairs to issue a joint decree in 1969 on the building of houses of worship.

An estimated one third of the inhabitants of East Timor were Catholics and two thirds were adherents of tribal religions. But by 1990 virtually all original East Timorese had become fervent Catholics, with Catholicism symbolizing opposition to Jakarta power. Muslims and mosques were targets of violence in East Timor in the mid-1990s. Motivated by sentiments against Jakarta authorities (government and army officials) and sentiments against Javanese, Makassarese and Buginese settlers who were (non-indigenous) Muslims, Catholic guerrillas attacked and destroyed some seventeen mosques and buildings belonging to Muslims. In other places where Muslims predominated churches were attacked, inflicting minor or major damage. Karel A. Steenbrink (1998: 338) compiled the following data on church attacks from 1945 to 1997.

Table 2
Number of churches attacked from 1945-1997

| Period | Attacks | Average per year |
|---|---|---|
| 1945-1955 | 0 | 0 |
| 1955-1965 | 2 | 0.2 |
| 1965-1974 | 46 | 4.6 |
| 1975-1984 | 89 | 8.9 |
| 1985-1994 | 132 | 13.2 |
| 1995-1997 | 105 | 52.5 |

The increase in the absolute number of churches attacked in 1975-1997 is significant. However, it should be noted that there was a tremendous increase in the number of churches during those years. In 2006 the Research and Development Body (Balitbang) of the Ministry of Religion announced that the number of churches had increased by 283% from 1977 to 2004 (*Republika*, 18 February 2006). Thus the percentage in terms of relative number of church attacks in fact declined during those years.

However, clashes between Muslims and Christians undeniably got worse from the mid-1990s into the early 21st century. They were not confined to houses of worship. There were also attacks on private property and thousands of people were killed. Some ten churches were destroyed in Surabaya in June 1996. In Situbondo 23 churches and a number of Protestant and Catholic schools were badly damaged or totally destroyed in October 1996. Less than three months later, in December 1996, riots broke out in Tasikmalaya, West Java where Christian buildings and Chinese shops were attacked. Other riots occurred in Jakarta, Solo, Ambon, Halmahera, Poso and Sampit.

Ambon conflicts include an enormous one between Muslims and Christians. It was triggered by an ordinary street dispute in the city of Ambon on 19 January 1999, but soon spread to the whole city and the province. Thousands of people on both sides died between 1999 and 2000 and there were between 123 000 and 370 000 refugees and displaced persons. The religious identity of those involved in that conflict featured prominently, since individuals tend to associate himself with a specific religious group. Group labels like '*pasukan merah*' (red force – Christians) and '*pasukan putih*' (white force – Muslims) were increasingly used, in combination with other identity markers (Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2009: 61).

The Ambon conflict died down and ended up among assorted issues after Muslim and Christian leaders held dialogues and signed the Malino agreement on December 19-20, 2001. Before the agreement secret meetings of senior ministers with the most militant commanders, political elites and both Muslim and Christian business people were held in Makassar, which paved the way for the Malino agreement. Finally key actors in the conflict, including the field commanders of Muslim and Christian militias, signed the agreement. Interestingly, a Muslim military group that had exported fighters to the battlefield also supported the Malino agreement 'arguing that peace would be a better environment for mission work than war' (Braithwaite 2010: 252; Van Klinken 2007: 86). Conflict between Muslims and Christians in Ambon was the nadir of Muslim-Christian relations, but the Malino agreement proves that peace building was more enduring than conflict.

From such conflicts friction between Muslims and Christians continued to explode in many places. Most of them were Muslim protests against church buildings and open air Christian revival meetings. The Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) at Gadjah Mada University recorded nine cases of Muslim protests in 2008, eleven in 2009 and 34 in 2010, mostly related to church activities and buildings. The case of Taman Yasmin church in Bogor, West Java was the most complicated. The city mayor withdrew the permit of that church after some Muslim groups questioned its validity. The church won the case in both the district court and the supreme court. But Christians still have difficulty using the church building because of violent threats from some Muslims and the mayor's refusal to comply with the court decision. CRCS reports also mention internal conflicts in Christian and Muslim communities. Among Muslims these were mostly mainstream Muslim protests and acts of violence against the Ahmadiyah group (Cholil et al. 2008; Cholil et al. 2009; Bagir et al. 2010).

Interreligious dialogue was initiated by government in the 1970s following tension caused by religious proselytization after the 1965 communist massacre. In 1979 the minister of religion, R.W. Alamsyah, launched a new project of religious harmony on three levels: intra-religious harmony, interreligious har-

mony, and harmony between religions and government. Between 1990 and at least 1998 the minister organized numerous interreligious meetings, often prompted by religious tensions (Steenbrink 1998: 332), but these talks mostly involved only leaders of the five recognized religions and did not reach lay people. They also disregarded adherents of religions other than the five recognized ones.

In 1997 Tarmizi Taher, minister of religion from 1993 to 1998, published a book *Aspiring to the middle path: religious harmony in Indonesia,* which is a compilation of his international speeches. Interestingly, he rejects the conception propounded by some foreign scholars of Pancasila as an Indonesian civil religion. Taher explicitly classifies Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and the rest as 'religions' and Pancasila as 'ideology'. In describing the policy of Pancasila as *azas tunggal* (the sole basis) of the Indonesian state he writes:

> 'The ideology of Pancasila will not interfere in the theology of religion. Government and religious leaders came to a consensus about ideology and religion, by the formulation that organizations were to be based solely on Pancasila but theology was to be based on the holy books' (Taher 1995, quoted in Steenbrink 1998: 333).

He advocates the line of Indonesian Muslims who adopt a moderate position between secularism and extreme religious fanaticism. He sees the Qur'anic words '*ummatan wasathan*' (moderate and quality-oriented nation) as a definition of the character of Muslims in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei: 'although they are dedicated and devout Muslims, the attitude and the culture of Muslims in this region are less Arabicized' (Steenbrink 1998: 333). However, despite the government organized dialogues with religious leaders and academics and promoting these abroad, conflict at grassroots level continues relentlessly. Minor and major clashes between Muslims and Christians continued in the late 1980s and into the early 21st century, some of which were mentioned above.

Individual public figures and interfaith NGO activists warned against the potential of interreligious tensions, partly caused by the government's policy of religious segregation. Some of them argued that interreligious dialogue would not be effective in preventing conflict when developmentalism in fact marginalizes poor people. In the 1990s Mangunwijaya, a Catholic pastor, in collaboration with scholars and activists (including interfaith activists), adamantly opposed the construction of Kaliombo dam that displaced several villages, their residents being forced by government to move to other places.

While Mangunwijaya championed poor marginalized people, Abdurrahman Wahid, head of NU from 1984 to 1999, worked for democratization through de-politicization of religions. In the early 1990s he denounced the projected Islamization of the state bureaucracy when Soeharto sponsored the establishment of ICMI (*Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals* Association). When Wahid

became president he reinstated Confucianism as one of six recognized religions after more than thirty years. He had vigorously advocated religious freedom long before he became president. In general religious and interfaith NGOs in Java such as Interfidei, LKiS, the Wahid Institute and the Ma'arif Institute conduct interreligious dialogue at grassroots level, while the Peace Provocateurs and the Mosintuwu Institute, both NGOs, work intensively in the post-conflict Moluccas and Poso.

Despite intermittent clashes between Muslims and Christians, their social cooperation generally runs deep. To cite a few examples: a group of Catholic and Protestant choirs chanted *sholawat* (praise to the prophet Muhammad) in the Qur'anic Chanting Festival (MTQ) in West Papua in 2008. Hindus at Puri Gede Amlapura invited Muslims to break the fast in 2009. In Jombang village, East Java, as in many other villages in Indonesia, Muslims, Christians, and Hindus attended the funeral of a Muslim in 2009. When Abdurrahman Wahid died in 2009 Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Confucianists and other religious groups prayed together for him in many places around Indonesia.

## 1.5 The study of religion in Indonesia

The history of Christian theological schools in Indonesia can be traced to the founding of *Hoogere Theologische School* (the first Christian theological school, now the Jakarta Theological Seminary) in 1934 (Singgih 2004: 395), while the history of Islamic higher education dates back to the establishment of *Institut Agama Islam Negeri* (IAIN, State Institute for Islamic Studies) in 1960 (Azra 2011: 49).

The number of Christian theological schools and institutions for Islamic studies has grown phenomenally. Indonesia has more than a hundred Christian (including Catholic) theological schools spread across all provinces. IAIN started in 1960 by merging the two main institutions of Islamic higher education: the *Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri* (PTAIN, State Islamic Higher Institute) in Yogyakarta and the *Akademi Dinas Ilmu Agama* (ADIA, Academy of Religious Sciences) in Jakarta (Steenbrink 1990: 153). In the early 2000s some IAINs were transformed into fully fledged universities, *Universitas Islam Negeri* (UIN, State Islamic Universities). Whereas IAINs only offer Islamic studies, UINs offer Islamic studies and other subjects such as social and human sciences, economics, medicine and engineering. Nowadays Indonesia has six UINs, sixteen IAINs and 31 Islamic state academies (STAIN), apart from hundreds of private Islamic institutions for higher education.

On the whole the study of religion in Western Europe and North America is based on an objectivist worldview and a positivistic view of science. From its earliest beginnings the study of religion in Indonesia rejected the 'objectivist' paradigm. Scholars such as Mukti Ali, considered the founding father of comparative religious study in Indonesia, tried to link the academic study of relig-

ion with the promotion of interreligious dialogue (Steenbrink 1990: 154). In the West European tradition science of religion claims to be neither naturalistic nor religious but to engage in 'objective' description and analysis of religion. Max Müller was the first to use the term *'Religionswissenschaft'* (science of religion). Under the influence of phenomenology the study of religion is 'an impartial and truly scientific comparison of religions' (Waardenburg 1974: 74; Flood 1999: 31). Edmund Husserl defines phenomenology as going back to 'the things themselves' (*Zurück zu den Sachen*) (Flood 1999: 93). Thus scholars of religion were convinced that religion existed 'out there'.

Mukti Ali received a thorough Islamic education at traditional *pesantren*s in Java. After obtaining a PhD from McGill University in Canada he launched the discipline of comparative religious studies in Indonesia. Mukti became the first head of the Department of Comparative Religion at IAIN Yogyakarta in the 1960s. In naming his department he preferred the term 'comparative religion' (*perbandingan agama*) to 'science of religion' (Ali 1990: 7). Later Mukti became minister of religion for the period 1973-1978, which facilitated the spread of his ideas about comparative religious studies to all IAINs.

In 1988 Mukti wrote a book, *Ilmu Perbandingan Agama di Indonesia* (The science of comparative religion in Indonesia), as part of the 25th anniversary of the Department of Comparative Religion at IAIN. In the last chapter of the book he refers to the debate at the 58th conference of International Association for the History of Religion (IAHR) in Tokyo, especially between Friedrich Heiler and R.J. Zwi Werblowsky, about whether or not the science of comparative religion should be 'objective' and neutral. Mukti positions himself quite explicitly in opposition to the principle of '*ilmu untuk ilmu*' (science for it own sake) (Ali 1990:7). He writes:

> 'We think comparative religion in Indonesia, in addition to studying religion scientifically, is also meant to develop society and the state in Indonesia. Even more important than the purpose of studying the science of comparative religion is to participate ... [in] creating a safe and peaceful world...' (Ali 1990: 7, author's translation)

Accordingly Beck (2002: 216-230) classifies Mukti's model of comparative religious studies as part of the pillar of social harmony in Indonesia's diverse society. Bolland (1971) sees Mukti Ali, not as a scholar of comparative religion, but as a 'designer of a Muslim theology of religion'. Mukti's speeches and major decisions during his term as minister of religion (1973-1978) are collected in nine volumes entitled *Agama dan Pembangunan di Indonesia* (Religion and Development in Indonesia). These books attest his endeavour to link comparative religious studies with national development.

Amin Abdullah (2004), rector of IAIN Sunan Kalijaga from 2000 till 2010, offers a more systematic paradigm of Islamic studies, in which he calls for both

'normative' and 'historical' approaches to religious studies. But he shuns the designation 'comparative study of religions' in order to avoid the concomitant issue of the superiority of Islam and, as generally occurred at West European and North American universities, the superiority of Christianity. Abdullah is optimistic that religious studies in Indonesia, especially Islamic studies, can reconcile 'theology' ('normative' study of religion) and 'science of religion' (anthropology and sociology of religion) (Abdullah 2004: 9, 17-18, 28-34). To this end he constructs a methodological 'integration' between disciplines of Islamic theology[5] and scientific disciplines[6] (Abdullah 2006). To my mind the idea of 'integration' is a methodological oversimplification. I think the term 'interdisciplinary' study or 'dialogue of disciplines' is more appropriate.

In general there was a development in the study of (other) religions in the 1990s from the identification of exclusive religious truths to a more inclusive approach, at least in some leading Islamic and Christian institutions. It was characterized inter alia by government sponsored academic dialogue. In 1990 IAIN Sunan Kalijaga founded an Indonesian branch of the International Association for the History of Religion (IAHR), which three years later organized a national conference commemorating the 1893 World Parliament of Religions in Chicago.

Prominent Muslim, Christian, Hindu and Buddhist scholars and theologians spoke at that conference. The Hindus speakers talked about pluralism and the participation of religions in national development (Steenbrink 1998: 332). The word 'pluralism' began to be heard. But the main message was about harmony, also reflected in the name of the journal recommended by that conference: *Religiosa, Indonesian Journal on Religious Harmony.* It was first published in August 1995. A keen awareness of the need for 'non-confessional' or 'non-doctrinal' religious studies also emerged at both Islamic and Christian institutions. It led to the incorporation of new methods of religious studies and contributed to interreligious understanding (Zainal & Abdullah 2011: 59).

Another development was the introduction of disciplines like anthropology, sociology and psychology of religion in the 1990s. These disciplines are core courses at Islamic and Christian universities. Some universities also have a department of sociology of religion, for instance UIN Bandung, UIN Yogyakarta, and Satya Wacana Christian University (UKSW) in Salatiga. But these disciplines are regarded as preparatory for introductions to religions rather than as 'objective' paradigms in religious studies.

---

[5] *Kalam* (theology), *falsafah* (Islamic philosophy), *tasawuf* (mysticism), *hadits* (the prophet's traditions), *tarikh* (Islamic history), *fiqh* (Islamic law), *tafsir* (exegeses) and *lughah* (Arabic language).

[6] Philosophy, history, anthropology-sociology, archaeology, philology, hermeneutics, physics-chemistry-biology, mathematic, ethics, phenomenology and psychology.

The qualification 'objective' is commonly used by scholars of religion in Indonesia as a technical term referring to an approach to their subject that obviates religious favouritism. It does not indicate the 'agnostic', 'unengaged' approach which is dominant in Western Europe and North America. Zainal and Abdullah (2011: 70) say that this is influenced by the Indonesian context. First, it should be understood that in Indonesian society the overwhelming majority considers itself religious. According to the 2009 Gallup poll 99% of all Indonesians respond affirmatively to the question, "Is religion an important part of your daily life?" Religious education is taught from the lowest level of elementary school to the highest level of tertiary education. Thus religious vocabulary is used throughout learners' careers. Secondly, because religions are so important in Indonesia, religions and religious institutions help to overcome societal problems.

The department of religious studies at Gadjah Mada University (UGM) of Yogyakarta, a state and non-religiously affiliated university, aims to contribute socially via conflict resolution, peace development and resolving the environmental crisis. In 2000 it established a Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies, which offers a master's programme (Lewis 2012). In 2006, in collaboration with UIN Sunan Kalijaga (Islamic university) and UKDW (Christian university), UGM established ICRS (Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies), which offers a doctoral degree (Banawiratma, Bagir et al. 2012). Besides a department of sociology of religion, UIN Yogyakarta also has a Dialogue Centre which organizes intra- and interreligious dialogues. UKDW has a master's degree in ministry which focuses mainly on Christianity and societal life; in addition it has opened *Pusat Studi Agama-Agama* (Centre for Interreligious Studies) that offers interreligious dialogue for students and society at large. Sanata Dharma University, a Catholic university based in Yogyakarta, offers master's programmes in its Department of Theology and Department of Religion and Culture (*Ilmu Religi dan Budaya*). Similarly, Satya Wacana Christian University offers master's courses in its Department of Theology and Department of Religion and Society (*Agama dan Masyarakat*). To my knowledge none of these courses adopt the approach of methodological atheism. Thus religious studies in Indonesia is not 'objectivist' but 'religionist'.

Flood (1999: 18-20) says the language of theology – as traditionally understood – is a language *of* religion whereas the language of religious studies is language *about* religion. For the aforementioned reasons (Zainal & Abdullah 2011: 70) such a distinction would be difficult to make in Indonesia. Hence in my view the positivistic and objectivist approaches to the study of religions and interreligious relations are inadequate to cope with religious dynamics in the Indonesian context with its complex relations between Muslims and Christians. To get beyond positivism and objectivism in religious studies my study shifts from a phenomenological to a discursive approach (Kippenberg 1983;

McCutcheon 1997; Flood 1999; Von Stuckrad 2003; Wijsen 2010; Ndaluka 2012) and aims to make a modest contribution by way of a case study in Surakarta.

After the *Reformasi* era Sunardi (2007) writes that 'in Indonesia the need for different ways of speaking about religion is urgent because of the increase in religious experiences characterized by intense and rich religious encounter'. Considering the manifold problems discussed in the previous section on Muslim-Christian relations it would be almost impossible to conduct a purely academic religious study in Indonesia. Put differently, Zainal and Abdullah (2011: 61) observe that despite Indonesia's long history of interreligious tolerance, relations between adherents of different religions are always tested by new social and political developments. A discipline like religious studies needs to respond to the aforementioned societal and scientific developments, and the present study seeks to contribute this development.

## 2 Conceptual design

In this section we clarify the conceptual design of our study (Verschuren & Doorewaard 1999). It consists of the research objective, research questions, theoretical framework and research concepts.

### 2.1 Research objective

For several decades before and after independence Indonesia was establishing its national identity by promoting *bahasa* Indonesia (Anderson 1966) and Pancasila (Steenbrink 1998; Hidayah 2010). When the New Order regime came to power in the mid-1960s the state prioritized economic growth by limiting democracy and suppressing diversity, including religious diversity (Dhakidae 2003; Latif 2008). Since the *Reformasi* in 1998 democracy and freedom have resumed (Bagir & Cholil 2008; Cholil 2010), but there has also been a return of religion to the public domain (Sterkens, Machasin & Wijsen 2007). In this doctoral thesis I study the relation between religious discourse and (the lack of) social cohesion in Indonesia after *Reformasi* in 1998.

I explore why and under what conditions religious discourses are elevated above other discourses and whether or not religious diversity jeopardizes social unity and leads to conflict. I start with the micro (interpersonal) level of discourse (focus group discussions, FGDs), but I am also interested in the dialectical relation between the micro (individual) and the macro (societal) level of discourse, and whether the meso (institutional) level plays a mediatory role between the other two levels.

The main approaches to the study of identity and diversity are positivism and constructivism. Positivism assumes a reality 'out there' that is governed by

natural laws. The scientist's duty is to discover these laws and make generalizations (Guba 1990: 20; Droogers 2011: 229). Put differently, the relation between observers and objects of observation is objective and impartial (Flood 1999: 31). By contrast constructivism works with an ontology that assumes the existence of diverse realities as multiple mental constructs that are explored by scholars of different disciplines. These realities are socially and experientially localized, limited and specific. In this scientific approach pursuit of *'the'* scientific truth is absent or at any rate relativized. Constructivism opts for realities in the plural, and is even cagey about whether these realities actually exist 'out there' (Droogers 2011: 229-230).

Research results depend on the scientific paradigm that is adopted. Positivism and constructivism handle research variables differently. The positivist model seeks to control them, the constructivist model treats them as the raw material for the ongoing process of identity and reality construction. Positivism helps to clarify the structure of power mechanisms, whereas constructivism examines the processes in which actors do something with these structure (Droogers 2011: 229-230). In keeping with the constructivist paradigm Flood (1999: 150) locates the observer 'within a context and responding to the problems of a particular environment'.

In this research I adopt a constructivist approach and try to find alternative ways of theorizing about and studying religious identity and interreligious relations. The research objectives are: (1) to gain insight into the relation between religious discourse and (the lack of) social cohesion (internal objective), and by doing so (2) to contribute to a theory and method of studying interreligious relations (external objective).

## 2.2 Research question

In the first section of this chapter I mention that Indonesia is an interesting country to study. It has a long tradition of peaceful co-existence, but also a long history of violence and ethnic and/ or religious conflict. Muslim and Christian history in Indonesia paradoxically reveals growing religious convergence and divergence. The paradox is compounded by technological progress and globalization that are accompanied by both cultural homogenization (Ritzer 1993) and cultural diffusion (Robertson 1992), so the religious discourse of the research participants in Solo cannot be separated from the broader discourse at the national level.

This study examines religious identity transformations in Indonesia after the *Reformasi* in 1998 as manifested in interreligious, particularly Muslim-Christian, relations. I make a detailed analysis of the discourse of Muslims about Christians and vice versa, and their discourse when they (Muslims and Christian) are together. I also explore why and under what conditions they elevate their religious identities above other (e.g. ethnic, national, economic) iden-

tities, and whether this leads to social conflict or social harmony. The question is whether the existing conflict (or cohesion) in society was reflected in the religious rhetoric and vocabulary of the research participants.

More specifically, the main research questions are the following. First, how do Muslims and Christians identify and position themselves and others? Secondly, what are the socio-cognitive effects of their identification and positioning? Sub-questions relating to question one are: (a) How do Muslims and Christians speak about each other? (b) How do Muslims and Christians speak with each other? Sub-questions relating to question two are: (a) What are the conditions for understanding/ misunderstanding? (b) What are the conditions for cohesion (convergence) or conflict (divergence)?

## 2.3 Theoretical framework

As indicated in section 1.5, in Indonesia there are two disciplines that study religion and interreligious relations: theology and religious studies. Theology and religious studies, and particularly the growing tension between the two disciplines, can be understood in light of societal and scientific developments in Europe in the modern era. In what follows, therefore, I interpret the tension between theology and religious studies from the perspectives of European intercultural philosophy and cultural history. Put differently, both disciplines are contextual and thus culture specific (Wijsen 2013). In Indonesia there is no marked tension between the two.

Indeed, in the European context Flood (1999: 18-20) also tries to mitigate the tension between the two disciplines. He writes:

> 'I shall attempt to illuminate the differences between theology and religious studies by arguing that these differences have been primarily about language, but that the language of contemporary, academic theology is closer to religious studies than to traditional theology understood as 'faith seeking understanding'... The language of theology is a language which *expresses* religion whereas the language of religious studies is language *about* religion.'

Following Flood, this study is inspired by the shift from the philosophy of consciousness, in all its variations and complexities, to the philosophy of signs (semiotics) or language (Flood 1999: 9, 107). Benhabib (1992: 208) observes that 'the paradigm of language has replaced the paradigm of consciousness'. In this study I concentrate on the linguistic model of studying interreligious relations (Panikkar 1978:19-22), based on the theory of performative speech or the symbolic power of language to make and unmake groups, a theory which Bourdieu (1991) derives from liturgical language. In my technical design this theoretical premise leads to the method of critical or socio-cognitive discourse analysis (Blommaert & Verschueren 1991; Fairclough 1992; Van Dijk 2008).

My primary interest is not the sources and teachings of religions but religious practitioners and their practices, not structures but people (Kim 2004: 3).

So I do not study scriptures (Bible or Qur'an), prophets (Jesus or Muhammad) and the like, but try to determine whether, when, how and with what intention these symbols are 'used' by believers. Parallel to the distinction between syntactics and pragmatics in linguistics, I distinguish between a systematic and a practical study of religion. Whereas systematic religious studies concentrates on the religious symbolic system, practical religious studies looks at its application by religious practitioners (Klöcker & Tworuschka 2008). The two, however, are interrelated. The symbol system is reproduced through its application (institutionalization), but the same system affects the practitioners and influences them.

The conceptual framework is inspired by Pierre Bourdieu (1991: 220), who noted that 'practical classifications are always subordinated to practical functions and oriented towards the production of social effects'. Bourdieu sees identity as a resource or capital, by means of which people strive to further their interests in collaboration or competition with others. According to him language has the power to make and unmake social groups. Identities are not defined by intrinsic values measurable by objective criteria, but are social through and through (Wijsen 2013). The assumption is that there is a dialectical relation between language and reality (Fairclough 1992).

I do not study religions as belief systems but as systems of communication and shared action. Von Stuckrad (2003: 268) calls this the discursive study of religion. I use this term (discursive study) in the title of this book. Instead of studying the believer's inner states of mind, I am interested in understanding the public manifestation of religions. I assess the strength of religions not according to their revealed transcendent truths but according to the communicative formation of identity and the way they provide people with a 'concrete script of action' (Von Stuckrad 2003: 268-269). Discourse analysis as it has developed in other disciplines (Wetherell 2001) can help scholars of religion to go beyond an essentialist and objectivist approach (Wijsen 2013).

To answer the question of how Muslims and Christians achieve convergence in Indonesia we can learn from the Tanzanian experience. In terms of linguistic pragmatism Muslims and Christians use language, in this case KiSwahili, to create common ground between them. They regard KiSwahili as an ecumenical language (Mazrui & Mazrui 1995; Ndaluka 2012: 25). Benedict Anderson explains it in the Indonesian context (narrowed down to the Javanese case). After Indonesian independence the Javanese had three languages and two separate linguistic cultural traditions. The languages were Dutch,[7] Javanese

[7] For instance , in his speech to the Committee of Indonesian Independence Preparation on 1 June 1945 Soekarno used many Dutch words such as *philosofische grondslag* (philosophic foundation), *politieke onafhankelijkheid* (political independence), *zwaarwichtig* (ponderous), *international recht* (international law), *nationale staat* (nation-state), and so forth.

and revolutionary Malay, while the traditions were Dutch (Western) and Javanese. However, since the 1960s the new *bahasa* Indonesian (Indonesian language) has had to develop into a communication medium which can express 'Indonesian nationalism' (Anderson 1966: 89). For the younger generation *bahasa* Indonesian is of paramount importance for shaping an ecumenical language.

However, even though Indonesians speak the same national language, they are still struggling to achieve social cohesion. Andrew Beatty cites the language used during ritual meals (*slametan*). By means of ambiguous language and playing with words 'people of different orientations come together in a single ritual and manufacture consensus or at least the appearance of it' (Beatty 1999: 27). According to the theory of communicative action two or more actors create a relationship and 'seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement. The central concept of interpretation refers in the first instance to negotiating definitions of the situation which admit of consensus' (Habermas 1984: 85-86). When a speaker uses language strategically, he or she controls language and instrumentalizes the listener to her own advantage. That means using language with a view to reaching 'parasitic' understanding (Habermas 1984: 288).

With increasing communication in an interculturally connected society dialogism becomes crucial. In reaction to philosophy of consciousness, Bakhtin (1993) defines his notion of 'dialogism' as a component of the larger signifying system of language and communication. The distinction between natural science, whose methods entail objectification and the identification of causes, and the social or human sciences, whose methods entail understanding subjectivities, is basic to dialogism. In this regard Bakhtin was influenced by Weber's concept of *Verstehen*. But dialogism is not subjectivism – the focus is on intersubjectivity and communication, explained by Bakhtin as the 'I' in interrelationship with other persons, that is 'I' and 'other', 'I' and 'Thou' (Flood 1999: 150-151).

Bakhtin uses the concept of utterance. Basically an utterance is any unit of language, from a single word to an entire text. However, for Bakhtin it is not so much a purely linguistic concept as a meeting place between my self-consciousness, my mind and the world with all its socio-historical meaning. An utterance is always a response to a previous utterance, and always expects an answer in the future. Any utterance is a link in the sequence of speech communion. The first aspect of an utterance is the active position of the speaker in some referential semantic sphere or another. The second aspect is the speaker's subjective, emotional evaluation of the referential semantic content of his utterance (Bakhtin 1952; Morris 1994: 84-85, 251).

Another important concept of Bakhtin's used in this research project is heteroglossia, which perceives language as ideologically saturated and stratified. Discourse always articulates a particular view of the world. Heteroglossia refers to the conflict between 'centripetal' and 'centrifugal', 'official' and 'unofficial' discourses in the same national language. It foregrounds the clash of antagonistic social forces (Bakhtin 1935; Morris 1994: 15-17, 248-249). This reminds us of Beatty's work on *slametan* in Java, where people of different orientations use ambiguous words (of the same local language, Javanese) and play with words to maintain harmony.

In Bourdieu's theory of practice human society, or 'social space', is multidimensional, consisting of diverse interrelated yet somewhat homogenous fields (*les champs*). A field is a competitive arena of social relations in which agents and institutions contend for the production, acquisition and control of forms of capital peculiar to that field. For example, academic degrees are an obvious form of educational capital in the educational field, money in the economic field and prestige in the cultural field. The term 'market' (*le marché*) is interchangeable with the term 'field'. Bourdieu maintains that all fields conform to a certain economic logic that is 'capable of treating all practices, including those purporting to be disinterested or gratuitous, and hence non-economic, as economic practices directed towards maximalizing of material or symbolic profit' (Bourdieu 1977: 183; Rey 2004: 332-333). The concept of field (arena) is helpful to discern the difference voices of our research participants in different arenas (e.g. religious, social, political).

Bourdieu's notion of habitus refers to the matrix of perceptions, or the basis of perception and appreciation of all subsequent experiences. Habitus predisposes the agent to perceive and behave in a certain fashion. An individual's habitus is always that of a specific class, which predisposes the agent to perceive, appreciate and act in ways reflecting the material conditions of the class that contributed to her habitus formation (Rey 2004: 335).

Among the various forms of religious capital Bourdieu frequently cites 'the goods of salvation' (*les biens de salut*). He goes beyond Weber and Marx, specifying the means by which the structures of domination and subjugation are entrenched and perpetuated, namely through the dynamics of (mis)recognition of the legitimacy of social inequalities. In regard to religious capital, Bourdieu emphasizes the impact of economic logic on religious practice and commerce. The forms that religious capital take are determined more by the needs of the consumer than by the power of the prophet. Here Bourdieu is critical of Weber's view of the prophet as someone possessing powers to create religious capital *ex nihilo*. Hence for Bourdieu the prophet is not *vox Dei,* as Weber has it, but rather *vox populi.* Bourdieu argues that charisma is socially grounded (Bourdieu 1987: 129; Rey 2004: 337-338).

Some critical approaches accept Foucault's notion that participants are positioned in discourse and that we do not have access to reality outside discourse. This view is deterministic. There are others who claim that the relation between discursive and non-discursive is dialectic, hence it is possible to develop discourse analysis as ideology critique. In fact, science is ideology critique. Gramsci's concept of hegemony is more helpful than Foucault's concept of power (Fairclough 1992: 58).

The basic premise of hegemony is that society is not ruled by force alone but also by ideas. For Gramsci a 'foundation of ruling class is equivalent to the creation of *Weltanschauung'* (Turin 1966: 75; Bates 1975: 351). Through the creation of meaning power relations become naturalized and so self-evident that they cannot be questioned. For instance, in the Indonesian New Order era people rarely questioned the second Indonesian president Soeharto's official interpretation of Pancasila, namely his 'Directives for the realization and implementation of pancasila'.[8] Another instance is that nowadays Indonesians commonly label bombers in Bali, Jakarta or Solo 'terrorists', and those in Papua 'separatists'.

Following John Thompson's and Gramsci's view of ideology, Fairclough maintains that resistance is possible. 'Subjects are ideologically positioned, but they are also capable of acting creatively to make their own connections between the diverse practices and ideologies to which they are exposed, and to restructure positioning practices and structures' (Fairclough 1992: 91; Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 76). In the Javanese war (1825-1830), for example, the Dutch administration declared Diponegoro a rebel. To counteract that his followers reproduced the notion of Diponegoro as a freedom fighter from Java and, more than that, a messiah. Hence hegemony is never stable but is always changing and unfinished, and consensus is at all times a matter of degree – a 'contradictory and unstable equilibrium' (Fairclough 1992: 93; Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 76)

## 2.4 Research concepts

In this study religious identity transformation is examined via interreligious, particularly Muslim-Christian, relations. The concept of identity emerged in the social sciences and humanities as a core concept in the 1950s (Gleason 1983). Over more than 60 years it has become one of the most widely used terms in these disciplines, featuring in the titles of many thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of books and articles (Wetherell 2010: 3). But it remains a highly controversial concept (Giddens 1991; Kim 2002).

The term 'identity' derives from the Latin *idem et idem* (the same and the same) (Gleason 1983). But instead of a fixed definition, Margareth Wetherell

[8] *Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila* (P4).

reformulates the trends in scholars' conceptualization of identity. There are three possible interpretations: identity as a personal project, a property of groups, or a convergence of social and personal identity. She also points out current theoretical shifts to intersectional and hybrid trends in the study of identity (Wetherell 2010). My thesis follows the latter trend (identity as a hybrid), since in most cases identities are not based on innate properties that can be measured according to objective criteria (Bourdieu 1991: 220-228). For example, the classification into *santri* and non-*santri* or *abangan* is not fixed but fluid and flexible (Beatty 1999: 115-157).

Thus in this research identity is defined as a narrative of the self (Giddens 1991: 54). People have not just one identity but multiple identities (polyphonic selves). They always engage simultaneously in a plurality of partly overlapping self-narratives, none of which corresponds entirely with only one society or territory (Van Binsbergen 2003: 381). In concrete conditions people may prefer one self-narrative among all potential self-narratives (Hall 1996). Social identity is shared by members of a group (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel & Turner 1986), but it is fragile, fluid, flexible, not fixed and stable. In this study I use 'social identity' as an umbrella term, which includes other identities (e.g. religious, ethnic, regional, national, economic). Religious identity is only one of the social identities people can have.

Similarly, religion is religion because it is placed in a particular narrative context or speech community. Outside that narrative context there is no religion (Asad 1991). This differs from Durkheim's (1964: 47) definition of religion as 'a unified system of beliefs and practices related to sacred things' or Geertz's (1973; 1993) phenomenological quest for a sui generis 'meaning' of religion. I assume that definitions of religion are not based on natural properties but are the result of the scholar's classification system (Asad 1993; McCutcheon 1997). Accordingly practices and artefacts are religious because their believers place them in a specific narrative context and distinguish them from other practices or artefacts, which are considered non-religious or secular (Flood 1999:137-141).

Put differently, definitions of what is religious and what is not are historical products of discursive processes (Asad 1993: 29). After more than a century religious studies has not managed to come up with a generally accepted definition of religion. There is disagreement between those who define religion as an autonomous reality and those who see it as a reflection of something else (e.g. psychological or social processes).

In this study the concept of understanding is seen as a cognitive process aimed at grasping speakers' intentions (Van Dijk 2008: 1-18). Understanding assumes at least partially shared knowledge, a common ground or meeting point. According to cognitive science producers of texts (communicators) always employ other 'texts' or mental models stored in their long-term memory.

And consumers of texts (interpreters) can only make sense of these texts if they are able to link them to other texts that they have stored in their long-term memory.

In cognitive theory culture is a cognitive system (beliefs, values, forms of knowledge, etc.) present in the minds of members of a specific social group. In understanding culture two conjoined aspects are key requirements: the cognitive system and language. People have lexical items (e.g. words) which articulate schemata (universal cognitive structures located in memory) (Flood 1999: 57-58). From an intercultural philosophy perspective it is accepted that human potential is universal, but people are also products of socialization and acculturation.

In daily life there will always be partial understanding and partial misunderstanding, misunderstanding understanding and understanding misunderstanding (Mall 2000), or working misunderstanding (Tanner & Wijsen 1993). From one point of view multicultural society is a drama and intercultural understanding an illusion. This is the theory of cultural collision (Blommaert 1991: 18-21) or clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996). But multicultural societies function more or less well and – at least partial – intercultural understanding is possible. In a postcolonial world no culture has the power to impose its worldview on other cultures. Thus intercultural understanding is the outcome of struggle and negotiation.

In this book transformation is defined in terms of conditions, processes and consequences of cultural contact (Burke 2009). Hence we always link the concept of transformation with the concept of identity and interaction. Norman Fairclough cites a simple, clear instance. The school system presupposes a specific language use (discourse) and specific social relations (e.g. lecture or seminar, authoritarian or democratic) and subject positions (teacher and pupil). The social system of the school determines the discourse to a large extent, but by using it teachers and pupils either reproduce the school system unchanged or they transform it (Fairclough 2001: 31-32). For example, teachers and pupils may reproduce hierarchical relations or develop egalitarian relations. By taking their positions participants become either teachers or pupils. So reproduction may further conservation or transformation of the existing order. It is not only rigid but also creative (Fairclough 2001: 24, 32). This logic reveals the link between discourse and transformation (social change).

In regard to cultural contact, if shared knowledge is necessary for understanding, we can conceptualize the conditions for cultural contact in three models. Briefly they are the following. The identity model is based on the assumption that 'we' and the 'others' are basically the same (Wiredu 1996): the 'others' are like 'us', we are equals. The alterity model is based on the assumption that 'we' and the 'others' are essentially different. The 'others' are not like 'us'; they are strangers and potential enemies. The analogy model is based on the assumption

that there are overlaps between 'us' and 'them'. Human potential is universal, but this does not mean that all people are the same, as they are also products of acculturation and socialization (Mall 2000). This book investigates social identity transformations through interreligious relations.

In this study social cohesion and conflict are defined in terms of convergence or divergence of interests (Bourdieu 1991). Bourdieu identifies society as a pluralistic enclave composed of more or less autonomous fields (or 'markets') where individuals or groups struggle to actualize their interests (make a 'profit') using various resources (forms of 'capital'), partly in coalition and partly in competition with others. Thus inclusion and exclusion almost always go together.

There are various theories about what conflicts are and where they come from, depending on the perspectives of different disciplines and levels of analysis. From a religious studies point of view there are those who recognize the causes of conflict mainly within the religions themselves (e.g. *dakwa*/ missionary activity, sacred text), and those who trace the roots mainly outside the religions (e.g. power struggle). The realistic group conflict theory (Sherif 1966) holds that inter-group conflicts occur when parties have incompatible goals or compete for resources. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1986) posits that inter-group conflicts are the result of social categorization and group identification per se. Experiments show that even if there is no shortage of resources, participants develop in-group favouritism. Most scholars combine various perspectives, maintaining that virtually all conflicts are complex and caused by a multiplicity of factors (Taylor & Moghaddam 1994).

## 3 Technical design

This section clarifies and justifies the technical design of the study (Verschuren & Doorewaard 1999). It describes the research strategy (social settings in which the study was conducted), research sources and language translation. Finally it outlines the output and planning of the research.

### 3.1 Research strategy: Surakarta as case study

My research strategy is a single case study. Social identity constructions in Indonesia are studied through Christian-Muslim relations, narrowed down to Surakarta as a case. That is to say, I study Muslim-Christian relations in one particular location, Surakarta. A single case study is commonly employed to obtain an explanatory as opposed to a merely exploratory account (Yin 1994: 5). The purpose of the research is to look at identification, relations and ideational processes among FGD participants in Surakarta that constitute and are constituted by the broader discourse of Indonesian society.

The city, formally called Surakarta, is popularly known as Solo (sometimes Sala). In tourism and in public spaces the name of Solo is more common than Surakarta. Surakarta was one of the great Islamic sultanates in Java, the 17th century Islamic Mataram. The Giyanti agreement in 1755 divided the Mataram sultanate into two kingdoms: Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Previously the Surakarta sultanate had been in Kartasura (Sala), but in 1745 it moved to Surakarta. Nowadays the Surakarta royal family plays a purely cultural role in preserving Javanese culture. The district is headed by a mayor, who is accountable to the governor of Central Java and the Ministry of Domestic Affairs.

Surakarta is located in the middle of Java island, the most densely populated island in Indonesia. Although 57.5% of the Indonesian population live on Java island, it represents only 6.8% of the whole Indonesian area (BPS census 2010). Surakarta is one of the major cities in Central Java, whereas the capital city of Central Java is Semarang. It is situated in a low-lying area at an altitude of 92m. The temperature ranges from 25°C to 27°C and humidity from 67% to 85%. In the north the city borders on the Boyolali regency, in the east on Karanganyar regency, in the south on Sukoharjo regency and in the west on Kartasura regency.

In 2011 Surakarta had a population of 588 110. The sex ratio was 95,02 (100 female to 95 male). Daytime dwellers could be three times the population figure (around 1,5 million). People from surrounding regencies such as Klaten, Boyolali, Kartasura, Sukoharjo, Wonogiri, Karanganyar and Sragen work in Surakarta by day and go home after work. Like other big cities in Java, Surakarta is popular among street traders (*pedagang kaki lima*). Out of 2 950 street traders, 38.7% operate by day and only 4.1% at night (*Surakarta in figures 2011/2012*).

The total area of the city is 44.04 km², including five sub-districts (*kecamatan*) and 51 villages (*kelurahan*). Land use is mainly housing (65%), while 8% is used for business, 6% for trade and only 2% for farming. Among the five sub-districts Banjarsari is the largest and Serengan the most densely populated.

The population comprises mostly industrial and construction workers (33.5%). The rest are: retired (10.7%), retail sector (8.0%), civil servants, army and police (5.5%), transport sector (5.3%), entrepreneurs (2.9%), farm workers (0.1%), and peasants (0.1%) (*Surakarta in figures 2011/2012*). The percentage of unemployed people is 8.7. About 13.9% of the population is considered to be below the poverty line with an income of less than IDR 306,584.00 (around USD 33.71) per month *(Regional statistics Surakarta 2011).*

The city has 274 elementary schools (SDs), 75 junior high schools (SLTPs), 79 senior high schools (SLTAs), 3 state universities/institutes, and more than 50 private big and small universities, institutes and academies. The majority of the population completed SLTA (24.2%). The rest completed SLTP (20.7%),

Table 3
Land area, number of villages, number of *RTs*, population and population density of sub-districts of Surakarta[9]

| Sub-district | Land area (km²) | Number of villages | Number of neighbourhood associations (RTs) | Total population | Population density |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Laweyan | 8,64 | 11 | 458 | 111.767 | 12.936 |
| Serengan | 3,19 | 7 | 312 | 63.491 | 19.903 |
| Pasar Kliwon | 4,82 | 9 | 424 | 89.164 | 18.499 |
| Jebres | 12,58 | 11 | 637 | 145.703 | 11.582 |
| Banjarsari | 14,81 | 13 | 874 | 177.985 | 12.018 |
| Total | 44,04 | 51 | 2.705 | 588.110 | 13.354 |

SD (20.6%), academy or university courses (9.2%) and 7.4% of the population did not complete SD (*Surakarta in figures 2011/2012*).

Certain unique characteristics of Surakarta make it a perfect case study. The first is its religious diversity. Islam is the majority religion (75.9%), with Christianity (Protestants and Catholics) a significant minority religion (23.2%). Catholics and Protestants are almost equal in number: Catholics at 11.7% and Protestants at 11.5%. The 2010 census puts the national percentage of Christianity at 9,87% (Protestant 6.96%, Catholic 2.91%), with only 2.75% at the provincial level (Central Java) (Protestant 1.77%, Catholic 0.98%). That national census puts Islam at 87.18% nationally and 96.74% at provincial level. Thus adherents of Christianity in Surakarta outnumber the national and provincial average.

Table 4
Religious demography in Surakarta in 1970[10], 2001[11] and 2011[12]

| Year | Muslim | | Catholic | | Protestant | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1970 | 286.928 | 61.8% | 38.686 | 8.3% | 40.305 | 8.7% |
| 2001 | 404.662 | 73.1% | 69.871 | 12.6% | 72.266 | 13.1% |
| 2011 | 446.036 | 75.9% | 69.057 | 11.7% | 67.653 | 11.5% |

| Year | Buddhist | | Hindu | | Confucian | | Others | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1970 | 12.307 (2.6%) | | | | 70.902 | 15,3% | 15.068 | 3.3% |
| 2001 | 4.400 | 0.8% | 2.381 | 0.4% | - | - | - | - |
| 2011 | 3.724 | 0.6% | 1.640 | 0.3% | - | - | - | - |

[9] *Regional statistics Surakarta 2011* and *Surakarta in figures 2011/2012*.

[10] *Sala in figures 1970*, total population 464.196. The label 'others' in this table refers to 13 groups of local beliefs, the three largest being Sapta Darma, Djwa Haju, and Pangestu.

[11] *Surakarta in figures 2001*, total population 553.580.

[12] *Surakarta in figures 2011/2012*, total population 588.110.

Both Buddhism and Hinduism exist in Surakarta, though their following is not significant: both are below 1%. The 2010 census also reports that there are adherents of Confucianism (0.03%) and other beliefs (0.01%). In this city Buddhists have six Vihara (Buddhist temples) and Hindus have three Pura (Hindu temples). During the last decade no new Buddhist or Hindu temples and Catholic churches were built. Catholics only have five churches in Surakarta. By contrast, according to the statistics the number of Muslim mosques and Protestant churches has grown significantly. In 2001 there were 419 mosques and 118 Protestant churches, whereas in 2011 there were 502 mosques and 180 Protestant churches. So 93 new mosques and 48 new Protestant churches were built during the last decade.[13]

One may ask how the proportion of Christians in Surakarta can be as high as 23.2%, while in other cities in Java it is below 10%. Conversely, why is the percentage of Muslims in Surakarta less than the average in other cities in Java? Religious demographic statistics show that it is not because of the success of Christian mission, as Muslims have assumed in recent years. As noted in table 4 above, the statistics in 1970 show that Muslims stand at 61.8%, whereas Christians (Catholics and Protestants) are put at 17%. From 1970 to 2011 Muslims increased by 14.1%, whereas Christians increased by 6.2%. In addition, over the past decade (2001-2011) adherents of all religions except Islam decreased slightly. Islam was the only religion to show a slight increase. Hence it is more accurate to talk about 'Islamization' than about 'Christianization' during the past four decades.

In the latter part of the Soekarno period people in Solo were strongly pro-PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) and the mayor was a Communist (Ricklefs 2012: 175). In the 1955 general election the PKI won 57.26% of the votes. A nationalist political party (PNI) got 30.03% of the votes. By contrast, two Islamic political parties won a minority of the votes: Masyumi 11.10% and NU 1.61% (Mulyadi & Soedarmono 1999). Since 1965 citizens have had to opt for one of five/six state recognized religions, and PKI and PNI members or sympathizers – mainly *abangan* or members of *kebatinan* (Javanese) – mostly chose Christianity or Islam. That was a fairly general pattern in Java (Feillard 1999; Hefner 2000; Suhadi 2006; Nugroho 2008). There are no statistics on religious affiliation in Surakarta before 1965, but the proportion of Christians in 1970 (17%) shows that Christian missions had achieved considerable success by then. However, Ricklefs (2012: 175) points out that not only Christianization

[13] However, this does not always mean the erection of new houses of worship, but relates to poor record keeping in the past. Maybe some mosques or churches were not listed in 2001, but were only listed in government records in 2011.

but also Islamization intensified in Surakarta.[14] Hence the significant number of Christians in Solo is not attributable to the success of Christianization in recent decades.

Surakarta is also a multi-ethnic city. The majority is Javanese, the others being Chinese, Arab, Banjarese, Madurese and so forth. Current statistics do not reflect ethnicity in Surakarta, but a 2001 report gives a clear picture of ethnic diversity in this city. Javanese constitute an absolute majority at 94%, whereas the two biggest minority groups are Chinese (3.5%) and Arab (0.7%).

Table 5
Number of ethnic groups in Surakarta in 200115

| Javanese | Chinese | Arab | Sunda/ Priangan | Madura | Batak/ Tapanuli | Malay | Betawi | Others |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 460.080 | 17.594 | 3.874 | 1.940 | 968 | 708 | 271 | 251 | 3.734 |

It is generally assumed that Chinese means Christian and Arab means Muslim. There is no cross tabulation of inter-ethnic and religious data, but a village monograph supports the popular assumption. The monograph on Pasar Kliwon village gives the following information: Javanese (73.5%), Arab (24.6%) and Chinese (1.9%); the religious statistics are Islam (95.8%), Protestant (3.6%), Catholic (0.3%) and Buddhist (0.3%). Thus the majority ethnic groups (Javanese and Arab) are most probably Muslim. Besides Christians, the Chinese group may include Khonghucu, Muslims and Buddhists. As a rule members of the Arab group do not convert from Islam but remain Muslim.

On the whole the Chinese and Arab groups dominate economically. Last but not least, Chinese and Arabs usually live separately from Javanese in certain parts of the city. This adds to their divergence from the Javanese. Arab settlements are mostly concentrated in Pasar Kliwon sub-district, especially the villages of Pasar Kliwon, Semanggi and Kedung Lumbu. Chinese settlements are located round Pasar Gede, Balong, Coyudan, Tambak Segaran and some main streets of the city.

In-group settlement based on ethnicity dates back to the era of the sultanate and Dutch rule in Surakarta. Through the *wijken* system and the pass system the Dutch administration prevented mixing of Arabs and Chinese with Javanese in the 19th century (Algadri 1988; Utomo 2010; Zunainingsih 2010). Many Arabs are in the textile business, while Chinese virtually dominate both retail and big business in Surakarta. Nowadays some Javanese label Arabs *encik*

[14] Ricklefs (2012: 175-184) devotes one section to purification of the *abangan* and *kebatinan* movements by Muslim movements in Surakarta in the 1970s.

[15] BPS 2001. This report sets the total population at 489.420.

(Farkhana 2007) and Chinese *cukong* (Utomo 2010). Both words have much the same meaning as 'boss'.

There is also diversity within the Arab community, which sometimes creates intra-group tension. By and large they are divided into two groups: Sayyid (Alawiyin) and Irsyadi. The first group claims descent from the prophet Muhammad, while the Irsyadi is positioned as lay Arab. In regard to religious orientation Sayyid tradition is the same as that of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), such as preserving *maulid nabi* (praise of the prophet and the family), respecting the graves of saints/ *ulama* and so on. The Irsyadi group is closer to the Muhammadiyah worldview, which concentrates on religious purification. Chinese in Surakarta belong to different clans such as Hokkian, Hakka, Tio Ciu and Kong Fu, sometimes reflected in their choice of a profession or line of business.

Historically Chinese and Arabs tried to promote unity (integration) among themselves and between them and the indigenous people (Javanese). In 1934, for instance, the Arabs established an organization named *Persatuan Arab Indonesia* (PAI, Union of Indonesian Arabs). Youth of Arabian descent made an oath which affirmed Indonesia as their homeland and *bahasa* Indonesian as their mother tongue. A similar trend occurred among the Chinese in Surakarta. The *barongsay* (China lion dance) is performed not only by Chinese but also by Javanese. But to some extent inter-ethnic social segregation is still clearly visible. For example, even though Al-Rabithah Al-Alawiyah (a school built by the Sayid group) is open to everyone, around 90% of its pupils are Arab (Novianti 2009).

The Christian community originated some centuries after the establishment of Islam and an Islamic sultanate in Surakarta. The *Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland* (GKN) was permitted to start missionary work in Surakarta in 1910 (Aritonang & Steenbrink 2008: 677). Since the late 18th century a fair number of local children of Dutch East India Company employees were raised in 'the true Christian Protestant religion' with the support of Dutch businessmen (Bosma & Raben 2008: 44). In 1920 Dutch Christian missionaries started four primary schools (*Christelijke Standaard Scholen*) in Margoyudan, Prayunan, Temenggungan and Danukusuman.

Long before that, in 1750, a charismatic Javanese Muslim figure, Kyai Jamsari, had established the first *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) in Jamsaren Surakarta. One of his students, Kyai Muhammad Mansyur, established a *pesantren* in Klaten close to Surakarta. Kyai Mansyur's student, Kyai Umar Abdul Manan, established *pesantren* Muayyad in 1947, which has grown into the biggest NU moderate *pesantren* in present-day Surakarta. The Muayyad *pesantren*, sometimes in collaboration with the Sayid group, conducts *dakwa* in society by way of cultural activities such as a mixture of Javanese and Arabic song and music. The Windan *pesantren*, a branch of Muayyad in the west of

Surakarta, concentrates on Islamic teaching, community development and interreligious dialogue (Pohl 2006).

Besides heavy influence from the modernist views of Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist outlook of NU, present-day Islam in Surakarta is shaped by a development which started in the 1970s. Three Arab descendants of the non-Sayyid group – Abdullah Sungkar, Abdullah Thufayl and Abdullah Marzuki (popularly known as triple-A) – each established his own Islamic institution in 1972 after a disagreement with their previous institution (Mulyadi & Soedarmono 1999). Sungkar founded *Pesantren* Al-Mukmin in Ngruki Sukoharjo close to Surakarta. This *pesantren* and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (Sungkar's successor) are often mentioned in the press as the centre and leader of a network of radical Muslims in Indonesia suspected of links with Al-Qaeda. Thufayl established *Majelis Tafsir Al-Qur'an* (MTA, Qur'anic Interpretation Council). The *dakwa* of MTA passionately propagates purging Islam of Javanese mystical elements, which often provokes tension, sometimes street fights, with NU followers. Marzuki in his turn established *Pesantren* Assalam, which is much more moderate than Al-Mukmin and MTA.

The current dynamics of Islam in Surakarta is also influenced by the presence of Muslim paramilitaries (*laskar*s). These include Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta (FPIS, Islamic Youth Front of Surakarta), Laskar Hizbullah, Laskar Jundullah and Barisan Bismillah. Some *laskar*s went to Poso and Ambon on a *jihad* in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Besides conducting religious services the *laskar*s were active in Surakarta and surrounding cities, where they combated gambling and drinking and attacked night clubs and Christian places of worship. Sometimes they engaged in fights with so-called *abangan* paramilitaries. Several members of both sides were killed in such fights.

Mainline Protestant and Catholic churches have long dominated the Christian community in Surakarta. There are only a few Orthodox churches. The first Catholic church, St Antony, was built in Surakarta in 1905. However, for almost two decades now the mainline churches have faced challenges from new Pentecostal/ charismatic churches. Several new Pentecostal churches have establish mega churches, some established medium-sized churches, while others move from one hotel/shop to another to conduct services.

The most monumental Pentecostal church in Surakarta is the Indonesian Bethel Church of God's Family (GBIKA, Gereja Bethel Indonesia Keluarga Allah). It started out with only seven congregants in 1989. Today GBIKA has around 30 000 members. Outside Surakarta they also have churches in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Semarang, Magelang, Sukoharjo, Wonogiri, Ngawi and Madiun. GBIKA is rated one of the ten most rapidly growing churches in the world (*Bahana Magazine*, October 2007, vol. 198; www.gbika.org). It owns a public TV station, a radio station and other businesses.

By and large people in Surakarta speak local Javanese languages (*basa Jawa*) in daily interaction. The royal family in the palace, people at cultural Javanese events and artists in Javanese dramatic performances tend to use upper class Javanese (*krama inggil*). Indonesian (*bahasa* Indonesia) is the national language that is mostly used as a teaching medium and in the government bureaucracy. Some Chinese and Arabs speak Mandarin (Chinese) or Arabic in their communities.

The national curriculum requires students to take *bahasa* Indonesia as a core course from elementary to university level. Only students from elementary to senior high school have to take Javanese, which is considered a local curriculum. English is taught from junior high school up to university level. Islamic schools and *madrasah* offer Arabic courses. Mandarin is offered at a limited number of Chinese schools and Chinese private learning institutions. All popular newspapers in Surakarta are written in *bahasa* Indonesia.

## 3.2 Sources and data collection

As this is a study of participants' perspectives, the main source was the spoken language of Christians and Muslims. Most of the data was generated by 24 FGDs. Thus the primary source was FGD participants (informants). Before organizing FGDs I conducted individual interviews, studied local newspapers (*Solopos*) from previous years and attended religious services in both Muslim and Christian communities. Secondary data came from pamphlets, brochures, banners, bulletins, letters from participants and the internet.

FGDs were the primary method of data collection, since the study focuses on intergroup and intra-group relations and communication. They provided information on how people interact in groups, thus enabling the researcher to analyse their speech acts. In view of the nature of the research problem FGDs were classified according to religion, gender, age (generation) and profession. This was because individuals feel relaxed to discuss issues with like-minded individuals of their own social group. In such an environment they tend to act naturally and reveal their discursive practices (Fairclough 1995).

Participants were first grouped according to their religions: Christianity and Islam. Religious classification was applied to all groups (gender, age and profession). Thus group discussions comprised eight Christian FGDs (first round), eight Muslim FGDs (second round) and eight FGDs composed of both Christians and Muslims (third round). Approximately half the participants in the first and second round FGDs took part in the third round, so both old and new participants joined in the mixed FGDs.

As for age (youths and the elderly), youths were aged between 15 and 24. The elderly were aged from 50 upwards. In fact, the youngest participant attending the group discussions was 17 years old and the oldest was 73. We do not have a specific 25-49 age category, but most professionals and workers

were in that age group. By professionals we mean entrepreneurs, managers, journalists and public servants. Workers are labourers, company employees, domestic workers, operators in the informal sector, et cetera.

To generate the data I asked a basic question at an early stage in each FGD: 'How would you describe the other (Christian/Muslim)?' The rest of the conversation dealt with issues raised by participants in response to that basic question. Each discussion lasted about two hours. The Christian and Muslim group discussions were held in the participants' houses or in the religious organization's offices. To create a relaxed atmosphere mixed group discussions were conducted in restaurants. All FGDs were tape-recorded, using a digital device that produced quite good results. The FGD research corpus (data) are taken from those tape-recordings.

In my fieldwork I had two research assistants, Mohammad Ishom (41 years old) and Ruth Andita Hayu Tejaningtyas (24 years old). Mohammad Ishom was born and lives in Solo. Ishom is a teacher at *Pesantren* Muayyad and a lecturer at the Nahdlatul Ulama University in Solo. He completed a BA degree in English at Sebelas Maret University in Surakarta and an MA at the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta. Andita was also born and lives in Solo. She is a member of the Javanese Christian Church (GKJ), a mainstream Protestant church in Indonesia, and graduated in communication at Sebelas Maret University in Surakarta.

Interviewees (research participants) were selected by means of purposive sampling, roughly as follows. Ishom invited the Muslim participants, while Andita invited the Christian participants. They contacted two candidates for each group, whom they already knew. These two then invited two of their friends to join the FGD. So Ishom and Andita knew some but not all of the participants.

Almost all contacted participants were eager to join the research project by accepting the FGD invitation. This shows that almost all prospective participants were comfortable with the project. Two Muslims candidates declined. One was a lecturer of Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta, who refused to join the professional Muslim group discussion. He told Ishom that this kind of study would be used by a Western university and non-Muslim parties for a negative purpose. Another was a Muslim student activist. He attended the young Muslim group discussion, but refused to join the young mixed (Muslim-Christian) group discussion. He told Ishom that he would join it, but cancelled when he learned it would be a mixed group discussion. One Christian male candidate also declined to join the FGD. He explained to Andita that he had another urgent programme, but he gave Andita a handwritten letter, which I have attached to this book (see appendix 1). Ultimately a total of 150 participants attended the FGDs.

Table 6
Participants in focus group discussions

| | MALE | | | FEMALE | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Muslims | Christians | Mixed | Muslims | Christians | Mixed |
| Elderly people | 5 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 7 |
| Youths | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 7 |
| Professionals | 5 | 3 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| Workers | 6 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 8 |

Although we tried to draw participants from diverse backgrounds, a case study such as mine is obviously not representative of all Solonese. We had only very few 'hardliners' or radicals among our participants, although some of their 'voices' were heard in our group discussions, and we must assume some conformity to social desirability and face saving. In term of religious affiliation, the Muslim participants are mostly members or sympathizers of Muhammadiyah or NU. A few are members of Salafi and sympathizers of new puritan Islamic movements. The Christian participants are mainly members of mainstream Protestant (GKJ and GKI) and Roman Catholic churches. Some young participants are members of old and new Pentecostal/ charismatic churches.

The Christian group discussions were held from 18 March to 27 April 2009, the Muslim group discussions from 25 July to 27 November 2009, and the mixed group discussions from 18 December 2009 to 28 February 2010. Thus the time lapse between first and last discussions was not more than one year.

## 3.3 Methods of data analysis

Critical discourse analysis is a theory and a methodology. It was chosen principally because of the need to explore a plausible dialectic relationship between language and socio-cognitive effects on Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia and explain the role of language in intercultural religious communication in the community. I wanted to determine participants' perspectives with due regard to their social identity and positions in maintaining and/or changing those positions.

Language analysis is a complex, sometimes highly technical sphere in its own right, requiring many types and techniques of analysis. Although a background in linguistics may be prerequisite for discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis is in fact multidisciplinary, and one cannot expect a sociologist, psychologist or political scientist to have a detailed linguistic background (Fairclough 1992: 74). Discourse analysis is multidisciplinary and some scholars have used it as a method in religious studies, for example Heather (2000), Wijsen (2010), Ndaluka (2012) and Wijsen (2013).

Discourse studies made their first appearance in the academic world only after the post-structuralist critique in the 1970s. Unquestionably Michel Foucault played a fundamental role in the development of discourse analysis (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 10). His ideas about power, cognition and the self have influenced a whole range of disciplines. Post-structuralism recognizes that signs get their meaning not from their relation to reality but from their relation to other signs. However, it criticizes the distinction between language system and language use (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 11). The relation between signs is not stable but fluid. Moreover, language use (*parole*) determines the system (*langue*), not just the other way round.

Although Foucault is a key figure, not all discourse analysts share his view of the relation between power struggle and knowledge production. One can differentiate between various versions of discourse analysis. Non-critical approaches take participants' perspectives as they are and study them from within. Content analysis and conversation analysis are examples. Critical approaches link knowledge production to power relations. To some extent critical discourse analysts are suspicious of what participants say, which is linked to their social positions and their interest in either maintaining or transforming the status quo.

Discourse is a practice like any other. In pragmatic terms, language is not only a way of saying things (informative); it is also a way of doing things (performative) or exercising power (Bourdieu 1991). The only difference from other practices is its linguistic form (Fairclough 1992: 71). Thus the first method is the analysis of discourse as linguistic practice, called description (Fairclough 1989: 26). According to critical discourse analysts the relation between language and social reality is not direct but occurs via discursive practices. Consequently the second method is the analysis of discursive practice or interpretation (Fairclough 1989: 26), that is analysing the production, distribution and consumption of texts (Fairclough 1992: 71). The discursive practice (interaction) is crucial, as the dialectic relation between linguistic practice (text) and social practice (context) is based on it.

In analysing text and talk researchers can proceed in two ways. They can focus on the meaning of the language, analysing taxonomies and other classifications. This is what content analysis is about. Or they can analyse the use of language in the construction of social realities (Kvale 2008: 103-104). In this study I followed the latter line and used a socio-cognitive approach to discourse analysis (Van Dijk 2008). While I acknowledge the existence of other analytical methods, both within discourse analysis and in the social sciences generally, I opted for critical discourse analysis (CDA), particularly Fairclough's version of it, as it is best suited to my assumptions and objectives. CDA approaches the text with the following assumptions.

Critical discourse analysts assume a dialectic relation between language and social structure: what participants say is shaped by and in its turn shapes social structures, either reproducing them or transforming them (Fairclough 1992: 72). This is the third method: the analysis of social practice or 'explanation'. In other words, critical discourse analysts are interested in the socio-cognitive – that is, ideational and interpersonal – effects of language.

Fairclough (1992: 73, 231) develops CDA as a multi-perspective and poly-methodical approach of discourse analysis. Elsewhere in his book he uses the term 'stages' instead of 'methods'. But the distinction between analytic perspectives and stages is not clear-cut. There are overlaps. Moreover, the distinction between perspectives and stages of analysis does not reflect a one-to-one situation. All stages are used for analysing all dimensions of practice, although one method may be more fruitful for analysing a specific dimension of practice than another. In this book I reformulate Fairclough's multi-perspective and poly-methodical approach as reflected in table 7. I also use numbering in the table as a technique for presenting data analysis in the next three chapters.

