



DIVERSITY ISSUES IN LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN PAPUA

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ABSTRACT. Many countries have implemented decentralization. However, in the case of Indonesia it has also been accompanied by a controversial phenomenon: the local government proliferation or “blossoming”. As result of the proliferation wave, the number of local governments in Indonesia increased significantly, also in Eastern Indonesia such as Papua. In recent decentralization and special autonomy for Papua, this region has significantly increased its regional income. Papua was called as example of frontier economy regions that have attracted a large number of economic migrants and it has had a profound impact on the demographic composition of Papua and its ethnic mix. Lack of human resources, in particular in the new autonomous regions, may increase voluntary migrants from other areas. The aim of this paper is to describe demographic changes in Papua and to argue this diversity issue should be concerned in Papuan development.

JEL codes: J11, Z13

Keywords: diversity, development, social capital, Papua

1. Introduction

One of important issues related to local development is decentralization. It is argued that decentralization may benefit local development (i.e. Helmsing 2001) since decentralization will reduce overload and congestion in the channels of administration and communication and bring government closer

to the people and increase participation of local communities to decision-making process (i.e. Rondinelli, Nellis, Cheema 1983).

The “Big Bang Decentralization” in Indonesia (Hofman and Kaiser 2002, Nickson *et al.* 2009: 59) was seen as an important policy to address the diversity in various aspects of Indonesia as a diverse country since it was aimed to bring the government to the people. But as Nickson *et al.* noted, although decentralization has increased the resources going to the local level, that increase has been much greater in the resource-rich regions than elsewhere and it does not systematically address either poverty or inter-regional inequality (Nickson *et al.* 2009: 90). Moreover, Aspinall (2010), in his article on the Indonesia’s democratic transition after Soeharto, claimed that the effects of decentralization on conflict amelioration have been positive, but the impact on corruption control and improving government performance has not been.

Decentralization may also results a reform on the territorial administration. Local government could be fragmented (proliferated) or consolidated. In the international context of territorial reforms, according to Ferrazzi (2007: 6–7), there was a long history of fragmentation and the more recent developments are consolidations, mainly in Western Europe and North America (for the Asia-Pacific regions, see: Nickson *et al.* 2009: 64). In contrast, several countries in Eastern Europe and other developing countries in Africa and Asia have established new regions (8–9). The creation of new regions in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia could be caused by several reasons (Tabel 1) such as buying political supports and bringing the government closer to the people (Ferrazzi 2007: 8). For example, popular pressures for increased democracy forced a rapid increase the number of municipalities in the Czech Republic after shedding communism. Meanwhile, in Poland, its government wished to bring government closer to the people and improve public services efficiency, besides there was the citizens groups’ pressure to demand a large number of municipalities. The Polish government used the “5-10-50” formula, which means each district would comprise at least five municipalities and a district capital of at least ten thousand inhabitants, and an overall population of at least fifty thousand. The results of this formula are 373 new districts. In Uganda, the number of districts also increased significantly, along ethnic lines, in particularly since 2000s and the major drivers were administrative job creation and fulfilment of political campaign promises by the ruling party (Emmanuel 2008).

2. Decentralization-Proliferation: The Setting

Proliferation is only one type of territorial reforms; others are amalgamation, division, and dissolution of regions. These reforms were intended to increase people's welfare through better service, enhanced democratic life, faster economic growth, increased security and order, and harmonious relations between regions. However, in facts, most of territorial reform implementations are proliferation of local government or '*pemekaran daerah*' in local terms ("blossoming"). The rapid growth of creating new local government makes Indonesia as a unique country compared to other countries that also experienced proliferation (Firman 2009: 143).

As a result of the proliferation wave, the number of local governments in Indonesia increased significantly. In 1998, there were 27 provinces and 289 districts and municipalities in Indonesia and in June 2009, but these figures jump to 33 and 497, respectively. As shown in Table 2, most of these new regions are located out of Java, such as in Eastern Indonesia. Surprisingly, the demand of creating new regions has been continuing until recently. Until February 2011, Ministry of Home Affairs has received 181 new proposals for creating new autonomous regions (*JPNN*, 17/2/2011). In March 2011, the House of Representative received about 85 proposals (*Kompas* 10/3/2011). In contrast, the Ministry of Finance found 80 per cent of 145 new autonomous regions have failed to improve public services and people's welfare (*Kompas*, 21/3/2011). Furthermore, it is estimated that in 2025 Indonesia will consists of 46 provinces and 545 districts and municipalities (www.detik.com, 2011/06/09).

