PRE-EMPTIVE WAR OR PRE-EMPTIVE PEACE?

The US National Security Strategy: a challenge to the peace movement

Advisory report for Pax Christi Netherlands
by Ben Schennink
PRE-EMPTIVE WAR OR PRE-EMPTIVE PEACE?

The US National Security Strategy: a challenge to the peace movement

Advisory report for Pax Christi Netherlands
by Ben Schennink
PRE-EMPTIVE WAR OR PRE-EMPTIVE PEACE?

The US National Security Strategy: a challenge to the peace movement

Advisory report for Pax Christi Netherlands

Ben Schennink¹

The war waged in Iraq by the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies was strongly condemned and opposed by Pax Christi. In a joint statement of February 13, 2003, Pax Christi and Cordaid, the Dutch Catholic co-financing organization for development and humanitarian aid, declared that the war was unjust, not self-evident and not unavoidable. They called for a policy of strict inspections for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction by the United Nations (UN) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for stricter containment of the Iraqi regime by reinforcing UN control of imports and exports, for the posting of UN human rights observers, for the UN to insist on free access for humanitarian organizations and for a UN Iraq tribunal. Similar positions were taken by Pax Christ International and other sections of Pax Christi, and the war was strongly opposed in Europe and the US by many organizations for peace and justice and many churches².

Many declarations said the military action was unjust because other avenues had not been exhausted. The mobilization and lobby in favor of strong, coercive diplomacy through the UN and opposed to military action influenced public opinion, with the majority opinion, even in the US, supporting this course. Although the campaign failed to prevent the war, Pax Christi and other peace organizations can build on its results. Both the peace movement’s failure and its results are a product of the new US National Security Strategy (NSS) published on September 17 2002².

The NSS introduced pre-emptive war as an explicit element in the US’s security policy. It argues that deterrence and containment are not effective against terrorists and rogue states that are prepared to use weapons of mass destruction.

The doctrine of pre-emptive war is diametrically opposed to the peace movement’s commitment to a policy of no war or pre-emptive peace: it undermines international cooperation, non-proliferation and disarmament and, in particular, the strengthening of international law and international institutions that have institutionalized a variety of mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes and that accept military action only as a last resort.

¹ Center for International Conflict Analysis and Management (CICAM), University of Nijmegen; e-mail: B.Schennink@mailbox.kun.nl. The sections on international law are based on texts and ideas put forward by Prof. Nico Schrijver of the Free University of Amsterdam, the sections on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on texts and ideas put forward by Dr. Tom Sauer of Leuven University. The author would like to thank Prof. Paul de Waart, Jan Gruiters, Marjolein Wijninckx, Prof. Ann Pauwels and Jan ter Laak for their comments on earlier drafts; participants at the conference of the International Dialogue Forum held in The Hague on May 25 and 26, 2003, the forum discussion in Utrecht on June 7, 2003 and the members’ council of Pax Christi on June 28, 2003 have also contributed to this report through their comments.
The US National Security Strategy

Pre-emption Is a Legitimate and Unchallenged Defense
In his address to the UN General Assembly on September 12, 2002, President Bush urged the UN to take decisive action against Iraq’s defiance of UN resolutions on the removal and destruction of weapons of mass destruction. Bush said: “We want the United Nations to be effective, and respectful, and successful. We want the resolutions of the world’s most important multilateral body to be enforced”. He added: “But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced – the just demands of peace and security will be met – or action will be unavoidable”iii. The National Security Strategy was published five days later. It made clear to the Security Council’s members and the world that the US had added a new element to its security policy. It would take pre-emptive action to “prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction”. “Our enemies” were “rogue states and their terrorist clients”iv, one of which was Iraq.

The US pressure contributed to the virtually unanimous approval of Security Council Resolution 1441 on the resumption of weapons inspections by the UN and the IAEA. In the Security Council’s evaluation of the inspections’ results, the US argued that Saddam Hussein was not complying with the resolution but it could not convince a majority in the Security Council to grant permission for military intervention to force Iraqi compliance. Rather than wait for permission, the US and its allies initiated “pre-emptive action” on March 22, 2003. It showed that the policy outlined in the NSS was not a mere paper policy and the wording of the NSS makes it clear that the threat of pre-emptive action is not restricted to Iraqv.