Table 7

Multi-perspective and poly-methodical model of discourse analysis

| METHOD | PERSPECTIVE | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Micro level (individual) | Meso level (institutional) | Macro level (societal) |
| Description (linguistic practice) | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| Interpretation (discursive practice) | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| Explanation (social practice) | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.3 |

### 3.3.1 *Description*

CDA begins with the analysis of linguistic features of the text (Fairclough 1989: 25; 109-139; Fairclough 1992: 76-77, 185-194). Description, also called linguistic practice, can be classified under four main headings: vocabulary, grammar, cohesion and text structure (Fairclough 1992: 75). In this research I use mainly one of these: vocabulary. I am also concerned with metaphor (Fairclough 1992: 195). Vocabulary concentrates mainly on individual words and can be investigated in many ways. It is of limited value to think of language as documented in dictionaries, because there are a great many overlapping and competing vocabularies corresponding to different domains, institutions, practices, values and perspectives.

The vocabulary analysed is wording, overwording and rewording (alternative wording). The term 'wording' entails expressing and constituting the world in words, which happens differently in different times and places and for different groups of people (Fairclough 1992: 76-77). Overwording is a sign of

'intense preoccupation' pointing to 'peculiarities in the ideology' (Fairclough 1992: 193). Rewording is new articulations which are set up as alternatives to, and in opposition to, existing ones (Fairclough 1992: 194). Fairclough (1992: 185-186) maintains that 'it is sometimes useful for analytic purposes to focus upon a single word or key words'. The analysis also took into account 'alternative wordings and their political and ideological significance' (Fairclough 1992: 77). The main question here is, what words do the participants use?

### 3.3.2 *Interpretation*

Interpretation is also called discursive practice. It involves processes of text production, distribution and consumption, and the nature of these processes varies between different types of discourse according to social factors (Fairclough 1992: 78). When participants produce (communicate) and consume (interpret) text or talk, they draw on members' resources (Fairclough 1989: 163) or mental models (Van Dijk 2008: 75) stored in their long-term memory (Fairclough 1989: 9-10; 24-24). Texts are also consumed differently in different social contexts. These resources are cognitive in the sense that they are in people's heads; and they are social in the sense that they are socially constructed and have social effect (Fairclough 1989: 24). So the question is, what members' resources or mental models do participants draw on to produce (communicate) or consume (interpret) text?

Processes of production and interpretation are socially constrained in a twofold sense. First, they are constrained by available members' resources – that is, effectively internalized social structures, norms and conventions, including orders of discourse – and conventions for the production, distribution and consumption of texts of the aforementioned sort, which have been constituted by social practice and struggle. Second, they are constrained by the specific nature of the social practice of which they are part, which determines what elements of members' resources they draw on and how they draw on these (Fairclough 1992: 80).

Fairclough (1992) mentions three aspects of inter-discursivity: the force of utterances, the coherence of texts, and the intertextuality of texts. I deal with only one of the three: the intertextuality of texts. Intertextuality is basically the property of texts that are full of allusions to other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo and so forth. The term 'intertextuality' refers to the productivity of texts, the way they transform earlier texts, restructuring and turning them into new conventions (Fairclough 1992: 102). As for production, an intertextual perspective stresses the historicity of texts: the way they always constitute additions to existing chains of speech communication.

When it comes to distribution, an intertextual perspective is helpful in exploring relatively stable networks within which texts move, undergoing pre-

dictable transformations as they shift from one text type to another. In the case of consumption an intertextual perspective is helpful in stressing that it is not just the text in hand that shapes interpretation, but also those other texts which interpreters invariably bring into the interpretation process (Fairclough 1992: 80-81). This suggests that speakers borrow and transform words from other sources or texts to justify their own speech in their social setting. In the FGDs, for example, participants used words from the Bible, the Qur'an and the constitution of Indonesia to justify social identities/positions to which they were referring.

Fairclough (1992: 104) also distinguishes manifest intertextuality, where a text overtly draws on specific other texts, from constitutive intertextuality (interdiscursivity). Interdiscursivity extends intertextuality to include the principle of the primacy of the order of discourse. On the one hand, we have texts heterogeneously constituted from specific other texts (manifest intertextuality); on the other hand, texts may be heterogeneously constituted from elements (types of convention) of orders of discourse (interdiscursivity).

### 3.3.3 *Explanation*

The third stage of analysis is explanation, also called social practice. It analyses the socio-cognitive effects of the text. When participants draw on their cognitive resources they are reproduced (Fairclough 1989:162). Thus social effects are achieved via members' resources (Fairclough 1989:163). Van Dijk's study of ethnic prejudice shows how stereotypes are reproduced in everyday talk. But they can also be reinterpreted and transformed. Here Fairclough (1992: 86-96) mentions a variety of tools. In my research I focus on 'hegemony' (Foucault 1977) and 'ideology' (Gramsci 1971), taking into account the overlap with the first stage which considers alternative wordings and their ideological significance. So the question is, what are the socio-cognitive effects of what participants say? Do they reproduce the existing order or transform it?

According to Fairclough (1992: 86) discourse as social practice relates to ideology and power. In his view certain uses and forms of language are ideological and serve to establish or sustain relations of domination in a particular discursive practice (Fairclough 1992: 87). Fairclough believes that ideologies in all societies are characterized by relations of domination, implying that discourse is a form of ideology critique. Unlike Foucault, who holds that there is no reality beyond discourse, or at any rate that scholars do not have access to it and thus lack instruments to assess what is true or untrue, Fairclough (1992: 58) is convinced that ideology critique is possible. In contrast to Foucault's determinism, he posits a dialectic relation between discourse and reality.

Fairclough (1992: 64-65) speaks about effects of discourse at three levels: knowledge or belief, social identities and social relations. In other words, language constitutes identities, relations and ideas (Fairclough 2001: 62, 93-94).

These are the ideational and interpersonal (identity in relation) effects of language use. Following Fairclough (1992: 65), I am interested in social change, that is, whether language use reproduces or transforms the societal order. Ideology is fixation of meaning. When participants say that Christians are 'expansionist' or that Muslims are 'extremists', prejudices are reproduced.

### 3.4 Language translation

The main language used by the interviewees (research participants) is *bahasa* Indonesia. Sometimes their utterances are phrased in Javanese or Arabic. Hence the first translation issue is from *bahasa* Indonesian into English, simply because this book is written in English.

Translation studies distinguish between two concepts: translation and interpretation. A translation deals with written language and translators have time to polish their output. Interpretation deals with spoken language and interpreters have no time to refine their work (Gile 1998: 41-42). In this book I am translating in the sense that spoken voices of FGD participants were recorded on tape and partially transcribed. I constantly went back to the transcription in the course of analysis and writing.

The second issue is translation from spoken language into written language, and the third is translation from colloquial language to academic language. Because this is an academic work, I chose formal rather than dynamic equivalents in translation. In the case of 'formal equivalent' (also called formal correspondence), the message in the receptor language should correspond as closely as possible with the diverse elements in the source language (Munday 2001: 36-48). Because of my choice of a translation method, I had to exert myself to determine accuracy and correctness according to the structure and style of the source language. Most typical of 'formal equivalent' translations are gloss translations as applied in this book, which closely approximate the source language structure, often supplemented with scholarly footnotes. This model of translation gives us access to the language and customs of the source culture (Munday 2008: 42).

In chapters 2, 3 and 4 there are many footnotes giving the source language, as well as glosses for certain words or phrases. In presenting the analysis the *bahasa* Indonesian version (sometimes Javanese or Arabic phrases/ words) of participants' talk is appended in footnotes. Participants' talk appears in quotation marks. My additions/explanations to their responses are in square brackets ([ ]). Three dots (...) show omissions from and/or continuations of the speech. Throughout the book double quotation marks ("...") indicate the research participant's own voice, while others quotations appear in single quotation marks ('...').

## 3.5 Planning and output

In presenting the research outcomes, after this general introduction I present the analysis of the Christian FGDs (chapter 2), the Muslim FGDs (chapter 3) and the mixed FGD (chapter 4). This is followed by a general conclusion. Two appendixes appear at the back of this book. They consist of a translation of a handwritten letter by a Christian candidate and a translation of a bulletin written by a female Muslim convert.

The research project on which this book reports started in 2009 and ended in 2013. It is part of a collaborative project on religious language, social cohesion and conflict in Tanzania and Indonesia. Whereas I conducted my case study in Indonesia, my counterpart conducted a case study in Tanzania (Ndaluka 2011) and our supervisor conducted a comparative study (Wijsen 2013). The doctoral dissertations were submitted to and defended at the Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. The main output of the project is two printed books. In collaboration with the principal supervisor, we also published several articles in international books on critical discourse analysis and a comparative study between Tanzania and Indonesia.

The scope of a case study is always limited. While I started with the macro political issue at an international (Toft et al. 2011) and national (Sterkens, Machasin & Wijsen 2007) level, I studied only one location, Surakarta. Although I acquired in-depth insight into social identity construction in interreligious relations at grassroots level, the fmdings cannot be generalized to the whole of Indonesia. The growing interconnectedness of cultures has generated an ever increasing number of cross-cultural and comparative studies.

Yet the question of the translatability or un-translatability of (religious) concepts remains unanswered. Insight into translatability or un-translatability of concepts reveals the possibilities and limitations of intercultural communication of religious meanings, and consequently the conditions for the possibility of peaceful co-existence of religions. I hope this book contributes to the academic development of religious studies, especially in regard to the cross-cultural identity of Muslims and Christians in Indonesia. Though the study does not seek to be practice-oriented, I nevertheless hope that the acquired insight may prove useful in policy making for religious community development.

# Chapter II

# "Normal" and "extreme" Muslims
# How Christians speak about Muslims

This chapter on how Christians speak about Muslims starts with two texts found in Solo. The first is a report in the local newspaper *Solopos* (28 October 2000): "Indonesia is *dar ul kufr*" (a land of infidels). It was a statement by a speaker in a discussion on "*Dakwa* strategy of Hizb Tahrir", organized in Solo by Hizb Tahrir of Indonesia (HTI). Hizb al-Tahrir (HT) is an international movement that seeks to overthrow democracy and revive the bygone transnational rule of the *khilafah* (caliphate) (Ahnaf 2011). HTI is the Indonesian branch of international HT. The newspaper reported that the speaker called Indonesia a *dar ul kufr* because it does not apply Islamic Syariah. The speaker argued that Muslims should not be responsible for national security. The second text is the Bank Mandiri Syariah's signboard on Jalan Slamet Riyadi, a main thoroughfare in Surakarta. Bank Mandiri Syariah is one of the many commercial banks using the Islamic banking system, which proliferated after the *Reformasi*.


*Figure 1: Signboard of the Mandiri Syariah Bank in Jalan Slamet Riyadi, Surakarta*
(Source: Author's collection)

Both texts describe how the word 'Syariah' entered the Indonesian public sphere after the *Reformasi* era. Surakarta is no exception. One text describes the demand to change the Indonesian constitution. Besides HTI, some other Islamic organizations and political parties ask for the implementation of Syariah through the state's law. Their membership is a small proportion of the huge number of Indonesian Muslims, but they are highly vocal. Another text relates to the commodification of Syariah to promote Islamic economic development. Among other discourses, the discourse on Syariah highlights the religious transformation in Indonesia after the 1998 *Reformasi*. The research subjects of this study, the Christians in Surakarta, constitute and are constituted by this transformation when they talk about Muslims.

As indicated in the introduction, this study explores social identity construction through interreligious – particularly Christian-Muslim – relations from a communicative practice theory point of view. We want to know why and under what conditions people, both individually and collectively, elevate their religious identity above other identities and whether or not religious identity threatens national identity and leads to social conflict. In this chapter we focus on Christians and how they speak about Muslims. When talking about Muslims as the 'other' (out-group), Christians sometimes talk about themselves (in-group).

The research data are mainly utterances from eight focus group discussions (FGDs) involving 39 Christian participants. On average each FGD involved five to six participants. In addition we draw from their sacred scriptures, religious books, newspapers, a handwritten letter from a candidate participant, flyers, cyber sources, et cetera. Apart from the religious criterion, participants were grouped according to three criteria. We had male and female groups, and within these categories we distinguished between elders and youths, and professionals and workers. Gender-wise 21 women and 18 men attended the FGDs. We classify participants aged 17 to 24 as youths and those aged 50 years and over as elders. We do not have a specific category of participants aged 25 to 49, but that was the age group of most professionals and workers. The youngest participant attending the young group was 19 years old, while the oldest in the elder group was 73 years old. By professionals we mean entrepreneurs, managers or public servants; by workers we mean labourers, company employees, domestic workers, et cetera.

All participants invited to join the Christian groups were happy to participate and none refused. Only one young Christian male cancelled his acceptance because he said he had another urgent commitment. However, on his own initiative he submitted a two-page handwritten letter explaining his description of Muslims. We include the letter as a data source to be analysed in this chapter. The full text of the letter appears at the back of this book (appendix 1).

To start the discussion in each focus group the researcher (moderator of FGDs) posed a basic question at an early stage of the session. This question was, "How do you describe Muslims?" The group then proceeded to deal with the issues raised by participants in response to the basic question. The main title of this chapter – "normal" and "extreme" Muslims – derives from participants' contributions. We use those words as the title of the chapter because "normal" and "extreme" are key concepts in Christians' labelling of Muslims in the FGDs.

## 1 Description

The first stage is description or the analysis of linguistic practice, that is the linguistic features of the text (Fairclough 1992: 76-77). For this stage Fairclough (1992: 73-78, 234-237) suggests various analytic tools. Here we focus on vocabulary, that is wording, over-wording and rewording (alternative wording). The term 'wording' refers to processes of wording the world, which differ in different times and places and among different groups of people (Fairclough 1992: 76-77). Over-wording is a sign of intense preoccupation pointing to ideological peculiarities (Fairclough 1992: 193), whereas rewording refers to new wordings proposed as alternatives and in opposition to existing ones (Fairclough 1992: 194). In addition we look at metaphors. Fairclough (1992: 195) says: "How a particular domain of experience is mataphorized is one of the stakes in the struggle within and over discourse practices." The object of analysis in this linguistic practice stage is words, phrases or sentences. In our case it is the way Christians speak about Muslims. Analytic questions are: How do Christians describe Muslims? What do they say about Muslims? What words do they use?

### 1.1 Analysis at micro level

The micro or individual dimension of discourse is when people speak about their personal lives and opinions as individual believers, for example as members of families, neighbourhoods or villages. Participants speak about Muslims as "friend", "neighbour", "sister", "brother", "relative" or "family member". A participant said, "I could not have only Christian friends. I like to have Christians, Muslims, Hindus or even Buddhists as friends. And I am happy."[16]

In talking about her friends a girl in the young female group described three of them. She said "One Muslim is rather fanatical, two others are ordinary."[17]

---

[16] *Aku juga gak bisa kok mengandalkan hanya bertemen dengan temen Kristen. Aku juga seneng banyak temen mbuh kuwi Kristen, Muslim, Hindu bahkan Buddha. Dan aku seneng.*

[17] *Yang satu agak fanatik, yang dua biasa.*

She uses "fanatical" (*fanatik*) and "ordinary" (*biasa*) as identity labels. By doing so she classifies Muslims into two groups: fanatical and ordinary. Another participant in that group used the same words to speak about her neighbours. She said:

> "There is a mosque [close to] my house that can be considered rather fanatical. There are two Muslims [neighbors] opposite of my house. One has a stall, the other doesn't. The one that has no stall goes to the fanatical mosque, sir. I don't know the name of the group. I have a dog. The dog often goes out. And if it goes out, it chases people. The fanatical man often [throws] stones at my dog. [He] often beats it, sir. When my dog is outside, the one who has no stall and is not fanatical will even open the door [of his house, gate]. He is not a dog fanatic."[18]

In this text the girl describes her relation with her Mulism neighbors. The utterance shows that in the participant's area, the Christian residences are not separated but mixed with Muslim residences. It is confirmed by later texts that the Christian residences sometimes close to mosques. In this text the girl mentions that the non-fanatical man is "not a dog fanatic". Using the foregoing classification, he is an "ordinary" Muslim. Another participant in the same group used the same words to define the identity of her fanatical neighbour. She said:

> "[He is] very fanatical ... I happen to have a Muslim neighbour. His Islam is from the school that wears pants like when people are in a flood. He is [a member of] LDII [Indonesian Islamic *Dakwa* Institution]... They [members of that family] are weird, sir. I played in his house. I was hurt. I sat down on the sofa. But the next day [I] saw that sofa. It was [drying] in the sun. ... I also played with his younger sister ... I went inside the sister's room... Then the next day I passed by [that house]. The bed was drying in the sun. The bed was a carrycot. Why was it drying?"[19]

The participant describes an ambiguous inter-personal relation between her and the neighbor. She describes the neighbor as a "fanatical" and "weird" Muslim.

---

[18] *Di rumah saya itu kan ada masjid yang bisa dibilang agak fanatik. Di depan rumahku itu ada Muslim dua-duanya. Yang satu punya warung yang satu nggak. Yang gak punya warung itu ke mesjid yang agak fanatik itu, Pak. Jadi aku gak tahu alirannya apa. Aku kan punya anjing. Anjingnya itu sering keluar. Dan kalau keluar itu sering ngejar orang. Nah sama bapaknya yang agak fanatik itu, dia itu kayak sering ngelempari anjing saya itu pakai batu. Sering ngusir itu lho, Pak. Lha kalau bapaknya yang punya warung dan tidak terlalu fanatik itu kalau anjing saya di luar pintunya malah dibukain. Dia itu gak fanatik sama anjing.*

[19] *Fanatik banget... Kebetulan saya punya tetangga Islam. Islamnya itu dari aliran yang kalau pakai celana itu kayak kebanjiran. Dia itu LDII. ...Mereka itu suka aneh gitu pak. Saya itu main masuk ke rumahnya. Saya itu sakit hati. Saya duduk di sofa. Tapi masak besuk paginya itu ngelihat sofanya itu dijemur di luar ...Lalu pernah juga saya main dengan adiknya... Saya itu masuk ke kamar adiknya... Waktu besuknya saya lewat, kok kasurnya dijemur gitu. Kan kasurnya yang lipetan gitu. Eh kok dijemur.*

But as their neighbor she makes relation with them, for instance by visiting their house and playing with them. In that text the phrase "like when people are in a flood" is a metaphor explaining calf-length pants. In the cited texts we see that when participants describe fanatical Muslims they differentiate between degrees of fanaticism, such as "rather fanatical", "fanatical" and "very fanatical". They not only label them, but the speakers also associate them with concrete behaviour like the fanatical man affiliated to the fanatical mosque and the dog fanatic, the "very fanatical" neighbour with drying the sofa after it had been used by a Christian, and so forth. The words "dog fanatic" refer to a specific (not absolute) kind of fanaticism.

The participant who cancelled his acceptance described his personal experience of Muslim paramilitaries. He wrote, "Islamic paramilitaries, such as FPI [Islamic Defender Front] and LUIS [Surakarta Islamic Paramilitary Troops], attacked my house to break up the Bible study that we were doing."[20] In this text he described a cause-effect relationship between the attack of the Islamic paramilitaries and the holding of Bible study meetings in the house.

Another participant said: "The older sister [of my friend] who is very fanatical... [is] *lebay* [over acting]."[21] Here "*lebay*" is a rewording (alternative wording) of "very fanatical". The word "fanatical" was repeated again and again by participants in almost all group discussions, also in one and the same FGD. Thus it is an over-wording, indicating intense preoccupation. The participant who cancelled his acceptance used the word "narrow-minded" as an alternative for "fanatical". He said that those narrow-minded Muslims think "...that their religion is the best while another religion is bad". A male worker participant complained about the loud voice from the "horn" of the Muslim house of worship. He said:

> "My house is near the mosque. After *magrib* [evening prayer] Islamic songs are broadcast until nine or ten a clock. After that there is *pengajian* [preaching] and the preaching often insults other people... There is also a big mosque... [Its] loudspeaker faces my house. I heard that it irked my friend ... [He] took a gun [air rifle], then he shot [the loudspeaker]."[22]

In the rest of his utterance the speaker said that the reason people protested against the *pengajian* in the mosque is that the preacher prohibited

---

[20] *Para laskar umat islam, misal FPI atau Luis (Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta)... pernah menyerbu rumah saya untuk membubarkan Pendalaman Alkitab yang diadakan di rumah saya.*

[21] *Kakaknya itu sangat fanatik,...lebay.*

[22] *Rumah saya deket masjid. Selesai magrib sudah lagu-lagu rohani Islam dikumandangkan sampai jam sembilan jam sepuluh malam. Setelah itu pengajian dan pengajiannya itu sering menyinggung perasaan orang lain... Satu masjid yang besar itu yang corongnya sudah pas di depan rumah saya... Saya pernah mendengarkan temen itu sampai jengkel. Ngambil senapan lalu ditembak.*

"gambling"[23] and the use of "drugs" by villagers.[24] That sermon "was broadcast [to people's houses] loudly through the horn".[25] The participant described how protesters "who are drinkers and gamblers directly went to the *musholla* [Muslim chapel, where the *pengajian* was held]. [They said to the preacher] if you still preach like that, please do not stay in this area."[26]

In talking about Muslims participants sometimes also talked about themselves. A Catholic in the male worker group spoke about his "Pancasila family". He said, "I myself have eight siblings. [My family is] a Pancasila family. There are Muslims, Christians, Catholics."[27] Another participant, a member of Bethel church in the female worker group, said, "My family is diverse (*majemuk*)... There are Catholics, Christians, Muslims."[28] Both participants described pluralist families, but they used different words. The first speaker called this a "Pancasila family", while the second spoke of a "diverse" family. A male worker described diverse religions in his neighbour's family: "The child is Christian, the wife is Christian, but he [the husband] is Muslim."[29]

Another participant said, "We are six siblings. My oldest sibling is Muslim. Our parents [and my] younger siblings are Christian. He/she [my oldest sibling] never problematizes [our diversity]. He/she accompanies [us] to Sunday school... When the fasting month comes, he/she [observes the fast] alone. My mother cooks early in the morning, asks my oldest sibling to wake up [and] have a meal before fasting [*sahur*]."[30] Here the speaker described social relations in her mixed family. A young male spoke about his parents. He said:

> "[My] father is Catholic, but [my] mother converted to Christianity [from Islam]... [My] mother was not a devout Muslim. When [she] met [my] father [she] fell in love... My father was active in the church. Then it was impossible [for him to convert], because [he] was already there. However, [my] mother, who was Islam KTP [Islam by Identity Card] [and was not] obedient, surrendered [converted]... So [my] mother's ID is Christian, [my] father's ID

---

[23] *Judi.*

[24] *Mabuk.*

[25] *Dicorongkan langsung pakai horn itu kan besar.*

[26] *Ada yang tukang mabuk, tukang main, langsung ndatangi ke mushola. Nek kowe sih ngajari koyok ngono, wis kowe ra sah ning lingkungan.*

[27] *Keluarga saya sendiri ada delapan saudara. Keluarga Pancasila. Ada Muslim, ada Kristen, ada Katolik.*

[28] *Keluarga saya majemuk... Ada yang Katolik, ada yang Kristen, ada yang Muslim.*

[29] *Anaknya Kristen, isterinya Kristen, tapi dianya Islam.*

[30] *Kami enam bersaudara. Yang tertua kakak saya itu memang Muslim. Orang tua kami adik-adike Kristen. Selama ini dia tidak mempermasalahkan. Kalau sekolah Minggu gitu dia yang nganterin... Kalau pas puasa, dia sendiri. Ibu saya yang masakin pagi-pagi, mbangunin kakak saya untuk sahur.*

is Catholic.[31] Their children are all Christians. I don't know [the process], but finally... [my] mother repented."[32]

In this utterance the participant described converting to Christianity as a kind of repentance. He also mentioned that his mother was not an obedient Muslim. The speaker called his mother "Islam KTP". Another person in the same group observed: "Thanks be to God, [my] father got [my] mother to become Christian."[33] Here the speaker said "thanks be to God" with reference to her mother's conversion to Christianity, so converting to Christianity is something to be grateful for.

At the micro level Muslims are generally described as "good" and "tolerant". Muslims and Christians live together harmoniously (social relations). Many utterances in FGDs reveal such coexistence in the family and the neighbourhood. A young female participant described the tradition of *lebaran* [an Islamic feast] in her extended family. She said, "The majority in my family are Muslims. During *lebaran* [we] gathered. There was an *arisan* [gathering and lottery]."[34] A man in the worker FGD said, "When Christmas comes in my place [village] [we] share food [with Muslims]... When *lebaran* comes I also receive parcels [of food] from them."[35]

A young female, a member of a Protestant church, said, "On the day of *Idul Fitri* [an Islamic feast] in Klaten our whole family met, mixed, shook hands. There was a *ziarah* [pilgrimage to cemetery]. We [Christians] also joined. They [Muslims] pray for the spirits, but we [Christians] pray for those who are alive. I think it is the *adat* [custom]."[36] Here the speaker described *ziarah* as an adat. She added that Christians do not pray for spirits but for the living. Thus she distinguished between two different aims of prayer.

Another utterance in the elderly male group reveals a similar attitude. In talking about Christmas celebrations in his neighbourhood association an eld-

---

[31] As was explained in the introduction (chapter 1, section 1.2) the Indonesian state recognizes six religions but distinguishes Christianity (Protestantism) and Catholicism as distinct religions.

[32] *Bapak Katolik, tapi ibu pindah ke Kristen... Ibu itu juga bukan Islam yang taat gitu. Waktu ketemu dengan bapak lalu cinta... Bapak dulu aktif di gereja. Karena itu kemungkinan kan sudah tidak memungkinkan, karena sudah disitu. Tapi ibu yang Islam KTP tidak taat itu sudah pasti dia yang mengalah... Jadi ibu KTP-nya Kristen, bapak KTP-nya Katolik. Anaknya Kristen semua. Gak ngerti, tapi akhirnya... ibu baru bertaubat.*

[33] *Puji Tuhan bapak bisa membawa ibu menjadi umat Kristen.*

[34] *Di keluarga saya sendiri mayoritas memang Muslim. Kalau lebaran ngumpul bareng. Ada arisan.*

[35] *Kalau Natalan itu tempat kami, bagi-bagi makanan... Kalau lebaran tempat saya itu juga dapat paketan dari mereka.*

[36] *Kalau hari H Idul Fitri sih di Klaten kami sekeluarga ngumpul-ngumpul, membaur, bersalam-salaman gitu. Trus ada ziarah kita juga ikut.Mereka mendoakan yang sudah mati, tapi kami ikut berdoa mendoakan yang masih hidup. Saya kira itu adat.*

erly male said, "I conducted a Christmas celebration. A Muslim [girl] who wears a *jilbab* [veil] acted as receptionist. But [she] did not follow the ritual."[37] By saying "[she] did not follow the ritual" he showed that even though the girl took part in the Christmas celebration, she did not join in the ritual.

The participants also talk about togetherness between individual Muslims and Christians. A young male said, "Whenever there is a prayer and Islamic learning program (*pengajian*) in the village I join in. [I help] by carrying [chairs, etc.]."[38] Here the speaker described his role in the Islamic prayer service as carrying chairs, so he was not involved in the ritual part of the service. Another participant in the elderly female group said, "At my place, for instance, if the Christians have services, those Muslims help [Christians]. [It also happens] the other way around. So there is no religious boundary."[39] An elderly male reported, "[There was] a funeral ceremony. I was asked to make a speech as the representative of [my] Muslim family."[40]

Another elderly male said, "When the [economic] crisis occurred, I initiated the prayer service in our place. That was a village service. Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, adherents of indigenous beliefs (*kepercayaan*) attended [that service]. We made cone rice (*tumpeng*).[41] Then [we] prayed, taking turns. The prayer was for the state [security]."[42] This speaker described a prayer service in which Muslims, Christians, Buddhists and adherents of indigenous beliefs took turns to pray.

A young male participant said, "Personally I do not agree with the PDS [a Christian political party]. For instance, ultimately [they] want to make Indonesia a Christian [country]... So [it is] not just [the advocacy of] Syariah by Muslims [that I disagree with]... To be honest, if I listen to the Christian party, I don't like [it], [I] hate [it]."[43] By means of over-wording the speaker described his strong personal disagreement not only with Islamic parties which espouse

---

[37] *Saya pernah mengadakan Natalan. Yang jilbaban yang Muslim jadi among tamu. Tapi tidak mengikuti ritualnya.*

[38] *Kalau ada pengajian saya juga ikut di desa. Bantu angkat-angkat.*

[39] *Di tempat saya saja itu katakanlah yang punya kerja orang Kristen, tapi mereka yang Muslim ya mambantu, juga sebaliknya bagitu. Sehingga, batas agama itu nggak ada.*

[40] *Kesripahan, saya sendiri diminta untuk memberikan sambutan wakil keluarga dari keluarga yang Islam. Jadi kita malah kerjasama.*

[41] *Tumpeng* is cone shaped rice served on a round woven bamboo tray called *tampa*, covered with banana leaf and surrounded by assorted dishes.

[42] *Waktu terjadi krisis, saya pernah mengadakan doa bersama di tempat kami. Itu program desa. Pada datang dari Muslim, Kristen, Hindu, Buddha, kepercayaan. Kita buat tumpeng. Lalu doanya gentenan, doanya untuk negara.*

[43] *Aku sendiri juga gak setuju kalau partai PDS, misalnya nanti terakhirnya ingin membuat Indonesia jadi Kristen... Jadi bukan hanya Syariah yang dari Muslim... Jujur kalau dengar partai Kristen, saya malah gak suka, benci.*

Syariah, but also with Christian political parties which want to make Indonesia a Christian country.

## 1.2 Analysis at meso level

The meso or institutional level of discourse is when participants speak about themselves as adherents of a religious institution, hence about shared, collective patterns of belief and practice which go beyond their personal convictions. In talking about Islam (the other, out-group) Christians sometimes also speak about their own religion, Christianity (in-group).

A participant said, "Islam is good. But it depends on the people."[44] "There is diversity in Islam,"[45] said another participant. The prospective participant who cancelled his acceptance wrote, "They [Muslims] are fragmented into various groups."[46] A male worker said, "Muslims in Solo could be classified into two [groups]. [There are] those [who are] nationalist Muslims... The second, actually very few, are those [who are] hardliners."[47] A female participant in the elderly group made similar utterances about nationalist and radical Muslims.

> Nationalist Muslim groups ... show a spirit of tolerance toward Christians... [By contrast] we are afraid of people [who advocate] radical Islam. How do we behave [towards them]? For instance, [they] refuse to shake hands. [When we] help to put up [their] washing line, [they] rewash. On the other hand, to adherents of nationalist Islam we [behave] ordinarily.[48]

In this text the speaker not only uses labels ("radical" and "nationalist Islam"), but also cites concrete behaviour. They (Christians) behave ordinarily to nationalist Muslims, but are afraid of radical Muslims. In referring to Muslims the speaker links identification as a radical with behaviour, namely refusal to shake hands with Christians.

A female worker observed, "Islam has diversities, sir. Those extremists are dangerous... They often attack cafes. [They do] something haphazardly ... But there are Muslims who want to gather with us."[49] In this text the speaker linked Muslim extremism with being dangerous and doing something haphazardly. They attack cafes and do not want to gather with Christians. Thus the speaker

---

[44] *Islam itu baik. Tapi tergantung orang-orangnya.*

[45] *Islam itu beragam.*

[46] *Mereka terpecah-pecah menjadi berbagai aliran.*

[47] *Solo ini terbagi dua Muslimnya. Muslim yang nasionalis... Yang kedua, sebetulnya sedikit sekali, Islam yang garis keras.*

[48] *Golongan orang Islam yang nasionalis kan... terhadap orang Kristen semangat toleransinya masih ada... Kalau terhadap orang Islam radikal kita jadi takut sendiri. Kita harus bersikap bagaimana. Misalnya salaman tangan saja tidak mau. Mbantu ngangkat jemuran aja sampai dicuci lagi. Beda kalau dengan orang Islam nasionalis kita biasa.*

[49] *Islam itu ya macem-macem lho, mas. Ada yang ekstrim itu lho bahaya... Yang sok nutup kafe-kafe. Ngawur itu... Tetapi ada orang-orang Islam yang mau bersama-sama dengan kita.*

described both the label of extreme and the concrete behaviour associated with Muslim extremism. Another participant said, "[We are] afraid to approach those radical Muslims."[50] If we compare utterances in the last two paragraphs, we conclude that the words "hardliner" and "radical" are alternatives for "extremist". The participants distinguish between Muslim extremists and nationalists.

A young female participant said, "There is very fanatical Islam. There is still normal, ordinary [Islam]."[51] Another participant used a different term, "proper" (*wajar*), saying, "To behave [as a Muslim] in society in a proper (*wajar*) way should be natural (*wajar*)."[52] In these texts the words "ordinary" and "proper" are alternatives for "normal". According to that classification, fanatical Islam is not normal or proper.

Some participants talked about Islam *abangan*. Two participants said, "At my place, the majority of Muslims are Islam *abangan*. [They] like to gamble and get drunk."[53] A male worker described drinking (alcohol) as a custom among *abangan* Muslims,[54] even on the night before *lebaran*.[55] The participants over-worded the Muslims' *abangan* attitude towards drinking, signifying intense preoccupation.

A participant said, "Islam *abangan* is the same as Islam KTP [Islam by ID]."[56] Another contrasted two categories: "Islam KTP" and "Islam *ndeles*" (piety). He said that Islam KTP refers to those who join the faith for pragmatic reasons, [57] who are "not clear"[58] about ritual affairs. Islam *ndeles* are "really spiritual"[59] and "obedient" Muslims.[60] Another participant said, "Those [*abangan*] Muslims never go to mosque, and [*abangan* Catholics] are Catholics but [they] never go to church. I think they are *abangan*."[61] This text shows that the word "*abangan*" is used not only for Muslims but also for Christians. Thus there are *abangan* Muslims and *abangan* Catholics/Christians. From the usage of the word we infer that *abangan* simply means Muslims or Christians who rarely go to their houses of worship.

---

50 *Kalau dengan Islam radikal takut untuk mendekat.*

51 *Islam itu ada yang fanatik banget, ada yang masih sebatas normal, biasa.*

52 *Hidup di masyarakat ya natural saja, wajar saja.*

53 *Di tempat saya mayoritas Islamnya Islam abangan. Suka judi dan mabuk.*

54 *Mabuk.*

55 *Besuk lebaran malamnya.*

56 *Islam Abangan itu sama dengan Islam KTP.*

57 *Seenaknya sendiri.*

58 *Ora cetho.*

59 *Bener-bener rohani.*

60 *Muslim taat.*

61 *Muslim tapi ndak pernah ke mesjid kalau dia Katolik tapi ndak pernah ke gereja, saya kira abangan.*

Participants further described social relations between Christians and Muslim fanatics/hardliners. An elderly female said, "If so-called fanatical [Muslims] are invited [by Christians] to a prayer service [they] do not want to [come]. [If they are] invited for Christmas [they] also do not want to [come]. [If they are] given [food], they throw it out. So we Christians already know [that attitude]."[62] "Those from the hardliner group ... the [gatherings of] PKK [mothers' union], kids [gatherings], *karang taruna* [youth village association] they join. But if there is a funeral ceremony, they do not want to accept the others [non-Muslims]," said a female worker.[63] Another participant in the same group commented, "When [they are] invited to church [they] do not attend... If [they are] invited to a reception at home, they [come]."[64]

Another participant in the same group said, "When there were celebrations [Christmas or Easter] we invited [Muslims] ... They [Muslims] came to the reception part. [They] chose [to attend at] a certain time. [If] the ritual was still going on, they didn't come ... They came after the ritual."[65] Another participant in the same group responded, "When *halal-bi-halal* [an Islamic feast] [was held] [all] the villagers [came], including Christians. Yes, all attend [the services] from beginning to end."[66] The last two texts describe a difference between Muslims and Christians with respect to accepting invitations from members of the other religious community. A female worker said:

> "At my place [there is] a mosque which people call [the mosque] of hardliners. Or [they use] other labels. Once someone with his pants hitting the floor [long pants] prayed [*sholat*]... After he had prayed [the floor] was cleaned. It [the mosque] belongs to a certain group. They [members of that mosque] wear pants that, sorry [to say], are rather short [calf-length pants]. There may be a teaching [in that group] which forbids them to say merry [Christmas]... If they are too close to non-Muslims, they are called *kafir* [by other members of that group]."[67]

---

[62] *Istilahnya fanatik sebut saja, diundang ke persekutuan tidak mau. Diundang ke Natalan juga tidak mau. Diberi ya dibuang. Jadi, kita umat Nasrani Kristen itu sudah maklum.*

[63] *Aliran garis keras... Untuk PKK, anak-anak, karang taruna, mereka ikut. Tapi ketika ada kematian mereka tidak mau menerima keberadaan orang lain.*

[64] *Kalau diundang ke gereja gak mau datang... Kalau diundang resepsi di rumah saja, datang.*

[65] *Di tempat kami di RW atau di kelurahan itu, kalau ada perayaan kan kita undang itu. ...Mereka itu datangnya itu pada saat resepsinya. Nanti pilih waktu sendiri, nanti wah ini kebaktian, dia tidak datang... Dia akan datang kalau sesudah perayaan.*

[66] *Kalau Halal-bi-Halal, itu satu kampung, termasuk yang Kristen, ya semua dari awal sampai akhir.*

[67] *Di tempat saya, mesjid aliran tertentu yang orang banyak bilang aliran keras atau apa ya. Pernah ada orang yang Sholat di situ yang celananya menyentuh lantai... Setelah sholat langsung dibersihin... Itu aliran tertentu. Mereka pakai celana yang, maaf, agak ke atas. Mungkin ada ajaran ndak boleh mengucapkan Selamat (Natal)... Kalau mereka terlalu bergaul dengan orang Non-Muslim, dibilangin kafir.*

Another participant said, "There is a mosque opposite my grandmother's house. My grandmother's driver [a Muslim] prays there. As soon as [he] has prayed [the mosque] is immediately cleaned."[68] "When I go there [to my relative's house, who is a Muslim fanatic], I am asked to wash my hands,"[69] said a participant. A female participant said, "Those males [fanatical Muslims] do not want to shake hands [with women]."[70] These last utterances described two types of social relations: first, relations between hardliner Muslims and other Muslims outside their group; second, relations between them and Christians.

In the young male and female FGDs the participants talked about different types of veils (*jilbab*).

> "The *jilbaber* women, their *jilbab* are very, very big. ... [just like] a bed sheet worn as a *jilbab*."[71]

> "Every Friday jilbaber held demonstrations. They occurred often, either in Slamet Riyadi Street or elsewhere."[72]

> "There was ... a Muslim family and she [the woman in that family] wore burqa (cadar). One day a washing line with wet laundry collapsed, sir. Then my uncle [a Christian] tried to help by taking and putting up [the washing line]. She rewashed the clothes."[73]

> "A pious Muslim woman [on my campus] wears jilbab. It is the modest jilbab, not the burqa. It is the modest one. Although she is pious, she shows great tolerance towards other religions."[74]

In the foregoing texts the participants distinguished between three kinds of veils: *jilbaber, burqa* and modest *jilbab*. The suffix -er in the word "*jilbaber*" indicates a person wearing a *jilbab*. The speaker does not apply this word to any woman wearing a veil, but only to Muslim women wearing "very, very large" *jilbab*. The words "a bed sheet worn as a *jilbab*" are sarcastic, describing an excessively large veil. The words "to rewash" wet clothes that have been touched by Christians are comparable with similar texts quoted previously. Using that classification, a woman wearing a *burqa* is a radical Muslim (cf.

---

68 *Ada masjid di depan rumah nenek saya. Sopirnya tadi kan sholat di situ. Lalu habis sholat langsung dilap.*

69 *Waktu saya ke sana, saya disuruh cuci tangan.*

70 *Yang laki-laki tidak mau salaman.*

71 *Cewek jilbaber, jilbabe gede-gede banget. ... Ki sprei dipakai jilbaban.*

72 *Setiap hari Jumat jilbaber itu beraksi. Itu sering, entah di Slamet Riyadi, entah di apa. Demo setiap hari Jumat.*

73 *Ada keluarga Muslim dan pakai cadar. Suatu saat ada jemuran yang jatuh lho Pak. Lha terus maksudnya pamanku tho nek tibo yo diambilke dibalekke. Itu dicuci lagi sama dia.*

74 *Muslim yang taat pakai jilbab. Jilbab yang modis. Bukan yang cadar. Jadi yang modis. Meskipun dia taat, tapi toleransinya juga besar pada agama lain.*

previous classification of radical and nationalist Muslims). By adding the word "although" in the last utterance the speaker contrasted piety and tolerance.

In regard to typical dress of fanatical Muslim men, a participant said, "Those fanatics... wear calf-length pants (*celana cingkrang*), [they] do not [behave] properly, [they] wear *koko* shirts, [they] wear *kopyah* [hats]."[75] Another participant commented, "The Bali bombers, they are very [anti-]West, they also hate Christians very much. They wear turbans, [have] beards, very long beards, [wear] head covering, and also [wear] what is called waistcoats."[76] In this last text the speaker links the Bali bombers with anti-Western and anti-Christian sentiments and a particular style of dress. The word "very" in the phrases "hate [the West, Christians] very much" and "very long beards" suggests strong intention. With reference to certain types of dress some participants observed, "They want to imitate their prophet, prophet Muhammad"[77] and "The prophet Muhammad is imitated exactly".[78]

A participant said, "[Why] is his [Muhammad's] teaching obeyed slavishly (*mentah-mentah*)?"[79] "In Arabia or Egypt this [style of dress] may protect [you] from dust, from hot weather. But in Indonesia it is not proper,"[80] said a participant. Another participant mentioned, "[Their way of dressing] is disgusting. According to me, they should wear ordinary (*biasa*) clothes."[81] In the phrase "their prophet, prophet Muhammad" the speaker described Muhammad as "their" prophet, not ours. In the text the participant explains that such clothes are appropriate in Arabia or Egypt, but not in Indonesia. It is not ordinary dress but disgusting. Here the speaker contrasts two words: ordinary and disgusting. The word 'disgusting' (*nggilani*) is a rude expression in the Javanese language.

The participant who cancelled his acceptance made the following statement in his letter:

> "Sometimes I feel sorry (*kasihan*) for Muslims because they are fragmented into various groups. This is because their understanding of the holy book is different and because most Muslims obey what their leaders say [they treat their leaders as if they were prophets] even though their leaders may not be right. For example, the *santri* [students] at *Pesantren* Ngruki

---

[75] *Yang fanatik... pakai celana cingkrang, gak anggah-ungguh, bajunya pakai koko, pakai kopyah.*

[76] *Pelaku bom Bali, mereka kan sangat apa namanya Barat, orang Kristen, dia juga sangat benci. Mereka berpakaian itu pake apa surban, jenggot, jenggot sangat lebat, penutup kepala, sampe yang namanya rompi.*

[77] *Mereka itu mencontoh nabi mereka, Nabi Muhammad.*

[78] *Nabi Muhammad itu dicontoh persis plek.*

[79] *Ajarannya kok dimakan mentah-mentah.*

[80] *Kalau di Arab apa di Mesir itu kan bisa melindungi dari debu, dari panas. Lha kalau di Indonesia kan kurang pas.*

[81] *Nggilani, menurutku, wong ya biasa aja gitu kan kalau berpakaian.*

think that Ba'asyir is always right, so they really look up to him and ignore the fact that he is a human being who has faults and weaknesses."[82]

In his letter he calls the followers stupid,[83] because "they are willing to be enslaved"[84] by the leader, "to fight against Christians"[85] or "to go to war". A male worker (Catholic) said something different: "If religion came [through] adapting the [local] culture, [then] there is no conflict. Because Christianity, Catholicism, Islam all came from abroad... If they implement [Islam in] Arabic [style] in Solo, conflict is sure to happen."[86] From the linguistic features of the text the speaker linked the practice of Arabic-style Islam with conflict. The phrase "be enslaved" is in the passive voice and is a highly sarcastic metaphor indicating blind obedience to the leader.

Several participants in the male worker group talked about two different kinds of Muslims and their social relations with Christians. "Muslims who are new learners about Islam, they show their egoism and they perceive themselves as the most proper,"[87] said one of them. Another observed, "People who are just learning [Islam], they show their fanaticism".[88] By contrast a participant said, "Those who are deeply educated in Islam have a better understanding of human relations"[89] and "they can assimilate with us".[90] Here the speakers suggested that the deeper Muslims' knowledge of Islam, the more harmoniously they live with others. Conversely, the more limited their knowledge, the more fanatical and egoistic they are.

Participants said that Muslims refuse to give seasonal greetings to Christians. A female worker said, "Everyday relations [between Muslims and Christians] are good. But when Christmas comes [they] never say merry Christmas."[91] An elderly male participant commented, "During *lebaran* we sometimes say happy *Idul Fitri.* But why do none [of the Muslims] give a greeting at

---

82 For the complete letter, see: appendix 1.

83 *Bodoh.*

84 *Mereka mau diperbudak.*

85 *Memerangi Umat Kristiani.*

86 *Kalau agama masuk menyesuaikan dengan budaya, tidak akan terjadi konflik. Karena agama Kristen, Katolik, Islam, itu dari luar semua... Kalau mereka terapkan yang dari Arab di Solo, itu pasti terjadi konflik.*

87 *Orang Islam yang Islamnya baru belajar, justru dia memberikan semacam ini ya keakuannya dan merasa dia yang paling benar.*

88 *Orang-orang yang baru belajar, justru mengeluarkan kefanatikannya.*

89 *Orang yang mendalam dalam pendidikan agama Islam itu justru lebih memahami hubungan antar manusia.*

90 *Mereka justru bisa membaur dengan kami.*

91 *Hubungan setiap harinya itu bagus. Tapi kalau Natal itu, tidak pernah acapan selamat Natal.*

Christmas?"[92] Also: "We went to our grandfather ... when *Idul Fitri* came... [We] follow the *sungkeman*.[93] But at Christmas [our Muslim relatives] never greet us [merry Christmas]."[94] "During [the month] of fasting [we] always put up a banner in front of our church saying "happy fasting". [There are also banners saying] "happy *Idul Fitri Mohon Maaf Lahir Batin*" [we wish/beg for forgiveness]. But on their side there is no response [when Muslims convey similar greetings],"[95] said an elderly male participant. "*Mohon Maaf Lahir Batin*" [we wish/beg for forgiveness] is a standard Indonesian Idul Fitri greeting.

Speaking about extremists, a participant contrasted their style of dress (white *kopyah*, long white dress, etc.) with their attitude. She said, "Many people wearing that typical dress give [me] the impression that [they are] pious, worshipful people ... [But, they] suddenly [yell] *Allahu Akbar* (the great God), then break something, then burn something."[96] In this text, the speaker linked typical Muslim dress with yells of *Allahu Akbar* and violent acts (breaking/burning things).

However, a Catholic participant said, "Javanese Islam is not like that [violent]. They must be influenced by something from outside that enters Solo. So these Javanese Muslims of Solo, we know they [observe] Javanese culture. Their tolerance ... is strong enough."[97] Here the speaker links Javanese Islam and Javanese Muslims with Javanese culture and tolerance of others (social cognition). The same participant commented, "Religion must enter [society] through local culture. If the culture is abandoned, there will be conflict."[98] In this utterance the speaker intimates that mixing religion with local culture would prevent conflict.

We have pointed out that in describing Islam or the Muslim community Christian participants sometimes also described their own religion or the Chris-

---

[92] *Pada waktu lebaran kadang-kadang kita itu sok mengucapkan Selamat Idul Fitri. Tetapi mengapa di saat Natal, mengapa tidak ada seorangpun yang mengucapkan.*

[93] *Sungkeman* is the Javanese ceremony during *Idul Fitri* in which the young people pay respect to the elder people. Usually the young people bend down in front of and kiss the hand of the elder people.

[94] *Kami datang ke kakek kami... saat idul fitri... Ikut sungkeman... Tapi kalau saat Natal itu gak pernah ada ucapan.*

[95] *Waktu puasa itu selalu di dalam gereja Selamat Menunaikan Ibadah puasa, pakai sepanduk di depan gereja. Selamat Hari Raya Idul Fitri Mohon Maaf Lahir dan Batin. Tapi di sisi lain tanggap responnya kok...*

[96] *Banyak orang yang pakai seperti itu kan kesane itu khusuk beribadah... Tiba-tiba Allahu Akbar kok yo mecahi kaca, trus bakar opo-bakar opo.*

[97] *Kalau Islamnya Jawa sebetulnya tidak seperti itu. Itu mestinya ada masukan dari orang luar yang masuk ke Solo. Jadi kalau Muslim Jawa Solo itu kita sama-sama tahu, budaya Jawa. Toleransinya... cukup kuat.*

[98] *Agama masuk itu harus melalui budaya setempat. Kalau budaya ditinggalkan, pasti akan terjadi konflik.*

tian community. At meso or institutional level they indicated that Christians should love others. An elderly male said, "Love others as you love yourself!"[99] A young female asked, "Why don't we love [others]...? When you are slapped on your right cheek, give your left cheek [as well]."[100] A young male participant said, "[I] pray for them [Muslims] because [I] love [them]."[101]

A participant said, "In a pluralistic society you have to be the salt [of the earth], and at the same time be the candle, the light."[102] The metaphor "you have to be the salt" indicates that Christians must serve others (social cognition). It is also an alternative wording of "candle" and "light". Some participants talked about what Christians should do when Muslims oppress them. A participant said, "Pray for those who hate you!"[103] A female professional commented, "When we are oppressed... [we must] pray for those who hate us!"[104]

Some participants claimed that they are also challenged by other Christian groups. They talked about a new wave of Christianity. A male worker referred to his Christian friend, who maintained that "it [our church] is wrong according to the Bible... Even [our] way of baptism is considered wrong."[105] An elderly male said:

> "My Christian friends have an inappropriate understanding. The inappropriateness is that they always say that to live [in a Christian way] they must practise the faith slavishly, slavishly... Usually that is a problem we have with our Muslim brothers... Radicalism in Christianity exists, exists. Secondly, something that creates problems with our Muslim brothers, it could be said that an evangelical group or a certain church is not sensitive to the surroundings, is not sensitive to the surroundings."[106]

In the text the speaker repeats the words "exists" and "is not sensitive to the surroundings". These are over-wordings indicating the significance of those words. In this text the speaker relates slavish understanding of Christianity to radicalism. The same participant said, "They just get to page two or three [of the Bible], [then they] think they have finished. But there are still hundreds of

---

99 *Kasihilah sesamamu sebagaimana dirimu sendiri.*

100 *Mengapa kita tidak mengasihi... Saat kamu ditampar pipi kananmu, berikan pipi kirimu.*

101 *Saat umat Muslim berpuasa, saya juga berpuasa dan berdoa untuk mereka mengasihi.*

102 *Di masyarakat yang majemuk, kamu harus menjadi garam, dan pada saat bersamaan menjadi lilin, penerang.*

103 *Doakan orang-orang yang membenci kamu.*

104 *Ketika kita ditekan... Doakan orang-orang yang membenci kamu.*

105 *Ini menurut Al-Kitab itu salah... Sampai baptisan pun dianggap salah.*

106 *Temen-temen Kristen ada yang mempunyai pemahaman yang kurang tepat. Kurang tepatnya adalah dia selalu berbicara bahwa aplikasi kehidupan itu harus mengaplikasikan iman secara mentah, secara mentah. Kalau gini yo gini...Sering-sering itu yang menjadi kendala bagi saudara-saudara kami yang Muslim... Radikalisme di dalam Kristen ada, ada....Yang kedua yang menjadi kendala saudara-saudara kami di Muslim katakanlah kelompok evangelical atau gereja tertentu tidak peka lingkungan, tidak peka lingkungan.*

pages after that."[107] This speaker considers the understanding of evangelical and radical Christians imperfect. The utterance about radical Christians is comparable with the previous reference to fanatical Muslims: "Those with a deep education in Islam have a better understanding of human relations."

### 1.3 Analysis at macro level

The macro or societal level of discourse is when participants speak about themselves as members of Solo society, as citizens of Indonesia, or about international issues. They talked about freedom (*kebebasan*) as something new in Indonesian life after the *Reformasi* in 1998. A male professional said, "Freedom has broadened, opened up more. Formerly there was oppression."[108] He classified the New Order era as an era of oppression and the *Reformasi* as an era of freedom.

A participant said, "In the government bureaucracy... it was difficult for non-Muslims to occupy [a high] position."[109] But after *Reformasi*, another participant said, "In Solo we fortunately have a leader [mayor] who is a Muslim [and] another [vice mayor] who is a Catholic."[110] The two texts describe the different positions Christians held in the bureaucracy before and after *Reformasi*. The word "fortunately" shows that having a Christian vice mayor is auspicious for Christians. An elderly male said, "Solo is an interesting example [in politics]. Among the leaders, the mayor is Muslim, the vice mayor is Catholic. In the past I never saw a big Christmas celebration in the city hall."[111] In this text the speaker sees a relation between the position of a Catholic vice mayor and the opportunity to hold a big Christmas celebration in the city hall.

However, some participants said that freedom stimulates the emergence of Muslim extremism. Freedom implies "whatever is free",[112] said a participant. Freedom also leads to "violence" (*kekerasan*). A male professional said, "To open the door of democracy on a large scale nowadays makes the dominant people able to do whatever they want. Because they think they are not challenged."[113] Here the speaker relates the introduction of large-scale democracy to scope for the dominant group (majority) to act arbitrarily. An elderly female described a similar situation using different vocabulary: "free in the wild

---

[107] *Dia membaca baru sampai halaman dua atau tiga dia merasa sudah khatam. Padahal masih ada sekian ratus halaman di belakangnya lagi.*

[108] *Kebebasan semakin diperluas, semakin dibuka. Kalau dulu kan ada tekanan.*

[109] *Di pemerintahan... non-Muslim itu sulit untuk menduduki jabatan.*

[110] *Di Solo ini utungnya kita punya pimpinan satunya Islam satunya Katolik.*

[111] *Solo ini bisa menjadi contoh menarik. Pemimpinnya, walikotanya Islam, wakil walikotanya Katolik. Itu dulu saya gak pernah merasakan Natalah besar-besaran seperti ini di balai kota.*

[112] *Apa-apa ini bebas.*

[113] *Membuka besar-besaran pintu demokrasi sekarang ini membuat orang yang dominan lebih bisa berbuat semaunya. Karena mereka merasa tidak mendapatkan halangan.*

sense".[114] This is an alternative wording of the phrase "whatever is free" and people who "are able to do whatever they want". A male worker described acts of violence during the 1998 riots. He said:

> "The mall of Ratu [and the mall of] Luwes belong to Chinese. [The masses shouted] they belong to Chinese. Just loot [them]! Just loot [them]! [They] belong to Chinese... [They] thought like that, like that. Because there was division between Javanese and Chinese. [It was] old vengeance. A long time ago Javanese were labourers of the Chinese."[115]

This text describes violence during the 1998 riots and illustrates the subject position of Javanese who take "old vengeance" on the Chinese. The identity of Javanese is that of employees of Chinese employers. Besides acts of violence during these riots, some participants referred to attacks and raids by radical Muslims on Christian places of worship. A participant said:

> "I live in the south of Solo. That [place] is very close to Ngruki. They [Muslims at the Ngruki *pesantren*] are Islamic radicals... [A group of Muslims] from Ngruki suddenly attacked the place [of worship]. They forced that place to close down and be forbidden to worship."[116]

In this text the speaker labelled Muslims at the *pesantren* of Ngruki Islamic radicals (social position). Another participant said, "This is a Pancasila state. Everyone has freedom of worship. But why was there a raid to force the closure of that place of worship? ... That [place] is not in their region. Ngruki belongs to Sukoharjo. That [place] belongs to Solo."[117] In the second utterance the participant described Indonesia as a Pancasila state where everyone should have freedom of worship. She also classified an inside and an outside region: those radical Muslims are from Sukoharjo, not from Solo.

A young male participant observed, "The [New Order] government had authority... But now the [*Reformasi*] government is defeated by words like *Reformasi* and freedom."[118] In this text the speaker linked authority with the New Order government, and absence of authority with the *Reformasi* government. He also combined the words "*Reformasi*" and "freedom" into something

---

[114] *Bebas dalam arti liar.*

[115] *Mall Ratu, Luwes itu yang punya China. Wuh kuwi nggone Cino. Dijarah wae! Jarah wae! Nggone Cino... Seperti itu berpikirnya, seperti itu. Karena ada batas antara Jawa dan China. Dendam sejak dulu. Sejak dulu itu orang Jawa itu menjadi bawahannya orang China.*

[116] *Saya tinggal di Solo selatan. Itu sangat dekat sekali dengan Ngruki. Itu kan Islam radikal ya... Dari Ngruki itu tiba-tiba menyerbu tempat itu. Mereka memaksa tempat itu ditutup dan tidak boleh lagi ada ibadah.*

[117] *Ini kan negara Pancasila. Setiap orang kan bebas untuk beribadah. Tapi kenapa harus ada yang namanya penggrebekan, penutupan secara paksa... Itu kan bukan kawasan mereka. Kalau Ngruki itu kan Sukoharjo. Itu kan kawasan kota Solo.*

[118] *Pemerintah memang memiliki otoritas... Tapi sekarang itu pemerintah itu sudah kalah dengan yang namanya kata-kata Reformasi dan kebebasan.*

that undermines government authority. By contrast an elderly female said, "Those [Muslims] extremists are very dangerous. Those [who] force cafes to close down are distracted."[119] The two speakers linked extreme Muslims with acts of violence, for instance forcing cafes to close down. A male professional said, "Nowadays it is probably very difficult to stop them [extremists] [from perpetrating acts of violence]."[120]

Some participants talked about the image Solo has among people elsewhere. "I went to East Java for several months. I was asked [by someone], from where are you, brother? [I answered] from Solo. Wow, [that is] a terrorist city. I am very surprised,"[121] said a male worker. In this text the speaker described someone identifying Solo as a terrorist city. Another participant in the same group talked about a Muslim wearing a shirt with the slogan "Fuck Terrorist".[122] The words were in English. He said, "They [Muslims] also disagree with the Islamic notions of the hardliners, the radicals."[123] In terms of our previous classification the speaker indicated that "normal" Muslims disagree with the Islamic perspective of hardliners and radical Muslims.

Besides acts of violence in the *Reformasi* era, participants also talked about the lack of Pancasila in society. "Pancasila was never promoted again,"[124] said a participant. On the contrary, the same participant pointed out, "There is politicization [of Islam]. Everything related to Islam is continually promoted. [It is] said that this country will end up an Islamic state."[125] In this text the participant described how an Islamic state would replace the Pancasila state.

A participant said, "The first pillar of Pancasila is Lordship. We have God, whom each of us perceives as ultimate. But each of us has our own understanding. [We are] united by the element of [Indonesian] culture."[126] This speaker suggests that Pancasila permits people to have different interpretations of God. He also mentions Indonesian culture as an element unifying diversity. An elderly male claimed, "As a [state] ideology Pancasila is nothing but the best."[127] Another participant in the same group said, "Pancasila is like colourful flowers

---

[119] *Yang ekstrim itu lho bahaya, yang sok nutup kafe-kafe. Ngawur itu.*

[120] *Saat ini dirasa sangat susah menghentikan mereka.*

[121] *Saya pernah jalan beberapa bulan lalu ke Jawa Timur. Saya ditanya dari mana mas? Dari Solo. Who, kota teroris. Wah saya kaget.*

[122] Fuck Terrorist.

[123] *Mereka juga tidak setuju pandangan-pandangan Islam yang mungkin garis keras gitu, radikal.*

[124] *Pancasila tidak didengung-dengungkan lagi.*

[125] *Ada politisasi. Hal-hal yang menyangkut keislaman itu didengung-dengungkan terus menerus. Pernah terdengar juga kalau negara ini akhirnya nanti mau dijadikan negara Islam.*

[126] *Unsur dari Pancasila kan satu ketuhanan itu. Sama-sama kita punya Tuhan masing-masing yang kita akui Yang Maha segalanya. Tapi masing-masing kita punya pemahaman sendiri-sendiri. Disatukan oleh unsur budaya.*

[127] *Sebagai ideologi, Pancasila itu tidak ada bandingannya.*

[in the garden]. If all are red, they are not beautiful. [The beautiful one is the one that] is next to yellow, green and red ones."[128] The speaker described Pancasila using a metaphor that refers to accommodation of diversity and coexisting with others.

Some participants described the identity of Muslims as anti-Pancasila. Christian identity, on the other hand, is described as pro-Pancasila. A male professional mentioned, "Christians have a deeper spirit of Pancasila than them [Muslims]."[129] The same person added, "Christians appreciate diversity more [than Muslims]."[130] "Those who recognize [themselves] as Christians, [they] appreciate the condition of pluralism, diversity more. It rarely [happens] that [Christians] are very, very extreme like Muslims,"[131] said another participant. Here the word "pluralism" is an alternative for the word "diversity". The expression "very, very extreme" is an over-wording.

A participant commented, "Some [Islamic] educational institutions are anti that [Pancasila]. Moreover, I heard that Ngruki [name of *pesantren*] does not recognize Pancasila. They refuse to respect the [national] flag, state symbol."[132] A woman worker said, "Because [they are] over fanatical they consider themselves to be better than others. They impose their beliefs [on others], which should not happen in the Pancasila state."[133] In this text the speaker identified Indonesia as a Pancasila state. The word "fanatical" is used again.

An elderly male said, "The majority [of Muslims] wants [Syariah] to be included in the constitution. If the Jakarta Charter were included, Pancasila would change."[134] A young male averred, "The Indonesian state does not have only one religion, [but] several religions. If [Indonesia] wanted to [create] a Syariah [state], it would be very difficult."[135] Here the participant points out the problem of a Syariah state in the context of Indonesian religious diversity. Another participant in the same group said, "[Rather than a] Syariah state ... Pan-

---

[128] *Pancasila itu seperti bunga yang berwarna-warni. Kalau merah semua kan nggak baik. Bisa berdampingan kuning, hijau, merah.*

[129] *Orang-orang Kristen itu lebih punya nafas Pancasila daripada mereka.*

[130] *Orang Kristiani itu lebih bisa menghargai kondisi perbedaan.*

[131] *Orang-orang yang mengaku Kristiani itu lebih bisa menghargai kondisi pluralisme, perbedaan. Kayaknya jarang sekali yang kayak Muslim sangat ekstrim sekali.*

[132] *Lembaga-lembaga pendidikan tertentu itu kan anti seperti itu. Bahkan saya dengar kalau di Ngruki itu gak mau mengakui Pancasila. Mereka gak mau hormat bendera. Mereka memahaminya sempit sekali mengenai bendera, lambang negara.*

[133] *Karena fanatik berlebihan, dia menganggap dirinya lebih benar dari yang lain. Dia memaksakan kepercayaannya yang seharusnya tidak terjadi di negara Pancasila.*

[134] *Mayoritas penginnya kan mau dimasukkan ke perundang-undangan.Misalnya Piagam Jakarta kan mau dimasukkan. Pancasila pengin diubah.*

[135] *Negara Indonesia kan agamanya gak cuma satu, lebih dari beberapa agama. Kalau mau dijadiin Syariah, ya sangat susah sekali.*

casila should be prioritized."[136] This speaker points out a contradiction between a Syariah state and the state ideology of Pancasila, thus applying another participant's classification: "Pancasila state contrasts with Syariah state".