Those figures indicate that local development in Indonesia not only face new circumstances due to decentralization but also specifically local government proliferation that has obviously prompted many concerns and questions on its benefits for the people in the new regions. As Fitriani, Hofman and Kaiser (2005: 57) argued, local government proliferation has been a fundamental in changing Indonesia's sub-national administrative, political and fiscal landscape. Moreover, Lamont (2009: 21) states that underlying issues of proliferation in Indonesia are amongst the most complex and difficult that any government confronts since they involve geographic, political and financial/economic elements.

Local government proliferations can influence local development. A number of studies have been dedicated to the subject of local government proliferation. Using various perspectives, studies identifying determinants of the occurrence of proliferation, and came with a mixed result (Fitriani, Hofman and Kaiser 2005, Nordhold and Klinken 2007, Qibthiyyah 2008 and 2010, Kimura 2010). For example, Fitriani, Hofman and Kaiser did not support the "fiscal spoil" hypothesis (splitting could bring additional fiscal

resources in the form of general transfer, revenue sharing, or locally derived revenues), but in contrast Qibthiyah found evidence supporting that hypothesis. While, Nordhold and Klinken (2007) argues that the creation of new regions is locally driven, Kimura (2010) shows there is an important influence of “territorial coalitions,” webs of networks and alliances, which linked national, regional and local levels, in the redrawing of boundaries at provincial level in Indonesia.

The second group of studies examines several aspects of the outcomes of proliferation (USAID-DRSP 2006, Bappenas and the UNDP 2008, Simatupang 2009, Firman 2009, Brata 2009). In general, these studies indicate the negative consequences of proliferation on development. Firman, for example, states there is a big question whether the proliferation of local government has improved economic development, poverty alleviation, and the quality of public service provision in the new regions (Firman 2009: 154). In contrast, Simatupang (2009) concludes there is no reason to reject proliferation since there is no evidence that it would hurt any sectors since the outcomes of education improved with decentralization and that local government are responding to local needs for education services as well as in the health services. In addition, the proliferation of new districts has exemplified the processes of predatory behavior at the local level (Aspinall 2010). It might occurred since the underlying motive of proliferation is often to provide some patronage resources for the local elite, such as bureaucrats and political bosses, or networks to dominate the new regions.

There are other aspects of local development in the new regions that need further scrutiny like the consequences of changing of demographic composition (in term of ethnicity and religion), together with local politics the latter could be the intermediate factors in explaining local development of the new regions in particularly the laggards.

2.1 Some Diversity Issues in Papua

Regarding issues related to proliferation, it is interesting to focus on the eastern part of Indonesia, which characterizes as the laggard regions, i.e. in poverty reduction and human development, although they are natural-rich regions (Resosudarmo and Jotzo 2009). Papua is an important case since this has rich natural endowments. Strokirch, in her article, argued that Indonesia’s national interest in retaining Papua is clear since its land mass—almost one quarter of Indonesia and is three and a half times bigger than Java—is home to 60 percent of the national population, and a substantial part of its natural resources (Strokirch 2001). Until recently, for many Papuans, the only interest of Jakarta in this province is the exploitation of its natural resources.

2.2 Demographic Changes

Concerning the demography issues, it could be said that both decentralization and proliferation may spur the demographic changes—through voluntary migration—in the new regions in particularly those have rich natural endowments or promising regions. An important reason for this migration is due to decentralization and proliferation may provide socio-economic opportunities at local level, therefore those may attract internal migration from other areas in the country. In recent years, both decentralization and special autonomy in Papua has significantly increased its regional income. Accordingly, development on this island does not face a lack of funds (Resosudarmo, Manning, Napitupulu 2009). Therefore, it is not surprising that Papua was called as example of frontier economy regions that have attracted large number of economic migrants (Chauvel 2009).

Migrants will come to the promising provinces. Ananta (2006) also mentions this for Riau Archipelago that migrants may provide contribution to development in this province only if the local government can capitalise on the migrants. Otherwise, this may give negative impacts such as social conflicts.¹ Therefore, in order to minimize the potential of this violent conflict, Ananta suggested to enlarge what he called as “the cake of economic development” and to distribute this among various ethnic and religious groups.