Together with the threat of pre-emption, the explicit policy to “build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge”vi is a second element in the US’s new security strategyvii. Enormous investments must make the US’s military strength so great that it cannot be matched by any power in the worldviii. The US is the only superpower and wishes to remain so. As such, it is claiming the right to pre-empt what it defines as an imminent threat and is claiming the right to take action, as in the case of Iraq, without UN consent.

Pre-emptive War and International Law
The US National Security Strategy claims that international law recognizes pre-emption if there is an “imminent threat of an attack” but its legitimacy depends on the degree of imminence.

The report adds that the concept “imminent threat” should be adapted “to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists [...] rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction — weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning. [...] To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively”ix.

International lawyers accept the first part of the argument but reject the second. Schrijver, for example, concurs that the right to pre-emptive self-defense is recognized in international law and is also in agreement with the UN Charter but notes that it is limited to acute danger or direct threat, also in the case of terrorist violence. A victim state cannot invoke the right to self-defense in order to justify its attacking another state that, in its opinion, is a supporter or potential supporter of terroristsx.
Hendrickson makes a comparable point from the perspective of international relations. He writes: “Though styled a doctrine of ‘pre-emption’, it is actually a doctrine of preventive war. Pre-emptive war is when force is used only when it is apparent that the enemy is on the verge of striking, ‘leaving no moment for deliberation’. Preventive war is the first use of force to avert a more remote though still ostensibly formidable danger. It has a simple liturgy, historically sanctioned in the endless wars of the European state system. War, the advocates of prevention say, is inevitable anyway, so let’s fight it under circumstances of our own choosing. In the present case, we are told that once Iraq or other evil states develop the capability to hit us, they will hit us. Ergo, we must strike to avert the threatened calamity, and sooner rather than later.

“Such a war is entirely distinguishable in justification from that which toppled al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Then the United States justifiably made war in response to direct attacks on its soil. Since Saddam’s complicity in those attacks has not been alleged by the administration, and cannot plausibly be inferred from the evidence thus far available, the justification for the war must rest on the aforementioned logic of prevention. That may not seem like much of a difference, but it is the difference in law between offensive and defensive war, and between aggression and self-defense. It is directly contrary to the principle that so often was the rallying cry of American internationalism in the twentieth century”xi.

A doctrine of preventive war undermines the international rule of law. Despite the President’s remarks in the UN, the United States does not seem particularly interested in making the UN and international law more effective. The NSS barely refers to the UN and ignores its Charter completely. Instead, it claims: “It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength”xii. The US prefers force to lawxiii. This policy threatens the preference for law, diplomacy and international cooperation expressed under American leadership since the Second World War.

**PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION, PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND US POLICY**

Since the danger of terrorists and rogue states using weapons of mass destruction reduces the effectiveness of traditional deterrence and containment policies, pre-emptive action might be necessary. Containment and deterrence are still US policies, however, and it will continue to use them against rogue states. The NSS says “the United States will not use force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats”xiv and this seems to be confirmed by US policy on North Korea. Nonetheless, the trauma of September 11 overturned the prevailing policy on weapons of mass destruction: from deterrence and containment to pre-emption and missile-based defense.

The policy developed in the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* of December 2002xv seeks to deny, prevent or respond to the use of weapons of mass destruction and is founded on the US’s continued possession and possible use of nuclear weapons. In this area, too, the policy is better described as preventive than pre-emptivexvi.

The US wishes to maintain and even expand its nuclear military strength. It agreed with Russia in 2002 that both countries would reduce the number of their strategic weapons to 2,000 each by 2012, whereby the old weapons might be kept in storage for possible use at a later date. The US administration has announced plans for new ICBM and SLBM nuclear
missiles and new bombers between 2000 and 2040 and will start research and development studies on “mini nukes”.

