Gender Equality Attitudes among Turks in Western Europe and Turkey: The Interrelated Impact of Migration and Parents' Attitudes

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Gender Equality Attitudes among Turks in Western Europe and Turkey: The Interrelated Impact of Migration and Parents’ Attitudes

Niels Spierings

This study applies unique data on three-generation migrant and non-migrant lineages to assess how assimilation and intergenerational transmission theories hold up for attitudes on gender equality in the context of Turkey–Europe migration. Information on migration histories of families and gender equality attitudes is collected for over 800 families. Based on those data assimilation and retention theories and theories on intergenerational transmission as a means to reproduce cultural attitudes among migrant families are tested from a dissimilation-from-origin perspective: how do migrants and their descendants differ from non-migrants from the same area of origin. The results of this study support concepts that focus on context- and path-dependency: segmented assimilation is shown in the form that the more traditional migrants who move back to Turkey have children with more traditional views than comparable people without migrant ancestors (retention). At the same time, among lineages that settle in Europe, migration seems to speed up the assimilation process of becoming more supportive of gender equality. Moreover, the youth that grew up in Europe is hardly influenced by the parents’ attitudes, whereas the ones growing up in Turkey are. This supports the idea of migration being a transmission belt for intergenerational transmission.

Keywords: Migration; Gender Equality Attitudes; Intergenerational Transmission; Turkey; Europe

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1. Introduction

Societal and political immigration and integration debates are more and more Islamized and a supposed lack of gender inequality has become a core theme in them (see Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013; Fekete 2006; Ghorashi 2010; Prins and Saharso 2008; Roggeband and Verloo 2007). In line with this, most academic studies on migration and gender equality attitudes focus on the role of Islam and the question whether cultural assimilation in the field of gender roles is taking place. While the impact of religion is fairly limited (cf. Alexander and Welzel 2011; Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013; Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Röder 2014; Scheible and Fleischmann 2013), the general conclusion is that immigrants do show signs of assimilation into the destination society’s culture (Bejarano, Manzano, and Montoya 2011; Bernhardt, Goldscheider, and Goldscheider 2007; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Read 2003; Röder 2014; Teney 2009).

The focus on these two issues, however, draws away attention from other pressing issues even though gender-role attitudes have been shown to be important explanations of individual behaviour among migrants (e.g. Herzog-Punzenberger et al. 2012; Huschek, de Valk, and Liefbroer 2011). One of the lacunae is that existing academic studies shed little light on the actual impact of migration on the development and change in gender equality attitudes among migrants. This study will therefore focus on how migration and intergenerational transmission interact in changing or perpetuating the gender equality attitudes among migrant families from Turkey of which the ancestors were guest labourers in Germany or the Netherlands and among non-migrants—people with a Turkish migrant background form the largest groups of immigrants in Europe, and the Netherlands and particularly Germany are major receiving countries (Bradatan and Sandu 2012).

As such this study provides two major contributions to the literature. First, assimilation theories expect that migrants’ attitudes move towards those dominant in the receiving society. Doing so, it assumes a move away from the culture of the origin society (cf. Barnett, Sonnert, and Sadler 2012; Bejarano, Manzano, and Montoya 2011; Huschek, de Valk, and Liefbroer 2011; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Röder 2014). To test the latter part of this claim, a comparison with non-migrant in the society of origin is needed (see Nauck 1989; cf. Bejarano, Manzano, and Montoya 2011), as is provided in this study. I show how gender equality attitudes have developed over three generations in about 800 families or lineages (Guvelin n.d.), comparing lineages originating from 1950s and 1960s guest labourers with lineages of non-migrant ancestors from the same regions in Turkey. This will introduce an origin perspective to understand the more complex patterns of assimilation, including accelerated dissimilation from the origin culture as well as resistance to gender equality among return-migrants’ offspring who seem to hold on to traditionalism in response to feeling threatened by or isolated in the ‘immoral’ West (cf. Diehl, Koenig, and
Second, this study focuses on one particular channel through which the culture of origin might be reproduced in the culture of destination: migrant parents transferring their (more traditional) gender equality attitudes to their offspring; a process that might be disrupted or strengthened by migration. Doing so, I take a perspective of context-dependent transmission in order to theorise how the intergenerational transmission of values is shaped by the migration histories of families. This insight is inspired by the concepts of segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou 1993) and transmission belts (Schönpflug 2001), and by combining it with an origin perspective these concepts are further developed. In line with other studies on the intergenerational transmission of culture (e.g. De Valk and Liefbroer 2007; Glass, Bengston, and Dunham 1986; Kohn, Slomczynski, and Schoenbach 1986; Schönpflug 2001), I find that gender equality attitudes are reproduced among the Turkish families in Turkey and Europe, supporting calls for paying more attention to the role of the family in this field (Bernhardt, Goldscheider, and Goldscheider 2007; Pedraza 1991; see also Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009). However, migration functions as an important transmission belt in one particular way: among children who grew up in Europe hardly any resemblance with their Turkish parents’ attitudes is registered. This suggests that the extra-familial context and education are important sites of assimilation (cf. Ali and Fokkema 2014; Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013; Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Pedraza 1991; Röder 2014).

