

## Bibliographic Details

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## CHAPTER 13. "Swarming" at the Frontiers of France, 1870–1885

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*How is the revolutionary subject to be tensed and spaced out, centered and decentered, sober and drunk, German and French, at one and the same time?*

(Eagleton 1988: ix)

*A Blanquist look at the terrestrial globe: "I contemplate from on high the globe in its rondure,/ and I no longer seek there the shelter of a hut" ... The poet has made his dwelling in space itself, one could say – or in the abyss.*

(Benjamin 1999: 352)

Early in the morning of Saturday, March 18, 1871, a crowd of mostly women and children spontaneously left the relative safety of their crowded Parisian apartments and clambered up the hill of the Buttes de Montmartre. Their goal was to prevent the regular national army from seizing assembled rows of cannons to be transported later that day to the government-in-exile in Versailles. An eyewitness at the scene recounted:

The women and children were swarming up the hill-side in a compact mass; the artillerymen tried in vain to fight their way through the crowd, but the waves of people engulfed everything, surging over

the cannon-mounts, over the ammunition wagons, under the wheels, under the horses' feet, paralyzing the action of the riders who spurred on their mounts in vain ... Like breakers, the first rows of the crowd came crashing on to the batteries, repeatedly flooding them with people ... The women especially were crying out in fury: "Unharness the horses! Away with you! We want the cannons! We shall have the cannons!" ... A National Guardsman who had managed to reach the scene of the action climbed on to a milestone and shouted: "Cut the traces!" The crowd let out a great cheer. The women closest to the cannons, to which they had been clinging for half an hour, took the knives that the men passed down to them from hand to hand. They cut through the harnesses. The same National Guardsman now shouted: "Open up the ranks! Spur on the horses! Let them through!" The maneuver was carried out amid joyful laughter and cheering. The artillerymen ... were soon won over to the side of the rebels. The cannons had been retaken. The cannons were in the hands of the people

(D'Esboeufs, cited in [Edwards 1973](#): 62–63).

The upward, disorderly movement of women and children along the craggy outcroppings of Montmartre's *buttes* in the spring of 1871 prefigured a global border for Europe, the unresolved legacy of which is its lived reality today. Although responding to a quite specific and localized disaster – the Prussian defeat of the French Second Empire at Sedan and the “dishonorable” peace treaty negotiated by the subsequent government of Adolphe Thiers – the experiment in Parisian Commune self-rule ushered in by the retaking of the cannon and its wartime antecedent produced a watershed rupture in the transboundary politics of European nation-states. Within the *longue durée* of “historical capitalism” such a politics had traditionally expressed the sovereign state's capacity and responsibility to control movement across its borders ([Wallerstein 1983](#)). Accordingly, the historical role played by European nation-state borders has been to naturalize a division of labor rooted in the separation of an international economic realm on the one hand and a political arena of ostensibly sovereign states on the other. As such, borders are understood to act primarily as the expression of the territoriality of states, constituting the “end point” for any legitimately democratic politics ([Paasi 1996](#); [Newman and Paasi 1998](#); [Newman 2006](#)). The Prussian threat and the Paris Commune had the effect of temporarily scrambling and denaturalizing these spatial divisions, making their constitutive processes visible again, from the local shop floor outwards into national, “European” and wider imperial arenas. This shock and its aftermath set the stage in the last quarter of the nineteenth century for the projection of a double boundary of European rule: an internal “European” borderland clearly demarcating French from German territorial sovereignty following the traumatic loss of Alsace-Lorraine; and an external, French “civilizational” frontier rimming a vast colonial ante-theater: Tunisia, Indochina, Madagascar. Together, these two borderscapes worked to clarify and radiate aspects of European modernity domestically and throughout the world, while reinforcing national cultural differences with metropolitan rivals, primarily England, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Italy ([Cooper and Stoler 1997](#)).

With the aim of reestablishing order in the wake of France's military defeat and the subsequent anarchy of *Commune*, both acts of rebordering, in a dynamic interplay which would soon become a common feature of European metropolitan colonial governance, produced a new space. They also produced new thinking about space in which the ideal of a firmly bounded *Hexagon* free of social strife both internally and with its surrounding neighbors would be complemented by a largely empty and passive *outré-mer*. This had the effect of pushing from view the global over-termination of Europe's borders, obscuring the constitutive relations linking Europe's internal borders and external frontiers, shunting their multiple interdependencies “underground” and offstage, so as to reassert the purity of nationally centralized authority over internal province and external colony alike.

The spatial legacies of this purification, I argue, haunt the European integration project today, as well as the broader border studies literature which has been a key intellectual “traveling companion.” Specifically regarding the latter, three issues in contemporary border studies scholarship may be drawn out for which this chapter constitutes a critical response. First, this contribution seeks to address the increasingly felt need for proper historicization within border studies. Rather than making the facile and timeless claim that “[w]e live in a world of lines and compartments” and that “the basic ordering of society requires categories and compartments, and that borders create order” ([Newman 2006](#): 142; see also [van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002](#)), current border scholarship is calling for a revitalized historical lens for understanding the specific orderings brought about by the dense imbrication of nation-states, empires and borders, both in past configurations as well as in terms of their ongoing legacies ([O'Dowd 2010](#)). As [Anderson and O'Dowd \(2007\)](#) recall, rather than stand as the “nemesis of imperialism,” in many cases imperialism and nationalism directly interacted in competition and in cooperation, and elements of both are embodied in the borders they created. In short, imperialism and nationalism have always been “mutually constitutive” ([Anderson and O'Dowd 2007](#): 935; see also [Kramsch 2002](#); [Kramsch and Hooper 2004](#)).