The US is doing little to honor its undertaking as a nuclear weapon state to give “an unequivocal undertaking […] to accomplish total elimination of [its] nuclear arsenal leading to nuclear disarmament”. This is one of the 13 concrete undertakings made at the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2000\textsuperscript{xvii}. Other concrete undertakings made at the time will also not be fulfilled. The US has withdrawn from the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and has made it clear that it will not ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The US argued at the recent (April 2003) NPT PrepCom meeting that the NPT’s main objective was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, not nuclear disarmament. It asked for, and accordingly received, the international community’s serious consideration of the ongoing development of nuclear weapons by North Korea. A great deal of attention was also paid to the possible development of nuclear weapons in Iran\textsuperscript{xviii}. Given these developments, it is doubtful that the NPT regime will be strengthened as the states undertook in 2000 and “total nuclear disarmament” is a long way away.

The fifth Revision Conference of the Convention on Biological Weapons ended in disharmony at the end of 2001. The hope that the many years’ negotiations would result in the realization of a strong verification regime was dashed by America’s refusal to cooperate. The US thought the agreements were not effective enough and feared, moreover, that they might damage its own industries. It was agreed to hold a series of follow-up conferences to determine how national measures to stop the production and proliferation of biological weapons could be made more effective and to meet again in 2006\textsuperscript{xix}.

**NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

Both elements of the National Security Strategy – the hegemonic power of the US and its readiness to start a pre-emptive war if it deems one to be necessary – have serious consequences for cooperation among the members of the international community. The war in Iraq showed that the National Security Strategy sows divisions both between and within nations, feeds resentment and revenge in many parts of the world and undermines effective international cooperation. Such cooperation is necessary to tackle the problems of terrorism, to promote the effective non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to counter the problems that rogue, failed and weak states can cause for their citizens and the international community. With the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union deeply divided, there is a yawning gap in some countries between the government and the dominant public opinion. The gap is particularly problematic in Arab countries whose governments are allies of the US. As a consequence, the positive values that the US wishes to promote through its foreign and security policy – “the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property”\textsuperscript{xv} – are more difficult to achieve because the international community holds divergent opinions on how they should be promoted\textsuperscript{xvi}. Owing to the deep division and the unrelenting scrutiny of the US’s conduct, moreover, conflicts and crises that do not interest the US – because, for example, they are not related directly to terrorism or the dangers of WMD proliferation – do not receive the attention from the international community that they deserve. The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo is such a case in point. In addition, the further development of international regimes for disarmament, verification and non-proliferation has been suspended and may even be reversed, as in the case of the NPT negotiations.
Challenges for the peace movement

The main challenge facing the peace movement is to counter these trends and developments. The experiences of the last period of weapons inspections in Iraq show that coercive diplomacy and international law can be effective alternatives to military force alone. The strong message presented by the peace movement and churches informed the majority public opinion in the US and Europe. The message was more than just an appeal to morals, it also offered a concrete and convincing alternative rooted in diplomacy and international law. The diplomacy was also effective because it was backed up by the US and UK military presence in the region. A joint evaluation by peace organizations and churches in various parts of the world could help find concrete ways to strengthen UN capacity for coercive diplomacy and the role of international law in international relations.

STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Proposals to strengthen international law and international institutions should consider three points:

• In the first place, the problem of fighting terrorism. As an intergovernmental organization, the UN is poorly equipped to combat attacks or threats from non-state organizations such as terrorist groups. Measures are being discussed internally to give the UN more power. The UN Commission for International Law, for example, has proposed increasing the responsibility of states for terrorist groups operating within their jurisdictions. In accordance with the advice of international lawyers, the peace movement should seek more effective ways for the Security Council to combat terrorism through collective defense rather than through individual states increasing their right to self-defense.

• The second point is humanitarian intervention. Although the purpose of the war was to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, a secondary objective was to remove the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein. This reintroduced the question of humanitarian intervention to the debate. The UN has very limited means to act in cases of genocide or other large-scale violations of human rights. The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs restricts the UN’s ability to intervene. The former Polish foreign affairs minister, Bronislaw Geremek, recently suggested that limiting the sovereignty of states that violated human rights on a large scale would give the UN more freedom to act.