2. Literature and Theory

To embed theories of assimilation and transmission, I will first present some dominant views on gender equality attitudes in the sociological literature as well as the empirical situation in Europe and Turkey. This background is crucial when taking an origin perspective on assimilation, because that perspective asks for an assessment of change compared to the situation and developments in the origin society.

2.1. Background: Gender Equality Attitudes

The general literature on gender equality attitudes is dominated by modernisation theory, which predicts a rise in attitudes supporting gender equality, with economic development as driving force, working through secularisation and a stronger focus on self-development and individualism instead of survival and communalism (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Norris 2003). This general theory seems supported by findings of increased support for gender equality due to higher education, declines in religiosity and being young (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Brewster and Padavic 2000; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Spierings 2014). The studies focusing on gender equality attitudes among immigrants have found comparable effects (e.g. Bejarano, Manzano, and Montoya 2011; Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013; Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Leaper and Valin 1996; Read 2003).
While some argue that gender-role attitudes are part of the orientations established in one’s early socialisation as a child, and thus relatively resistant to change (see Berger and Luckmann 1967; Inglehart 1997; Pettersson 2008), the results discussed above show that there is room for change within a lifetime. This implies that migration can have an effect even if one is migrating later in life.

Evidently, also the socio-economic structure and culture of a country matter in shaping people’s attitudes (Baxter and Kane 1995; Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Crompton and Harris 1997; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Sjöberg 2004). This is particularly relevant when studying migration, because migrants construct their identity based on their experiences in both the origin and the destination context. The migration from Turkey to Europe is mainly a history of labour and family reunification (see Akgündüz 1993). Turks in Turkey live in the context of an industrial, relatively more traditional country compared to the post-industrial (post)modern part of Europe to which respondents in this study have migrated (Schönpflug 2001; Schwartz 1992).

Following the modernisation logic this difference in contexts is important, because in industrial societies gender equality attitudes are expected to rise, partly because women’s entry into the labour market. In the post-industrial countries they are expected to remain stable (Crompton and Harris 1997; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Norris 2003). This is also exactly what the World Value Surveys (WVS 1981–2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901 2009) data on gender equality attitudes show (Figure 1).

There are three important observation to make from these data: (i) the reported support for gender equality in the West-European countries is higher than in Turkey, (ii) the gap between Germany and the Netherlands is negligible compared to the gap between Turkey and Europe; and (iii) the support in the Germany seems close to stable, whereas the support for gender equality in Turkey shows a clear increase of about 1% point a year, and thus the gap between the countries has been decreasing over the year (for the Netherlands no trend data were present). Consequently, a

![Figure 1. Support for gender equality in five countries.](image-url)
growing support for gender equality among Turkish migrants in Europe will not be strong proof of assimilation, even though results from comparable studies have been interpreted as such (see Bejarano, Manzano, and Montoya 2011).

2.2. Assimilation or Alienation?

The dominant perspective on understanding the socio-economic and cultural position of migrants is assimilation theory, with all its strands and variations (Alba and Nee 1997; Barnett, Sonnert, and Sadler 2012; Portes and Rumbaut 2001), including different forms of assimilation theory in migration studies, modernisation theory in sociology and political science and acculturation theory in psychology (see also Teney 2009).

While there are important differences between different interpretations of assimilation theory, they do share the basic understanding that migrants adjust to the culture of the destination society in that they take over at least some of the culture of this new context. Consequently, the distance between the migrants and the new context becomes narrower—which can be partly due to the destination culture changing in the direction of the migrants as well (Alba 2005; Alba and Nee 1997; Barnett, Sonnert, and Sadler 2012).

In terms of gender equality attitudes, this implies that citizens with a migration background will partly internalise the lifestyles (e.g. women’s presence in the public sphere) and value system (e.g. formal equality) of the host society. Over time, these citizens and their offspring will resemble the native citizens of their new home more closely. They are thus expected to become more supportive of gender equality if the destination society has a more gender equal culture than the origin society (e.g. Bejarano, Manzano, and Montoya 2011; Bernhardt, Goldscheider, and Goldscheider 2007; Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Röder 2014; Teney 2009)—as has been illustrate above for the situation studied here.

In this explanation and formulation of assimilation theory, the dominant perspective is a destination perspective: assimilation to the new culture. However, the full theoretical process also implies dissimilation from the culture of origin taking place at the same time. As a result of migrating to a different country and culture an emigrant’s attitudes should develop differently than those of non-migrants. From an origin view, assimilation theory thus predicts dissimilation:

Hypothesis 1: The support for gender equality grows more strongly among migrant families than among non-migrant families.