In general, migration is also not a new phenomenon for Eastern Indonesia. As discussed in Riwanto (2009: 18–19, 25), the increasing number of recent in-migration to provinces in the eastern part of Indonesia was already occurring in the 1980–1985 period as the result of transmigration program, a central government’s program which officially aimed to balance regional distribution of population. After that period, voluntary migrants were the majority of recent migrants mostly to urban areas. In other words, decentralization and specifically proliferation may result an increase of voluntary migrants to urban areas of new regions.

Certainly, migration has demographic impacts. McGibbon (2004: 1–2) states that since 1970s, migration particularly from Java and Eastern Indonesia has had a profound impact on the demographic composition of Papua and its ethnic mix. Moreover, previous work by Searle (2002: 3) argued the Indonesian migrant settlers from elsewhere in this country, mainly from Java, dominate the economy of Papua.

Table 3 shows a significant increase of population in West Papua and Papua. It may indicates that this increase is also a result of migration related decentralization and special autonomy. Moreover, a recent projection based on partial release of the 2010 Indonesia census shows a dramatic change of the demographic of Papuan (Elmslie 2010). Elmslie labeled it as a “demographic catastrophe” that compared with 96.06% of the population in the

Land of Papua in 1971, in 2010 Papuan make up less than 50%, and only 28.99% of the population in 2020. He also mentioned that the Papuan population is still growing although at a much slower rate than the non-Papuan population. Based on ethnic composition, population in Papua province in 2010 consists of 76.21% Papuans and 23.79% non-Papuans (Table 4), while in West Papua in 2006 the population consists of 65.7% Papuan and 34.3% non-Papuan (<http://irjabar.bps.go.id/>). There are five regions in Papua province which proportion of Papuan are less than 50%. In other words, non-Papuans dominate population in these five regions. Non-Papuans in these regions contribute about 17% of population in Papua.

One may relate the ethnic composition to local economic opportunities. It was already known that Mimika (until 1999 was a part of Kabupaten Fakfak) is the location of the Freeport McMoran mining industry. Meanwhile, Jayapura is the capital city of the province. Keerom was a part of Kabupaten Jayapura until 2002. It gives indicates a relationship between economic opportunities and migration that changed ethnic composition in Papua.² As shown in Table 5, these five regions contribute more than 75 percent of total GDRP of regencies and municipality in Papua province. This figure confirms that changing ethnic composition in this province is closely related to economic opportunities or with previous migration policies. For example, Keerom has experienced as location for transmigration programs mainly from Java and Nusa Tenggara. Until recently, local people, the Papuans, feels transmigration programmes only bring negative consequences for the indigenous people.

2.3 Employment and Local Politics

Besides the natural endowment, resources in local region not only refer to economic or natural resources but also political access as occurred in Papua. For this case, Chauvel (2008) noted one of the political realms in Papua is competition of elite and bureaucratic for the control of government position and resources, thus the political change in Papua was also a result of democratic changes in Indonesia. Implementation of Special Autonomy for Papua in 2001 and direct elections in late of 1990 has succeeded in diverting the local indigenous elite of bureaucrats and aspiring politicians away from supporting independence (as they had in 1999–2000) and toward competition for patronage through elections and “blossoming”, although it being far less successful at ameliorating separatist sentiment (Aspinall 2010). Both political changes have facilitated what so called as “Papuanisasi” and “lokalisasi” of political leadership in local government.

These developments, as well as the local government proliferation indicated a revival of local and regional identities (Chauvel 2008). Papuanization

realized mainly in the local bureaucracy, which indigenous local leaders dominate local government positions. For example, Papuans dominate the position of the heads of district in both Papua and West Papua provinces, while the deputy heads are a mixture of local Papuans, Papuan from elsewhere and non-Papuans. Unfortunately, lack of qualified Papuans to become local government officials resulted a continuing of non-Papuans dominations in particularly in new regions. The International Crisis Group (ICG) estimated that, as quoted by Chauvel (2008), about 85% of the officials are non-Papuans in some of the new districts.

