Opvang, Kinderen, rechten van, Discriminatie

\[\text{[Europees Sociaal Handvest - 17; 31; Vw 2000 - 10]}\]

» Samenvatting

1. Het Comité concludeert met betrekking tot art. 31 lid 1 ESH (herzien) dat het ontzeggen van adequate huisvesting niet automatisch inhoudt het ontzeggen van noodzakelijke zorg ter voorkoming dat personen in onverdraaglijke omstandigheden terecht komen. Het verstrekken van huisvesting zou tegen het doel van het vreemdelingenbeleid in gaan om mensen die geen rechtmatig verblijf hebben aan te moedigen terug te keren naar het land van herkomst. Kinderen die niet rechtmatig verblijven in een lidstaat vallen niet onder de toepassing van art. 31 lid 1 ESH.

2. Lidstaten moeten onder art. 31 lid 2 ESH (herzien) onderdak regelen voor kinderen die onrechtmatig aanwezig zijn op hun grondgebied, zolang ze onder hun jurisdictie vallen. Iedere andere oplossing is in strijd met het respect voor hun menselijke waardigheid en houdt geen rekening met de kwetsbare situatie van de kinderen. Nu dit niet het geval is heeft Nederland art. 31 lid 2 geschonden.

3. Art. 17 lid 1 sub c (herzien) vereist dat Staten passende en noodzakelijke maatregelen treffen om te zorgen voor bescherming en speciale hulp voor kinderen die tijdelijk of definitief geen gezinshulp ontvangen. Zolang zij geen rechtmatig verblijf hebben kunnen zij geen beroep doen op art. 10 Vw 2000. De verplichtingen gerelateerd aan art. 31 lid 2 nu onderdak voor onrechtmatige verblijvende kinderen niet is geboden zolang ze vallen binnen de jurisdictie van Nederland is tevens sprake van schending van art. 17 lid 1 sub c ESH (herzien) op dezelfde grond.

4. Het discriminatieverbod in art. E van het ESH (herzien) is niet van toepassing in deze zaak.

» Uitspraak

Procedure

1. The complaint lodged by Defence for Children International (“DCI”) was registered on 4 February 2008. It alleges that the situation in the Netherlands violates Article 31 of the Revised European Social Charter (“the Revised Charter”) taken alone or in conjunction with Article E in that children not lawfully present in the Netherlands are excluded by law and practice from the right to housing. It further submits that this alleged violation entails a violation of Articles 11, 13, 16, 17 and 30
taken alone or in conjunction with Article E.

2. The Committee declared the complaint admissible on 23 September 2008.

3. In accordance with Article 7par.1 and par.2 of the Protocol providing for a system of collective complaints (“the Protocol”) and with the Committee’s decision on the admissibility of the complaint, on 29 September 2008 the Executive Secretary communicated the text of the admissibility decision to the Dutch Government (“the Government”), DCI, the Contracting Parties to the Protocol and the states that have made a declaration in accordance with Article Dpar.2 of the Revised Charter and to the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), BusinessEurope (former UNICE) and the International Organisation of Employers (IOE).

4. In accordance with Rule 31par.1 of the Committee’s Rules, the Committee set a deadline of 21 November 2008 for presentation of the Government’s submissions on the merits. These were registered on 20 November 2008.

5. In accordance with Rule 31par.2 of the Committee’s Rules, the President of the Committee invited DCI to respond to the these submissions by 6 February 2009. DCI’s response was registered on 5 February 2009 and forwarded to the Government on 12 February 2009. In its response, DCI made a request for a public hearing pursuant to Rule 33 of the Committee’s Rules. By its letter of 22 September 2009, the Committee informed DCI and the Government of its decision not to organise a hearing in the present case.

**Submissions of the parties**

**A – The complainant organisation**

6. DCI asks the Committee to find that Dutch legislation and practice which deny children unlawfully present in its territory access to adequate housing, are in violation of Article 31 taken alone or in conjunction with Article E of the Revised Charter. DCI states that housing is a prerequisite for the preservation of human dignity and therefore that legislation or practice which denies entitlement to housing to foreign nationals, even if they are on the territory unlawfully, should be considered contrary to the Revised Charter. In addition, DCI refers to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the Netherlands has ratified, in that it guarantees protection to all children within the jurisdiction of a State Party, regardless of their legal status.

7. DCI further holds that due to the fact that housing is a basic and essential commodity for the well being of a child, the finding of a violation of the right to housing implies a violation of Articles 11, 13, 16, 17 and 30 taken alone or in conjunction with Article E of the Revised Charter. It therefore asks the Committee to also find such violations.

**B – The Government**

8. The Government asks the Committee to reject DCI’s complaint as unfounded as the children whose rights are allegedly violated by the contested Dutch legislation and practice fall outside the scope *ratione personae* of the Revised Charter since they do not meet the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 of the Appendix, namely, they are not lawfully residing in the country. The Government further argues that to rely on provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child to extend the scope *ratione personae* of the Revised Charter would amount to a *de facto* replacement of the system of one treaty by that of another.
9. Subsidiarily the Government considers that the complaint is unfounded since law and practice in the Netherlands allow for the provision of accommodation as exceptions exist to the principle that unlawfully present children cannot enjoy entitlements to public provision.

Relevant domestic and international law

A – Domestic law

10. In their submissions the parties refer in particular to the “linkage principle” as set out in the Benefit Entitlement (Residence Status) Act (Koppelingswet) of 1 July 1998, which was incorporated in the Aliens Act 2000 and reads as follows:


   “1. An alien who is not lawfully resident may not claim entitlement to benefits in kind, facilities and social security benefits issued by decision of an administrative authority. The previous sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis to exemptions or licences designated in an Act of Parliament or Order in Council.

   2. The first subsection may be derogated from if the entitlement relates to education, the provision of care that is medically necessary, the prevention of situations that would jeopardise public health or the provision of legal assistance to the alien.

   3. The granting of entitlement does not confer a right to lawful residence.”

11. The Committee also deems that the following Sections of the Aliens Act 2000 are of relevance to the present case:

   – Section 43, Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000)

   “1. The consequences whereby an application for the issue of a residence permit for a fixed period (...) or a residence permit for an indefinite period (...) is rejected, shall by operation of law, be that:

   a) the alien is no longer lawfully resident (...);

   b) the alien should leave the Netherlands of his own volition within the time limit prescribed in section 60, failing which the alien may be expelled;

   (c) the benefits in kind provided for by or pursuant to the Act on the Central Reception Organisation for Asylum-Seekers or another statutory provision that regulates benefits in kind of this nature will terminate in the manner provided for by or pursuant to that Act or statutory provision and within the time limit prescribed for this purpose;

   (d) the aliens supervision officers are authorised, after the expiry of the time limit within which the alien must leave the Netherlands of his own volition, to enter every place, including a dwelling, without the consent of the occupant, in order to expel the alien;

   e) the aliens supervision officers are authorised, after the expiry of the time limit referred to in c), to compel the vacation of property in order to terminate the accommodation or the stay in the residential premises provided as a benefit in kind as referred to in c).”

   – Section 60, Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000)

   “1. After the lawful residence of an alien has ended, he should leave the Netherlands of his own volition within four weeks.

   2. Notwithstanding subsection 1, an alien should leave the Netherlands immediately if the review period referred to in section
67 elapses without being used and during this period the operation of the decision under which the application is rejected or the residence permit is cancelled or not renewed is suspended.