Secondly, a reminder of the historical entanglement of nationalism and imperialism is timely and welcome, as it problematizes assertions made only half a decade ago relating to borders and identities that “most of us retain strong ethnic or national affiliations and loyalties, be they territorial-focused or group affiliations” ([Newman 2006](#): 147). This may be the case in some instances, but this can no longer be taken as a trans-spatial truth; indeed, the experience of empires shows us a complex dialectic between national metropolitan borders and imperial frontiers

whose outcome cannot be reduced to the production of a single, national “affiliation” or “loyalty.” As this essay shows, the imperial frontier played a transformative role in reshaping the substantive content of core metropolitan states, and actors located below the level of high statecraft played an important role in resetting the terms of engagement across the imperial divide separating national core and colonial periphery (B. Anderson 2005). This chapter thus develops the potential of the “swarm at Montmartre” so as to reconnect what has been sundered by the apparent irreconcilability of nationalizing metropolitan borderlands and their respective imperial frontiers, thereby granting a widened spatial perspective which dovetails with recent attempts to infuse a “cosmopolitan” and “global” dimension to the study of European borders (Rumford 2008; Rovisco 2010).

Finally, much has been made of the fact that 9/11 has reinforced the barrier effect of borders in many parts of the world. For some this has constituted a “paradigm change in the study of borders” (Newman 2006: 149), refocusing attention on the process through which borders can be more tightly controlled (see also Andreas 2003; Brunet-Jailly 2004; Nicol 2005). Border scholars inspired by Foucauldian governmentality approaches have also become fixated on the means by which borders have become the object as well as the agency of heightened surveillance and repression (Walters 2004; Amoore 2006; Salter 2010). What has been lost in these moves, I argue, is a sense that borders and frontiers can become sites not only of discipline and domination but also of political *possibility*.

This “possibility of the border” I explore through the ideas of “vision” and “hiddenness,” each of which have their own conceptual genealogies. As Santos (2010) has argued recently, in pursuing the broader goal of tracing imperial boundary change and its political effects “from below,” we may need to train greater attention on the epistemological as well as material fractures produced by the “abyssal lines” of an imperial modernity which carved the world into a territorial realm of colonial “reason” and colonized “unreason,” producing lines of “visibility” and “invisibility” which continue to charge relations of inequality in the world-system at large. Crucially, this approach, rather than merely serving as a pretext to trace “historical variations in imperial meanings and methods” across various nationalizing contexts (Anderson and O’Dowd 2007: 937), would allow for an exploration of geohistorically specific conjunctures permitting a reenvisioning of boundaries and frontiers as part of wider, emancipatory political projects. In this view, borders, in addition to separating spatiotemporal fissures across the modern colonial divide (itself the product of colonialism’s spurious teleologies), could then be linked to an epistemological space from which to open out onto “worlds of borders” (Khatibi 1983; Kramsch and Brambilla 2007; Robinson 2011).

In reenvisioning European metropolitan borders and imperial frontiers thusly, we may draw productively upon a stratagem of following French Communard “outcasts” into the penal tropics of the New Caledonian frontier, their numbers augmenting year by year as the decade of the 1870s lengthened. Contemporaneous debates within the French metropolitan core, both popular and of high statecraft, over the fate of the Communards located 6,000 kilometers away in the Pacific, helped to reshape the national imaginary of the French state in decisive ways. It did so first in an attempt to reestablish the moral foundations for France’s regained bourgeois civility at home while projecting its “civilizing mission” overseas. Secondly, in debates over Communard “amnesty,” it aided in delineating the contours of national citizenship within the emergent Third Republic. Exploring the impact of the frontier on the French national imagination thus allows for an important practical as well as theoretical depth to frontierspace which would otherwise be lacking in accounts which merely view the frontier as the outer membrane of state territoriality, as mere container of state sovereignty (M. Anderson 1996).

Furthermore, such a move provides a window on the relational dynamics between bordered metropolitan centers and peripheries which can focus analysis on contradictions and surprise reversals in colonial rule, revealing transversal solidarities between metropolitan core and imperial periphery that would otherwise remain under the radar of a reified, scalar and territorial understanding of the border as the “end of the state” or the “end of politics.” On the contrary, the experience of the Paris Commune and French penal frontier at New Caledonia, both located within the tight historical window of 1871–1885, is the subject of an intense political process whose outcome is none other than the future shape and constitution of the French Republic.

## COMMUNARD BARRICADE: STREETS AND LIVING ROOMS TURNED OUTSIDE/IN AND INSIDE/OUT

Un sentiment de fatigue d’être Français; le désir vague d’aller chercher une patrie, ou l’artiste ait sa pensée tranquille et non a tout moment troublé par les stupides agitations, par les convulsions bêtes d’une tourbe destructive.<sup>1</sup>

(Goncourt, cited in Priollaud 1983: 38)

The explosive social space that inaugurated the Paris Commune’s brief experiment in self-rule on March 18, 1871 was not entirely unprecedented. According to its protagonists, the term “Commune” itself hearkened self-consciously to the French Revolution, notably Year II (1793), a date invoked by the Communards in the face of Napoleon III’s defeat at Sedan (Edwards 1973). But closer antecedents were also easily at hand. In Lyon, silk-workers had risen up in revolt in 1831, followed by further labor unrest again at Lyon and Paris in 1834. The Europe-wide insurrections of 1848 found their pride of place in Paris in June of that same year. But for some close observers such

as Marx (1974: 155), the very existence of the Commune represented something entirely unforeseen, a true “invention of the unknown.” Marx understood only too well that the historical capacity of the state to detach itself from civil society was achieved through an increasingly fine-meshed social division of labor. That the primary aim of the Commune was to abolish such compartmentalization in order to organize all aspects of social life freely “beyond the state” was seen by him to be one of the most original contributions of the Commune revolt to the nineteenth-century history of social struggle and emancipation.