Those figures confirms Situmorang's finding that there was a problem of recruiting local employment for both public and private sector in West Papua due to a low quality in education among Papuans (Situmorang 2007). In the public sector, there was a trend to implement "20:80" formula in recruitment policy (20% for non-Papuans and 80% for Papuans) for positions in civil services (locally known as *Pegawai Negeri Sipil/PNS*) and local government enterprises (*Badan Usaha Milik Daerah/BUMD*). However, since most of Papuans largely did not meet the minimum requirements in education and practical skills, most of employees in both formal sectors are non-Papuans (Situmorang 2007: 18, 21–25).

This implies that improving education and skill of indigenous people is an important affirmative policy to increase their participation in the local labor market. In contrast, as many critics, most of local political actors they have been too busy celebrating local government proliferation and exploiting their new political position for their particular interests. In addition, another question concerns on the role of the non-Papuan officials in the formulating and implementing development policy in the new regions. As other migrants in Papua, their superiority in education capacity together with a lack of necessary attention of indigenous local leaders on local development, they could realize their particular interest on both political and economical arenas through their formal or informal networks.

2.4 The Papua Road Map, an Optimistic View

The above discussion suggests that the situation in Papua, in particularly in its new regions need to be improved. An important study in respect to development in Papua under decentralization and special autonomy is *The Papua Road Map*, written by a team of the Indonesian Institute of Science (Widjojo *et al.* 2010). This book celebrates an optimistic view that the Papuan problem can be resolved with justice, peace and dignity. It identifies four groups of issues of the Papuan conflict. The first is the marginalization and discriminatory impact on the indigenous Papuan people of economic development, political conflict and mass migration into Papua since 1970.

The second is the failure of development particularly in education and health for indigenous Papuan and the failure to engage their economy. For the first and second issues, Widjojo *et al.* (2010) advocated to promote an affirmative policy of recognition in order to empower the Papuan people and a new paradigm of development, which focuses on improving public services and welfare for Papuan people living in the *kampung*s (villages). They argue that the new paradigm for development in Papua is necessary in order to strengthen the policy of recognition of Papuans in the sense of raising the quality of life of Papuans to the level of other Indonesian citizens.

The third group of issue is conflict between Papua and Jakarta about the history of Papua's integration into Republic of Indonesia and about political identity in the construction of the understanding of *Indonesia-ness* and *Papua-ness*. The last issue is accountability for past state violence against Indonesian citizens in Papua. By considering that the four issues are closely connected, *The Road Map* indicates clearly that Papua need to be supported in order to increase the quality of life of Papuan and leave the tragic story of Papua as cursed by plenty phenomenon (*The Economist*, July 8th, 2010).

In the context of local development issue, the paradigm for Papua needs to comply with the context of local development in new regions as results of proliferation of local government in the decentralization policy and special autonomy for Papua. In *The Papua Road Map*, Widjojo *et al.* (2010) states that development programs must be able to meet the basic needs and rights of Papuans in education, health and economic welfare. The resources and participatory abilities of the Papuans in any development program should also be improved so that Papuans feel themselves as a part of the project as the subject of development and social changes in Papua. Furthermore, it is important to create inter-cultural links that would make it possible for Papuans to understand what is happening and prepare themselves for actively participate in various developmental activities and be a part of the changes taking place that has an impact on their social and economic conditions. As the opposite of exploitation of Papua's natural resources, the wishes and the rights of the indigenous population to their traditional land should also be taken into account.

The Papua Road Map has provided a strategic framework in addressing the problems of Papua. It seems that the new development paradigm for Papua must be developed from within, from the local level since creating economic opportunities on this island without improving the local people would only benefit the migrants and increase social tension between Papuans and migrants. It is important since in general there is a common knowledge that development of Papua will benefit Indonesia as a nation state.

As pointed out by Titus (2002) based on a socio-spatial analysis, there are two development focuses to achieve a more balanced type of regional

development for Indonesia. Both are the diversification of the outer island economies, and completely abandon the transmigration program. It means that the potential of local economy in the outer islands, such as Papua, need to be developed, while the central government abandon their effort in redistribution of population from main island (Java) to other islands through transmigration program. These policies are expected to absorb the increasing numbers of voluntary migrants (including those from the centre regions) in the urban-commercial activities. Moreover, he mentioned that this development might also entail participation of various local and non-local ethnic groups on a more equal footing, as all of them have to accommodate and integrate in a new and different type of social, economic and cultural environment, which at the same time erodes their socio-cultural differences and prevents issues of cultural domination.