3. Notwithstanding subsection 1, an alien:

a) whose lawful residence has ended on the grounds of section 8 (i) or

b) who was not lawfully resident immediately prior to his arrival in the Netherlands,

shall immediately leave the Netherlands.

4. Our Minister may, notwithstanding subsection 1, shorten departure period to less than four weeks:

a) in the interests of the expulsion;

b) in the interests of public policy (ordre public) or national security.

12. Exclusion of aliens not lawfully residing in the Netherlands from entitlement to specific benefits or facilities which would enable them to exercise a right to housing, is laid down in the following:

– Article 8, Social Support Act (Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning – WMO of 29 June 2006)

“1. Foreign nationals shall only be eligible for the granting of individual measures if they are lawfully resident within the meaning of Article 8.a to e and 1 of the Aliens Act 2000.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, in cases stipulated by or pursuant to order in Council, and, if necessary, by derogation of Article 10 of the Aliens Act 2000, such categories of foreign nationals not lawfully resident in the Netherlands as are designated by or pursuant to the order may be wholly or partially eligible for individual measures to be designated in the order. Eligibility for an individual measure shall not entitle a foreign national to lawful residency."

B – International standards


Article 3

“1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures. (…)”

Article 27

“1. States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.

2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions necessary for the child’s development.

3. States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their means, shall take appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child to implement this right and shall in case of need provide material assistance and
support program’s, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.”

13. In its Concluding observations on the Netherlands (document CRC/C/NLD/CO/3) of 27 March 2009, the Committee on the Rights of the Child made the following recommendation to the State:

“par. 29. The Committee recommends that the State party take all appropriate measures to ensure that the principle of the best interests of the child, in accordance with article 3 of the Convention, is adequately integrated into all legal provisions and applied in judicial and administrative decisions and in projects, programmes and services which have an impact on children.”

14. In the report concerning his visit to the Netherlands (document CommDH(2009)2), the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe noted that:

“par. 61 Children coming to the Netherlands with their family are generally included in the asylum procedure of their parents. There is no organisation making sure that the decision is in the best interest of the child in contrast to other areas of Dutch law such as family law, where the Council for Child Protection (Raad voor de Kinderbescherming) is involved. (…)”

15. In its General Comment No. 6 on Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children outside their Country of origin (document CRC/GC/2005/6), with regard to the right to an adequate standard of living, the Committee on the Rights of the Child stated that:

“par.44. States should ensure that separated and unaccompanied children have a standard of living adequate for their physical, mental, spiritual and moral development. As provided in Article 27par.2 of the Convention, States shall provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.”


“The Dutch Government should make clear to all officials that the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other relevant international and regional instruments mandating minimum standards for the treatment of all children are applicable to migrant children regardless of their legal status.”

17. In its third report on the Netherlands (document CRI(2008)3) adopted on 29 June 2007, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) made the following recommendation as to the living conditions in particular of unaccompanied children :

“par. 46. ECRI strongly encourages the Dutch authorities in their plans to review their policies on unaccompanied children and stresses that detention of children should be strictly limited to cases where it is absolutely necessary and in the best interest of the child.”

18. In the report concerning his visit to the Netherlands (document CommDH(2009)2), the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe highlighted that:

“par. 62 Until January 2008, the Dutch authorities were widely criticised for detaining about 240 children and their families, for an average time of 59 days and a maximum of 244 days. In response to this criticism and a parliamentary motion, on 29 January 2008, the Dutch government publicised its new policy regarding administrative detention of children and their families. The aim is to reduce the
detention period for children by introducing a maximum of two weeks detention prior to expulsion, the creation of more alternative accommodation for children and their families, and the improvement of detention conditions. Furthermore, the government announced that it would add 12 weeks to the 28-day period given to asylum seekers and migrants to leave the country voluntarily after their application has been rejected.”

(…) par. 66 NGOs report that the new policy for asylum-seeking children in administrative detention has not yet led to (…) a significant decrease in unaccompanied migrant minors in detention, estimating in June 2007 that some 40 unaccompanied minors were at the time detained in juvenile detention centres (Children’s Rights in the Netherlands, the third report of the Dutch Coalition for Children’s Rights on the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, July 2008, p. 48). In a letter to Parliament, the Ministry of Justice explained that they see detention of unaccompanied minors as a measure of public order since the risk to let these children free is sufficiently higher than for children with parents, referring also to the danger of being trafficked. Nevertheless, the Government started a pilot project, providing semi-closed secure shelter facilities to unaccompanied minors considered to be at risk of trafficking. The Dutch authorities informed the Commissioner that they always seek alternatives to detention when faced with an unaccompanied minor and that in 2007, about 150 unaccompanied minors were placed in detention.”


“1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The State Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international cooperation based on free consent.”

– Article 3, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

– Article 1, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000

“Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.”

– Recommendation No. R (2000) 3 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the right to the satisfaction of basic material needs of persons in situation of extreme hardship adopted on 19 January 2000

(…) “Principle 2: The right to the satisfaction of basic human material needs should contain as a minimum the right to food, clothing, shelter and basic medical care.

(…) Principle 4: The exercise of this right should be open to all citizens and foreigners, whatever the latter’s’ position under national rules on the status of foreigners, and in the manner determined by national authorities.” (…)

“7. (...) Where forced return is inevitable, it should be implemented in a humane and transparent manner in compliance with human rights and with respect for the safety and dignity of the person concerned.

11. (...) the Assembly fears that, under the revised policy of the Netherlands, detention, of potentially unlimited duration, could be resorted to as a punitive measure to sanction those who do not co-operate, or who cannot prove that they are co-operating, towards facilitating their own return. It regrets that this policy does not foresee any clear exemptions from detention for specific categories of failed asylum seekers such as children (...) 

14. (...) the Assembly believes that the revised policy of the Netherlands should be modified in so far as it allows, in some cases, for certain persons to be protected from expulsion where it is impossible to return them, whilst simultaneously depriving them of all access to housing (...). This is a particularly worrying development, especially regarding children in the light of the rights laid down in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. (...) 

15. The Assembly, therefore, calls on the Government of the Netherlands and on other Council of Europe member states having similar policies to: (...)

15.14. ensure an appropriate level of access to housing (...) for all failed asylum seekers up to the time of their departure from the country;” (...)


Section 3.3.2 – Reduction of homelessness

(...) “The requirement of dignity in housing means that even temporary shelters must fulfil the demands for safety, health and hygiene, including basic amenities, i.e. clean water, sufficient lighting and heating. The basic requirements of temporary housing include also security of the immediate surroundings. Nevertheless, temporary housing need not be subject to the same requirements of privacy, family life and suitability as are required from more permanent forms of standard housing, once the minimum requirements are met.”(…)

**The Law**

**Preliminary issues**

**A – As to the role of the Committee**

19. Relying on the Committee’s decision on the merits in FIDH v. France (Complaint No. 14/2003, decision of 8 September 2004, par.par. 26-32), DCI argues that, as medical assistance, housing also is a prerequisite for the preservation of human dignity and therefore legislation or practice which denies entitlement to housing to foreign nationals, even if they are on the territory unlawfully, should be considered contrary to the Revised Charter.

20. The Government considers that the Committee’s decision (FIDH v. France, Complaint No. 14/2003, decision of 8 September 2004, par. 32) relied upon by DCI was not upheld by the Committee of Ministers since, with Resolution ResCHS(2005)6, the Committee of Ministers did not address a recommendation to the respondent Government.