• The third point is that the UN’s capacity to act as a diplomat, inspector or a kind of global police force is too limited and too dependent on the cooperation of its member states. This was reiterated in the Brahimi report in 2000. All three instruments are needed to conduct coercive diplomacy and combat terrorism within the framework of the international rule of law. Brian Wicker recently argued “What is needed today is the development of a global police effort to enforce law and order against those like Al Qaida, who commit ‘terrorist’ crimes against humanity. Such a police effort, if it is made, will not be a ‘war against terrorism’, but police-work on behalf of global law and order.” Wicker proposes the implementation of article 47 of the UN Charter and the establishment not of a “military staff committee” but of a “UN police staff committee”. The idea is similar to the proposal for a standing UN rapid deployment brigade made by the Dutch minister Hans van Mierlo in the UN in 1995. The Brahimi report of 2000 repeats this call. In response to the Brahimi report, 56 members of the US House of Representatives from both parties submitted a proposal in March 2001 for US support for the establishment of a “UN rapid deployment police and security force.”
Promote non-proliferation and disarmament

US policy on nuclear non-proliferation raises a number of concerns:

- the disparity between states that may have nuclear weapons and those that may not makes an effective non-proliferation policy difficult. The 1986 NPT requires all states to seek total nuclear disarmament (article VI); this is repeated in the 13 undertakings given in 2000. The US’s policy undermines those undertakings and thus its own promise as a nuclear weapon state to make serious efforts towards total nuclear disarmament;xxx;
- the US’s aggressive unilateral approach to proliferation may actually accelerate proliferation, as illustrated by the case of North Korea;
- pre-emptive attacks against states that have weapons of mass destruction may fail and provoke counterattacks with dreadful consequences;
- other nuclear states, such as India and Pakistan, may be encouraged to use the same pre-emptive strategy.

“Pre-emption is not the model” to combat proliferation, according to Mohamed ElBaradei, the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Instead, he believes the collective security system should be reinvigorated and modernized. ElBaradei also argues that chronic disputes and weapons proliferation should be considered in parallel with each other as part of an overall settlement. In the Middle East this would mean settling the Israeli-Palestinian problem while earnestly seeking to establish a WMD-free zone in the region. This proposal was repeated in the recent NPT PrepCom of 2003. Endorsement of these proposals by the peace movement and the churches might help mobilize public and political support for them in Europe, the US and the Middle East. The peace movement should also cooperate with the New Agenda Coalition in the UN to ensure that the undertakings given in 2000 to strengthen the NPT regime, including the nuclear weapon states’ promise of total nuclear disarmament, are realized insofar as possible in 2005.

Strengthening verification of the development and possession of biological weapons should also receive more attention in the years ahead than it does at present. The European countries that called for a powerful verification regime in 2001 have done no more than conclude such a treaty with like-minded states in order to keep the US on board. If the 2006 Review Conference is to be a success, the peace movement must urge those countries to take the initiative for a new treaty with a strong and broad verification regime. An initiative by the Netherlands might lead to the treaty’s executive organization being located in The Hague, where it could build up a good working relationship with the organization that monitors compliance with the prohibition on chemical weapons, which is also located in The Hague.

IMPROVE THE CLIMATE FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

A serious challenge facing the peace movement is the creation of a climate that is conducive to international cooperation between states and citizens. Such a climate is of vital importance to end humanitarian crises such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia and to find lasting solutions to the problems in the Middle East, the Balkans, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It is also a precondition for strengthening and developing the disarmament regimes applicable to biological and chemical weapons, anti-personnel mines and small arms and for strengthening international law, for example through the International Criminal Court, which commenced in 2002, and the UN itself.

The peace movement can make a start by intensifying international cooperation between organizations and citizens throughout the world and by developing a joint agenda for concrete issues that mobilize public support. This would help create a more conducive climate for
international cooperation and would also encourage cooperation with like-minded states. This has been demonstrated by the successful campaigns to ban anti-personnel mines, to found the International Criminal Court and to ban the use of child soldiers. Through these campaigns, which had specific and concrete goals, the peace movement found that international cooperation with organizations and like-minded states can produce significant results in a short period of time even if the US or other superpowers do not cooperate.

Many of the proposals considered above are included in or are consistent with the strategic agenda that Javier Solana presented to the European Council in Thessaloniki on 20 June 2003xxxiii. The key strategic goals for a safer Europe, according to Solana, are: to extend the security zone around Europe; to strengthen international order; and to counter threats by means of anti-terrorism and anti-proliferation measures and the reconstruction of failed states. Realising these goals, according to Solana, will require: the members to conduct a more active and coherent policy; Europe to be better equipped for its task through the combination of its members’ diplomatic, military and civil resources; and greater cooperation with partners worldwide.