2.5 A Note – Concern on Social Association

To sum, diversity issues should be concerned in local development in recent situation Papua. One of important stages in this context is to remind that the aims of local development are not only about how to create a sustainable and equal welfare of the local territory, but also of the people in that local territory. Besides, it needs to mention that the relation or association among components or agents in a local area is an important aspect and it will influence the local development. For instance, Blakely and Leigh mentioned that local economic development concerned with both people and place since in the changing economy specific locations must be tied to specific people (Blakely and Leigh 2009: 98). They define local economic development as “a process that emphasize the full use of existing human and natural resources to preserve and increase a community’s standard of living that is based on principle of equity and sustainability.”

That shows that Blakely and Leigh argue the important of both equity and sustainability of development in specific location and specific people. While Coffey and Polèse (1984) interpreted the adjective “local” of local development into two meanings: the place or territory and factors, thus came with two approaches (“the development of localities” and “development based on local factors” or endogenous development,” Blakely and Leigh connected with these both meanings. Meanwhile, another broad definition of local development mentions the importance of interaction between the agents, sectors, and forces within the limits of a territory (Canasova in Moscardó 2008).

In the optimistic view, we may assume that people naturally need to interact with other. In other word, “everyone might be better off by cooperating” (Molenaers 2006). Therefore, we may expect the existence of social

interactions in a local territory, whatever their quantity and strength. Then, local development practices have to concern on how parties in a local development setting activate and use their social associations for their purposes. Trigilia (2001) states a good endowment of social capital allows for policies in local development, which are more efficient and effective for promoting human capital and specialized knowledge and for providing collective goods such as services for firms and infrastructures. He also argues this allows the “the hidden resources” of a particular area to be better exploited.

In short, we could argue that social association that includes not only direct interactions but also the capabilities of agents or stakeholders of local development to acquire knowledge and information is important for their development purposes. Therefore, local development should be also concerned using a social capital perspective. A growing number of studies on various issues of local economic development have used social capital perspective (i.e. Bebbington and Perreault 1999, Cooke and Morgan 1998, Kassahun 2010, Molenaers 2006, and Skaufias, Lunde, Patrinos 2010).

Based on their study of highland Ecuador, Bebbington and Perreault (1999) found that access to resources, livelihood possibilities, and local sociopolitical relationships have changed significantly in Guamote as the results of the cumulative impact of external interventions by NGOs, church, and the state on local governance and rural civil society. They also mentions that the most significant aspect of these interventions has not been the injection of technology and money but rather the landscape of networks, relationships, and organizations that has been built up in the process, at times deliberately, at times inadvertently. Meanwhile, Cooke and Morgan (1998) focus on the role of intermediate associations. In this associational repertoire, one of the key developmental roles of the states is to create the conditions—the formal framework as well as the informal norms of trust and reciprocity—whereby firms, intermediate associations, and public agencies can engage in a self-organized process of interactive learning. One of results of Kassahun (2010) study of poor-neighborhoods in Addis Ababa is the high level of social capital appear to function as signals of community capacity that motivate residents to become engaged in community developments. It confirms the role of social capital in local development.

However, it should be underlined that social capital has negative sides. Based on a study on associational life and local development in two Nicaraguan villages, Molenaers (2006) found that the existence of a large number of associations with high levels of membership is not necessarily indicative of trust, reciprocity and horizontal cooperation. Moreover, associational life has proved to be subject mainly to the clientelism practices, which actors attempt to gain access to resources via local leaders, who act as brokers

between organizations and inhabitants. Thus, she mentions that creating trust and thence social capital depends on the transparent working of institutions, projects and interventions, and on the possibility of preventing and punishing clientelist abuse of resources.

Concerning local development in Papua, diversity such as in term of ethnicity, may provide positive influences to local development through social association between different groups. For example, within an association certain groups, in particularly migrants or non-indigenous people may share their skills and knowledge with other participant of association—the indigenous people—thus the latter will be able to improve its participation in development and benefited by development. This association can be also found in the informal (economic) activities since this sector provide an opportunity for different groups to meet and made social relation. Although the activities are informal in term of legal basis, it is possible for them to establish such organizations mainly based on voluntary motives.