21. The Committee recalls that it is clear from the wording of the Protocol providing for a system of collective complaints that only the European Committee of Social Rights can rule on whether or not a situation is in conformity with the Charter: this is the case with any treaty establishing a judicial or quasi-judicial body to assess
 Parties’ compliance with that treaty. The explanatory report to the Protocol explicitly states that the Committee of Ministers cannot reverse the legal assessment made by the Committee. It may only decide whether or not to additionally make a recommendation to the state concerned. Admittedly, when using this power to decide which follow up should be given to the Committee’s finding of a violation of the Charter, the Committee of Ministers may take account of any social and economic policy considerations, but it may not question the Committee’s legal assessment (Confédération Française de l’Encadrement (CFE CGC) v. France, Complaint No 16/2003, decision on the merits of 12 October 2004, par.par. 20-21).

22. As a consequence, the Committee’s decision in FIDH represents today’s interpretation of the Revised Charter.

B – As to the rights of the child under the Revised Charter

23. DCI invites the Committee to interpret the rights provided in the Revised Charter in the light of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which protects all persons under the age of 18 within the jurisdiction of a contracting party, regardless of residence status.

24. The Government states that the Committee cannot extend its competence by applying or interpreting the provisions of a treaty other than the one to which it owes its existence.

25. The Committee points out that the European Social Charter guarantees each child – that is persons aged under 18 – a significant number of fundamental rights. The Charter firstly treats children as individual rights’ holders since human dignity inherent in each child fully entitles her/him to all fundamental rights granted to adults. Additionally, the specific situation of children, which combines vulnerability, limited autonomy and potential adulthood, requires States to grant them specific rights, such as those enshrined in the following provisions of the Charter:

- right to shelter Article 31par.2),
- right to health (Articles 8, 11, 7, 19par.2),
- right to education (Articles 9, 10, 15, 17, 19par.par.11-12),
- protection of the family and right to family reunion (Articles 16, 27, 19par.6),
- protection against danger and abuse (Articles 7par.1, 17),
- prohibition of child labour under the age of 15 (Article 7par.1 and par.3),
- specific working conditions between 15 and 18 (Article 7).

26. Because of this comprehensive approach, coupled with the effective nature of the rights it embodies, the European Social Charter is the most significant treaty at the European level for children’s human rights. It complements the European Convention on Human Rights in this area and reflects the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, on which its new Article 17 is based (see FIDH v France, Complaint No. 14/2003, decision on the merits of 8 September 2004, par. 36 and World Organisation against Torture (OMCT) v. Greece, Complaint No. 17/2003, decision on the merits of 7 December 2004, par. 31).

27. Moreover, the Committee reiterates that the rights in the Charter must take a practical and effective, rather than a theoretical, form (see inter alia, International Movement ATD Fourth World (“ATD”) v. France, Complaint No. 33/2006, decision on the merits of 5 December 2007, par. 59 and International
Commission of Jurists v. Portugal, Complaint No. 1/1998, decision on the merits of 9 September 1999, par. 32). It therefore interprets the rights and freedoms set out in the Charter in the light of current conditions (Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v. Greece, Complaint No. 30/2005, decision on the merits of 6 December 2006, par. 194) and in the light of relevant international instruments that served as inspiration for its authors or in conjunction with which it needs to be applied (European Federation of National Organisations working with the Homeless (FEANTSA), Complaint No. 39/2006, decision on the merits of 5 December 2007, par. 64).

28. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is one of the most ratified treaties world-wide and it has been ratified by all member states of the Council of Europe. It is therefore entirely justified that the Committee should have regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child as it is interpreted by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (see OMCT v. Ireland, Complaint No 18/2003, decision on the merits of 7 December 2004, par. 61) when ruling on the alleged violation of any right of the child which is established by the Charter.

29. In particular, when ruling on situations where the interpretation of the Charter concerns the rights of a child, the Committee considers itself bound by the internationally recognised requirement to apply the best interests of the child principle. It is indeed mindful that in General Comment No. 5 (document CRC/GC/2003/5,par.par. 45-47), the Committee on the Rights of the Child stated that “Every legislative, administrative and judicial body or institution is required to apply the best interests principle by systematically considering how children’s rights and interests are or will be affected by their decisions and actions – by, for example, a proposed or existing law or policy or administrative action or court decision, including those which are not directly concerned with children, but indirectly affect children”.

C – As to the interpretation of paragraph 1 of the Appendix concerning the scope of the Revised Charter in terms of persons protected

Paragraph 1 of the Appendix – Scope of the Revised Charter in terms of persons protected

1 Without prejudice to Article 12, paragraph 4, and Article 13, paragraph 4, the persons covered by Articles 1 to 17 and 20 to 31 include foreigners only in so far as they are nationals of other Parties lawfully resident or working regularly within the territory of the Party concerned, subject to the understanding that these articles are to be interpreted in the light of the provisions of Articles 18 and 19.

This interpretation would not prejudice the extension of similar facilities to other persons by any of the Parties.

Submissions of the parties

30. The Government states that the Netherlands ratified the Revised Charter and its Protocol providing for a system of collective complaints on the understanding that its law and practice with regard to aliens unlawfully present in its territory did not come within the scope of the Revised Charter. It based this understanding on the terms of paragraph 1 of the Appendix which limit such scope of application to “foreigners only in so far as they are nationals of other Parties lawfully resident or working regularly within the territory of the Party concerned”.

31. Moreover, the Government alleges that aliens policy is pre-eminently an issue dealt
with at the level of national states. It would therefore run counter to this principle if States were obliged to recognise a right to housing or other economic, social and cultural rights for those who reside in their territory unlawfully, thereby facilitating a prolongation of the unlawful situation. The Government further observes that this is not changed when the persons concerned are minors. Making a categorical exception for minors to the denial of certain rights would frustrate the right of the State to control immigration.

32. DCI replies that holding children accountable for their whereabouts is contrary to the position of children in today’s world. Children are recognised as extremely vulnerable persons, who, for a large part of their existence are dependent on others, usually their parents, for their survival. This dependence on others entails that they have very limited (or no) influence on their place of residence. DCI therefore argues that if the choice of the adult turns out to be less favourable it should not result in substandard living conditions for the child. Relying on the Committee’s decision on the merits in FIDH v. France, DCI argues that, as medical assistance, housing also is a prerequisite for the preservation of human dignity and therefore legislation or practice which denies entitlement to housing to foreign nationals, even if they are on the territory unlawfully, should be considered contrary to the Revised Charter.

33. DCI further clarifies that the complaint is not intended to create an entitlement to a residence permit for either the child or the parents. It acknowledges that the Government has a choice in such respect. It considers that the Government may therefore either deport the child together with the parents or it should provide the necessary protection as long as the child is within the Netherlands’ jurisdiction.

Assessment of the Committee

34. The Committee recalls that the Charter was envisaged as a human rights instrument to complement the European Convention on Human Rights. It is a living instrument dedicated to certain values which inspired it: dignity, autonomy, equality, solidarity (FIDH v. France, Complaint No. 14/2003, decision on the merits of 8 September 2004, par. 27) and other generally recognised values. It must be interpreted so as to give life and meaning to fundamental social rights (FIDH v. France, Complaint No. 14/2003, decision on the merits of 8 September 2004, par. 29).