Moreover, if Syariah were to be included in the constitution, a participant said, "Bali [people] want to separate [from Indonesia], North Celebes [people] want to separate, Papua [people] want to separate."[137] A participant commented, "If Islamic Syariah [were implemented], [Indonesia] would be like purely Arabia [or] Pakistan."[138] Another said, "The Syariah bank is from the Middle East."[139] The participants repeated the words "Pancasila state" and "Syariah state". They over-worded those terms, revealing intense preoccupation. A participant said:

> "My mother's extended family is Muslim. My father's are all Christians. One night [we] watched television at [our] grandma's house... [We] watched the fighting of Israel and Palestine [programme]. Then [we] discussed. They [Muslims] thought that the Israeli-Palestinian war was a religious war ... It is a fact that sixty percent of Israeli people are Christians. It is taken for granted by [them, Muslims] that Christians are friends of Israel. [We] must disagree with that [idea]. [When I] look for [information] on the internet it also says that Christians are henchman of Israel. [It was mentioned there] that Jews and Christians [are] those who colonize our [Muslim] friends in Palestine."[140]

This text describes Jews and Christians as colonizers of Palestinian Muslims. Another participant said, "[The Israeli-Palestinian war] involves Islam and Jews. But they [Muslims] understand it as a war between Islam and Christianity."[141] "If there is a conflict abroad ... they [Muslims] feel solidarity with them [other Muslims abroad]. Because they are of the same faith,"[142] said another participant. This participant described how Muslims felt solidarity based on the same faith beyond Indonesian territory. Another participant commented, "[Muslims] easily say that America is *kafir*."[143] In this text the participant main-

---

136 *Negara Syariah... Pancasila seharusnya diutamakan.*

137 *Bali ingin pisah, Sulawesi selatang ingin pisah, Papua ingin pisah.*

138 *Jika Syariah Islam, akan jadi murni Arab, Pakistan.*

139 *Bank Syariah itu dari Timur Tengah.*

140 *Keluarga besar saya dari orang tua yang dari ibu saya kan Muslim. Terus dari bapak saya itu semuanya Kristen. Pernah suatu saat malem itu nonton di TV di rumah nenek itu, bu Lik saya kan Kristen, melihat pertikaian antara Israel dan Palestina. Setelah itu lama-lama trus ngobrol, jadi pandangan mereka tentang perang Israel Palestina itu adalah perang agama... Kenyataane kan Palestina itu enampuluh persen Kristen. Secara pandangane umum, Kristen itu temane Israel. Bener-bener harus dibantah seperti itu. Browsing-browsing internet juga itu ada yang intinya bahwa umat Kristen itu anteknya Israel. Itu yang menjajah teman kita Palestina itu.*

141 *Itu kan Islam sama Yahudi. Tapi pemahamannya kan perang Islam sama Kristen.*

142 *Kalau ada konflik di luar negeri... Tenggang rasanya itu malah ke mereka. Karena mereka itu saudara seiman.*

143 *Dengan mudahnya mengatakan Amerika itu kafir.*

tained that Muslims apply the term "*kafir*" not as religious vocabulary but to a country (America).

In places where fanatical, extreme and radical Muslim groups exist Christians have difficulty maintaining or building churches. An elderly male participant said, "In radical areas on the border of Sukoharjo, [especially close to *pesantren*] Ngruki, we know for a fact that our churches experience difficulties when their members want to worship."[144] In this text the participant repeats the word *pesantren* "Ngruki", also mentioned by other participants. It is an over-wording.

A male professional mentioned, "There are several locations where these groups exist. [I] mean places where very fanatical [Muslims] live... [We] just want to build a church. [It is] very, very difficult."[145] Again the speaker relates the presence of fanatical Muslims in such localities to the difficulty of building a Christian church. By adding the word "just" the speaker indicates that building a church is a basic need for a Christian community. The repetition of the word "very" in the phrase "very, very difficult" is an over-wording indicating extreme difficulty of building a Christian church. Another participant in the same group said, "They are very extreme. If there are churches in the area, [they are] raided".[146] This speaker not only used the label "extreme", but also cited a concrete example of extreme behaviour by Muslims, namely raiding churches.

Some participants talked about state regulations that discriminate against Christians.[147] A male professional described it as follows:

> "[We have] difficulty building a church... When we want to develop [our community], [the others] obstruct it. I think this [situation] is a new thing, sir. In the past it was different. When I was a university student there were many small churches here [but no problems]. When I was child there were many [churches]. [But] after *Reformasi* [the problems] began to appear. [Churches] must have [state] permission... Basically [Muslims] look for arguments [to stop Christians developing]... But they do not check whether [every] mosque has permission or not. That is also [our] question: why do only Christian [churches] have their permission restricted?"[148]

---

[144] *Radikalisme di daerah-daerah yang berbatasan dengan Sukoharjo, Ngruki, dan kami tahu persis gereja-gereja di lingkungan kami ada kesulitan-kesulitan warganya untuk menjalankan ibadah.*

[145] *Ada beberapa tempat-tempat tertentu yang ada basis-basis tertentu. Artinya ya yang dihuni lingkungan-lingkungan yang sangat fanatik...Mau mendirikan gereja saja sangat sulit sekali.*

[146] *Mereka sangat ekstrim. Jadi seumpama ada gereja di situ digrebek.*

[147] *Mendiskriminasikan orang-orang Kristen.*

[148] *Kesulitan mendirikan gereja... Mengapa kita ingin berkembang kok ada yang menghalangi. Kayaknya yang seperti itu baru-baru aja sich Pak. Kalau yang dulu-dulu beda. Waktu saya masih kuliah juga banyak sich gereja-gereja kecil disini.Waktu saya kecil banyak.Baru waktu Reformasi itu kelihatan sekali. Harus pakai ijin... Pokoknya cari alasan... Tapi gak pada melihat*

The speaker mentions building a church as a way to develop the Christian community. Muslims are described as obstructing that development by questioning the church's licence to do so. The speaker points out a difference between the situation when he was a child and a university student (before *Reformasi*), and the situation after *Reformasi*. The problems came after *Reformasi*. The restriction only applies to churches, not to mosques. In another FGD a participant described such a situation as "discrimination".[149]

An elderly female participant stated that those who refuse having a church in Banyuanyar "are not community members from [that place]. If there are members of the community from there, [they are] only one or two."[150] Another participant in the same FDG said, "They are from another place. Not all of them are villagers from Banyuanyar."[151] Both speakers said that the challenge comes from outsiders, not from members of the local community. An elderly male talked about perpetrators of acts of violence in Solo. He said, "In fact they are not from Solo, but from outside, from Sukoharjo."[152] "If people from outside did not enter Solo... there would be no conflict [between Muslims and Christians],"[153] said another participant. Another elderly male said the following:

> "We had an experience in Jebres. This is an interesting and very touching experience. A certain group from outside, Muslims from outside Jebres, wanted to close the church [in my village]. But villagers from there, they are our Muslim brothers. [The street] was blocked. [The attackers] were forbidden [to enter the village]... Because the church is also used for PKK (village mothers' union) activities every week except on Sunday, such as *Posyandu* [child health care]... In fact our [Muslim] brothers also care [about us]. They [our Muslim brothers] do not allow acts of violence [perpetrated by other Muslims]."[154]

In this text the speaker describes Muslim villagers who protect them from attack by "outside" Muslims as "our Muslim brothers". He says that having Muslim brothers protect them is a very touching experience. The participant uses the words "from outside" twice (rewording) to underscore their significance. The word "because" indicates a cause-effect relation between Muslim villag-

---

*juga apakah mesjid punya ijin tidak.Kadang-kadang itu juga satu pertanyaan juga kenapa hanya Kristen saja yang diperketat ijinnya.*

149 *Diskriminasi.*

150 *Bukan warga situ, kalau ada warga situ ya cuma satu dua.*

151 *Dari tempat lain. Bukan semuanya penduduk Banyuanyar.*

152 *Sebenarnya yang dari Solo sendiri tidak, tapi itu dari luar, dari Sukoharjo.*

153 *Kalau orang luar tidak masuk ke Solo... tidak akan ada gesekan.*

154 *Ini kami pernah punya pengalaman di Jebres. Ini kejadian yang menarik dan menyentuh hati betul. Kelompok tertentu itu tadi dari luar, Muslim, dari luar Jebres akan menutup satu gereja. Tetapi justru dari masyarakat kampung disitu, yang notobene saudara kita Muslim. Dipalang. Gak boleh... Karena kebetulan gereja itu di hari-hari tidak minggu dipakai untuk kegiatan PKK, Posyandu... Ternyata saudara kita peduli juga. Tidak mengijinkan tindakan-tindakan kekerasan.*

ers' protection of the church and the church's function in village society. He also describes closing the church as a kind of act of violence. A female worker said, "Mostly in my place they [radical Muslims] are newcomers."[155] This speaker makes the point that radical Muslims are not old inhabitants but newcomers from outside. Another participant mentioned that they are "new people in my area".[156]

When the participants talked about Muslims they also talked about themselves. An elderly male said, "On our side [Christians] there is also radicalism. Because ... the influence of freedom of expression extends to the field of religion too."[157] This text makes two points. First, radicalism as a growing movement is not confined to the Muslim community, but also occurs in the Christian community. Second, the word "because" indicates a cause-effect relation between freedom of expression and emerging radicalism.

## 2 Interpretation

The second stage is interpretation or analysis of discursive practice, which includes production, distribution and consumption of texts. Analysis of discursive practice (interpretation) is the intermediary between analysis of linguistic practice (description) and analysis of social practice (explanation). There are many ways to analyse discursive practice (Fairclough (1992: 78-86, 232-234), but this study uses mainly two tools: intertextuality and what Fairclough calls inter-discursivity. When participants produce (communicate) and consume (interpret) text or talk they draw on members' resources (Fairclough 1989: 163) or mental models (Van Dijk 2008: 75), stored in their long-term memory (Fairclough 1989: 9-10; 24-24). These resources are cognitive in the sense that they are in people's minds, and they are social in the sense that they are socially constructed (Fairclough 1989: 24). So what members' resources or mental models do Christian participants use to produce (communicate) or consume (interpret) talk?

### 2.1 Analysis at micro level

The participants drew on mental models of living in "harmony (*rukun*)" with their relatives, friends and neighbours when they talked about the others (Muslims) or about themselves. Talking about togetherness of Muslims and Christians, a young female participant referred to the situation in her family when

---

[155] *Banyak di tempat saya kebanyakan mereka itu pendatang.*

[156] *Orang baru di lingkungan saya.*

[157] *Dari sisi kami juga ada radikalisme. Karena... pengaruh kebebasan berpendapat itu masuk imbasnya ke ranah agamawi juga.*

*Idul Fitri* came. She said, "All of our family members met, mixed, shook hands." Another young female drew on her family tradition of *arisan* and gathering during *lebaran*.

Speaking of Muslims' and Christians' engagement in society, an elderly male participant remembered the funeral of a relative when he was asked to act as the representative of his Muslim family. They described such practices as the "custom" (*kebiasaan*) of Javanese in Solo. A participant was also referring to custom when he said, "For the Javanese these [religious] days are for visiting the elders out of respect [for them]."[158] Custom is a common ground that unites Christians and Muslims.

Talking about religious conversion from Islam to Christianity, a young male participant remembered his mother's conversion process. He said that his mother was Islam KTP (Islam by ID). He also said, "[my] father's ID is Catholic". The Indonesian ID card (KTP, *Kartu Tanda Penduduk*) shows the person's gender, religion, occupation and marital status. Officially only Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism are recognized in Indonesia. The identity card is issued by the civil administration (political arena). So when participants referred to Muslim/Christian "by ID" they were using a mental model from the political arena. They drew on a typical Indonesian system of officially recognized and unrecognized religions.

The Christians drew on their individual experience with their neighbours in the village. When talking about fanatical Muslims and fanatical mosques they were remembering personal encounters in neighbourhood life. In mentioning the unpleasant attitude of a Muslim who throws away food given by Christian, an elderly female participant was drawing on her memory of a personal relationship with a Muslim neighbour. Likewise the elderly male participant cited his relationship with Muslims neighbours when he spoke about Muslims who do not wish Christians merry Christmas.

When discussing relations between Christians and Muslims the participants referred to shared ideas about how to be good villagers. "I initiated the prayer service at our place. That was a village event. Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, adherents of indigenous beliefs (*kepercayaan*) attended [that occasion]," said an elderly male. A participant also referred to his personal experience of helping Muslims at the *pengajian* service and another referred to an occasion when Muslim and Christian villagers came together to celebrate *halal bi halal* (an Islamic feast). Here Christians were speaking of an identity shared with Muslims as neighbours or fellow villagers. When speaking about the apparel of fanatical Muslims some participants referred to shared knowledge about what is considered normal. According to them the fanatics' dress is improper and not well mannered.

---

[158] *Untuk orang Jawa hari besar itu untuk silaturrahmi menghormati yang lebih tua.*

The participants also drew on friendship when talking about Muslims. A young female remembered her Muslim friends when speaking about fanatical and normal Muslims. Another referred to her individual experience of having Christian, Muslim, Hindu and even Buddhist friends. But "friend" does not always refer to a crony or comrade. The elderly male, who said that the evangelical group was not sensitive to the surroundings ("our Muslim brothers") was showing his disagreement with that group, yet he still called them "my Christian friends". This utterance is a common way of maintaining a high level of politeness.

In the young female FGD the concept of fanatical and normal Muslims arose from the early phase of the discussion. When I (the researcher) asked the participants in that group how they described Muslims a participant responded by telling about her friend's brother who is a member of LDII. Soon afterwards she used the label "fanatical Muslim" when referring to the boy from LDII. Another participant in the group told a story about three friends and said that "one Muslim was rather fanatical and the other two were normal".[159] Whereas talk about friendship crops up frequently in FGDs with youths, references to neighbourhood are more common among the elderly.

Some participants referred to friendship or daily family activities when talking about their social relations with Muslims. For example: "I played inside the house [of my Muslim friend]", "my mother... asked my [Muslim] sibling to have a meal before fasting (*sahur*)," et cetera. Some of them referred to pets such as a dog. Others cited experience of good interpersonal cooperation ("helping" each other) in neighbourhood life when they talked about social relations between Muslims and Christians.

Sometimes when participants talked about Muslims or Christians they also referred to adherents of other religions in their surroundings. For instance, a participant referred to Confucians when talking about relations between religions and local cultures in Islam and Christianity. He said, "Opposite my [house] lives a Confucian. He/she is a Christian, but also a Confucian. Christianity is his/her faith, Confucianism is his/her custom (adat istiadat). Even though he/she is a Christian, there is a statue of the goddess Kwan-im in [that] house."[160] In referring to a Confucian neighbour the speaker described two categories: "faith" (*iman*) and "custom" (*adat*). This distinction is a mental model stored in the speaker's memory.

---

[159] *Yang satu agak fanatik, yang dua biasa.*

[160] *Di depan saya itu ada Konghucu. Dia itu Kristen, tapi juga Konghucu. Kristen itu keimanan dia, Konghucu itu adat istiadatnya. Walaupun dia Kristen, di dalamnya pasti ada arca dewa Kwan-im.*

## 2.2 Analysis at meso level

At meso level Christian participants often used the classification of "we" (*kami, kita*) and "them" (*mereka*) when speaking about themselves and Muslims. They drew on a mental model of Christian communalism. One participant used the words "from our side". This is a reference to Christian community spirit. When some participants talked about forcible closure of place of worship by radical Muslims or "building a church is very, very difficult", they saw themselves as coming from the same community (religion, institution). At other times participants made utterances that revealed a personal voice. Thus a participant said, "Personally I do not agree if the PDS [a Christian political party], for instance, finally want to make Indonesia a Christian [country]."

Christian participants drew on general Christian sources when talking about Muslim-Christian relations. When explaining that "Islam has a lot of interpretations"[161] and "has many faces" (extremist, hardliner, nationalist, tolerant) a participant – a member of a Pentecostal church – said that he was citing a book series *40 Days to love nations in prayer*.[162] The book series is published by an international evangelical movement. One volume[163] writes about diverse features of Islamic understanding and comprehension (*Corak pemahaman dan penghayatan Islam yang berbeda-beda)*. The book lists eleven models of Islam: normative Islam, exclusive Islam, cultural Islam, transformative Islam, inclusive pluralist Islam, contextual Islam, esoteric Islam, traditional Islam, modernist Islam, actual Islam and rationalist Islam. The same participant said:

> "In that [book] there is knowledge about [Islam]... There are clearly Qur'nic verses which refer to capturing Christians and killing Christians... [However,] there are verses which are in line with the Bible. Those verses are to love Christian, to love others... I myself concluded that there is diversity among Muslims, because the one Qur'an contains many things. [If] they take [only] one thing, they will fight Christians. They will be extremists, hardliners. If they take [verses of] loving Christians, loving others, they will be nationalist Muslims, who are tolerant."[164]

---

[161] *Islam itu tafsirannya banyak sekali.*

[162] In bahasa Indonesia: *"40 Hari Mengasihi Bangsa-Bangsa dalam Doa"*.

[163] 22 August-30 September 2008, pp. 7-17.

[164] *Di situ ada pengetahuan tentang Muslim... Ada ayat-ayat di dalam Al-Qur'an yang dengan jelas ngomong bahwa tawanlah orang Kristen dan bunuhlah orang Kristen... Ada yang sejalan dengan Al-Kitab. Ayat-ayatnya ini mengasihi orang Kristen, mengasihi sesama... Kalau menyimpulkan sendiri, ada banyak perbedaan di Muslim, karena di dalam satu Al-Qur'an itu ada bermacam-macam. Mereka hanya menangkap satu bagian itu, dia akan memerangi orang Kristen. Dia akan menjadi Muslim yang ekstrim gitu, yang bergaris keras gitu. Kalau dia menangkap mengasihi orang Kristen, mengasihi sesama, dia akan menjadi Muslim yang nasionalis yang bisa toleransi.*

Here the speaker was referring to another volume of *40 Days to love nations in prayer*.[165] One section of the book, 'What the Qur'an says?', lists three categories of Qur'anic verses: verses and *hadits* (Muhammad's traditions) that accord with the Bible; verses and *hadits* which are in opposition to the Bible; and verses and *hadits* which are unrelated to the Christian faith. In this case the speaker described Islam or Muslims, not by quoting the Qur'an directly but by citing a book about Qur'anic verses produced by the Christian community. Here intertextuality illustrates a process of indirect discourse representation (Fairclough 1992: 107). Hence the speaker was not citing Muslims' ideas but the ideas of Christians about Islam. In discourse representation there is a distinction between a Christian voice talking about Muslims and the voice of the Muslim who is talked about.

Other participants assumed that Muslims perceived Christians as *kafir*. One participant said, "I often hear from their *ustadz*s [preachers] that [Muslims] are asked not to associate with people from a different faith."[166] Another said that in the "great religious meeting" [*pengajian akbar*] "[the preacher] forbade Muslims to interact with the *kafir*."[167] Usually major religious meetings are broadcast on loudspeakers, so villagers around the mosque can hear the sermon. In the text "The great religious meeting [*pengajian*] ... [the preacher] forbade Muslims to interact with the *kafir*", the speaker referred to an Islamic *pengajian* in a mosque near her house. A speaker referred to his assumption about the Muslim's voice saying, "There is Islam that wants to gather with us. But there is Islam that considers non-Islam [non-Muslims] *musyrik* [polytheists]. Those [non-Muslims] are considered enemies."

In talking about Muslim clerics and intellectuals who are tolerant because they have a good understanding of Islam an elderly male drew on an Islamic principle, "my religion is mine, your religion is yours".[168] It is from the Qur'anic surah 109:6: "*lakum dinukum wa liyadin*" (to you be your religion, and to me my religion). Another participant referred implicitly to his own knowledge of the Qur'an: "Those extremists and hardliners do not pay attention to the truth in the Qur'an itself. They pay attention to the [teachings] of their clerics."[169] Thus he communicated that the Qur'an does not teach extremism, but Muslim clerics do.

Talking about the relation between religion and local culture, a participant referred to a book about Sunan Kalijaga (a Muslim saint). He said, "Sunan Kalijaga, as I have read, preached his religion [Islam] that is not similar to Ara-

---

[165] 3 September-12 October 2007, p. 64.

[166] *Dari ustad-ustadnya sering saya dengar tidak boleh bergaul dengan yang tidak seiman.*

[167] *Mengharamkan... orang Islam berhubungan dengan kafir.*

[168] *Agamaku ya agamaku, agamamu ya agamamu.*

[169] *Itu yang ekstrim dan garis keras itu nggak ngelihat dari segi kebenaran di dalam Al-Qur'an itu sendiri. Mereka itu melihat dari pendahulu-pendahulu mereka.*

bic [Islam]."[170] Following the oral tradition, some people believe that Sunan Kalijaga was one of nine saints, early figures who spread Islam in Java. He conducted his *dakwa* using local cultural media such as *gamelan,* shadow puppets and Javanese songs.

A female worker, a member of the Bethel church, cited the evangelist Matthew when talking about love among Christians. She said, "In the Bible Matthew said [if] you love me [who is invisible], you should[171] love your brother/sister who is visible."[172] Other participants also drew on biblical texts such as love others as you love yourself and when you are slapped on your right cheek, turn your left cheek as well. Another participant drew on Christian teaching, saying that Christians must be humble towards others in this world in order to be humbled before God. A female professional, a Chinese Catholic, drew on the concept of predestination in Catholicism when she talked about her bread shop, which was burnt down during the 1998 riots in Solo. She said, "I feel my life was prepared [by God]."[173] She rebuilt the bread shop shortly after the riots ended.

When Christian participants in the elderly female group talked about the attacks on Christian places of worship I (the researcher) asked them whether Christians do not want to counter-attack. One of them replied, "No, [because we have] a teaching of love."[174] Another participant in that FGD said that Christians have a teaching that when you are slapped on your right cheek, you must offer your left cheek as well.

A Protestant participant was inspired by the church's prohibition of praying for the spirits. She said that "*ziarah*" (pilgrimage to cemetery) and prayer for spirits are "*adat*" (custom, not religion). She only prayed for those who are alive and not for the spirits. Here the word "adat" refers to a mental model (social cognition) that is used by the speaker to interpret and evaluate Muslims' prayers to the spirits.

Talking about Syariah a participant mentioned that Syariah creates "a wall of segregation"[175] between Muslims and Christians. It separates Muslims from others in society (mental model). They referred to this experience, especially in Aceh. A participant said, "That [Syariah] will encourage strong sectarianism in

---

[170] *Sunan Kalijaga, seperti pernah saya baca, menyiarkan agamanya tidak sama dengan yang di Arab.*

[171] The literal translation of the text is, "*you love me [who is invisible], but why you do not love your brother/sister who is visible?"* But it does not render the meaning for English readers, so I rephrased it.

[172] *Dalam Injil matius dikatakan kamu mengasihi aku, tapi kenapa kamu tidak mengasihi saudaramu yang terlihat.*

[173] *Perjalanan hidup saya itu sudah dipersiapkan.*

[174] *Tidak, karena ajaran kasih.*

[175] *Tembok pemisah.*

the future, not so?"[176] By contrast the Christian vision is to break down walls of segregation. An elderly male, a presbyter in the Javanese Christian Church (GKJ), drew on Jesus' words to covey the Christian rejection of segregation: "It was stated by Jesus at that time that Samarian people, who were considered *kafir* [infidels] by the Jews, were in fact visited by Jesus, helped by Jesus... How can we now build walls of segregation? All humans are the same."[177] The speaker was inspired by a narrative similar to a biblical account (Luke 10:33-34).

The participants also mentioned Gandhi's view that "Islam is the same [good religion], Christian is good, Buddhist is also good... Mahatma Gandhi said... it all depends on the people." Another participant referred to Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid): "Gus Dur ... was a very democratic, moderate [Muslim leader]."[178] In similar vein a participant observed that Sobari [a Muslim figure] has been saying that he and pastor Mangun are of "the same faith, but of different religions."[179] Here the participants referred to the views of Christian, Muslim and Hindu leaders.

When some elderly male participants talked about religious radicalism, a member of that group compared Islam and Christianity, pointing out that radicalism also existed in Christianity. "The evangelical group or a certain church is not sensitive to the surroundings [Muslims]," said a participant. Most participants referred to Muslim groups when talking about religious radicalism, but in this text the speaker cited a Christian case.

Talking about social relations between Muslims and Christians some participants remembered their experience of wishing Muslims happy fasting or happy *Idul Fitri,* but the Muslims did not reciprocate. The picture below shows a similar utterance in Solo where Christians put up a happy fasting banner outside the Javanese Christian Church (GKJ).

Sometime participants referred to me (the interviewer) not only as the researcher, but also as a Muslim (double identity). An elderly male said, "Pak Hadi (my nickname), [you] have a very good role next, in writing the dissertation."[180] In that text the speaker referred to the significance of my proposed dissertation on Muslim-Christian relations. But the same person also said, "This I take from yours [i.e. interviewer's religion: Islam], *fastabiqul khairat*

---

[176] *Apakah itu kemudian ke depan tidak menimbulkan sektarianisme yang begitu kuat.*

[177] *Dikatakan Yesus saat itu yang orang Samaria dikatakan kafir oleh orang Yahudi justru didatangi oleh Yesus, ditolong oleh Yesus, dibantu Yesus... Lha kita kok membuat tembok pemisah, manusia itu manusia juga.*

[178] *Gus Dur sangat demokratis, moderat.*

[179] *Seiman, tapi beda agama.*

[180] *Pak Hadi, memiliki peran yang sangat baik, nanti, di dalam penyusunan desertasi.*

means please compete in doing good"[181] when he talked about his hopes of how Muslims and Christians should act in society. In that utterance the speaker used the Arabic terms, "*fastabiqul khairat*" (so race to do good). It is a fragment of surah 2:148 that reads: "For each [religious following] has a direction toward which it faces. So race for [all that is] good [*fastabiqul khairat*]..." These utterances show that several Christian FGD participants are quite familiar with Islamic expressions.


*Figure 2: 'The whole council and congregants of the GKJ Manahan wish Muslims a happy fast.' Banner outside GKJ Manahan church in Surakarta, 2012* (Source: Author's collection)

## 2.3 Analysis at macro level

At macro level participants compared the situations under the New Order and after *Reformasi.* The statements "formerly there was constraint" and "I never experienced ... [that] in the past" referred to the political situation under the New Order regime. Statements such as "to open the door of democracy on a large scale nowadays", "I think this [condition] is a new thing", and "after *Reformasi* [the problems] began to appear" referred to the current political era of *Reformasi.*

[181] *Ini saya ambil dari panjenengan, fastabiqul khairat, dalam arti berlomba untuk berbuat baik.*

Participants drew on Pancasila philosophy when they talked about their social identity and social relations between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia. Most of them mentioned only the first pillar. In saying "The first pillar of Pancasila is Lordship. We have God whom each of us perceives as the Ultimate. But each of us has our own understanding", the speaker might have been inspired by a popular principle in Indonesian society, namely agreeing to disagree or agreeing to differ.

The participants produced a meaning of the word "Pancasila" which extends its original connotation. They consumed and reproduced Pancasila in relation to freedom of worship, spirit and appreciation of diversity, appreciation of pluralism, and used a metaphor of colourful flowers in a garden. The original definition of Pancasila refers to five pillars which are written in the preamble to the constitution of 1945. They are: belief in the one Lordship; just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; and social justice for all the people of Indonesia.

Freedom of worship is not mentioned in the five pillars of Pancasila, but it is written into the constitution of 1945. Article 29, paragraph 2 reads that "the state guarantees all persons freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion or belief". Pluralism is a mental model that might be taken from the common language in society, which is popular in books and the media. When comparing the Pancasila state with an Islamic or Syariah state participants drew on a general understanding among Christians in which images of an Islamic, Syariah state are anti-Pancasila. When a participant commented, "If the Jakarta Charter were to be included, Pancasila would change", he drew on an understanding of the Charter as anti-Pancasila. The Jakarta Charter is the initial draft of Pancasila. It was drafted and ratified by a Committee of Nine (eight Muslims and one Christian) before the preparation for Indonesian independence on 22 June 1945. The difference between the Jakarta Charter and Pancasila is confined to the first pillar. The first pillar of the Jakarta Charter is 'Belief in Almighty God with the obligation for Muslim adherents to carry out the Islamic Syari'ah'.[182]

Comparison between the Jakarta Charter and Pancasila philosophy was one of the public discourses during the process of constitutional amendment in the early 2000s. Some Christian politicians and leaders refused to reinstate the Jakarta Charter. We give a few examples. *Kompas* newspaper published two articles on 4 August 2000 when the house of representatives (DPR) was debating the constitutional amendment. Herman Musakabe, a Protestant and governor of Nusa Tenggara Timor, wrote an article entitled, 'Please be careful in

---

[182] *Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariah Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya.*

amending the constitution'.[183] Yongky Karman, a Catholic pastor, wrote an article entitled 'About the first pillar of Pancasila'.[184] Both writers mentioned that Pancasila is 'the foundation of the Indonesian state'. 'Replacing the first pillar of Pancasila with the Jakarta charter would change that foundation, with all its implications,[185] Musakabe wrote. He added that it "would strengthen the spirit of disintegration of Indonesia because religion can stimulate disintegration".[186] Karman in his turn wrote:

> "Christians of Eastern Indonesia rejected the inclusion of the majority religion in the state foundation, because they feared that it would lead to undesirable excesses by all parties, namely a growing sense of first class citizens [Muslims] and second class citizens [Christians]."[187]

Referring to Sukarno, he wrote: "Indonesia is neither a religious nor a secular state but a Pancasila state."[188] The claim that it would change the foundation of the state drew on the idea that if the Jakarta Charter were included in the amended constitution, it would replace Pancasila. The writer gives the reason why Christians rejected it: they were worried about becoming 'second class' Indonesian citizens. He also uses the words "Pancasila state". The foregoing examples clearly show that the discourse in the FGDs was linked to a discourse that had been going on in Indonesian society. The utterance in the FGDs that "Bali [people] want to separate [from Indonesia], North Celebes [people] want to separate, Papua [people] want to separate" if Syariah were to be included in the constitution relates to Musakebe's comment on "the spirit of disintegration [of Indonesia]".

When talking about Pancasila some participants referred to certain Muslim groups in society. The speaker who said that Ngruki does not recognize Pancasila was referring to such a group. Ngruki is a village in Sukoharjo district south of Solo. The *pesantren* Al-Mukmin led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir is based in this village. People commonly call it by the name of the village. Ba'asyir was suspected by international anti-terrorism agencies of links with the international network of Al-Qaida. He was jailed for fifteen years by an Indonesian court in Jakarta after the state had proved his support of acts of terrorism in Aceh. Participants' references to a Syariah/Islamic state are based on a general

---

183 *Hati-hati mengamandemen UUD.*

184 *Sekitar sila pertama Pancasila.*

185 *Mengubah dasar negara dengan segala konsekuensinya.*

186 *Akan memperkuat semangat disintegrasi karena faktor agama sebagai pemicunya.*

187 *Orang Kristen dari Indonesia Timur menolak pencantuman agama mayoritas di dalam dasar negara sebab pencantuman itu dikhawatirkan akan menimbulkan ekses yang tidak diinginkan semua pihak, yakni berkembangnya perasaan menjadi warga negara penuh dan menjadi warga kelas dua.*

188 *Indonesia bukan negara agama, juga bukan negara sekular, tetapi negara Pancasila.*

image in Islamic countries like Arabia, Pakistan and Middle Eastern countries. When talking about Syariah and Pancasila they said that the Indonesian state does not have only one religion but several religions. In so doing they were mindful of and referring to the existence of many religions in the country.

A participant mentioned shared knowledge about the social and economic gap between Javanese and Chinese when he talked about the cause of the riots. In talking about Muslim radicals, rioters or church attackers the participants referred to urban or village territorial divisions such as "not from Solo", "from outside, from Sukoharjo", "from another place" or "not from Banyuanyar". Administratively Solo and Sukoharjo are two different territories. Sukoharjo is the name of a district south of Solo city.

When participants talked about radical Muslims they sometimes referred to the discourse of outsiders, for instance the description of Solo as a terrorist city. In expressing disagreement with terrorism a participant compared his utterance with Muslims' utterances, such as "They [Muslims] also disagree with the Islamic notions of the hardliners". A participant also mentioned a popular t-shirt logo, 'Fuck Terrorist', illustrated below (figure 3).


*Figure 3: T-shirt logo 'Fuck Terrorist'*
(Source: http://digitalsablon.blogspot.com)[189]

Talking about problems associated with church building, FGD participants referred to state "permission". This is the licence required by a joint decree of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Domestic Affairs in 2006. The decree requires approval by sixty non-adherents of the religion proposing the construction of a house of worship. In addition it has to be approved by the Forum of Interreligious Harmony (FKUB). The participants also referred to the fact that the "restriction" generally applied only to Christians, not to Muslims.

---

[189] The blog is a commercial advertisement written in *bahasa* Indonesian. For more details see: http://digitalsablon.blogspot.com/2010/09/sablon-digital-kaos-hitam-sablon-flex.html, posted on September 25, 2010 and accessed on April 25, 2012.

A participant talked about his Christian friend stopping the *pengajian* (Islamic learning/teaching) in the *mushola* (Muslim chapel) "because ... the *pengajian* was SARA and stimulated conflict".[190] SARA is an acronym for *Suku* (ethnicity), *Agama* (religion), *Ras* (race), and *Antar golongan* (intergroup). It is a mental model. The New Order government introduced SARA and prohibited talk about SARA problems in the public sphere, which could generate conflict. Since *Reformasi* government and citizens still use the word occasionally, though not as often as in the New Order era. So the speaker was invoking a mental model (SARA) stored in his long-term memory.

## 3 Explanation

The third stage is explanation or the analysis of social practice, that is analysis of the socio-cognitive effects of the texts. The aim is to determine the nature of the social practice of which the discourse is part, which explains why the discourse is what it is, and the effects of the language (text) on social reality (context). The analytic concepts used in this stage are ideology (Foucault 1977) and hegemony (Gramsci 1971). For Fairclough, discursive practices are ideological insofar as they include significations aimed at either supporting or restructuring power relations. When participants draw on their mental models they either reproduce or transform them (Fairclough 2001: 158-161). For the purpose of this section we look at ideational and relational transformations, particularly in regard to subject positions or social identities. The question is: what are the socio-cognitive effects of what the Christian participants said?

### 3.1 Analysis at micro level

At a personal level the participants primarily positioned Muslims in two boxes: "fanatical" and "ordinary" or "normal". A participant identified a fanatical Muslim as one who 'stones my dog', while an ordinary Muslim is one who opens the door of his house for the participant's dog. Another participant had a personal experience with a fanatical Muslim neighbour who dried the sofa and the bed after she (the Christian participant) had used them.

The participants position these fanatical Muslims as 'weird'. That is to say, fanatics are not the norm but the exception in neighbourhood life. Participants in the youthful groups identified fanatical Muslims by using a slang word, "*lebay*" (over acting). Here they were heavily influenced by popular culture (hegemony).

The participants positioned ordinary Muslims as good and tolerant (subject position). This classification meant that they positioned fanatics as "not good"

---

[190] *Karena... pengajian ini sudah SARA, menimbulkan konflik.*

and intolerant. Whereas tolerant Muslims share food with Christians during religious feasts, intolerant Muslims throw away food that was given by Christians. These "good" Muslim villagers are prepared to act as receptionists at Christmas celebrations. In family life "good" Muslims will accompany their Christian siblings to Sunday school.

When a male Catholic participant said, "I myself was asked to make a speech as the representative of [my] Muslim family", he reproduced an image of a tolerant Muslim family. In relation to family and neighbourhood life participants clearly classified fanatical Muslims as those who problematize religious diversity, whereas tolerant Muslims do not.

On the whole participants positioned themselves as pluralistic but pious persons. They constituted and were constituted by religious diversity in their families, schools and villages. Several participants identified their families as "Pancasila families". This shows the influence of the political domain on the personal domain. Pancasila rules citizens' interpersonal everyday life (hegemony). Participants reproduced the ideology of national unity and harmony in their families.

In regard to interpersonal tolerance, a young female Protestant identified herself as joining in a "*ziarah*" (pilgrimage to ancestral cemetery) of her Muslim relatives during an *Idul Fitri* celebration. Hence she made social adjustments for the sake of good relations with her Muslim relatives. Another participant identified the Javanese "custom" (*kebiasaan*) in Solo, which requires respecting elders by visiting them on holy days. In families with diverse religious backgrounds, then, participants were constituted by Javanese custom in their personal relations with Muslim relatives. This shows the effects of the cultural field on the personal field.

A Protestant participant explained, "They [Muslims] pray for spirits, but we [Christians] pray for those who are alive." She positioned *ziarah* (pilgrimage to ancestral cemetery) as "*adat*" (custom). Here she was influenced by Protestant beliefs, illustrating the effects of the religious field on the personal field.

By saying "thanks be to God, [my] father got [my] mother to become a Christian", a participant positioned Christianity as something to be grateful for, thus positioning herself as a non-relativist. Linguistic practice analysis reveals a high frequency of "*puji tuhan*" (thanks to be God) and "fortunately". Thus participants identified that being tolerant is not the same as being a relativist. Pluralism and piety go together.

### 3.2 Analysis at meso level

At meso level Christian participants identified Islam as having "many faces" and multiple interpretations. In general they reproduced two images of Islam/Muslims: a "normal" and an "extremist" image. They positioned normal

Muslims as "moderate", "tolerant" and "proper". Extremists, on the other hand, are positioned as "dangerous" and "disgusting".

Participants identified that trouble with Islam was not caused by normal Muslims but by extremists. They reproduced an image of extreme Muslims who position Christians as *musyrik*, *kafir* and enemies. They also identified extreme Muslims as anti-Christian and anti-West. This identification shows the influence (hegemony) of a common discourse about Westerners as typifying Christians in general. Thus the Christian participants position extreme Muslims as people who do not know where to draw the line between anti-Western and anti-Christian.

Most participants positioned themselves as supporters of normal Islam and as critics of extreme Islam. Muslims should behave "properly" in society. Hence they positioned extreme, hardliner and fanatical Muslims as abnormal and improper. Fanatics are identified as "new learners about Islam". By contrast normal Muslims are identified as having a "deep education in Islam". Participants positioned Muslims who are knowledgeable about Islam as more tolerant. This is comparable with the way participants talked about Christians. The better Christians' understanding of Christianity, the more tolerant they are. So there is a correlation between education and tolerance.

One participant mentioned that "although she [a Muslim] is pious [person], she has great tolerance toward other religions". The conjunction "although" suggests a negative correlation between piety and tolerance. Besides advocating "normal" Islam, most participants favoured democratic and moderate Muslims.

As mentioned in the section on description, terms like "extreme", "hardliner", "radical" and "fanatical" are interchangeable. Some participants identified extreme Muslims with acts of "violence" and "*jihad*" activities/ groups. A Christian positioned *jihad* as fanatical Muslims' fight against Christians. A participant identified the term "hardliners" with Muslims' notion of fighting and killing Christians. As noted in the section on description, usage of these terms is fluid.

Participants also produced an image of Muslims based on their appearance and style of dress. A participant identified the Bali bombers as having long beards. Other participants positioned Muslim men wearing calf-length pants as extreme, hardliner, radical or fanatical. They included Muslim women who wear large *jilbab* or *burqa* in those groups. The participants identified these groups as ones who want to purify Islam, which influences how they dress nowadays. However, the participants positioned Muslim women who wear modest or ordinary *jilbab* as tolerant.

Besides identifying some Muslims as normal and others as extreme, participants identified some Muslims as "*abangan*". They positioned *abangan* Muslims as those who (arbitrarily) oversimplify religious ritual. In addition they are

positioned as breaking common Islamic rules such as the prohibition of gambling and drinking liquor. In contrast to Islamic/Muslim *abangan,* the participants identified obedient Muslims.

Some participants distinguished between Islam (the religion) and Muslims (its believers). Others differentiated between the Qur'an and its interpretations. The problems were not with Islam and the Qur'an, but with the clerics and "the people". The dominant opinion was that the problems arose from the extremists' and hard-liners' interpretations of Islam and the Qur'an. However, few participants identified the Qur'an as problematic in the sense that it literally supports Muslims capturing and killing Christians.

Some participants identified a difference between Indonesian or local Islam and Middle Eastern or Arabian Islam. Normal Muslims are positioned as practitioners of Indonesian or local Islam. Conversely, extreme Muslims practise Middle Eastern or Arabian Islam. The dominant voice reproduces an image of Indonesian or local Islam as the way to avoid conflict with Christians. Indonesian or local Islam uses local culture as the medium to conduct *dakwa* (preaching Islam), for instance *gamelan*, shadow puppets and Javanese songs. Extreme Muslims are influenced not only by the Arabic way of practising Islam but also by their style of dress. The participants identified troubles arising from religious teachings as not coming from local Islam/Muslims, but from abroad.

The participants cite evidence that fanatical, extreme and hardliner Muslims divide things or goods into two categories: pure (*suci*) and impure (*najis*). Hardliner Muslim groups were identified as ones who perceive Christians as impure. That is why they dry a sofa after it has been used by Christians, rewash wet clothes that have been touched by Christians, and ask Christians to wash their hands before shaking hands with them. In other utterances hardliner Muslims clean the mosque floor after it had been used by Muslims outside their group. So here Muslims outside their own group are also considered impure.

The Christian participants positioned fanatical Muslims as ones who distinguish ritual/worship/religious from social activities. They identified joining in Christmas celebrations, saying merry Christmas and participating in a funeral ceremony as religious activities. PKK (mothers' union) gatherings, children's gatherings and *karang taruna* (youth village association) gatherings are social activities. In regard to social relations with Christians, fanatical Muslims are identified as participating only in social activities with Christians and not in religious activities. Thus fanatical Muslims do not segregate themselves from Christians totally but only partially.

In constituting and positioning Muslims as other Christians sometimes also constituted and positioned themselves. Participants primarily positioned Christianity as a religion of love. They cited sources that Christianity taught them to be a candle, light and salt of the earth. But this does not prevent some partici-

pants from positioning other Christians as radicals. Radical Christians come from evangelical rather than mainstream groups.

Evangelicals create trouble not only for Muslims who are "not sensitive to the surroundings", but also for other Christians. Participants identified evangelical groups as arguing that the non-evangelical understanding of the Bible and baptism is wrong. They reproduced a link between level of education and tolerance. The better Christians understood the Bible, the more sensitive they would be to the surroundings.

One participant hoped that he would convert Muslims to Christianity through his prayers. He said, "[I] pray for them [Muslims] because [I] love [them]." He referred to the book, *40 Days to love nations in praying,* which sees the purpose of prayer as God touching and transforming Muslims' hearts because he is their Creator[191] and the Lord Jesus wanting to bring them (Muslims) into his eternal kingdom.[192] That means that he hoped that by praying for Muslims he would convert them to Christianity.

Some participants identified Catholics as more inclined to appreciate local culture than other Christians. They are identified as praying for the spirits (*doa-doa arwah*) and commemorating certain days after a person's death, such as the 40th, 100th and 1000th anniversary, while others reject those practices. Some participants positioned praying for the spirits (*doa-doa arwah*) as according with Javanese culture. They positioned some Christians as appreciating local culture in their missionary work, whereas others criticized local culture. They reproduced the view that missionaries' neglect of local culture would cause conflict with both Muslims and Javanese people.

They identified Christians as participating in Muslim religious events, whereas Muslims mainly refuse to join in Christian religious occasions and participate only in the social part. Christians are identified as extending religious seasonal greetings to Muslims, but not vice versa. Thus most participants positioned Christians as more tolerant than Muslims.

### 3.3 Analysis at macro level

At macro level participants identified a transformation among Indonesian people from the New Order to the *Reformasi* era. Participants reproduced an image of the New Order as an era of state oppression. By contrast they recognize *Reformasi* as an era of freedom. They reproduced the view that in the *Reformasi* era freedom was not only opened up but also broadened.

---

[191] *Tuhan sanggup menjamah dan mengubahkan hati umat Islam karena Dialah Sang Pencipta mereka. 40 Days to love nations in praying*, 3 September-12 October 2007, p. 1.

[192] *Tuhan Yesus rindu untuk membawa mereka masuk ke dalam kerajaan-Nya yang kekal. 40 Days to love nations in praying*, 3 September-12 October 2007, p. 3.

They reproduced an image of the *Reformasi* era as presenting a dilemma. On one hand a Christian can be "vice mayor" and Christians can have a big Christmas celebration in the city hall, which never happened before. On the other hand freedom leads to "violence". The participants also identified that Christians were not immune to the influence of discourse on freedom in society (hegemony). Because of freedom radicalism is also growing among Christians.

Some participants identified the post-*Reformasi* era in Indonesia as transformation into a "Syariah state" (Islamization). They cited the examples of the establishment of a Syariah bank, implementation of Syariah law in Aceh, the demand for inclusion of the Syariah in the amended constitution, and the appearance of Islamic programmes on television, for instance Islamic *sinetron* (drama) programmes.

In general participants identified the affairs of the Muslim majority as emerging in many aspects of (public) life, including the economic and social spheres.[193] One participant explained that if this tendency is consistently promoted, Indonesia will really become an "Islamic state". If this were to happen, there will be regional "separation". Participants identified that some regions are already threatening separation or independence. In a globalizing world participants identified extreme Muslims as positioning America and the West as enemies.

Participants reproduced an image that "freedom" and "democracy" tend to give the "dominant" people a voice. They cited examples of the minority religious group (Christians) and the minority ethnic group (Chinese) being targets of discrimination and violence. The participants identified instances where churches and Christian places of worship in their area were raided by extreme Muslims.

Most participants reproduced an image of the state's lack of authority in the *Reformasi* era to deal with extreme Muslims' acts of violence. In the present era they positioned the state as defeated by extreme Muslims. Thus they positioned the state as unable to protect them against acts of violence. Since *Reformasi* some participants have also experienced difficulty in obtaining state permission to build churches or worshipping communally outside the church. But this restriction does not apply to Muslims.

However, this does not lead to identification of the majority of Muslims as supporting Syariah law and practising discrimination and acts of violence against Christians. The trouble came from outsiders, hardliners who are very few and not local Muslims. Thus the participants identified the challenge to Muslim-Christian relations as coming from minority groups within mainstream Islam. Among Christians, too, the problem comes from evangelical movements, not from mainstream denominations such as the Javanese Christian and

---

[193] *Mayoritas banyak berkembang ke berbagai aspek kehidupan, segi sisi ekonomi, sosial.*

Catholic churches. Thus participants reproduced a social mechanism to maintain harmony and peace between Muslims and Christians.

Participants created an image of a Syariah state as opposed to a "Pancasila state". They cite examples of extreme Muslims who reject the Pancasila state or are anti-Pancasila. To uphold state authority participants identified a need to "prioritize Pancasila"[194] rather than "Syariah". They identified the implementation of Syariah in public life as the main cause of segregation between adherents of different religions. By identifying Christians as having a deeper spirit of Pancasila than Muslims the Christian participants advocated Pancasila.

In general participants reproduced an image of Indonesia as a pluralistic country where religious minority groups are protected by the state. In advocating communal prayer by religious believers in the village when Indonesia was experiencing an economic crisis in the mid-1990s, a participant reproduced the image of Solo as pluralistic region where diverse religious believers live together in harmony. The pattern of communal prayer in which different religious leaders pray, taking turns, shows that Solo is primarily a multireligious society.

## 4 Conclusion

In this research we use the method of critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992) to acquire insight into the relation between religious language and social cohesion. We distinguish between the dimensions of individual believers (micro level), their (full or partial) identification with their religions or religious institutions (meso level), and the societal context in which these religions or religious institutions operate (macro level). At the micro, meso and macro levels our research participants produced rich labels of Muslims. Indeed, they are more than labels in that they also identify concrete behaviours.

Our conclusions pertain to the classifications (description), the cognitions or mental models that are drawn on (interpretation) and the social conditions and effects (explanation). Christian participants classified Muslims into "normal" and "extreme" categories. Normal Muslims adhere to Javanese custom and extreme Muslims follow new waves of Islam from outside. According to them Javanese Muslims do not support violence. They identify Javanese Islam as peaceful, non-violent.

On the level of mental models, Christians identified Muslims as distinguishing between social and ritual affairs. According to them this accords with the Qur'anic principle, 'to you be your religion, to me my religion'. Christians perceived fanatical Muslims as differentiating strictly between pure and impure things. According to them fanatical Muslims perceived Christians as impure.

---

[194] *Pancasila seharusnya diutamakan.*

Christians considered normal Muslims to be those who follow Pancasila philosophy, that is unity in diversity and agreeing to disagree. We conclude from the Christian FGDs that Javanese culture and Javanese wisdom are identified as shared cognitions.

On the level of social conditions Christians identify themselves as a minority group and they position Muslims as the majority group. Muslims are identified as pious believers, who are faithful to their own tradition. In general Muslims were positioned as tolerant and respectful towards others (Christians), but they refuse to mix Islamic with other religious teachings. The participants reproduced an image of Javanese *adat* (custom) as bridging the gap between Muslims and Christians. Custom was identified as common ground between the two religions. Some participants advocated that religion must adapt to local culture, otherwise it leads to conflict. They positioned puritan and fundamentalist Muslims as far removed from Javanese culture. Even though Christians identified several Muslim groups as not respecting Pancasila, most of them position Muslims as nationalists who endorse the Pancasila state.

# Chapter III

# "Good" and "excessive" Christians

# How Muslims speak about Christians

Although Muslims are a majority (75.8%) of the population of Surakarta, Christians are a significant minority group (23.2%). There are many churches – 153 to be precise – in a city with an area of only 44 $km^2$, which is considered small in Indonesia. When one passes Jalan Sutan Sahrir in Surakarta one immediately spots a new megachurch belonging to a Pentecostal community, the Gereja Bethel Indonesia Keluarga Allah (GBIKA). The building was finished in 2006 with a total capacity of 5,000 seats. Bahana Magazine (8-10 October 2007) writes that the GBIKA is one of the ten fastest growing churches in the world. Thus Muslims in Surakarta are very aware of the development of Christians surrounding them.

*Figure 4: The Gereja Bethel Indonesia Keluarga Allah megachurch in Surakarta* (Source: Author's collection)

In this dissertation I study social identity constructions through interreligious, particularly Christian-Muslim relations from a communicative practice point of

view. I seek to determine why and under what conditions people, both individually and collectively, elevate their religious identity above other identities and whether or not religious identity threatens national identity and leads to social conflict. This chapter focuses on how Muslims speak about Christians. In talking about Christians as the other (out-group) Muslim participants sometimes talk about themselves (in-group).

The main data are utterances from eight focus group discussions (FGDs) involving 44 Muslim participants. In addition I use sources like sacred scriptures, religious books, newspapers, bulletins, flyers and cyber sources. On average five to six participants were involved in each FGD.

Besides the religious criterion, participants were grouped according to three criteria. We had male and female groups and within these categories we distinguished between elders and youths, professionals and workers. Gender-wise 21 women and 23 men attended the FGDs. We classify participants aged 17-24 as youths and those aged 50 and over as elders. We do not have a specific age category of participants aged 25-49, but professionals and workers were mostly in that age group. The youngest participant attending the youths group was 17 years old, while the oldest elder was 71. By professionals we mean entrepreneurs, managers or civil servants, whereas by workers we mean labourers, company workers, domestic workers, et cetera.

Almost all invited participants of the Muslim group were happy to join the FGDs. Only one person, a lecturer at Muhammadiyah University, refused to come. He told Mr Ishom (my research assistant) that this kind of study would be used by Western universities and non-Muslim parties for negative purposes.

To start the discussion in each FGD the researcher (moderator of FGDs) posed a basic question at the beginning: "How would you describe Christians?" The rest of the conversation dealt with issues raised by participants in response to that basic question. The words "good" and "excessive" (Christians) in the title of this chapter are the participants' words.

## 1 Description

The first stage of discourse analysis is description or analysis of linguistic practice, that is analysis of the linguistic features of the text (Fairclough 1992: 76-77). For this stage Fairclough (1992: 73-78, 234-237) suggests various analytic tools. Here we focus on vocabulary: wording, over-wording, rewording and alternative wording. The term 'wording' connotes processes of wording the world, which differ in different eras and places and for different groups of people (Fairclough 1992: 76-77). Over-wording is a sign of intense preoccupation pointing to peculiarities in the ideology (Fairclough 1992: 193). Rewording is new wordings presented as alternatives, and in opposition, to existing ones

(Fairclough 1992: 194). We also look at metaphors. Fairclough (1992: 195) says, "How a particular domain of experience is metaphorized is one of the stakes in the struggle within and over discourse practices."

Thus the objects of analysis in this linguistic practice stage are words, phrases or sentences. We focus on how Muslims speak about Christians. Analytic questions are: How do Muslims describe Christians? What do they say about Christians? What words do they use?

## 1.1 Analysis at micro level

This section deals with the micro or individual level of discourse, that is where Muslims speak about Christians from the perspective of their personal experience and opinions as individual believers, members of a family, neighbourhood or friendship. At individual level many Muslim participants describe Christians as their friends. For instance, a professional woman said, "[In] junior high school I had a close friend. Her name was Fani[195] and [she was] a Christian."[196] The word "close" shows that the speaker had an intimate relationship with her friend.

The participants referred to Christians as family members or relatives. A participant said, "The background of my father's relative was Hindu-Christian." This text shows that the participant's extended family represents diverse religions: Hinduism, Christianity and Islam. Some participants said that they have members of many different religions in the extended family and only few different religions in their nuclear family.

A professional male said, "We do not differentiate [between] Muslim and Catholic [in my family]. So [we have] something like a family fund. [If members of the family] are sick, if [they], what is it called, have an operation, [they] receive one million [rupiah], a hundred [rupiah] for those who get a less serious sickness."[197] This text shows the equal position ("we do not differentiate") and mutual relationship (sharing money) between Muslims and Catholics in the speaker's family.

Some participants used the label "*abangan*" as an attribute of their family. A male professional said, "I am from an *abangan* family. My uncles are Christians, I mean Catholics, and Muslims. It is customary [to have] a meeting during *lebaran* [Islamic feast]."[198] Here the word "*abangan*" indicates a family

---

[195] This is a pseudonym.

[196] *SMP itu saya punya teman dekat, namanya Fani, dan Kristen.*

[197] *Kita satu keluarga ya tidak memandang Islam atau Katolik. Jadi ada semacam iuran keluarga. Ada yang sakit, kalau apa namanya operasi dapat sekian juta, seratus ribu kalau sakit biasa.*

[198] *Saya dari keluarga abangan. Pak De saya ada yang Kristen, eh Katolik, dan Islam. Sudah biasa seperti itu ketemu kalau lebaran.*

with religiously diverse members. Another participant contrasted "*abangan*" Christians with "fanatical" Christians.

> "[In] Blibis area, Baki... [the Christians] succeeded to build church. Now [it] has become an area of Christianization. Some of the inhabitants [who are now Christians] formerly were Muslims. So they [new Christians by conversion] have had social intercourse for a long time, have family relationships, [are] close neighbours. They don't have problems in daily relations. But their Christianity is also *abangan*, not that fanatical. The *abangan* Muslim meets the *abangan* Christian, so [it is] ordinary [no problem]."[199]

The phrases "*abangan* Muslim" and "*abangan* Christian" show that the label *abangan* is applied not only to Muslims, but also to Christians. Neither *abangan* Muslims nor *abangan* Christians are fanatics. In this text *abangan* is a shared identity that serves as a meeting point between Muslims and Christians. That is why they "don't have problems in daily relations". Thus, the word "*abangan*" is not only an identity label but also relates to concrete behaviour. The speaker's phrase "area of Christianization" indicates a place where processes are at work to Christianize Muslims.

The participants referred to Christians as their "neighbours". An elderly female talked about her Christian Chinese neighbour: "In the '70s [1970s] I had a Christian Chinese neighbour... When it was Ramadan [she] often made *dawet*[200] for me. "Bu Siti,[201] I made *dawet* for you."[202] Here the participant talked about social relations between her and her Christian neighbour. Another elderly female commented: "In my place [one person] donates rice during *Idul Fitri* [Islamic feast]... up to two quintals. [He/she is] a Chinese Christian."[203] The phrase "Chinese Christian" in the last two utterances shows a combination of religious and ethnic identities.

A male worker said, "There is a Christian neighbour of mine. Coincidentally he is close [to me] and he often repairs his bicycle at my house."[204] In the last utterance, besides talking about his neighbour as a Christian (social position), he also describes a social relationship between him and his neighbour.

---

199 *Daerah Blibis, Baki... sudah berhasil bangun gereja. Sekarang jadi daerah Kristenisasi. Sebagian yang disitu itu dulu aslinya Islam. Jadi bermasyarakat sudah lama, ada yang bersaudara, tetangga cukup dekat. Dalam sehari-hari gak ada masalah dalam berhubungan. Tapi Kristennya sekarang juga Kristen abangan, bukan Kristen yang fanatik. Islam abangan musuh Kristen abangan, jadi ya biasa-biasa aja.*

200 *Dawet* is a cold drink made from rice or arrowroot, flour, coconut milk and palm sugar.

201 This is a pseudonym.

202 *Tahun tujuh puluhan itu saya punya tetangga itu ya Kristen ya China... lha itu kalau Ramadhan, sering buatkan saya dawet. Shoh, tak gekke dawet.*

203 *Di tempat saya, kalau idul fitri itu ada yang ngirim beras... sampai dua kwintal. Wong Kristen China.*

204 *Tetangga saya itu ada yang umat Kristiani. Kebetulan itu dekat dan itu sering sok ndandakke sepeda ke rumah saya.*

This utterance and some of the earlier ones show that when Muslims talk about the others at micro level they also talk about themselves.

Most Muslim participants said that they have a diversity of friends. A participant said, "My friends are diverse." Some participants described their schools which represented diverse religions. A participant said, "When I was at junior high school [the students were] Catholic, Protestant, Muslim."[205] Another female participant described a similar situation, "[At my] senior high school... half the class were Muslims, half were Catholics."[206] These two sentences indicate that some participants attended religiously diverse schools. A young female participant said, "My boyfriend's family [its members] is [religiously] diverse: Christian, Catholic and Islam."[207] The word "boyfriend" shows that the speaker, a young female, has a special relationship with a Christian boy. Thus the word "tolerant" is not only a label but also relates to concrete behaviour.

Generally Muslim participants mentioned that Christians are tolerant. A young female said, "[I] had a Christian boyfriend. He was highly tolerant... if [I said] a prayer of *tarawih*, [he] didn't pray with me, but [he] waited for [me] outside the mosque."[208] In that text the participant described a link between the word "tolerant" and an attitude of waiting for his girlfriend while she prayed.

Most participants described interpersonal relations between Muslims and Christians as good. A participant said, "Their relationship with us is good... I was hospitalized in the PKU (Muhammadiyah hospital), [I was] visited. The Christians also visited [me]. [They] also prayed [for me] outside [the ward]."[209] Likewise an elderly male narrated, "I was hospitalized in Jebres. My [Muslim] friends didn't come first, my *jema'ah* (congregants) didn't come first, they [Christians] came first."[210] In those texts two participants shared the same experience of being visited by Christians in hospital when they were sick.

Some participants described interpersonal interaction with Christians in daily life. An Arabian businesswoman in the elderly female group talked about her daughter's wedding. She gave the invitations to her neighbours regardless of whether they were Muslim or Christian. She said, "When I had a wedding [for my daughter], I organized something [a party]. Although they [my

---

[205] *SMP ada yang Katolik, Protestan, Islam.*

[206] *SMA... separoh kelas Muslim, separoh kelas Katolik.*

[207] *Pacar saya kan beda-beda agama keluarganya, ada Kristen, ada Katolik, sama Islam.*

[208] *Sempat punya pacar Kristen juga. Itu toleransinya sangat tinggi. Bila sholat tarawih, tidak ikut sholat sich, tapi menunggu di luar mesjid.*

[209] *Hubungannya dengan kita ini ya baik... Saya mondok di PKU itu ya ditiliki. Orang-orang Kristen itu yo dho tilik. Di luar itu ya pada mendoakan.*

[210] *Saya opname di Jebres. Temen-temen saya belum dateng, jama'ah saya belum dateng, mereka udah ke sana.*

neighbours] are Christians, the invitation was for them."[211] Here the speaker described that she did not discriminate between guests at a wedding party on a religious basis. By adding the word "although" she shows that sometimes Muslims do not invite Christians to a party.

A young female participant expressed her personal experience of playing inside the church when she was child. She said, "My house is very close to the church. When [I was] a child, that church was in the same area as my friend's house. So except on Sundays, except during prayer time, kids played there [inside church]. Because its chairs could be moved, that place became a playground."[212] Here the speaker indicated that church was not an exclusive place reserved for Christian religious services.

Some Muslim participants mentioned that in forming friendships and neighbourhood relations Muslims and Christian avoid mixing religious (Islamic and Christian) practices. A female professional said, "I had a friend. [She was] also Christian. She distinguished *ibadah* [worship] affairs from friendship affairs. So she did not mix [*ibadah* and friendship]."[213] In this text she mentioned that the Christian avoided mixing Islamic and Christian worship or prayer. She continued, "When time for *sholat* [prayer] came I was asked [by her] to pray first. When she had a [Christian] service, [she] asked permission to have her service first... So her tolerance was very high."[214] Here the speaker described a connection between a high degree of "tolerance" and the Christian's suggestion that the Muslim pray first.

Another participant shared the same notion of respecting each other's prayers but not mixing them. "I had a friend who was a Muslim. He/she also made friends with a Catholic. When the Muslim friend prayed in the mosque, that Catholic waited outside. [It was] always like that. So it seems very social. We didn't interfere with each other's *aqida* [faith]."[215] Here the label "social" is used for an interpersonal understanding between a Muslim and a Christian. Using the distinction between social and religious affairs, the speaker's Catho-

---

[211] *Saya punya acara pernikahan, mengadakan apa. Walau dia Kristen tetep undangan itu jatuh untuk dia.*

[212] *Rumahku deket skali dengan gereja. Waktu kecil gerejanya itu jadi satu sama rumahnya temenku. Jadi disitu kalau nggak minggu, waktu bukan ibadah, malah buat tempat main anak-anak. Soalnya disitu gerejanya kursinya itu bisa dipindah-pindah, jadi disitu malah jadi tempat bermain.*

[213] *Aku pernah punya temen, cewek dari Kristiani juga. Dia itu bisa bedakan mana yang urusan ibadah, mana urusan buat teman. Jadi dia gak mencampuradukkan.*

[214] *Kalau pas waktunya aku sholat, aku disuruh sholat dulu. Kalau dia waktunya ibadah ya ijin ibadah dulu... Jadi toleransinya sangat tinggi.*

[215] *Pernah tho punya temen, temen itu Muslim. Dia sahabatan sama orang Katolik juga. Setiap temen Muslim itu sholat di masjid, yang Katolik nunggu di luar. Pasti kayak gitu. Jadi sosialnya terasa banget. Kita nggak masuk ke masalah aqidahnya masing-masing gitu.*

lic friend is described as tolerant. In this text the speaker differentiated between the fields of *aqida* (faith) and friendship.

A male participant, who is a local board member of Muhammadiyah, observed, "When they have a Christmas celebration... we are invited to attend. Yet it's impossible for us to come, because it is related to *aqida* [faith]."[216] Here the speaker explained that attending a Christmas celebration is prohibited because Christmas is a religious feast.

Again, a young female mentioned, "In social activities, let's work together. But if it is religious affairs [of Islam and Christianity], do not mix."[217] Thus the participant distinguished between social and religious affairs. In another text an elderly female said: "In *muamala* [social] affairs we are good [to Christians], [while] in *aqida* (faith) affairs we couldn't be good."[218] As evidenced by the linguistic features of these texts, the word "*aqida*" [faith] is an alternative wording for "religion" (*agama*), while the word "*muamala*" is an alternative wording for "social". Using the previous classification, the participant was saying that it is permissible to be tolerant in the social arena but not in the religious arena.

