Majorities’ attitudes towards minorities in European Union Member States

Results from the Standard Eurobarometers 1997-2000-2003

Report 2 for the
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Dr. Marcel Coenders
Dr. Marcel Lubbers
Prof. Dr. Peer Scheepers

University of Nijmegen
Nijmegen Institute for Social and Cultural Research
Department of Social Science Research Methodology
Department of Sociology
# Table of contents

2.0 Executive summary

2 Majorities’ attitudes towards minorities in European Union Member States

2.1 Comparisons between Member States: descriptive analyses

2.1.1 Resistance to multicultural society

2.1.2 Limits to multicultural society

2.1.3 Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants

2.1.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants

2.1.5 Insistence on conformity of migrants to law

2.2 Comparisons between social categories: descriptive analyses

2.2.1 Resistance to multicultural society

2.2.2 Limits to multicultural society

2.2.3 Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants

2.2.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants

2.2.5 Insistence on conformity of migrants to law

2.3 Comparisons between Member States and social categories:
multivariate multilevel analyses

2.3.1 Resistance to multicultural society

2.3.2 Limits to multicultural society

2.3.3 Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants

2.3.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants

2.3.5 Insistence on conformity of migrants to law

2.3.6 Evaluation of hypotheses

2.4 Comparisons over time within Member States: descriptive analyses

2.4.1 Resistance to multicultural society

2.4.2 Limits to multicultural society

2.4.3 Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants

2.4.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants

2.4.5 Insistence on conformity of migrants to law
Appendix 1. List of countries and abbreviations 48
Appendix 2. Data collection 49
  2.1 Weighting 50
  2.2 Selection of majority population 51
  2.3 Missing value treatment 51
Appendix 3. Measurements of ethnic exclusionism 53
  3.1 Invariance in measurement models in EU member states 2003 regarding measurements of ‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’, and ‘limits to multicultural society’ 60
  3.2 Invariance in measurement models in EU member states 2003 regarding measurements of ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’ 63
  3.3 Sum indices of dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. 66
  3.4 Invariance in measurement models in EU member states over time, regarding measurements of ‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’, and ‘limits to multicultural society’. 68
  3.5 Invariance in measurement models in EU member states over time, regarding measurements of ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’ 71
  3.6 Overview of survey questions 74
Appendix 4. Measurements of independent variables at the individual level 77
Appendix 5. Measurements of independent variables at the contextual level 79
Appendix 6. Grand means, means per country and percentages of support for exclusionist stances 84
Appendix 7. Test for significant over time changes within countries 87
2.0 Executive summary

We distinguished five different stances regarding majorities’ (autochthonous people belonging to national majorities) attitudes towards minorities that have been proven to be cross-nationally as well as longitudinally comparable, and hence useful to answer our first general question on the prevalence of these different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism in EU member states. Other exclusionist stances appeared to be incomparable across nations and are therefore not included in the reports.

- We discovered resistance to multicultural society, a view which was subscribed to by one in four Europeans living in member states, who constituted a rather stable minority over time (1997-2000-2003).
- We ascertained the view that there are limits to multicultural society was supported by a growing majority of about two out of three Europeans living in member states. Three other attitudes refer directly to the influx and presence of minorities and legal migrants.
- We ascertained a vast and, over time (1997-2000-2003), rather stable minority (of about four out of ten) that opposes civil rights for legal migrants.
- We found a growing minority of about one out of five Europeans living in member states that is in favour of repatriation policies for legal migrants.
- We found an over time growing majority of about two out of three Europeans that insists on the conformity of migrants to law.

We found large differences between countries regarding these attitudes. Resistance to multicultural society and the view that there are limits to multicultural society is widely present in many countries in Western and Central Europe, whereas Nordic countries and Mediterranean countries, except for Greece, appear to disassociate themselves from these views.

Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants is strongly present in countries in Western and Central Europe, and much less so in Mediterranean countries. People in Mediterranean as well as many Central European countries favour policies to repatriate migrants, which is much less common among Nordic citizens. Nordic people as well as many citizens living in Western and Central Europe insist on the conformity of minorities, whereas people in Mediterranean countries support this view much less.
Let us turn to our second general question, i.e. on the prevalence of these dimensions within specific social categories for which we also found large and rather consistent differences between social categories across different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism.

- We found that people who finished their educational career before or on their eighteenth birthday are more in favour of most of these dimensions of ethnic exclusionism than people with a prolonged educational career.

We found this pattern time and again, however, with one exception: when it comes to insistence on the conformity to law, it turns out that the people with a prolonged educational career are more in favour of this view than people who finished their career earlier.

- Regarding occupational categories, we found strikingly consistent patterns. Very often, people who are self-employed as well as manual workers strongly favour most of the dimensions of ethnic exclusionism which similarly also holds for people who depend on social security and for people who fulfil household tasks.

Again, we found exceptions to this rule regarding insistence on conformity to law which turned out to be strongly subscribed to by (lower and higher) professionals.