35. The Committee interprets the Charter in the light of the rules set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, among which its Article 31 par.3(c), which indicates that account is to be taken of “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. Indeed, the Charter cannot be interpreted in a vacuum. The Charter should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part, including in the instant case those relating to the provision of adequate shelter to any person in need, regardless whether s/he is on the State’s territory legally or not.

36. The Committee considers that a teleological approach should be adopted when interpreting the Charter, i.e. it is necessary to seek the interpretation of the treaty that is the most appropriate in order to realise the aim and achieve the object of the treaty, not that which would restrict to the greatest possible degree the obligations undertaken by the Parties (OMCT v. Ireland, Complaint No. 18/2003, decision on the merits of 7 December 2004, par. 60). It follows inter alia that restrictions on rights are to be read restrictively, i.e. understood in such a manner as to preserve intact the essence of the right and to achieve the overall purpose of the Charter (FIDH v. France, Complaint No. 14/2003,
decision on the merits of 8 September 2004, par.par. 27-29).

37. Moreover, as stated in its decision on the merits in FIDH v France (Complaint No. 14/2003, decision on the merits of 8 September 2004, par. 30), the Committee reiterates that the restriction in paragraph 1 of the Appendix attaches to a wide variety of social rights and impacts on them differently. It further holds that such restriction should not end up having unreasonably detrimental effects where the protection of vulnerable groups of persons is at stake.

38. It results from the above mentioned considerations (A, B and C) that with regard to each alleged violation in the instant case, the Committee will thus preliminarily have to determine whether the right invoked is applicable to the specific vulnerable category of persons concerned, i.e. children unlawfully present in the Netherlands. Additionally, it shall do so mindful of its obligation to respect the best interests of the child principle.

D – As to the scope ratione materiae of the complaint

39. In the light of the submissions made during the proceedings, the Committee observes that allegations concerning violation of rights other than that to housing for children unlawfully present in the Netherlands are presented as subsidiary and are not sufficiently developed. The Committee therefore considers that the complaint concerns the following issues:

– denial of access to housing of an adequate standard to children unlawfully present in the Netherlands (Article 31par.1);

– failure to prevent or reduce homelessness by not providing shelter to children unlawfully present in the Netherlands as long as they are in the Netherlands’ jurisdiction (Article 31par.2).

– failure to take all appropriate and necessary measures designed to provide protection and special aid from the state to children unlawfully present in the Netherlands by denying them entitlement to shelter (Article 17par.1.c);

– discrimination in access to housing against children unlawfully present in the Netherlands (Article E read in conjunction with Articles 31 and 17).

First part: the alleged violation of the right to housing

Article 31 – The right to housing

Part I: Everyone has the right to housing.

Part II: With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to housing, the Parties undertake to take measures designed:

1. to promote access to housing of an adequate standard;

2. to prevent and reduce homelessness with a view to its gradual elimination;

3. to make the price of housing accessible to those without adequate resources.

40. The Committee observes that DCI does not specify whether Article 31 in its entirety is specifically invoked in the present complaint. On the basis of the content of the submissions, the Committee considers that the alleged violations invoked by DCI, i.e. the denial of adequate housing as well as that of shelter to children unlawfully present in the Netherlands relate to Article 31par.1 and Article 31par.2 respectively.
I. On the alleged violation of Article 31 par.1 for denial of access to housing of an adequate standard to children unlawfully present in the Netherlands

As to the applicability of Article 31 par.1 to children unlawfully present in the Netherlands

41. Like the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”), the Committee acknowledges that States have the right under international law to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens from their territories (see mutatis mutandis European Court of Human Rights, Moustaquim v. Belgium, judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 193, p. 19, par. 43 and European Court of Human Rights, Beldjoudi v. France, judgment of 26 March 1992, Series A no. 234-A, p. 27, par. 74). The Netherlands is thus justified in treating children lawfully residing and children unlawfully present in its territory differently.

42. Like the Court, the Committee however highlights that States’ interest in foiling attempts to circumvent immigration rules must not deprive foreign minors, especially if unaccompanied, of the protection their status warrants. The protection of fundamental rights and the constraints imposed by a State’s immigration policy must therefore be reconciled (see mutatis mutandis European Court of Human Rights, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium, judgment of 12 October 2006 par. 81).

43. The Committee recalls that under Article 31 par.1 (the right to adequate housing), it holds that temporary supply of shelter cannot be considered as adequate and individuals should be provided with adequate housing within a reasonable period of time (ERRC v. Italy, Complaint No. 27/2004, decision on the merits of 7 December 2005, par. 35 and EREC v. Bulgaria, Complaint No. 31/2005, decision on the merits of 6 December 2006, par. 34). Adequate housing under Article 31 par.1 means a dwelling which is safe from a sanitary and health point of view, i.e. it must possess all basic amenities, such as water, heating, waste disposal, sanitation facilities and electricity and must also be structurally secure, not overcrowded and with secure tenure supported by the law (see Conclusions 2003, Article 31 par.1, France and FEANTSA v. France, Complaint 39/2006, decision on the merits, 5 December 2007, par. 76).

44. States’ immigration policy objectives and their human rights obligations would not be reconciled if children, whatever their residence status, were denied basic care and their intolerable living conditions were ignored. As far as Article 31 par.1 of the Revised Charter is concerned, the Committee acknowledges that the denial of adequate housing, which includes a legal guarantee of security of tenancy, to children unlawfully present on its territory, does not automatically entail a denial of the basic care needed to avoid persons living in intolerable conditions. Moreover, to require that a Party provide such lasting housing would run counter the State’s aliens policy objective of encouraging persons unlawfully on its territory to return to their country of origin.

45. Accordingly the Committee concludes that children unlawfully present on the territory of a State Party do not come within the personal scope of Article 31 par.1, which thus does not apply in the instant case.

II. On the alleged violation of Article 31 par.2 for failure to prevent or reduce homelessness by not providing shelter to children unlawfully present in the Netherlands as long as they are in the Netherlands’ jurisdiction
As to the applicability of Article 31par.2 to children unlawfully present in the Netherlands

46. The Committee recalls that Article 31par.2 (prevention and reduction of homelessness) is specifically aimed at categories of vulnerable people. It obliges Parties to gradually reduce homelessness with a view to its elimination. Reducing homelessness implies the introduction of emergency and longer-term measures, such as the provision of immediate shelter and care for the homeless as well as measures to help such people overcome their difficulties and to prevent them from returning to a situation of homelessness (Conclusions 2003, Italy, Article 31 and FEANTSA v. France, Complaint 39/2006, decision on the merits, 5 December 2007, par. 103).

47. The Committee considers that the right to shelter is closely connected to the right to life and is crucial for the respect of every person’s human dignity. The Committee observes that if all children are vulnerable, growing up in the streets leaves a child in a situation of outright helplessness. It therefore considers that children would adversely be affected by a denial of the right to shelter.

48. The Committee thus holds that children, whatever their residence status, come within the personal scope of Article 31par.2.

A – Submissions of the parties

1. The complainant organisation

49. DCI states that section 10 paragraph 1 of the Aliens Act 2000 which provides that an alien who is not lawfully resident in the Netherlands may not claim inter alia entitlement to benefits in kind entails that children without a legal residence status are excluded from the right to housing. This is confirmed by the fact that section 10 paragraph 2 of the Aliens Act 2000, may be derogated only if the entitlement relates to education, the provision of care that is medically necessary, the prevention of situations that would jeopardise public health or the provision of legal assistance to the alien.