Whereas some participants described how they avoided mixing Islamic and Christian worship and teachings, others described the togetherness of Muslims and Christians during Islamic or Christian feasts. An elder female talked about her Muslim and Christian neighbours who helped each other decorate the balcony for Christmas and *halal bi halal* (Islamic feast) celebrations. Similarly, a young male said, "I have many Christian neighbours... There is service [held by my Christian neighbour], I don't know [what it is called], [they] sing... I also assist there [serving food, etc.]."[219] Here the speaker described helping at his Christian neighbour's religious service.

An elderly male, a Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) leader, talked about a Catholic pastor who died and some Muslims participated in the funeral ceremony. The pastor was his close friend. He said, "When he died, he was a Catholic pastor, there was a cross on the tombstone, [but those] who carried his corpse were [members of] *Banser* and *Anshor* [NU's youth wing]."[220] Here the speaker de-

---

[216] *Kalau mereka Natalan... kami diundang untuk menghadiri itu. Ya, kami tidak mungkin datang. Kerena itu sudah menyangkut soal aqidah.*

[217] *Kalau masalah sosial ayo kerja bareng-bareng. Tapi kalau masalah agama jangan dibanding-bandingkan.* In the text the speaker did not use the word 'mix', but "be compared (*dibanding-bandingkan*)". However, for the sake of clarity I use the word 'mix'.

[218] *Untuk muamalah kita baik, untuk aqidah kita tidak boleh baik.*

[219] *Tetangga saya banyak yang Kristen... Ada acara apa, saya gak tahu, nyanyi-nyanyi itu... Saya juga ikut nyinom disitu, tetangga saya yang Islam juga banyak nyinom disitu.*

[220] *Pada waktu dia meninggal, dia itu jelas romo, bandosane ada palang gitu, yang ngangkat itu Banser sama Anshor.*

scribed how even though his close friend was a Catholic pastor, members of his organization helped to carry his corpse at the funeral.

Another elderly male, an imam and member of Muhammadiyah, said, "When there was *halal bi halal* [Islamic feast] in the church [yard], I was invited to preach. [It was] in Gajahan. Sixty percent of those attending were Muslims, forty percent were non-Muslims."[221] A male worker mentioned, "[I got] many SMSs [short messages] from my *Tionghoa* Christian friends during *lebaran* [Islamic feast]."[222] The linguistic features of these texts indicate that the word "*lebaran*" is an alternative wording for "*halal bi halal*", while "*Tionghoa Christian*" is an alternative wording for "Chinese Christians".

Talking about whether Muslims should also distribute *zakat* (alms) to poor Christians during the month of Ramadan, a female worker said the following:

> "There is a guideline from the Qur'an and *hadits* about the *zakat fitrah* (personal alms) [in Islam]. But we could not implement it strictly here [in this village]. How [to implement the teaching of] Islam? Here we prioritize social. Why? ...For instance I am a member of Muhammadiyah. If I were to implement the principles of Muhammadiyah [about *zakat* – she assumed that these principles prohibited giving *zakat* to non-Muslims], the Muhammadiyah rules from the HPP [the organizational guidance] or whatever, then [I would] make non-Muslims, [even] Muslims, not symphatize with Islam".[223]

In contrast to the foregoing narrations, some Muslim participants described Christians as the enemy. A participant said, "When I was at senior high school, [I] considered Christians the enemy... Even in my [early] university years [it was] still like that."[224] Other participants mentioned that "not all Christians are good to Muslims".[225] Mostly they complained about Christianization. The way they "spread their religion" makes Muslims "emotional" (angry).

Some participants said that Christians pretend to do good deeds for Muslims. A female participant said, "Their (Christians') daily life is good, but how is their heart? Perhaps the goodness is pretended. Perhaps [it is] to get protec-

---

[221] *Kalau saya halal bi halal di gereja pun saya suruh ngisi. Di Gajahan. Yang datang enam puluh persen Muslim, empat puluh persen non-Muslim.*

[222] *SMS kalau lebaran itu kan banyak dari temen-temen Kristen Tionghoa.*

[223] *Zakat fitrah kalau disini itu ya untuk dalilnya untuk pedoman Al-Qur'an dan Haditsnya ada dan tahu. Tapi untuk disini kalau diterapkan seperti itu saya kira kurang begitu apa ya istilahnya terlalu saklek. Kalau Islam? Di sini itu yang kita utamakan itu sosial dulu. Karena apa? ...Umpamanya saya, Muhammadiyah memegang teguh dari prinsip Muhammadiyah, kaidah-kaidah Muhammadiyah dari HPP atau apapun, itu nanti menjadikan umat lain, umat Islam kurang simpati dengan Islam.*

[224] *Waktu saya SMA, memandang Kristen sebagai musuh... Bahkan waktu awal-awal kuliah masih seperti itu.*

[225] *Tidak semua orang Kristen baik terhadap orang Islam.*

tion. Perhaps there are other intentions."[226] A Muslim participant used the label "stubborn" [227] to describe Christians who always have hidden intentions when doing good deeds for the benefit of Muslims. Christians are described as having hidden agendas aimed at Christianization underlying their benevolence to Muslims.

Several participants described their personal experience of Christianization within their family. A female worker said, "My sister was a Muslim. She attended a Christian junior high school. She followed the [Christian] course, so she converted. Since then she has been following Christianity. However, *alhamdulillah* [thanks be to God], her younger siblings are still Muslim."[228] The speaker uses the word "*alhamdulillah*" to show that being and remaining a Muslim is something to be grateful for.

Another participant described a conversation with her daughter. She said, "My daughter joined an extracurricular course [at a Christian institution]. Once or twice [she was asked to] do exercises, this one and that one. Later the course was changed... [She said] mom, I was taught religious [Christian] education like this. [Then I said] when you are picked up [by your friends] tomorrow, please don't join [go]."[229] Here the speaker described her suspicion about hidden agendas underlying Christian education.

Some participants described a difference between religious education at public and Christian schools. A female professional said, "[I received my] high school [education] at a public high school... When [we were taught] religion [we were] separated."[230] At public schools students are separated because they are taught their respective religions. Another participant had a different experience. She said, "My big cousin was Muslim, but he/she went to a Christian junior and senior high school. And its [religious] course was exclusively on Christianity. From the books on worship, about worship [he/she] was also taught Christianity... even though he/she was Muslim."[231] In Christian schools Muslims are taught about Christianity. Compared with the previous descrip-

---

[226] *Kesehariannya itu baik, tapi bagaimana hatinya? Mungkin kebaikan pura-pura. Mungkin untuk mencari perlindungan. Mungkin ada tendensi lain.*

[227] *Nekad.*

[228] *Agama Islam... dia kakak saya. Terus dia masuk SMP Kristen. Dia kan mengikuti pelajaran itu, ketut njuran. Mulai itu dia terus ikut Kristen. Tapi alhamdulillah adik-adiknya tetep Islam.*

[229] *Anak saya ikut les. ... satu dua kali ya latihan nggarap ini nggarap ini. Lama-lama pelajaranne kok ganti... Buk, lha aku tadi diajari ngaji ngene-ngene. Yo sesuk nek diampiri ra usah melok.*

[230] *SMA di SMA Negeri... kalau pelajaran agama dipisah.*

[231] *Kakakku keponakan itu dia Islam, tapi dia untuk SMP-SMA-nya Kristen. Dan untuk pengajarannya pure Kristen gitu. Jadi mulai buku-bukunya, trus kalau pas ibadah, ibadah itu juga diajari Kristen. Jadi nggak ada pemilahan subjek oh ini agama Islam ini agama Kristen... Walau dia itu agamanya Islam.*

tion, this speaker was worried that the aim of these lessons was to persuade pupils to "follow Christianity" (i.e. to convert).

A participant described her personal experience. "In Kusumodiningratan, on the whole [people are] Christians. Their way to restrain us, to make [us] afraid to enter the area... is to keep dogs. Our experience living in Kusumodiningratan is that on average each house has a dog. And in the afternoon the dogs are let out. But the afternoon is when [Muslim] kids learn Qur'anic recitation."[232] In this utterance the speaker describes a link between "dog" and a Christian family. Moreover, the phrase "to make [us] afraid" describes a dog as an animal used to frighten Muslims.

Similarly, a young female commented, "When I used to teach kids the Qur'an... the young [Christians] were hanging around. And that is admittedly a Christian area. They don't have tolerance. They played football, played music. At the same time we used to teach kids in the mosque. [The place where they hung out to play is] just across the road."[233] The speaker wanted to say that young Christians displayed a lack of empathy and tolerance by disturbing Muslim children who were studying the Qur'an. Here the speaker described intolerance in a particular age category, namely the younger generation.

Another participant used a *bahasa* Indonesian metaphor, saying that Christians are "like a jackal in sheep's fur",[234] which means tricking by pretending. A participant added, "[They] don't respect Muslims."[235] Another participant used a metaphor to describe the relation between Christians and Muslims "as that of oil and water",[236] implying that Muslims and Christians can never blend.

In talking about the others, the participants also talked about themselves. A young female talked about her housemate. She said, "She wears *jilbab* of a different kind to the *jilbab* I use... Her *jilbab* is wide. She is indeed anti non [non-Muslims]."[237] The speaker linked wearing a wide *jilbab* with an anti-Christian attitude. The label "non" is applied to Christians (non-Muslims).

---

[232] *Kalau di Kusumodiningratan, ini ya rata-rata, itu Nasrani. Mereka caranya mencegah kita agar takut masuk ke ruangan itu, ke lingkungan itu, dengan mereka memelihara anjing. Karena pengalaman kami pernah tinggal di daerah Kusumodiningratan, sehingga rata-rata satu rumah pasti punya anjing. Dan sore hari anjingnya dikeluarkan. Padahal sore itu adalah waktunya anak TPA.*

[233] *Saat saya mendidik anak-anak belajar ngaji... kaum yang masih muda nongkrong. Dan disitu memang wilayahnya orang-orang Kristen. Disana tidak ada kata toleransi, ya untuk dia bermain bola, apa genjrengan. Padahal kita mendidik anak-anak di masjid. Hanya berseberang jalan.*

[234] *Serigala berbulu domba.*

[235] *Tidak menghormati umat Islam.*

[236] *Seperti air dengan minyak.*

[237] *Dia juga pakai jilbab yang berbeda dengan cara berpakaian jilbab seperti saya... jilbabnya besar. Dia memang antipati dengan non.*

## 1.2 Analysis at meso level

The meso or institutional level of discourse is when participants speak about themselves as members of an institutional religion, that is shared, collective patterns of belief and practice which go beyond personal convictions. In talking about Christianity (the other, out-group), sometimes Muslims also speak about their own religion, Islam (in-group).

At an institutional level Muslim participants generally described Christians as "grandchildren of Abraham (*cucu Ibrahim*)" and Christianity as a "good" religion. For example, a male professional said, "Christians are not too different from Muslims, being grandchildren of Abraham."[238] An elderly female observed, "Basically the core of all religions is good ... their teachings are almost the same."[239] Another elderly female said, "Basically all religions are good."[240] The utterance "Christians are not too different from Muslims" shows that Christians and Muslims share their traditional roots. The two speakers use the word "good" rather than right or true.

However, some participants described Christians as infidels (*kafir*) and polytheists (*musyrik*). Christians by conversion are described as apostates (*murtad*). A participant commented, "There are many apostate Christians, who left Islam for Christianity."[241] Another said that Muslims will go to "paradise",[242] in contrast to Christians who go to a different place. Yet another pointed out that the Qur'an says "do not make those Jews and Nasrani your allies".[243]

A male professional said, "[If] a Christian [says] *assalamu'alaikum* (greeting/peace upon you), we are forbidden to reply. Just answer *wa'alaikum* (be upon you), not *wa'alaikum salam* (peace be upon you)." Likewise a female professional observed, "If it [*salam*, greeting] is [spoken by] a Muslim, [we have to] answer. If it is [spoken] by a non-Muslim, we are forbidden to answer."[244] Here the speaker used the passive voice. She did not mention who forbade that practice.

Both the foregoing speakers said that the greeting "*assalamu'alaikum*" is exclusively for Muslims. A female participant who works for an NGO engaged in community education and who often invites government staff to present courses, said that she had asked government to send only Muslim staff as its representatives in the Muslim community programme. She said, "If there is an

---

238 *Umat Kristen tidak jauh berbeda dengan umat Islam sebagai cucu Ibrahim.*

239 *Intinya semua pada dasarnya agama baik... ajarannya hampir sama.*

240 *Pada intinya semua pada dasarnya agama baik.*

241 *Kristen murtadan akeh, murtad saka Islam nang Kristen.*

242 *Surga.*

243 *Jangan jadikan orang Yahudi dan Kristen temanmu.*

244 *Kalau Muslim kan harus dijawab, kalau non Muslim kita tidak boleh menjawab.*

Islamic programme... Whatever the way, [we] ask for a Muslim [as government representative]. So we can use [Islamic greetings] to answer their greetings."[245]

An elderly female participant said, "They [Christians] had been indoctrinated by the church to proselytize."[246] Another person in the same FGD said, "Dewi Purnamawati is from Arimatea [organization of Muslims by conversion]. Dewi was a Catholic, staunch. Allah gave [her] guidance. [When she was a Catholic] she had been indoctrinated since she was child... to apostatize."[247] Another participant said, "Their nature is to look for our carelessness [about being Christianized]."[248] By comparing the two statements we learn that the verb "to apostatize" is an alternative wording for "to proselytize". The expression "Allah gave [her] guidance" refers to the person's conversion to Islam.

Some participants said that building new churches and serving the poor are forms of Christianization. A young male participant talked about the church's service of providing for poor Muslims during the month of Ramadan. He said:

> "It could be an invitation [to become Christian], because ... I see those who join the fast-breaking are only pedicab drivers and beggars. Actually those people are easily indoctrinated. The first step is to join the fast-breaking. The second step is through another way. That is their mission. There is a second [strategy]. Maybe, maybe [it is] the cheap rice [programme]."[249]

By adding the word "only" in this text the speaker describes pedicab drivers and beggars as poor Muslims. Thus only poor Muslims attend the church fast-breaking. The speaker is describing a particular social class: the lower class. The vocabulary shows that he uses the word "mission" with reference to Christians' strategy to persuade Muslims to convert to Christianity by rendering a social service. If we compare this with a previous utterance by another participant, the word "mission" is used as an alternative for the Christianization of Muslims.

A young male participant said, "In Solo Christians behave excessively (*kelewatan*). For instance, during the month of Ramadan (fasting) church

---

[245] *Kalau ada kegiatan Islam... Entah caranya gimana minta yang Muslim. Sehingga kita jelas kan menjawabnya.*

[246] *Mereka itu sudah didoktrin dari gerejanya agar selalu berusaha meraih.*

[247] *Dewi Purnamawati dari Arimatea, Dewi itu dulu Katolik, jeglek, Allah memberi petunjuk, sekarang menjadi mubalighah. Dari kecil dia itu sudah didoktrin... memurtadkan.*

[248] *Sifat mereka itu mencari kelengahan kita.*

[249] *Bisa saja untuk apa namanya sebagai mengajak, karena... saya lihat yang buka puasa disitu kan, hanya tukang becak, ataupun yang pengemis. Sebenarnya orang-orang seperti itu kan mudah terdoktrin. Tahap awal mereka ada yang ikut buka puasa. Tahap kedua dengan cara lain. Ada misi mereka. Ada yang kedua kalinya. Mungkin ada, mungkin dengan beras murah.*

[members] prepare fast-breaking [for Muslims]."[250] The same person described another instance of the fast-breaking programme in the Javanese Christian Church of Manahan. He said, "Inter alia they want to do a good thing for Muslims, that's their aim. But [they engage in] excessive [practices] towards Muslims, to us. So no, they should not do that. If they want to do a good thing for us, [do] not do this by inviting us to the church."[251] In both texts the speaker said that preparing fast-breaking for poor Muslims and inviting them to come to the church are "excessive" Christian practices. From the linguistic features of the texts, the speaker does not object to the fast-breaking programme as such but to inviting Muslims to come to church.

Another participant said, "When the floods [came], or what, the church was very quick [to help people]. Their funds were already readily available... But we would always question: what is the intention?"[252] Here the speaker is suspicious of Christians' assistance to Muslims. Another participant said, "We should not be fooled by their kindness. Because later they will have missions."[253] Here the word "mission" signifies the practice of Christianizing Muslims. A participant said, "Muslims who are financially poor are assisted by them until [they feel] embarrassed [to refuse their invitation to become Christians]."[254]

The linguistic features of the following sentences show that participants questioned whether social and educational services are ways of Christianizing Muslims. A female professional talked about her neighbours who converted to Christianity. She said, "[They] are always picked up to go to church, receive money, receive clothes, receive basic goods."[255] The speaker added, "If I am not mistaken it is the GBI (Indonesian Bethel Church) of Solo Baru."[256] Another participant said, "Many children are driven to school and their school fees are paid. It is in Mojosongo."[257] In the texts the speakers mentioned the names of two places/churches: Solo Baru and Mojosongo. "She/he [a Christian] is doing

---

[250] *Di Solo, umat Kristiani ini memang bertindaknya sudah kelewatan gitu, seperti bulan Ramadhan. Apa gereja-gereja membuat buka bersama.*

[251] *Mereka memang salah satunya pengin berbuat baik untuk umat Islam, itu tujuan mereka. Tapi kelewatan terhadap orang Islam, terhadap kita. Jadi nggak, tidak boleh mereka. Kalau toh niat mereka ingin berbuat baik kepada kita, ya dengan ndak ngundang ke gereja donk.*

[252] *Itu ada banjir, atau apa, itu gereja sangat cepat sekali. Dana mereka memang sudah ada betul... Tapi kita akan tetap bertanya mereka ada tendensi apa?*

[253] *Jangan sampai kita istilahnya terlena dengan kebaikan-kebaikan mereka. Karena apa bisa belakangnya mereka punya misi-misi.*

[254] *Orang Islam yang lemah ekonominya kemudian disantuni oleh dia sampai lewat pekewuh.*

[255] *Setiap ke gereja dijemput, mendapatkan uang, mendapatkan pakaian, mendapatkan bahan pokok.*

[256] *Gerejanya itu kalau tidak salah itu GBI mana Solo Baru.*

[257] *Banyak anak-anak yang diantar, dijemput, disekolahkan, dibayari. Itu daerah Mojosongo.*

*dakwa* ... sometimes with food or whatever, [giving] clothes,"[258] said a male worker. Here the speaker used "*dakwa*" as an alternative wording for Christian mission (*misi*).

A participant said, "[They] convert to that religion [Christianity] for a parcel."[259] Another participant commented, "His/her KTP [identity card] says Islam, but he/she never performs *sholat* (prayer). Their religion could be exchanged for *Sarimi* [a brand of noodle]."[260] In this text, the speaker shifts from using single pronoun (he/ she: *dia*) to plural pronoun (they: *mereka*). This commonly happens in Indonesian oral conversation. A young female participant said, "Because of financial need they will go to church and [when they] return [they] brought *Sarimi*. [They are] picked up to go [to church]. [If they] do not come, [they are] looked for."[261] This speaker described a link between Muslims who "never perform *sholat*" and their casual way of changing their religion to obtain *Sarimi*. The word "parcel" is an alternative wording for "*Sarimi*", referring to gifts from Christians which are viewed suspiciously as ways of persuading poor Muslims to convert to Christianity. By contrast a male worker felt that "those [who] already have a religion, should not be converted to another religion".[262] In effect he was saying that converting Muslims to Christianity is prohibited. In this text the speaker used the passive voice. Using previous and subsequent categories applied by participants, the speakers described people who easily convert to another religion as not "devout Muslims", but "*abangan*" (nominal) Muslims and "poor people".

With reference to KTP, a male worker said, "Their Islam is Islam KTP. Then [they are] given something, tempted. They live in poverty. Unfortunately their friends [come] to influence [them]. Join me [in Christianity], then [you will] receive a monthly incentive [money]."[263] Another male worker said, "I have a cousin. Fortunately [the cousin was] previously a Muslim. But his/her [way of] Islam rarely performed *shalat* (prayer). Now he/she has joined the church [Christianity] ... [because he/she] is given a job. [It is] Pasar Legi Bethany Church."[264] The label "Islam KTP" is applied to Muslims who may be tempted to join Christianity. If we compare it with the previous sentence,

---

[258] *Dia dakwah... kadang pakai makanan atau apa pakaian.*

[259] *Pindah ke agama sana karena sesuap parcel.*

[260] *KTP-nya Islam, tapi dia tidak pernah menjalankan shalat. Mereka-mereka inilah yang mau-maunya agamanya ditukar sama Sarimi.*

[261] *Karena kepentok kebutuhan ekonomi, mereka mau ke gereja dan pulang dibawakan Sarimi. Berangkat pun dijemput. Tidak datang, pun dicari.*

[262] *Yang sudah punya agama jangan ditarik ke agama lain.*

[263] *Islamnya Islam KTP, terus dikasih itu, diiming-imingi, mereka kan hidup kekurangan. Ndlalah ada temennya yang mempengaruhi. Melu aku wae nanti per bulan dapat gaji.*

[264] *Saya punya kepokan sendiri, kebetulan kemarin Islam, tapi Islamnya juga jarang sholat. Sekarang itu dia masuk gereja... dikasih kerjaan. Di gereja Bethany Pasar Legi.*

"his/her KTP says Islam, but (he/she) never performs *sholat* [prayer]. Their religion could be exchanged for *Sarimi* [a brand of noodle]", the speaker says that the target of Christianization is "Islam KTP" who rarely perform *shalat* (prayer). The speaker specifically mentioned the Pasar Legi Bethany Church.

Some participants talked about Muslim-Christian marriage. "They [young Christian men] also approach our children, our girls," said an elderly female participant.[265] A female professional explained: "At first, when getting married, the man [converts to] Islam. But when [they] have a child [the woman] is threatened: if you do not want to follow me [become a Christian], please take care of your kid yourself. Indeed the woman was forced to be a housewife [not working outside the house]... Finally [she] moved, moved to Christianity."[266] The sentence, "please take care of your kid yourself" is a divorce threat. The wording of the utterance shows that marriage can be a strategy to convert someone to Christianity.

A young female participant described various strategies such as providing food, clothing and education for poor Muslims as "Christianization in a smooth way".[267] A participant said, "Two [missionaries] who cycle every afternoon come to people's houses to deceive [them] to join their religion."[268] A female professional made a similar observation:

> "There were [two] people cycling, wearing helmets. One of them was Indonesian. [The other] was a foreigner. Both people went cycling every afternoon. [They] went door to door to persuade [other people] to follow their religion... At first I did not realize they were missionaries. I did not think [they were missionaries]. I thought [they were] tourists... [Once] I met them [missionaries from the same group] coincidentally in the Grand Mall. [I] met a woman, a foreigner, a sister... [she] approached [people] one by one."[269]

Thus, besides "Christianization in a smooth way" there is door-to-door mission. Another participant used the word "*londo*" (Dutch) to speak about foreign missionaries. "Those active [in mission] were cycling. [They] wore white [and] black uniforms. Those *londo* [went] door to door."[270] Another participant said,

---

[265] *Mereka kan juga mendekati anak-anak kita, gadis-gadis kita.*

[266] *Pertama waktu nikah yang cowok mau Islam. Tapi begitu sudah punya anak, diancam kalau kamu gak mau ikut saya, anakmu urusono dewe. Padahal yang perempuan sudah dikondisikan ibu rumah tangga... Akhirnya yo pindah, pindah Kristen.*

[267] *Kristenisasi secara halus.*

[268] *Dua bersepeda jalan setiap sore, datang ke rumah-rumah gitu. Untuk membujuk memeluk agama mereka.*

[269] *Orang bersepeda dengan helmnya. Mereka dari Indonesia ada satu. Dari luar ya kayaknya. Dua bersepeda jalan setiap sore, datang ke rumah-rumah gitu untuk membujuk memeluk agama mereka...Pertamanya saya gak tahu kalau dia misionaris. Saya gak tahu. Saya tahunya ada turis nih... Saya pernah ketemu tidak secara langsung di Grand Mall. Itu ketemu sama perempuan, bule, sister... Mendatangi satu per satu.*

[270] *Yang aktif itu pakai sepeda. Tapi pakai sragam hitam putih. Londo itu door to door.*

"There are many institutes of theology in Solo... The final assignment [of students] is to bring [convert] at least one person [to Christianity]... If he/she cannot bring one, then [he/she] doesn't pass [obtain the diploma]."[271] Here the speaker described students of institutes of theology as agents of Christianization.

However, other participants refused to generalize on the issue of Christianization. A male professional said:

> "Regarding the expansion of Christianity, those Christians are not Javanese Christians. In the GKJ [Javanese Christian Church] they are not too problematic... Those who are expansionist are other churches like El-Shaddai, Bethany, et cetera, Adventists ... One cannot generalize that all Christians are like that. [I] think the Javanese, [for instance] the GKJ, are more and more nice to [other] people ... in Javanese language, more acculturated".[272]

In that text the speaker uses two different words: "Javanese Christians", a general category, and "the GKJ (Javanese Christian Church)", a specific church. From the foregoing text we gather that the gap is between Muslims and non-Javanese churches such as El-Shaddai, Bethany and Adventist. Similarly, a young male participant said, "Because of the similarity of customs ... there is no gap between [Javanese] Nasrani and Muslims."[273] In these texts the participants assigned a different position to Christian churches that are close to Javanese culture and those that are not. The linguistic features of the texts tell us that "Nasrani" is an alternative wording for Christian.

An elderly female participant said, "If we [live] close to the church [and] they are singing... we have to accept [the situation]. [We] can't... be egoistic, angry, then report [them]... It isn't right... Although he is the first Muslim leader [to criticize Christians]."[274] She also said, "For Christians, all, if they stay here, there is a mosque next door [to their house], then when *adzan* (summon to prayer) is echoing, maybe he/she will also complain [but in fact they don't]."[275] She added, "Do not be too critical[276] of their religious affairs."[277] The linguistic

---

[271] *Sekolah tinggi teologi cukup banyak di Solo ... Tugas akhirnya membawa minimal satu orang... Kalau gak dapat ya nggak lulus.*

[272] *Ini berkaitan dengan ekspansi dari Kristen. Kristen pun bukan Kristen Jawa. Kalau GKJ itu nggak terlalu bermasalah kayaknya... Yang ekspansif itu kayak gereja-gereja lain kayak El-Shaddai, Bethani dan sebagainya, Advent... Gak bisa menggebyah uyah bahwa Kristen kabeh seperti itu. Kayaknya kalau Jawa, GKJ, itu lebih dengan warga itu lebih enak... berbahasa Jawa, akulturasi lebih.*

[273] *Karena kesamaan adat... di situ gak ada istilahnya jurang pemisah antara umat Nasrani dan umat Islam.*

[274] *Kalau kita deket gereja dianya nyanyi-nyanyi... kita harus terima. Nggak boleh... egois, marah, lalu lapor... Itu sudah nggak benar... Meskipun dia orang Muslim yang paling top.*

[275] *Bagi orang-orang Kristen, semuanya, kalau dia tinggal disini, sininya mesjid, terus adzan barengan. Mungkin bagi dia juga ndrememeng.*

[276] In the Indonesian text the speaker used two adverbs together: *terlalu* (too) and *banget* (very).

features of these texts show the speaker arguing that Muslims should accept Christians and churches as they are. Those Muslims who rejected Christians are described as egoistic. The words "do not be too critical" show that the speaker is highly critical of her own Muslim community.

In talking about Christianity (religion of the others) participants talked about Islam (their own religion). Mostly they described its social identity as one of "*rahmat*" (mercy). A male participant said that Islam is for "*rahmatan lil 'alamin*" (mercy to the world). A participant, the leader of NU, said, "The important thing [in relating to Christians] is *bil hikmah wal maudzatil hasanah* (to do so in wise and good ways)."[278] In this text the participant suggests to other participants that Muslims should behave in a "good" way toward Christians. He continued, "*Inna hudallah huwal huda* (the guidance of Allah is the (only) guidance). [We] do not need to be tense [with Christians]."[279] In this text the speaker says that whether someone becomes Muslim or Christian depends on God's guidance. The way Muslims encounter Christians should be "wise" and "good". The speakers mixed Indonesian and Arabic in the same sentence.

An elderly female participant said, "There is also a basic teaching from the *hadits: man kana yu'minu billahi wal yaumil akhiri falyukrim jarahu* (whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day, let him treat his neighbour respectfully)."[280] She was connecting belief in Allah and the Last Day with a duty to treat one's neighbour respectfully. An Arabian businesswoman said, "If we worry all the time about building churches and mosques, [we] can never stop [conflict between each other]."[281] Then she added, "We take the best, [that is] *rukun* (harmony)."[282]

A participant – a journalist – said, "[At] UNS (State University of Sebelas Maret), in the middle [of our student years] I and my friends who were Catholics, Buddhists, initiated an interfaith community in Surakarta."[283] He continued, "We always discuss, always meet to talk, not about the differences but about the similarities."[284] In that utterance the label "interfaith community" refers to a community of people from different religious backgrounds. The speaker said that in their community they preferred to talk about the similarities

---

[277] *Ndak usah terlalu kritis banget urusan agama mereka.*

[278] *Yang penting bil hikmah wal mauidzatil hasanah.*

[279] *Inna huda hudallah, tidak perlu metenteng.*

[280] *Aturan bertetangga itu kan haditsnya dasarnya: man kana yu'minu billahi wal yaumil akhir fa yukrim jarahu.*

[281] *Kalau kita ngributin gereja, masjid, yang dibangun dimana-mana, itu ya gak ada habisnya.*

[282] *Kita ambil wae yang terbaik, rukun.*

[283] *UNS, bahkan waktu pertengahan itu saya membentuk sama-sama teman-teman Katolik, Buddha, membentuk komunitas dialog antar iman Surakarta.*

[284] *Kami selalu diskusi, selalu ketemu untuk apa ya kita tidak berbicara soal perbedaan, tapi mencari persamaan-persamaannya.*

between their religions rather than about the differences. The same person also said, "I am closer to the Catholics... They already recognized that there is truth outside church."[285] By this he meant that Catholics are more open than other Christian groups.

### 1.3 Analysis at macro level

This subsection deals with the macro or societal level, where Muslim participants speak about themselves as members of Solo society, as citizens of Indonesia, or about international issues. By and large participants said that Indonesia had experienced *Reformasi* since 1998. "In this *Reformasi* era," a participant said, "the state is really free, freedom like nowadays."[286] As a result of *Reformasi*, another participant mentioned, "[In] Solo, many candidates for becoming legislature members (MPs) are Christians."[287] "Now the vice mayor is non-[Muslim],"[288] said another participant. In these texts, the speakers described links between *Reformasi*, freedom and the new phenomenon of Christian MPs and a Christian vice mayor.

At macro level the participants described Indonesia as based on Pancasila and the principle of *bhineka tunggal ika* (unity in diversity). A female professional said, "I am not living in an Islamic state. I am living in a *bhineka tunggal ika* state which recognizes five religions and even [indigenous] beliefs."[289] She added, "We cannot force ourselves to be an Islamic or Muslim state. Our city of Solo must not be based on Islam."[290] In these texts the speaker contrasted two categories: a "*bhineka tunggal ika* state" and an "Islamic or Muslim state". She described a *bhineka tunggal ika* state as one that accommodates diverse religions and beliefs. The speaker also described her refusal to identify Solo as a region based on Islam.

A young male, an activist in the NU youth organization, made the following distinction between Syariah in the sense of rituals (*amaliyah*) and Syariah as a (political) system. He rejected Syariah as a political system, but accepted Syariah in the sense of Islamic rituals.

> "We do not reject Syariah in terms of... rituals (*amaliyah*). We must accept [Syariah], because we are Muslims... The Islamic Syariah [that I reject] has to do with symbolization or formalization of a [political] system... Yesterday I debated with friends from HTI [Indone-

---

[285] *Saya lebih dekat dengan orang Katolik... mereka sudah menganggap kebenaran ada di luar gereja Katolik.*

[286] *Negara sangat bebas, kebebasan seperti saat ini.*

[287] *Solo, calegnya yang Kristen banyak.*

[288] *Sekarang wakil walikotanya non.*

[289] *Saya tidak hidup di negara Islam. Saya hidup di negara yang bhineka tunggal ika yang agamanya mengenal lima bahkan ada aliran-aliran kepercayaan.*

[290] *Kita tidak bisa memaksakan diri kita itu menjadi Islam atau negara Muslim. Atau kota Solo harus berdasarkan Islam.*

sian Hizbut Tahrir]. They strongly favoured the *khilafah*. I was invited [to a discussion] on the topic of plurality [pluralism] or *khilafah*. I have no choice, I choose pluralism ... meaning that Indonesia should not be an Islamic state. [Otherwise it] would be like Iran."[291]

In this text the speaker contrasted the political concept of *khilafah* with that of pluralism. Even though he disagreed with the people of HTI and debated with them, he called them "friends" (social position). A young male observed, "Pancasila itself, if you look at it, there is no contradiction with the values of Islam. The belief in one divine Lordship, just and civilized humanity – in the end, there is no contradiction with Islam."[292] Another young male said, "*Nashara* or Christians ... they are also citizens of Indonesia."[293] The use of the word "also" shows that the man wanted to say that, like Muslims, Christians are citizens of Indonesia. "*Nashara*" is an alternative wording for Christian.

Speaking about what happened in 1945, a participant said, "The Jakarta Charter ... [that proposes] the implementation of Islamic Syariah for adherents [of Islam], I think it should not be dropped. Because in fact we Muslims are the majority."[294] In this text the speaker described her support of the Jakarta Charter or the principle of implementing Islamic Syariah for Muslims. She also gives the reason: "it is because Muslims are a majority in Indonesia".

A participant said, "Now the vice mayor is a non-[Muslim]... Since Mr Rudy became vice mayor [the] number of Muslims, the Muslim population has decreased drastically."[295] Another participant commented, "In Surakarta ... there are many acts of Christianization. According to the figures [Muslims] remain sixty [percent], seventy percent [of the population]."[296] Another participant said, "Formerly [Christians were] only sixteen [percent]."[297] The first speaker related the position of a Christian as vice mayor to the decrease of the Muslim population. Again the participant used the label "non" with reference to Christians.

---

[291] *Kita nggak menolak Syariah dalam arti... amaliyah. Kita pasti menerima, karena kita orang Islam... Syariah Islam itu kayak semacam simbolisasi atau formalisasi sistem... Kemarin saya juga sempet debat dengan temen-teman HTI. Mereka getol sekali memperjuangkan khilafah. Kebetulan saya diundang itu temanya plurality atau khilafah. Ya mau gak mau, saya harus milih pluralism.... Jadi tanpa harus Indonesia itu negara Islam. Malah justru nanti kasusnya kayak Iran.*

[292] *Pancasila sendiri, kan kalau njenengan amatin itu kan juga nggak ada yang bertentangan dengan nilai-nilai Islam juga. Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab, sampai terakhir itu kan juga gak ada yang bertentangan dengan Islam.*

[293] *Nasrani atau Kristen... mereja juga warga Indonesia.*

[294] *Piagam Jakarta... menjalankan Syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya bagi saya, itu tidak diubah gak masalah. Karena kenyataan kita mayoritas, Muslim.*

[295] *Sekarang wakil walikotanya non... Setelah Pak Rudy menjadi wakil walikota itu, angka Islam, populasi Islam, itu menurunnya sangat tajam.*

[296] *Di Surakarta... banyak Kristenisasi. Dari angkanya sendiri kan enam puluh tujuh puluh persen.*

[297] *Dulu kan hanya enam belas.*

Some participants said that they were afraid of Christians occupying public office. A participant said, "If Mr Jokowi [the mayor, a Muslim] lives for the next five years [it is no problem]. But if he passes away after a year, he will be succeeded by Mr Rudi, who is a Christian. So what will Solo be? If we are replaced by Christians, then Islamic *dakwa* in mosques will be closed, closed. What will we do?"[298] Here the speaker described his fear of a Christian occupying the position of mayor of Solo. The speaker over-worded "closed" to show his concern. He used the word "we", assuming that all Muslims feel the same.

Two other participants expressed similar sentiments. An elderly male said, "When the village headman of Pasar Kliwon was replaced by a non-Muslim we protested, sir! Then, it was cancelled."[299] The speaker's point was that the headman of a predominantly Muslim village had to be a Muslim. An elderly female said, "When my village headman was a Christian the craft training of PKK [village mothers' union] was run by... [a group from] Santo Paulus [Christian school]."[300] In this text the speaker linked a Christian village headman with the role of Santo Paulus Christian school in the village programme.

An elderly male had a different opinion about the Muslim population and Christianization. He argued that actually "formerly they indeed were not Muslim". Here is a quotation from his text.

> "Formerly they [new Christians] indeed were not Muslims, they acted as if they were Islamic (*Islam-islaman*). Because of G30S [communist massacre in September 1965], for safety's sake, not to be killed, et cetera [they became Muslims]. There were many [communists] in Solo. Now the situation is totally safe. The state does not problematize [if someone becomes religious or not]. [Then they] returned to their original [non-Muslim] faith. Originally they indeed were not Muslims... Because of the temptations [from Christians] [they became] like that [converted to Christianity]."[301]

In that text the speaker used the expression "acted as if they were Islamic (*Islam-islaman*)" to say that they were not really Muslim. Looking at the vocabulary, we can see that "*Islam-islaman*" is an alternative wording for "*abangan*".

In general the participants described Christianization as a problem in Muslim-Christian relations. A young male participant talked about pamphlets that he saw in mosques. He said, "In some mosques there are many pamphlets say-

---

[298] *Kalau Pak Jakowi itu selama lima tahun masih bisa hidup, kalau saumpama satu tahun terus dia meninggal digantikan Pak Rudi yang Kristen itu, mau jadi apa Solo... Kalau kita digantikan oleh yang Kristen, nanti dakwah di masjid ditutup, tutup. Kita mau apa?*

[299] *Lurah Pasar Kliwon, ini pernah mau diganti yang non Islam, kita berontak pak. Terus ndak jadi.*

[300] *Setelah lurah saya yang ini Kristen, PKK diisi keterampilan soko... Santo Paulus.*

[301] *Dulunya itu memang bukan Islam, Islam-islaman. Dengan adanya G 30 S itu akhirnya supaya selamat, tidak dibunuh dan lain sebagainya. Kan Solo banyak sekali... Sekarang keadaaan semua aman. Negara tidak mempermasalahkan. Kembali ke aslinya. Aslinya dulu itu memang ndak Islam... Dengan adanya iming-iming itu tadi, iming-iming tadi, ya seperti itulah.*

ing: be careful of the latent danger of Christianization."[302] A participant, an activist of the Muhammadiyah youth organization, said, "We refused church [building], because we had bitter experiences of Christianization. Don't be stolen again! If there is a church, that is their base. [Muslims who live] behind, in front of, next door [to them] will be given basic commodities, et cetera and are sure to be converted."[303] Here the speaker described Christianization as a kind of robbery. He also referred to "giving basic goods" as a strategy of Christianization. A participant in the professional group commented, "Basically, [we] reject [Christianization]. What is the weapon? Yes, it is the SKB [government rule about constructing places of worship]."[304] Thus the label "Christianization" is applied to Christians' attempts to convert Muslims. In calling SKB a weapon for Muslims to fight Christianization the speaker used military terminology.

Some participants mentioned Muslims' opposition to "illegal" churches as a response to Christianization. "Many houses are turned into churches without [state] permission," said a participant.[305] A male professional, who identified himself as a member of the Muhammadiyah movement, said, "Yesterday we threatened a house in Sukoharjo region which was used as a church, an illegal church. The church did not have [state] permission. But there were religious activities there. ... In the end it was closed down."[306] Here the label "illegal church" refers to a church that has no state "permission". He added, "To show their force, the *laskar*s (Muslim paramilitaries) play a role. If negotiations were conducted [but failed] ... then the church will be encircled."[307] He added, "If [they have been] warned once, twice [to close the place of worship], [and they] do not [close it], [the place of worship] must be raided ."[308] The word "we" indicates that the speaker was part of the group which attacked the "illegal" church. The word "illegal" is juridical vocabulary.

Participants also talked about actors responding to Christian expansionism or Christianization. An elderly male observed, "They are hardliners, the *Laskar Laweyan*, the *Jama'ah Islamiyah*, the FPI [Islamic Defender Front], the *Jun-*

---

[302] *Di masjid-masjidnya itu banyak pamphlet itu hati-hati bahaya laten Kristenisasi.*

[303] *Intinya kita menolak gereja, karena kita sudah punya pengalaman pahit dengan Kristenisasi, jangan sampai kecolongan lagi. Gitu ada gereja, basisnya mereka itu disitu. Belakang, depan, samping dikasih terus, sreeet sembako dan lain-lain, mesti ada yang kena.*

[304] *Intinya itu menolak. Senjatanya apa? Ya SKB itu.*

[305] *Banyak rumah-rumah yang dialihkan untuk gereja tanpa ijin.*

[306] *Itu kemarin kita menggerebek rumah di daerah Sukoharjo yang dijadikan gereja, gereja ilegal. Gerejanya itu tidak ada ijin. Cuman, ada kegiatan keagamaan disitu... Akhirnya dia ditutup.*

[307] *Untuk menunjukkan show force-nya laskar-laskar itu berperan. Kalau sudah negosiasi... gereja itu dikepung lah.*

[308] *Kalau satu dua kali diperingatkan gak bisa, ya harus diparani.*

*dullah*. They [include] [group] X.[309] They are hardliners, like the FPI."[310] Another participant said, "Salafi [members] are anti-Christianization."[311] Besides mentioning names of groups, the first speaker referred to those who are anti-Christianization as "hardliners". Furthermore the second speaker used the word "actively" to describe the intensity of Salafi's anti-Christianization fervour. In talking about *laskar*s (Muslim paramilitaries) who attack "illegal" churches, a participant said, "The *laskar*s are mostly from outside the region [outside Solo]."[312] Thus the problem comes "from outside".

Participants also talked about the relation between religion (Christianity, Islam) and ethnicity (Javanese, Chinese). A young male participant said, "In Solo ... there are ethnic groups such as Arabs, Chinese, Javanese. The Chinese, as far as I know, are Christians..., Arabs are Muslim, Javanese are a mix of Islam *abangan* and fundamentalist Islam."[313] Thus he identifies three ethnic groups: "Javanese", "Chinese" and "Arabs". He describes "Arabs" as "Muslim", "Chinese" as "Christian", and "Javanese" as "*abangan*" and "fundamentalist" Muslim. In an earlier sentence the participant also mentioned Javanese Christians. Thus the ethnic label "Javanese" includes both Muslims and Christians.

Sometimes participants linked ethnic-religious identity with residential areas. For instance, a young female participant said, "In Gajahan ... the majority is Christian, that is Chinese."[314] This speaker associated the majority population of a certain area (Gajahan) with a religion (Christianity). She also associated that area with a specific ethnic group (Chinese). A young male participant said, "In Solo there is [residential] grouping. In Pasar Kliwon the majority is Muslim, by and large. In Kauman they are also Muslim, Arab, while Christians are the majority in Balong near Widuran, near the centre of churches [where there are many churches]. There are [residential] groupings based on religions."[315] These participants classified Pasar Kliwon and Kauman as Javanese Muslim and Arab Muslim areas, while Gajahan and Balong are Chinese Christian areas.

---

[309] The speaker mentioned the name of the group, but I substituted a pseudonym.

[310] *Itu aliran keras, Laskar Laweyan, JI, FPI, Jundullah. Itu X. itu aliran yang keras seperti apa FPI.*

[311] *Salafi itu justru gencar anti Kristenisasi.*

[312] *Laskar itu rata-rata berasal dari luar daerah.*

[313] *Di Solo itu kan... ada etnis-etnis seperti Arab, China, Jawa sendiri. Kalau China itu mungkin notobene sepengetahuan saya umat Kristiani... Arab Islam, Jawa campuran Islam abangan dan Islam fundamental.*

[314] *Di Gajahan... mayoritas memang Kristen, China-China.*

[315] *Di Solo itu ada yang mengelompokkan diri. Di Pasar Kliwon, itu kan mayoritas kebanyakan agamanya Islam, rata-rata. Di Kauman sendiri juga Islam, Arab. Kalau orang Kristen, mereka juga seperti itu. Di Balong deket Widuran dekat dengan pusat-pusat gereja. Seperti ada pengelompokan-pengelompokan menurut agamanya.*

A participant described the connection between religion, ethnicity and the economy as follows:

> "The economy here is dominated by the Chinese. And their links are very good... We [financially] suffer from their tricks. The trade in Pasar [market] Gede, Pasar Kliwon is strongly connected with Chinese links ... Their religion is Christianity, Islam is rare, there are only a few [Muslims]. [They are] mostly Nasrani, Protestant Christians. So those Chinese mostly go to church [i.e. are Christians], [go] to church. [They] build economic empires here in Solo. The big businessman in Solo also [is the same, a Christian] as far as I know: Pak X,[316] the owner of Catlay. [He] has a restaurant in the Grand Mall. He actively supports the church, wholeheartedly. Even the Roti Dika [Christian-owned bakery], its policy is to give ten percent [of its profits] to the church."[317]

In this text the speaker refers to three interconnected social entities: Chinese Christian and "economic empires" in Solo. The word "empire" (kingdom) signifies the dominance and close connection between Chinese Christians and the economy. She says that only a few of them are Muslims. She mentions some markets, stores and brands such as Pasar Gede, Pasar Kliwon, Catlay and Roti Dika. The donations of these economic empires are said to go to the church. The speaker mentions a specific group of Christians: Protestants. She overworded "go to church" to underscore that they really are Christians (intense preoccupation).

Another participant said, "It is also Luwes [name of supermarket]. Those big malls, all of them have church links, Chinese, and [they] give donations to the churches."[318] "Their numbers are small, but their funds are strong,"[319] said another participant. An elderly female spoke about the megachurch of El-Shaddai. She said: "The whole area of the village was bought, Kepatihan [name of village], almost all was bought by El-Shaddai."[320] The expression, "the whole area of the village was bought" is a metaphor indicating that the church is extremely big. Besides dominating the economy, Christians are said to own radio stations. A participant mentioned, "Ria FM [name of radio station] is

---

316 The speaker mentioned the person's name, but I substituted a pseudonym.

317 *Ekonomi di sini itu banyak dikuasai orang China. Dan mereka linknya sangat bagus... Kita banyak dirugikan dengan trik-trik mereka. Perdagangan di Pasar Gede, Pasar Kliwon dengan link China itu sudah sangat erat. Mereka agamanya Kristen, semua... jarang yang Islam, ada tapi cuma beberapa. Mereka semua ke gereja, Kristen. Nasrani banyaknya, Kristen Protestan. Jadi China-China itu banyaknya ke gereja, ke gereja. Membangun suatu imperium ekonomi di Solo ini. Pengusaha-pengusaha besar di Solo ini, juga yang saya kenal, Pak X yang punya Catlay, di Grand Mall punya restaurant. Dia aktif memberikan bantuan ke gereja, secara penuh. Bahkan Roti Dika, itu trade mark-nya 10 persen untuk gereja.*

318 *Juga Luwes. Mal-mal yang besar itu, itu semua rentetan dari gereja, China, dan menafkahkan ke gereja.*

319 *Mereka itu lebih minim jumlahnya, tapi lebih kuat dananya.*

320 *Sak kampung dituku kabeh weh, Kepatihan hampir semua dibeli El-Shaddai.*

Christian ... El-Shaddai, Perdana, Meta FM [names of radio stations] – all of them are backed by Christians."[321]

In talking about Christians as the others, the participants also talked about themselves (Muslim organizations). A young female classified various forms of Islam, saying, "There is Islam NU, there is Islam Muhammadiyah. And there is Islam which is more extreme. [The women of that group] wear *burqa* (*cadar*). They [extreme Muslims] refuse to take gifts from Christians."[322] Here the speaker described Islam NU and Islam Muhammadiyah as not extreme. Some participants referred to other social identities of Muslims such as *abangan*, fundamentalist and moderate. A young male said, "In Solo maybe there are fundamentalists, there are moderates, even *abangan*. Maybe those moderates have good relations with the *abangan*."[323]

By contrast a participant commented, "The KAMMI [Indonesian Muslim Students Action Front], the HTI [Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir] are very anti non-Muslim organizations."[324] These texts show that members of NU, Muhammadiyah and moderate Muslims have good relations with Christians, unlike fundamentalist Muslims and members of KAMMI and HTI.

Some participants described a new Muslim organization in Solo: MTA (Qur'anic Exegesis Council). An elderly male participant said, "*Alkhamdulillah* (thanks be to God), nowadays [Christianization] is suppressed by the MTA"[325] Also: "Because of MTA Semaki [name of canton] has become [Islamic]. Maybe if there was no MTA [that place] could be Nashara's pilot project."[326] The phrase 'very anti non-Muslim' indicates a fiercely anti-Christian attitude. The word "*alkhamdulillah*" indicates the speaker's support for the MTA, which is opposed to the Christianization project. Nashara is an alternative wording for Christian. Another participant said, "MTA is the fortress (*benteng*) [against Christianization], we are sympathetic [to it]."[327] Here the speaker identified MTA as a fortress protecting Muslims from Christianization.

An elderly male said, "The headquarters of Indonesian [MTA] is here [in Solo]."[328] Another participant in the same group went on: "The MTA has now become a very powerful organization ... [They] have their own commercial

---

321 *Ria FM Kristen... El-Shaddai, Perdana, Meta FM semua berbacking Kristen.*

322 *Ada Islamnya Islam NU, ada Islam Islamnya Muhammadiyah. Dan ada Islam yang lebih ekstrim. Pakai cadar. Itu kan menolak pemberian dari orang Kristen.*

323 *Di Solo, mungkin ada yang fundamental, ada yang moderat, malah ada yang abangan. Mungkin hubungan antara yang moderat dengan yang abangan itu baik.*

324 *KAMMI, HTI itu antipati banget sama organisasi-organisasi non-Muslim.*

325 *Alkhamdulillah saat ini terbentengi dengan adanya MTA yang kentel.*

326 *Maka dengan adanya MTA ini betul-betul Semaki menjadi, mungkin kalau tidak ada MTA bisa menjadi pilot project-nya Nashara.*

327 *MTA sebagai benteng, kita tersentuh.*

328 *Itu pusat sak Indonesia disini.*

businesses. The MTA is very strong, very extra big ... [Its followers] are very militant."[329] Another participant said that MTA's [religious] puritanism is almost the same as that of Muhammadiyah, but [its followers'] submission to the leader (*kyai*) is like in NU."[330] In this text the speaker described an element that MTA shares with both NU and Muhammadiyah. The speaker also indicated that Muhammadiyah is puritan. "Even though Muhammadiyah is puritan, it is not as hard as MTA in its practice,"[331] said an elderly male participant who is the leader of NU. He was describing the similarity and difference between Muhammadiyah and MTA. With reference to degree of puritanism, the text says that NU is not puritan, Muhammadiyah is puritan, and MTA is very puritan.

Several other elderly males commented on the MTA: "The MTA has television [a station], [it] has radio [a station]";[332] "The sympathizers [of MTA] that listen to the radio [the MTA station] are so many";[333] and "They [MTA followers] always refer to the radio. [While] the radio [is full of preaching of] Ustadz Sukino [name of the leader]."[334] The linguistic features of the participants' utterances indicate huge numbers of MTA followers/sympathizers, the effectiveness of radio in MTA *dakwa*, and the authority of Ustadz Sukino, its leader.

"The conflict [between MTA and NU] ... in Grobokan [a region to the north of Solo] relates only to [the practice] of *tahlil* [repeated recitation/prayer],"[335] said a participant. A male professional, an activist in Muhammadiyah, said, "Muhammadiyah should criticize it [MTA]. It [MTA] has many schools [that compete with Muhammadiyah schools], [from] kindergartens to senior high schools."[336] In this text the speaker expressed the hope that Muhammadiyah would criticize the development of MTA schools.

The participants also mentioned fundamentalism among Christians. A participant said, "If Islam has fundamentalists, [they also exist] in Christianity, exactly [the same], I think. But their movement is more hidden."[337] Here the speaker points out that there are fundamentalists in both Islam and Christianity, but Christian fundamentalists have a different strategy in the sense that they operate undercover.

---

[329] *MTA sekarang menjadi kekuatan yang besar sekali... Sudah punya ekonomi sendiri. Sudah kuat sekali MTA itu, besarnya bukan main itu... Militan-militan.*

[330] *Puritannya hampir sama dengan Muhammadiyah, tapi taqlid pada kiainya seperti NU.*

[331] *Walaupun Muhammadiyah puritan, tetapi tidak sekeras MTA dalam pelaksanaannya.*

[332] *MTA punya televisi, punya radio.*

[333] *Simpatisan yang mendengar radio itu besar sekali.*

[334] *Dia itu selalu menurut radio. Radio itu ustadz Sukino.*

[335] *Konflik... di Grobokan, Grobokan, hanya soal tahlil.*

[336] *Muhammadiyah seharnya mulai mengkritisi dia. Itu sekolah-sekolahnya sudah banyak, TK sampai SMA.*

[337] *Kalau di Islam sendiri ada kaum yang fundamental, di Kristen pasti saya pikir. Cuman gerakan mereka lebih tersembunyi.*

The discussion on religion and ethnicity led some participants to talk about the 1998 riots in Solo and other parts of Indonesia. They used different labels in speaking about the riots. Some talked about ethnic conflict, others about political conflict or conflict about religion. Yet others said that it was "not only inter-ethnic conflict, but also [motivated by] social inequality". The actors in the conflict were called *ocnum* (individuals). Talking about the actors in the 1998 Solo riots, a male worker said, "They are merely *ocnum* (individuals)."[338] The word "merely" (*saja*) underscores that the speaker distinguished between the actors as individuals and their religious and ethnic identity. They acted neither as members of a religious community nor as members of an ethnic community. Besides, "Some [persons] took advantage of the riots for personal gain ... For instance, shops were plundered," a participant said.[339]

A young male participant, an NU student activist, mentioned that in society in general Javanese were repressed by the Chinese. Then conflicts that were actually motivated by "social inequality"[340] turn into conflicts "in the name of religion"[341] or "of ethnicity".[342] A male worker differentiated between two kinds of riots in which Chinese become the victims: anti-Chinese riots and anti-state riots. He said, "Formerly, in the 1980s, they were [anti-]Chinese riots, they were really [anti-China]. But in 1998 [the rioting] was only [people] destroying [because they were anti] the state. They were *ocnum* wanting to destroy the state."[343] Previously he had said, "Because we want to destroy the state, we [destroy] the Chinese first."[344] Here the speaker described the Chinese as an intermediary target before the state, which was the primary target. He applied the label "*ocnum*" to the rioters. The repetition of "[anti-]Chinese riots" is an over-wording to indicate that the 1980s riots were "really" different from the 1998 riots. An elderly Arab female said, "Before the Chinese [stores] were burnt [in the 1980s and 1998] we Arabs [were the object of riots in 1970s] ... my place was destroyed... [my] house was destroyed."[345] This speaker pointed out that the objects of riots in the past were not only Chinese, but also Arabs.

Since some people in Solo were involved in acts of terrorism and some terrorists were captured in Solo, the participants talked about it. "I was surprised.

---

338 *Itu oknum saja.*

339 *Ada yang memanfaatkan kerusuhan itu untuk kepentingan sendiri... misalnya ada toko yang itu apa dijarah.*

340 *Ketimpangan sosial.*

341 *Atas nama agama*

342 *Atas nama etnis.*

343 *Dulu yang tahun 1980an pernah kerusuhan China, pernah bener-bener. Tapi yang 1998 cuma mau menghancurkan negara. Ada oknum saja mau menghancurkan negara.*

344 *Karena kita mau menghancurkan negara, China dulu.*

345 *Sebelum Cina-Cina diobong-obong itu kan kita-kita orang-orang Arab-Arab... tempatku ancur... rumah ancur.*

The bodies of terrorists were refused [burial] in many places. But in Solo, Air and Eko [two suspected terrorists] were considered heroes of Islam. [There were banners] welcoming the heroes of Islam everywhere. Ba'asyir came to the funeral."[346] In this text, the speaker differentiated between the response of people in Solo and that of people of other regions to requests to bury the bodies of suspected terrorists in their region. He also mentioned that some people in Solo labelled Air and Eko "heroes of Islam".

Here is a short conversation in the female worker FGD on Noordin M. Top who was shot dead in Solo. Indonesian police captured and shot him in his hideout close to the female worker's house in 2009.

> Participant A: Before there was a mosque for *tarawih* prayer [during Ramadan] it was held in my house. It was in my house. It was held, but in my house. *Alkhamdulillah* (thanks be to God). [We] can pave the floor [of the mosque], even its, what is it called, veranda, that veranda, *alkhamdulillah*, from the proceeds of Noordin yesterday, *alkhamdulillah*. The donation was from [the incident] of Noordin yesterday.
>
> Other participants: Ha.. ha..
>
> Participant A: Yes, yes, like that...
>
> Researcher: What do you...?
>
> Siti: Noordin brought a blessing (*berkah*), he brought a blessing [*berkah*]. Although Noordin was a disaster (*musibah*), [but all the same he] brought a blessing (*berkah*). That was from the visitors, we circulated boxes for donations [*infaq*] for the mosque.
>
> Researcher: Also it was near the holiday, madam?
>
> Other participants: Ha.. ha...
>
> Participant B: Yes, it was like a place for recreation [tourism].
>
> Participant A: Yes, it was in [the month of] fasting, after that the holidays. Finally, it was collected ... maybe how many millions [of rupiah] for [ceramic] tiles for that veranda [of the mosque].
>
> Researcher: It was from parking [fees]?
>
> Participant A: Yes, from parking [fees], [and also] from the boxes of donations that we collected, then we used it to tile the floor [with ceramics]. Thanks be to God (*alkhamdulillah*), [but] also to him shall we return (*innalillah*)...[347]

---

[346] *Saya itu heran. Jasad teroris ditolak dimana-mana. Malah di Solo Air dan Eko dianggap pahlawan Islam. Selamat datang pahlawan Islam di mana-mana. Ba'asyir malah datang ke pamakamannya.*

[347] *Sebelum ada masjid, untuk sholat tarawih-nya itu di rumah saya. Di rumah saya sholat tarawih. Itu tetap ada tapi di rumah saya. Sudah alkhamdulillah. Bisa mengeramik sampai ke,*

In that conversation the participant described Noordin's death using two different terms: "blessing" (*berkah*) and "disaster" (*musibah*). It was a blessing in that local Muslims made some millions of rupiah from parking fees and collection boxes. But it was also a disaster because, she said, society was "polluted".[348] In colloquial speech "polluted" means that the image of society was tarnished.

Some participants talked about Muslim-Christian relations outside Indonesia. An elderly female described Muslims in other countries who had been ill-treated by non-Muslim groups. She said, "Internationally Muslims are really oppressed. In Moro [south Philippines] there was [a mother who was] breast-feeding. But then her throat was slit [by non-Muslims] until her child drank the blood."[349] Here the speaker described Muslims being oppressed and killed internationally.

An elderly male said, "Saudi Arabia invests its money in American banks. [They] are given interest, [but they] refuse. Finally the money is given to [Christian] mission to destroy Muslims."[350] A participant said, "Globally ... there are certain [Christian] missions... to destroy Muslims.[351] An other participant in the same group said, "The language [of the funding agencies/ missions] is not to destroy Islam but ... to civilize [Islam]."[352] A participant linked the struggle of the Hizbut Tahrir with Muslims' oppression worldwide.

## 2 Interpretation

In this second section we interpret or analyse the discursive practice, which includes the production, distribution and consumption of text. Discursive practice connects linguistic practice (text) with social practice (context). There are

---

*apa istilahnya teras, emperan itu, alkhamdulillah kemarin dari hasil Noordin itu. Infaq dari Noordin kemarin./ Ha..ha../ Ya iya memang./ Maksudnya gimana...?/ Noordin itu kan membawa berkah, dia kan membawa berkah. Meskipun musibah kan membawa berkah. Itu bagi pengunjung kita berikan kotak infaq untuk masjid./ Apalagi itu mau hari raya ya Bu?/ Ha..ha.../ Ya malah jadi tempat rekreasi./ Ya itu pas puasa, selebihnya kan hari raya. Akhirnya setelah itu terkumpul... mungkin itu berapa juta, terus untuk ngeramik yang itu serambi./ Berarti anu dari parkir?/ Ya dari parkir, dari kotak infaq itu kita kumpulkan terus kita untuk ngeramik. Betul unik ini. Alkhamdulillah, juga innalillah.*

[348] *Tercemar.*

[349] *Secara internasional saja orang-orang Islam digencet sampai penyet. Islam di Moro masak baru ngemiki dipenggal lehernya anaknya sampai minum darahnya.*

[350] *Dana non Muslim itu kan dari luar negeri. Bahkan, ini pernah dengar kan, bahkan Arab Saudi itu, orang-orang Arab Saudi itu memendam uang di bank di Amerika. Diberi bunga ndak mau. Akhirnya, diberikan kepada misi untuk menghancurkan orang Islam.*

[351] *Secara global... ada misi-misi tertentu... untuk menghancurkan Islam*

[352] *Bahasanya bukan untuk menghancurkan Islam, tapi... untuk memajukan.*

many ways to analyse discursive practice (Fairclough 1992: 78-86, 232-234), but this study uses just two tools: intertextuality and interdiscursivity. The theory underlying discursive analysis is that when participants produce (communicate) and consume (interpret) text or talk they draw on members' resources (Fairclough 1989: 163) or mental models (Van Dijk 2008: 75) stored in their long-term memory (Fairclough 1989: 9-10; 24-24). These resources are cognitive in the sense that they are in people's heads; and they are social in the sense that they are socially constructed (Fairclough 1989: 24). What members' resources or mental models do Muslim participants use to produce (communicate) and consume (interpret) talk?

## 2.1 Analysis at micro level

In talking about Christians and about themselves Muslim participants at micro level drew on the mental model of helping each other in the family. For instance, they help each other when a family member is sick, regardless of whether the person is Muslim or Catholic.

When saying "I am from an *abangan* family" the participant referred to a mental model, namely the concept of "*abangan*". Although it normally refers to a religion (usually Islam), in this case it alludes to the family. It connotes a social cognition which is shared by the members of the speaker's society, namely the concept of nominal believers (*abangan*) as distinct from devout believers (*santri*).

Some participants referred to experiences in family life when they talked about "Christianization". For instance, a participant mentioned her sister's conversion to Christianity because she joined a course in Christianity at school. Several other participants referred to similar occurrences in their families. They distrusted the provision of Christian education to poor people. A mother remembered her daughter doing an extracurricular course offered by a Christian educational service. According to her the daughter was taught Christianity in order to convert her.

Many participants drew on a mental model of "tolerant" and "harmonious" *(rukun)* relations with friends. For instance, a Muslim girl talked about her relations with Christian friends by remembering her childhood when they played inside the church. Other participants remembered school day experiences with friends. Thus a participant mentioned that when he was in senior high school, half the students in his class were Muslims and the rest were Catholics. Another participant said that when she was at junior high school she had a "close friend" who was a Christian.

Other participants remembered friendly relations with Christians outside school. A young girl recalled a personal relationship with a Christian "boyfriend". An elderly male, the leader of NU, referred to the funeral of a close

friend who was a Catholic pastor. A worker, a parking attendant, remembered his "Tionghoa Christian friends" who sent SMSs at *lebaran*.