Ethnic diversity may also connect to local politics in order to articulate their particular interests or common interests with their indigenous counterpart regarding development issues. Local politics may refer to local agents and political institutions, which formally have access and power in formulating local development policies. These agents are such as local politicians, government officials or key civil society players. Since these agents are heterogeneous, then they may have specific networks with their cultural origin in term of ethnicity (and religion). Meanwhile, local political institutions are formal political institutions in the region such as political parties, local house of representative, and other government institutions.

Furthermore, parties of local politics may influence local development by providing supports for local initiatives. These initiatives may as results of interaction between different ethno-religious groups whether those are aimed for particular interests or common interests. Both local development policies and programs can be used as indicators on how the local politics realize their supports for local initiatives. Of course, in other side, as already mentioned, this relation may benefit participants of local politics in what so called as rent seeking practices or buying political supports.

To conclude, a social capital perspective is a challenging approach in order to reduce the negative impact of diversity while “exploit” its benefit for Papua local development in recent decentralization and proliferation.³

NOTES

1. Ananta discusses some cases of migration and conflict in Indonesia (Ananta 2006: 51–53).
2. Another issue of diversity is the composition of population based on religion. This paper does not assess this issue due to lack of data. However, in 2005, population of Papua province consist of 78.6% Christians and Catholics, 21% Moslem, and 0.4% Buddhist and Hindus.
3. Figure 1 describes the preliminary framework of this approach.

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APPENDIX

Table 1 New Region Creation in Developing Countries

Country	Before reform	After reform	Period of creation	Scale	Reason
Poland	17 0	49 373	1973-1974 1999	Voivods Districts	Political: if small then less threatening Political: buy support from wide range of political actors
Czech Republic	0	14	2001-2002	Regions	Augment capacity and add intermediary level democratic institutions
Nigeria	21 136	30 589	1991	States Districts	Social justice/balance development
Uganda	54	72	2006	Districts	Reduce large size/remoteness
South Africa	4	9	1994	Province	Recognize minority economic and ethnic interests
Ghana	110	135	2004	Districts	Not found in literature reviewed
Kenya	49 71	71 108	1992-2002 2005-2007	Districts	Better representation (political party considerations)
Pakistan	16 102	23 160	2001-2007	District Towns	Political: bring government closer to the people – representation (“align” districts with higher level parties)

Source: Ferrazzi (2007: 8), summarized from various studies.

Table 2 Recapitulation of New Autonomous Regions in Indonesia, 1999–2009

Island	Province	District	Municipality	Total
Sumatra	2	61	14	77
Jawa/Bali	1	1	8	10
Kalimantan	0	22	3	25
Sulawesi	2	29	4	35
Nusa Tenggara	0	10	1	11
Maluku	1	12	3	16
Papua	1	29	1	31
Indonesia	7	164	34	204

Source: Ditjen Otda Kemdagri <<http://www.depdagri.go.id/media/documents/2010/03/05/d/o/-1.pdf>>