50. DCI acknowledges that shelter up to twelve weeks is provided to children unlawfully present in the Netherlands if they cooperate with their return to their country of origin. However, DCI questions whether a minor may cooperate if the parent does not. Children whose parents do not cooperate are not eligible for this kind of shelter. DCI further is of the opinion that twelve weeks are usually not enough to return to one’s country of origin. It states that children failing to leave within twelve weeks are removed from the shelter.

51. As to unlawfully present children and the possibility they may have of obtaining accommodation if they demonstrate that they are unable to leave the Netherlands through “no fault of their own”, DCI considers this extremely difficult to demonstrate in practice, particularly for children. Moreover, while proof is being sought such children have no right to housing under Dutch law.

52. Finally, as to unaccompanied minors whose asylum requests fail, DCI argues that in practice it is very difficult to fulfil the requirements to obtain the special residence permit for them. DCI maintains that unaccompanied minors often end up in some sort of “twilight zone” between legality and illegality being guaranteed solely that they will not be deported until the age of 18 unless there is adequate accommodation and support in their country of origin.

53. Ultimately, DCI maintains that no governmental policy concerning aliens should result in children becoming homelessness.
2. The respondent Government

54. The Government states that it has the exclusive right to determine who may or may not reside on the territory of the Netherlands. It further explains that the basic assumption underlying Dutch policy on aliens is that those who do not, or no longer, reside lawfully in the Netherlands, must leave the country, whether after the expiry of a set period or not. Responsibility for leaving the Netherlands rests primarily with the aliens themselves, who should do everything possible to fulfil that obligation. In this context, the linking of entitlements to residence status (“linkage principle”) as set out in section 10 of the Aliens Act 2000 is intended to make it impossible for illegal aliens to prolong their unlawful residence.

55. The Government clarifies that unlawfully resident families with children may qualify for a stay of up to twelve weeks in a special centre where their freedom is restricted. The centre was originally intended for failed asylum seekers with children, to prevent them having to be held in detention. The centre has also become available for unlawfully resident families who cooperate with a view to their return to the country of origin.

56. The Government also highlights that illegal immigrants who are unable to leave the Netherlands through “no fault of their own” may qualify for a residence permit on such ground.

57. Finally, the Government also points out that unaccompanied minor aliens who applied for an asylum residence permit which was refused are provided with accommodation until they reach the age of 18. The residence permit may nevertheless be revoked before the age of 18 if adequate care and protection become available in their country of origin.

B – Assessment of the Committee

58. The Committee notes that according to figures provided in the complaint and not contested by the Government, the number of children unlawfully present in the Netherlands – be they with their parents or unaccompanied – varies between 25,000 and 60,000. The Committee understands from the submissions during the proceedings that their unlawful presence may result from a failed asylum procedure, from a failed regular immigration procedure or pending the results of a regular immigration procedure.

59. The Aliens Act 2000, which entered into force in 2001, stipulates the conditions for foreign nationals to enter the Netherlands, the issue of residence permits and removal for both the asylum and non-asylum (immigration) categories. The Committee observes that the Act unequivocally links entitlement to benefits other than education, necessary medical care and legal aid, to residence status. Thus, children unlawfully present in the Netherlands are not, as a general rule, guaranteed a right to shelter. Exceptions exist where children cooperate with the authorities with regard to their return to their country of origin and under other specific circumstances. However, the Committee notes that there is no legal requirement to provide shelter to children unlawfully present in the Netherlands for as long as they are in its jurisdiction. Moreover, according to section 43 of the Aliens Act 2000, after the expiry of the time limit fixed in the Act on the Central Reception Organisation for the Asylum-Seekers or another statutory provision that regulates benefits in kind, the aliens supervision officers are authorised to compel the vacation of property in order to terminate the accommodation or the stay in the residential premises provided as a benefit in kind.

60. Additionally, the Committee notes from observations and recommendations of July 2003 by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") on the implementation of the Aliens Act 2000, that after its entry into force more than 60% of all asylum applications were rejected in the accelerated procedures according to figures provided by the Ministry of Justice (TK 2002-2003, 19 637, no 731). UNHCR highlights that material support is terminated immediately following a negative first instance decision in accelerated procedures. Such material support includes shelter.

61. The Committee reiterates that Article 31par.2 of the Revised Charter is directed at the prevention of homelessness with its adverse consequences on individuals’ personal security and well being (Conclusions 2005, Norway, Article 31 and ERRC v. Italy, Complaint 27/2004, decision on the merits of 7 December 2005, par. 18). Where the vulnerable category of persons concerned are children unlawfully present in the territory of a State as in the instant case, preventing homelessness requires States to provide shelter as long as the children are in its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Committee is of the view that alternatives to detention should be sought in order to respect the best interests of the child.

62. As to living conditions in a shelter, under Article 31par.2 the Committee holds that they should be such as to enable living in keeping with human dignity (FEANTSA v. France, Complaint No 39/2006, decision on the merits of 5 December 2007, par.par. 108-109). In this regard the Committee refers to the Recommendation of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe on the implementation of the right to housing (June 2009) where he claims that “the starting point to reduce homelessness should be (...) to guarantee that all people, regardless of circumstance, are able to benefit from housing that corresponds with human dignity, the minimum being temporary shelter. The requirement of dignity in housing means that even temporary shelters must fulfil the demands for safety, health and hygiene, including basic amenities, i.e. clean water, sufficient lighting and heating. The basic requirements of temporary housing include also security of the immediate surroundings. Nevertheless, temporary housing need not be subject to the same requirements of privacy, family life and suitability as are required from more permanent forms of standard housing, once the minimum requirements are met. The housing of people in reception camps and temporary shelters which do not satisfy the standards of human dignity is in violation of the aforementioned requirements.”

63. Finally, the Committee recalls that under Article 31par.2 States Parties must make sure that evictions are justified and are carried out in conditions that respect the dignity of the persons concerned, and must make alternative accommodation available (see Conclusions 2003, France, Italy, Slovenia and Sweden, Article 31par.2, as well as ERRC v. Italy, Complaint No 27/2004, decision on the merits of 7 December 2005, par. 41, ERRC v. Bulgaria, Complaint No. 31/2005, decision on the merits of 18 October 2006, par. 52, ATD v. France, Complaint 33/2006, decision on the merits of 5 December 2007, par. 77 and FEANTSA v. France, Complaint No 39/2006, decision on the merits of 5 December 2007, par. 81). Accordingly, the Committee holds that, since in the case of unlawfully present persons no alternative accommodation may be required by States, eviction from shelter should be banned as it would place the persons concerned, particularly children, in a situation of extreme helplessness which is contrary to the respect for their human dignity.

64. On the basis of the above, the Committee concludes that States Parties are required, under Article 31par.2 of the Revised Charter, to provide adequate shelter to children unlawfully present in
their territory for as long as they are in their jurisdiction. Any other solution would run counter to the respect for their human dignity and would not take due account of the particularly vulnerable situation of children.

65. As this is not the case, the Committee holds that the situation in the Netherlands constitutes a violation of Article 31par.2.

Second part: on the alleged violation of Article 17 for failure to take all appropriate and necessary measures designed to provide protection and special aid from the state to children unlawfully present in the Netherlands by denying them entitlement to shelter

Article 17 – The right of children and young persons to social, legal and economic protection

Part I: Children and young persons have the right to appropriate social, legal and economic protection.