Participants also drew on the principle of neighbourly cooperation and sharing regardless of religious identity. For instance, a male worker referred to his Christian neighbour who often came to his house to repair his bicycle. Another participant remembered her Christian Chinese neighbour who often made her *dawet* (a cold drink) during *Ramadan* to show Muslim-Christian tolerance. A young male participant remembered an occasion when he assisted his Christian neighbour during a Christian service at the latter's home. To show how a Muslim should behave towards others an elderly female participant described an occasion when she had a wedding party and invited all her neighbours regardless of religion.

When the participants produced and consumed talk they drew on mental models stored in their long-term memory. For instance, a participant mentioned: "When I was at senior high school [I] considered Christians to be the enemy... Even in my [early days at] university [it was] still like that." Here the speaker drew on a mental model of Christians as Muslims' enemies.

Participants were inspired by social "custom", such as helping neighbours regardless of the person's religion. They referred to other customs such as visiting a sick neighbours and gatherings during *lebaran*.

Some participants clearly drew on the resource of distinguishing "social" affairs from *aqida* (religious affairs). They also drew on local metaphors such as "like oil and water" (*seperti air dengan minyak*) and "a jackal in sheep's fur" (*serigala berbulu domba*). One participant drew on the mental model of a dog being impure (*najis*), relating it to the Christians' animals stored in his long-term memory. Apart from this participant's talk, both the book of Muhammad's tradition (*hadits*) and the law books (*fiqh*) refer to dogs' saliva being impure. Some *fiqh* schools regard not just the saliva but the dog itself as impure.

## 2.2 Analysis at meso level

At meso level participants drew on the mental model of Muslim communalism. For instance, they reproduced the words "our kids" and "our girls", meaning Muslim children. In many conversations they classified themselves as "we" (*kami, kita*) or "our" (*milik kami, milik kita*) and Christians as "they" (*mereka*). A participant said, "We [Muslims] have our reward guaranteed by God... They [Christians] do not have [it]." The quotation in the analysis of linguistic practice about whether Muslims can distribute "*zakat*" (alms) to poor Christians reveals the participant's dual self-identification as both a person living in a poor canton (micro level) and a member of Muhammadiyah (meso level). Hence besides referring to themselves as persons, participants refer to themselves as members of organizations.

When saying, "In the Qur'an it is clear that [we are advised] not to have them [Christians] as allies" the participant was citing Surah 5:51: "O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another." Some participants quoted the Qur'an verbatim in Arabic when they talked about the other or about themselves, such as the utterance, "*wa la tardha 'anka yahudu wala nashara hatta tattabi'a millatahum*" (and never will the Jews or the Christians approve of you until you follow their religion). It comes from Surah 2:120. Another participant quoted another part of that surah: "*inna hudallah huwal huda*" (the guidance of Allah is the [only] guidance).

When calling Islam the religion of *rahmatan lil 'alamin* (mercy to the world) a participant summed up the instruction in the Qur'an, Surah 21:107. The actual text reads: "And We have not sent you, [O Muhammad], except as a mercy to the world." In this verse the personification "mercy to the world" refers to Muhammad's vision, but the participant reproduced it as the vision of Islam. Speaking about *dakwa,* a participant said, "The important thing is *bil hikmah wal maudzatil hasanah* [with wisdom and good instruction]." He was inspired by a principle of *dakwa,* whose parallel can be found in the Qur'an, Surah 16:125: "Invite them [non-Muslims] to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good instruction, and argue with them in a way that is best."

One participant was inspired by a general notion that "Christians are not too different from Muslim, being descendants of Abraham". This positions Jews, Christians and Muslims as descendants of Abraham. A similar notion can be found in the Qur'an, Surah 14:40 on Abraham's prayer: "My Lord, make me an establisher of prayer, and [many] from my descendants. Our Lord, accept my supplication." Surah 14 is also known as the surah of Abraham. The general interpretation of it is cited in many popular Islamic books. For instance, in her book entitled *Gus Mus: Satu Rumah Seribu Pintu* (Gus Mus: one home, a thousand doors) Labibah Zain (2009: 143-144) wrote about "*cucu Ibrahim*" (descendants of Abraham) from the roots of Moses, Isa and Muhammad.

A participant cited the *hadits* of prophet Muhammad: "There is also a basic teaching from the *hadits: man kana yu'minu billahi wal yaumil akhiri falyukrim jarahu* (whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day, let him treat his neighbour respectfully)." That was the *hadits* transmitted by two Islamic scholars Bukhari and Muslim. The participant who called someone who leaves Islam to join Christianity an apostate was inspired by one meaning of *murtad* (apostate) or *riddah* (renegade from the Islamic community) in Islamic teaching. Qur'an Surah 2:217 states: "And whoever of you reverts from his religion [to unbelief] and dies while he is an unbeliever..." The Gema Insani Press, a popular Islamic publisher, published a book entitled *Musuh Besar Ummat Islam* (The great enemy of Islam). It says that apostasy (*kemurtadan*) means "leaving Islam" (Bashori 2006: 96).

A participant, inspired by a notion that has a parallel in the *hadits* of prophet Muhammad, said: "[If] a Christian [says] *assalamu'alaikum* (greeting/peace upon you), we are forbidden to reply. Just answer *wa'alaikum* (be upon you), not *wa'alaikum salam* (peace be upon you)." Another participant said, "If it [*salam*, greeting] is [uttered by] a Muslim, [we have to] answer. If it [is uttered by] a non-Muslim, we are forbidden to answer." Both participants are inspired by a *hadits* recorded by Bukhari: "If the people of the book [*ahl al-Kitab*] greet you, say in reply: *Wa alaykum* (and also on you)." In saying "[If] a Christian [says] *assalamu'alaikum* ... just answer *wa'alaikum*" the speaker was inspired by the idea that Christians are people of the Book. The popular understanding in Islam is that Jews and Christians are people of the Book.

Another participant referred to daily Islamic rituals such as *adzan* (summons to prayer), *sholat* (prayer) and *tahlilan* (reciting Qur'anic verses and prayers). *Adzan* is the summons to prayer five times a day, usually echoing from the mosque or *mushalla* (Muslim chapel). The speaker who said, "when time to *sholat* [pray] came" meant the prayers five times a day. They are a specific kind of prayer – there are many other kinds. When comparing Christian home worship and Muslim *tahlilan* the speaker was referring to reciting Qur'anic verses and saying prayers at home.

The participant who said, "I am closer to the Catholics... They already recognize that there is truth outside church" drew on a theological interpretation by the Roman Catholic Church. The utterance, "there is truth outside church", refers to a new interpretation after the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s.

Participants are inspired by state policy in talking about their relations with Christians. When a participant said, "we take the best, that is *rukun* (harmony)", she drew on a mental model existing in society. Interreligious harmony (*kerukunan antar umat beragama*) is also state policy. Several participants said "his/her Islam is Islam KTP [Islam by ID]" and "his/her KTP is Islam". They drew on the official policy that citizens' religious identity is specified on their identity document (KTP/ID). Besides such identities as sex, occupation and citizenship, citizens must declare their religious identity on their ID.

When a participant said "those who have a religion, let them not be converted to another religion", he was inspired by a general discourse in society, which is also state policy – prohibition of proselytizing anyone who has a religion. In 1979 the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Domestic Affairs published a joint regulation, "Procedure of Religious Mission and International Aid for Religious Institutions in Indonesia".[353] In that regulation the

[353] The Joint Regulation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Domestic Affairs No. 1, 1979.

government prohibits religious mission among persons or groups that already belong to another religion.[354]

A participant drew on another official policy when he said, "Basically, [we] reject [Christians]. What is the weapon? Yes, it is the SKB." SKB stands for *Surat Keputusan Bersama* (Joint Decision). It was actually the 2006 *Peraturan Bersama* (Joint Regulation) on the building of houses of worship, not SKB.[355] When calling SKB a weapon for Muslims to fight Christianization the speaker used military vocabulary. So did another participant, who said that "nowadays [Christianization] is embattled by the MTA".

In talking about Christianization of poor Muslims several participants mentioned *Sarimi*. In the sentence "their religion could be changed by *Sarimi*" the speaker used commercial language: *Sarimi* is a brand of Indonesian noodle which is a common food in Indonesia. It is a metaphor for any basic food.

When some participants talked about door-to-door mission they were referring to the mission of the Salvation Army in Solo. One participant mentioned Dewi Purnamawati from Arimatea when she talked about Christianization. Arimatea is the acronym for "Advocacy, Rehabilitation, Immunization of *Aqidah* [that is] Integrated, Effective, and Actual".[356] Its slogan is to preach Islam, to prevent apostasy. Its main mission is to explain Islam (i.e. conduct *dakwa*) to non-Muslims and to counterbalance/hinder any other religious movement which interferes with the *aqida* of Muslims.[357] This organization was established in 2003 and is based in Jakarta.

Purnamawati joined the Arimatea Forum of Solo. A participant referred to a bulletin written by her: "She had been indoctrinated since she was child... to proselytize." In the bulletin Purnamawati mentioned her little brother (a priest), whose task is to convert Muslims.

> "One example of my mother's successful teaching is my younger brother. After obtaining his master's degree at the Christian Institute TIRANUS Cimahi, Bandung, he has been a priest in Cimahi ever since. He created a false impression by teaching the villagers to cultivate hydroponic plants and helping them to sell these, providing therapy for drug addicted Muslim teenagers in a rehabilitation centre, and counselling through the Consultant Bureau. All these good deeds are just a means to Christianize Muslims and lead them to receive Jesus as God."[358]

---

[354] Chapter 4 of the Joint Regulation.

[355] The Joint Regulation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Domestic Affairs Nos 8 and 9, 2006 on the Task Guidance for Head/Vice Head of Region in Maintaining Interreligious Community Harmony and House of Worship Building.

[356] *Advokasi, Rehabilitasi, Imunisasi Aqidah Terpadu Efektif dan Aktual.*

[357] Anonymous, *5 Years of Arimatea (2003-2005)*, p. 3.

[358] In the bulletin Purnamawati described other Christianization or proselytization practices. The speaker mentioned that Purnamawati was Catholic, but she was mistaken. She was Protestant. For further details, see appendix 2.

**NADIANTO / DEWI PURNAMAWATI**
**FORUM ARIMATEA SOLO**
Jln. Sutowijoyo 26 C Penumping - Solo - Jateng
081329074635

# BIBLE MENGANTAR AKTIFIS GEREJA MEMPERJUANGKAN ISLAM

**Kisah Mualaf : Dra. Dewi Purnamawati**

*Assalaamu 'alaa manittaba alhudaa*

( Semoga keselamatan diberikan kepada orang yang mengikuti petunjuk. )

Perkenalkan, saya Dra. Dewi Purnamawati, lahir di Solo tahun 1962. Tahun 1971 saya ikut ayah yang anggota AURI pindah tugas ke Pulau Lombok. Sekolah di Lombok NTB, di SD Katolik St. Antonius Ampenan, SMP Katolik Kesuma Cakranegara & di STM Negeri Mataram, lulus tahun 1981. Kuliah di IKIP Negeri Yogyakarta lulus Tahun 1985. Tahun 1986 saya kembali ke Solo dan mengajar listrik di salah satu STM.

Pengaruh kekristenan dari Ibu yang Aktifis Gereja, sangat kuat. Tahun 1971 Ayah yang Islam, dikristenkan ibu bahkan berhasil dibina menjadi aktifis penginjilan (misi menyebarkan ajaran Kristen) yang militan & handal. Ayah punya talenta mampu berinteraksi dan mengusir roh kegelapan. Padahal kemampuan metafisik / paranormal yang umumnya dianggap anugrah Tuhan itu, sebenarnya dari Setan.

Saya dan 2 adik saya dididik dengan taat dalam kehidupan Kristen yang fanatik. Sejak kecil sudah dicekoki doktrin-doktrin Kristen. Merendahkan&aprioriterhadapIslam. Harus mampu mencitrakan bahwa Kristen adalah KASIH. Digembleng menjadi militan untuk mampu memasuki dan mempengaruhi kehidupan masyarakat Pulau Lombok yang mayoritas beragama Islam. Kami semua aktifis gereja, aktif memurtadkan muslimin.

Contoh keberhasilan didikan ibu



*Figure 5: First page of Dewi Purnamawati's bulletin*

Some participants referred to events in their surroundings when talking about Christians or about themselves. For instance, a participant referred to the fast-breaking programme for poor Muslims at the Javanese Christian Church Manahan. Other participants mentioned actions by churches in Solo and the surroundings such as the GBI (Indonesian Bethel Church) of Solo Baru, the Pasar Legi Bethany Church, the GKJ (Javanese Christian Church), the El-Shaddai church, and the Adventist Church.

In general the FDG participants agreed with the ideas expressed by their fellow participants. But in some cases they refuted their friends' utterances (interdiscursivity). There was a heated discussion in the elderly female FDG. The main view was that they have to oppose any acts of Christianization. A mother (let's say Mrs A) said that Muslims in her village prohibit Christians to have community prayers at home. "[We] prohibit them to have *pengajian* (prayers, Christian religious meeting) in [our] village, because they clap and make a noise."[359] Another participant (let's say Mrs B) promptly replied, "We have to accept [the situation]. [We] shouldn't... be egoistic, angry..." She continued, "For all Christians, if they stay here there is a mosque next door [to their house], then *adzan* [summons to prayer] is echoing, maybe he/she will also complain [but in fact they don't]." Mrs A, annoyed by this response, grumbled to other participants. She said again, "The [Muslim] community leader also supports us." Then Mrs B replied, "It isn't right... Although he is the first Muslim leader [to criticize Christians]." A similar situation arose in the elderly male FGD. A participant questioned why other participants in his group objected to Christian services at home. He argued that these services at home are the same as *tahlilan* in Muslim tradition, which is also held at home.

## 2.3 Analysis at macro level

At macro level, the participants drew on the concept of *Reformasi,* maintaining that nowadays Indonesia is "really free, [there is] freedom". With respect to the *Reformasi* era, they reproduced an image of Solo where many MPs and even the vice mayor were Christians.

In fact only eight Christians became members of Surakarta's legislature for the period 2009-2014. The total number of MPs is forty, so the Christians constitute 20%. Of these, five are from the *Indonesian* Democratic *Party* of Struggle (PDIP), two are from the Prosperous Peace *Party* (PDS/Christian party), and one is from the Democratic Party (PD).[360] The vice mayor referred to FX Hady Rudyatmo, a Roman Catholic.

---

[359] *Melarang pengajian di kampung, lha keplok-keplok rame.*

[360] Secretariat of Surakarta House of Representatives 2009.

*Figure 6: The Muslim mayor (Joko Widodo) and Catholic vice-mayor (FX Hady Rudyatmo) of Surakarta, 2005-2012*
(Source: www.suaramerdeka.com)[361]

In talking about Indonesian politics and the state's foundation participants drew on the philosophy of *bhineka tunggal ika* (unity in diversity) and referred to the principles of Pancasila. "I am living in a *bhineka tunggal ika* state, which recognizes five religions and also some [indigenous] beliefs," said a participant. But *bhineka tunggal ika* does not relate directly to the state's form. It is rather the political symbol of Garuda Indonesia. It is also one of four pillars of Indonesian nationhood. The other three are the constitution, Pancasila, and the *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* (United Republic of Indonesia).

*Bhineka tunggal ika* also has no direct link with the recognition of five religions and certain indigenous beliefs. Freedom to follow and worship any one of the religions or local beliefs was not granted by *bhineka tunggal ika* but by the constitution (chapter 29, article 2). It declares that "the state guarantees each and every citizen the liberty of religion and of worship in accordance with his religion and belief". In the New Order era five religions were officially recognized: Islam, Christianity, Catholicism (as a separate religion, distinct from Christianity), Hinduism and Buddhism, but the *Reformasi* government reintroduced Confucianism as a state recognized religion in 2002.

Pancasila refers to the five pillars of the Indonesian state ideology. They are: belief in one divine Lordship; just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; and social justice for all the people of Indonesia. In saying that there is no contradiction between Pancasila and Islamic values the speaker was inspired by a mental model that is also supported by Muslim organizations. Almost all Indonesian Muslim organizations accept Pancasila as their organizational base.

Participants also referred to the "Islamic state" that evolved in Islamic politics after the collapse of the Ottoman *khilafa* model in the early 20th century. In

[361] Link: http://suaramerdeka.com/v1/index.php/pilkada/profil/9, accessed on July 20, 2012.

the utterance, "We cannot force... Solo must be based on Islam", the speaker was referring to an aspiration among certain Muslim groups who support the formalization of Syariah. A participant classified Syariah into two categories: rituals (*amaliyah*) and the political system.

Some participants drew on the Jakarta Charter. It was the initial draft of the five pillars of Pancasila. It was drafted and approved by a Committee of Nine (eight Muslims and one Christian) during the preparation for Indonesian independence on 22 June 1945. The only difference between the Jakarta Charter and Pancasila is in the content of the first pillar. The first pillar of the Jakarta Charter is "belief in Lordship with the obligation for its Muslim adherents to carry out the Islamic Syariah".[362]

A participant linked Christianization with a decrease of the Muslim population. Another participant reproduced a relation between that decrease and the social position of a Christian vice mayor (Mr Rudy). He added that the Muslim population decreased drastically. A participant mentioned that in Solo Muslims remain at 60% and another participant said formerly Christians were only 16%. Both participants referred to a general assumption that the number of Muslims is decreasing and the number of Christians increasing without specifying exact percentages.

By saying that if Mr Rudi were to replace Mr Jokowi as mayor of Surakarta, Islamic *dakwa* in mosques will come to an end the participant was referring to a growing fear in Muslim society. In general Muslim participants reproduced a feeling of fear (majority inferiority complex) of a Christian becoming a public leader such as mayor or village headman. They also drew on a mental model of fear when discussing Christian and Chinese domination in the economic arena. They display an inferiority complex or sense of marginalization.

A participant referred to the history of the crusades when he talked about conflict between Muslims and Christians. Another participant referred to the Communist mass killing in 1965 when they talked about the proselytization of Communist members. The utterance, "be careful of the latent danger of Christianization", is a mental model. The phrase "*bahaya laten*" (latent danger) is political language produced by the New Order government: "*bahaya laten komunis*" (the latent danger of communism). The New Order regime launched a virulent campaign against communism in Indonesian public discourse in order to prohibit the ideology. Other participants remembered the Solo riots in the 1970s, 1980s and 1998 when they talked about conflict in Solo.

Participants drew on government policy when they talked about regulations on the building of houses of worship. Some of them drew on the obligation of Christians to get state permission when they want to build a church. In talking about illegal churches a participant used a mental model of attacking such

---

[362] *Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariah Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya.*

churches, which was considered appropriate when non-violent acts were ineffective.

Some participants drew on the members' resource that Muslims were engaged in combat with Christians, for example the statement about MTA being "*benteng*" (a fortress) against Christianization. Another participant drew on the language of criminal law ("don't be stolen again!") when warning the other participants in his group against Christianization.

In talking about terrorism some participants referred to the incident when Noordin was shot by the police near their homes. As was described in section 1.3, in terms of interdiscursivity the participants in that FGD joked about the incident. One participant said the place where Noordin was shot was like a place for recreation. Talking about another case of terrorism, a male professional referred to banners proclaiming Air and Eko (two suspected terrorists) heroes of Islam. Here is a banner displaying such a slogan.


*Figure 7: "Welcome Islamic heroes; the martyrs Air Setiawan and Eko Joko Sarjono; Jihad still continues"; a banner* (Source: www.tempo.co)[363]

A participant referred to a book that she borrowed from her friend at the Ngruki Pesantren. It said that internationally Muslims are oppressed, for instance in Moro. It reveals an inferiority complex in the international Muslim community. Another participant remembered pamphlets that he saw in mosques when talk-

[363] Link: http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2009/08/13/063192398/Ada-yang-Menolak-Air-dan-Eko-Dikubur-di-Pemakaman-Muslim, the picture was posted on August 13, 2009 and accessed on July 22, 2012.

ing about warnings from a certain Muslim group about the danger of Christianization.

Some participants referred to ethnic and religious residential grouping in Solo, such as Javanese, Chinese, Arabian groups or Muslims and Christians groups. They also referred to Muslim organizations when talking about Christians and Muslims, such as Muhammadiyah, NU, MTA, HTI, KAMMI and Salafi. A participant referred to Ustadz Sukino when he talked about MTA followers' submission to their leader. Other participants mentioned different Christian groups or churches such as the GKJ, the Catholic Church, El-Shaddai Church, Bethany Church, the Adventist Church and Bethel Church.

## 3 Explanation

The last section of this chapter presents an explanation or analysis of social practice, namely the socio-cognitive effects of the texts. The aim is to specify the nature of the social practice of which the discourse forms part, which is necessary to explain why the discourse practice is what it is; and the effects of the discourse practice on social practice. The analytical concepts used in this stage are ideology (Foucault 1977) and hegemony (Gramsci 1971). For Fairclough discursive practices are ideologically imbued insofar as they absorb significations which support or restructure power relations. When participants draw on their mental models they either reproduce or transform them (Fairclough 2001: 158-161). For the purpose of this analysis we look at ideational and relational transformations, particularly concerning subject positions or social identities. The question is: what are the socio-cognitive effects of what Muslim FGD participants say?

### 3.1 Analysis at micro level

At the micro or personal level the participants mainly positioned Christians as "good" persons. Some participants identified Christians as "my close friend", someone who "repaired his/her bicycle at my house" or who "often made *dawet* [a cold drink] for me". Others identified Christians as donating rice during *idul fitri* (a Muslim feast), "visiting me when I was hospitalized" and sending an SMS "wishing me happy *Idul Fitri*". In talking about Christians the peripheral voice of Muslims positioned Christians as "excessive" because of their acts of Christianization.

The participants primarily positioned Christians as "tolerant" and on the whole as respecting Muslim ritual. Some of them pointed out that when it was time to *sholat* (prayer) their Christian friends asked them to pray and the Christians would wait outside the mosque. But several participants identified young

Christians as intolerant. In a village where Christians are the majority their dogs frightened Muslim children.

Some participants constituted and were constituted by diverse religious backgrounds in the family. They mentioned that they have relatives with different religious affiliations in their extended family such as Christianity, Catholicism or Hinduism.

The participants identified both "*abangan*" Muslims and "*abangan*" Christians as not "fanatical". One participant reproduced an image of *abangan* Muslims as not genuinely religious by saying they acted "as if they were Islamic" (*Islam-islaman*). That also applied to *abangan* Christians. *Abangan* people have least difficulty coexisting harmoniously. Thus participants referred to two social effects of those identifications. First, "*abangan*" are always "tolerant". Second, religious persons (both Christians and Muslims) may be tolerant, since they are not very "fanatical" or "extreme".

The participants constituted and were constituted by a multireligious neighbourhood milieu and they lived in harmony. Many participants said, "I have many Christian neighbours", "My house is very close to the church", and "I was nursed in the PKU [Muhammadiyah hospital]... The Christian [neighbours] also visited [me]". In addition participants constituted and were constituted by a religiously diverse friendship milieu. Quite a number of participants said, "I had a close friend... and [she was] a Christian", "I had a friend, [she was] also a Christian", "[I] had a Christian boyfriend", and "When I was at junior high school [my classmates' religions were] Catholic, Protestant, Islam". Many of them identified that their friends were "diverse". The girl who confided about her Christian boyfriend positioned the boy and herself as "tolerant". Thus at micro level the participants engaged and had good interpersonal relations with Christians in everyday life.

In general participants positioned themselves as "tolerant" people, not "fanatics", except for two persons. For example, a participant who is an imam preached in the churchyard on *halal bi halal* (Islamic feast). An NU leader established a close friendship with a Catholic pastor. This shows that at the level of Muslim leaders inter-religious and inter-personal relations with Christians occur. This engagement also happens at the level of Muslim lay persons as is shown by the story about a young Muslim who assisted at a service of worship at his Christian neighbour's home. An Arab business woman said that when she had a wedding party she invited both her Muslim and Christian neighbours.

However, some Muslim participants reproduced contradictory expressions in talking about Christians. On the one hand they identified Christians as "good" persons, on the other they identified Christians as having "hidden agendas" ("intentions") behind their "good" attitudes towards Muslims, namely Christianization. In interpersonal and social relations, Christians are good, but

in spreading their religion they angered Muslims. A participant identified that Christians do good deeds for Muslims to get Muslims' protection. This relates to the position of Muslims as a majority and Christians as the minority.

Even though participants generally reproduced a discourse of separating "religious" ("*aqida*") from "social" ("*muamalla*") affairs, they assumed different positions in identifying something as either religious or social. Some participants positioned celebrating Christmas as "religious", others positioned it as "social". Another example: some participants considered attending a Christian funeral as "*aqida*", whereas others positioned it as "social".

A participant took a position of prioritizing social affairs in implementing Islamic practice. Implementing *zakat fitrah* (personal alms) as an Islamic rule (Qur'an, *hadits*, the Muhammadiyah's codes) rigidly will alienate Islam from society. Another participant identified himself thus when talking about his family's practice of donating money when a relative is sick: "We don't consider [whether someone is] Muslim or Catholic [in our family]." Thus participants were ambivalent when deciding whether something was religious or social (power relations). At micro level participants positioned themselves as community or family members rather than as members of religious associations.

### 3.2 Analysis at meso level

At meso level Muslim participants identified Christianity as an Abrahamic religion just like Islam. They reproduced Christians and Muslims as "brothers/sisters", being "grandchildren of Abraham". In saying that the core of all religions is good they identified the universality of religions.

The participants positioned Christianity as a good religion, which is an ethical qualification. They did not use a theological qualification, such as right or true. Even though participants identified a common ground ("not too different") between Muslims and Christians, they consider Islamic identity important. Thus they frequently used the expression *alhamdulillah* (thanks be to God), for example "*Alhamdulillah,* her younger siblings are still Muslim".

They also reproduced religious inclusion and exclusion. By calling Christians "*kafir*" (infidel) and "*musyrik*" (polytheists) participants were religiously exclusive. Some reproduced social borders between Muslims and Christians. Two participants identified the greeting "*assalamu'alaikum*" as reserved for Muslims. Two participants identified dogs as pets of Christians. A social effect of that identification is that Muslims avoid and are afraid to have relations with Christians who have dogs.

The Qur'anic text on Islam as grace to the world and the *hadits* injunction to respect neighbours are transformed into the social practice of interreligious harmony between Muslims and Christians. This kind of transformation was illustrated by the participant who said *dakwa* should be conducted in "wise and good ways". He also positioned himself by saying that he had a close friend-

ship with a Roman Catholic pastor. Besides, he advocated social equality between Muslims and Christians and rejected acts of violence against Christians.

One participant constituted and was constituted by a Qur'anic verse when she said, "And never will the Jews or the Christians approve of you until you follow their religion." Then the speaker expressed her suspicious attitude towards Christians. Participants' narration about Christianization strengthens and reinforces their suspicious perception of Christians.

Some participants identified Christians as "excessive" (*kelewatan*) because of their fast-breaking programme for poor Muslims in their church. Those Christians were identified as "overacting". Because they are rich they help poor Muslims. The same was said in regard to natural disasters: "Their funds were readily available", so they were quick to help. These utterances reproduce Muslim participants' suspicion of Christians.

One Muslim participant reproduced enmity toward Christians. By saying that SKB was a "weapon" for Muslims to fight Christianization this participant positioned Muslims as adversaries of Christians. He identified some Muslims as obstructing the progress of Christianization, such as the *laskar*s (Muslim paramilitaries) who took part in the fight against illegal churches.

The participants mostly understood the religious principle "*lakum dinukum wa liyadin*" to you be your religion, and to me my religion" in two ways. First, they recognized religious diversity. Second, they identified themselves as distinguishing between "religious" affairs ("*aqida*") and "social" affairs ("*muamala*"). For instance, one participant refused an invitation to a Christmas celebration from his Christian neighbours because "it is already related to *aqida* (faith)". There was also a statement that they did not interfere in each other's *aqida*. But, as noted already, this distinction between religious and social affairs is sometimes fluid.

Participants identified ethnic identities (Javanese, Chinese, Arab), which relates to the reproduction of interreligious cohesion or convergence. Most participants positioned Javanese Christians or Javanese churches as "more acculturated". Some participants identified Javanese Christians as having the same "customs" as Muslims. On the other hand they identified a gap between them and Christians from non-Javanese churches.

A participant identified the relations of "moderate" or "*abangan*" Muslims with "moderate" or "*abangan*" Christians as good. However, relations between "fundamentalist" Muslims and "fundamentalist" Christians are not good. Both *abangan* Muslims and *abangan* Christians are positioned as having close relations. By saying "I am from the *abangan* family", that is a religiously diverse family, and they live in harmony, the speaker positioned an ideology of religious tolerance as governing their everyday life.

### 3.3 Analysis at macro level

At macro level participants in the Muslim FGDs mostly positioned and reproduced Indonesia as a "Pancasila state" that upholds the principle of "*bhineka tunggal ika*" (unity in diversity). A participant identified Indonesia as a "*bhineka tunggal ika* state", not an "Islamic state".

Participants recognize that Indonesia is a home for various religious groups. When saying, "I live in a *bhineka tunggal ika* state which recognizes five religions and also some [indigenous] beliefs", the participant reproduced the recognition of different religions and beliefs in Indonesia.

Participants constituted and were constituted by the idea of equal citizenship (ideology). Here we note a socio-cognitive effect of utterances about Pancasila or *bhineka tunggal ika* and the recognition of civic equality between Muslims and Christians: "Christians ... they are also citizens of Indonesia."

Regarding equal citizenship, a participant positioned an Islamic state and a Syariah political system as not accommodating pluralism. But by saying "We do not reject Syariah... We must accept [Syariah], because we are Muslims" he refused to be identified as anti-Syariah. The speaker explained that there are two domains: Syariah as a political system championed by the Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir (HTI), and Syariah as ritual (*amaliyah*). He positioned himself as anti political Syariah and pro non-political Syariah.

None of the participants in the Muslim FGDs positioned Indonesia as an Islamic state. Nevertheless most of them argued that the Pancasila state must accommodate the interests of Muslims. For example, a participant stated "[It is] very necessary [to have] a person who understands Islam in government. So [we want] no *Perda* (local government law) to be published, or any law that complicates Muslim life."[364]

Muslim participants at macro level positioned Indonesia as undergoing "Reformasi" since 1998. They identified the political situation in this Reformasi era as "really free, freedom". Some Muslims are worried about this development, because freedom allows a Christian to become vice-mayor of Solo as well as many more Christian MPs. Thus participants identified a transformation of power relations in the *Reformasi* era, which is a threat to Muslims. The threat includes Christians who are village headmen.

In the statement, "If Mr Jokowi [the mayor, a Muslim] is still alive in five year's time [it is no problem]. But if he were to pass away after a year, then he will be succeeded by Mr Rudi, who is a Christian. ... Then Islamic *dakwa* in mosques will be closed down", the speaker reproduced fear of a situation in which political authority passes into Christian hands. A participant uttered:

---

[364] *Memang perlu sekali orang yang paham agama Islam duduk di pemerintahan. Jadi jangan sampai nanti keluar Perda, atau UU, menyulitkan kehidupan Islam itu sendiri.*

"Since Mr Rudy has been vice mayor the number of Muslims, the Muslim population has decreased drastically."

However, census statistics for Surakarta over the last thirty years show that while the Muslim population decreased and the Christian population increased, the change was not drastic. In 1980 Muslims were at 80%, while in 2011 they were 75.8%. In 1980 Christians (Catholics and Protestants) were at 19%, whereas in 2011 they were 23.2%. Thus during the last three decades Muslims have decreased by 3% and Christians have increased by 1.3%.[365] But during *Reformasi* (2000-2010) Muslims increased by 0.3%, while Christians decreased by 1.2%.

Some participants indicated that Christian education has hegemonic intentions. Muslim students are taught Christian teachings and worship in Christian schools and extracurricular courses. Thus Christian educational services are used for Christianization.

The participants also constituted and were constituted by ethnic identity construction. In general they reproduced inter-ethnic/religious identity such as Javanese as Muslims, Christians or *abangan*; Arabs as Muslims; and Chinese as Christians. They also identified such inter-ethnic/religious identity groups in society, especially in certain parts of Solo.

Chinese in particular were identified as "rich". "Their number is small, but their financial situation is strong." Thus participants – mostly Javanese Muslims – positioned themselves as economically inferior to Chinese Christians (power relations). Because of this financial power they were identified as using tricky ways of Christianization.

Most participants refused to position the Solo riots as inter-ethnic or interreligious conflict. They were mostly identified as social conflicts caused by social inequality, for instance between poor Javanese Muslims and rich Chinese Christians. But some of them identified ethnic and religious sentiments and propaganda being spread in society, including via religious sermons.

The refusal to position the conflicts as inter-ethnic or interreligious is a mechanism to explain that the problems are not from within. Thus participants positioned the problems as not between Muslim and Christian, or Javanese and Chinese.

Actors in conflicts are identified as "*ocnum*" (individuals). This supports the foregoing explanation. The actors are individuals, which dissociates them from their religious and ethnic identity. In another case – an attack on a Christian place of worship – a participant identified the Muslim paramilitaries (*laskar*s) as coming from outside Solo. So the problems come from "there", not from

---

[365] Thus, according to the statistics, the statement that Muslims 'decreased drastically' after *Reformasi* was not valid.

"here". The refusal to identify conflicts as arising inside society is a social mechanism to maintain harmony and avoid further and deeper conflict.

Some participants identified current intra-Muslim divergence (intergroup power relations) between NU-Muhammadiyah and MTA. NU and MTA disagreed on the issue of tahlilan (religious field), while Muhammadiyah and MTA clashed in the area of schooling (educational and ultimately economic field). However, the participants positioned MTA ambiguously. On one hand they criticized MTA, but on the other hand they value MTA as the defender of Islam against Christianization.

The participants also constituted and were constituted by religious pragmatism. When a suspected Muslim terrorist (Noordin M. Top) was captured and shot by the police near to the participants' houses, some participants reported financial benefits. They called the incident a "blessing", because they profited from Noordin's death.

Some participants reproduced the image that some countries outside Indonesia oppressed Muslims. Muslims are under pressure internationally. Some of them identified America as encouraging Christianization in Indonesia. Another participant identified Muslims in Moro, the Philippines, as oppressed by a non-Muslim regime.

## 4 Conclusion

In this study we use critical discourse analysis as a method (Fairclough 1992) to gain insight into the relation between religious language and social cohesion or the lack of it. We distinguish between the dimensions of individual believers (micro level), their (full or partial) identification with their religions or religious institutions (meso level), and the societal context in which these religions or religious institutions operate (macro level). At micro, meso and macro levels our research participants produced a wealth of labels for Christians. Indeed, they are not only labels but also identify concrete behaviours.

We draw conclusions with respect to the classifications (description), the cognitions or mental models that are drawn upon (interpretation) and the social condition and effects (explanation). In general Muslims said that expansionist Christians are not Javanese Christians. Muslims classified Christians into those who share Javanese culture and those who adopt non-Javanese ways that are "excessive" and who have a "hidden agenda". They said that Christian fundamentalism and the problem of Christianization come from new, non-mainline churches that are minor groups within Christianity. Chinese Christians were classified as rich people in Christian society and they built economic empires in Solo. Muslim participants classified Christians as fellow citizens of Indonesia.

When it comes to mental models, Muslims see Christians as their fellow "children of Abraham" and "people of the Book". Whereas Christians are oppressors and allies of the West, Muslims are internationally oppressed. However, because of the similarity of their "customs" (*kesamaan adat*), there is no gap between Muslims and Christians. Thus Javanese culture and *adat* (custom) are shared cognitions. Another mental model is the principle of "*rukun*" (harmony). Muslims distinguished between "religious" (*ibadah*) and "social" (*muamalah*) affairs. They also differentiated two areas of Syariah: Syariah as a political system and Syariah as ritual (*amaliyah*).

As for social conditions or social effects, Muslims positioned Javanese churches as more inculturated. *Abangan* Christians are positioned as living in harmony with *abangan* Muslims. A Muslim participant identified a tendency among young Christians to be more intolerant than older generations. Muslims positioned themselves as inferior to Chinese Christians because of their economic poverty. They positioned themselves as avoiding any mixing of religious teachings. In general Muslims rejected Syariah as a political system and advocated its ritual (*amaliyah*) aspects. They positioned Christians as fellow citizens of Indonesia. Muslims primarily positioned themselves as religiously tolerant, while radicals who use militant language are a peripheral voice.

# Chapter IV

# "The family of Pancasila"

# How Muslims and Christians speak to each other

In Surakarta Muslims and Christians mingle in daily life. Some families have members belonging to diverse religions, for instance Islam and Christianity. The Al-Hikmah mosque and the Javanese Christian Church (GKJ) of Joyodiningratan stand side by side in Jalan Gatot Subroto. They symbolize the coexistence of Muslims and Christians in the city. The GKJ Joyodiningratan was built in 1929, while the Al-Hikmah mosque was constructed in 1947. The congregants of those two houses of worship not only respect each other, but also sometimes work together. At the feast of *Idul Fitri* a lot of Muslims pray in the mosque, even in the street outside the building. At Christmas Christians use the street in front of the mosque to park their vehicles. They also share food during religious feasts. In 2006 they worked together to help earthquake victims in Yogyakarta and Klaten.

*Figure 8: The Al-Hikmah mosque and the Javanese Christian Church (GKJ) Joyodiningratan stand side by side in Jalan Gatot Subroto of Surakarta* (Source: Author's collection)

However, as noted in previous chapters, Muslims and Christians in Surakarta also experience religious tensions. The emergence of extreme groups in both Muslim and Christian communities, who elevate their religious identity above other (e.g. ethnic, national) identities, has characterised religious transformation in Surakarta for over a decade.

Like the previous chapters, this chapter looks at social identity construction through interreligious, particularly Christian-Muslim relations from a theory of communicative practice point of view. I explore why and under what conditions people, both individually and collectively, elevate their religious identity above other identities and whether or not religious identity threatens national identity and leads to social conflict. In the previous chapters we focused only on how Christians or Muslims speak about each other. In this fourth chapter we analyse the way they speak to each other.

The main data are utterances from eight focus group discussions (FGDs) involving 52 participants. Of these, 26 had participated before in Christian or Muslim FGDs. Another 26 new participants attended these mixed FGDs. Gender-wise 28 women and 24 men attended the FGDs. We classify participants aged 17-24 as youths and those aged 50 and over as elders. Even though we do not have a specific age category of participants aged 25-49, most professionals and workers are in that age group. The youngest participant attending the youthful group is 18 years old, while the oldest in the elderly group is 72 years old. By professionals we mean entrepreneurs, managers, journalists and state employees, whereas workers are labourers, company employees, domestic workers, workers in the informal sector, et cetera.

Almost all contacted persons in the previous series of Muslim and Christian discussions were eager to join the mixed FGDs. Only one Muslim (a student activist at a senior high school) refused to join. At first he said he wanted to join the discussion, but when he learned that the groups would be mixed Muslims and Christians, he withdrew.

In each FGD I asked a basic question at the outset: "How would you describe the other (Christian/Muslim)?" The rest of the conversation dealt with the issues raised in response to that question. The main title of this chapter, "The family of Pancasila", derives from participants' words.

## 1 Description

The first stage is the analysis of linguistic practice (description), that is the linguistic features of the text (Fairclough 1992: 76-77). For this stage Fairclough (1992: 73-78, 234-237) suggests various analytic tools. Here we concentrate on vocabulary (i.e. wording, over-wording and rewording or alternative wording). The term 'wording' refers to processes of wording the world,

which differ in different times and places and among different groups of people (Fairclough 1992: 76-77). Over-wording is an "unusually high degree of wording, often involving many words which are near synonymous" (Fairclough 2001: 96). It is a sign of intense preoccupation, pointing to "peculiarities in the ideology" (Fairclough 1992: 193). Rewording is using new words as alternatives or in opposition to existing ones (Fairclough 1992: 194). In addition we look at metaphor. Fairclough (1992: 195) writes, "How a particular domain of experience is mataphorized is one of the stakes in the struggle within and over discourse practices." The object of analysis in this linguistic practice stage is words, phrases or sentences. We focus on how Christians and Muslims speak to each other. Analytic questions are: How do the participants speak to each other? What words do they use?

### 1.1 Analysis at micro level

The micro level of discourse is where people speak about their personal lives and opinions as individual believers, such as members of families, neighbourhoods or villages. Some participants said that they come from a "diverse" family background. Several participants used the label "Pancasila family" to describe their family that accommodates different religions. A Christian professional said, "I grew up in a Pancasila family... My father is Hindu, my mother is Muslim, their children are Christians."[366] A young male Christian said, "I also come from a Pancasila background. [My] extended family consists of Christians, Catholics and Muslims."[367] In the phrase "Pancasila family" Pancasila is an adjective qualifying family.

A female Christian participant described her background: "My parents are *abangan,* so only Islam KTP [Islam by identity card/ID]. I [became a Christian] because of education. My kindergarten and elementary school was Christian ... When I was at the third level of high school [I] asked to be baptized... Fortunately my parents gave permission."[368] In that sentence the word "*abangan*" is associated with Islam KTP. By inserting the word "only" (*hanya*) before the phrase "Islam KTP" the speaker indicated that her father was not really Muslim. She used the active voice ("[I] asked...") to stress that it was her own initiative. The speaker said that a Christian education was the factor that caused her to become a Christian. The word "fortunately" expresses that baptism is perceived as something to be grateful for.

---

[366] *Saya dibesarkan... dari keluarga Pancasila. Ayah saya Hindu, ibu saya Islam, anak-anaknya Kristen.*

[367] *Aku dari latar belakang Pancasila, dari keluarga besar ada yang Kristen, Katolik, ada juga yang Islam.*

[368] *Orang tua saya abangan, jadi hanya Islam KTP. Terus saya juga karena pendidikan. Sekolah saya dari TK SD itu Kristen... Saya kelas tiga SMA itu minta baptis... orang tua saya kebetulan mengijinkan.*

A Muslim participant said, "My extended family on my father's side is Christian and Muslim."[369] Similarly, a Christian participant said, "My father is Hindu, my mother is Muslim, their children are Christians."[370] A young Christian female contributed: "I grew up in and come from two different cultures and religions. Fortunately my family is a very democratic family that respects the principle of humanity."[371] In this last sentence the speaker used the phrase "democratic family" in line with her appreciation for the fact that cultural and religious differences were respected according to the principle of humanity. The word "very" in the phrase "very democratic family" emphasizes the label "democratic".

A Christian participant said, "In my extended family the two religions (Islam and Christianity) are all mixed together and our tolerance is very extraordinary, very extraordinary."[372] The speaker used the word "tolerance" to describe social relations in her family. She also used over-wording by repeating "our tolerance is very extraordinary, very extraordinary", which shows intense preoccupation. Another Christian participant said, "[My] relatives are Muslim and Christian. Moreover, many of my uncles are Muslims."[373]

A Muslim male said that his extended family is "very *abangan,* because it is said that my grandmother was [a member of the] PKI (Indonesian Communist Party)."[374] Here the speaker linked *abangan* with PKI affiliation. In that sentence he used the passive voice. From the utterance it is not known who said that his grandmother was PKI. The word "very" is an adverb of degree, indicating that his grandmother was definitely *abangan.*

Like the participant quoted above who was grateful for her Christian baptism, another participant described her gratitude to God for the fact that she and her relatives were born Muslims. A Muslim female said, "*Alkhamdulillah [K05]*(thanks be to God), fortunately we were all born Muslims."[375]Ais eaker [#K05]considers having a mono-religious family to be fortunate.

A Christian male described his parents' experience when they obtained their IDs at the civil administration office. He said, "My father was an adherent of [indigenous] belief (*kepercayaan*). Finally in a certain year [he] had to choose one of the religions. [I forget] in what year [my parents] registered for an ID. [We] did not know who made a mistake. Finally both were [registered as] Bud-

---

[369] *Keluarga besar saya yang dari ayah itu ada yang Kristen, ada yang Islam.*

[370] *Ayah saya Hindu, ibu saya Islam, anak-anaknya Kristen.*

[371] *Saya tumbuh dan berasal dari dua budaya dan dua agama yang berbeda. Kebetulan keluarga saya adalah keluarga yang sangat demokratis menjunjung asas kemanusiaan.*

[372] *Di keluarga besar kami dua agama ini berkumpul bersama-sama dan tentunya toleransi atas setiap kami itu luar biasa banget, sangat luar biasa.*

[373] *Keluarga ada Muslim ada Kristen. Bahkan Pak De saya pun banyak yang haji.*

[374] *Sangat abangan, karena katanya nenek saya itu PKI.*

[375] *Kami memang kebetulan terlahir alkhamdulillah dari keluarga yang Muslim semua.*

dhists. My mother is [registered] as Buddhist, my father is [registered as] Buddhist. But actually [they are] Hindus."[376] The phrases "adherent of the [indigenous] belief" and "but actually [they are] Hindus" show that the speaker described his parents as combining Hinduism with indigenous belief. A Muslim male said, "I am *kejawen*, my ID is Islam."[377] Here the speaker described the discrepancy between his personal belief (*kejawen*) and the religious identification on his ID (Islam).

In regard to participants' diverse family backgrounds, some of them described their social relations with Christians in celebrating religious feast days in interreligious togetherness. A Christian said, "At *Idul Fitri* [Islamic feast day] I, my kids and my husband always visit my parents and my little brothers/sisters. Similarly, when I celebrate Christmas my mother and my little brothers/sisters visit my home."[378] Here the speaker described Christians and Muslims visiting each other over religious holidays. A Muslim confirmed this: "When *lebaran* [Islamic feast day] comes, [we] gather; when Christmas comes, [we] gather. Even when Valentine's day comes I am also invited."[379] As is evident in the linguistic features of those two sentences "*lebaran*" is an alternative wording for *Idul Fitri.*

Another Christian participant mentioned, "During *lebaran*... my Muslim brothers/sisters usually pray first [in the mosque]... And we, [who are] from another religion ... I am a Christian, we prepare food [for them]."[380] In this text the speaker described the situation in her family during *lebaran*. She reinforced her identity by saying "I am a Christian." Another Christian participant said, "When Christmas [is coming] my little brothers/sisters usually send SMSs [saying] Merry Christmas."[381] Here at micro level the participant described her Muslim siblings conveying Christmas greeting to her.

Some participants talked about daily togetherness of Muslims and Christians in the family. A Christian participant cited this example: "Although my uncle is a *hajj*, [he] still wants to stay overnight in my house... [When] on Sunday my uncle stays at home, we [my relatives and I] go to church. [We say]

---

[376] *Ayah saya itu mengikuti kepercayaan penghayatan itu. Akhirnya tahun berapa itu harus memilih agama salah satu, itu jadi Hindu. Tapi tahun berapa itu, bikin KTP, gak tahu yang salah yang mana itu. Jadi Buddha semua. Ibu saya Buddha, bapak saya Buddha. Padahal sebenarnya Hindu.*

[377] *Saya kejawen, KTP saya Islam.*

[378] *Kalau itu Idul Fitri saya dan anak-anak saya dan suami saya mesti menghadiri orang tua saya dan saya ke adik-adik saya. Kemudian sama kalau saya Natalan ibu dan adik-adik saya yang ke tempat saya.*

[379] *Kalau di pas acara lebaran itu ya kumpul bareng, Natal kumpul bareng. Bahkan valentine saya juga diundang.*

[380] *Di saat Lebaran... saudara-saudara saya Muslim untuk biasanya sholat dulu ... Dan kami dari agama lain, saya Kristiani, kami menyiapkan makanan.*

[381] *Kalau Natal kebanyakan adik saya SMS Selamat Natal.*

don't want to go inside the church. That is what I mean that he/she is too fanatical about her/his religion."[392]

## 1.2 Analysis at meso level

We analyse the meso level of discourse when participants speak about themselves as members of a religion (institution), hence the shared or collective patterns of belief and practice which go beyond personal convictions. In the mixed groups participants at meso level classified Islam and Christianity as "religions of heaven", "having the same goal", "having the same human values" and "good" religions. A Muslim participant commented, "We [Muslims and Christians] all have beliefs, all have God, all have a way of worship."[393]

A Christian participant said, "All religions have the same human values."[394] Another Christian said, "Essentially all religions are good."[395] A Muslim participant confirmed, "[All] religions, their goal is good."[396] In addition a Christian participant said, "All religions... focus on the one God, focus on Allah who is the only one God."[397] The participants reworded the term "good" in describing the character of all religion. The Christian speaker used the word "Allah" as an alternative for *Tuhan* (God). He created common ground between Muslims and Christians. Apart from the term '*Tuhan*', the word "Allah" is used in *bahasa* Indonesia.

A female Muslim explained, "The meaning of the word Islam is *salam* and *salam* means peace. So actually [Islam] teaches beautifulness."[398] A Muslim male also mentioned, "In Islam we have a concept of *rahmatan lil 'alamin* (a mercy to the world), that is according to Islam, Islam means mercy for all creatures."[399] Similarly, a female Christian said, "The basic [teaching of Christianity] is "love" (*kasih*). Love your God with your heart totally and love others as yourself."[400] As seen in the linguistic features of those texts, for Muslims the

---

[392] *Anak saya itu nikah di gereja. Mereka-mereka ndak mau masuk... aku ora melu ning grejo, wegah mlebu grejo. Lha meniko lho Bu, berarti pun pemanggih kulo, dia itu terlalu fanatik dengan agamanya.*

[393] *Kita sama-sama punya keyakinan, sama-sama punya Tuhan, sama-sama punya cara untuk beribadah.*

[394] *Agama apapun memiliki rasa kemanusiaan yang sama.*

[395] *Pada hakikatnya semua agama itu baik.*

[396] *Agama itu tujuannya sama-sama baik.*

[397] *Semua agama... menuju satu Tuhan, menuju kepada Allah Yang Maha Esa.*

[398] *Arti kata Islam sendiri adalah salam dan salam itu artinya selamat. Jadi sesungguhnya mengajarkan keindahan.*

[399] *Di Islam, kita punya konsep rahmatan lil 'alamin yang menurut Islam, Islam itu rahmat bagi seluruh alam.*

[400] *Dasarnya memang kasih. Kasihilah Tuhan Allahmu dengan segenap hatimu dan kasihilah sasama manusia seperti dirimu sendiri.*

word "mercy (*rahmat*)" is an alternative for the Christian concept of love (*kasih*).

Muslim participants made a basic distinction between different types of religion in Islam: the "religion of heaven" (*agama samawi*) and the "religion of earth" (*agama ardhi*). An elderly Muslim female said, "According to Islam there are religions that are revealed by Allah to the prophets. They are called the religions of heaven (*agama samawi*)... The religions revealed by Allah are Judaism, Christianity, Islam. Each of them has a holy book and a prophet... Apart from these three religions, there are religions that are not of heaven, [but] of earth [*agama ardhi*]. These religions are created by humans."[401] Both Islam and Christianity are classified as religions of heaven. In this way the participants created common ground between Muslims and Christians.

A Christian participant described the social position of Muslims and Christians, and the relations between them. "A Muslim is [our] brother/sister... So [our] treatment of [our] Muslim brother/sister is like we treat ourselves. If being pinched is painful, [then] do not pinch [the other]."[402] The expression "if being pinched is painful, [then] do not pinch [the other]" is a metaphor in *bahasa* Indonesia, which means treat others as you treat yourself.

Some participants differentiated between the "goal" (*tujuan*) and the "way" (*cara*) of Christianity and Islam. A Muslim female described it thus: "The difference between Islam and Christianity is only in the way (*cara*). Whereas the goal (*tujuan*) is actually the same, that is to worship God."[403] A young female Muslim pointed out, "[Muslims and Christians] all have God. And [they] have ways to communicate with God. But those ways are different."[404] The word "only" in the first utterance shows that the sameness of goal is much more significant than the differences between the ways of Islam and Christianity. The following two participants confirmed those utterances.

---

[401] *Menurut Islam itu memang ada agama samawi yaitu agama yang diturunkan oleh Allah kepada para Rasul.... Agama yang diturunkan Allah yaitu agama Yahudi, agama Nashrani, dan agama Islam. Masing-masing memiliki Kitab Suci dan Rasul... Adapun selain ketiga agama ini tidak agama Samawi, agama Ardhi. Itu agama yang direkayasa oleh manusia sendiri.*

[402] *Orang Muslim itu sebagai saudara... Jadi perlakuan terhadap saudara Muslim ya seperti terhadap diri sendiri. Kalau dicubit sakit ya jangan mencubit.*

[403] *Perbedaan antara agama Islam dan Kristen itu hanya terletak pada cara. Sedangkan tujuannya sama sebenernya, menyembah Tuhan.*

[404] *Sama-sama mempunyai Tuhan. Dan sama-sama punya cara untuk berkomunikasi dengan Tuhan. Tapi caranya yang berbeda-beda.*

"Who are Adam and Eve? They are my and your ancestors. What is their religion? ... Does each religion have its own paradise? No, paradise is only one... Because [we are from] the same origin. *Ingkang dipun gayuh sami* (what will be reached is the same)."[405]

"In the early creation God created Adam and Eve. So all of us are descendants of Adam and Eve. So actually we are the same. Only the road (*jalan*) to God is different. If you happen to be Muslim it is via this way, those Christians [go] via that way..., but all focus on God."[406]

Among the linguistic features of the foregoing texts, the word "road" (*jalan*) is an alternative for "way" (*cara*). The phrase "*ingkang dipun gayuh sami*" (what will be reached is the same) is a Javanese expression. It is an alternative wording of "*tujuan*" (goal) in Indonesian. In the utterance "does each religion have its own paradise? No, paradise is only one" the speaker wanted to say that Muslims and Christians have and will be in one and the same paradise.

The participants also made the following classification of brotherhood and in so doing they spoke about the different social positions of Muslims and Christians. A Muslim participant said:

"The brotherhood of humanity (*ukhuwah bashariah*) is a brotherhood based on humanity.... the brotherhood of nation (*ukhuwah wathaniyah*) is a brotherhood among members of a nation. Regardless of his/her religion, that is among citizens. There is another [brotherhood], that is the brotherhood of Islam (*ukhuwah Islamiyah*), which is among Muslims."[407]

Thus the Muslim speaker distinguished between three kinds of brotherhood: those of humanity, the nation and Islam. A female Christian maintained, "Those Christians are brothers/sisters of the same faith, [but] those non-Christians are brothers/sisters of a different faith."[408] Thus for the Muslim the phrase "brotherhood of Islam" is an alternative for the Christian's "brotherhood of same faith".

Some participants claimed that salvation is exclusively for certain religious believers. A young female Christian, a member of a Pentecostal church, said, "We believe in the salvation that is only through the Lord Jesus. Since we are

---

[405] *Adam Hawa menika sinten? Menika janipun leluhur kulo panjenengan, menapa agaminipun Adam Hawa? ... Napa saben agami gadah suargi piambak-piambak? Mboten. Suarga punika namung setunggal... Krana mekaten asal usulipun sami, ingkang pun gayuh sami.*

[406] *Di awal penciptaan, Tuhan menciptakan Adam dan Hawa. Jadi, semua kita ini keturunan Adam dan Hawa, Jadi, sebetulnya kita ini sama. Hanya untuk ke Tuhan jalannya berbeda. Kebetulan yang Muslim dengan cara demikian, yang Kristen punya cara sendiri..., tapi semua arahnya kepada Tuhan.*

[407] *Ukhuwah bashariyah yaitu saudara sesama umat manusia.... Ukhuwah wathoniyah yaitu saudara sesama warga negara. Perkara agamanya berbeda ndak masalah. Itu sesame warga negara lho. Ada lagi ukhuwah Islamiyah, itu sesama agama Muslim.*

[408] *Yang Kristen itu saudara sesama iman, yang non-Kristen saudara beda iman.*

still in the world, our task is to spread that salvation."[409] In that utterance the speaker expressed that people reach salvation by no other way except through the Lord Jesus. A Muslim participant said, "Each [prophet] has a teaching and his period is limited. [The prophet Moses, the prophet of the] Jews is far ahead of prophet Isa (Jesus). [His prophecy was] continued by the prophet Isa. After prophet Isa prophet Muhammad came. He is the last prophet."[410] Here he described how the period of Jesus' prophecy ended when Muhammad came.

Some participants talked about "*kafir*" (infidel). Christians and Muslims used the word "*kafir*" in different ways. A Muslim participant said, "Principally *kafir* is someone who does not uphold Islam, madame! [Someone who] does not uphold Islam is what we consider *kafir*."[411] A Christian participant in the same FGD replied, "According to the understanding in our [religion], *kafir* is [someone] who does not uphold any religion... does not worship God."[412] Another Christian said, "Christianity is only religion. To believe in Jesus as God, that is salvation, according to us, no matter what [their] religion."[413]

As seen in the linguistic features of the foregoing texts, both Christian and Muslim participants used the word "*kami*", a "we" that includes the speaker and some audiences but excludes others. By using the exclusive "we" they shared a collective understanding of belief and practice among their own group, either Muslim or Christian, that goes beyond personal convictions. In those texts differential utterances about "*kafir*" express disavowal of Islam by Muslims and disavowal of God by Christians.

A Christian participant said, "There are [Muslims] who consider us [Christians] as *kafir*... [Then they] refuse to communicate or have relations [with us]."[414] A Muslim participant commented, "There is a group [in Islam] which says that those [who] have different ways of worship [though they are Muslim], [because they have] different rituals, [are] called *kafir*... even if they [those who have a different way of worship] are their own fathers. Crazy!"[415] In this text the speaker called that kind of Muslim "crazy", indicating disunity in the fam-

---

[409] *Kita imani keselamatan itu jalannya hanya Tuhan Yesus. Kalau kita masih didunia, ya tugas kita memberitakan keselamatan itu.*

[410] *Masing-masing punya ajaran dan waktunya juga ada ketentuan waktunya. Yahudi adalah sebelum Nabi Isa, kemudian diganti nabi Isa. Kemudian setelah nabi Isa ada lagi lebih baru Nabi Muhammad. Itu nabi terakhir.*

[411] *Prinsipnya kalau kafir itu bukan agama Islam, ya Bu. Tidak memeluk Islam itu kami anggap kafir.*

[412] *Pemahaman di tempat kami kalau kafir ndak beragama... Tidak menyembah Tuhan.*

[413] *Kristen itu cuman agama. Mempercayai Yesus itu Tuhan itulah keselamatan. Menurut kami gitu, gak masalah agama apapun gak masalah.*

[414] *Ada yang menganggap kami kafir... gak mau berkomunikasi ataupun gak mau berhubungan.*

[415] *Ada satu aliran yang menyatakan kalau dia sudah apa tata cara beribadah, amaliah berbeda, itu ya sudah dikatakan orang kafir... meskipun itu ayah kandungnya sendiri. Gila!*

ily. The same Muslim participant said, "Nowadays the conflict is between Muslim and Muslim."[416]

Muslim participants described a prohibition of mixing different faiths. A Muslim participant said, "On the issue of *aqida* [faith], there is a rule that says *lakum dinukum wa liyadin* (to you be your religion, and to me my religion). You have your religion, please practise your own religion. Whereas I have my Islamic teaching, I practise my religious teaching."[417] In that text the speaker used the words "religion" (*din*)' and "teaching" (*ajaran*) as alternatives for the word "faith" (*aqida*). The speaker described the prohibition of mixing the faiths, religions and teachings of Islam and Christianity.

A Muslim said, "Nowadays we are trapped, driven, then comes up [a concept of] religious pluralism, sir [refers to researcher]! It is dangerous. If a person does not have the correct faith, it would be a source of disaster."[418] This speaker defined religious pluralism as a mixture of the faiths, religions and teachings of Islam and Christianity. In that text she also describes religious pluralism as "dangerous" and a "source of disaster for the faith". In the expression "we are trapped, driven" she used the passive voice to signify that religious pluralism came from outside and was initiated by others.

A Muslim male professional described a contrast between his personal view and the view of his religious institution:

> My background is Muslim Muhammadiyah... The people of Muhammadiyah are sometimes perceived as very, very puritan. If [they] face Christians, rather – what? ... hard. But in daily life I could not avoid my personal view, which is rather different [from Muhammadiyah]. I am more open. Not only in social affairs, but also I and my Catholic or Christian or other friends often discuss beliefs, faith. And of course to look for a meeting point, not the differences.[419]

In that text the speaker described three things. First, he said that he is Muslim Muhammadiyah. Second, he described Muhammadiyah as "very, very puritan" compared to Christians. Third, he pointed out that he has a personal view which is more open than that of Muhammadiyah. The phrase "are perceived as

---

[416] *Sekarang konfliknya adalah orang Islam sendiri dengan orang Islam sendiri.*

[417] *Dalam soal aqidah kepercayaan sudah ada aturan, yaitu apa lakum dinukum wa li yadin. Anda punya agama, silahkan anda menjalankan agama yang anda anut dengan agama anda. Sedangkan kami punya ajaran Islam, ya saya mengamalkan ajaran saya.*

[418] *Sekarang kita itu dijebak, digiring, sehingga muncul pluralisme agama, Pak! Itu bahaya. Sebab kalau orang sudah tidak punya keyakinan yang benar itulah sumber bencana.*

[419] *Latar belakang saya Muslim Muhammadiyah... Orang Muhammadiyah itu kadang ada yang menilai apa ya sangat sangat puritan. Kemudian jika berhubungan dengan Kristiani rada rada apa ya... keras. Tapi secara keseharian saya ndak bisa melepaskan diri bahwa pandangan saya itu agak-agak berbeda. Saya lebih terbuka. Tidak hanya bidang sosial, tapi kadang saya dan teman-teman dari Katolik atau Kristen atau yang lain sering berdiskusi soal-soal apa namanya kepercayaan, keimanan. Dan tentunya mencari titik temunya, bukan perbedaan-perbedaan.*

very, very puritan" is in the passive voice, showing that this is the perception of people outside Muhammadiyah. Another Muslim participant in the young female FGD said, "I am Muslim, but [I] don't wear *jilbab* (veil)." By adding the word "but" the speaker wanted to say that her practice differed from Muslim women in general.

A Christian female participant referred to her religion and the idea of the Belief in One Divine Lordship in Pancasila. She said "Pancasila exists... The understanding is different [among different religious Indonesians]. [In respect of] the Belief in One Divine Lordship... the Christian faith isn't [exactly the same as the belief in] one Lordship [in Pancasila]. [We] believe in the Christ."[420] In this utterance, the participant described a different understanding of the Pancasila Belief in One Divine Lordship between Christians ("believe in the Christ") and Muslims ("the one Lordship"). She used the term "different" (*berbeda*), a polite utterance, in order to avoid confrontation.

Some participants used labels such as "*abangan*", "fanatical" and "*santri*" (devout). A Muslim participant described three types of Islam: "In Islam there is Islam *abangan*, fanatical Islam and Islam *santri*."[421] Other participants described the social relations between fanatics and people who have a different religion. A Muslim participant mentioned, "Those of the fanatical line who wear calf-length *pants* or large *jilbab* refuse to associate with people of a different religion."[422]

Another Muslim participant said, "Those who are not fanatical Christians cooperate [with Muslims]."[423] A Christian participant observed, "Each religious adherent, all religions, if they are not too fanatical by segregating this and that... [they will] respect, appreciate [each other]."[424] In those texts the participants linked the label "fanatical" with dress and the interreligious relations of fanatics ("refuse to associate with", refuse to cooperate, apply segregation). The phrase "too fanatical" is an over-wording.