- Looking at the different income brackets, most dimensions of ethnic exclusionism are more strongly adhered to by the lowest income brackets, except for insistence on conformity to law which turned out to be somewhat more popular among the people in the highest bracket.
- The older age categories, i.e. over 50s, appeared to favour all exclusionist stances more than average.
- All dimensions of exclusionism were favoured more strongly in the countryside than in cities.
- Finally, all dimensions of exclusionism were strongly subscribed to by people on the moderate or far right side of the political spectrum, except for insistence on conformity to law that was strongly supported by all except for the people who placed themselves on the far left.

Turning to our third general question, on the spurious determinants of aspects of ethnic exclusionism, we found that most of the previously mentioned individual characteristics appeared to affect ethnic exclusionism except for the effect of income which turned out to
have merely minor and often non-significant effects. The effect of education turned out to be negative, also pertaining to insistence on conformity to law. Remarkably, we found some instances where gender differences, previously ascertained to be non-significant in bivariate analyses, showed up as being significant: men turned out to be somewhat more resistant to multicultural society and to oppose civil rights for legal migrants.

The answer to the fourth question on the contextual determinants is that only four of the effects of country characteristics turn out to be significant. The four significant effects are all in the expected direction.

- The higher the level of unemployment in a country (in the year before the survey data were collected), the stronger the resistance to multicultural society and the stronger the support for repatriation policies.
- In countries where the proportion of non-Western non-nationals is higher and where the GDP per capita is lower, resistance to multicultural society is stronger.
2 Majorities’ attitudes towards minorities in European Union Member States

Based on our conceptual analysis of exclusionist stances (see Report 1), we have distinguished five dimensions of majorities’ attitudes that have been shown to be cross-nationally and longitudinally comparable (see Technical Appendix 3 to this report). These five dimensions consist of eleven items. Other items turned out to be cross-nationally incomparable. Therefore, we have decided not to include these particular items in the reports. We have used the cross-nationally comparable items to calculate index scores for Europeans living in member states on the distinguished five dimensions of ethnic exclusionism for comparative purposes.

Next to the grand means of the index scores we present percentages of Europeans living in member states who favour a particular stance. Appendix 6 contains the numeric information as well as the calculation procedures. A comparison of these scores in EU member states tells us that there are considerable differences between these dimensions.

Five ‘dimensions’ of ethnic exclusionism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overview 1: grand mean scores on dimensions of majority population's attitudes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance to multicultural society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits to multicultural society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insistence on conformity to law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overview 1 shows that a vast majority of Europeans living in member states (67%) strongly insist on conformity to law (EU mean=.78) and a similar majority (60%) takes the view that the limits of multicultural society have been reached (grand mean=.70). There is somewhat less opposition to the granting of civil rights to legal migrants (39%) and less resistance to multicultural society (25%). We find the lowest mean score for the scale that measures a view that favours the repatriation of legal migrants, implying that 22% of Europeans living in member states favour these (rather drastic) policies.
2.1 Comparisons between Member States: descriptive analyses

Let us now take a look at the differences between member states. This relates to our first general question introduced in Report 1:

We have performed analyses of variance to calculate these differences between the means of the countries. These differences generally reach significance levels, which is, given the number of respondents, no surprise at all. We have depicted these differences in graphs for visual purposes. Appendix 6 contains more specific numeric information. Member states have been ordered geographically, from north to south.

2.1.1 Resistance to multicultural society

Let us take a look at the cross-national differences regarding resistance to multicultural society which are presented in Figure 1. This view implies that people oppose cultural, ethnic and religious diversity as an enrichment for society as a whole.

Figure 1: mean scores resistance to multicultural society

This figure shows that some countries are above the EU mean: Greece, Germany (East and West), Belgium and Austria. Italy has the same mean score the EU has. All other countries

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1 For country codes see appendix 1.
(Nordic and some Mediterranean countries alike) are quite below this grand mean. Ireland and Northern Ireland have the lowest means of the EU member states.

### 2.1.2 Limits to multicultural society

Many more Europeans living in member states feel that there are limits to multicultural society than expressed by the grand mean: a vast majority feels that their country has reached the limits of cultural or ethnic diversity. Let us take a look at the differences across countries.

#### Figure 2: mean scores on limits to multicultural society

We find a number of countries in which people feel that there are limits to multicultural society: Greece is (again) on top, followed by Germany (East and West), Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Great Britain, Austria, France and Portugal. Well below the EU mean are Northern Ireland, Spain, Italy and the Nordic countries like Denmark, Sweden and Finland.

### 2.1.3 Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants

Opposition to civil rights for legally administered residents is less widespread in the EU. Some people oppose the granting of civil rights to legal immigrants similar to those other legal residents have. For country differences see Figure 3.
This figure reveals that this kind of opposition is rather strong in Belgium, followed by Germany (East and West), Great Britain and Austria, whereas Denmark, Finland and France are just above the EU mean. Well below the EU mean are the Mediterranean countries like Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, but also Ireland and Northern Ireland.