Part II: With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of children and young persons to grow up in an environment which encourages the full development of their personality and of their physical and mental capacities, the Parties undertake, either directly or in cooperation with public and private organisations, to take all appropriate and necessary measures designed:

1 c) to provide protection and special aid from the state for children and young persons temporarily or definitively deprived of their family’s support; (…)

As to the applicability of Article 17 to children unlawfully present in the Netherlands

66. In the light of the preliminary remarks made above concerning the rights of the child under the Revised Charter and bearing in mind its decision in FIDH v France (Complaint No. 14/2003, decision on the merits of 6 September 2004, par. 30 and par. 32), the Committee holds that children, whatever their residence status, come within the personal scope of Article 17 of the Revised Charter.

A – Submissions of the parties

1. The complainant organisation

67. DCI states that when parents, who have primary responsibility for their children, cannot, because of their residence status, provide them with minimum care (nutrition, clothing, housing), States must provide the necessary protection. DCI argues that Dutch legislation and practice denies children unlawfully present in the Netherlands this minimum care as concerns housing.

2. The respondent Government

68. The Government understands the complaint to allege a violation of the right to housing for unlawfully resident children. Hence, it does not put forward any new argument under Article 17.

B – Assessment of the Committee

69. The Committee observes that DCI invokes Article 17 generally. However, in the light of the preliminary remarks made above on the scope ratione materiae of the complaint, the Committee considers that the main allegations raised by DCI relate to Article 17par.1.c.

70. Article 17par.1.c requires that States take the appropriate and necessary measures to provide the requisite protection and special aid to children temporarily or definitively deprived of their family’s support. The Committee observes that as
long as their unlawful presence in the Netherlands persists, the children at stake in the instant case, are deprived of their family’s support in that by law (see section 10 of the Aliens Act) they may not claim entitlement to the benefits or facilities which would _inter alia_ secure them shelter.

71. In this respect, the Committee holds that the obligations related to the provision of shelter under Article 17par.1.c are identical in substance with those related to the provision of shelter under Article 31par.2. Insofar as the Committee has found a violation under Article 31par.2 on the ground that shelter is not provided to children unlawfully present in the Netherlands for as long as they are in its jurisdiction, the Committee also finds a violation of Article 17par.1.c of the Revised Charter on the same ground.

**Third part: on the alleged violation of Article e in conjunction with Articles 31 and 17**

**Article E – Non-discrimination**

“The enjoyment of the rights set forth in this Charter shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national extraction or social origin, health, association with a national minority, birth or other status.”

**As to the applicability of Article E to paragraph 1 of the Appendix**

72. The Committee holds that the prohibition of discrimination, which is enshrined in Article E of the Revised Charter, establishes an obligation to ensure that any individual or group, who falls within the scope _ratione personae_ of the Revised Charter, equally enjoy the rights of the Revised Charter.

73. As the Court has repeatedly stressed when interpreting Article 14 of the Convention, the Committee has held that the principle of equality, which is reflected in the prohibition of discrimination, means treating equals equally and unequals unequally (Autism-Europe v. France, Complaint No. 13/2002, decision on the merits of 4 November 2003, par. 52). Thus, as acknowledged above, States Parties may treat persons lawfully or unlawfully present on their territories differently. However, in so doing, human dignity, which is a recognised fundamental value at the core of positive European human rights law, must be respected.

74. The Committee observes that the question, as submitted by the complainant organisation in the instant case, does not concern equality of treatment of children unlawfully present in the Netherlands compared to children lawfully resident. The question is instead whether such a category of persons may claim entitlement to rights under the Charter and under what conditions. Article E of the Revised Charter does not serve this purpose.

75. For these reasons, the Committee considers that Article E is not applicable in the instant case.

**Conclusion**

77. For these reasons the Committee concludes

– unanimously that Article 31par.1 is not applicable in the instant case;

– unanimously that there is violation of Article 31par.2;

– unanimously that there is violation of Article 17par.1.c;

– unanimously that Article E is not applicable in the instant case.
1. Het Europees Comité voor Sociale Rechten (het Comité) beslist in bovenstaande uitspraak naar aanleiding van een klacht van Defence for Children International (DCI) tegen Nederland dat ‘de situatie in Nederland’ (dat onrechtmatig verblijvende kinderen geen huisvesting krijgen, FFL/PEM) in strijd is met artikel 31, tweede lid van het herziene Europees Sociaal Handvest (hierna: het herziene Handvest). Het Comité beslist tevens dat voor zover artikel 31, tweede lid van het herziene Handvest is geschonden, artikel 17, eerste lid onder c van het herziene Handvest ook is geschonden. Dit laatste onderdeel bepaalt dat lidstaten de nodige maatregelen moeten nemen om bescherming en speciale hulp te bieden aan kinderen en jongeren die tijdelijk of definitief zonder steun van hun familie leven.

Deze noot belicht eerst het oordeel van het Comité dat niet rechtmatig verblijvende vreemdelingen onder de personele werkingssfeer van het Handvest vallen (2 t/m 4). Daarna wordt ingegaan op de voorwaarden die het herziene Handvest volgens het Comité stelt aan de huisvesting van rechtmatig verblijvende vreemdelingen, zoals de opvang van asielzoekers (5 t/m 8).

2. In de bovenstaande beslissing stelt het Comité eerst vast dat de in artikel 31, eerste lid van het herziene Handvest beschreven doelstelling om de toegang tot adequate huisvesting te bevorderen, niet van toepassing is op kinderen die onrechtmatig verblijven in een land dat partij is bij het herziene Handvest. Het Comité overweegt daartoe dat het onthouden van adequate huisvesting aan deze kinderen niet automatisch betekent dat hen de noodzakelijke zorg wordt onthouden die nodig is om te voorkomen dat de betrokkenen in ontoelaatbare omstandigheden verblijven. Bovendien zou de eis van adequate huisvesting ingaan tegen de doelstellingen van het vreemdelingenbeleid van de staat om onrechtmatig verblijvende personen te laten terugkeren naar hun land van herkomst.

De reden voor de grote publiciteit rondom deze beslissing (bijvoorbeeld een uitzending van NOVA met als titel: Nederland zet asielkinderen op straat, 26 maart 2010; De Volkskrant ‘Hier is je treinkaartje, succes ermee’, 25 maart 2010) is gelegen in de paragrafen 58 t/m 65. In deze paragrafen oordeelt het Comité dat ‘de situatie in Nederland’ een schending is van artikel 31, tweede lid, van het herziene Handvest. Dit onderdeel bepaalt dat lidstaten maatregelen nemen die zijn gericht op het voorkomen en verminderen van dak- en thuisloosheid teneinde het geleidelijk uit te bannen. Het Comité beslist reeds in paragraaf 48 dat dit onderdeel wel van toepassing is op kinderen op het grondgebied van de verdragsluitende partijen ongeacht de verblijfsstatus van de kinderen. Het onderdeel heeft tot gevolg dat de bij het herziene Handvest aangesloten landen kinderen zonder rechtmatig verblijf onderdak dienen te bieden zolang deze onder hun jurisdictie vallen, en dat alternatieven moeten worden gezocht voor detentie. Elke andere oplossing is volgens het Comité in strijd met de menselijke waardigheid en houdt geen rekening met de bijzondere kwetsbare situatie van kinderen.