Acknowledging that dissimilation-from-origin is part of assimilation theory also highlights the link to its main competitor more clearly. This second perspective goes under different names as well: retention, resistance, alienation, revival and more (e.g. Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Guveli and Platt 2011; Huschek, de Valk, and Liebroer 2011; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2010).

While living in the destination environment, the culture of origin is often still an important reference point for migrants (Fortin 2002). Since gender attitudes are
central to one’s identity (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Pettersson 2008), migrants might actually feel a particularly salient ‘risk of dissimilation’ from their origin culture regarding these attitudes. This insecurity might even lead to a feeling of being threatened by a receiving society that is culturally different and sometimes rather critical or outright hostile. Overall, this can lead to strong attempts to consolidate one’s identity and stick to the origin country’s values (Alba 2005; Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2010).

Moreover, young second- and third-generation migrants are often looking for a way to create a transnational identity, synthesising the culture of their country of living and that of their parents (Fortin 2002; Morley 2001). This leads to a stronger focus on their identity and tends to intensify cultural loyalties (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Verkuyten 2009). More generally, people in a minority situation can be expected to seek for reassurance of their identity and experience peer pressure as well as support from a cultural in-group (Phalet and Schönpflug 2001).

These expectations vary slightly in the direction of change here: from staying close to the society of origin/parents to becoming more conservative than that origin society. There is, however, no move towards the society of destination:

Hypothesis 2: The support for gender equality grows as much or less among migrant families than among non-migrant families.

2.3. Intergenerational Transmission and Migration

As already mentioned, the preservation of the culture can partly run through parents, who transmit their views to their children, and this might contribute to explaining the pace of change in the generational shifts of cultural values among migrant families (Bisin and Verdier 2000). However, the intergenerational transmission literature has hardly studied gender role or equality attitudes (an exception is Farré and Vella [2013] who find a small transmission effect). There is some work on other attitudes though, which shows the reproduction of culture through parental socialisation (e.g. De Valk and Liefbroer 2007; Glass, Bengston, and Dunham 1986; Kohn, Slomczynski, and Schoenbach 1986; Schönpflug 2001). This socialisation is expected to take place mainly during the enculturation of children, when they are learning the identity, rituals and values dominant in their direct environment. This process can be intentional and unintentional, and should not be equated to replication (Schönpflug 2001):

Hypothesis 3: The support for gender equality is higher among children of whom the parents support gender equality more.

The power of intergenerational transmission is said to be altered by transmission belts of which migration can be one, since migration is a breakpoint that reshapes family ties and leads to a new and different environment (Schönpflug 2001). So while transmission might explain the reproduction of origin culture in the destination
society, intergenerational transmission among migrant families should be understood
as being subject to the influence of migration as well, and as such migration has a
more complex effect on processes of dissimilation and assimilation. Echoing Alba and
Nee (2003), the focus should be not on whether, but on the extent to which people are
influenced by their ancestors and the impact of the host society.

The empirical research on the interaction between intergenerational transmission
and migration is relatively scarce. In one study, Schönpfug (2001,184) concludes on
Turkish migrants in Germany that:

A continuous cultural context does not lead to intensified transmission. Turkish father-
son dyads living in Turkey did not reveal more transmission than did Turkish father-
son dyads living in a big city or in a provincial environment after work migration to
Germany.

This conclusion can be read as proof for migration not functioning as a transmission
belt. It might also indicate that multiple (counteracting) effects work simultaneously.
Theoretically that is quite well possible, and I will theorise three possible, partly
counteracting, effects.

First, it might be expected that the effect of transmission is considerably stronger if
a parent migrates with the child and is close to the child when the latter is growing
up; during the enculturation process. A parent living abroad will be absent most of
the time and, for instance, influence by example will not be exerted:

Hypothesis 4: The effect of parents’ gender equality attitudes on children’s gender
equality attitudes is stronger if parent and child resided in the same country when the
child grows up.

Second, if a parent migrates to a context that is rather different from their origin
country – sometimes even hostile to the immigrants and their views (see Careja and
Andreß 2013; Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2005) – this might make parents’
identities and attitudes more salient and strengthen the feeling that their culture is
threatened. Consequently, a strengthening effect of a parent’s EU-experience can be
expected as part of a retention reaction (discussed above):

Hypothesis 5: The effect of parents’ gender equality attitudes on children’s gender
equality attitudes is stronger if parents have (re)migrated.