A Christian worker described an *abangan* Christian practising "*sesajen*" (offering of flowers or food to the spirits). She said, "Before [he/she] enters the church [becomes an active church member], [he/she] has practiced *sesajen* (offering). That was [before his/her] faith was strong. So [he/she] was still

---

[420] *Pancasila tetap ada ya... Pemahamannya berbeda. Kalau Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa... tapi untuk imannya tetep orang Kristen ndak Maha Esa. Yang dipegang ya Kristusnya.*

[421] *Di internal Islam tadi itu kan ada Islam abangan, Islam fanatik, Islam santri.*

[422] *Orang-orang yang garis fanatik orang yang katok cingkrang atau jilbab besar itu tidak mau duduk bareng sama orang-orang yang beda agama.*

[423] *Yang tidak fanatik sama agama Kristen, tetap menjaga kerjasama.*

[424] *Masing-masing penganut agama, semua agama, asal tidak terlalu fanatik dengan membedakan ini dan itu... saling menghormati, saling menghargai.*

*abangan*. People who are still *abangan* practise [*sesajen*]."[425] In that text the speaker described two things. First, an *abangan* Christian practises *sesajen,* whereas faithful ("strong") Christians do not. Second, the phrase "before entering [becoming active in] the church, [he/she] practised *sesajen*" indicates that the church makes Christians give up that practice. By adding the word "still" in the phrase "still *abangan*" the speaker conveys that the *abangan* Christian did not fully practise the Christian faith.

However, a Muslim participant said, "I think the culture of Java is extraordinary... A Javanese does not lose his/her Java-ness when following Hinduism. When Buddhism enters [the Javanese area], for instance, it is also like that. Buddhism does not eliminate the [culture of] Java. The culture of Java is still there, while Buddhist adherents also exist. [That pattern] also happens in Islam [and] Christianity."[426] Here the speaker described how Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity do not "eliminate" Javanese culture. The same participant added, "Which means that the people of Solo are quite elastic (*liat*) [and] flexible (*lentur*) toward others."[427] Here he uses the labels "elastic" and "flexible" to describe the people of Solo, who have a Javanese cultural background.

Another young female Muslim said, "Formerly Islam was only one stream. Islam was still [close to] Java, the culture of Java. Then our life was so peaceful. [It is] not like now, when feelings are hot even among [people of] the same religion."[428] By using the word "formerly" the speaker said that in the past Islam was close to Javanese culture. She described the history of Islam in Java as peaceful. Another Muslim participant said:

> "[Someone looks at him/herself] primarily as Muslim, as Muslim. Java is only a place of birth, daily language, et cetera. But there is a person who looks at [him/herself] as I am Muslim [and] at the same time Javanese. So I am Muslim, but also practising the customs of Java, whereas the first [person] does not practise the values and the culture of Java, et cetera. I am a Muslim, a puritan Muslim. Java is only the daily language [and] the place of birth. But there is also a Muslim who is also Javanese. I practise Islam, I also practise the values of Java. However, there is [a person] who is more Javanese [than Muslim]. I am Javanese first, Muslim comes second. That is *kejawen* [Javanese-ness]."[429]

---

[425] *Dia sebelum ke gereja bikin sesajen. Sebelum imannya kuat, jadi masih abangan. Yang masih abangan itu dia bikin.*

[426] *Budaya Jawa ini menurut saya luar biasa... Orang Jawa tidak kehilangan Jawanya ketika memeluk Hindu. Ketika Buddha masuk misalnya juga gitu, gak ada, Buddhanya gak merubah Jawanya. Budaya Jawa masih, orang Buddha juga ada. Islam Kristen juga begitu.*

[427] *Itu artinya bahwa orang Solo paling tidak yang saya tahu cukup liat gitu lho, cukup lentur ketika dia dengan selainnya.*

[428] *Dulu itu Islam itu masih satu aliran. Islam masih ke Jawa, budaya Jawa. Jadi hidupnya lebih apa ya malah tentrem lah, tenteram. Gak seperti sekarang ini yang semakin panas antar satu agama saja.*

[429] *Yang pertama adalah Muslim-nya, sebagai Muslim, Jawa itu hanyalah tempat lahir, bahasa keseharian dan lain sebagainya. Tetapi ada juga orang yang menganggap saya Muslim*

The speaker distinguished between three kinds of Muslims (social identities). First, "puritan" Muslim who see themselves as primarily Muslim, who do not practise the values and culture of Java, to whom Java is only their place of birth and their everyday language. Secondly, there are Muslim Javanese who see themselves as Muslim and at the same time Javanese, who practise both Islam and the values of Java. Thirdly, *kejawen* (Javanese-ness) refers to Muslims who claim to be more Javanese than Muslim, or to be Javanese first and only then Muslim. In that text the words "teachings of Java" are an alternative wording of "values of Java". This description by a Muslim participant is comparable with the Christian participant's description of faithful ("strong") and "*abangan*" Christians.

To go into Muslim society in more detail, a male Muslim participant explained: "In Islam the NU is closest to the traditions. The Muhammadiyah is in between... The most [anti-tradition] is the *laskar*."[430] As seen in the linguistic features of the text, the word "tradition" in this utterance is an alternative wording of "Javanese culture" in the previous utterance. Using the previous category of puritanism, we can say that the *laskar* is very puritan, the Muhammadiyah is puritan, and the NU is not puritan.

With reference to purification in Muslim and Christian society a male Muslim said, "Groups that are eager to purify their religious teaching exist everywhere [in Christianity and Islam]. They sometimes create tensions."[431] In this utterance, the speaker linked religious purification movements with the creation of tension. Another participant described a new trend, namely prohibiting Muslims to wish Christians merry Christmas in Muslim society. He said, "In the past saying Merry Christmas to one's neighbours was no problem. [But] after reading a book which states that the greeting of Merry Christmas is prohibited (*haram*) a person no longer greets."[432] In this utterance the speaker illustrates the shifting of Muslims' attitudes before and after reading a book forbidding them to wish Christians a merry Christmas.

---

*sekaligus saya Jawa. Jadi saya Muslim tapi juga mempraktikkan ajaran-ajaran Jawa. Kalau yang pertama tadi sudah tidak menggunakan apa ya kejawaannya, nilai-nilai Jawa kemudian budayanya dan lain sebagainya. Saya Muslim, Muslim puritan. Jawa sekedar bahasa sehari-hari, tempat lahir saja. Tapi ada juga saya Muslim sekaligus Jawa. Saya mengamalkan Islam, saya juga mengamalkan nilai-nilai Jawa. Tetapi ada yang lebih dominan kejawaannya. Saya Jawa dulu, Muslimnya yang nomor sekian. Ini yang kejawen.*

[430] *Di Islam ya NU lebih dekat ke tradisi. Muhammadiyah agak tengah-tengah... Yang paling atas laskar-laskar itu.*

[431] *Kelompok-kelompok yang mau memurnikan ajaran agamanya itu di mana-mana selalu ada. Lha itu kadang yang menjadikan ketegangan-ketegangan.*

[432] *Dulu sama tetangganya mengucapkan Selamat Natal tidak masalah. Setelah dia baca buku kemudian ada orang yang menyatakan bahwa mengucapkan Selamat Natal itu haram, akhirnya dia tidak mengucapkan.*

The participants also talked about the cause of fanaticism. A young Christian female, a radio journalist, said, "The person becomes fanatical because he/she learned a lot... Because like this, sir! Noordin [a suspected terrorist], I did the live journalism report from there [place where Noordin was shot]... Apart from bombs, a lot of Islamic books were found."[433] On the other hand a Muslim participant said, "The person with rich knowledge will not be a fanatic... But if [he/she] has limited knowledge, limited knowledge, wow... all people are wrong [except his/her own group]."[434] Thus the two participants expressed two different opinions about the relation between Islamic education or knowledge and fanaticism.

Some participants described "streams" in Islam and Christianity. A Christian male, a member of the Javanese Christian Church, mentioned, "There are streams in Islam, also in Christianity. The stream of Pentecost... stimulates people to fly high."[435] A young Christian female described the liturgy in a charismatic church: "[The liturgy] in that church is like in a discotheque, noisy like a concert."[436] In those utterances the speakers described the social identity of charismatic and Pentecostal churches that stimulate people to "fly high" and their noisy liturgy.

Another Christian participant described Christian Pentecostal groups that he considered examples of that "stream".

> "[The members of] those big churches, unfortunately, do not have a political sense [of being part of] the Indonesian state. They [feel that they are] part of another state [kingdom of God]. Moreover, their theology is a theology of success, of prosperity. So the rich people, those are blessed by God. The puppies, the poor [are considered] not to have repented yet."[437]

The speaker linked the big churches, the theology of success or prosperity with a lack of political sense of being Indonesian citizens. Another participant spoke about Christian brotherhood[438] and the strong religious solidarity[439] of Pentecostal Christians at an international level. Another Christian participant said,

---

[433] *Orang itu menjadi fanatik ketika dia rajin belajar. Menurut saya seperti itu. Karena begini Pak... Noordin, kebetulan saya juga raportase live dari sana... Selain ditemukan bom di sana itu ditemukan banyak buku Muslim.*

[434] *Orang itu kalau ilmunya banyak, malah justru tidak fanatik.... Tapi kalau masih terbatas ilmunya, terbatas ilmunya, wuh... iki kabeh salah.*

[435] *Muslim wonten madzhab-madzhab, Kristen nggih wonten... merangsang orang untuk melambung tinggi.*

[436] *Di gereja kok kayak ning diskotik, gedombrengan, kayak konser.*

[437] *Gereja-gereja besar ini repotnya itu nggak punya kesadaran politis sebagai bagian dari negara Indonesia ini. Mereka ini adalah bagian dari negara yang di sana. Itu kan kemudian teologinya teologi sukses, teologi kemakmuran. Jadi orang yang kaya, orang yang ini, itu yang diberkati Tuhan. Yang kere, yang mlarat, itu belum bertobat.*

[438] *Persaudaraan Kristen.*

[439] *Solidaritas keagamaan.*

"There is pride [among people of those churches] if [their] congregations increase every Sunday. But they are not aware that [they] take people away from other [Christian] churches."[440] Here the speaker points out that new members of Pentecostal churches come from other Christian churches. Hence he is describing a contest among Christians themselves.

### 1.3 Analysis at macro level

At macro level the participants in general described Muslims and Christians as citizens of Solo society (social position). Those members of Solo society live in "harmony" (*rukun*) and display "tolerance" (social relations). An elderly Christian female said, "Their harmony is very fabulous."[441] A Muslim participant described a similar picture. He said, "In Solo [the relationship] between Muslims and Christians is good, extremely good. For instance, during the fasting month Christians prepare the fast-breaking meal [for Muslims] with enthusiasm. So tolerance is very high."[442] The phrase "...good, extremely good" is an over-wording.

A Christian said, "[The population] in my place is diverse, but the harmony among people is very good. When the *halal bi halal* [Islamic feast day] was held the villagers, both Muslim and non-Muslim, came."[443] Another Christian participant mentioned, "At *Idul Adha* (Islamic offer feast) there was a *rewangan* (work party) in Javanese [culture]. My family and I [who are Christians] were invited... I was very happy, I was happy."[444] In those utterances, the speakers described Christians involved in Muslims' religious celebrations. The words "I was very happy, I was happy" represent an over-wording.

Some participants described cooperation between Muslims and Christians in religious celebrations. A Muslim participant commented, "At *Idul Adha* non-Muslims, without being asked and invited, [they] help [Muslims] in the mosque... While at Christmas usually non-Muslims ask Muslims to help to cook food."[445] Similarly, another Muslim said, "Yesterday there was a Christian who joined in the process of slaughtering an animal [in *Idul Adha*] from begin-

---

[440] *Ada kebanggaan kalau jemaat saya setiap minggu bertambah. Tetapi dia ndak sadar ngambilnya dari gereja lain.*

[441] *Kerukunannya itu begitu hebat.*

[442] *Di Solo umat Islam sama umat Kristen itu baik, sangat baik sekali. Contohnya kayak bulan puasa itu ya umat Kristiani antusias sekali menyediakan buka. Jadi toleransinya tinggi.*

[443] *Di tempat saya beragam, tapi juga kerukunan umat beragamanya saya bilang bagus juga. Kalau diadakan Halal bi Halal, siapapun yang merasa warga di kampung saya itu Muslim maupun non Muslim dateng.*

[444] *Saat Idul Adha, ada apa ya kalau orang Jawa, ada kayak rewangan. Saya dan keluarga saya itu diundang... saya bersuka cita banget, saya seneng.*

[445] *Kalau pas Idul Adha pun dari non Muslim itu, tanpa harus diminta tanpa harus diundang gitu itu mau bantuin ke mesjid... Kalau pas Natal biasanya dari yang agama non itu minta bantuan ke Muslim untuk bantuin bikin makanan.*

ning to end, up to distributing [the meat]."[446] Those descriptions show mutual cooperation between Muslims and Christians in society.

Christian and Muslim participants described social cooperation between them in rendering social services. A member of the Javanese Christian Church told the group: "Every year I organize a health service. I cooperate with young Muslim friends from Nusukan... The first year there was no response [from the Muslims]. The second year we discussed again, then [we] reached a common understanding. Finally, now it works. Indeed, [the place is] prepared [by Muslims]. [The Muslims said] Sir, please conduct it in front of the mosque."[447] A Muslim participant said, "The Javanese Church did a social service. That [service] was in cooperation [between the church] with a *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) at Mojosongo."[448]

Muslim and Christian participants described Indonesia primarily as a Pancasila country which respects freedom of religion. A participant said, "This is Pancasila [country]."[449] A young male participant used a metaphor, "If we were a broom made of such splintered ribs, Pancasila is the string."[450] Here the speaker describes Pancasila as a factor that binds diverse citizens together. Another participant said, "In Pancasila freedom of religion is much respected... If we really implement Pancasila, our tolerance of other religions will be much stronger."[451] Thus the speaker linked Pancasila, freedom of religion, and tolerance.

Yet the participants described a new situation that has arisen since *Reformasi* in 1998. A Christian participant said, "Since *Reformasi* Pancasila is never mentioned in social interactions."[452][K04]A female participant observed, [#K04]"Nowadays Pancasila is being lost step by step."[453] Both participants described the decline of Pancasila after *Reformasi.*

A Muslim participant said, "After *Reformasi* there were militant groups among Christians. So [according to them] a Christian who is not militant is not [considered] a [good] Christian. [They also] invite [Muslims] to become Chris-

---

[446] *Ada bahkan dari umat Kristiani kemarin ikut apa itu penyembelihan hewan sampai dari awal sampai akhir, sampai ngedumke daging itu ikut.*

[447] *Saben tahun kulo ngawontenaken peladosan-peladosan kesehatan. Kulo kerjasama kalih konco-konco pemuda Muslim Nusukan ingkang celak peken... Tahun pertama dereng wonten. Tahun kaping kalih rembakan malih sampun tuwuh pemahaman bersama. Pungkasanipun, lajeng sak mangke mlampah. Malah dipun sediyani, Pak sudahlah pak di halaman masjid ini.*

[448] *GKJ Nusukan ada aksi sosial. Itu kerjasama dengan pondok pesantren di Mojosongo.*

[449] *Ini kan Pancasila.*

[450] *Kalau kita misalkan sapu lidi, Pancasila itu pengikatnya.*

[451] *Dalam Pancasila sendiri kan diakui apa kebebasan beragama itu sangat dijunjung tinggi... Kalau kita benar-benar mengamalkan Pancasila kita mungkin toleransi kita terhadap agama lain itu makin kuat.*

[452] *Sejak Reformasi Pancasila kan tidak pernah disebut-sebut dalam pergaulan masyarakat.*

[453] *Sekarang ini untuk Pancasila itu sedikit demi sedikit kelihatannya semakin terkikis.*

tians. I think it also happens among Muslims."[454] Here the participant described the growing phenomenon of Christian and Muslim militant groups after *Reformasi*.

A participant commented, "After the *Reformasi* era... other [new religious] groups from abroad in all their diversity... came to [Indonesia]."[455] Another participant mentioned, "Though they (militant groups) live in Solo, they have [new] religious teachings which come from the Middle East. In Christianity [it is similar]. I think [the new trends] come from America, Korea."[456] The two utterances reveal similar trends in Muslim and Christian communities after *Reformasi*.

The participants agreed that there is an awakening of religion characterized by the emergence of *jihad* movements after *Reformasi*. These movements accentuate "*kekerasan*" (violence). Some participants talked about attacks on alcohol drinkers and gamblers by the *jihad* group in Solo. A Muslim participant said, "Actually [condemning] people who drink [alcohol], gamble is not [part of] their authority. It is not the authority of the *jihad* [group] ... [However, they] enter villages, to purge them in the name of *jihad*."[457] A Christian participant in the same group mentioned, "[When the] *jihad* groups entered the village, entered my village... fighting occurred on the road, stones were thrown [by villagers at the *jihad* group]."[458] In this last sentence, the speaker described the villagers' counter attack on the *jihad* group.

A Christian participant described the attack on the "red district" in Solo: "Gilingan is the red district (*kawasan merah*) in Solo that is very old, [it is] close to the [bus] station. The prostitutes were attacked... while [the attackers] cried in the name of God. The prostitutes opened their BH [brassieres], then [the attackers] ran away quickly. It really occurred in 2005 or 2006."[459]

Some participants also described the attack on the church's social services in Solo by *jihad* groups. A Christian participant mentioned, "During the [month

---

[454] *Setelah Reformasi, di kalangan Kristen juga ada kelompok-kelompok menurut saya cukup militan. Jadi orang Kriten kalau tidak militan ya nggak Kristen. Artinnya mengajak orang menjadi Kristen. Saya lihat temen-temen di Muslim juga ada.*

[455] *Setelah Reformasi... kelompok-kelompok lain termasuk dengan luar negeri dengan macem-macem ...itupun juga masuk.*

[456] *Walau dia tinggal di Solo, Jawa, tapi dia mempunyai paham keagamaan yang porosnya, misalnya, di Timur Tengah, wajar. Di Kristen saya kira, di Amerika, Korea.*

[457] *Sebetulnya orang mabuk, orang judi itu kan bukan wewenang dia tho. Bukan wewenang jihad-nya itu tho. Kita kan punya itu, ada polisi ... Trus berani masuk kampung-kampung berani operasi... dengan menamakan jihad tadi.*

[458] *Jihad masuk kampung, masuk ke kampung saya... dan sempat terjadi bentrokan di jalan dilempari batu.*

[459] *Gilingan ini adalah kawasan merah di Solo yang sudah tua, di dekat terminal. Itu sampai digropyok kan pelacur-pelacurnya... menyebut-nyebut nama Tuhan gitu. Kemudian dari dalam pelacur-pelacurnya buka BH, lari terbirit-birit. Bener tahun 2005 atau 2004 terjadi.*

of] fasting the Christians hold [a fast-breaking for Muslims], pay [for it], [and] prepare food for that fast-breaking... There was a conflict last [year] when it was stopped by the *jihad*. The *jihad* came... [They] assumed that there was Christianization [going on]."[460] In that utterance the speaker used the label "*jihad*" to describe a group attacking the church's fast-breaking service.

A Muslim participant said, "The cheap food programme offered by the GKJ (Javanese Christian Church)... [was] supported by society. People joined that programme. Not only Christians took advantage of that cheap food programme, but Muslims also joined that programme."[461] So he mentioned that the programme benefited both Christians and Muslims.

A Christian participant, the organizer of the fast-breaking service, said, "When it was stopped by the police, we thought that it (the programme) would [really] be closed. But friends [who were Muslims], journalists, and friends from NGOs did not agree [with the closure]... Those friends eventually supported [the programme]."[462] A Muslim participant said, "[Those protests come from] only that group [of *jihad*] again and again."[463] By adding the words "only... again and again" the speaker wanted to say that the *jihad* group consists of a small number of people.

In the following utterance the participant described the transformation from gangster to *laskar*. He said, "The conflict between Mr X[464] [a gang leader] and the *laskar* [Muslim paramilitaries] should not be seen as a conflict between believers (*orang yang beriman*) and gangsters. It is more a fight among the gangsters themselves... When a group of gangsters fights [another group of gangsters], when one [of them] loses... then it transforms itself into *laskar*."[465] That is why the speaker said that the fight against gangsters in the name of *jihad* by certain Islamic groups is actually an intergroup fight between gangsters. Thus the speaker described the *laskar* not as a group of believers, but as a

---

[460] *Kalau puasa kan umat Kristen dari gereja mengadakan, mengongkosi, menyiapkan nasi untuk buka. Tapi pernah kemarin kebetulan kemarin puasa yang kemarin lalu ada konflik sedikit entah gimana itu distop oleh jihad, jihad datang... Pemikiran dari orang-orang yang menghentikan itu ternyata mengkristenkan.*

[461] *Nasi murah yang dilakukan di GKJ... Mendapat dukungan misalnya dukungan masyarakat, kemudian orang ke sana, tidak saja orang Kristen yang memanfaatkan nasi murah itu tetapi juga ada orang Islam yang masuk ke sana itu.*

[462] *Ketika sudah ditutup oleh kepolisian ya udah lah kita selesai. Tapi justru yang gak terima temen-temen, temen-temen wartawan sama temen-temen LSM... Itu yang kemudian diadvokasi temen-temen.*

[463] *Hanya kelompok yang itu-itu saja.*

[464] For the sake of confidentiality I do not disclose the name used by the speaker.

[465] *Konfliknya Tuan X itu kan dengan laskar itu jangan dipahami bahwa konfliknya orang yang beriman dengan preman, tapi lebih lebih pada pertarungan antar kekuasaan para preman sendiri... Ketika dia bertarung kemudian tidak bisa mempunyai jaringan kekuasaan... dia bisa mengubah dirinya jadi laskar.*

group of gangsters. The linguistic features of these utterances show that the words "*laskar*" and "*jihad*" are used as alternatives. Participants in FGDs often used these two terms as alternative wordings.

A Muslim participant spoke about cultural and religious awakening as a response to globalization.

> "The religious awareness of Indonesians generally has increased. [I] mean compared to my childhood ... But I suspect this is [only] fear... of progressive globalization, et cetera. When [we are] unable to withstand [globalization]... finally [we turn] to religion, to culture. Currently Javanese culture is gaining strength. Nowadays people are willing to pay to learn the Javanese language. People learn how to be MCs (masters of ceremony) in Javanese. Then [they] start to learn about Javanese culture at the palace. This is seemingly a new symbol for Solo people... On the other side religiosity also increases... Then [as a consequence] the only way to control people is [through] religion."[466]

In saying "compared to my childhood" the speaker was describing a social change. The participant illustrates the strengthening of Javanese culture by citing three indicators: people are willing to pay to learn Javanese, people learn how to be MCs in Javanese, and they start to learn about Javanese culture at the palace.

Christian participants talked about the difficulty Christians encounter in building churches or houses of worship. A female Christian said in Javanese, "In the village of Banyuanyar there is not even one church in any part of the village. [We] want to build a church, [but] it is extremely difficult."[467] By contrast, "When a mosque is to be built in a [certain] region it seems to be very easy. But for the church ... to get permission from the state... the process will be long. So it is more complicated. In Kota Barat, [close to] the pharmacy, there is the Hope of God Church. Up to now it has not managed to get [permission]."[468] Here the speaker suggested differential treatment of Muslims and Christians when it comes to getting permission to build a house of worship.

---

[466] *Kesadaran keberagamaan kita secara umum masyarakat Indonesia semakin baik. Artinya dibanding masa kecil saya... Tetapi saya juga curiga jangan-jangan ini hanya ketakutan... terhadap kemajuan globalisasi dan lain sebagainya. Nah ketika menghadapi itu tidak mampu... akhirnya ke agama, budaya. Budaya Jawa akhir-akhir ini menguat. Orang belajar bahasa Jawa itu sekarang berani bayar. Orang belajar menjadi apa namanya MC bahasa Jawa. Kemudian belajar budaya Jawa di Kraton sekarang udah mulai ini. Agaknya ini menjadi simbol-simbol baru bagi orang Solo... Sisi yang lain keagamaan juga meningkat... Sehingga satu-satunya jalan untuk mengontrol diri dan umat ya agama.*

[467] *Jenenge kelurahan Banyuanyar kuwi sak kelurahan grejo siji wae ra eneng. Arep mbangun wae angel ora njamak.*

[468] *Kalau umpamane suatu daerah mau dibangun masjid, kayaknya ah gampang banget.. Tapi kalau yang namanya gereja... tanda tangan dari pemerintah... proses itu cukup panjang. Jadi istilahnya dipersulit... Daerah Kotabarat. Apotek itu ada namanya Gereja Pengharapan Allah. Itu sampai sekarang tidak mendapat.*

A Muslim participant said, "When the minority [Christians] group built a house of worship in the majority [Muslims] group's [area]... many objections came .... There were no massive riots [and] acts of violence between the two religious groups [in society]. But [there were] many objections [to church building proposals]."[469] In this text the speaker referred to the social position of Muslims as the majority and Christians as a minority. He differentiated between two realities in Solo: the absence of acts of violence between the two religious groups and the many objections to the proposed church building.

Some participants mentioned the Solo riots in 1972, 1980 and 1998. A participant said, "It was not noted in history that people of different religions have less good relations in Solo, especially Christians and Muslims... I heard [about the study of] conflicts in Solo from Mr Dharmono, who is a historian, there was no conflict based on religion. But conflicts based on ethnicity happened many times."[470] Here the speaker described the absence of religious conflict and the frequent incidence of ethnic conflict in the history of Solo.

A Christian participant recounted: "By accident I became involved [in the riots] of '80 [1980]... On the third day [of the riots] I and my friends ran riot, amuck, were angry ... There were no swearwords relating to religion... [The swearwords were about] China, China, basically only China, without mentioning religion."[471] Here the speaker described his own position and that of his friends as actors in the 1980 Solo riots. He over-worded "China", indicating intense preoccupation with the ethnic conflict. This text confirms the previous utterance about the absence of religious conflict and the presence of ethnic conflict in Solo's history.

The same person said, "I also witnessed the '72 [1972] riots... it was not about religion. It was [prompted by conflict between] Arabs and pedicab drivers. It was a purely social problem, not about religion."[472] From the wording of the text we learn that the speaker perceived the riot as a social problem, because it was prompted by Arabs (rich people) and pedicab drivers (poor people). Even though the speaker mentioned that it was prompted by Arabs, none

---

[469] *Ketika kaum minoritas mendirikan tempat ibadah di sebuah kelompok kaum mayoritas... Banyak penolakan-penolakan itu muncul... Daerah Solo memang tidak ada kerusuhan skala masif kekerasan-kekerasan antar umat beragama. Tapi banyak terjadi penolakan-penolakan.*

[470] *Di Solo tidak ada sejarah terkait dengan apa relasi yang kurang bagus antar umat beragama, khususnya antara Kristen dengan Muslim... Saya denger dari Pak Dharmono konflik di Solo, dia orang sejarah, gak ada konflik yang didasarkan atas agama. Tetapi kalau konflik berdasarkan etnik memang sudah berkali-kali.*

[471] *Kebetulan tahun 80 saya ikut... hari ketiga itu langsung saya ikut ndundeng-ndundeng sama temen-temen, pokoke nesu, ngamuk... gak ada istilah-istilah yang terungkap yang terkait dengan agama... Cina... Cina... pokoknya Cina aja, tanpa ngomongke tentang agama.*

[472] *72 saya juga lihat... Itu gak agama. Lagi-lagi persoalan orang Arab sama supir becak. Itu hanya persoalan sosial saja, jadi bukan agama.*

of the participants in that FGD described the 1972 Solo riots as an ethnic conflict.

A participant said, "The strong symbol [of religion] is the house of worship. That is [the religious] symbol. For Muslims it is the mosque, for Christians and Catholics it is the church. [For Buddhists] it is the *vihara*. In fact, in fact, no *vihara* was destroyed, no church was destroyed. If at a certain level of consciousness it related to religion, at least, at least, the house of worship would be destroyed."[473] Here the speaker pointed out that if they were religious conflicts, the houses of worship would have been destroyed.

However, some participants talked about the victims of the 1998 Solo riots and the graffiti during the riots which referred to ethnic and religious identity. A male Muslim professional said, "Even though the victims were friends of people with a Chinese ethnic [background], ethnically Chinese, in fact Muslims from a Chinese ethnic background did not become victims."[474] Here the speaker described two identities: non-Chinese Muslims and Chinese Muslims.

During the 1998 Solo riots some people wrote graffiti on textiles and put these up in front of their houses to avoid mass attacks. A Christian participant described the situation: "The writing was about Muslims, Java... On the *sarong* displayed [in front of the house], for example, it was written Muslim, Java. If they were [non-Muslims, then they wrote] only Java. Java! [Chinese Muslims only wrote] Muslim!"[475] In that text the speaker used the labels "Muslim", "Java" and "Muslim-Java". He added, "[They wrote like that] in order to not be considered Chinese."[476]

A Muslim participant said, "I believe that economics is the main motive. [There are riots] because of the economic distribution issue, the problem of access to [economic] power. Why do the Chinese develop their businesses easily while non-Chinese do not...? [Because of that] the Chinese ethnic group was eventually eradicated."[477] In this utterance the speaker connected "Chinese" with economic power.

---

[473] *Sebagai simbol itu yang paling dekat adalah rumah-rumah ibadah. Kan itu kan simbol. Bisa Muslim ya mesjid, kalau Kristen Katholik ya gereja. Vihara. Faktanya, faktanya, tidak ada vihara yang rusak, tidak ada gereja yang rusak. Kalau toh itu pada tingkat kesadaran tertentu ada hubungannya dengan agama paling minimal, paling minimal, rumah-rumah ibadah ada yang dirusak.*

[474] *Meskipun yang kena korban itu teman-teman etnik China, ethnic China, tetapi kenyataannya etnik China yang beragama Islam ya tidak kena.*

[475] *Tulisannya ada Jawa Muslim ya tho. Bikin tulisan apalah, sarung dijereng tulisane Jawa Muslim misalnya. Kalau yang anu ya Jawa saja. Jawa mas! Muslim!*

[476] *Biar dikira bukan China.*

[477] *Saya tetep yakin itu ekonomi yang jadi motif utama. Karena persoalan pemerataan ekonomi, persoalan akses kekuasaan. Kenapa orang China lebih gampang untuk mengembangkan usahanya. Sementara orang non-China nggak bisa.... Etnis China saja yang sekarang dihabisi.*

A Muslim participant in the same group responded, "Those involved in the riots quote-unquote were Muslims. If they wrote Islam, [it was in order not to be] attacked... The [word Islam] was just attached. But we cannot say that it was a purely religious conflict. Because I believe the strongest triggers were the economy and [political] power."[478] By using the words "not ... purely" the speaker acknowledged the religious element involved in the conflict, but the words "the strongest triggers were the economy and [political] power" indicate the dominance of non-religious motives.

The Christian participant in his turn replied, "If [the motive is] the economy, I clearly agree. Because in those years... our Chinese brothers/sisters were rather arrogant, rather arrogant, arrogant. [They] did not get along [with others/Javanese]... But after *Reformasi* up to today those Chinese brothers/sisters have become aware of that [they socialize]."[479] Here the participant described the Chinese as brothers/sisters. In that sentence the over-worded "arrogance" shows intense preoccupation. The words "after *Reformasi*" describe a transformation among the Chinese after the *Reformasi* era.

Some participants mentioned "outsiders" or "people of Jakarta" as the actors and provocateurs in the 1998 Solo riots. A participant said, "If people of Jakarta did not have interests, Solo would be peaceful... Unfortunately Solo became an object."[480] The participant added, "Solo became a target, sometimes called a short fuse *(sumbu pendek)* [of conflict]. The short fuse was a label used by Jakarta people."[481] In that utterance, the speaker said peace in Solo was a result of the absence of "interests" of "people of Jakarta". The speaker used the metaphor "short fuse", which means easy to explode. It describes the identity of people of Solo from outsiders' point of view.

As seen in the last two utterances, in general Muslims and Christians attributed the problems to "outsiders". A Muslim participant described Abu Bakar Ba'ashir, a Muslim who was jailed by the government for acts of terrorism, as being "not from Solo". He said to his friend, "[You] do not know the map. Abu Bakar Ba'ashir is not a person of Solo, [he is from] Sukoharjo."[482] Thus the speaker denied that Ba'asyir, whom he described as militant, is a person from Solo.

---

[478] *Yang bikin rusuh tanda petik itu mayoritas mungkin umat Islam. Ya kalau dia menulis Islam, tidak akan diganggu... Itu (agama) tetep numpang, meskipun tidak bisa kita katakan ini murni konflik agama. Karena pemicu utama saya yakin pasti motif ekonomi dan kekuasaan.*

[479] *Kalau ekonomi jelas saya setuju. Karena memang tahun-tahun itu... saudara-saudara kita yang China itu agak arogan, agak sombong, arogan. Gak mau bergaul... Tapi setelah Reformasi ke sini teman-teman China sudah mulai menyadari.*

[480] *Bila orang Jakarta tidak punya mau, Solo aman. Sayangnya Solo jadi objek.*

[481] *Solo jadi target, kadang disebut sumbu pendek. Sumbu pendek itu julukan orang Jakarta.*

[482] *Tidak tahu peta. Abu Bakar Ba'ashir bukan orang Solo, Sukoharjo.*

## 2 Interpretation

As indicated in previous chapters, the stage of interpretation or discursive practice concerns the production, distribution and consumption of text. Discursive practice mediates between linguistic practice (text) and social practice. There are many ways of analysing discursive practice (Fairclough 1992: 78-86, 232-234), but this study concentrates on two tools: intertextuality and interdiscursivity. When participants produce (communicate) and consume (interpret) text or talk they draw on members' resources (Fairclough 1989: 163) or mental models (Van Dijk 2008: 75), stored in their long-term memory (Fairclough 1989: 9-10; 24). These resources are cognitive in the sense that they are in people's heads; and they are social in the sense that they are socially constructed and have social effects (Fairclough 1989: 24). So what members' resources or mental models do Christian and Muslim participants use to produce (communicate) or consume (interpret) talk?

### 2.1 Analysis at micro level

When speaking about their personal experience participants referred to (religious) diversity in the family. In talking with others Muslim and Christian participants referred to their diverse family background, for instance, "My father is Hindu, my mother is Muslim, their children are Christians."

Several participants used the concept of Pancasila. When speaking about a "Pancasila family" they drew on Pancasila as a mental model of the diversity of religions in their family. Actually Pancasila does not have any relation to familial patterns. The word refers to the five pillars of the state ideology mentioned in the preamble to the constitution. The term "Pancasila family" is also used outside the FGDs. For example, a girl named Adearin, who declared herself to be a Muslim, posts quite a long article on her personal website under the title "the Pancasila family" (*keluarga Pancasila*). She submitted her article for an essay competition. It talks about her extended family in Purworejo, Central Java, which consists of Buddhists, Muslims, Christians and Catholics who live in harmony.[483]

Another person who used that term is Rachmanto Widjopranoto. Widjopranoto (1983) wrote a book entitled *The Pattern of Developing the Pancasila Family* (*Pola Pengembangan Keluarga Pancasila*). It is based on his research in the village of Bantul Yogyakarta. Widjopranoto used the term "Pancasila family" to refer to a family whose members observe the values of Pancasila.

These two writers use the expression "Pancasila family" in different ways. First, it refers to a family consisting of adherents of different religions, yet liv-

---

[483] http://adearin.multiply.com/journal/item/297?&show_interstitial=1&u=%2Fjournal%2Fitem, this article posted on October 17, 2010, accessed on October 20, 2011.

ing in harmony. Thus "Pancasila family" relates not only to the hybrid identity of the family, but also to its harmonious relations. Secondly, it refers to a family whose members observe Pancasila values (they are not necessarily religiously diverse). The concept of Pancasila family as used by our FGD participants approximates the first meaning.

A participant referred to a democratic family. Democracy is a mental model. There is no relation between democracy and family structure. Outside the FGDs the term "democratic family" is also used with reference families whose members respect each other. For instance, M. Husnaini (2007) wrote a book review on the Nahdlatul Ulama website under the heading, "Portrait of a Democratic Family" (*Potret Keluarga Demokratis*). He was reviewing *The Same but Different: Portrait of the Extended Family of K.H.A. Wakhid Hasyim* (*Sama Tapi Berbeda: Potret Keluarga Besar K.H.A. Wakhid Hasyim*). This book by Ali Yahya (2007) is about the six children of Wakhid Hasyim, father of Abdurrahman Wahid (former Indonesian president), who have different professions, political orientations and personal characters. But they respect each other in that "colourful family" (*keluarga yang penuh warna*).[484] Thus when speaking of a democratic family FGD participants drew on general language used in society.

In talking about family affairs (micro level) some participants also referred to a broader development in society. For instance, a female participant spoke of "progressiveness" (*kemajuan*) in describing the appreciation of diverse religions in a family. She said, "Nowadays [the family] is already quite progressive (*cukup maju*)... People do not really have problems with a family which has diverse religions."[485]

Some participants referred to their family or parents as "*abangan*". *Abangan* is a mental model that does not relate specifically to either Islam or Christianity. It refers to nominal or non-practising believers, such as nominal Muslims ("Islam KTP"). The words "Islam KTP" refer to a popular public discourse in Indonesia. For instance, for fifteen months SCTV (national television) broadcasted a soap opera entitled "Islam KTP" (2010-2011).[486] Thus the expression "Islam KTP" is common outside the FGDs.

A participant remembered that her grandmother was "very *abangan*", because she was affiliated to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The PKI was perceived by some Indonesians as a political party with an atheistic orien-

---

[484] http://www.nu.or.id/page/id/dinamic_detil/12/9210/Buku/Potret_Keluarga_Demokratis.html, accessed on October 20, 2011.

[485] *Sekarang sudah cukup maju... orang tidak terlalu mempermasalahkan sekali yang agama dalam satu keluarga campur-campur agamanya.*

[486] http://www.multivisionplus.co.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=57:islam-ktp&catid=42:sinetron-tayang&Itemid=123, accessed on October 22, 2011.

tation. Another participant referred to the mental model of *kejawen,* which relates generally to the practice of Javanese values and beliefs.

The participants remembered interactions between Muslims and Christians in diverse families when they talked about Muslim-Christian relations. For instance, a female Christian remembered her uncle (*"hajj"*) who stayed overnight in her house. Another example: "When I celebrate Christmas my mother [who is Muslim] and my little brothers/sisters [who are Muslims] visit my home."

Some participants referred to problems in Muslim-Christian relations when describing relatives' experiences of conversion. A Catholic participant recalled her grandparents' disagreement with her parents' conversion to Catholicism. A Protestant Christian referred to his sibling's conversion either to Islam or Catholicism.

In terms of 'interdiscursivity', a Christian mother applied the label Muslim 'fanatics' to her relatives who refused to enter the church when she held a wedding ceremony for her daughter. A Muslim participant in the same elderly female FGD replied, "[We are] forbidden to be fanatical."[487] To this another Muslim participant reacted, "[We] must be fanatical, but [we] cannot disparage other religions."[488] In so doing she criticized the Christian participant. The previous Muslim speaker responded by reporting her personal experience: "When I was on the board of a Muslim woman's organization in Solo I also entered a church in response to a Christian church's invitation."[489] She also cited then example of her student days at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, when she attended church services to observe Christian ritual practices. On the other hand, in Egypt non-Muslims often went to mosques simply as tourists. She argued that they did not visit churches "because [they] have less understanding [of Islam], because they lack knowledge [about Islam]."[490]

Participants drew on personal experiences with their neighbours in talking to each other. A Christian participant remembered an invitation from her Muslim neighbour to join a "*khenduri*" (prayer meeting). In responding to the utterance of that Christian participant, a Muslim participant in the same group said, "For us [Muslims] it is impossible to ask non-Muslims to pray [in an Islamic way]. [We invite Christians] as guests [out of] respect [for neighbours]. [We] appreciate [them] as neighbours... For the harmony of the neighbourhood."[491]

---

[487] *Tak boleh fanatik.*

[488] *Fanatik itu harus, tapi tidak boleh merendahkan agama lain.*

[489] *Ketika saya masih menjadi pengurus Ormas perempuan Muslim, saya juga masuk gereja pada saat organisasi Kristen mengundang.*

[490] *Itu karena kurang pengertian, karena kurang pengetahuan.*

[491] *Kita tidak mungkin mengajak umat Muslim untuk berdoa. Tapi sebagai tamu, penghormatan. Menghargai sebagai tetangga... Untuk kerukunan tetangga.*

This related to the general comment that Muslims object to mixing Muslim and Christian religious teachings, for example in interreligious worship.

A Christian participant referred to the invitation of her Muslim neighbours to join a "*rewangan*" (work party) at the *Idul Adha* celebration, whereas a Muslim participant remembered her neighbour's conversion from Islam to Christianity. Participants also drew on friendship experiences. A young female Muslim remembered her Christian boyfriend when she talked about tolerance between Christians and Muslims. Another Muslim participant referred to his university friends from different religious backgrounds when he talked about interfaith discussion, while a Christian participant drew on his experience with friends when they were all involved in the 1980 Solo riots.

Participants drew on a distinction between *agama* (religion) and *kepercayaan* (indigenous belief). A Christian participant said, "My father was a follower of [indigenous] belief. Finally, in a certain year, [he] had to choose one of the religions." Here he was distinguishing between religion and belief. In part that mental model is influenced by state policy. The PNPS act of 1965 on religious blasphemy introduced a classification: religions/*agama-agama* (Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism) and beliefs/*aliran-aliran kepercayaan*. The Ministry of Religious Affairs also classifies beliefs/*aliran kepercayaan* as not religion. The classification is reflected in public administration. Religious affairs fall under the Ministry of Religion and "beliefs" are dealt with by the Ministry of Education and Culture.

Participants referred to other personal experiences of talking with others at special occasions such as *Idul Fitri, lebaran, Idul Adha,* Christmas, Valentine's Day (which is not a religious event) and *Ramadan, khenduri (slametan), sembahyangan, tarawih* prayer and fasting.

Participants sometimes used indirect discourse representation. For instance, one participant said, "It is said that my grandmother was [a member of] the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party)." By using the passive voice he represented another anonymous speaker who spoke about his grandmother. Similarly, in the utterance "They [my Muslim relatives] did not want to enter the church... [They said] I don't want to go inside the church", the speaker represented her Muslim relative's voice.

## 2.2 Analysis at meso level

In talking with others the participants referred to themselves in two ways. The Indonesian language has two words for we: "*kita*" and "*kami*". The word "*kita*" refers to an (inclusive) "we" that includes the speaker and the audience. For instance, "We (*kita*) all have beliefs, all have God, all have a way of worship." "We" in that sentence covers both Muslims and Christians. The word "*kami*" (exclusive we) refers to a "we" that includes the speaker and some audiences, but excludes other audiences. This exclusive "we" is illustrated clearly when

Christians or Muslims talk about *kafir* in terms of their respective religions. "According to our (*kami*) side [religion] *kafir* is [someone] who does not have any religion," said a Christian participant, whereas a Muslim participant said, "[Someone who] does not uphold Islam is what we (*kami*) consider *kafir*." Thus, Muslims and Christians have different mental models of the concept of *kafir*.

The participants were inspired by the religious understanding in their faiths when they said that both Islam and Christianity focus on God. It is commonly accepted that both religions are theistic. When participants talked to each other about the concept of God in Islam and Christianity they referred to the first pillar of Pancasila, namely *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (Belief in One Divine Lordship). Whereas Muslim participants perceived the concept 'One Divine Lordship' as similar to *tawhid* (monotheism) in Islam, Christian participants adjusted it to include the concept of Christ. Thus Christians and Muslims refer to the first pillar of Pancasila in quite different ways.

In general Christian participants drew on a mental model of Christianity as a religion of "love" (*kasih*), while Muslim participants generated a mental model of Islam as a religion of "peace" (*salam*). By saying "In Islam, we have a concept of *rahmatan lil 'alamin* (a mercy to the world)", the Muslim participant referred to the general narration found in the Qur'an, surah 21:107. But the reference in that Qur'anic verse is to the prophet Muhammad, not Islam. Thus in the mental model of Muslims Muhammad is equated with Islam. By stating, "The basic [teaching of Christianity] is love *(kasih)*. Love your God with your heart totally and love the others as yourself', the Christian participant referred to the narration about the teaching of love in Matthew 22:37-39.

> Qur'an, surah 21:107:
> "And We have not sent you, [O Muhammad], except as a mercy to the world."
>
> Bible, Matthew 22:37-39:
> "And He replied to him, You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind [intellect]. This is the great [most important, principal] and first commandment. And a second is like it: You shall love your neighbour as [you love] yourself".

When a Christian participant said, "We believe in the salvation that is only through the Lord Jesus", she drew on a mental model of salvation in Christianity. We find the narration of such an interpretation in the Bible, John 14:6: "Jesus said to him, I am the Way and the Truth and the Life; no one comes to the Father except by [through] Me."

When a Muslim participant mentioned that "...After prophet Isaiah there is a prophet Muhammad. He (Muhammad) is the last prophet", he drew on a mental model in the Islamic faith that designates Muhammad the successor of Isaiah

and the last prophet. We find this description in the Qur'an, surah 3:3: "He has sent down upon you, [O Muhammad], the Book in truth, confirming what was before it. And He revealed the Torah and the Gospel"; also in Qur'an, surah 33:40: "Muhammad is not the father of [any] one of your men, but [he is] the Messenger of Allah and last of the prophets...".

When describing the prohibition of mixing different faiths a participant referred to a similar narration in Arabic that we find in the Qur'an, surah 109:6. It is "*lakum dinukum wa liyadin*" (to you be your religion, and to me my religion). When talking about the "same origin" of Christians and Muslims as descendants of Adam and Eve a Christian participant said that God created Adam and Eve. He was inspired by the concept of human creation in Christianity and Judaism, which we find in the Bible, Genesis 4:1: "And Adam knew Eve as his wife, and she became pregnant and bore Cain; and she said, I have gotten and gained a man with the help of the Lord."

An elderly Muslim woman, an NU activist, referred to the aforementioned three kinds of brotherhood in Islam: the brotherhoods of humanity (*ukhuwah bashariah*), the nation (*ukhuwah wathaniyah*) and Islam (*ukhuwah Islamiyah*). Here she drew on a popular teaching in NU. It was first popularized by K.H. Ahmad Shiddiq, the former Rais 'Aam (general leader) of the central body of NU in a speech at the Muktamar (Ulama conference) in Krapyak Yogyakarta in 1989.[492] The teaching of three brotherhoods is also written in the NU organizational guide book, *Aswaja*.

When pointing out that Pentecostals in Surakarta took new congregants from other churches a participant drew on a common perception of the Christian community's several mega-churches in Surakarta and its surroundings. One of them is the Indonesian Bethel Church of God's Family (*Gereja Bethel Indonesia Keluarga Allah*/GBIKA). It openly propagates a vision of one million saved souls in its books, pamphlets, television and radio broadcasts and on its website, as on the following banner.


*Figure 9: Banner of the GBIKA 'Let's pray for the vision of 1 million saved souls'*
(Source: www.gbika.org)[493]

[492] M. Eksan (2000: 90) writes that a cleric from East Java who was also the former Rais 'Aam of the Central Body of NU, K.H. Akhmad Shiddiq, one day spoke about the concept of *ukhuwah* (brotherhood). According to him, there are three types of *ukhuwah*: *ukhuwah Islamiyah* (the brotherhood of Islam), *ukhuwah wathaniyah* (the brotherhood of the nation), and *ukhuwah basyariyah* (the brotherhood of humanity).

[493] http://www.gbika.org/about_familyofgod.php accessed on October 18, 2012.

When a Muslim participant described religious pluralism as dangerous and a source of disaster for the "*aqida*" (faith) he drew on current general discourse which positions religious pluralism as "*haram*" (prohibited). The discourse on religious pluralism among Muslims has taken the form of a lively public debate in Indonesia. In 2005 MUI (Indonesian Ulama Council) published a *fatwa* prohibiting the ideologies of pluralism, secularism and liberalism. The MUI said that the concept of religious pluralism is 'incorrect and misleading'.

By describing Muhammadiyah as "puritan" and "hard" in its dealings with Christians the participant, a Muhammadiyah activist, referred to one of the perceptions of Muhammadiyah in society. For example, in 1995 Alwi Shihab, an Indonesian scholar, wrote a doctoral dissertation at Temple University in the USA entitled "The Muhammadiyah movement and its controversy with Christian mission in Indonesia". It was translated into Indonesian in 1998.[494] It described Muhammadiyah as a movement to block the penetration of Christian mission in Indonesia.

When saying "brother/sister of the same faith" (*saudara seiman*) a Christian participant was using language that is commonly used in the Christian community. For instance, a brochure, "Sunday school for youth" (SMR) of the Manahan Javanese Christian Church (GKJ Manahan) in Solo, writes that the SMR of the GKJ is one way to help youth to grow up and keep in touch with their brothers/sisters of the same faith (*saudara-saudara seiman*).[495] The term is also commonly used by Pentecostal churches such as the GBIKA, to which the speaker is affiliated.[496]

A Christian participant referred to a current development in some Muslim communities, which prohibits wishing Christians merry Christmas at Christmas time. The discourse on whether Muslims are permitted to say merry Christmas is a vigorous debate in Indonesia, including Surakarta. For instance, a book published by a Muslim publisher entitled "*Hari-Hari Nasrani*" (the Christian days) mentions that greetings of merry Christmas and happy New Year (or other seasonal days of infidels) is "*haram*" (prohibited), because indirectly, by doing that, "we recognize their submission to the cross".[497]

The issue of Christmas greetings by Muslims is also a lively debate among Muslim clerics and scholars in Indonesian public discourse. In 1981 the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) issued a decree (*fatwa*) for Muslims prohibiting participation in Christmas celebrations and Christmas greetings. On the other hand, a Muslim scholar based in Solo, H.M. Dian Nafi, wrote a popular article

---

[494] Shihab, A. (1998). *Membendung Arus: Respons Gerakan Muhammadiyah terhadap Penetrasi Misi Kristen di Indonesia.* Bandung: Mizan.

[495] http://www.gkjmanahan.org/content/weekend-sekolah-minggu-remaja, accessed October 15, 2011.

[496] http://www.gbika.org/, accessed October 15, 2011.

[497] Al-Ghamidhi, 1995, p. 33.

in *Solopos* (23 December1998) on the "law of saying merry Christmas", which to some extent permits it. The issue whether Muslims are permitted or prohibited to say merry Christmas always resurfaces in public discourse, especially when Christmas day approaches. The speaker was possibly inspired by that general discourse in society.

The participants referred to the Javanese worldview in Javanese. For instance, when talking about the "same goal" of Christians and Muslims the participant used a Javanese expression: "*ingkang dipun gayuh sami"* (what will be reached is the same). That is comparable with the Javanese value of *sangkan paraning dumadi* (the goal of the existence of life), which is popular in Java. Here the speaker preferred to use the Javanese language to express a specific Javanese idea, which might not be rendered accurately in *bahasa* Indonesia.

When a Muslim woman described two classifications of religion in Islam, the religion of heaven and the religion of earth, she drew on a general teaching in Islam. This teaching is popular among Muslims and is taught in schools or *madrasah.* For example, the national curriculum of the *Pendidikan Agama Islam* (Islamic Education) for the second year at junior high school (SMP) deals with this classification.

The participants generated a mental model of the culture of Java, implying that it is "extraordinary", "elastic" and "flexible". They also drew on the distinction between *abangan* (nominal) and *santri* (pious) Muslims. A participant referred to history when she observed, "Formerly, Islam was only one stream... our life was so peaceful."

Some participants referred to general discourses that are spreading in society at large. For instance, a Christian participant mentioned, "There are [Muslims] who consider us [Christians] *kafir*... [They] refuse to communicate or to engage in relations [with us]." A Muslim participant referred to a Muslim group in society by saying "There is a group [in Islam] which says that those who have different ways of worship [though he/she is Muslim] ... are called *kafir*."

The participants referred to their daily observation of religious practice in society when they talked about fanatical Muslims wearing "calf-length pants" (men) and "large *jilbab*" (women). Those Muslim and Christian "puritans" sometimes experience tensions among themselves. A Christian participant also drew on his observations when he said that the liturgy of Pentecostal churches is noisy.

They referred to the development of religious groups in Solo when talking about new "streams" in Islam and Christianity, including the megachurches. They also referred to a general occurrence in the society when they talked about "*abangan*" who practise "*sesajen*". With reference to *ziarah* to the graves of ancestors, a Muslim female worker commented: "Those neglecting *ziarah,*

they will usually forget the destination of life."[498] When I asked, "Do people practise *ziarah* to the grave of the ancestors especially during the month of *ruwah* [the month before Ramadan in the Javanese calendar]?",[499] a Christian participant in that group replied, "Commonly all old people practise *nyadran* [*ziarah* in the month of *ruwah*], but only some youths practise that ritual."[500]

## 2.3 Analysis at macro level

At macro level the participants referred to social change in Indonesia before and after the Indonesian *Reformasi* in 1998. The phrase "after *Reformasi*", "since *Reformasi*" and "nowadays" referred to the political and social situation in the post-New Order era when Pancasila ideas declined while those of militant Muslims and Christians intensified.

When talking about Indonesia's respect for religious freedom a participant referred to Pancasila. He said, "This is a Pancasila [country]." As mentioned repeatedly in previous chapters, Pancasila consists of five pillars which are written in the preamble to the constitution of 1945. The first pillar, Belief in One Divine Lordship, literally implies monotheism. There is no direct relation between religious freedom and Pancasila. The concept of religious freedom is not mentioned in Pancasila. The Constitution of 1945, article 28.I speaks about "freedom of religion" (*hak beragama*) and article 28.E says, "Every person shall be free to choose and to practise the religion of his/her choice" (*Setiap orang bebas memeluk agama dan beribadat menurut agamanya*).

By saying "If we were a broom made of such splintered ribs, Pancasila is the string", a young male participant drew on a popular metaphor about in *bahasa* Indonesia. In *bahasa* Indonesia the broom is a metaphor for the Indonesian national motto "Bersatu kita teguh, bercerai kita runtuh" (United we stand, divided we fall).

A participant referred to a social transformation that happened in Indonesian society as a whole and in Surakarta in particular, namely the awakening of religious and ethnic identities after Reformasi. He said that the religious awareness of Indonesians generally increased and that currently Javanese culture was getting stronger. It relates to earlier statements by other participants about militant Islam and Christianity gaining strength and a decline in nationalism after *Reformasi*.

Concerning the awakening ethnicity, the participant spoke about people's desire to learn the Javanese language, for instance in order to act as masters of ceremony (MC) in Javanese. That speaker referred to the development of soci-

---

[498] *Orang yang melupakan ziarah, dia biasanya akan lupa ke mana tujuan hidupnya.*

[499] *Apakah orang-orang melakukan ziarah ke kuburan leluhur, khususnya pada bukan* ruwah*?*

[500] *Pada umumnya semua orang tua melakukan* nyadran*, tapi hanya sebagian anak muda yang melakukan ritual itu.*

ety in Solo. For instance, the newspaper *Suara Merdeka* (12 April 2003) reported that the number of participants in the *Sanggar Pasinaon Pambiwara* (course for Javanese MCs) at Surakarta palace in the past was only about 60-80, but the number of applicants increased and since 2003 there have been more than 150 students per course.[501] So the discourse in that FGD tied in with a broader discourse in society.

In describing that there were no conflicts between Christians and Muslims in Solo a Muslim participant, a journalist for *Solopos*, referred to the history of Solo and the study of conflicts by Mr Darmono. Mr Darmono is the nickname of Drs Soedarmono, S.U. (lecturer in the Department of Historical Science, University of Sebelas Maret, Surakarta). In 1999 Soedarmono and his colleague, M. Hari Mulyadi, published a book, *Runtuhnya Kekuasaan Kraton Alit: Studi Radikalisasi Sosial Wong Sala dan Kerusuhan Mei 1998 di Surakarta* (The collapse of the little palace power: study of social radicalization of Solonese and the 1998 May riots in Surakarta).

Soedarmono quite often explained his study of the Solo riots in seminars and the mass media. For instance, *Solopos* (1 June 2008) reported his explanation of the riots in Solo. He said events of 14-15 May 1998 were the eleventh riot in Solo since the Dutch colonial period. All those riots were caused by racial issues or by animosity between locals (*pribumi*) and non-locals (*non-pribumi*).[502]


*Figure 10: 'Javanese village!! Pro Amien Rais',503 a graffiti above a village gate in Surakarta* (Source: Team Solopos 2008)

501 According to *Suara Merdeka* newspaper, 12 April 2003.

502 *Solopos,* 1 June 2008, "The style of leadership must be changed."

503 Amien Rais is a Muslim leader born in Solo. He was the Indonesian head of Muhammadiyah for the period 1995-2000.

Some participants drew on memory when talking about the 1998 Solo riots. The Christian professionals remembered that people wrote graffiti ("Muslim", "Java" and "Muslim-Java") in front of their houses and in villages. The following picture shows such graffiti.

In reaction to the foregoing statement I asked, "So it (the 1998 Solo riot) was an ethnic and religious conflict?"[504] A Christian professional in that FDG replied that it was not a religious but an ethnic conflict. He argued thus: "There was no *vihara* destroyed, there was no church destroyed... there was no house of worship destroyed." Another participant, a Muslim, corroborated the Christian's utterance: "I believe that the economy is the main motive. Because of the economic distribution issue, the problem of access to economic power. Why do the Chinese develop their businesses easily while non-Chinese do not? ... Then the ethnic Chinese were finally eradicated [in the 1998 Solo riot]."

When a participant mentioned that he happened to get involved in the 1980 riots he was remembering his involvement in those riots. The statement that the Chinese have no difficulty developing their businesses, while non-Chinese do drew on a mental model: a Javanese inferiority complex stored in the speaker's memory.

Some Christian participants drew on collective memories when talking about the difficulty Christians have when they want to build a church or house of worship. A Christian participant said, "[We] want to build a church, [but] it is extremely difficult." Describing the building of a mosque as apparently unproblematic, the speaker pointed out that the church must obtain permission from the state – entailing a lengthy process. When citing the example of Kota Barat the speaker referred to an event in society. Thus they drew on community experience of discrimination. The sense of being discriminated against is a mental model.

When talking about the emergence of jihad movements the participants painted a problematic picture of "jihad" practices in society (mental model). Some participants referred to the jihadist attacks on alcohol drinkers and gamblers in Solo. A Christian participant referred to a fight between the *jihad* group and villagers in his village. The participant also mentioned an attack by the *jihad* group on the "red district" in Solo. Responding to the utterances of male workers about the examples of *jihad* attacks on those places, I asked, "Were those attacks old or new things?"[505] One of the participants replied, "Those were new things, that happened around 2000."[506]

Talking about the church's social services, some participants referred to the cheap food programme of the GKJ (Javanese Christian Church). It is a service

---

[504] *Jadi, itu adalah konflik etnik dan agama?*

[505] *Kapan peristiwa-peristiwa itu terjadi, baru atau lama?*

[506] *Hak itu baru, kira-kira setelah tahun 2000an.*

for poor people, mostly Muslims who are fasting. The following picture shows people joining that service.

*Figure 11: Cheap food programme during the month of Ramadan in the GKJ Manahan, Surakarta* (Source: Antara news office 2009)

A Christian participant, an active member of the GKJ Manahan, remembered that the *jihad* groups protested against the cheap food programme. The police asked the church to close down the programme. The speaker played a prominent role in the process of advocacy. The Indonesian mass media proved that it really occurred. For instance, detiknews.com (28 August 2009), a leading Indonesian online news medium, reported a meeting between the police, the participant and his colleagues as GKJ representatives. The title of the report was: "The cheap food programme for the fast breaking in the GKJ Solo has been closed by the police."[507]

When saying that if people of Jakarta would not bother [people of] Solo, if they would leave them alone, Solo would be peaceful, the speaker cited earlier drew on general discourse among locals in Solo. For an example of such discourse we take an article in *Solopos* (18 December 1998) under the headline, "The Solo riots were caused by the Jakarta elite conflict."[508] It was a report on the conclusion to a seminar about the social radicalism of Solo people in historical perspective, held in Solo on 17 December 1998.

The phrase "short fuse" (*sumbu pendek*) is also used by people outside the FGDs. In a seminar held in the studio of the Radio Republic Indonesia Surakarta, Anung Indro Susanto, an official of Solo city, explained that "the slogan of Solo as the spirit of Java is an advertisement made by the local government

---

[507] http://us.detiknews.com/read/2009/08/28/202438/1191890/10/program-nasi-murah-buka-puasa-di-gkj-solo-dihentikan-polisi, accessed October 22, 2011.

[508] *Kerusuhan Solo karena konflik elit di Jakarta.*

to promote the culture of Java and to eliminate the image that Solo [region and society] has a short fuse [is very explosive]".[509]

## 3 Explanation

The stage of explanation or the analysis of social practice deals with the socio-cognitive conditions and effects of texts. The aim is to trace explanatory connections between text and context. The analytical concepts used in this stage are ideology (Foucault 1977) and hegemony (Gramsci 1971). For Fairclough discursive practices are ideologically loaded insofar as they absorb significations which support or restructure power relations. The theory of hegemony concerns change in relation to the *evolution of power,* entailing a particular focus on discursive change, but is also a means of viewing it as both contributing to and being shaped by broader processes of change. When participants draw on mental models these models are either reproduced or transformed (Fairclough 2001: 158-161). In this chapter we look at ideational and relational transformations, particularly as regards subject positions or social identities. The question is: what are the socio-cognitive conditions and effects of what Muslims and Christians said?

### 3.1 Analysis at micro level

When talking to each other Muslim participants mainly identified Christians as "good" persons. while Christian participants primarily identified Muslims as "democratic". A Christian participant reproduced an image of her Muslim relatives as very democratic and respectful of human values.

In family life participants constituted and were constituted by different cultures and religions. Some Muslims and Christians become "democratic", others become "fanatical". Most participants identified families with diverse religious membership as normal and ordinary "nowadays". But since religious militancy is also increasing, some family members may be "fanatics". This creates disunity in the family. For instance, a Christian participant spoke about her fanatical Muslim relative who refused to attend a church wedding ceremony for her daughter.

Two participants in different FGDs identified themselves as coming from a Pancasila family consisting of members of different religions. Many more participants identified themselves as having relatives with "diverse" (*beragam*)

---

[509] *Slogan Solo the spirit of Java merupakan branding Pemkot Solo untuk mempromosikan budaya dan mengeliminasi kesan Solo sebagai sumbu pendek*, as reported by http://mediakeberagaman.com/faktor-politik-dan-industrialisasi-picu-kekerasan-di-solo.php 1 April 2010, accessed October 20, 2011.

religions. By saying "nowadays [the family] is already quite progressive (*cukup maju*)... people do not really have problems with a family with diverse religions", the participant identified the effect of "progressiveness" as acceptance of religious diversity at the family level.

Only one person explicitly identified mono-religious families as "fortunate". She saw the fact that she and all her relatives were born Muslim as something to be grateful for, saying that being born into such a mono-religious family was occasion for *alkhamdulillah* (thanks be to God). Indeed, she identified herself as a tolerant person, who appreciates diversity and is close to Javanese culture. This shows that she wanted to be a faithful Muslim and at the same time tolerant of non-Muslims, thus without being relativist.

At a personal level most participants positioned themselves clearly as either Muslim or Christian. They identified themselves as pious or devout Christians and Muslims. In Islamic terms they are *santri.*

However, several participants positioned themselves and their relatives as combining (mixing) religion and indigenous beliefs. For instance, a Muslim participant identified himself thus: "I am *kejawen*, my ID is Islam." A Christian participant identified his parents as Hindus and followers of indigenous belief.

In identifying their and their relatives' religion some participants saw themselves as constituted as Muslims or Christians by education and state policy. "I [became Christian] because of education. My kindergarten and elementary school were Christian," said a young Christian woman. Thus a Christian institution was hegemonic in her personal life. Another participant said, "My father was a follower of [indigenous] belief. Finally, in a certain year, [he] had to choose one of the religions [which is recognized by the state]." This text refers to state policy on religions.

Muslim participants positioned Christians as friends, and the other way round. An elderly Christian participant positioned young Muslims in his village with whom he cooperated in social services as friends. A Muslim participant positioned Christian or Catholic students with whom he had inter-faith group discussions at university as friends. A young Muslim woman positioned her special Christian friend as her boyfriend.