Table 3 Population in Papua, 2006–2010

Code	District/Municipality	Jun 2006	Jun 2007	Jun 2008	Jun 2009	SP2010
9101	FAKFAK	64.367	65.645	66.864	68.116	67.153
9102	KAIMANA	40.541	41.346	42.046	42.810	46.243
9103	TELUKWONDAMA	22.289	22.731	23.140	23.569	26.311
9104	TELUKBINTUNI	51.773	52.801	54.528	55.805	52.403
9105	MANOKWARI	166.288	169.590	173.382	176.847	187.591
9106	SORONG SELATAN	59.241	60.404	61.463	32.978	37.579
9107	SORONG	95.042	96.928	98.091	91.436	70.635
9108	RAJA AMPAT	39.863	40.654	41.170	41.860	42.471
9109	TAMBRAUW				8.276	6.393
9110	MAYBRAT				29.605	33.735
9171	Kota SORONG	162.657	165.900	169.278	172.558	190.341
9100	PAPUA BARAT	702.061	715.999	729.962	743.860	760.855
9401	MERAUKE	164.583	168.513	172.478	176.466	195.577
9402	JAYAWIJAYA	220.937	224.572	99.308	100.867	199.557
9403	JAYAPURA	96.462	98.028	99.586	101.128	114.515
9404	NABIRE	169.027	171.422	103.146	104.531	130.314
9408	KEPULAUANYAPEN	74.566	76.168	77.778	79.390	83.593
9409	BIAK NUMFOR	105.409	107.351	109.292	111.224	126.125
9410	PANIAI	118.532	120.622	122.708	124.780	149.093
9411	PUNCAK JAYA	117.762	120.307	73.775	75.314	101.906
9412	MIMIKA	134.679	139.036	143.486	148.019	183.633
9413	BOVEN DIGOEL	33.211	33.995	34.786	35.581	55.822
9414	MAPPI	69.225	70.123	71.009	71.877	81.781
9415	ASMAT	65.266	66.580	67.898	69.214	77.053
9416	YAHUKIMO	144.750	147.935	151.139	154.351	166.716
9417	PEGUNUNGAN BINTANG	93.049	94.780	96.511	98.234	65.399
9418	TOLIKARA	46.788	48.021	49.270	50.531	114.240
9419	SARMI	33.451	34.326	23.258	23.746	33.263
9420	KEEROM	40.822	42.582	44.402	46.282	48.527
9426	WAROPEN	22.677	23.022	15.397	15.720	24.988
9427	SUPIORI	12.607	12.624	12.642	12.660	15.861
9428	MAMBERAMO RAYA			19.922	20.340	18.424
9429	NDUGA			28.255	28.699	79.520
9430	LANNY JAYA			58.104	59.015	151.384
9431	MAMBERAMO TENGAH			24.005	24.382	43.266
9432	YALIMO			18.515	18.806	51.137
9433	PUNCAK			49.091	50.115	93.363
9434	DOGIYAI			70.647	71.595	83.324
9435	INTAN JAYA					38.844
9436	DEIYAI					62.998
9471	Kota JAYAPURA	211.129	215.609	220.109	224.615	261.776
9400	PAPUA	1.974.932	2.015.616	2.056.517	2.097.482	2.851.999

Table 4 Population in Papua Province based on ethnicity, 2010

Kab/Kota	Papuan	Non Papuan	Total	% Papuan
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Merauke	73,082	122,634	195,716	37.34
Jayawijaya	177,698	18,387	196,085	90.62
Jayapura	68,430	43,513	111,943	61.13
Nabire	62,119	67,774	129,893	47.82
Kepulauan Yapen	64,338	18,613	82,951	77.56
Biak	93,482	33,316	126,798	73.73
Paniai	149,427	4,005	153,432	97.39
Puncak Jaya	99,339	1,809	101,148	98.21
Mimika	75,267	106,734	182,001	41.36
Boven Digoel	37,355	18,429	55,784	66.96
Mappi	72,390	9,268	81,658	88.65
Asmat	68,641	7,936	76,577	89.64
Yahukimo	162,194	2,318	164,512	98.59
Pegunungan Bintang	62,361	3,073	65,434	95.30
Tolikara	113,315	1,112	114,427	99.03
Sarmi	22,935	10,036	32,971	69.56
Keerom	19,725	28,811	48,536	40.64
Waropen	20,396	4,243	24,639	82.78
Supiori	15,283	591	15,874	96.28
Mamberamo Raya	17,088	1,277	18,365	93.05
Nduga	78,377	676	79,053	99.14
Lanny Jaya	148,354	168	148,522	99.89
Mamberamo Tengah	39,315	222	39,537	99.44
Yalimo	50,327	436	50,763	99.14
Puncak	92,510	708	93,218	99.24
Dogiyai	83,395	835	84,230	99.01
Intan Jaya	40,414	76	40,490	99.81
Deiyai	61,565	554	62,119	99.11
Kota Jayapura	90,196	166,509	256,705	35.14
PAPUA	2,159,318	674,063	2,833,381	76.21

Source: BPS Papua

Table 5 GDRP (at 2000 constant price) of selected regions of Papua 2005 & 2009 (billions rupiahs)

Districts/Municipalities	2005	2009**
Merauke	1127	1394
Nabire	782	794
Mimika	14957	12432
Keerom	181	325
Kota Jayapura	1713	2777
(1) Total of 5 regions	18760	17722
(2) Total of Reg./Mun.	22566	23313
(3) = (1) / (2)	83%	76%

Source: BPS, ** very preliminary figures

Figure 1