Third, the Western European assimilation of children might also weaken the impact
of parents’ attitudes: ‘In a foreign land, parental controls can wane fast when
confronted with the sustained challenges of deviant lifestyles, media-driven con-
sumerism, and peer influences’ (Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2005, 1013) and
parents might ‘let their children adapt behaviour patterns that are functional in the
new environment’ (Schönpfug 2001, 176). Particularly, immigrant youth face much
new and divers information outside the family, at school for instance (Ali and
Fokkema 2014). Consequently, socialisation in the family might weaken and be
Hypothesis 6: The effect of parents’ gender equality attitudes on children’s gender equality attitudes is weaker if children did not grow up in the society with their culture of origin.

3. Data and Methods

3.1. Data

This study makes use of the 2000Families data (Guvelin n.d.; Guveli, Spierings, and Bayrakdar 2014), which include information on lineage and migration as well as important socio-economic and attitudinal characteristics of 6562 members of Turkish families from four regions (Acipayam, Akçaabat, Emirdağ, and Kulu). The data are derived applying random sampling of 100 Primary Sampling Units (PSU; rural villages or urban streets) in each region. In each PSU, doors were knocked via a method of skip-one-door, turn left at the end of the street and right at the end of the next (Ganzeboom and Sozeri 2013).

In these data, 883 lineages are present for which the migration status as well as the attitudes towards gender equality is measured in three consecutive generations. Moreover, the data include migrant and non-migrant families, which enables an origin or dissimilation perspective in which the developments in Turkey can be compared to those among Turkish migrants and their descendants in Western European countries.

Of the G1-migrants included here, about 80% migrated to Germany and 20% to the Netherlands, reflecting the pivotal role of Germany as receiving country and the large Turkish community in the Netherlands. While I do not assume these countries to be identical in terms of their gender culture and policies, Figure 1 has shown that the German and Dutch gender equality attitudes are similarly high, but some studies suggest that the Turkish second generation in Germany is more gender conservative than in the Netherlands (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013). Nevertheless, I will study the two destination societies as one sample in order to maximise statistical leverage. Evidently, this would be problematic if the focus of this study was on differences in assimilation across Europe; however, the focus here is mainly on the difference between ‘Turks in Europe’ and the society of origin. Moreover, additional analyses only on migrants living in Germany (and non-migrants only living in Turkey) do not lead to different conclusion – the Dutch subsample is too small for separate analyses. It is notable though that the number of return-migrants among G1 is larger for the Dutch migrants, which might (partly) explain the difference in gender traditionalism mentioned above (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013), given the selective return migration as found and discussed in the results section.

Another limitation of the 2000Families data is that they are sampled in relatively rural areas and cannot be treated as a fully representative sample of Turkish society.
or migrants, even though the four regions are important sending regions. As gender equality support is generally lower in rural areas (e.g. Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smits 2007), interpretations of the descriptive statistics should not be treated as representing Turkey as a whole. On the other hand, WVS data (also used in Figure 1) do not show lower support for gender equality in the rural Central and East Turkey (0.605) than in the urban West and coastal areas (0.583). Also, the data used here show a highly similar trend as the one found in the WVS data (compare Figures 1 and 2), suggesting a certain degree of external validity. Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) data—which only samples women—from 1998, 2003 and 2008 do include information on urbanisation and gender equality attitudes. Those data show a highly consistent and steady increase in gender equality attitudes in the countryside, towns and small cities. Only women in the large cities show some decline in supporting gender equality, but this is very likely due to strong and increasing internal migration from the rural areas to Istanbul and the other big cities (see Eryurt and KOC 2012). Overall, results based on the 2000Families data seem to bear significance beyond the areas sampled, but generalisation deserve some caution.

3.2. Dependent Variable

Two questions are used to measure support for gender equality: (i) ‘A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl’ and (ii) ‘On the whole, men make better business executives than women do’. These questions cover leadership and education and are highly similar to standard questions in for instance the European Value Surveys (EVS) and WVS. They do not measure sexual liberalisation attitudes and private gender roles, which are sometimes included in a broader concept of emancipatory attitudes (cf. Bejarano, Manzano, and Montoya 2011; Bernhardt, Goldscheider, and Goldscheider 2007; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Röder 2014). The focus is thus on gender equality in the public sphere, and the questions are much used indicators of that.

Both questions have five possible answers (strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree), and the scores on the two questions are added up and rescaled to a 9-point scale, of which the lowest score is ‘0’ and the highest ‘1’ (in between: 0.125; 0.25; 0.375; 0.5; 0.625; 0.75; 0.875). A higher score indicates more support for gender equality. In the regression analyses, the gender equality scores of the G3 respondents serve as dependent variable.