The Commune, then, represented not just an uprising against Napoleon III's Second Empire but also against all forms of social regimentation. Indeed, the original concern of the Parisian Communards was less about gaining control over the means of production than about targeting those figures – the *curé*, the gendarme, the concierge – responsible for the social classification and policing of everyday life.<sup>2</sup> In the struggle to break down the barriers between social, political, cultural and economic categorization, two figures stand out: poet Arthur Rimbaud and social geographer Élisée Reclus.

For Rimbaud, critique of the bourgeois division of labor was intimately related to the dawning spatiality of European high imperialism. Against the expansive, metric and strategic space of imminent colonial exploration, Rimbaud counterposed a space marked by flight, affect and latent event (Steinmetz 2001). Through this gesture, Rimbaud is a European who “becomes African” at the threshold of Europe's civilizing mission. His goal was “devenir-bête,” “devenir-nègre”:

Oui, j'ai les yeux fermés a votre lumière. Je suis une bête, un nègre. Mais je puis être sauvé. Vous êtes de faux nègres, vous maniaques, féroces, avares. Marchand, tu es nègre; magistrat, tu es nègre; général, tu es nègre; empereur, vieille démangeaison, tu es nègre ... Le plus malin est de quitter ce continent, ou la folie ronge.<sup>3</sup>

(Rimbaud 1932: 87)

Rimbaud's immediate target would be those poets of the Parnassian School who attempted to impose an order on the anxious and turbulent world of rapid urbanization and industrialization. This they would attempt to do by reverting to a form of poetic “landscapism” in which space was proposed as a natural referent, devoid of conflict and history. Towards this stance Rimbaud would respond caustically that the Parnassians merely “describe what they see” (Derfler 1998: 89). For the young rebel artist, such a poetics revealed an underlying elitism and racism. Concerned with the disorienting effects of modernity notwithstanding, Parnassians only succeeded in reproducing in their texts the boundary-reinforcing relations of a rapidly nationalizing identity which they mistook as paradigmatic sign of their times. As a “bastard,” border-crossing figure of displacement and vagabondage, Rimbaud's reply to the dualistic social constructions of his day would be succinctly put: “Je est un autre” (1932: 90).

The “empty” landscapes of Parnassian poetry would find their analogue in the emergence of “university geography” in France, embodied by the central figure of Paul Vidal de la Blache. Enamored with the “science of objective space,” de la Blache set himself the task after the French defeat of 1870 of crafting a “spatial history” that defined landscapes as natural physical referents located within an immemorial time drained of historicity (Vidal de la Blache 1917). Such a static spatial imaginary would be imposed both on the internal domestic *pays* of France as well as on its overseas colonial dominions, enclosing both within the amber of a timeless time in which any form of contestation or struggle was eviscerated. As with Rimbaud's reaction to the Parnassians, the rise of Vidalian geography in France was viewed as anathema to the anarchist geographer Élisée Reclus. Reclus's political life as well as professional geographical commitments were both deeply marked by his active participation in the Paris Commune (B. Anderson 2005). He was an active participant in the quarrel that led to the break between Marx and Bakunin in 1872, while defending anarchocommunist ideals in articles published in *Le Révolté* and *La Liberté*. Proposing that “geography is nothing but history in space,” Reclus (1905–1908: 335) was the first to refer to the term “social geography” as a replacement for the Vidalian notion of “landscape.” Attentive to the power geometries binding empires, states and peoples, across a range of work spanning decades, Reclus, in a direct challenge to Vidal de la Blache, came to view space as a deeply social product.

In confounding the natural boundaries between poetic Self and exteriorized Other, “social” and “landscape” geographies, Rimbaud and Reclus expressed late nineteenth-century forms of spatial thinking rooted in a perspective which aimed to dissolve the privileged notion of space as a natural and nonhistorical referent, one in which alterity was eliminated. These vibrant spatial imaginaries constituted real threats to those like the Parnassian Catulle Mendès, who, in his private journal *Les 73 journées de la Commune* (1871), objected to the kind of varied activity expressed by someone “who can make excellent boots like Napoléon Gaillard, or paintings as good as Gustave Courbet's” (1871: 166). Mendès was here concerned primarily with the *bel ouvrage*, and its imminent demise in a topsy-turvy world where boot-makers become painters and painters boot-makers.

But the genius of the Commune lay precisely in its ability to destabilize the idea of “proper métier” or “proper place” in favor of a permanent exchange between sites, places, streets and neighborhoods. Of paramount importance here,

recognized by Henri Lefebvre's tribute in the next century, was the local *quartier*, whose autonomy and self-governing capacity was strengthened in the absence of central state authority. At the height of the Commune's resistance to the forces of reaction represented by the army of Adolphe Thiers, the street barricade became the most poignant architectural expression of the Commune experiment in displacement. In his *Mémoires*, Gustave-Paul Cluseret, the Commune's first Delegate of War, explained that the barricade had to be built as quickly as possible, in contrast to the unique, well-situated and centralized civic monument whose power derived from its isolation and stability. Barricades, for Cluseret, were not meant to have a unique and "proper place," as they were produced through a *bricolage* of "overturned carriages, doors torn off their hinges, furniture thrown out of windows, cobblestones where these are available, beams, barrels, etc. (Cluseret 1887: 274-287).