Evenals in de FIDH-uitspraak is het Comité zich er in onderhavige beslissing van bewust dat de klacht betrekking heeft op een groep kinderen die volgens een letterlijke interpretatie van de Bijlage van het herziene Handvest buiten het personele bereik van de bescherming van het Handvest valt. Het Comité stelt daarom in paragraaf 22 heel duidelijk dat de beslissing van het Comité in de FIDH zaak de huidige interpretatie van het herziene Handvest vertegenwoordigt en merkt vervolgens in paragraaf 27 op dat de rechten in het Handvest op een praktische en effectieve wijze moeten worden uitgelegd en niet op een theoretische wijze. Daarom interpreteert het Comité de rechten en vrijheden die beschreven worden in het Handvest in het licht van de huidige omstandigheden en in het licht van de relevante internationale instrumenten die de ontwerpers van het Handvest geïnspireerd hebben of in overeenstemming met die instrumenten die van toepassing zouden moeten zijn.

De interpretatie van onderdeel 1 van de Bijlage van het herziene Handvest komt verder in de paragrafen 34 t/m 37 uitvoerig aan bod. Het Comité roept in herinnering dat het Handvest bedoeld is als een mensenrechtensinstrument om het EVRM aan te vullen. Het is een levend instrument toegewijd aan een aantal waarden waardoor het geïnspireerd is: waardigheid, autonomie, gelijkheid en solidariteit en andere algemene waarden. Het moet dusdanig geïnterpreteerd worden dat het betekenis geeft aan fundamentele sociale rechten (paragraaf 34).

Vervolgens geeft het Comité aan dat de interpretatie van het Handvest plaatsvindt in het licht van de regels die neergelegd zijn in het Verdrag van Wenen inzake het Verdragenrecht waarin artikel 31, lid 3 onder c aangeeft dat rekening gehouden moet worden met alle relevante regels van internationaal recht die van toepassing zijn in de relatie tussen de partijen. Het Handvest kan niet als opzichzelfstaand in een vacuüm worden geïnterpreteerd. Het Handvest moet waar mogelijk worden geïnterpreteerd in harmonie met andere regels van internationale recht waar het deel van uitmaakt, waaronder in deze zaak die regels met betrekking tot het bieden van adequate opvang aan een ieder in nood onafhankelijk van de vraag of hij of zij legaal verblijft.

In paragraaf 36 overweegt het Comité verder dat voor de interpretatie van het Handvest gekozen moet worden voor een teleologische benadering, d.w.z. het is nodig om die interpretatie van het verdrag te kiezen die het meest gebruikelijk is teneinde het doel van het Verdrag te bereiken en niet die interpretatie die de verplichtingen die de partijen zijn aangegaan zoveel mogelijk zou beperken. Dat betekent onder meer dat beperking van rechten terughoudend toegepast moeten worden d.w.z. dusdanig geïnterpreteerd dat ze de essentie van het recht op opvang overeind houdt en het algemene doel van het Handvest bereikt, aldaar het Comité.

Nogmaals verwijzend naar de beslissing in de FIDH zaak, herhaalt het Comité dat de beperking in onderdeel 1 van de Bijlage van het herziene Handvest ziet op een grote variëteit van sociale rechten en deze op verschillende manieren beïnvloedt. Een dergelijke beperking mag niet eindigen in een onredelijke beschadigend effect waar het gaat om de bescherming van kwetsbare groepen in kwestie.

In paragraaf 47 overweegt het Comité dan ook dat het recht op opvang nauw verwant is aan het recht op leven en cruciaal is voor het respect van een ieders menselijke waardigheid. Het Comité merkt op dat, ervan uitgaand dat alle kinderen kwetsbaar zijn, opgroeien op straat een kind in een situatie brengt van volledige hulpeloosheid. Daarom overweegt het Comité dat kinderen
nadelig getroffen zouden worden door een ontkenningsrecht op opvang.

4. Minister Hirsch Ballin heeft op Kamervragen van PvdA kamerlid Spekman geantwoord dat de Nederlandse regering vraagtekens zet bij de gevolgde interpretatiemethode op grond waarvan het Comité tot zijn oordeel, in het bijzonder over de personele reikwijdte van het herziene Handvest, is gekomen (brief 25 maart 2010, kenmerk 159858). Volgens de minister is in de Bijlage bij het herziene Handvest inzake de werkingssfeer met betrekking tot de te beschermen personen, die integraal onderdeel uitmaakt van het herziene Handvest, bepaald dat dit Handvest – op enkele hier niet van toepassing zijnde uitzonderingen na – slechts rechten toekent aan legaal op het grondgebied van een lidstaat verblijvende personen. De conclusie dat de artikelen 31, tweede lid (het voorkomen en verminderen van dak- en thuisloosheid), en artikel 17, eerste lid, onder c (het geven van bescherming en ondersteuning aan kinderen en jeugdige personen die tijdelijk of definitief de steun van hun gezin moeten ontberen), dat deze bepalingen ook zien op illegaal in een lidstaat verblijvende kinderen en dat Nederland deze artikelen ten aanzien van kinderen schendt, acht de regering in strijd met de tekst van de zojuist genoemde verdragsbepaling, waarin de bedoelingen van de verdragsluitende partijen ondubbelzinnig naar voren komen.

Deze conclusie van de minister past weliswaar binnen een letterlijke interpretatie van (de bijlage bij) het Handvest maar doet geen recht aan de dynamische interpretatie, die niet alleen door het Comité wordt voorgestaan maar ook door verschillende andere organen binnen de Raad van Europa de laatste jaren is verdedigd. Zo trekt de Commissaris voor de mensenrechten in een issue paper van 17 december 2007 over “The human rights of irregular migrants in Europe” onder andere de conclusie dat: “Greater use of the European Social Charter should be made in order to protect basic social and economic rights of irregular migrants. Furthermore, greater use needs to be made of the Collective Complaints mechanism under the European Social Charter in terms of concern to regular and irregular migrants” (CommDH/IssuePaper (2007)1, p. 20, conclusie 9).

En in een recente ‘Recommendation on the implementation of the right to housing’ geeft diezelfde commissaris expliciet aan: “While irregular migrants and temporary residents are, in principle, excluded from the protection of the ESC, anyone in urgent need due to lack of resources, as well as children of undocumented migrants, are required to be supported with temporary measures according to Article 13par.4” (30 juni 2009, CommDH(2009(5), p. 17)). De commissaris noemt hier weliswaar niet de artikelen 31 en 17, maar wel artikel 13, vierde lid van het Handvest, waarvan de personele reikwijdte zich formeel ook alleen beperkt tot rechtmatig verblijvende vreemdelingen.

In Resolutie 1509(2006) over ‘human rights of irregular migrants’ stelt de Parlementaire Vergadering van de Raad van Europa onder punt 13.1: ‘adequate housing and shelter guaranteeing human dignity should be afforded to irregular migrants’. Deze resolutie is gebaseerd op een rapport van Van Thijn namens de Commissie voor migratie, vluchtelingen en demografie (Doc. 10924). In dit rapport wordt onder punt 35 verwezen naar de FIDH zaak, waarna de rapporteur stelt: “In view of the fact that various other rights under the Charter are closely linked to the notion of human dignity, one can not exclude a dynamic interpretation by the European Committee on Social Rights on rights such as:

– the right to work, in so far as this prohibits forced labour (Article 1par.2);
the right to social and medical assistance (Article 13);
the right of persons with disabilities to protection (Article 15);
the right of children to protection (Articles 7 and 17);
the right of elderly persons to social protection (Article 23);
the right to dignity at work (Article 26);
the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion (Article 30);
the right to housing (Article 31), particularly from the standpoint of preventing and reducing homelessness (par.2).