3.3. Independent Variables

For testing Hypotheses 1 and 2, the different migration lineages are charted by distinguishing between (i) stayers, non-migrants, (ii) migrants, (iii) return migrants, (iv) people who were born in Europe and stayed and (v) EU-born who left for Turkey. Combining this information for all three generations in each lineage created over 50 different three-generation migration histories. These have been grouped into five theoretically meaningful categories in order to create sizeable groups that allow
statistical comparison: (i) lineages of which all members have always lived in Turkey \( (n = 84) \); (ii) lineages of which the grandparent was a guest labourer in Europe, but all descendants lived their whole lives in Turkey \( (n = 289) \); (iii) lineages of which the first two generations have been born in Turkey and migrated to Europe (and some returned), while the third generations have lived their whole lives in Turkey \( (n = 69) \); (iv) lineages of which both the first and second generation have been born in Turkey and migrated to Europe and the third generation was born in Europe \( (n = 279) \); and (v) lineages of which the ancestor remained in Turkey, the second generation migrated and the third was born in Europe \( (n = 25) \). A wide variety of other lineages were grouped in a sixth category \( (n = 137) \).

Hypotheses 3 through 6 are tested in regression models, for which the scores on gender equality of the parents (G2) are used as a predictor of the gender equality attitudes of the youngest generation, the G3 respondents. For testing Hypotheses 1 and 2, the grandparents’ gender equality attitudes are also calculated.

To test Hypotheses 4 through 6, I created interaction terms of the parent’s attitudes with different migration-history variables. For Hypothesis 4, I created a dummy variable for whether the child grew in vicinity of the parent. This was based on the information of the migration histories. If in the first 16 years of the child’s life, the parents and the child both migrated or both did not, the score was ‘1’. If the parent was abroad those 16 years, but the child was not, the score was ‘0’. For the remainder of cases it was calculated how many years the parent and child lived in the same country. If this was 8 or more the dummy was coded ‘1’; if it was less, the score is ‘0’. Hypothesis 5 focuses on whether a parent has lived in the EU-experience \( (1 = \text{yes}) \). Finally, Hypothesis 6 on whether the child grew up in Europe was tested by a set of dummy variables measuring whether the respondent lived in Europe, Turkey or both partly during the first 16 years of her or his live.

As control variables age, education and sex were included (see Alexander and Welzel 2011; Bejarano, Manzano, and Montoya 2011; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Brewster and Padavic 2000). Age was measured in years, for education a common metric of 11 categories was included as an interval variable, and sex was measured by a dummy variable \( (1 = \text{woman}) \). Also, the migration history of the G3 respondents functions as a control variable, with four categories: (i) always lived in Europe; (ii) born in Turkey, migrated to Europe; (iii) lives in Turkey, has lived in Europe; and (iv) always lived in Turkey. Descriptive information on all variables can be found in Appendix 1.

3.4. Model

Hypotheses 3–6 are tested with multilevel regression models (SPSS Mixed procedure), because some respondents (i-level) have the same parent (j-level). The main effects in the interaction models show the effect of parents’ attitudes for the references group; the interaction coefficient indicates to what extent the average transmission is different for the group indicated by the interaction term and whether the difference between effects is statistically significant. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are tested by assessing
the groups of lineages described at the beginning of Section 3.3 and their aggregated gender equality attitudes scores.

4. Results

4.1. Gender Equality Attitudes across Generations

Overall, the support for gender equality in the public sphere has risen from 0.63 among the first generation to 0.82 among the third generation (Figure 2, finely dashed black line). However, the development of gender equality attitudes is markedly different for families with different migration histories. Three distinct patterns are shown, and the differences between those three are statistically significant ($p < 0.001$).²

First, the lineages of which all members have always lived in Turkey (Group 1) show a steady increasing support for gender equality, comparing generations. This pattern is very similar to the one displayed in Figure 1 for Turkish citizens based on the WVS data. Especially the growing support between G2 and G3 stands out compared to the other lineages in the 2000Families data. The third generation in families that have always lived in Turkey is among the groups most supportive of gender equality.

Second, the lines are very similar for the lineages of which the first or second generation started to migrate and of whom the third generation has lived or lives in Europe (Groups 4 and 5). They show relatively high gender equality support among the first two generations and a slight further increase from the second to the third generation. Applying an origin perspective and comparing this pattern with that of the stayer lineages (Group 1) show that the third-generation migrants have pretty similar scores to the third generation in the origin society. The higher scores among the first two generations of migrant lineages could be due to both selectivity (more

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**Figure 2.** Gender equality attitudes among three-generation lineages with different migration histories.
liberal people being more inclined to migrate) or to a process whereby migration accelerates the development towards stronger gender equality attitudes. This study is the first to make this origin comparison and show this pattern; disentangling effects from selectivity is beyond the scope of the data used here.³ Figure 2, furthermore, shows that from the second generation onwards the level of saturation might have been reached among the migrant lineages, giving little room for the migrants to further liberalise.