As the Paris Commune's grand old man Auguste Blanqui made clear in his *Instructions pour une prise d'armes* of 1868 (Blanqui 2000a), the immediate function of the barricades was to prevent the free circulation of enemy troops throughout the city. Complementing the barricade's effects, Blanqui described a strategy involving the "lateral piercing of houses," in which Commune troops gutted adjoining rows of apartments in such a way that insurgents could move freely in all directions, along passageways and networks, rendering the enemy stationary and vulnerable. In this way, according to Blanquian strategy, unlike the experiences of 1830 and 1848, Commune combatants could remain "out of sight and out of reach of the enemy" (2000a: 109). Barricade fighting would take place "from the windows" of adjacent houses. Thus "out of sight," within urban neighborhood enclaves whose grand nineteenth-century facades enclosed laboratories of autonomous governance purposefully erected on the model of Fourierist phalansteries, a space of hiddenness is inaugurated in European modernity, whereby the Commune barricade-border, acting more than a device for military separation and defense, produced the outer membrane of self-created *border worlds* (Kramsch and Dimitrovova 2008).<sup>4</sup>

It is perhaps one of the more moving ironies of European history that the lineaments of such a worldly borderspace (*espace frontière-monde*) would itself have been secreted within the most constrained and confined space imaginable: an island prison located several kilometers off the shores of Brittany. On May 17, one day before the dramatic events on the hills of Montmartre, Blanqui was arrested and transported to Le Fort du Taureau. Forbidden from "seeing the ocean" that surrounded him, cut off from the revolutionary developments on the mainland, Blanqui sat down to the task of writing what we might call in hindsight a manual in political astrology. Originally penned as a reply to certain scientific theories of the contemporaneous astrologer Laplace, *l'Éternité par les astres* of 1871 (Blanqui 2000b) is a text of hallucinatory power, a redemptive meditation on space-time in which the failure of the experiment in Commune self-rule, subsequent state repression and imperial rebordering are anticipated and then deftly sublimated by way of reflection on the state of the universe and the movement of the stars. As the title of the book, eternity via the stars, suggests, *l'Éternité* addresses the nature of the universe as infinite and eternal space:

The universe is infinite in time and space, eternal, without restrictions and indivisible ... [L]et's admit for an instance the existence of [a] surface, that finds itself the limit of the world. This limit, shall it be solid-liquid, or gaseous? Whatever its nature, it immediately becomes the prolongation of what it contains or purports to contain. Let us assume that on this score there exists neither a solid, nor a liquid, nor gas, not even ether. Nothing but empty and black space. This space does not lack three dimensions, and would necessarily have as a limit what would be called continuation, another portion of space of the same nature, and then after that, another, then again another, and so on, *indefinitely*.

(Blanqui 2000b: 231-233, author's translation)

Here, in what Walter Benjamin (1999: 111, 352) would later affirm as Blanqui's attempt to "open new doors in his dungeon," to make "his dwelling in space itself," the old revolutionary would conjure the central themes of a frontier politics that reverberates into our day as with the flash of an "illumination": the limit of a "world" (*monde*) serving not only as a barrier but as a spatio-temporal hinge opening onto other "worlds;" the indeterminacy and ambiguity of all spatial demarcations, caught between an "infinite" universalism and the arbitrary particularity of all set lines; and, finally, in his long rumination on comets, the movement of "astral" material preventing the "stasis and glaciation" of the world, as bearing newness by way of their "inconsistency, and ... vagabond habits" (Blanqui 2000b: 271). Of comets, Blanqui argued:

Are they not rather captive supplicants, chained for centuries to the barriers of our atmosphere, and demanding in vain either liberty or hospitality? From its first to last ray [of light], the intertropical sun shows us these pale Bohemians, who pay so brutally for their indiscreet visitation to established society. Comets are veritable fantastic beings ... Our world in particular is gorged with them, and yet, more than half escape from sight, even from the telescope. How many of these nomads have chosen residence among us? ... One of these days, they will raise up their legs and will go join their numberless tribes in the imaginary spaces.

(1871: 260-261, author's translation)



Blanqui's spatial syntax would be prescient, anticipating the defeat of the Commune experiment in worker self-rule,<sup>5</sup> the brutal reinscription of spatial divisions of labor within core European nation-states, matched by a tense standoff along the Rhineland border between France and the newly minted German state, and the deportation of Commune "vagabonds" – "pale Bohemians" all – to the penal colonies of Guyana and New Caledonia, where they were to be rehabilitated through hard labor. It is here, on Europe's proto-imperial overseas frontier, where the barricade logic of being "out of sight and out of reach" would reveal its truly "worldly" dimension.

For, in what we might productively describe as the "explosion" of the urban barricade-as-border out into global-imperial space, a secondary border zone for France is created, one that complements the firmly nationalizing internal borders of the French *Hexagon* with that of a fluid frontier located in the Pacific Ocean, some 6,000 kilometers from the French capital. As its internal logic would serve as a dress rehearsal for full-blown colonial expansion over the coming years in Tunisia, Indochina and Madagascar, the New Caledonian penal frontier would crystallize a contradictory space for France. In this arena, the goals of universal self-improvement and moral reform of Commune prisoners would clash with the extreme physical hardship of locally enforced labor, often carried out with local indigenous Kanak populations.

At stake in this frontier penal experiment would be the crafting of a renewed bourgeois-civil order for the French nation, as well as a complementarily reenergized overseas civilizing mission. As with the Parisian urban barricade, however, the spatial distance separating frontier penal colony from European metropole would produce its own space of "hiddenness" far removed from the socially regimented world of French metropolitan society, a quality which allowed for the (not unproblematic) re-negotiation of identities, particularly between French Commune and Kanak. Moreover, as the object of heated legislative debate in the French National Assembly over the decade of the 1870s-1880s in relation to the issue of amnesty and repatriation of political prisoners, the activities of the exiled ex-Communards and their metropolitan interlocutors actively succeeded in reshaping the Republican nature of the emergent Third Republic in ways that demonstrated the highly ambiguous political dimension of bordering practices within the European imperial theater.

## THE MORAL REHABILITATION OF VAGABONDAGE ON THE NEW CALEDONIAN FRONTIER

Is it really to troublemakers that we should confide the mission of communicating the lights of our civilization?