At micro level Christian and Muslims participants also positioned each other as neighbours. An elderly Christian female positioned a Muslim in her area who invites her to a *khenduri* (*slametan,* prayers*)* as her neighbour.

However, the words "friend" and "neighbour" sometimes convey extreme politeness. An elderly Muslim participant positioned a new Christian convert in her vicinity as a neighbour. A Javanese Muslim participant positioned the victims of the 1998 Solo riots who had a Chinese ethnic background as friends. To some extent the terms "friend" and "neighbour" is a gracious way to identify the others.

The participants testified that relations between Muslims and Christians are primarily good. One participant used the adjective "extraordinary". The participants constituted and were constituted by the concept of tolerance, which is conducive to friendly relations in the family and neighbourhood. Tolerant Muslims were mostly identified by Christians as ones who are willing to extend Christmas greetings to Christian relatives and friends. By contrast, fanatical, militant, puritan and extreme Muslims were identified as ones who consider Christmas greetings "*haram*". Tolerant Christians were identified by Muslims as ones who appreciate Muslim rituals and do not engage in Christianization.

Some participants said that they organize gatherings either on Islamic feast days such as *Idul Fitri* (*lebaran, halal bi halal*) or on Christian feast days such as Christmas. On such occasions they invite all family members to gather, irrespective of their religion. While the Christian or Muslim relatives are attending the ceremony or ritual in the church or mosque, the others prepare food for them at home. In family life the participants reproduced a mingled relationship.

In neighbourhood life some participants reproduced an image of *khenduri* (*slametan*), an inclusive ritual. It is held by and for a particular group of religious people (Muslim or Christian), but close neighbours from different religions are invited. School and university are reproduced as spaces where youths experience and discuss diversity.

There was a peripheral discourse in which Christian participants positioned Muslims as fanatics, and the other way around. A Muslim identified new Christian converts as "too fanatical" about their new religion, whereas a Christian identified Muslims who refuse to attend the church wedding of a relative as fanatical.

The participants identified fanatical Christians as ones who refuse to cooperate with Muslims. Similarly, fanatical Muslims refuse to associate with people of a different religion. The participants recognize fanatical Muslims (not fanatical Christians) by their style of dress. They positioned Muslims wearing calf-length pants (men) or large *jilbab* (veils) (women) as "fanatical" Muslims.

## 3.2 Analysis at meso level

At meso level, Christian and Muslim participants primarily positioned Islam and Christianity as basically similar in three respects. First, originally Islam and Christianity come from God. In Muslim terminology both Islam and Christianity are "religions of heaven" (*agama samawi*). Second, both religions focus on God. Thus the participants reproduced an image of Christianity and Islam as theistic religions. Some participants reproduced an image of Christians and Muslims focusing on the one (same) God and ending up in the one (same) paradise. Third, the purpose of both Islam and Christianity is good and they have the same human values. In Christian terms Christianity promotes "love"

(*kasih*), while in Muslim terms Islam promotes "peace" (*salam*) and "mercy" (*rahmat*). Thus the participants reproduced an image of Islam as a religion of peace and Christianity as a religion of love.

Some participants constituted and were constituted by Javanese indigenous philosophy in expressing their religious view (ideology). For instance, with reference to the similar goal of Christians and Muslims a participant used the Javanese idiom" "*ingkang dipun gayuh sami*" (what will be reached is the same).

The participants distinguished the "goal" (*tujuan*) from the "way" (*cara*) of religion. By way of example they pointed out that the goal of Muslim and Christian worship is the same, namely to praise God, but their ways of worship differ. Thus the difference is located in the way of communicating with God.

The participants also constituted and were constituted by a classification of brotherhoods. The categories "brotherhood of humanity" (*ukhuwah bashariah*) and "brotherhood of nation" (*ukhuwah wathaniyah*) in Muslim terms include Christians and Muslims as brothers/sisters. The category "brothers/sisters of a different faith" in Christian terms includes Muslims and Christians as brothers/sisters.

However, the category "brotherhood of Islam" (*ukhuwah Islamiyah*) in Muslim terms excludes Christians. The category "brothers/sisters of the same faith" in Christian terms excludes Muslims. Thus the participants reproduced ambiguity in their classification.

Furthermore, some participants reproduced rigid segregation between Muslims and Christians. A Christian participant identified salvation as accessible only through the Lord Jesus. A Muslim participant reproduced non-Muslims as *kafir*. Thus they positioned both Islam and Christianity as exclusive religions.

Some participants identified religious exclusion nowadays as a phenomenon not only between but also within religious groups. A Muslim participant identified militant Muslims who perceived other Muslims outside their group as *kafir*. A Christian participant also identified charismatic groups who regard other Christians as people who have not repented yet.

Only Muslim participants reproduced a fear of mixing religious practices, which they identified as religious "pluralism". The dominant voice is: practise your own religion. Mixing the faith and teachings of Islam and Christianity is dangerous and a source of disaster for the *aqida* (faith). None of the Christian participants reproduced that kind of fear.

Christian participants said it was difficult to adjust their faith in the trinity to the first pillar of Pancasila, that is Belief in One Divine Lordship (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*). A Christian participant positioned the Christian faith as focused not on the one God, but on Christ.

Christians and Muslims primarily positioned "*abangan*" Islam or Christianity at a lower level of religion (power relation). A Christian participant distin-

guished "*abangan*" Christians from "strong" Christians. A Muslim participant distinguished between *abangan* and *santri* Muslims. *Abangan* Christians still practice "*sesajen*", while *abangan* Muslims are "only Islam KTP".

Participants primarily positioned Javanese culture as elastic and flexible. They identified it as historically underlying diverse religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity. The early missionaries of those religions did not eliminate the culture of Java. In those days Islam and other religions coexisted peacefully.

In regard to accommodation of Javanese culture, they reproduced an evaluation of Muslim and Christian institutions. Participants positioned NU as the most accommodating towards Javanese culture. By contrast the *laskar*s and the *jihad* groups were positioned as least accommodating ("purification"). "They sometimes create tensions," said a participant. Muhammadiyah was positioned in the middle.

Comparably, Javanese Protestant and Catholic churches were positioned as most accommodating towards Javanese culture. Pentecostal churches, on the other hand, were positioned as least accommodating. Christian participants identified the theology of those Pentecostal churches as focusing on success and prosperity. In general participants positioned religious purification as creating "tensions".

Thus participants identified churches that are accommodating towards Javanese culture as peaceful religious institutions. That is why Muslim participants advocate the ideal form of religiosity for Javanese as "Muslim-Java" rather than "puritan" Islam or "*kejawen*".[510] The dominant voice is: "I am Muslim [and] at the same time Javanese" and "I practise Islam, I also practise the values of Java." As mentioned previously, this position is also applicable to Javanese Christians.

Some participants distinguished clearly between their personal and institutional positions. A Muslim male, an activist in Muhammadiyah, reproduced an image of Muhammadiyah as puritan, but added: "I am more open." A young female participant positioned herself by saying "I am Muslim, but [I] don't wear *jilbab* (veil)."

### 3.3 Analysis at macro level

At macro level most participants reproduced an image of Indonesia as a Pancasila country where the principle of religious freedom is respected. By using a popular metaphor of Pancasila as a "string of splintered ribs" a participant constituted and was constituted by the Indonesian nationalist idea of unity in diversity. Participants identified Indonesians as a tolerant nation which accommodates religious diversity in society. They positioned Pancasila as encouraging

---

[510] See: the three Muslim positions in section 2.2 above.

tolerance and respect for religious freedom. However, Christian community which adheres to the theology of success or prosperity lacks a political sense of being Indonesian citizens (social effects).

Relations between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia and in Solo are identified as good. Christians and Muslims live side by side in harmony. They engage in mutual cooperation during religious holidays and help each other in everyday life. Muslims and Christians also cooperate in social services.

Christian and Muslim participants identified the *Reformasi* of 1998 as a milestone in Indonesian social and political life. However, the *Reformasi* era reveals an ambiguity. On the one hand participants identified the Indonesian situation as more democratic and progressive. For instance, "After *Reformasi* up to today those Chinese brothers/sisters have become aware of that [they socialize]."

On the other hand they identified "*jihad*" groups, which accentuate "violence". The participants witnessed and spoke about acts of violence such as groups attacking alcohol drinkers, gamblers, prostitutes in the "red district", purging villages of people who, according to them, were disobedient or unfaithful. These groups also protested against and stopped a Christian social service (the fast-breaking programme) for Muslims during Ramadan, which they perceived as Christianization.

A male Christian participant identified a counter attack (fight) from the villagers when the *jihad* groups purged the participant's village. Some participants positioned *jihad* groups as associations of "gangsters" rather than "believers" (*orang beriman*). They claimed that the problems do not come from believers but from and among the gangsters. They identified two issues. First, religious groups should not use violence. Acts of violence are close to the way of gangsters. Second, some *jihad* group members were former gang members.

Some participants explained that the emergence of *jihad* groups after *Reformasi* went hand in hand with the awakening of religious awareness (identity) and religious militancy. It happens not only in the Muslim community but also in the Christian community. In the Christian community they not only invite Muslims to become Christians, but also snatch their congregants from other Christian churches.

The participants identified the direction for peaceful Muslim-Christian relations to lie in the local culture. The direction of militant Islam and Christianity comes from abroad. Militant Islam refers to "Middle Eastern" Islam, while militant Christianity refers to "America" or "Korea".

Some participants identified the awakening of Javanese culture after *Reformasi.* They cited evidence of the strengthening of Javanese culture. A participant explained that Javanese culture provides new symbols for Solo people. But they reproduced the awakening of Javanese culture as less powerful than the religious awakening. The participants positioned the awakening of religion

and culture as a response to globalization, prompted by fear. They explained that this is the only way to control people.

In identifying her grandmother, an affiliate of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), as "very *abangan*" a participant reproduced a New Order doctrine defining PKI as a political party with an atheistic orientation. The New Order government reproduced that discourse in school curricula and courses, a film on the PKI broadcast on 30 September each year, the banning of Communism, Marxism and Leninism, et cetera.

Christian participants identified discrimination against Christians which still continues after *Reformasi*. They testified that Christians face difficulties in building churches, for example in Banyuanyar and Kotabarat. By contrast, it is easy for Muslims to build a mosque. The Muslim participants did not deny that there are objections from Muslims when Christians want to build church in a predominantly Muslim area, because Muslims object to Christianization in their area. Thus Muslim and Christian participants disagreed on this issue.

Some participants said that people used "swearwords" and graffiti such as "Muslim", "Java" and "Muslim-Java" during the 1998 Solo riots, but they refused to identify those riots as interreligious conflicts. A participant explained that there was no destruction of houses of worship (*vihara*, mosque, church) during the riots. Indeed, those houses of worship are "symbols of religion". Some participants indicated that people used religious and ethnic texts like Muslim, Java and Muslim-Java to avoid victimization during the riots.

Both Christian and Muslim participants identified the Solo riots in 1980 and 1998 as primarily motivated by social, economic and political grievances. Some participants positioned them as inter-ethnic conflicts. A participant explained that religious elements and words were used in the riots, but they were "just attached". The main trigger was economic.

They positioned the actors and provocateurs of the 1998 Solo riots as outsiders or "people of Jakarta". In speaking about militant and *jihad* groups they also rejected the statement that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir is from Solo; instead they said he is from Sukoharjo. The firm refusal to attribute the riots to interreligious conflict and to insiders in Solo reveals a strong desire to maintain religious harmony and avoid conflict.

## 4 Conclusion

In this study we use the method of critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992) to gain insight into the relation between religious discourse and social cohesion. We distinguish between the dimensions of individual believers (micro level), their (full or partial) identification with their religions or religious institutions (meso level), and the societal context in which these religions or reli-

gious institutions operate (macro level). When speaking to each other at the micro, meso and macro levels our research participants produced rich identity labels, which were also related to concrete behaviour. We draw conclusions about the classifications (description), cognitions or mental models that are drawn on (interpretation) and the social condition and effects (explanation).

In general Muslims and Christians consider people of Solo to be "elastic". They identified others and themselves as faithful believers who are tolerant (of others) but not relativistic (in their own religion). The utterance "thanks be to God" is used by both sides. Whereas Jesus is classified as the "only saviour", Muhammad is the "last prophet". They made a distinction between tolerance and pluralism. Muslims and Christians classified religious fanatics as crazy, abnormal people from "outside" or newcomers. Whereas they classified Javanese culture and people as "extraordinary", Chinese are classified as arrogant.

In regard to mental models, Christians and Muslims perceived Christianity as a religion of "love" (*kasih*), while Islam is a religion of "peace" (*salam*) and "mercy" (*rahmat*) for the world. Whereas they see an overlap of identity (as in the case of the mental model of brotherhoods) between Muslims and Christians, they subscribe to "to you be your religion, to me my religion". Javanese culture embodies not only greatness of vision but also a sophisticated worldview, expressible only in the Javanese language, for instance the concept of "*slametan*" or the saying, "*ingkang dipun gayuh sami*" (what will be reached is the same). Thus Javanese culture offers opportunities for managing religious diversity. Pancasila is perceived by participants as advocating interreligious tolerance and respecting religious freedom.

In regard to social effects Christians and Muslims positioned Javanese Islam and Javanese Christianity as conducive to peaceful life, whereas non-Javanese churches and Islamic institutions stimulate conflict. Thus the ideal religions are Javanese Islam and Javanese Christianity. However, they positioned pluralism as dangerous, which accords with the prohibition of mixing religious teachings. This is quite strong on the Muslim side, but less so on the Christian side. Our research participants positioned conflicts and riots in society as primarily caused by people from "outside Solo" – a social mechanism to maintain harmony and avoid conflict among them. Most Muslims and Christians positioned Indonesia as a Pancasila country.

# Chapter V

# "People of Solo are quite elastic"

# Conclusions and discussion

In Solo Muslims and Christians mingle in daily life. Some families comprise members of diverse religions such as Islam and Christianity. A participant said, "People of Solo are quite elastic [and] flexible." However, as noted in previous chapters, Muslims and Christians in Surakarta also experience religious tensions. The emergence of extreme groups in both Muslim and Christian communities, who elevate their religious identity above other (e.g. ethnic, national) identities, has marked religious transformation in Surakarta for over a decade. In this thesis I study social identity transformations through interreligious, particularly Muslim-Christian, relations in the post-*Reformasi* era in Indonesia. As mentioned in the introduction, the aim is to answer two main questions. First, how do Muslims and Christians identify and position themselves and others? Second, what are the socio-cognitive effects of their identification and positioning?

As a background to these questions I quote scholars who argue that religion has not died on our modern globe as secularization theory might suggest. The 21st century is God's century (Toft et al. 2011). In addition Peter Berger (1999: 2), a sociologist who had been one of the main advocates of the secularization theory declares that this theory is false: 'The world today with some exceptions ... is furiously religious, as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever.' In the Indonesian context we see the resurgence of religious identity in public space after the *Reformasi* of 1998. Whereas Indonesia has a long tradition of peaceful coexistence, it also has a long history of ethnic and/ or religious violence and conflict (Bertrand 2004; Klinken 2007; Lire 2011). Scholars record a series of violent collisions in diverse regions of the country before the collapse of Soeharto's political regime in 1998 and in the ensuing *Reformasi* era.[511]

This research seeks to determine whether the rhetoric about the return of religion into the public arena is an appropriate way to speak about the transformations taking place in Indonesia, and if so, why and under what conditions people elevate religious identity above other (ethnic/ national) identities. The New Order regime tried to limit the manifestation of religious identities in the

[511] In general Indonesian contemporary history is classified into three phases: Old Order era (1945-1967), New Order era (1967-1998), and *Reformasi* era (1998-now).

public sphere to safeguard national stability. Soeharto assumed that the emergence of religious identities in the public arena would lead to conflict and would create instability, which could hamper economic development (Dhakidae 2003; Latif 2008). For this reason Pancasila philosophy was invoked to manage diverse religious identities and reduce the potential for conflict.

In studying social identity transformations I examine how Muslims speak about Christians, and the other way around, and how Muslims and Christians speak to each other when they are together. In separate groups some participants used harsh language when speaking about the others. For instance, a Christian participant found the style of dress of "fanatical" Muslims "disgusting", and a Christian participant quoted that (Muslim) terrorists deserve a "fuck [you]". In Muslim groups the participants called Christianization a kind of "stealing". A Muslim participant said that it is a latent danger, implying that Christianization is as dangerous as communism.[512] This kind of language creates divergence between Muslims and Christians. We do not find the same language use in the mixed groups to the same extent. Pemberton writes that more than people of Yogyakarta, people of Surakarta are epitomes of *halus*-ness (refinement), in contrast with people of East Java who are epitomes of *kasar*-ness (harshness) (Pemberton 1994; Retsikas 2007: 970). In general our study confirms Pemberton's qualification of Surakarta people, but also suggests that the situation is changing.

In our FGDs we saw that the participants mostly speak Indonesian (*bahasa* Indonesia), but they sometimes switch to Javanese (*basa Jawa*) and then revert to Indonesian. Muslim participants sometimes use Arabic words or phrases. Thus they mix and blend languages. There is both code shifting and code mixing. It is no exception to hear participants using two or three languages in one utterance. Linguists speak about creole language as the language-in-between-languages (Cohen &Toninato 2010: 9). Young participants sometimes use slang. For instance, a Muslim participant used the words "ill feel" to refer to her female Muslim housemate wearing *niqab* while engaging in immoral behaviour. The phrase "ill feel" here is Javanese-English slang, a creolization of "*ilang* feeling" (loss of feeling). Thus she used mocking language.

We dealt with religious identity transformation in chapters 2, 3 and 4. The main objectives of this research are the following. First, to gain insight into the relation between religious discourse and (the lack of) social cohesion (internal objective). By doing so, second, we seek to contribute to a theory and method

---

[512] Regarding this metaphor, it is interesting to see Mujani's survey. In his survey of democratic culture and Muslim political participation in the Indonesian post-Soeharto era he finds that an overwhelming majority (84%) object to having a communist as their neighbour. In addition smaller proportions objected to having Christian or Catholic (16%), Muslim (14%), Chinese (13%), or Hindu or Buddhist (12%) neighbours (Mujani 2003: 173).

of studying interreligious relations (external objective). In this chapter I present and discuss the conclusions of this book. I classify the conclusions in two sections. The first concerns religious identity transformation and the second the contribution to the theory and method of studying interreligious relations.

## 1 Conclusions regarding religious identity transformation

In the introduction to this book I quote Giddens (1991: 54), who defines identity as a 'narrative of the self'. I also refer to Burke (2009), who describes transformation in terms of conditions, processes and consequences of cultural contact. In talking about the link between the concept of transformation and the concept of identity and interaction Fairclough (2001: 31-32) cites an example from the school system (teacher-pupil relations). To a large extent the social system of the school determines the discourse, but in the process teachers and pupils either reproduce the school system unchanged or they transform it. He concludes that reproduction may further conservation or transformation of the existing order. In relation to identity transformation six points seem pertinent.

### 1.1 Religious transformation in the post-*Reformasi* era

The transformation of the political and economic fields (Suryo 2000: 166) that occurred in Indonesia in the late 1990s has contributed to transformation in religious field as well. The idea of freedom and liberalization, which is very much alive in the political arena, influences religious life in Indonesian society. The research participants identified religious transformations in the *Reformasi* era by comparing these with the New Order situation. They identified the *Reformasi* as an era of freedom (*bebas, kebebasan*), while –according to them– the New Order was an era of "pressure". In the *Reformasi* era freedom was not only "opened" but also "broadened".

Participants maintained that the government of the *Reformasi* era did not have as much authority as the government of the New Order era. The "weakness of the state" opens opportunities for extremist groups to perform acts of violence (*kekerasan*). Therefore participants said that freedom leads to violence. A Christian participant identified the emergence of radicalism in Christianity after *Reformasi,* saying "the influence of freedom of expression enters the area of religion". Ismatu Ropi (2008: 84) finds the same in one of his articles. Present-day Indonesia is like an 'open free market for ideologies and movements'. He says that 'everybody has freedom', 'everybody can express views freely', and 'even the hardliners posses certain rights to disseminate their views'. Our FGDs participants described a similar situation: nowadays "everything is free" and the extremists "can do whatever they want to."

The influence of the political arena on the religious arena in this study is reminiscent of Bourdieu's view of society as a heterogeneous space composed of more or less autonomous 'fields' where actors or groups of actors try to serve their interests (make a 'profit', material or symbolic) by using various resources (forms of 'capital'), in competition (exclusion) or collaboration (inclusion) with others (Bourdieu 1990, 1991). In his theory of practice human society ('social space') is multidimensional, consisting of various more or less autonomous fields, in which 'capital' can be transferred from one field to another (Bourdieu 1992: 7; Rey 2004: 332-3). The political field influences the religious field, and vice versa. Using Bourdieu's terminology we can say that freedom is a 'habitus' in the Indonesian post-*Reformasi* era. The habitus predisposes the agent to perceive and behave in a certain fashion (Bourdieu 1997: 22). As agents, Muslims and Christians in Indonesia constitute and are constituted by the habitus of freedom. Besides insisting that Indonesia has more freedom, participants also claimed that the country has become more democratic.

There was an awakening of religion in society after the *Reformasi* era. This awakening is characterized by the emergence of extremist Muslim and militant Christian groups. As indicated in greater detail below, the ideas of those groups are said to be "new" and to come from "abroad". This pattern was noted in all FGDs. Extremists and militants were described as taking advantage of the situation of freedom. In addition there was an awakening of ethnic, that is indigenous (Javanese cultural) identities (e.g. renewed study of Javanese language), but not as strong as that of religious identities.

In this situation Christians positioned extremist Muslims as a challenge. They cited evidence that they were targets of violent actions by Muslim extremists, who attack Christian places of worship. In addition Christians were said to be discriminated against, as in the case of the requirement to have state permission to build a house of worship: which is implemented more rigorously for Christians than for Muslims. By contrast Muslim participants claimed that Christians threaten the political power of Muslims. Christians and Muslims talked about the vice mayor of Surakarta being a Catholic, but they did so in different ways. Throughout the FGDs we see a balancing of feelings of inferiority and superiority, being a minority or a majority. Christians (especially those from a Chinese ethnic background) seem to be economically superior but a religious minority. Muslims are a religious majority and politically superior, but are seen as economically inferior.

There is a link between power interests and attempts to control discourse. Discourse relations can thus be portrayed as power relations, which means that the term 'discourse' pertains not only to the framework of meaning but also to instruments of power (Foucault 1971; Van Dijk 1989: 18; Fairclough 1992: 49; Von Stuckrad 2010: 159). When Muslims and Christians described the vice mayor of Surakarta as a Catholic they used not only informative but also per-

formative language. There was a power struggle beneath the surface. Christians wanted to demonstrate their progress in politics by pointing out the advantages of freedom in the *Reformasi* era. However, Muslims recognized their loss of political authority, at least partially, by pointing out the disadvantages of freedom. This confirms that language is not only informative but also performative (Fabian 2001: 29).

Whereas most Muslim participants reproduced a fear of Indonesia and/ or Surakarta becoming more Christian (through Christianization), Christian participants reproduced a fear of Indonesia and/ or Surakarta becoming more "Syariah". The description of the position of a Christian as vice mayor and the so called "decrease" of the Muslim population could be understood in this context.[513] On the other hand, when Christian participants positioned the Syariah banks as a threat (see chapter 2) it could also be understood in this context. In fact a Syariah bank does business regardless of the client's religion. Non-Muslim business people also open Syariah banks and the clients are both Muslims and non-Muslims.

### 1.2 Belonging to society first

When a Christian said "*puji Tuhan*" (thanks be to God) because her mother converted to Christianity, and when a Muslim mentioned "*alkhamdulillah*" (thanks be to God)because she and all her relatives were born Muslim, this shows that for them being a Christian or a Muslim is something to be grateful for. There are 14 similar utterances describing participants' gratitude to God in the quotations in chapters 2, 3 and 4, and there are many more in the interviews. Most participants in the FGDs define themselves as faithful believers. Being Christian or Muslim is important for them. That is why being baptized a Christian is considered "fortunate" by a woman participant. Yet, although they define themselves as faithful, pious and devout, they say that they are tolerant and respectful towards others, hence neither extreme nor relativistic.

In keeping with that distinction, in terms of religious identity participants – in both separate and mixed groups – sometimes identified and positioned the others as "they" (*mereka*) and themselves as 'we' (*kami*). *Bahasa* Indonesia grammar has two forms of the personal pronoun 'we': one excludes the out-group (*kami*), the other includes it in the in-group (*kita*). It is a subtle difference with huge performative effect. Participants derive their personal identities from social identities which are shared by the members of a group. In this sense we agree with social identity theory. But social identity theorists assume that identification with the in-group is accompanied by animosity and hostility towards the out-group (Tajfel & Turner 1986). Our study shows that this is not neces-

[513] The religious demographic statistics (chapter 1, table 5) show a different picture. The number of Muslims in Surakarta grew over time: 61.8% in 1970, 73.1% in 2001, and 75.9% in 2011.

sarily the case. Friendship with out-group members does exist (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka 2010: 68-70). Thus identification is more complex, as Tajfel (1978: 63) admits, and dialogical self theory seems more adequate to explain the current situation in Solo than social identity theory (Wijsen & Cholil 2013). In our FGDs, even though participants sometimes identified and positioned the others as "they" (*mereka*) and themselves as an exclusive "we" (*kami*), they sometimes also identified the others as an inclusive "we" (*kita*).[514]

Muslim participants called Christians their relatives, friends, fellows, neighbours, brothers, sisters or classmates, and the other way round. Very rarely they called the other *kafir* (infidel), *musrik* (polytheist) or *musuh* (enemy). Reconciliatory terms are common, resulting in harmonious interaction in the group. By using reconciliatory labels they transcend sectarian differences. That means they used polite, respectful words when communicating with people and thus were inclusive rather than exclusive, egalitarian rather than hierarchical, and communitarian rather than individualistic (Wijsen 2013). They also visited and shared food with each other on religious holidays.

Hence it is not surprising that although the participants are faithful believers, they use mainly inclusive language. They shaped and were shaped by diversity in their family, neighbourhood and school environments. They referred to processes of unification and convergence in those environments. Participants (with a few exceptions) said they can be friends or neighbours to adherents of other faiths. "I could not have only Christian friends," said a Christian participant.

At an interpersonal level participants primarily said that belonging to society (relatives, neighbours and friends) was more important than being an adherent of a religion. This preference showed that they prioritize civic rather than religious identity. In chapter 3 a Muslim woman described how she distributed *zakat fitrah* (personal alms) to both Muslim and non-Muslim poor people, though she knew that it was counter to the religious rule. "Here, we prioritize social first," she said. Another Muslim positioned himself as "more open" than the religious organization he is affiliated to.

In chapter 3 a Muslim participant identified "good" Christians as those who do *kerjabakti* (voluntary service) and appreciate social togetherness in the village. Hence belonging to society is a criterion to identify whether someone is "good" or not. In analysing *kerjabakti* Guinness (2009: 200) notes that deference and mutual obligation are key elements of neighbourhood community. It is considered an effective way to maintain social order.[515]

---

[514] For an analysis of Pancasila as 'Pancasila *kita*' (inclusive 'we') and 'Pancasila *kami*' (exclusive 'we'), see Saputro (2010).

[515] Guinness (2009: 93) writes that over decades *kerjabakti* has been responsible for the construction of amenities such as wells, washrooms and toilet blocks, retaining walls, safety walls,

However, for a few participants, belonging to a religion is more important than being a member of society (peripheral discourse). In other words, they prioritize religious identity over civic identity. These participants want to create boundaries between Muslims and Christians. Several Muslim participants emphasized that the greeting "*assalamu'alaikum*" is exclusively for Muslims and it is forbidden to extend it to Christians. Some Muslims in Solo were reported to refuse to say "merry Christmas". The analysis of discursive practice shows that it relates to religious "purification".

### 1.3 New wave of religious orientations

A Muslim participant in chapter 4 said that "formerly Islam was only one stream", which was close to Javanese culture and was peaceful. He narrates a religious ideal (religion is peaceful, not "hot" like nowadays). This ideal is usually associated with the situation as it was in the past. But this is an "invention of tradition" (Ranger 1993) or an "ideology of home" (Robertson 1995). We know from Indonesian history that there was quite a lot of violence in the past (Hüsken & De Jonge 2002), also informed by religion. The speaker wanted to highlight the current religious transformation in society, but whether there is more violence now than before is doubtful (Hüsken 2009). The Christian participants described that the current "hot" situation prevailed in Christian communities as well. In general they recognized new trends in both Islam and Christianity. In Christianity the new orientation is said to come from America and Korea, whereas in Islam it is attributed to the Middle East, Pakistan and Iran.

Several Christian participants identified themselves as members of Pentecostal movements, who perceived their task as spreading "the salvation that is only through the Lord Jesus". One Muslim participant described how he had been involved in a protest towards an "illegal church". Another Muslim participant described that his group had invited Abu Bakar Ba'ashir to give an Islamic lecture. Both Muslim and Christian participants in general identified these new religious groups (not "common" Islam or Christianity, cf. "normal" discourse in the next subsection) as the source of worsening interreligious relations between Islam and Christianity. For Christian participants, the evangelical groups were "not sensitive to the surrounding [Muslims]".

Some Christian participants talked about their conflict with evangelical groups. The groups were said to perceive mainline Christians' understanding of the Bible as wrong. According to some participants they called for re-baptism of Christians from outside their group. FGD participants positioned those who are attracted to charismatic churches as poor people in a purely financial sense.

---

drains, etc. in Javanese villages. They are constructed with voluntary labour through community donations of cash and refreshments, although sponsors have sometimes been found.

In her study of the evangelical/ charismatic Family of God Church (GBI-KA) in Solo Rodemeier (2012) found that people were attracted to the GBI-KA mainly because of 'its inner cell-structure which sees everyone as a potential leader'. In contrast to most Javanese religious institutions, this offers opportunities for individuals to move up the hierarchical ladder.

Muslim participants from both an NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and a Muhammadiyah background talked about conflict between them and members of MTA (Qur'anic Interpretation Council). An NU Muslim participant described conflict between NU and MTA, while a Muhammadiyah Muslim participant said that "Muhammadiyah should criticize" MTA. Thus, besides exacerbating inter-religious relations, the new groups in Islam and Christianity also engender intra-religious tensions. But although NU and Muhammadiyah participants described intra-religious tension between them and members of MTA, they recognized that MTA is "the fortress (*benteng*)" against Christianization, which is also part of their concern. That shows the complexity of intra- and interreligious relations. In Bourdieu's terms (1991), 'the others' can be both competitors and collaborators at the same time. Boundaries between 'us' and 'them' are not fixed but fluid.

We ended the previous subsection on belonging to society first with a reference to the trend towards religious purification. The participants said that the new groups in Christianity and Islam advocated purification and fanaticism in their teachings. In the case of Islam, Zain's study (2011) of MTA confirms this tendency. The leaders of MTA forbid their members to join in *slametan, khenduri, tahlilan* and other local Islamic practices. MTA identifies those practices as *bid'ah* (heretical) and *syirik* (unbelief). Muslims practising indigenous beliefs are identified as '*ijik melu agamane mbahe*' (those who still follow the ancestors' religion). Whereas scholars identify purification movements as primarily urban phenomena (Tamney 2008), Zain's study of MTA shows it is a rural phenomenon. MTA is growing mostly in rural areas in Java, Kalimantan and Sumatera (Zain 2011: 2, 81-82).

Our research participants had different ideas about the source of religious fanaticism. The conversation about it in chapters 2 and 4 is very lively. The first idea identified was that the more one learns about religion, the more fanatical one becomes. A participant gave the example of Noordin M. Top, a suspected terrorist who was shot dead in Solo. A participant, a journalist, found many Islamic books in his hideout. By contrast, the second idea identified was that the more one learns about religion, the less fanatical one becomes. A participant cited an example of radical Christian groups. "They just get to page two or three [of the Bible]... However, there are still hundreds of pages after that," said a participant. In chapter 4 a Muslim participant argued that fanatical Muslims lack knowledge about Islam.

## 1.4 Extremists as mentally ill religious people

What we saw in our FGDs is a hegemonic struggle between dominant and peripheral voices to define what is considered "normal" Muslims and Christians. The participants primarily identified Islam as a religion of "peace" and "mercy to the world", while Christianity is seen as a religion of "love". Whereas Christian participants identified extremist (fanatical, fundamentalist) Muslims as abnormal, Muslim participants identified Christians who favour and practise Christianization as "excessive". They positioned extremists and excessive persons as extraordinary. Thus they identified extremism as not the norm but an exception to the rule of religions (institutional level).

In distinguishing between "normal" and "extreme" the participants primarily positioned themselves as normal or ordinary religious people who are moderate. They identified those who cause conflict as neither moderate Muslims nor moderate Christians, but fundamentalists in their respective faiths. In certain cases they identified the conflict as one between extreme (*laskar*) groups and non-religious gangsters. However, several participants mentioned that actually all of them were gangsters. Before they became extreme Muslims they had been gangsters. Here the participants tried to avoid identifying the problem as coming from within their religions.

The participants' "normal"/ "not-normal" classification reminds us of Michel Foucault's work *Madness and civilization.* A society which perceives people as mentally ill labels them accordingly and will treat them as mentally ill (Foucault 1965; Schatzman 1971). Put differently, we can say that some research participants perceived radicals, extremists and terrorists who are identified as not-normal to be mad or mentally ill. In fact around 240 people who were identified as terrorists by the police were killed and many more injured in four major acts of terrorism in Indonesia from 2002 to 2005.Three terrorists were executed and 57 people suspected of terrorism were shot dead in their hideouts (such as Noordin, Air and Eko who were mentioned by the participants). In addition around 700 people accused of terrorism were jailed.[516] Here we can see the link between knowledge production about terrorism and the treatment meted out to them (killing, imprisonment, etc.).

Foucault (1980: 39) notes that power in society is persistent and subtle in that it 'reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives'. In Christian groups the participants identified extreme Muslims who wear typical clothing (calf-length pants, *niqab*, etc.) as improper

---

[516] These statistics are generated by BBC Indonesia, 10 October 2012, interview with Ansyaad Mbai (head of National Counter Terrorism Agency) and Noor Huda Ismail (director of Prasasti Perdamaian Foundation), http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/laporan_khusus/2012/10/121010_lapsusterorism1.shtml, accessed on October 15, 2012.

and not normal. The youths in Christian groups called extremist and terrorist Muslims "*lebay*", new slang for something out of the ordinary. From the Muslim participants' side, they identified Christians' social services as "Christianization" strategies. They tended to identify Christians as always having hidden intentions when offering social services (e.g. to Christianize Muslims). We interpret FGD participants' labels such as "improper", "not normal", "out of the ordinary", "*lebay*" and "excessive" in terms of Foucault's classification of mad and civilized people.

In November 2010 International Crisis Group (ICG) Indonesia published a policy brief entitled *Indonesia: 'Christianization' and intolerance*. It confirms the Muslim participants' voice in our FGDs about the general discourse of Christianization.[517] The ICG report links the increase of acts of violence and intolerance by hardliner Muslims with the increase of acts of Christianization by certain Christian missionary groups. Quoting the brief, some Islamic media and radicals put Christianization in the framework of 'a global Christian-Zionist plot to weaken Islam', 'oppression suffered by Muslims', and so forth (ICG 2010: 15). Similar narrations can be seen in chapter 3 of this book.

ICG's policy brief as well as the primary voice in our FGDs positioned extremists and hardliners as "funny", "foolish", "odd" and "not normal" (these wordings are from FGDs, not from ICG). However, from the perspective of extremists and hardliners, as noted in the report, they blame the Indonesian government for being allies of the West in its war against terrorism. ICG writes about 'a conspiracy of Western Christian colonialists and their local puppets' (ICG 2010: 15). In his study, *Religious discourse, social cohesion and conflict* in Tanzania, Ndaluka writes that some Muslims say that they 'make a noise (*pigakelele*)' if they feel that they are being marginalized (Ndaluka 2012: 206). The hardliners' voices are suppressed because of the national and international war on terror. However, studies of terrorism indicate that when hardliners' voices are silenced they tend to become more, not less radical (Mamdani 2004).

## 1.5 Effects of Pancasila rhetoric

As a consequence of the liberalization and pluralizationof Indonesian society after the collapse of the New Order authoritarian regime there is a struggle to redefine "unity in diversity" in the post-*Reformasi* era. The participants' utterance, "I come from a Pancasila family", which I cite in the title of this book, expresses that their families comprise different religions yet live in harmony. This language use shows that Pancasila ideology rules interpersonal everyday life.

---

[517] The ICG report calls Christianization a reality. The study was conducted in Banten and West Java.

Even though several participants said, "Since the *Reformasi* era Pancasila is no longer mentioned in societal interaction", the ideal of Pancasila was very much alive and talked about by participants in almost all FGDs. In the quotations in chapters 2, 3 and 4 the word "Pancasila" occurs 24 times, and there are many more incidences of this word in the interviews. A participant used the metaphor of a broom[518] to describe Pancasila's role in keeping a diverse people together. Other participants reproduced a link between "Pancasila country" and "tolerance, respecting religious freedom". The *bhineka tunggal ika* covers hidden differences. In order to maintain societal unity and harmony differences are covered up. Culture is not a shared knowledge system but the organization of diversity. It is not a state of the mind but a process (Hannerz 1992: 13-14). Aware of the differences among them, Muslims and Christians in FGDs said they have the same root, being descendants of Abraham.

What we saw in our FGDs is a struggle to redefine Pancasila in the context of the Indonesian *Reformasi* era, which is characterized by an awakening of religious ideology. Because of the diminishing role of the state in the *Reformasi* era, the ideology of Pancasila is no longer enforced top-down, but citizens seem to endorse it bottom-up. Norman Fairclough (1992: 62, 186) assumes that discourses "can be expected to have long-term effects on the knowledge and beliefs, social relationships, and social identities of an institution or society". It is reasonable to conclude from our case study that Pancasila rhetoric did have long-term effects, as people still cite these 'culturally salient keywords' and use them to interpret experiences and generate behaviour. In the New Order era the Indonesian government supported the socialization of the Pancasila idea as a dogma for its citizens. Some of the measures taken were the inclusion of Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (PMP/Pancasila Moral Education) in school curricula as a core course from elementary school to university level; inculcation of P-4 (New Order dogma on Pancasila)[519] for all students and civil servants; regular recitation of the five pillars of Pancasila at Monday flag ceremonies; et cetera.[520]

On the Christians' side there was a voice that Christians have a "deeper spirit of Pancasila" than Muslims. This was motivated by the emergence of Syariah discourse in public life along with Islamic "purification" and acts of violence by *laskar* groups. From the Muslim side there was a statement that there is no contradiction between Pancasila and the values of Islam. Some Muslim participants explained that the five principles of Pancasila (one God,

---

[518] "If we were a broom made of such splintered ribs, Pancasila is the string."

[519] P-4 stands for *Pedoman Penghayatan Pengamalan Pancasila* (Directives for the Realization and Implementation of Pancasila).

[520] The *Reformasi* government abolished P-4 and changed the PMP course into civic education (*Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan*).

humanity, national unity, democracy and social justice) accord with the teachings of Islam. Most participants described Pancasila and Syariah as clearly opposed. By contrasting Pancasila and Syariah they reproduced an image of Indonesia as a pluralistic state. The primary discourse is, "Our Indonesian state has Pancasila, which should be prioritized." However, the participants used the term "Syariah" in relation to the political vision of (some) Muslims. A Muslim participant explained two different areas of Syariah: the political system, and ritual (*amaliyah*). He expressed rejection of the political system of Syariah and advocated its ritual aspects.

In religious vocabulary there is 'untranslatable translatability' or 'translatable untranslatability' (Mall 2000: 13-14; Panikkar 1999: 19-22; Moyaert 2011: 227). As noted in the introduction to this book, in articulating the first pillar of Pancasila (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa,* Belief in One Divine Lordship) Muslim scholars refer to the Islamic concept of monotheism (*tawhid*). On the other hand Christian scholars argue that it does not refer to the God concept of specific religion. The word '*Ketuhanan*' has a vague meaning in that it refers not to God as such, but to something divine (*yang ilahi*) (Mujiburrahman 2006; Ichwan 2006).[521] Thus they showed the 'untranslatable translatability' of the first pillar of Pancasila. Soekarno acknowledged that he borrowed the principles of Indonesian ideology from Sun Yat Sen's (the founder of Republic of China) idea of *San Min Chu* (the three people's principles): nationalism, democracy and socialism. Soekarno invented the further principle of *Ketuhanan* to situate these principles in the Indonesian religious context, which differs from that of China (Darmaputera 1988).

In our case study participants demonstrated the 'untranslatable translatability' of the first pillar of Pancasila. According to our Muslim interviewees one divine Lordship refers to the Islamic concept of monotheism. Christian interviewees, on the other hand, argued that it does not refer to the God concept of a specific religion. That means Christians can use those words. The Christian participants mentioned that they have their own understanding of the first pillar of *Pancasila,* a different understanding from Muslims. In other words, the understanding of religious concepts by Muslims and Christians is diverse, yet

---

[521] The difficulty also arises when people have to translate the first pillar of Pancasila into English. What words do they use or choose? Sita Hidayah (2006) finds no fewer than eleven English translations of the first pillar of Pancasila by the Indonesian government and scholars mainly from a Muslim or Christian background. She identifies 'transcreation' as an unusual rewording such as 'oneness', which emphasizes a *tawhid* Islamic point of view, while 'one divine Lordship' is a Christian version of Adonai (and Kyrios). The eleven forms are: 'belief in God', 'the belief in one God', 'belief in the oneness of God', 'belief in the one and only God', 'belief in divine omnipotence', 'God's divine omnipotence', 'belief in an all-embracing God', 'belief in one divine Lordship', 'the unity of God', 'a supreme Godhead', 'the absolute Lordship of God' (Hidayah 2006: 242-243).

they get on with each other. They agree to disagree on this point (Beatty 1990: 25-50). It works, in the sense that even though Christian participants have their own understanding, they approve of the religious spirit of Pancasila. This confirms Mall's (2000) theory of 'analogous hermeneutics', according to which there is neither total translatability (commensurability) nor radical untranslatability (incommensurability). He says that no culture is a windowless monad, so all cultures possess varying degrees of intercultural overlap (Mall 2000: 14), which makes communication and coexistence possible, at least to some extent.

## 1.6 Conflict and strategy to maintain harmony

We should not understate Indonesian violence because it could have been worse. The violence involves highly inflammable identities like religion and ethnicity. Yet the state is not the only institution that can control violence. According to Hüsken (2009) we should not ask why there has been so much violence in Indonesia, but rather better why there has been so little. Thus social institutions are needed to maintain societal convergence. I have said that my first objective was to gain insight into the relation between religious discourse and (the absence of) social cohesion. The participants found it difficult to explain the causes of the 1998 Solo riots and earlier riots. According to them the riots were not about religion but only about social problems. However, they reported that people used words such as "China", "Java", "Muslim" and "Muslim-Java" during the riots. Conflicts almost always are complex and caused by a multiplicity of factors (Taylor & Moghaddam 1994). Yet we saw in chapter 4 that participants argued that anti-Chinese ethnic sentiments and the economy were the main motives and "the strongest trigger" of conflict. However, in the Muslim FGDs (chapter 3)[522] some participants explained clearly that the money of Chinese Christian empires goes to churches. This utterance connects religion and ethnicity.

In the broader context of Indonesia John Sidel, a political scientist, says much the same thing. The New Order regime, at least during the first two decades, was dominated by secular nationalists, Christians and Chinese businessmen. Networks of Indonesian Protestants and Catholics enjoyed a privileged position in the Soeharto regime. In addition the army's officer corps had long been dominated by men raised in secular and Christian school systems (Sidel 2008: 44, 46). Here we see an interplay of ethnic and religious identity in communal conflicts. In Indonesia it is very hard to disentangle religious loyalties from ethnic backgrounds. Apart from the case of Solo, conflicts in other parts of Java, in North Moluccas and in West Kalimantan before and after 1998

[522] FGDs permit participants to share ideas about a sensitive issue in a relaxed atmosphere more than mixed FGDs.

reveal this interplay of ethnic and religious identity (Sidel 2007; Van Klinken 2007).

In chapter 3 some participants described ethnic-religious grouping in terms of place of residence. The participants, again in chapter 3, also identified that Javanese and Arabs are primarily Muslim, while Chinese are Christian. In chapter 1 I outlined the history of ethnic-religious grouping based on settlement with reference to the policy of the Surakarta sultanate before the 19th century and the Dutch authority in Surakarta in the 19th century. Thus the segregation of ethnic-religious groups has a long history in Solo. Arab settlements are mostly concentrated in Pasar Kliwon sub-district, especially the villages of Pasar Kliwon, Semanggi and Kedung Lumbu. Chinese settlements are located round Pasar Gede, Balong, Coyudan, Tambak Segaran, et cetera.

Studies of local conflicts in Indonesia have demonstrated that they often erupted because of fights over material issues (land, water and other resources) and that posters about religion and ethnic solidarity were used only as rallying mechanisms (Hüsken 2009). In chapter 4 I reproduced a picture of a banner about religion and ethnicity during the 1998 Solo riots. At the same time participants reproduced a narration that the riots were triggered by a feeling that the Chinese are rich and the indigenous people (Javanese) are always oppressed. Thus in this particular narrative context our FGD participants reproduced an interplay of three identities in the Solo riots of 1998: ethnic (Java, China), religious (Muslim, Christian), and social class (rich, poor).

As religious identity is our concern, this study found inclusive language use by Christian and Muslim participants to be a strategy to maintain convergence among themselves and in society. The NU metaphor of three brotherhoods, mentioned by a Muslim participant in the mixed group, is telling in regard to multiple identities: the brotherhoods of Islam, of the nation and of humanity. Muslims positioned non-Muslims as their brothers/ sisters either as fellow Indonesians or simply as human beings. Christian participants reproduced a comparable narration of brothers/ sisters of the same faith and brothers/ sisters of a different faith. To maintain convergence among themselves, they reproduced a strategy of social inclusion. Muslim participants cited the Qur'anic verse "to you be your religion, and to me my religion", which signifies peaceful coexistence while not mixing religions.

The participants constituted and were constituted by the concept of *rukun* (harmony). "We take the best, [that is] *rukun*," said a Muslim participant. In chapter 4 a Christian mother asked her son to join a *kendhuri* (*selametan*) which was held by her Muslim neighbour. Hyung-Jun Kim (2007: 129) writes that in a village neighbours, regardless of religious and financial differences, are invited to and attend their neighbours' *kendhuri*. In this sense the ritual actualizes the social norm of *rukun*. Via the concept of *rukun* people tolerate differences and, where necessary, make social and cultural adjustments.

Our FGD participants were keenly aware of the fact that harmony in Indonesia is fragile and that conflicts erupt every now and again, such as the Solo riots in 1972, 1980 and 1998. After the riots people return to normal as soon as possible, showing that conflict is 'not normal'. Min-Sun Kim claims that 70% of the world's population have interdependent self-constructs, hence avoiding conflict and maintaining harmony is a normal style of conflict management (Kim 2002: 5, 57-58).

After the 1998 Solo riots the Solonese, among other efforts, conducted such rituals as *ruwatan* (purifying) led by a *dhalang* (puppeteer in traditional shadow play) in *wayang* (shadow puppet) performances. Collective experience was replicated in ritual and theatrical discourse. In one scene in the *wayang* performance at Beteng Plaza, a public commercial mall, the *dhalang* narrated:

> 'Let us pray together! Besides performing the *ruwatan* tonight, let us never cease in our devotions. To perform devotions is to follow religious belief with conviction. Pray to God so that the present situation may soon become calm. May we have peace and calm again, like the puppeteers who return to the rules of performance'. (Headley 2004: 456)

In that utterance the normal 'rule' is peace and calm. The Solonese showed that they always restore conflict to normality. There is a tendency among the participants to identify trouble makers as "newcomers" and "outsiders". We find 15 such identifications in the quotations in chapters 2, 3 and 4, and there are many more in the interviews. In the case of attacks on or protests against churches, the participants identified the perpetrators as not "our Muslim brothers" from "here", from "this village" or from "local society", but from "*pesantren* Ngruki" or "outside Solo". As for radical Muslims, participants said they were not Javanese Muslims from Solo but hardliners from Sukoharjo. And "excessive" Christians were not from the GKJ or the Catholic churches, but evangelicals from El-Shaddai church and the Salvation Army. In the case of the 1998 Solo riots the actors came from outside or were "people from Jakarta".

However, mostly the Muslims from *pesantren* Ngruki were Javanese, El-Shaddai church is based in Solo, and in fact Solonese were also involved in the 1998 riots. The participants tried to distinguish themselves from people "outside Solo" and Muslim and Christian hardliners. At the same time they are aware that not all trouble-makers and actors in conflicts come from "outside". That would contradict the reality on the ground. But they said the locals were just "one or two", "few", "newcomers" or "only *ocnum*" (individuals). By calling them *ocnum* they positioned the actors in conflict as isolated persons to preclude further identification of their religious and ethnic identity. This kind of narration is a way to maintain harmony and a social mechanism to avoid further and deeper conflict.

Summarizing our findings we offer a synthesis on two axes, one with the religious and the secular positions as extreme poles, the other with two oppo-

site religious positions (Java Muslim/ Christian) at the centre. But as noted above, classifications are fluid and flexible and that applies to this one as well.




*Figure 12: Synthesis of Muslim/Christian identity*

In general what we see in the FGDs is a struggle between three positions. First, the extreme position advocates an Islamic Syariah state or comprises militant Christians who are "not sensitive to the surrounding [Muslims]". This first position is mono-cultural, which is a peripheral voice. Second, there is the moderate position (e.g. the Qur'anic text: "to you be your religion, and to me my religion") or peaceful coexistence: tolerate the other but do not mix (at least not religions). This is a multicultural position. Supporters of multiculturalism are motivated by great tolerance and endorse the politics of Pancasila: unity in diversity. They espouse a culture of *rukun* (harmony). A third position, which is also peripheral, is relativist or nominal. Put differently, this is an intercultural position which stresses real, existing overlaps ("I am *abangan/ kejawen*"). From a different angle, the multicultural (religio-ethnic) identity is midway between two other peripheral identities: religious ("puritan" Muslim or Christian) and secular.

## 2 Conclusions regarding the contribution to interreligious studies

This last section seeks to determine the contribution of our research to a theory and method of studying interreligious relations, which is the external objective of this research project. In chapter 1 I mentioned that this doctoral dissertation favours a discursive study of religion (Von Stuckrad 2003: 268), which goes beyond the essentialist and objectivist approach. Following Flood (1999: 113), I regard religion as a communicative or speech event. That is to say, human practices and artefacts become 'religious' because they are placed in a narrative

context by the believers; they are not religious because of innate properties. I also said that the framework of my study is the context of religious studies in Indonesia. In that section I noted that it would be almost impossible to develop a 'purely theoretical' religious studies in Indonesia without any orientation towards practice. With due regard to these provisos I come to the following conclusions concerning the theory and method of studying religion.

## 2.1 Linking the micro and macro levels of analysis

Fairclough's (1992) clearly specifies linking the analyses of discourse as text and as social practice. The two stages of analysis are linked via a third, the analysis of discursive practice. But Fairclough leaves a gap when he differentiates between the levels of analysis. Given the fact that we analyse interactions between participants in FGDs, thus at the individual and interpersonal level, how can we draw conclusions at a societal level? Put differently, how can we link the micro and macro levels of analysis?

In chapter 4 (section 1.3) the participants talked about Noordin Mohammad Top, a famous terrorist from Malaysia, who was shot dead by the police in a rented house in a working class area in Surakarta. Looking at the linguistic features of the text, the female FGD participant makes a radical contrast when she describes Noordin as both a disaster and a blessing. She also draws on typical Islamic vocabulary associated with matters of life and death: "thanks be to God" and "everything comes from God", expressing God's omnipotence and humans' duty to acquiesce in his will (meso/ institutional level), even in situations of disaster and misfortune. In so doing she positions herself as a pragmatic believer (agency, micro level) who sees profit in something that in itself is perceived as a disaster (social practice, macro level).

When Fairclough (1992: 67, 138) talks about the relations between parents and children, teachers and pupils, doctors and patients, he speaks about social positions and social relations within the institutions of the family, schools and hospitals. It is in fact these institutions with their concrete practices, pre-existing relationships and identities, patterns and routines, which link the individual and societal levels of analysis. These practices, relationships and identities were originally discursively constituted, but have become sedimented in institutions and non-discursive practices (Fairclough 1992; Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 62). In our view it is the institutional level that mediates between the individual and the societal level.

In our study, for example, people speak about "sameness of custom" between Muslims and Christians when they go together to the graves of the same ancestors. When Muslims spoke about Christianization they said that "Javanese Christians are not like that". And when Christians referred to Islamic extremism they said that "Javanese Islam is different". Javanese language and customs are institutions or shared practices and patterns of behaviour that go beyond

individuals. This is the level where ethnicity (Javanese) and religion (Muslim or Christian) intermingle in one reality. In talking about interreligious relations our research finds that Javanese culture or "sameness of custom" bridges the gap between Muslims and Christians as individuals (micro level) and society (macro level), as shown in figure 12.

## 2.2 Role of social cognition in discourse analysis

The foregoing insight brings us to a second conclusion. The patterned behaviour and routines (e.g. 'sameness of custom') are based on shared knowledge or social cognitions (e.g. 'Javanese wisdom'). Our conclusions in chapters 2, 3 and 4 reveal extensive general cultural knowledge of the wisdom of Javanese culture. This cultural knowledge – shared presuppositions about the world – plays an important role in people's understanding (Holland & Quinn: 2000).

Fairclough (1992) is ambiguous about the role of social cognition. He clearly rejects the "idealist conclusion that realities of the social world such as family merely emanate from people's heads" (Fairclough 1992: 65). Whereas he is clear about the limitation of cognitive psychology, saying that it ignores the social condition of cognitions, he nevertheless endorses the idea that cognition plays a role in the production and consumption of text, and thus in discursive change. The aforementioned "sameness of custom" is based on the Javanese worldview or wisdom.

Van Dijk (2005) is more explicit about cognitions. He refers to 'knowledge strategy' in which two members of the same epistemic community, by definition, share all the general knowledge of the community. It assumes that what I know is also known by the recipients (in our research audiences of FGDs), and vice versa (Van Dijk 2005: 79-80). When Muslim participants mentioned Christianization they have a similar idea of projects of Christianizing Muslims. When Christian participants spoke about "*jihad*" they meant Muslim militant attitudes or acts of violence. Van Dijk (1987) uses the term 'social memory' which assumes that 'language use and interaction... are possible only to this socially shared nature of our word meanings, rules, and action concepts'. Furthermore, he positions social memory ('semantic memory') as long-term memory stored in people's cognitive framework (Van Dijk 1987: 182-183).

Although cognition plays a relevant role, Flood (1999: 58) suggests that the discipline of religious studies should not be trapped in a reductive cognitive approach which sees culture merely as a cognitive system. Culture, and especially language, exists independently of cognition. That means that unless a person is nurtured in a culture and language, individual cognition would not be stimulated or activated.

Flood (1999: 63) writes: 'If the study of religions is to avoid a phenomenological transcendentalism, on the one hand, or a reduction to the biological organism on the other, then it must take seriously the inter subjective realm of the

cultural sign.' In other words, the human cognitive system always functions in and through the framework of culture and/ or religion. The human cognitive system and language/ culture/ religion are absolute conditions for each other (*conditio sine qua non*). Thus religious studies must consider shifting from a philosophy of consciousness, in all its varieties and complexities, to a philosophy of signs (semiotics) or language (Flood 1999: 9, 107). We need to clarify the relation between discursive study of religion and cognitive science. This would be an interesting field for further research.

## 2.3 Complexity of classifications

In chapters 2, 3 and 4 our research participants reproduced various classifications. Such as "ordinary" and "fanatical"; "normal" and "extreme"; "*abangan*" (nominal) and "*santri*" (devout). Following scholars like Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, our research clearly showed the relevance of distinctions and classifications. It also confirms Bourdieu's (1991: 220) statement that language has the power to make and unmake social groups. Identities are not defined by intrinsic values that can be measured by objective criteria, but are social through and through in the sense that they are socially conditioned and have social effects.

But our study showed that distinctions and classifications are not clear-cut. They are not fixed but flexible. For example, persons who are labelled 'modern' in socio-economic affairs may not be modern in religious affairs. People who are strict in religious affairs may be respectful and tolerant towards other believers, like the girl from NU who said *alkhamdulillah* (thanks be to God) because she and all her relatives "were fortunately born Muslims". But she positioned herself as a tolerant person. Unlike social identity theories (Tajfel & Turner 1986), which define identity on the basis of intrinsic values that can be measured by objective criteria, we found that identities are fluid (Blommaert & Verschueren 1991; Antaki & Widdicombe 1998).

In a survey of nearly 300 respondents conducted by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi in Kediri East Java, about a quarter refused to be put in a particular box and came up with self-identifications which the researchers had not thought of (Ricklefs 2008: 129). In complex societies boundaries will always be fluid. The boundaries between *abangan* and *santri*, moderate and militant, good and bad, black and white, and so on, are not that strict, not only at a social level (Beatty 1999: 115) but also at an individual level (Kim 2002: 172). The data are simply too contradictory, confusing and complex (Ricklefs 2008: 133-134).

We can relate that conclusion to a current trend in the study of religious identity. It seems that in modern times religious identities were more or less fixed, whereas from a postmodern perspective they are more fluid, hybrid. That is to say, religious believers not only switch easily from one language to the

other but increasingly mix them. This makes the postmodern situation different from modernity and classification or categorization becomes complex; hence the project of 'exact' science, including science of religion, is almost impossible (Bourdieu 1990).

## 2.4 From social identity to 'multiple identity' theory

The aforementioned insight into the fluidity of distinctions has huge implications for social identity theory, which is based on social classifications into in-group and out-group, 'we' and 'they'. Those classifications showed the complexity and dynamics of participants' voices in identifying the others and themselves. In our FGDs the participants described themselves and others in terms of group membership. Asked to complete the sentence "I am ...", the participants would not answer, 'I am me', but I am Solonese, I am part of a Pancasila family, I am a Javanese Muslim/ Christian, I am a citizen of Indonesia, and so on. People develop in-group favouritism. In most (if not all) cases personal identity refers to social identity. In this sense it is relevant to talk about 'social identity theory' (Tajfel & Turner 1986).

Social identity theory assumes that identities are shared by members of a group. They unite them and distinguish them from others. In experiments conducted by social identity theorists individuals are classified as members of two non-overlapping groups (Tajfel & Turner 1986: 13). In studying polarization in Javanese society Merle Ricklefs (2008), a prominent historian on Java, initially saw the polarization between *abangan* and *putihan* as more or less essential. He writes about 'the birth of *abangan*' in one section of his book about Islamic and other visions in Java in 1830-1930 (Ricklefs 2007: 84-86). Nonetheless, in his more recent works he recognizes that the data are simply too contradictory, confusing and complex (Ricklefs 2008: 133-134; Ricklefs 2012: 271-272).

Traditional models such as social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1986) view identities as essentialist and realist (Blommaert &Verschueren 1991: 3). Identity is 'something' that exists in me. The alternative models can be labelled social constructivist. Examples are models based on Foucault. These models have in common that they are anti-essentialist and anti-realist. Last but not least there are postmodern views of identity, or rather multiple identities. In this view the self is fluid and hybrid (Wijsen 2013).

When using the pronoun 'we' *bahasa* Indonesia introduces not only an exclusive 'we' (*kami*), but also an inclusive 'we' (*kita*), which our research participants used quite often. Whereas the exclusive 'we' confirms social identity theory, the inclusive 'we' shows that individuals can have a multiplicity of overlapping identities. Our research shows that distinctions are not clear-cut, not fixed, but flexible and fluid. This is why the cultural collision (Blommaerts 1991: 19) or clash of civilizations (Huntington 1992) perspectives are inadequate. According to them a multicultural society is a tragedy and intercultural

communication an illusion. However, our study shows that at least partial intercultural or interreligious communication and understanding are in fact possible. In everyday life there is an 'ordered ambiguity' (Beatty 1999: 27).

## 2.5 Critical theory and engaged religious studies

Fairclough (1992) combines linguistic analysis with critical theory. That makes the project of discourse theory a project of ideology critique (Laclau 1996; Jørgensen& Phillips 2002: 186). Ideology has indeed been a fertile subject of investigation in CDA (Fairclough 1989, 1992; Wodak 1989; Van Dijk 1998; Blommaert 2005). These authors expand the definition of ideology from 'a specific set of symbolic representations' (let's call this the first category) to 'a general phenomenon characterizing the totality of a particular social or political system, and operated by every member or actor in that system' (second category).

The first category includes -isms (Marxism, capitalism, socialism, etc.), schools and doctrines. It is ideology critique in a 'traditional' sense (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:87). The second category, which is the concern of CDA, highlights that ideology stands for the 'cultural', ideational elements of a particular social and political system, the 'grand narratives' characterizing its existence, structure, and historical development (Blommaert 2005: 158-159). As *critical* analysis CDA inherits the tradition of the critical school. Under the influence of postmodernism and post-colonialism it was argued that a neutral standpoint in academia is an illusion. Scholars of religion always adopt a certain position (Wijsen 2013).

In that sense CDA moves from disengaged to engaged science, which is relevant to the debate on religious studies in Indonesia that we started with. As mentioned in the introduction to this book (chapter 1, section 1.5), religious studies in Indonesia need to respond to a societal problem. Bagir and Abdullah (2011: 68-70) use the term 'engaged religious study' at the end of their article as a recommendation. But they do not investigate it further, since their main concern is 'reflections' on the development and role of religious studies in Indonesia. They position the engagement of religious studies in societal problems as 'ethical-religious concerns', but they also warn that such engagement may lead to 'religionizing' of nonreligious problems (Bagir & Abdullah 2011: 68-69).

Cush (2005), one of the very few works on engaged religious study, explores its content, methods and aims. He is very much aware of Jonathan Smith's (1982) view that religion is non-essentialist (an academic artefact, not a reality 'out there'). But Cush still considers the phenomenological approach important in religious studies simply because it adopts an impartial, objective position on the traditions and issues studied, and tries to understand before judging. Thus he assumes that methodological agnosticism is needed to avoid

premature evaluation, an attitude described as 'epistemological humility' (Cush 2005: 92). Bagir and Abdullah (2011) have a similar understanding when they define the concept of objectivity in religious studies. In my view their position is theoretically ambiguous. In the case of the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) at Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia it is clear that its vision is 'to promote the development of a democratic, multicultural, and just society in Indonesia' (leaflet MA Programme CRCS-UGM 2012). Thus CRCS is not 'objective', but engages in social engineering. In other words, the religious *mission* of CRCS is to endorse a democratic, multicultural and just society.

Having learnt from this doctoral research, it is my contention that scholars of religion should not lapse into theoretical ambiguity. By positioning religions as systems of communication and shared action we can conduct religious studies in a 'constructivist' paradigm which is non-objectivist. The term 'engaged' itself indicates that it is non-objectivist, not impartial, but actively involved in the issues to be studied. Bagir and Abdullah (2011) and Lewis (2012) show the profound engagement of the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies at Gadjah Mada University with societal problems, albeit from a religious point of view. In a society where 99% of the population says that religion is important in their daily life (Gallup Poll 2008) there is no other way. In this sense religious studies in Indonesia differs from religious studies in Europe or North America, which sticks to methodological agnosticism. The staff and students at the Center are engaged in religion, but not in an apologetic way, propagating one religion as better than the other. This research by way of a discursive study of religion (Von Stuckrad 2003) and more specifically the CDA method (Fairclough 1992) will, I hope, contribute to theoretical clarification as well as offer a methodological alternative for developing engaged religious studies in Indonesia.