The third pattern is found for the two lineages with offspring (G3) that has always lived in Turkey, with return migrants as ancestors (G1, G2) (Lineages: Groups 2 and 3). These lineages show a relatively low support for gender equality in the first two generations and a decline from the second to the third generation. Compared to the non-migrant group, this suggests a resistance effect caused by an ‘echo of migration’. Not the generation of migrants to Europe from these lineages, but the return-migration families’ third generation seems to hold on to what ‘the Turkish attitudes’ were during the days of their parents. One explanation is that the (relatively traditional) return-migrant parents disliked the European morals they experienced and brought up their children to remain ‘Turkish’. This also fits the already lower support for gender equality found among the first two generations. In addition, this result suggests that a selection effect takes place in return migration (more traditional migrants return more), not just in migration (cf. Norris and Inglehart 2012). Because the data oversampled rural families and many return-migrants came from and returned to agricultural households, this indirect retention effect might be real, but specific to migrants from already more traditional environments. In addition, for this reasoning to hold a transmission of values from parents to children needs to exist, as I will focus on next.

4.2. Intergenerational Transmission of Gender Equality Attitudes

To what extent explains intergenerational transmission the reproduction of attitudes among Turkish (non-)migrants and how is this process influenced by migration? That is displayed in Table 1. Model 1 includes all control variables. In Model 2 the parental effect is included (Hypothesis 3); Models 3 through 5 show how migration changes the impact of parents’ attitudes (Hypothesis 4 through 6). The control variables show the expected effects (Models 1 and 2), which support the overall validity of the data.⁴

In line with intergenerational transmission theory, the data show that parents who are more supportive of gender equality attitudes have children who are more supportive as well. In Model 2, the effect is highly significant ($p < 0.001$) and parent’s attitudes are one of the strongest explanatory variables.⁵ In substantive terms, on average a parent’s increase on the gender equality scale by 1 translates to an increase of 0.13 in the child’s attitudes. This relationship is a bit stronger than effects found in similar studies on cultural attitudes not focusing on migrant lineages (e.g. Farré and Vella 2013).

Models 3 through 5 present the results for one interaction hypothesis each. Whether the parent was present during the child’s youth (Hypothesis 4; Model 3) and
Table 1. Multilevel model on the support for gender equality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1: control variables</th>
<th>Model 2: parents attitudes</th>
<th>Model 3: interaction with 'same country'</th>
<th>Model 4: interaction with 'parent lived in EUR'</th>
<th>Model 5: interaction with 'grew up in EUR'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parent's gender equality attitudes</td>
<td>0.133 (0.033)***</td>
<td>0.180 (0.108)†</td>
<td>0.154 (0.045)**</td>
<td>0.171 (0.040)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents attitudes interacted with...</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same country during youth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.044 (0.114)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent has lived or lives in Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.045 (0.066)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grew up in EUR (ref. = TUR)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.144 (0.074)†</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grew up in TUR and EUR (ref. = TUR)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.053 (0.136)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same country during youth (ref. = no)</td>
<td>-0.062 (0.098)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent has lived or lives in Europe (ref. = no)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.053 (0.059)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grew up in (ref. = TUR)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.225 (0.183)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed: TUR and EUR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.165 (0.126)</td>
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<td>Migration status (ref. = always EUR)</td>
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<td>Migrated to Europe</td>
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<td>0.008 (0.039)</td>
<td>-0.040 (0.046)</td>
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<td>Once in Europe</td>
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<td>-0.045 (0.058)</td>
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<td>Always Turkey</td>
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<td>-0.089*** (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.091*** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.076*** (0.034)</td>
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<td>Educational level (0–10)</td>
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<td>0.009† (0.005)</td>
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Table 1 (Continued)

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<th>Model 2: parents attitudes</th>
<th>Model 3: interaction with ‘same country’</th>
<th>Model 4: interaction with ‘parent lived in EUR’</th>
<th>Model 5: interaction with ‘grew up in EUR’</th>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>Variance at parent level</td>
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<td>(0.004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Variance at child level</td>
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<td>833</td>
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BIC, Bayesian Information Criterion; EUR indicates Europe; TUR indicates Turkey.

Note: The standard errors are given between brackets. All models are multilevel models, with the parent level as higher-level context.

†p < 0.10, ‡p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****p < 0.001.
whether the parent has an EU-migration history (Hypothesis 5; Model 4) do not clearly impact the intergenerational transmission. No substantively or statistically significant effects were found.6

Model 5, however, indicates that migration does have an impact on intergenerational transmission. The interaction term shows a substantial effect and is marginally significant (it deviates from zero with a probability of 94.7%; i.e. \( p = 0.053 \)).7 The effect of the parent’s gender equality attitudes on those of the child is around 0.17 for the youth that grew up in Turkey (about 58% of our sample), but this effect is 0.14 smaller for children that grew up in Europe (about 35% of the sample).8 In other words, the effect of the parent is almost completely absent among the migrant Turks who grew up in Europe.9 Indeed, rerunning the model with growing up in Europe as the reference category shows that the effect of parent’s attitudes is not significant for respondents who grew up in Europe. In substantive terms: the European non- or extra-family socialisation seems to overpower the Turkish migrant within-family socialisation.