(Faucher, cited in [Bullard 2000](#): 138)

The Franco-German borderland, site of defeat for the Second Gallic Republic, would haunt the French imperial enterprise in the years to come. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, political life in France would be riven to one degree or another by two opposing tendencies: the one set on the path of revenge against Germany, the other swept up in the civilizing mission of overseas colonial rule. Both geopolitical orientations embodied discrepant and partly overlapping bordering logics, as the former was tied to regaining and protecting lost territory and maintaining a "peaceful" export-orientated social division of labor, while the latter involved the establishment of a mobile frontier charged with the task of radiating France's universal values throughout the world. The ideal of a uniquely French "civilizational morality," however, would connect both internal and external borderlands in a complex web of interdependence.

The contrapuntal dynamic linking internal/external bordering tendencies found their initial expression not in the colonization of fresh territories but in the population of the existing French overseas penal archipelago. France, of course, had established penal colonies in the decades prior to the Third Republic of Jules Ferry, but on an institutional level they came into full maturity only with the arrival of thousands of ex-Commune prisoners on the extraterritorial islands of French Guyana, off the coast of Venezuela, and New Caledonia, in the Pacific Ocean. In particular, the deportation of 4,500 Communards to New Caledonia figured prominently in the Third Republic's moral regeneration of France. Already in the waning days of the Commune, the military actions of Thiers and his Versailles troops had been widely perceived as a "social cleaning" of Paris ([Bullard 2000](#): 67). In preparing for the mass deportations to come, the governments of Thiers and Ferry designated the Communards as "savages," thus placing them outside both the legal and moral boundaries of civilized society. In this way, the Commune "savage within" would be seen as a primary threat to *la cité morale*, an element that had to be returned to a state of nature "beyond politics" ([Bullard 2000](#): 73).

But in the context of the wider French civilizing mission, the deported Communards, considered "savages" in the metropole, were burdened with the paradoxical task of "civilizing" the local indigenous population, the Kanak, on the New Caledonian islands of Nouméa and Isles des Pins. In order to do so, the Commune prisoners would have themselves to undergo a moral regeneration, requiring not just a change in political convictions and desires but a profound reorientation of the soul in relation to good and evil ([Bullard 2000](#): 93). This, it was hoped, would be achieved by virtue of the overwhelming moral force of nature surrounding the penal colony. Here, the influence of

Vidalian “landscape” geography would be made apparent, as it was believed that the natural physical contours of the environment, reshaped through hard labor, would prove sufficient to rehabilitate Communard and Kanak alike.

Through the enforced deportation of Communard prisoners half a world away from the French metropole, hopes for the moral regeneration of French society, the rehabilitation of internal “savagery” and the expansion of the French nation into the southwest Pacific would be neatly bundled into a single overarching rationale. Such an orientaling of the tropical frontier would require a teleological collapsing of “difference into space” (Gregory 1995). But it also signified a qualitatively novel production of space, one marked not by a Benthamite order of surveillance, vision and transparency characteristic of the metropole but by a redemptive “hiddenness” and partial invisibility located in lands as yet “unseen and unknown” by Europeans.

The interplay between (en)lightened national metropolitan borderland and only partially visible colonial frontier would generate a space of contradiction between seemingly opposed principles – bourgeois/convict, political/common criminal, liberty/reform, settled/deported, inside/outside, civilized/uncivilized. As a key characteristic of the penal colony, partial invisibility would in turn spur the development of a border praxis which grasped these antinomies not as fixed and static entities but as a ceaselessly mobile “swarming” whose terms could only be resolved by the creative “coming into hiding” of Communard and Kanak alike (Bull 1999). The contradictory rationality of French rule in New Caledonia would therefore be productive not only of a foundational paradox in the governance of modern interstate borders but would generate the very resources for those oppositional strategies seeking to transcend the bordered dualities it set in motion.

The ambiguities of this frontier modernity were plain enough to the Communard *déportés*. Though banished from the territory of the *Hexagon*, ex-Communard prisoners were expected to assume all the obligations and burdens of French citizenship, especially in the realm of employment. Toward this end the French government provided prisoners with food, shelter and medical care, in addition to subsidized concessionaires, either as land to be farmed, the right to practice a trade or profession or run a shop. The ultimate goal would be to transform the prison population on New Caledonia into self-governing communities on the basis of a pastoral ideal (Bullard 2000). Through “work, civilization, and patriotism,” ex-Communards were thus offered the chance to regain their ties to a civil society from which they had sundered themselves through revolutionary activities. Yet given that only a small minority of Communards were condemned to enforced labor, the question arose among penal administrators as to the best way to induce the Communards to colonize New Caledonia according to the agricultural model they had envisioned. As political prisoners, most *déportés* could only be “encouraged” to colonize; they could not be forced to do so. In a cunning ruse of space, d’Haussonville and his committee on deportation would come to pose on the French imperial frontier the same question that had vexed the Communards standing sentry at their Parisian barricades a few years earlier: “What is the basis of all society?” (cited in Bullard 2000: 129). For d’Haussonville the answer was self-evident: “[P]roperty and family: without property and without family, no civilization is possible” (Bullard 2000: 129).

Civilized domestication of the New Caledonian outback began in earnest when the National Assembly passed legislation granting wives a much greater right to property in the penal colony than they had been allowed under French common law. Under a system of specially devised land grants, the wives of ex-Communards were entitled to one-half the property rights of their husbands. By 1874 fifty-seven families had been reunited under the provisions of the new law, followed by 165 families the year after and 174 families by 1877 (Bullard 2000: 130). But the experiment in family-settler colonization proved short lived, as the agricultural ideal envisioned by penal administrators grated sharply against the harsh realities of penal life. Indeed, the French government’s original perception of the Isle of Pines as well as Grande Terre as extensive nature was grossly mistaken, as the presence of a large Kanak indigenous community would prove. The dense overcrowding of penal colony lands further belied the pastoral ideal, as did French fears of a landscape associated with wild savages and uncontrollable criminals (Bullock 2000: 138). The resulting gap between the ideal and practice of the French penal system on New Caledonia would prove the ultimate undoing of a “designed wildness” which could not bear the weight of the tension between the logic of humanitarian reform and retributive punishment on the islands (Bullard 2000: 138–39). The spectacular and much publicized escape of the journalist Henri Rochefort and companions on 19 March 1874, signaled the demise of the French colonial idyll and the reassertion of a much more repressive policy of penal discipline.