Solana’s agenda provides peace organizations that wish to promote international cooperation as an alternative to the US strategy of prevention and military force with an excellent opportunity for cooperation with like-minded states. The outcome might help peace organizations and public opinion in the US to change government policy and to put US foreign policy back on its old track of strengthening the international legal order and promoting international cooperation as routes to peace and security in the US and the world.

January 2004

---

1 For statements made by Pax Christi and for many other statements made by churches, see the Pax Christi Netherlands website: http://www.passievoorvrede.nl/; statements made by Pax Christi International and by many sections and partners can be found in the Middle East section of the Pax Christi International website: http://www.paxchristi.net/.
2 http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
4 NSS, pp. 13 and 14.
5 John Lewis Gaddis suggests in Foreign Policy of November 2002 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/) that the NSS is part of “a grand strategy …. for transforming the entire Muslim Middle East: for bringing it, once and for all, into the modern world”, and less a military threat to members of the “axis of evil”. His argument for this is that the NSS makes no mention of the concept. However, the NSS explicitly refers to North Korea, Iraq and a “small number of rogue states” with regard to pre-emptive action.
6 NSS, p. 29.
7 Both Carl Kaysen, John D. Steinbruner and Martin B. Klein, U.S. National Security Strategy Policy: In Search of Balance, in: Carl Kaysen et al., War with Iraq, Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives, Committee on International Security, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge (Ma), 2002, pp. 1-5, and David Hendrickson, Toward Universal Empire: The Dangerous Quest for Absolute Security (World Policy Journal) http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj02-3/hendrickson.html indicate that these two elements are the most important innovations in US policy.
8 “A crude indicator of US dominance: the US defense budget is today larger than the combined defense expenditure of the next twenty-five largest militaries”, Kaysen et al., op. cit., p. 2.
9 NSS, p. 15.
10 Nico Schrijver, Elf September en de uitdagingen aan het volkenrecht (September Eleven and the Challenges to International Law), in Vrede en Veiligheid, 32, 2003, p. 36.
11 Hendrickson, op. cit., p. 7.
12 NSS, p. 29.

xviii For the final declaration of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, see http://disarmament2.un.org:8080/wmd/npt/finaldoc.html. The quotation is taken from par. 15.6, article VI; the other 12 undertakings are also repeated there.


xxiii See, for example, Schrijver, op. cit.


xxx This is also the conclusion of a recent conference (May 12, 2003) of the US Fourth Freedom Forum, the Norwegian Atlantic Commission and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, which made a number of proposals to strengthen NATO’s nuclear non-proliferation policy. Alistair Millar and Morten Bremer Maerlis (eds) NATO Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policies in a changing Threat Environment, http://www.fourthfreedom.org/.

x xxvii Brian Wicker, Policing Al Qaida, SD09E03, Pax Christi International, March 2003.

xxviii For Van Mierlo’s speech, see http://www.undp.org/missions/netherlands/50gamier.htm; see also the report on a UN standing rapid deployment brigade that the Netherlands submitted to all members in April 1995 http://www.undp.org/missions/netherlands/brigindex.htm.


xxx This is also the conclusion of a recent conference (May 12, 2003) of the US Fourth Freedom Forum, the Norwegian Atlantic Commission and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, which made a number of proposals to strengthen NATO’s nuclear non-proliferation policy. Alistair Millar and Morten Bremer Maerlis (eds) NATO Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policies in a changing Threat Environment, http://www.fourthfreedom.org/.


xxviii For Van Mierlo’s speech, see http://www.undp.org/missions/netherlands/50gamier.htm; see also the report on a UN standing rapid deployment brigade that the Netherlands submitted to all members in April 1995 http://www.undp.org/missions/netherlands/brigindex.htm.


xxx This is also the conclusion of a recent conference (May 12, 2003) of the US Fourth Freedom Forum, the Norwegian Atlantic Commission and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, which made a number of proposals to strengthen NATO’s nuclear non-proliferation policy. Alistair Millar and Morten Bremer Maerlis (eds) NATO Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policies in a changing Threat Environment, http://www.fourthfreedom.org/.