# Bibliography


Abdullah, M.A. (1996). *Studi Agama. Normativitas atau Historisitas?* Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.

Abdullah, M.A. (2006). *Islamic Studies di Perguruan Tinggi Pendekatan Integratif-Interkonektif.* Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.

Abuza, Z. (2007). *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia.* London: Routledge.

Algadri, H. (1994). *Dutch Policy Against Islam and Indonesians of Arab Descent in Indonesia.* Jakarta: LP3ES.

Ali, M. (1990). *Ilmu Perbandingan Agama di Indonesia.* Yogyakarta: IAIN Sunan Kalijaga Press.

Anderson, B. (1966). The Language of Indonesian Politics. *Indonesia,* No. 1 (April), 89-116.

Antaki, C., S. Widdicombe (1998). Identity as an Achievement and as a Tool. In C. Antaki, S. Widdicombe (eds.), *Identities in Talk.* London-Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 1-14.

Aritonang, J. (2004). *Sejarah Perjumpaan Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia.* Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia.

Aritonang, J., K. Steenbrink (2008). *A History of Christianity in Indonesia.* Leiden: Brill.

Asad, T. (1993). *Genealogies of Religion. Discipline and reasons of power in Christianity and Islam.* Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Assyaukanie, L. (2002). *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia.* Singapore: ISEAS.

Azca, M. (2011). *After Jihad A Biographical Approach to Passionate Politics in Indonesia.* Ph.D. Thesis. University of Amsterdam.

Azra, A. (2006). *Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy. Dynamics in a Global Context.* Singapore: Solstice.

Azra, A. (2011). From IAIN to UIN. Islamic Studies in Indonesia. In K. Bustamam-Ahmad, P. Jory (eds.), *Islamic Studies and Islamic Education in Contemporary Southeast Asia.* Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Ilmuwan, 43-56.

Baidi (2010). Agama dan Multikulturalisme. Pengembangan Kerukunan Masyarakat Melalui Pendekatan Agama. *Millah Jurnal Studi Agama,* Vol. 10, 1-29.

Bagir, Z. et. al. (2011). *Laporan Tahunan Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia 2010.* Yogyakarta: CRCS UGM.

Bagir, Z., Suhadi (2009). *Laporan Tahunan Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia 2008.* Yogyakarta: CRCS UGM.

Bagir, Z., I. Abdullah (2011). The Development and Role of Religious Studies: Some Indonesian Reflections. In K. Bustamam-Ahmad, P. Jory (eds.), *Islamic Studies and Islamic Education in Contemporary Southeast Asia.* Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Ilmuwan, 57-74.

Banawiratma, J., et. al. (2010). *Dialog Antarumat Beragama. Gagasan dan Praktik di Indonesia.* Yogyakarta: CRCS UGM.

Barton, G. (2010). Indonesia. In B. Rubin (ed.), *Guide to Islamist Movements.* Volume 1. New York: Sharpe, 133-136.

Bassnett, S. (1998). *Translation Studies,* London: Routledge.

Bates, T. (1975). Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony. *Journal of the History of Ideas,* Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr.-Jun.), 351-366.

Beatty, A. (1999). *Varieties of Javanese religion. An anthropological account.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Beck, H. (2002). A Pillar of Social Harmony: the Study of Comparative Religion in Contemporary Indonesia. In G. Wiegers, J. Platvoet (eds.), *Modern Societies and the Science of Religions. Studies in Honour of Lammert Leertouwer*. Leiden: Brill, 331-349.

Benhabib, S. (1992). *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*. New York: Routledge.

Berger, P. (1999). The Desecularisation of the World: A Global Overview. In P. Berger (ed.), *The Desecularisation of the World. Resurgent Religion and World Politics*. Washington D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Centre, 1-18.

Bertrand, J. (2004). *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Blommaert, J. (1991). How Much Culture is There in Inter-Cultural Communication? In J. Blommaert, J. Verschueren (eds.), *The pragmatics of Intercultural and International Communication*. Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 13-31.

Blommaert, J., J. Verschueren (1991). Intercultural and International Communication. In J. Blommaert, J. Verschueren (eds.), *The pragmatics of Intercultural and International Communication*. Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Bolland, B. (1971). The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia. *Verhandelingen Van Het Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, No. 59, The Hague: Nijhoff, 196-204.

Bosma, U., E. Raben (2008). *Being Dutch in the Indies. A History of Creolisation and Empire, 1500-1920*. Trans. by W. Shaffer. Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Trans. by R. Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1987). Legitimation and Structured Interest in Weber's Sociology of Religion. In S. Whimster, S. Lash (eds.), *Max Weber, Rationality, and Modernity*. London: Allen and Urwin, 119-136.

Bourdieu, P. (1990). *In Other Words. Essays Towards Reflexive Sociology*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1991). *Language and Symbolic Power*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1992). *The Logic of Practice*. Trans. by R. Nice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bowen, J. (2003). *Islam, Law, and Equality in Indonesia. An Anthropology of Public Reasoning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Braithwaite, J., et. al. (2010). *Anomie and Violence*. Canberra: ANU E-Press.

Bryceson, D. (2010). Swahili Creolization. The Case of Dar es Salaam. In R. Cohen, P. Toninato (eds.), *The Creolization Reader. Studies in Mixed Identities and Cultures*. London-New York: Routledge, 364-375.

Burke, P. (2009). *Cultural Hybridity*, Cambridge: Polity.

Bush, R. (2008). Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom? In G. Fealy and S. White (eds.), *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*. Singapore: ISEAS.

Bush, R. (2009). *Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia*. Singapore: ISEAS.

Cholil, S. et. al. (2010). *Annual Report on Religious Life in Indonesia 2009*. Yogyakarta: CRCS UGM.

Cholil, S. (2010). Freedom of Religion or Belief in Indonesia and the Challenge of Muslim Exceptionalism. In S. Sinn, M. Sinaga (eds.), *Freedom and Responsibility. Christian and Muslim Explorations*. Geneva: Lutheran University Press, 117-134.

Cribb, R., A. Kahin (2004). *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia*. Second Edition. Maryland: Scarecrow Press.

Cush, D. (2005). Engaged Religious Studies . *Discourse*, Vol. 4, Number 2, Spring, 83-103.

Darmaputera, E. (1988). *Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society. A Cultural and Ethical Analysis.* Leiden: Brill.
Delabastita, D., et al. (eds.) (2006). *Functional Approaches to Culture and Translation: Selected Papers by José Lambert.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
Droogers, A. (2011). *Play and Power in Religion: Collected Essays.* Göttingen: Hubbert & Co.
Dhakidae, D. (2003). *Cendekiawan dan Kekuasaan dalam Negara Orde Baru.* Jakarta: Gramedia.
Durkheim, E. (1964). *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.* New York: Humanities Press.
Eliot, J., L. Capaldi, J. Bickersteth (2001) *Indonesia Handbook,* 3rd Edition, New South Wales: Footprints.
Fabian, J. (2001). *Anthropology with An Attitude.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Fairclough, N. (1989). *Language and Power.* London: Longman.
Fairclough, N. (1992). *Discourse and Social Change.* Cambridge: Polity Press.
Fairclough, N. (1995). *Critical Discourse Analysis.* Boston: AddisonWesley.
Fealy, F., V. Hooker, S. White. (2006). Indonesia. In G. Fealy and V. Hooker (eds.), *Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia A Contemporary Sourcebook.* Singapore: ISEAS.
Feener, R. (2007). *Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Flood, G. (1999). *Beyond Phenomenology. Rethinking the Study of Religion.* London, New York: Cassell.
Fitzgerald, T. (2007). *Religion and the Secular. Historical and Colonial Formations.* London: Equinox.
Foucault, M. (1965). *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason.* New York: Pantheon Books.
Foucault, M., C. Gordon. (1980). Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. *Manchester: Manchester* University *Press.*
Geertz, C. (1960). *The Religion of Java. The Religion of Java.* Glencoe: Free Press.
Geertz, C. (1973). *The Interpretation of Culture.* New York: Basic Books.
Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Identity in the Late Modern Age.* Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gile, D. (1998). Observational Studies and Experimental Studies in the Investigation of Conference Interpreting. *Target* 10 (01), 69-93.
Gleason, P. (1983). Identifying Identity. A Semantic History. *The American Journal of History,* 69 (4): 910-931.
Goh, R. (2005). *Christianity in Southeast Asia.* Singapore: ISEAS.
Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks.* London: Lawrence and Wishart.
Guba, E. (1990). The Alternative Paradigm Dialog. In E. Guba (ed), *the Paradigm Dialog.* California: Sage.
Guinness, P. (2009). *Kampung, Islam and State in Urban Java.* Singapore: NUS Press.
Habermas, J. (1984). *The Theory of Communicative Action, Reason and the Rationalization of Society.* Cambridge: Polity Press.
Halbfass, W. (1988). *India and Europe. An Essay in Understanding.* New York: State University of New York Press
Hall, S. (1996). Minimal Selves. In H. Baker, M. Diawara, R. Lindeborg (eds.), *Black British Cultural Studies. A reader.* Chicago-London: University of Chicago Press, 114-119.
Hannerz, U. (1992). *Cultural Complexity. Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning,* New York: Columbia University Press.
Hasan, N. (2005). *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia.* Ph.D. thesis at University of Utrecht Netherlands.

Headley, S. (2004). *Durga's Mosque: Cosmology, Conversion And Community in Central Javanese Islam.* Singapore: ISEAS.

Heather, N. (2000). *Religious Language and Critical Discourse Analysis.* Oxford, Bern & Berlin: Lang.

Hefner, R. (2000). *Civil Islam. Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Hermans, H., A. Hermans-Konopka (2010). *Dialogical Self Theory. Positioning and Counter-Positioning in a Globalizing Society.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heuken, A. (2008a). Catholic Converts in the Moluccas, Minahasa, and Sangihe-Talaud, 1512-1680". In J. Aritonang, K. Steenbrink (eds.), *A History of Christianity in Indonesia.* Leiden: Brill.

Heuken, A. (2008b). The Solor-Timor Mission of the Dominicans, 1562-1800. In J. Aritonang, K. Steenbrink (eds.), *A History of Christianity in Indonesia.* Leiden: Brill.

Hidayah, S. (2010). Translating "Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa". An Amenable Religuious Ideology. In F. Dhont, K. Ko, M. Hoadley, Th. Conners (eds.), *Pancasila's Contemporary Appeal. Re-legitimizing Indonesia's Founding Ethos.* Yogyakarta: Indonesian History Studies Center-Sanata Dharma University, 239-253.

Holland, D. & N. Quinn (2000). *Cultural Models in Language and Thought.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Huntington, S. (1996). *The clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster.

Hüsken, F. (2009). Violence for the Sake of Religion? Paper presented at the Nijmegen Interdisciplinary Centre for Development and Cultural Change. Radboud University Nijmegen. May 29, 2009.

Hüsken, F., H. de Jonge (eds.). (2002). *Violence and Vengeance. Discontent and Conflict in New Order Indonesia.* Saarbrücken: Verlag für Entwicklungspolitik.

Hussein, F. (2007). *Muslim-Christian Relations in the New Order Indonesia: The Exclusivist and Inclusivist Muslims' Perspective.* Bandung: Mizan.

Ichwan, M. (2006). *Official Reform of Islam: State Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia 1966-2004.* Ph.D. Dissertation at Leiden University, the Netherlands.

Indrayana, D. (2008). *Indonesian Constitutional Reform 1999-2002. An Evaluation of Constitution-Making Transition.* Jakarta: Kompas.

Intan, B. (2006). *Public Religion and the Pancasila-Based State of Indonesia. An Ethical and Sociological Analysis.* New York: Peter Lang.

Isaacson, J., C. Rubenstein (eds.) (2009). *Islam in Asia: Changing Political Realities.* New Jersey: Transaction.

Juoro, U. (2008). The Development of Islamic Banking in the Post-Crisis Indonesian Economy. In G. Fealy and S. White (eds.), *Expressing Islam. Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia.* Singapore: ISEAS.

Jørgensen, M., L. Phillips (2002). *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method.* London: Sage.

Kartodirdjo (1966). *The peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel. A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Kim, C. (2004). *Islam among the Swahili in East Africa.* Nairobi: Acton Publisher.

Kim, H. (2007). *Reformist Muslims in a Yogyakarta Village: The Islamic Transformation of Contemporary Religious Life.* Canberra: ANU Press.

Kim, M. (2002). *Non-Western Perspectives on Human Communication.* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Kippenberg, H. (1983). Diskursive Religionswissenschaft. In B. Gladigow, H. Kippenberg (eds.), *Neue Ansätze in der Religionswissenschaft.* Kösel-Verlag München.

Kvale, S. (2008). *Doing Interviews*. Los Angeles: Sage.
Latif, Y. (2008). *Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power*. Singapore: ISEAS.
Lawrence, B. (1999). *The Eastward Journey of Muslim Kingship, Islam in South and Southeast Asia*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, B. (2007). Teaching Religion in Indonesia. A Report on Graduate Studies in Java. *Teaching Theology and Religion*, Vol. 15, Issue 3, July, 241-257.
Mall, R. (2000). *Intercultural Philosophy*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Masuzawa, T. (2005). *The Invention of World Religions*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Mazrui, A. (2006). *Islam between Globalization and Counter-Terrorism*, Oxford: Currey.
Mazrui, A., A. Mazrui (1995). *Swahili State and Society. The Political Economy of an African Language*, London: Currey, Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers.
McCutcheon, R. (1997). *Manufacturing Religion. The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia*. New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moffett, S. (2005). *A History of Christianity in Asia. Vol. II 1500-1900*. New York: Orbis.
Morris, P. (ed.) (1994). *Bakhtin Reader: Selected Writings of Bakhtin, Medvedev, Voloshinov*. London: Edward Arnold.
Mujiburrahman (2006). *Feeling Threatened. Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia's New Order*. Ph.D. Thesis at Utrecht University, the Netherlands.
Mulyadi, M., Soedarmono. (1999). *Runtuhnya Kekuasaan "Kraton Alit". Studi Radikalisasi Sosial "Wong Sala" dan Kerusuhan Mei 1998 di Surakarta*. Surakarta: LPTP.
Munday, J. (2008). *Introducing Translation Studies Theories and Application*. New York: Routledge.
Ndaluka, T. (2012). *Religious Discourse, Social Cohesion and Conflict Muslim-Christian Relation in Tanzania*. München: Lit Verlag.
Notholt, S. (2008). *Fields of Fires. An Atlas of Ethnic Conflict*. Leicester: Matador.
Novianti, R. (2009). *Tradisi Marawis di Pasar Kliwon: Studi Tentang Budaya Masyarakat Arab di Surakarta*. B.A. Thesis at Sebelas Maret University of Surakarta, Indonesia.
Nugroho, N. (2008). *Menyintas dan Menyeberang. Perpindahan Massal Keagamaan Pasca 1965 di Pedesaan Jawa*. Yogyakarta: Syarikat.
Panikkar, R. (1978). *The Intra-Religious Dialogue*. New York: Paulist Press.
Partonadi S. (1998). *Sadrach's Community and Its Contextual Roots. A Nineteenth Century Javanese Expression of Christianity*. Ph.D. Thesis. Free University of Amsterdam.
Pemberton, J. (1994). *On the Subject of Java*. New York: Cornell University Press.
Picard, M. (2011). Introduction Agama, Adat, and Pancasila. In M. Picard, R. Madinier (eds.). *The Politics of Religion in Indonesia. Syncretism, Orthodoxy, and Religious Contention in Java and Bali*. London: Routledge, 1-20.
Platzdasch, B. (2009). *Islamism in Indonesia. Politics in the Emerging Democracy*. Singapore: ISEAS.
Pohl, F. (2006). Islamic Education and Civil Society: Reflections on the Pesantren Tradition in Contemporary Indonesia. Comparative Education Review, Vol. 50, No. 3, Special Issue on Islam and Education, 389-409.
Prior, J. (2007). Dari Kelompok Sempalan Menjadi Kekuatan Utama. In G. Kirchberger, J. Prior (eds.), *Kekuatan Ketiga Kekristenan: Seabad Gerekan Pantekostal 1906-2006*. Maumere: Ledalero-Puslit Candraditya.
Prior, J., A. Hoekema (2008). Theological Thinking by Indonesian Christians 1850-2000. In J. Aritonang, K. Steenbrink (eds.), *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*. Leiden: Brill.
Pringle, R. (2010). *Understanding Islam in Indonesia. Politics and Diversity*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Rachman, B. (2010). *Membela Kebebasan Beragama. Percakapan Tentang Sekularisme, Liberalisme, dan Pluralisme*. Jakarta: Grasindo.

Ranger, T. (1993). The Invention of Tradition Revisited. In T. Ranger, O.Vaughan (eds.), *Legitimacy and State in Twentieth-Century Africa*. London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 62-111.

Reid, A. (1993). *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680.* Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis. Chiang Mai: Silkworm.

Retsikas, K. (2007). Being and Place. Movement, Ancestors, and Personhood in East Java, Indonesia. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.)* 13, 969-986.

Rey, T. (2004). Marketing the Goods of Salvation. Bourdieu on Religion. *Religion* 34 (4), 331-344.

Ricklefs, M. (2007). *Polarising Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions, C. 1830-1930.* Singapore: NUS Press.

Ricklefs, M. (2008). Religion, Politics and Social Dynamics in Java. In G. Fealy, S. White (eds.), *Expressing Islam. Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*. Singapore. ISEAS.

Ricklefs, M. (2012). *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious HIstory, c. 1930 to Present.* Singapore: NUS Press.

Ritzer, R. (1993). *The McDonaldization of Society. An Investigation Into the Changing Character of Contemporary Social Life*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.

Robertson, R. (1995). Glocalization. Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity. In M. Featherstone, S. Lash & R. Robertson (eds.), *Global Modernities*, London: Sage, 25-44.

Rodemeier, S. (2012). Everyone is a Potential Leader. Attractiveness of a Charismatic Church in Solo, Java Indonesia. *Economics,* 3 (20), 45-58.

Ropi, I. (2008). Defending Religious Freedom in Indonesia. Muslims, Non-Muslims, and Legislation on Houses of Worship. In B. MacQueen, K. Baxter, R. Barlow (eds.), *Islam and the Question of Reform. Critical Voices from Muslim Communities.* Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Ruskhan, A.G. (2007). *Bahasa Arab dalam Bahasa Indonesia: Kajian tentang Pemungutan Bahasa.* Jakarta: Grasindo.

Salim, A. (2007). Muslim Politics in Indonesia's Democratization. The Religious Majority and the Rights of Minorities in the Post-New Order Era. In R. McLeod and A. MacIntyre (eds.), *Indonesia. Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance*. Canberra: ANU.

Samuel, H., H. Schulte Nordholt eds. (2004). *Indonesia in Transition*, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.

Schatzman, M. (1971). Madness and Morals. *Salmagundi*, No. 16, R. D. Laing & Anti-Psychiatry (Spring), 159-184.

Sapir, E. (1956). *Culture, Language, and Personality.* Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Sherif, M. (1966). *Group Conflict and Cooperation*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Shihab, A. (1996). *The Muhammadiyah Movement and Its Controversy with Christian Mission in Indonesia.* Ph.D. Thesis at Temple University of America.

Singgih, E. (2004). *Mengantisipasi Masa Depan: Berteologi dalam Konteks di Awal Milenium III.* Jakarta: BPK.

Sirait, S. (2001). *Politik Kristen Indonesia Tinjauan Etis.* Jakarta: BPK.

Smith, W. (1963). *The Meaning and End of Religion. A new Approach to the Religious Traditions of Mankind*. New York: New American Library.

Smith, J. (1982). *Imaging Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sirry, M. (ed.) (2004). *Fiqih Lintas Agama Membangun Masyarakat Inklusif-Pluralis*. Jakarta: Paramadina.

Steenbrink, K. (1990). The Study of Comparative Religion by Indonesian Muslims. A Survey. *Numen*, Vol. 37, Fasc. 2 (Dec.), 141-167.
Steenbrink, K. (1998). Muslim-Christian Relations in the Pancasila State of Indonesia. *The Muslim World* Vol. LXXXVIII, No. 3-4 July-October, 320-352.
Steenbrink, K. (2006). Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam. Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950. Amsterdam-New York: Rodopi.
Sterkens, C., M. Machasin, F. Wijsen (eds.) (2007). *Religion, Civil Society and Conflict in Indonesia*. München: LIT Verlag.
Sterkens, K., H. Hadiwitanto (2009). From Social to Religious Conflict in Ambon. An Analysis of the Origins of Religiously Inspired Violence. In Sterkens C., M. Machasin, F. Wijsen (eds.). *Religion, Civil Society and Conflict in Indonesia*. München: LIT Verlag, 59-85.
Suhadi (2006). *Kawin Lintas Agama*. Yogyakarta: LKiS.
Sumartana, T. (1991). *Mission at the Crossroads. Indigenous Churches, European Missionaries, Islamic Association, and Socio-Religious Change in Java 1982-1936*. Jakarta: BPK.
Sunardi (2007). Lagune Cara Landa Kok Tembunge Basa Jawa. Postcolonial Perspective in Religious Studies. Paper presented on the international conference on the problem and promise of inter-religious studies in Indonesia, ICRS-Yogya, January 14-16, 2007.
Suryo, D. (2000). Political Transformation in Indonesia. *Kaseas*, Vol. 09, 165-186.
Swidler, L., P. Mojzes (2000). *The Study of Religion in an Age of Global Dialogue*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Tajfel, H. (1978). Social Categorization. In H. Tajfel (ed.), *Differentiation Between Groups*, London: Academic Press.
Tajfel, H. & J. Turner (1986). The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour. In S. Worchel, W. Austin (eds.), *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 7-24.
Tamney, J. (2008). Modernization and Religious Purification: Islam in Indonesia. *Review of Religious Research*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Dec.), 207-218.
Tanner, R., F. Wijsen (1993). Christianity in Usukuma. A Working Misunderstanding. *Neue Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft* 49 (3), 177-193.
Tarling, N. (ed.) (1999). *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*. Volume One, Part One From Early Times to c. 1500. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, D., F. Moghaddam (1994). *Theories on Intergroup Relations. International Social Psychological Perspectives*. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger.
Taylor, J. (2003). *Indonesia Peoples and Histories*. London: Yale University Press.
Toft, M., D. Philpott, T.S. Shah eds. (2011). *God's Century Resurgent Religion and Global Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.
Utomo, C.A. (2010). *Peran Etnis Cina dalam Perdagangan di Surakarta pada Tahun 1959-1998*. B.A. Thesis at Sebelas Maret University Surakarta, Indonesia.
Van Binsbergen, W. (2003). *Intercultural Encounters. African and Anthropological Lessons Towards a Philosophy of Interculturality*. München: LIT Verlag.
Van Dijk, T. (1987). *Communicating Racism. Ethnic Prejudice in Thought and Talk*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
Van Dijk, T. (2005). *Racism and Discourse in Spain And Latin America*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
Van Dijk, T. (2008). *Discourse and Context. A Sociocognitive Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Van Klinken, G. (2007). Communal Violence Democratization in Indonesia Small Town Wars. New York: Routledge.
Van Liere, L. (2011). Fighting for Jesus in Ambon. Interpreting Religious Representations of Violent Conflict. *Exchange* 40, 322-335.

Verschuren, P., H. Doorewaard (1999). *Designing a Research Project*. Utrecht: LEMMA.

Von Stuckrad, K. (2003). Discursive Study of Religion. From States of the Mind to communication and action. *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 15, 255-271.

Waardenburg, J. (1974). Islam Studies as a Symbol and Signification System. *Humaniora Islamica,* 2, 267-285.

Wetherell, M. (2001). Debates in Discourse Research. In M. Wetherell, S. Taylor, S. Yates (eds.), *Discourse Theory and Practice*. London, Thousands Oaks, New Delhi: Sage, 380-399.

Wijsen, F. (2007). *Seeds of Conflict in a Haven of Peace. From Religious Studies to Interreligious Studies in Africa*. Amsterdam, New York: Editions Rodopi.

Wijsen, F. (2013). *Religious Discourse, Social Cohesion, and Conflict*. Studying Muslim-Christian Relations. Oxford: Peter Lang.

Wilson, I. (2008). As Long As It's Halal. Islamic Preman in Jakarta. In G. Fealy, S. White (eds.), *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*. Singapore: ISEAS.

Wiredu, K. (1996). *Cultural Universals and Particulars. An African perspective*, Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Yewangoe, A. (2001). *Agama dan Kerukunan*. Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia.

Yin, R. (1994). *The Case Study Research. Designing and Methods*. London: Sage.

Zain, Z. (2011). *Di Balik Gerakan Purifikasi. Kajian Atas MTA (Majlis Tafsir Al Quran) Cabang Kemusu I Desa Watu Gedhe*. M.A. Thesis. Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies, Graduate School, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia.

Zunainingsih, M. (2010). *Sekolah Islam Diponegoro Surakarta Tahun 1966-2005*. B.A. Thesis. Sebelas Maret University Surakarta.

# Appendix 1

*(A candidate for the Christian young male group cancelled his acceptance. He told the research assistant he had an urgent personal commitment, but he gave her a handwritten letter in Bahasa Indonesia. Here is a translation of that letter.)*

Sometimes I feel sorry (kasihan) for Muslims because they are fragmented into various streams. This is because their interpretations of the holy book differ, and because most Muslims obey leaders slavishly (it's like they treat the leaders as prophets), even though their leaders may not be right.

Example: the *santri* at *Pesantren* Ngruki think Ba'asyir is always right, so they really look up to him and ignore the fact that he is a human being who has faults and weaknesses.

Second example: the Islamic paramilitary, such as FPI [Islamic Defender Front] or LUIS (Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta/ Surakarta Islamic Paramilitary Troops), attacked my house to disperse our Bible study group. From their perspective I conclude that they feel perturbed about that activity [Bible study], since a lot of Muslims convert to Christianity because of it. That is why they oppose our Bible study; in their terms they call it *jihad*. From my point of view, maybe it was only fear of several people but then they gathered a mob to fight the Christians. Because of the idea that their leaders are always right, the followers just obey their instructions, even if it means going to war. Sometimes they are stupid because of the idealism of their leader. They are willing to be enslaved [by the leader].

My view of Muslims is that I pity them because they are swayed by the teachings of certain individuals who make them split into different groups. I think because of this separation Muslims have disputes among themselves, even when determining the fasting day and the holyday [*Idul Fitri*].

If I were to describe Muslims, I would use an analogy of a boat with several captains who all have different goals. This confuses the passengers about whom to follow. Some passengers may have decided whom they want to follow, but they are still confused. In the end they debate with each other to reach their own goals. So in the boat itself there is division and perhaps even war among the passengers.

Sometimes they are too fanatical. It makes them narrow-minded and think that their religion is the best while other religions are bad. Sometimes they force people to follow their religion, even using violence.

There is a saying in *bahasa* Indonesia: *katak dalam tempurung* (a frog in a coconut shell, meaning a very narrow-minded person). They are very self-absorbed and do not open themselves to learn or to understand other people outside their group.

PS: *Mbak* Ruth [the research assistant], sorry my handwriting is ugly. This is my own point of view. Indeed, I used to hate them after what they did at my house, but after I opened my eyes and learned to understand them, I feel very sorry for Muslims.

One thing is sure: Christ's followers are the best because there is love and togetherness, and the love is not just for us but also for others outside our group. This is different from some Muslim groups' perspective that says "brothers/sisters are only one (Muslim) congregation, therefore if you are going to help other people, help your brother/sister first, not the heathen" (the heathen here are people from other religions).

# Appendix 2

*(Some participants referred to Dewi Purnamawati when talking about Christians. She is a Muslim woman by conversion and became a preacher after converting to Islam. A Muslim participant brought this bulletin written by Dewi Purnamawati and gave it to the researcher. The original version is in bahasa Indonesia. The capital letters are original.)*

Nadianto / Dewi Purnamawati
Arimatea Forum Solo
Sutowijoyo St. No. 26C, Penumping – Solo – Central Java

**Bible leads church activist to fight for Islam**
**Story of a convert: Dra. Dewi Purnamawati**

*Asalaamu'alaamanittabaalhudaa*
(Peace be upon those who follow the guidance)

My name is Dra. Dewi Purnamawati. I was born in Solo in 1962. In 1971 I followed my father, an air force officer, and moved to Nusa Tenggara Barat [West Nusa Tenggara]on Lombok Island. From elementary school to junior high school I went to Catholic schools: SD Katholik St Antonius Ampenan [elementary school], then SMP Katholik Kesuma Cakranegara (junior high school). I attended senior school at STM Negeri Mataram (vocational high school), graduated in 1981, then continued my studies at IKIP Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta Pedagogical College), graduating in 1985. In 1986 I returned to Solo and taught a course in electricity in a vocational school.

I was given a solid Christian upbringing by my mother. In 1971 my mother successfully converted my father, a Muslim, to Christianity and made him a vibrant and prominent evangelist (whose mission is to spread Christianity). My father had good interpersonal skills and was able to exorcise demons, although so-called supernatural/ magic ability, which is considered a gift from God, is actually satanic.

My two siblings and I were taught to be fanatical and obedient Christians. Since our childhood we had been convinced by Christian doctrine to despise Islam and were anti Islam; also, we had to affirm 'LOVE' as a Christian value. We were taught to be Christian militants in order to Christianize Lomboknese, where Islam was the majority. We were all church activists and actively involved in converting Muslims.

One example of my mother's successful teaching is my younger brother. After completing his master's degree at the Christian Institute TIRANUS Cimahi, Bandung, he became a priest in Cimahi and has been one ever since. He made a deceptive impression by teaching the villagers to cultivate hydroponics and helping them sell these, providing therapy for Muslim teenage drug addicts in the rehabilitation centre, and providing problem-solving services through a Consultant Bureau. All those good deeds are just a means to Christianize Muslims and lead them to receive Jesus as God.

My younger sister is an evangelist in Madura. Sometimes on Saturday nights she would watch the *kyai* (Islamic religious leaders) leaving for Surabaya. She observed that the *kyai* changed into jeans and T-shirts and then go to the red district. This evidence can be a tool to convert the *kyai* when the Suramadu bridge starts to operate.

During my childhood I was able to convert some of my Muslim friends. I invited them to come to Sunday school, luring them with cookies, shoes, books, bags, et cetera. And in the end, together with me, they were baptized.

I am wondering now why their parents did not worry and did not pay much attention to such conversions. They did not realize that their children were being led to hell. In 1986 I married an HMI (Association of Islamic Students) and *pengajian* (religious learning) activist, and successfully converted him to Christianity. In 1987 we had child.

Even though Christianity did not allow it – "[Therefore] what God has joined together, let no one separate" – the pastor finally let us divorce in 1992. The pastor could not find a solution for our marriage problem. Since then the pastor has approved many divorces: better to divorce than live in hell.

Since my divorce my child has been living with my parents in Lombok. My child was taught to be a militant missionary Christian. Using his talents and charm, he successfully converted some of his Muslim friends through music. He was not reluctant to sing Islamic songs, yet at Christmas he invited his Muslim friends to play music in church, also introduced them to Christian life, which was pleasant and in accordance with their youthful spirit. Slowly but surely his friends apostasized; he studied at the Christian University in Yogyakarta, majoring in Christian pastoral counseling (the graduate then becomes GOD'S SERVANT!). In July 2007, when I went to Lombok for *dakwah* (Islamic preaching), I found my son had just delivered his girlfriends' veil; he had converted his Muslim girlfriends to Christianity.

To be honest, I have had doubts about Christianity since I was child. I often wondered why there were so many odd, illogical and immoral stories. Every time I asked my religion teacher, pastor, priest, even a theologian, their answer was always *yes* and *amen*, and I was not allowed to ask again. I was often punished by my teacher and parents because I asked such questions. It was funny, though, because the priest exorcised me, thinking I was possessed.

Despite all the punishment I tried to keep my Christian faith. I kept involving myself in church activities, although deep inside my heart I was restless. Converting to Islam? Wow.... Sorry, I never had such an idea, but I hated and undervalued Islam. Often we even despised Islam. Negative perceptions and opinions about Islam had already deep struck deep roots in our hearts: that Islam was a religion of stupid people, weaklings, the poor and the lazy, and it was the provocation of all the riots and violence; what a coincidence that in Lombok Islam only exposed us to this negative portrayal!

However, no one can suspend God's *hidayah* (guidance). "A good and perfect book does not need revision," that is the Qur'an. If the Bible was true, why did God revise it in the Qur'an? This fact troubled me and shook my Christian faith. Is the Bible a holy scripture? God's revelation? So why are there drunken prophets, even naked, who even lay with their daughters? Why does the Bible tell vulgar and pornographic stories? Why does it talk about adultery among siblings, children and parents and in-laws, lesbianism, even masturbation? Is the aim of the bible to nurture our faith or our lust, especially after reading such great sex adventures as those of the Ohola Oholoba brothers in the book of Ezekiel?

The Bible forbids people to drink wine but why did Jesus transform six buckets of water into wine at a wedding in Cana? Why does this forbidden drink become the symbol of Jesus' holy blood in the church's communion? It happened that a glass of wine which was supposed to be for communion was drunk by one person and the person got drunk immediately. Does it mean that Jesus' blood is intoxicating?

Why did God lose when wrestling with a human being? Why did God also make a wrong decision and regret it? Why was God exalted in falsehood? Why were the interest and fornicator payment holy before God? Why did God need to stop his work and rest? Was God tired? How come God was born of a human being, which means Jesus was on earth while God was in heaven? Besides, it is also mentioned that Jesus will sit at God's right hand. Clearly, it shows that

Jesus and God are two different entities. Why is it taught that Jesus is God? Which means Jesus also eats, drinks and defecates, which is *najis* (unpure). Is it appropriate to picture the holy God as unclean?

Jesus claimed that he was sent [by God], which means Allah sent [him]. He also claimed that he had no power of his own, which means Allah is the Almighty. Jesus only did the Father's will, but Allah is the sovereign. Jesus also prayed, and Allah answered his prayer. Jesus refused to be addressed as kind, because Allah is the God of kindness. Jesus gave his life to Allah, which means Allah was above him. So why is Jesus equal to Allah? Is it possible that the messenger is equal to the sender, the weak to the almighty, worker to controller, receiver to giver, giving to receiving? If Jesus were God, why did not the great prophets like Adam, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Ishmael, David, Solomon, Moses, Zachariah and Maria submit and pray to Jesus?

If Jesus was God and died on the cross, where was his divine character as the life, the eternal, the alpha and omega, and the almighty? Who had the power to kill God? If God died, who would control the universe? And who would answer all the prayers? Who would replace him? Or was there another God ruling this universe?

Why does God have a genealogy, even in two different versions [Matthew's and Luke's]? It means that God has parents, grandparents and ancestors. Why is Judah, who committed adultery with Tamar, his daughter-in-law, in Jesus' genealogy? King David, who sneaked a peek at Bathsheba and committed adultery with her, and planned to kill Uriah, Bathsheba's husband, is also in the genealogy. David and Bathsheba begot Solomon, who had 700 wives and 300 mistresses; Solomon's love for his wives was greater than his love for God. Is it logical that the holy God is the descendant of immoral, idolatrous and adulterous people? It is even illogical, because Jesus is the descendant of both Solomon and Nathan, Solomon's older brother. Is it possible? Should faith overrule logic?

*TAUHID* (monotheism) is worshipping the only almighty God. Jesus and the prophets taught *Tauhid*. Many *Tauhid* verses can be found in the Bible, in both the Old and the New Testament. Yet Paul taught about Jesus' godliness and the trinity concept. Jesus kept the Torah, while Paul didn't. Why do [people] believe in Paul's teaching rather than Jesus'? It indicates that Paul has more power than Jesus.

Israel consisted of twelve tribes. Jesus was sent for the Israelites and forbade his disciples to spread the gospel outside Israel, because later on Jesus was going to judge the Israelites. Why, then, do missionaries decisively say that they carry out the great commission to spread the gospel to all nations, like the Javanese, Chinese, Bataknese, etcetera? Are those nations Israelites? If they were, to which Israelite tribe do they belong? In other words, the missionaries present Jesus as God but ignore his command.

I got more confused. There were too many whys, contradictions, immoralities and abstruse ideas in the Bible. I became reluctant to go to church and to read the Bible; besides, the Bible was revised by the Qur'an.

On Christmas Eve 1998 I forced myself to join the Christmas service. Yet I received no peace but only got more entangled. Many questions were still unanswered and caused me more confusion. RELIGION, GOD, SCRIPTURE are all about TRUTH, not JUSTIFICATION, therefore it must be the right choice because it leads to either hell or heaven!

When the church and Bible could not satisfy my quest, a terrible accident almost cost me my life. Driving fast to Madiun, I had a flat tire because my car drove over a piece of sharp metal. I zigzagged out of control. I was pale and my heart beat faster. Terror of death overwhelmed me, whether I would go to hell or heaven when I died. I had already left Christianity and had not found the right religion; thanks be to God, as he still saved me. I regained control and pulled my car into the middle of a rice field far from anywhere. Suddenly I heard *azan Maghrib*, the call to prayer at sundown. It touched my heart..."Is it the answer?" I asked myself. I had to decide what was my choice.

When a friend lent me a book called *Akhlak Islam* (Islamic morality] I was astonished. Islam put into its concern all the triviality; Islam also regulates and gives guidance about it through Hadits and the Qur'an. For example, after having sexual intercourse husband and wife must take a bath. A woman who is having her period is not allowed to do *shalat*, enter the mosque and read the Qur'an. Another thing, a wife should have permission from her husband before leaving [the house], and when there is person sitting nearby, those who pass by should greet him. Just like these trivial things are considered, so much more is the important business. Islam is the real guidance from God for our lives. In a way Islam is a stark contrast to Christianity, in which the crucial things are not revealed, such as being a Christian, celebrating Christmas, and worshipping the trinity. All these teachings are human, not God's.

After years of meditation, struggle and asking the real God about the right religion, in February 1999 I decided to convert to Islam. I believe that Islam is the true religion, the *tauhid* religion from God, a religion which was believed and taught by prophets and apostles. The Islamic *syariah* (law) was developed from prophet to prophet and made perfect by the prophet Mohammed peace be upon him, whereby this latest *syariah* is perfect and blessed by God.

*Some temptations after I became a Muslim:*

1 Just after becoming a Muslim my family, friends and Christian neighbors disowned me, while the Muslims still questioned my Islamic faith.
2 On 14 August 2001 my doctor said that I only had two years left because of my illness.
3 As I continued to learn Islamic teaching, I succumbed to heresy. I did *shalat* in old mosques, asking for a blessing either at the *walis'* (saints') graves or at the old sacred grave. I even ate bread with Arabic letters imprinted on it, chanted certain mantras and wore talismans to fulfill my wish. The *kyai* asked me to do all those things. It was said that the *kyai* was invulnerable and could hit enemies from afar. In the end it was a lie. When I had problems with people the *kyai* was just sitting at his home chanting his mantra, was afraid to come out. When his child had an accident he was safe but his child passed away. So where was his power? He emphasized *dzikir* (chanting), *wiridan* (chanting) the whole night instead of performing *shalat subuh* (prayer at dawn) in time and together in mosque. [He performed] *shalat subuh* at 10 a.m. because he often woke up late.
4 I went bankrupt because of a *kyai,* who deceived me by pretending to guide and help me. I assumed God put his rod upon me because I ignored him and put my trust and faith in *kyai.*
5 My second husband was the only Muslim manager in his company, which was one of the biggest automotive companies in Indonesia. He was discriminated against and was made to feel unwelcome by his boss, who had just been ordained a priest. His colleagues created an unfriendly environment in order to make him resign.
6 On 18 August 2003 my husband passed away without any disease when my Islamic faith was starting to grow and bloom. He was the person who led and introduced me to Islam. In fact it was I who was seriously ill. I was also penniless and only had IDR 10.000.
7 A week after my husband died my mom came from Lombok and urged me to return to Christianity. She gave me a choice: if I chose Islam, I must return all the money she had spent raising me since childhood. Thankfully, I had Allah to whom I could cling. With the help of some *ustads* [Islamic teachers] and friends I was able to repay my mom.
8 Being alone and a widow, I wanted to fetch my child in Lombok to live with me in Solo. However, my mom abandoned me unless I returned to Christianity; I had to struggle hard and had three miscarriages before Ihad my son, and I also suffered great pain in conceiving and labor.
9 On the eve of Ramadan 27 in 2004 my son phoned me and asked me whether I wanted him or religion. If I chose him, I must return to Christianity. Without hesitation I told him I preferred Islam. I had my *shahada* (declaration of faith) and had promised Allah to follow him

faithfully. Allah deserves our love more than anything, and Allah deserves to be number one in our lives, more than our children and family. Allah is the solid rock for us to rely on. Since then I have been officially expelled from my family; my grandmother does not consider me her granddaughter, my uncles and aunts do not want me to be their niece, my parents do not receive me as their daughter, my younger sister and brother, who received my support during their studies, also regard me as a stranger. If I have to lose my family, wealth, even my life to defend my Islamic identity, I am ready as long as I still receive Allah's *ridha* and *rahmat* (mercy). May Allah keep my faith strong.

10 Now I have joined Arimatea Forum in Solo to do *dakwa* and protect Muslims against conversion and Christianization. Because of this I often receive threats. Once I was threatened that I would be reported to [*Kantor*] *kelurahan* (sub-district office) for causing disharmony. I was also threatened that I would be reported to the police, murdered, hanged, even having my face scratched. Yet I was not afraid and would never back down because almighty Allah would keep his promise as it is written in the Qur'an, book of Mohammed, verse 7: O YE WHO BELIEVE! IF YE WILL AID [THE CAUSE OF] ALLAH, HE WILL AID YOU AND PLANT YOUR FEET FIRMLY. And *mudharat* (benefit, blessing, grace) is only from Allah.

Problems come to me in a row, but Allah is just and he will not let me suffer. Allah loves his servants. He puts his servants to the test and teaches them in order to purify them to become better and more acceptable persons to sit at his side. A *mukmin* (faithful Muslim) is beyond words because s/he can endure all the tests of suffering and unhappiness gratefully, which are meant for his/her own goodness.

This is my up-and-down story of being Christian for about 30 years and my struggle to maintain my *Dienul* Islam (Islamic religion). Islam is an honorable religion that teaches its followers to *amar makruf nahi munkar* (counsel goodness and prevent evil) and to have faith in Allah. Islam is the only way to Allah's grace, salvation, happiness and eternal happiness, Allah's heaven!

The more I study Christology, I find evidence that Christianity is not God's revelation:

1 None of the verses in the Bible mentions God or Jesus commanding people to be Christians. Even in Acts 11:26 it points out that the term 'Christian' came after Jesus was dead and had ascended to heaven. It means that Jesus never heard of this term, never knew or taught Christianity.

2 The great commission [Christianizing the world] in Matthew 28:16-20 turns out to have been an addition by a Christian evangelist in order to Christianize the world. This manipulation was first revealed by Hugh J. Schonfield (Nobel prize nominee in 1959) in his book *The original New Testament* and Robert Funk (a professor of New Testament theology) in his book *The five gospels.*

3 The Christian doctrine that says "the Word was God" in John 1:1-18 turns out to be a manipulation of the Platonic hymn, which says "Logos [the word] is from God..." This manipulation was revealed in Augustine's book *The confessions of Saint Augustine.*

4 The results of a Jesus seminar attended by 76 biblical experts from different field of study show that about 82% of Jesus' statements and actions are doubtful, even fake; this seminar is held twice a year and was held in 1985-1996.

5 Jesus was positioned as God by men at the Council of Nicea in 325. It was convened by Constantine the Great and attended by 318 bishops.

6 In 381 men posited the Holy Spirit as God at the Council of Constantinople. It was convened by Theodosius and attended by 150 bishops. It also added the creed, "Believe that the Holy Spirit is God".

7 CHRISTMAS! The merriest and most sacred service and celebration for Christians was never mentioned/ written in the Bible.
8 December 25 as the celebration of Jesus' birth is a pagan custom, according to which gods are believed to be born on December 25 and was celebrated (Mithras in Persian, Bacchus in Greek, Krishna in India, etc.).
9 God's commandment that the *Sabbath* is on Saturday was changed to Sunday by Constantine the Great; it follows the sun worshipper society's calendar ('Sunday' is from the words 'sun' and 'day'). It means that God's commandment is ignored while human conduct is valued.
10 The doctrine of the trinity taught by Paul (not Jesus) follows paganism, which was widespread and powerful before, after and during Jesus' time.

*Example of trinitarian doctrine followed by Christians*

| Area | God 1 | God 2 | God 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| India | Brahma | Vishnu | Shiva |
| Persia | Oromasdes | Mithras | Ahrimanes |
| Egypt | Osiris | Horus | Isis |
| Greek | Orphic Hanes | Ericapeus | Metis |

On the other hand, the more I learn and practice Islam, the more I find it tremendous and awe-inspiring. Islam conforms to the human disposition, values, reason, and has never denigrated human reason. Clearly and importantly, Islam is from Allah, belongs to Allah, and will always be protected by Allah. Also it is free from human misleading interference.

After studying the Qur'an I found many instances of Christian heresy:

1 Christians wrote the Bible with their own hands, then claimed it was from Allah (Qs 2:79)
2 Christianity is not from Allah (Qs 3:19).
3 Allah rejects Christianity (Qs 3:85)
4 Christians are infidels and will go to hell (Qs 5: 72, Qs 5:73 and Qs 98: 6)
5 Jesus is not Allah's son and Christianity follows the trail of paganism (Qs 9:30)
6 Jesus never said that he was God (Qs 5:116)
7 Jesus was never murdered and crucified, which means there is no penance (Qs 4:147)
8 God begets no son, nor is he begotten (Qs 112: 3)
9 Christianity deviates from Jesus' teaching (QS 23: 53)
10 Jesus is only Allah's servant and prophet (Qs 19:30)
11 Christianity over steps in religiosity (Qs 4: 171)
12 A Christian is not allowed to be appointed a leader or friend (Qs 5: 51 and 57)
13 Christians will never be happy until a *mukmin* follows their religion (Qs 2:120)
14 Christians always fight against and convert Muslims (Qs1: 217)
15 Christians obstruct Allah's way and distort it (Qs 3: 99)
16 Following Christianity means leading a *mukmin* to infidelity (Qs 3:100)

What would shame me would be if Allah the creator and ruler of the universe found me dead still embracing the old infidel belief. How contemptible of me if Allah the protector, provider and owner of heaven and hell found me dead still believing in a faith that is against Allah's guidance.

I am grateful that Allah has led me to find the right path and showed me *Dienul* Islam. Yet I still have concern for my beloved brothers and sisters who have known Islam since birth but have not understood it. Islam is more precious than the universe, even more precious than our lives.[If people] do not understand Islam, it means [they are] easily deceived by *djin* (neither human being nor spirit) and easily led to infidelity.

Finally, I pray may my husband and I always receive blessings from Allah. May our entire lives contribute hugely to Islam and the Muslim faith. We also pray that we will embrace Islam till death in *husnul khatimah* (ending/death in a good way) or being martyrs for Allah.

## Why Islam is a must and the only

The fact is, there are many religions but only Islam is right and blessed by Allah. Islam is the only religion that helps us to go to eternal heaven. Islam also brings peace and blessings while we are still living on earth. However, when there are Muslims who do not find peace and blessings in their life it is not Islam that is to blame but THE PERSON HIM/ HERSELF BECAUSE S/HE DOES NOT FOLLOW ISLAM RIGHTEOUSLY.

Apart from Islam, religion is heresy and misleading. It also leads to eternal hell. Although the majority of the planet believes in it, even though the state approves it, non-Islam is heresy. Although people keep saying that all religions are good and truthful and guarantee heaven, only Islam can guarantee it truthfully.

I do not mean to be fanatical, but truth should be upheld. Let us prevent heretical teachings that are sullying, thwarting the truth, and making the truth look bad, even bad is praised.

Again, mortal and eternal salvation is only through Islam, to die in Islam. Why?

### 1 Islam is the only religion approved by God the owner of heaven

Ali Imran (3): 19

*Religion for Allah is Islam (submission to his will)*

Apart from Islam, religions are not from Allah but human. Therefore no religion mentions its name in their scripture except Islam. For example: the names of Judaism, Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, etcetera are not from God but from human beings.

### 2 Islam is the only way to heaven

Al-An'am (6): 153

*Verily, this is My way, leading straight. Follow it; follow not [other] paths: they will scatter you from His [great] path. Thus doth He command you, that ye may be righteous.*

Allah is the creator and ruler of heaven and men. Islam is Allah's path; it leads to Allah, his *ridha* (will), and his heaven. Other paths only lead men away from Allah, his *ridha* and his heaven.

### 3 Allah only receives Islam, non-Islam is a disadvantage in the afterlife

Ali Imran (3): 85

*If anyone desires a religion other than Islam [submission to Allah], never will it be accepted of him; and in the hereafter he will be in the ranks of those who have lost [all spiritual good].*

Non-Islam means violating Allah's rule, therefore Allah, the judge, and eternal owner of sovereignty, rejects it. All the abundant charity men have ever done does not provide *pahala* (reward). It also does not bring men to heaven but to eternal hell where misery prevails.

### 4 Islam is the only religion for humanity, taught and believed by all prophets

An-Nahl (16): 36

*For We assuredly sent amongst every people an apostle, [with the command], "Serve Allah, and eschew evil." Among the people were some whom Allah guided,and some in whom error became inevitably [established]. So travel throughout the world, and see what was the end of those who denied [the Truth].*

Al-Mu'minun (23): 52

*And verily this brotherhood of yours is a single brotherhood, and I am your Lord and cherisher: therefore fear Me [and no other].*

The core of Islam is *Tauhid*; it worships, surrenders to Allah, and leaves *taghut* (idolatry or anything worshipped except Allah). This was taught by Prophet Muhammad to every believer. Islam means one religion, from Allah for men (believers). The prophet Muhammad's disciples who turned against him created new religions, such as Judaism, Christianity, etcetera (Qs. Al-Mu'minun: 53). In addition Islam establishes different *syariah* for different people in different periods; it follows believers' development.

## 5 Islam is the only perfect religion and is blessed by Allah

Al-Maidah (5): 3

*...This day have I perfected your religion for you, completed My favor upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion...*

The development of *syariah* from the early to the later prophets finally reached its wholeness. Allah blesses this *syariah* when he commanded this verse just before prophet Muhammad's death.

Let us *sami'naa wa atha'naa* (we listen and we obey). **Listen & DO IT!**

# Summary

This doctoral thesis studies the relation between religious discourse and (the lack of) social cohesion. In this respect Indonesia is an interesting case. It has a long tradition of peaceful co-existence, but also a long history of violence and ethnic and/ or religious conflict. Muslim and Christian history in Indonesia paradoxically reveals growing religious convergence and divergence.

In this work I examine social identity construction through Christian-Muslim relations (research object) from the theoretical angle of communicative practice (research perspective), namely the power of language to make and unmake groups, thereby generating convergence or divergence between Christians and Muslims. The hypothesis is that language use is shaped by and shapes broader social and cultural processes. Following Norman Fairclough (1992), I consider critical discourse analysis an appropriate method for studying social change.

I explore why and under what conditions religious discourses are elevated above other discourses and whether or not religious diversity jeopardizes social unity and leads to conflict. I start with the micro (interpersonal) level of discourse (focus group discussions, FGDs), but am also interested in the dialectical relation between the micro (individual) and the macro (societal) level of discourse, and whether the meso (institutional) level plays a mediatory role between the other two levels.

In this research I adopt a constructivist approach and try to find alternative ways of theorizing about and studying religious identity and interreligious relations. The research objectives are: (1) to gain insight into the relation between religious discourse and (the lack of) social cohesion (internal objective), and by doing so (2) to contribute to a theory and method of studying interreligious relations (external objective).

More specifically, the main research questions are the following. First, how do Muslims and Christians identify and position themselves and others? Secondly, what are the socio-cognitive effects of their identification and positioning? Sub-questions relating to question one are: (a) How do Muslims and Christians speak about each other? (b) How do Muslims and Christians speak with each other? Sub-questions relating to question two are: (a) What are the conditions for understanding/ misunderstanding? (b) What are the conditions for cohesion (convergence) or conflict (divergence)?

Following Flood (1999), this study is inspired by the shift from the philosophy of consciousness, in all its variations and complexities, to the philosophy of signs or language. The conceptual framework is inspired by Pierre Bourdieu

(1991), who noted that 'practical classifications are always subordinated to practical functions and oriented towards the production of social effects'. Bourdieu sees identity as a resource or capital, by means of which people strive to further their interests in collaboration or competition with others.

In this study religious identity transformation is examined via interreligious, particularly Muslim-Christian, relations. Thus in this research identity is defined as a narrative of the self (Giddens 1991: 54). People have not just one identity but multiple identities (polyphonic selves). They always engage simultaneously in a plurality of partly overlapping self-narratives. Religious identity is only one of the social identities people can have. Religion is religion because it is placed in a particular narrative context or speech community.

My research strategy is a single case study. Social identity constructions in Indonesia are studied through Christian-Muslim relations, narrowed down to Surakarta as a case. That is to say, I study Muslim-Christian relations in one particular location, Surakarta. Certain unique characteristics of Surakarta make it a perfect case study. The first is its religious diversity. Islam is the majority religion (75.9%), with Christianity (Protestants and Catholics) a significant minority religion (23.2%). Adherents of Christianity in Surakarta outnumber the national and provincial average. Surakarta is also a multi-ethnic city. The majority is Javanese, the others being Chinese, Arab, and so forth.

As this is a study of participants' perspectives, the main source was the spoken language of Christians and Muslims. Most of the data was generated by 24 FGDs. Thus the primary source was FGD participants (informants). Ultimately a total of 150 participants attended the FGDs. Secondary data came from pamphlets, brochures, banners, bulletins, letters from participants and the internet.

Critical discourse analysis was chosen as method of data analysis principally because of the need to explore a plausible dialectic relationship between language and socio-cognitive effects on Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia and explain the role of language in intercultural religious communication in the community. Fairclough (1992) develops CDA as a multi-perspective and poly-methodical approach of discourse analysis.

Our research participants primarily said that belonging to society (relatives, neighbours and friends) was more important than being an adherent of a religion. This preference showed that they prioritize civic rather than religious identity. Although they are faithful believers, they use mainly inclusive language. What we saw in our FGDs is a hegemonic struggle between dominant and peripheral voices to define what is considered "normal" Muslims and Christians. Whereas Christian participants identified extremist (fanatical, fundamentalist) Muslims as abnormal, Muslim participants identified Christians who favour and practise Christianization as excessive. They positioned extremists and excessive persons as extraordinary. Thus they identified extremism as not the norm but an exception to the rule of religions.

The research participants do not understate Indonesian violence because it could have been worse. Our FGD participants were keenly aware of the fact that harmony in Indonesia is fragile and that conflicts erupt every now and again, such as the Solo riots in 1972, 1980 and 1998. According to them the Solo riots were not about religion but only about social problems. This kind of narration is a way to maintain harmony and a social mechanism to avoid further and deeper conflict.

The idea of freedom and liberalization in the political arena influences religious life in Indonesian society, and the other way around. The research participants identified the *Reformasi* as an era of freedom. What we saw in our FGDs is a struggle to redefine Pancasila in the context of the Indonesian *Reformasi* era, which is characterized by an awakening of religious ideology. Because of the diminishing role of the state in the *Reformasi* era, the ideology of Pancasila is no longer enforced top-down, but citizens seem to endorse it bottom-up. They reproduced a link between "Pancasila country" and tolerance and religious freedom.

Summarizing our findings we offer a synthesis on two axes, one with the religious and the secular positions as extreme poles, the other with two opposite religious positions (Java Muslim/ Christian) at the centre. In general what we saw in the FGDs is a struggle between three positions. First, the extreme position advocates an Islamic Syariah state or comprises militant Christians. This first position is mono-cultural, which is a peripheral voice. Second, there is the moderate position or peaceful coexistence: tolerate the other but do not mix (at least not religions). This is a multicultural position which is a mainstream position. A third position, which is also peripheral, is relativist or nominal. From a different angle, the multicultural (religio-ethnic) identity is midway between two other peripheral identities: religious and secular.

In relation to the contribution to a theory and method of studying interreligious relations (external objective) I conclude as the following. Fairclough's (1992) clearly specifies linking the analyses of discourse as text and as social practice. The two stages of analysis are linked via a third, the analysis of discursive practice. But Fairclough leaves a gap when he differentiates between the levels of analysis. Given the fact that we analyse interactions between participants in FGDs, thus at the individual and interpersonal level, how can we draw conclusions at a societal level? In our view it is the institutional level that mediates between the individual and the societal level. For instance, in our FGDs we recognize that Javanese language and customs are institutions or shared practices and patterns of behaviour that go beyond individuals.

The foregoing insight brings us to a second conclusion. The patterned behaviour and routines (e.g. 'sameness of custom') are based on shared knowledge or social cognitions (e.g. 'Javanese wisdom'). Although cognition plays a relevant role, Flood (1999) suggests that the discipline of religious studies

should not be trapped in a reductive cognitive approach which sees culture merely as a cognitive system. We need to clarify the relation between discursive study of religion and cognitive science. This would be an interesting field for further research.

Our research participants reproduced various classifications. Such as "ordinary" and "fanatical"; "normal" and "extreme"; "*abangan*" (nominal) and "*santri*" (devout). But our study showed that distinctions and classifications are not clear-cut. They are not fixed but flexible. Unlike social identity theories (Tajfel & Turner 1986), which define identity on the basis of intrinsic values that can be measured by objective criteria, we found that identities are fluid. We can relate that conclusion to a current trend in the study of religious identity. It seems that in modern times religious identities were more or less fixed, whereas from a postmodern perspective they are more fluid, hybrid. That is to say, religious believers not only switch easily from one language to the other but increasingly mix them. Those classifications showed the complexity and dynamics of participants' voices in identifying the others and themselves. Thus, it is important in religious study to shift from social identity to 'multiple identity' theory.

Fairclough (1992) combines linguistic analysis with critical theory. In that sense CDA moves from disengaged to engaged science, which is relevant to the debate on religious studies in Indonesia that we started with. In Indonesian context, religious study mainly is not 'objective', but engages in social engineering. In a society where 99% of the population says that religion is important in their daily life (Gallup Poll 2008) there is no other way. In this sense religious study in Indonesia differs from religious studies in Europe or North America, which sticks to methodological agnosticism. Scholars of religious study in Indonesia are mostly engaged in religion. This research by way of a discursive study of religion and more specifically the CDA method will, I hope, contribute to theoretical clarification as well as offer a methodological alternative for developing engaged religious studies in Indonesia.

# Curriculum Vitae

Suhadi is a lecturer at the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS), Graduate School, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia. He is also a board member who is responsible for higher Islamic education at the Pesantren Sunan Pandanaran Yogyakarta. He obtained his B.A. degree from the State Institute for Islamic Studies Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta in Islamic law and his M.A. degree from CRCS, Graduate School, Gadjah Mada University in religion and cross-cultural studies. Among his publication are "This is Why We Make Noise: National Unity and Religious Diversity in Indonesia and Tanzania", co-author with Frans Wijsen and Thomas Ndaluka in Khudori, *Religious Diversity in A Global Society: Discourse and Realities in Asia and Africa with a Comparative View from Europe* (Malang: Universitas Brawijaya Press, 2013), "Freedom of Religion or Belief in Indonesia and the Challenge of Muslim Exceptionalism" in Sinn & Sinaga, *Freedom and Responsibility: Christian and Muslim Explorations* (Zurich: Lutheran University Press & the LWF 2010), *The State of Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: A Literature Review,* co-author with Zainal A. Bagir (Amsterdam: Hivos, 2008), "The Politico-Religious Contestation, Hardening of the Islamic Law on Muslim-non-Muslim Marriage in Indonesia" in Jones, Chee & Maznah, *Muslim-non-Muslim Marriage: Political and Cultural Contestations in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008).


Jorge E. Castillo Guerra; Joop Vernooij (Eds.)
**Relaciones interreligiosas en el Caribe**
Ecumene, interculturalidad e interreligiosidad
Una investigación del campo religioso en el Caribe – de la que la presente publicación es una muestra muy valiosa – no sólo es urgente para rescatar el valor de la diversidad religiosa y espiritual, sino para «devolver» a sus pobladores algo de la riqueza apropiada por los poderes coloniales y neocoloniales. Además, puede dar un impulso decisivo para investigaciones parecidas en América Central y Sudamérica, tanto en países con fuerte presencia de religiones afrodescendientes (Brasil, Colombia, Ecuador) como indígenas originarias (Guatemala, México, Panamá, Ecuador, Perú, Bolivia). (...) En la presente publicación, se ha optado por un abordaje integral y sobre todo empírico del campo religioso en el Caribe. Se intenta articular los diálogos intercultural, ecuménico e interreligioso, partiendo desde la religiosidad popular, y no desde unos parámetros de tipo ideal o doctrinales (teológicos). Se trata, ante todo, de un intento de «fenomenología» religiosa que incluye aportes antropológicos, sociológicos y comparatísticos, complementados por enfoques más pastorales y eclesiológicos. La riqueza fenomenológica constituye una base muy valiosa y sólida para futuras investigaciones y reflexiones de tipo teológico, misionológico y hasta filosófico.
*Josef Estermann*
*Interreligious Studies*, Bd. 4, 2010, 200 S., 19,90 €, br., ISBN-CH 978-3-643-90021-0

LIT Verlag Berlin – Münster – Wien – Zürich – London
Auslieferung Deutschland / Österreich / Schweiz: siehe Impressumsseite




Thomas Joseph Ndaluka
**Religious Discourse, Social Cohesion and Conflict**
Muslim – Christian Relations in Tanzania
This book analyzes socio-religious transformation in Tanzania. Some scholars claim that religion has returned to the public domain since the collapse of Tanzanian socialism, and that there is a tension between Muslims and Christians. Based on focus group discussions in Dar es Salaam, the author acquires insight into Muslim - Christian relations using Critical Discourse Analysis. He analyses how Muslims and Christians identify and position themselves in relation to each other and the conditions which make them elevate their religious identity over other identities. The book reveals that some periphreal voices threaten social cohesion, but in general Muslims and Christains maintain friendly relations and avoid conflict. It also shows individualization or de-institutionalization as dominant trends in the country. However, educational institutions have remained strong and influence other institutions such as the family.
*Interreligious Studies*, vol. 5, 2012, 288 pp., 24,90 €, br., ISBN-CH 978-3-643-90211-5

LIT Verlag Berlin – Münster – Wien – Zürich – London
Auslieferung Deutschland / Österreich / Schweiz: siehe Impressumsseite

This book studies social identity transformations through interreligious relations in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia. It answers two questions: first, how do Muslims and Christians identify and position themselves and others; and second, what are the socio-cognitive effects of their identification and positioning? The objectives are first to gain insight into the relation between religious discourse and (the lack of) social cohesion; and second to contribute to a theory and method of studying interreligious relations. The study is based in 24 focus group discussions in Surakarta (Central Java) and making a critical discourse analysis of them. The author concludes that interviewees use various classifications to identify and position themselves and others, but that these are not fixed but fluid, depending on specific situations and interests. He advocates a shift from the 'social identity' theory to a 'multiple identity' theory for studying religion and interreligious relations.

Suhadi is a lecturer at the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) at Gadjah Mada University (UGM), Yogyakarta, Indonesia. He is also a board member of the Pesantren Sunan Pandanaran Yogyakarta. He obtained a B.A. degree in Islamic law from the State Institute for Islamic Studies Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta and a M.A. degree in religious and cross-cultural studies from CRCS. From 2008 till 2013 he was a Ph.D. candidate at Radboud University Nijmegen (RUN), The Netherlands.

978-3-643-90465-2

LIT
www.lit-verlag.ch