## “CONFUSIONS” ON ISLES DES PINS, OR THE RIGHT TO GO NATIVE

[W]e are still savages ourselves.

(Michel, cited in Maclellan 2006: 74)

Despite the attempts of penal administrators to enforce discipline on the islands in the wake of Rochefort’s escape, the Communard *déportés* located on the Isles des Pins created the “stimulus of a little confusion” on the French penal colony (Soja 1996: 280). Part of this state of affairs was self-inflicted; the French penal system had already partially erased the boundaries separating “civilized” *colon* and Kanak “savage” by allowing the latter to hunt down

and beat recalcitrant White prisoners, a move which represented a radical racial inversion of the natural social order on the islands (Bullard 2000: 230). The confusion soon deepened, however, as the Governor of New Caledonia complained that the Kanak could no longer distinguish between potentially untrustworthy former convicts and “*colon libres*.” This was troubling for the governor, who in a letter to the Ministry of the Marine on 15 October 1872 complained that unsupervised former convicts “lived in the middle of the indigenous people, adopted their mores, or at least took on those which were agreeable, polygamy for example.” Such a mixing of populations threatened “civilized order” (cited in Bullard 2000: 138).

For a large segment of the convict population, this disorienting miscegenation was experienced as a fear of “becoming savage.” In letters to his mother and sister in France, *déporté* Henri Messenger wrote, unwittingly echoing Rimbaud, “[W]e’re becoming Kanak here, what do you want? ... All about one sees the reign of the most profound boredom, which every three or four days, at payday or when post-checks arrive, changes into an orgy” (Messenger 1979: 320–21). Ironically, men such as Messenger repudiated Lafargue’s Communard ethos and embraced precisely that pastoral dream envisioned for them by the French penal administration.

But as the eight-month Kanak insurrection of 1878 gained ground, many Communards demonstrated a more ambivalent attitude towards the “civilizing mission” of the French state in New Caledonia. Drawing obvious parallels between the repression of Paris in 1871 and the crushing of the Kanak rebellion of 1878, prisoners developed active sympathies with their indigenous neighbors. Communards Achille Balliere and Francois Jourde, for instance, visited Kanak homes, where they dined and played with their children. Moreover, men such as Balliere actively sought out Kanak women; at least two marriages between a Communard and a Kanak were proposed within the first year of deportation alone (Bullard 2000: 201). Such mixed Euro-Asian marriages belied the strict separation of European and Kanak on the islands; the “Kanak” included large numbers of children with partly European parentage, just as many “whites” were frequently of mixed ancestry. Colonial *creolization* became more pronounced with the arrival in 1871 of exiled Kabyle prisoners who had fought against French imperial rule in Algeria. Settling in the Nessadiou valley near Bourail, most remained in New Caledonia, eventually integrating completely into the island’s European community. At the Nessadiou pass there is still to be found a *cimetière arabe*.

But the ties between European and Kanak were more than familial. Contrary to those *déportés* who purportedly died or went mad with “nostalgia” for France, and taking advantage of that “distance” from the metropole from which other comrades suffered, Louise Michel directed a school for the Kanak and became such a trusted confidante that she offered moral support to several young Kanak as they took part in the 1878 uprising (Bullard 2000: 201). In her memoirs of this period she wrote “I wondered which of us was the superior being ... the one who assimilates foreign knowledge through a thousand difficulties for the sake of his race, or the well-armed white who annihilates those who are less well armed” (Michel, cited in Maclellan 2006: 128).

Produced “in hiding,” Michel’s scientific humanism would stand in counterpoint to a racially-tinged humanitarian discourse emanating from the French metropole. Despite the realities of colonial hybridity on the French imperial frontier, the French World Exhibitions of 1867 and 1878 solidified the image of the Kanak as lazy, distrustful and cannibalistic “earth animals” (Kircher 1986). Such distorted images of the Kanak on view in the French *Hexagon* would generate a counter-discourse of tolerance and human rights, one which paradoxically required a dehumanization of the Kanak in order for them to receive the enlightened benefits of civilization. Thus, as the boundaries between French citizen and Kanak hardened in the colonial metropole, they paradoxically softened and blurred on the imperial frontier, producing anxieties in the core regarding the nature and direction of national priorities in the context of France’s wider overseas engagements.

## **“NO ONE ANSWERS BECAUSE THERE IS NOTHING TO ANSWER”: THE ISSUE OF AMNESTY**

Acts of boundary blurring, whether in the French metropole or colonial antipodes, could also be used for conservative purposes, as illustrated by the fact that the precise legal status of the deported Communards remained a contested issue until the very end of the nineteenth century. That ex-Communards were so easily lumped together by penal administrators within the category of common criminals indicated one aspect of the domestic effort to de-politicize the period of the Commune as an aberrant rupture devoid of social or economic foundations. By rendering the boundaries between political and common crimes indistinguishable, the French penal system thus prepared the ground for conflicts that would afflict the national imaginary at century’s end, notably during the Dreyfus Affaire. Anti-colonial activists and Communard sympathizers throughout Europe, on the other hand, worked hard to maintain the conceptual distinctions between the two categories of prisoners. The Belgian and British Internationals, for instance, declared the Communards “political men,” embraced the Commune itself as “worthy as a great achievement of humanity” and pronounced that its members deserved “the right to the sympathy and respect of all brave men” (cited in Bullard 2000: 78).