Figure 3 depicts the difference in intergenerational transmission among respondents who grew up in Europe and those who did in Turkey by giving the estimated gender equality attitudes for the respondents based on the parent’s attitudes.10 The figure clearly shows that children who grew up in Europe are hardly influenced by their parents’ attitudes, whereas children who grew up in Turkey are substantially influenced by their parents’ attitudes. Also, it shows that this difference in effect seems to lead to a difference among children with more traditional parents; children with the most gender progressive parents show more similar scores in Europe and Turkey (ceteris paribus).

5. Discussion and Conclusion

This study engages with theories of cultural integration of immigrants and more specifically the impact of migration on the support of gender equality. I focused on assimilation and retention theories (e.g. Alba and Nee 1997; Norris and Inglehart

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Figure 3. The impact of parent’s gender equality attitudes on Turks who grew up in Turkey and Europe.
2012; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2010) and migration belts in theories of intergenerational transmission (Schönpflug 2001). While the genderedness of migration is acknowledged in the larger literature (e.g. Kraler et al. 2011) and reflected, for instances, in the Turkish–European migration history that shifted from labour recruitment to family reunification (see Akgündüz 1993) and the gendered anti-Islam political debates (Roggeband and Verloo 2007), little scholarly attention has been paid to the actual change and perpetuation of gender equality attitudes due to migration and family processes. In this study, I provided tests of existing integration theories with unique empirical material on gender equality attitudes among migrants from Turkey to Europe. This study makes an important theoretical contribution by presenting a novel frame in the integration debate. I focused on the backside of assimilation theories: dissimilation from the culture of origin and the difference between migrants and the people from the sending areas who did not migrate (see Nauck 1989). As such, I provided new empirical and theoretical insights for this widely debated topic in academia and society.

Summarising the results, I showed that retention to assimilation by the destination culture mainly affects the descendants of (the already more traditional) return-migrants in Turkey (the country of origin), and that assimilation (or dissimilation from origin) processes do take place, but (i) that migration at best accelerates the already existing development towards a more supportive position on gender equality as found in Turkey and (ii) that migration, if the descendants grew up in Europe, almost nullifies intergenerational transmission through which attitudes towards gender equality would be reproduced otherwise.

These results have several important theoretical implications. I will highlight three interrelated points. First of all, some results favour assimilation theory (Hypothesis 1) over retention theories (Hypothesis 2) among staying migrants, but the assimilation effects are highly conditional and this should be theorised more. Three forms of conditionality have been shown here: (i) compared to the control group of Turkish non-migrants, the assimilation process seems to be one of acceleration, as younger generations in Turkey are becoming more supportive of gender equality as well. Some additional analyses suggest that this effect is not solely due to selectivity, but the results here do ask for further analyses once data are available on attitudes before and after migration. For now, it seems plausible that the acceleration effect is a direct cultural effect as is predicted by assimilation theories (Alba 2005; Bejarano, Manzano, and Montoya 2011). It certainly does not seem to be due to rising levels of education (cf. Pedraza 1991), but other attitudes, such as religiosity, might be linked to it and this needs further study (cf. Alexander and Welzel 2011; Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Röder 2014); (ii) the intergenerational transmission results supporting Hypothesis 6 indicate that assimilation is mostly effective when people are young. For migrant youth the extra-familial acculturation seems crucial in assimilation, as has been suggested by scholars on political socialisation as well (e.g. Bloemraad and Trost 2008; Sapiro 2004). This also suggests that enculturation is more important than acculturation (cf. Norris and Inglehart 2012; Read 2003); and
The results for return migrants strongly suggest that assimilation theories are mainly confirmed because not assimilated migrants seem to return to the country of origin (the possible selectivity in return migration), making them invisible in the current literature as migrants.

The importance of return migration provides the second major theoretical implication as well: retention theories are correct in predicting a backlash effect on value patterns, but this is only found among the descendants of return migrants. In terms of intergenerational transmission this suggests that the return-migrant parents are the ones that raise their children to be more traditional. Thus retention takes place indirectly and mainly affects the country of origin, whereas the dominant perspectives in the literature do not theorise such effects (e.g. Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Verkuylten and Yildiz 2010) and on gender equality attitudes comparisons mainly focus on migrants and natives in the destination society (Bejarano, Manzano, and Montoya 2011; Bernhardt, Goldscheider, and Goldscheider 2007; Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Read 2003; Röder 2014; Teney 2009). More research on return migration effects is needed. For instance, the data used here do not allow us to conclude with certainty whether the more traditional views among return migrants are part of a self-selection process or whether migration to Europe actually leads to holding more traditional views. The results simply show that the migrants with more traditional attitudes remigrate more often. Do more traditional migrants leave their families in Turkey because they intended to work in Europe for a brief period to secure some capital? Did this particular group of migrant perceive the European societies as more immoral than the other migrants?