Uit de beslissing kunnen eisen worden gedestilleerd die worden gesteld aan de huisvesting van de rechtmatig verblijvende minderjarige asielzoeker op grond van artikel 31, eerste lid van het Handvest. Op deze eisen kan een beroep worden gedaan door middel van een klacht bij het Comité, maar de eisen kunnen ook een aanvulling bieden op de minimumnormen voor de voorzieningen voor asielzoekers als beschreven in richtlijn 2003/9/EG (opvangrichtlijn) en zo een rol spelen in een procedure over de toepassing van de opvangrichtlijn.

6. Een eerste voorbeeld van een bepaling in de opvangrichtlijn die door artikel 31, eerste en tweede lid van het Handvest kan worden aangevuld, is artikel 14, eerste onderdeel, subonderdeel b. Dit onderdeel van de richtlijn bepaalt dat de huisvesting van asielzoekers kan plaatsvinden in opvangcentra die een toereikend huisvestingsniveau bieden. Verschillende bepalingen van de richtlijn geven alleen in zeer algemene bewoordingen aan in welk geval de huisvesting van minderjarigen toereikend is. Artikel 17, tweede lid van de opvangrichtlijn bepaalt bijvoorbeeld dat de lidstaten in hun nationale wetgeving inzake materiële opvangvoorzieningen en gezondheidszorg rekening moeten houden met de specifieke situatie van minderjarigen. Een beschrijving van de eisen waaraan de (voorgeschreven voorzieningen van) huisvesting dan concreet moeten voldoen, ontbreekt echter. Dat deze in de opvangrichtlijn aan de lidstaten overgelaten vrijheid echter slechts een vrijheid in gebondenheid is, blijkt onder meer uit deze uitspraak van het Comité dat beslist dat het onderkomen vanuit sanitair perspectief en gezondheids technisch veilig moet zijn; basale voorzieningen als water, verwarming en elektriciteit bevat; het onderkomen structureel veilig en niet overbevolkt is; het onderkomen duurzaam is, welke laatste voorwaarde in de wet dient te zijn geregeld. Zolang de huisvesting slechts tijdelijk wordt geboden, kan in
beginsel geen sprake zijn van adequate huisvesting in de zin van artikel 31, eerste lid van het Handvest: de staat moet in dat geval zo snel mogelijk zien te regelen dat wel adequate huisvesting wordt geboden (zie paragraaf 43). Een beperking van dit recht is echter op grond van het Handvest ongeacht de verblijfsstatus van het kind wel toegestaan. De staat voldoet ook aan zijn verplichtingen van het Handvest als een minderjarige rechtmatig verblijvende vreemdeling, zoals de minderjarige asielzoeker, geen adequate (dus duurzame) huisvesting wordt geboden, maar slechts in de noodzakelijke zorg wordt voorzien door het bieden van tijdelijk onderdak, bijvoorbeeld in een asielzoekerscentrum. Het Comité beslist in dit verband dat doelstellingen van immigratiebeleid en de mensenrechtelijke verplichtingen niet met elkaar in overeenstemming kunnen worden gebracht als de noodzakelijke zorg niet wordt geboden en de ontoelaatbare levensomstandigheden worden ontkend. De noodzakelijke zorg dient te voldoen aan minimale standaarden van menselijke waardigheid: dit betekent dat het Handvest aan tijdelijke huisvesting minder eisen stelt, bijvoorbeeld inzake de privacy en het gezinsleven van de bewoner, dan bij duurzamere vormen van huisvesting het geval is.

7. Een tweede voorbeeld van een bepaling voor welke het Handvest betekenis kan hebben, is artikel 16 van de opvangrichtlijn. Deze bepaling biedt de EU-lidstaat de bevoegdheid gronden op te nemen in het nationale recht die reden zijn de materiële opvangvoorzieningen (d.i. onderdak, voeding, kleding, zakgeld) van de asielzoeker te beperken, in te trekken of te weigeren, of om een sanctie op te leggen. Een grond voor het opleggen van een sanctie is bijvoorbeeld de omstandigheid dat de asielzoeker zich bezondigt aan een ernstige vorm van geweld in het opvangcentrum. De beslissing tot het opleggen van een sanctie dient gelet op het vierde lid van artikel 16 van de richtlijn te worden genomen op grond van de specifieke situatie van de betrokkene, met name voor personen zoals minderjarigen, en met inachtneming van het evenredigheidsbeginsel. De vraag is of een sanctie die inhoudt dat de huisvesting aan een rechtmatig verblijvende minderjarige asielzoeker wordt onthouden, de toets door het Hof van Justitie aan dit beginsel kan doorstaan. In het kader van de toetsing van een dergelijke sanctie aan het noodzakelijkheidsvereiste en het geschiktheidsvereiste moet worden bezien of een minder belastende maatregel kon worden getroffen. Bovendien kan in deze toets mede een rol spelen dat artikel 31, tweede lid van het Handvest tot gevolg heeft dat indien een rechtmatig verblijvend kind uit de huisvesting wordt gezet, de reden daartoe de uitzetting moet rechtvaardigen; de uitzetting wordt uitgevoerd onder omstandigheden die de waardigheid van de persoon respecteren; en alternatieve accommodatie (onderdak) beschikbaar wordt gesteld (paragraaf 63). Op grond hiervan moet worden geconcludeerd dat volgens het Handvest de rechtmatig verblijvende minderjarige asielzoeker tijdens de asielprocedure nooit zonder opvang kan worden gelaten.

8. Het Voorstel voor een richtlijn van het Europees Parlement en de Raad tot vaststelling van minimumnormen voor de opvang van asielzoekers in de lidstaten (COM(2008) 815 definitief; 2008/0244 (COD)) is in dit verband relevant. Dit voorstel schrapt deels de mogelijkheid voor de lidstaten over te gaan tot volledige intrekking van de opvangvoorzieningen op grond van artikel 16, eerste lid van de opvangrichtlijn (bijvoorbeeld bij het niet voldoen aan de meldplicht). Het derde lid van het artikel houdt echter de mogelijkheid van het treffen van een sanctie ingeval ernstige inbreuken op de regels met betrekking tot de opvangcentra en bij ernstige vormen van geweld, intact. De sanctie kan dus op grond van dit onderdeel van de opvangrichtlijn ook
bestaan uit het ontnemen van onderdak: een sanctiemogelijkheid die naar Nederlands recht bestaat. Op grond van artikelen 10 en 19 van de Rva 2005 in combinatie met het niet gepubliceerde Reglement Onthouding Verstrekkingen (ROV) kan het COA deze sanctie bijvoorbeeld opleggen ingeval van ‘zeer bijzondere, en buitengewone ernstige overlast’ van de asielzoeker. Het ontnemen van onderdak aan een rechtmatig verblijvende minderjarige asielzoeker is echter op grond van voorgaande redenering in strijd met het herziene Handvest, en zou mede gelet op het evenredigheidsbeginsel in de zin van artikel 16, vierde lid en andere diverse bepalingen in de opvangrichtlijn over de bijzondere positie van minderjarigen, een schending kunnen zijn van de geldende opvangrichtlijn.

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