The controversy that raged over the status of the Communards located thousands of kilometers from the metropole took on its most acute form in legislative discussions concerning the granting of amnesty to the *déportés*. In this we can observe the role of France’s overseas penal frontier in inflecting the nature and direction of French re-nationalizing tendencies in the final decades of the nineteenth century. And it is in the political rhetoric for and



against Commune amnesty in as far-flung places as Guyana and New Caledonia that we may trace the glimmering of a contrary process of re-bordering in which not only different views of the proper French imperial subject are invoked but also the very terms of national reconciliation. In a pattern that would repeat itself into the next century, efforts to expand the frontiers of bourgeois civic virtue to include a greater number of the dispossessed would only serve to produce greater societal tensions and rifts, as the partiality, arbitrariness and essentially reactionary nature of instituted boundaries would become increasingly visible both to domestic as well as overseas publics.

On 13 September 1871, barely four months after the failed uprising, radical Republicans in the National Assembly presented a motion calling for the amnesty of ex-Communards. Written by Henri Brisson and signed by 48 members of the opposition, the motion was to include all “condemned or prosecuted for political crimes or lesser offenses, at Paris and in the provinces, during the past year” (Joughin 1955: 68). No action was taken on this and subsequently similar motions for months. Meanwhile, the National Assembly busied itself with quashing the last domestic traces of Commune radicalism: all revolutionary sites were placed under martial law; the International Workingman's Association (IWA) was outlawed; and an investigation was begun into the causes of the Commune (Joughin 1955). Regarding the latter, the findings of a thirty-man commission under Comte Daru targeted Socialism as the primary offender, along with universal suffrage, popular sovereignty, freedom of the press and public education.

Despite the vigorous response to the events of the Commune in France, threats to the conservative model of republican rule persisted just across France's internal borders. London and Switzerland would quickly become safe havens for ex-Communards, who would busy themselves in publishing pro-Commune tracts and newspapers, to be then smuggled across French lines (Anderson 2005). In London, the support of Bakunin's Jurassien Federation would prove crucial in this effort (Joughin 1955: 84–85). The broader Commune diaspora in Europe would also receive moral energy from fellow ex-Commune and geographer Elisée Reclus, exiled in Lugano. In his public statements Reclus refused to think of himself as separate from the totality of the condemned men of the Commune. Indeed, the deported Communards, “hidden” from public view half a world away, impressed themselves deeply on the conscience of the European Commune diaspora, while unsettling the virtuous pieties of the conservative members of the National Assembly.

In the Spring of 1874, the Jurassien Federation opened a permanent subscription for the men and women deported to New Caledonia. In this task, Reclus was charged with getting money to the deportees, and when no longer capable he entrusted a fellow ex-Commune to send funds through a friend in London (Joughin 1955: 86). In three years, 6,000 francs were collected from refugees in Belgium, Switzerland and the United States. The dreadful condition of the deportees strengthened the bonds between the European exiles and pushed them to political action. In September 1875, a group of Swiss exiles, hoping to reawaken the conscience of the French proletariat, published a collection of letters from the “living dead at Noumea” (Joughin 1955: 86). The preface, attributed to Reclus, revealed the horrendous conditions at New Caledonia and stated “we are proud that we – we ourselves – are as one with these men” (Reclus, cited in Joughin 1955: 87).

Within conservative Republican circles, such solidarity would be countered by the belief that only by dealing with each Commune individually would it be possible to consider leniency under the terms of a pardon. In such a way, they believed the Republican values of universal and legal due process would be upheld, and the political crime of the Commune treated as a criminal one, to be adjudicated on a case by case basis. It is only from this position, they concurred, that one might expect ex-Communards to return to France and become reintegrated into French society. Towards this end, in June 1871 a Commission on Pardons was established to enable the Chief of the Executive Power to pardon the Communards at New Caledonia. Legislation defending the right of the Commission to pardon Communards individually was also shored up by government policies aimed at reviewing appeals, pardons and the reduction of sentences (Joughin 1955: 88).

Sympathetic to the cause of amnesty, Victor Hugo, a delegate to the Paris Municipal Council, published a letter in which he characterized Paris as a city martyred for her patriotism. For her heroic resistance against the Prussians, she had received only insults, he declared. But in 1876, Paris was asking “nothing for herself, everything for the country” (Hugo, cited in Joughin 1955: 93). In calling for amnesty, Hugo invited the electors of the Senate to “Create ... a Republic to be desired, a Republic without martial law, without muzzles, without exiles, without political prisons, without a military yoke, without a clerical yoke, a Republic of truth and liberty” (Hugo 1876: 13–15).

Partially as a result of Hugo's intervention, debate over the destiny of men deported half a world away would have a significant influence in shaping the political discourse over the type of desired French republic at “home.” The pressures of the amnesty question would soon impinge on legislative elections to the Chamber in the mid-1870s. Émile Acolas, whom the Commune had named Professor of Law *in absentia* while he was living in Switzerland, campaigned actively for a blanket amnesty. But the precise terms of this national “conciliation,” hinging as it did on divergent and conflicting views over the status of the men to be returned to *la metropole*, was not to be made any clearer despite the demise of the monarchist-orientated National Assembly and fresh electoral victories by more moderate Republican candidates. As long as the amnesty question festered unresolved, the possibilities of achieving any lasting reconciliation appeared remote.