The third theoretical implication builds on these signs of path-dependency. The results here show (i) that migration influences the transmission of values (Schönpflug’s [2001] ‘migration belts’) and (ii) that the initial gender equality attitudes of parents shape the impact of migration on the development of attitudes among their descendants as discussed more elaborately above. This resonates the concept of segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2005; Waters 1996), even though the segmentation I found is not an example of different trajectories in the destination society, but a different impact of migration in the destination and origin society, depending on the starting position of (e)migrants. The migration experience seems to reproduce and widen already existing gaps in attitudes towards gender equality. Both segmented assimilation and transmission belts argue for a context- or path-dependency approach, and the importance of this is also confirmed in this study. The concepts thus hold beyond the issue of migrants’ socio-economic position and are also applicable to the development of attitudes. At the same time, this study showed that the concepts should be theorised further. The framework should account for return migration and a more specific understanding of which aspect of migration affects the intergenerational transmission of values—I found only one migration variable to serve as a migration belt and two that did not (refuting Hypotheses 4 and 5). However, we should not immediately dismiss the role...
of growing up in the vicinity of a parent (Hypothesis 4) and having migrant parents (Hypothesis 5), since the data only included one parent. Compensation by a second parent for the absence of the first could explain absent effects. I could not test such dynamics.

In sum, to get a full understanding of the impact of migration on gender equality attitudes and more generally migrants’ attitudes and position, the differences between origin and destination society, and the complex migration histories of families, should be taken into account and studied more systematically.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

[1] In total, 5760 people are sampled in the three generations: 967 first-generation ancestors (G1), 0–2 descendants of G1 (G2; in total 2571) and subsequently 0–2 descendants of G2 (G3; in total 2222). Of these respectively 90.6%, 87.2% and 84.4% had valid scores on both gender equality items used to construct the dependent variable. For 883 of the G3 respondents there was information available for both a parent and a grandparent. The data thus contain 883 actual units of analysis. Most G1 respondent come from the four regions mentioned, and consequently most return migrants also had these regions as destination. A few families, however, originate from differences areas and of the return migrants several returned to Turkey but to other regions within Turkey, such as Ankara, Istanbul and Şırnak. The large majority, however, comes from or returned to the mentioned regions.

[2] Kruskal–Wallis H test has been used given the characteristics of the data. Stayer and remigration lineages are significantly less supportive of gender equality than the migration lineages among the first two generations; among the third, remigration lineages are significantly different from stayer and migration lineages.

[3] Within group differences among G1 respondents, however, do suggest that it is not just selectivity, as in many cases the stayers and stayer migrants (Turks living in Europe) do not differ from each other. For instance, internal migrants are considerably older than the other groups (7–9 years), with the stayer migrants, return migrants and stayers all having an average age within a bandwidth of 3 years. Also, the internal migrants among G1 have the highest education level (3.9), with all other groups being similarly behind (2.0–2.4). If only selectivity was at work, we could expect that the stayer migrants were considerably younger and higher educated (two factors strongly related to gender equality attitudes) than the return migrants and stayers.

[4] The control variable for migration status shows that the respondents who have lived in Europe all their lives are significantly more supportive of gender equality than the respondents who have lived in Turkey all their lives. This cannot be simply interpreted as assimilation. It might actually be the result of third-generation retention echo discussed in
the previous section, since most of the ‘always lived in Turkey’ respondents have return-
migrants among their ancestors.

[5] Rerunning the model with standardised scores (z-values) for all independent variables
confirms this. The largest coefficient is found for sex (0.054) and then the parent’s attitudes
(0.038), followed by the dummy for having lived in Turkey their entire live (−0.032) and
education (0.020). All other variables have considerably smaller effects.

[6] An additional test of Hypothesis 4 included an interaction between the current presence of
the parent and the parent’s attitudes did not show statistically significance either.

[7] In line with arguments of McCloskey and Ziliak (1996), I will treat this as relevant.

[8] The small group (<6%) who grew up in both Europe and Turkey falls neatly in between the
other two, but the interaction term is statistically not significant given the small group size.

[9] To check whether this result was not due to the current place of living, I estimated a
separate interaction model with ‘current place of living’ × ‘parent’s attitudes’. That
interaction term was statistically not significant and showed a much smaller weakening
effect (0.065 on 0.190).

[10] The estimation is based on the regression equation of Model 5, using sample-average scores
on all variables in the model (except the parent’s attitudes).

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Gender and Family Attitudes in Early Adulthood in Sweden." *Zeitschrift für Familien-


Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics

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