As the transport vessel *La Loire*, packed with new deportees bound for New Caledonia, chugged out to sea in March

1876, the journalist Gabriel Deville, in an article entitled “Amnesty and the center-left,” argued that no political progress would be forthcoming as long as the Communards – “whose only crime was to think differently from those who govern us, whose great wrong was not to have succeeded” (Deville, cited in [Joughin 1955](#): 101) – continued in their suffering. For Deville, the men of the Commune did not need a pardon, as a distinction had to be made between “political crimes” and “common law crimes.” Blurring them, he claimed, had made possible the space of New Caledonia as a location for the arbitrary application of French governmental power. For Deville everyone must be amnestied, since there was no such thing as a common law crime under the Commune's reign:

In his desire for a full amnesty, Deville was joined by George Clemenceau, Édouard Lockroy and Olivier Ordinaire. But Léon Gambetta, President of the Chamber of Deputies, fearing that an unconditional amnesty would plunge the country into a prolonged crisis, struck a tone whose ambivalence reaffirmed the internal borders of the Republic, claiming: “No sacrifice will be made either to prejudice or to fear; no sacrifice will be made to the detriment of law, order, and public peace” (Gambetta, cited in [Joughin 1955](#): 106).

In the Senate Chamber on May 22, 1877, after hearing the praises of the Commission on Pardons and the President of the Republic, Victor Hugo stood up and in a profound silence read a lengthy prepared speech, in which he argued that an amnesty ought to be voted because of justice and pity, and because of reasons of state. When he was finished, no one rose to reply. A voice called out: “No one answers because there is nothing to answer” ([Raspail 1876](#): 30).

## “SWARMING” BORDERS, “SWARMING” BORDER STUDIES

Exiled to the French penal archipelago, political prisoners at the end of the nineteenth century were routinely prohibited from looking at the sea from the windows of their cold and stony cells. This seemingly trivial datum is significant, for through this injunction the all-seeing eye of the modern French state sought to deprive revolutionary men such as Blanqui (and later in the century, Albert Dreyfus, deported to Isle du Diable, French Guyana) *the possibility of hope*. But as Blanqui intuited from his Breton island outpost, the power of the state to impose its governmentalizing vision, both within the firmly bounded nationalizing metropole and on its multiple carceral frontiers, was limited, riven with contradictions, and ultimately self-defeating. This is so, he argued, due to the inherent indefiniteness (*l'indéfini*) of all frontiers and boundaries, defined by the “manifest impossibility of locating or of conceiving a limit to space” ([Blanqui 2000b](#): 233).

We may forgive Blanqui's “astral excesses,” but from France's loss of an internal territorial borderland to Prussia at Sedan, the failure of the “Communard barricade” to shore up a utopian political project “beyond the state,” and the contradictory experience of Communard *déportés* in New Caledonia we may deduce the lineaments of a dialectic linking an internal European borderland and an external frontier whose ambiguous and contradictory logics continue to resonate in our day. For this double-border dynamic to become manifest, I have argued, we must depart from the current fixation of border studies on clearly defined state sovereignty and territoriality as the only relevant parameters for understanding how borders function and change. This requires undertaking an equally serious examination of the ways in which geohistorically constituted frontiers have produced recursive effects on the nationalizing spatial imaginaries of states, through processes of transboundary interaction that have often occurred “in hiding,” at the very limits of state visibility.

This insight addresses not only some of the epistemological blindspots of state-centric social science, but opens up a space of postcolonial “swarming” within border studies, one which could help refocus historical attention on the tensions and reversals in European transboundary rule, holding its internal borders and external frontiers within the same analytical frame. As foreshadowed by the “swarm at Montmartre,” such a frame was able to convey the way in which under the Third Republic a project was undertaken to “naturalize” the penal frontier so as to reestablish the metropolitan core as a firmly bounded space of moral regeneration and bourgeois civility, only to have this clean division of “Us/Them” founder against the realities of Communard/Kanak allegiance on the Isles des Pins.

In similar fashion, as observed in French parliamentary debates over the issue of “amnesty,” attempts to lump Communard prisoners together with common criminals ran against a swarm of opposition – unseen, beyond the borders of the *Hexagon* – from internationalists bent on preserving the ideal of a French Republic in which one's political convictions remained exempt from judicial scrutiny. In so doing, the relational geographies linking metropolitan borderlands and imperial frontiers reveal transboundary solidarities and alliances – spaces of “border possibility” – that would otherwise have remained invisible within an exclusively territorial narrative of the border defined as the “end of the state” or the “end of politics.” “Swarming” at the frontiers of France, we may therefore join [Blanqui \(2000b](#): 260–261) in positing future worlds of “swarming border studies,” whose flaring “comets ... raise up their legs and ... go join their numberless tribes in the imaginary spaces.”

## NOTES

1 “A feeling of tiredness being French: the vague desire to go look for a home country, where the artist has his tranquility, and not at every moment disturbed by stupid agitations, by the idiotic convulsions of a destructive mob”

(author's translation).

2 In the famous Communard debating clubs that sprang up like mushrooms throughout Paris during this time, discussion over the banning of night-time work for bakers would exemplify this "antidiscipline" (Edwards 1973).

3 "Yes, I have my eyes closed at your light. I am an animal, a Black. But I can be saved. You are false Blacks, you ferocious, greedy maniacs. Merchant, you are a Black; magistrate, you are a Black; general, you are a Black; emperor, you old itchy brute, you are a Black ... The most clever thing to do is leave this continent where madness reigns" (author's translation).

4 Kristin Ross locates the "emergence of social space" in the late nineteenth century at that very moment when the French National Guard topples the imperial-age column established by Napoleon III at the Place Vendôme, May 20, 1871 (Ross 1988). With respect to the proto-geography of European bordering strategies and counterstrategies, I situate this inaugural moment instead in a much less spectacular but for that matter no less vital space: the inverted world of the barricade-*monde* (barricade-world).

5 In the months that followed, the Communard "swarm" would be dealt with harshly by the government of Thiers, as in the last weeks of the uprising an estimated 25,000–30,000 Parisians were executed in the streets of the capital. Delescluze, that "old hyena," was shot beside a barricade, while it was surmised that Commissioner of Public Safety Félix Pyatt succeeded in stowing himself away in one of the balloons that were seen in the sky the day Versailles troops entered Paris (Priollaud 1983).

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