2.1.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants

One step further than opposing civil rights for legal migrants is to favour policies to repatriate these legal migrants, particularly when these migrants are unemployed. Figure 4 presents the mean scores on these policies.

We find (again) that about half of the Greeks strongly favour this kind of policy, followed by people from Portugal, Austria, Germany (East and West), Ireland, Italy, Spain and France. The Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden and Denmark) are much less in favour of such policies than the people living in Northern Ireland and the Netherlands.
2.1.5 **Insistence on conformity of migrants to law**

Let us take a look at the stance that so many Europeans living in member states appear to agree upon: insistence on migrants’ conformity to law and conventions.
This figure shows us that particularly people living in the Nordic countries insist on conformity to law: people from Denmark, Sweden and Finland, followed by people in Western Europe like from the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany (East and West). Well below the grand EU mean are people living in some of the Mediterranean countries such as Portugal, Italy and Greece, but also people living in Ireland and Northern Ireland.
2.2 Comparisons between social categories: descriptive analyses

After this (bivariate) description of country differences, we will proceed with analyses of the differences between social categories regarding the majority’s attitudes to minorities and migrants. We follow these procedures to answer our second general question:

4) Which particular social categories of the general public support these different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism?

Again, we have performed analyses of variance to calculate the differences between these categories. Many differences between social categories have proven to reach significance, except for gender. Since we have found no statistically significant differences at all between men and women, we will not include this characteristic in the visual results.

2.2.1 Resistance to multicultural society

Let us take a look at resistance to multicultural society (EU mean=.37). We will start with a closer look at the differences between educational categories, i.e. the age at which respondents have stopped their educational career.

Figure 6 tells us that people who have stopped their educational career before or at the age of 18 resist multicultural society rather strongly whereas those who stopped their education after the age of 18 show far less resistance to multicultural society. This finding is in accordance with our hypothesis.2

2 Hypothesis 1: Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic ‘outgroups’, more particularly among: a) people with a low level of education.
Figure 6: resistance to multicultural society by education

![Bar chart showing resistance to multicultural society by education.](image)

Figure 7: resistance to multicultural society by occupation

![Bar chart showing resistance to multicultural society by occupation.](image)

This figure shows us that particularly the self-employed resist multicultural society, but also the people who work in their own household and the retired. In support of our hypothesis
we find that unskilled and skilled manual workers and, in support of hypothesis 1c, unemployed people favour this view more than average, whereas white collar workers (higher and lower professionals and routine non-manual workers) dissociate themselves from this view.

3 Hypothesis 1: Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic ‘outgroups’, more particularly among: c) unemployed people.
Figure 8: resistance to multicultural society by income

Here we only find very minor differences between income brackets. However, we find, in accordance with our hypothesis 1d, that the people in the lowest income quartile show more resistance.

Figure 9: resistance to multicultural society by age

4 Hypothesis 1: Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic ‘outgroups’, more particularly among: d) people with a low income.
We find a more or less monotonic relationship between age and resistance to multicultural society: the older people are, the more resistance they show. There is, however, one exception to this finding: people in their thirties show somewhat more resistance than people in their forties.
Figure 10: resistance to multicultural society by degree of urbanisation

This figure shows that people living in rural areas harbour more resistance than people living in large towns which actually refutes our hypothesis where we proposed that it would be the other way around. We will get back to this finding.

Figure 11: resistance to multicultural society by political self placement

\[5\] Hypothesis 1: Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic ‘outgroups’, more particularly among: c) people living in urban areas.
Figure 11 shows us that people who consider themselves to be on the moderate or far right wing harbour more resistance to multicultural society than people who place themselves on the far left of the political spectrum. People who consider themselves to be politically in the centre are actually in the middle, that is on the mean. People who refuse to place themselves politically hold similar views to those who consider themselves to be on the moderate right of the spectrum.

### 2.2.2 Limits to multicultural society

Let us take a look at the social categories that hold the view that the limits to multicultural society have been reached, a view that is supported by a majority of the general European population living in member states (EU mean=.70).

We find a similar pattern to the one found for resistance to multicultural society. People who have stopped their education at or of before the age of 18 take the view that multicultural society has reached its limits more than people who prolonged their educational career after the age of 18, who are less supportive of this view.

**Figure 12: limits to multicultural society by education**
We find that people who work in their household and the retired people strongly feel that multicultural society has reached its limits, followed by manual workers and self-employed people. Unemployed people are just above the grand mean. Professionals (lower and higher) and people performing routine non-manual work disassociate themselves from this view. This pattern is also quite similar to the pattern we found regarding resistance to multicultural society.

Once again, there are very minor differences between income categories. All income categories support this view more than the highest quartile income category.
Figure 15: limits to multicultural society by age

Here we once again encounter a monotonic relationship between age categories and the view that multicultural society has reached its limits. People under 50 are below the grand mean whereas people over 50 years of age are considerably above the grand mean.

Figure 16: limits to multicultural society by urbanisation

Once more, there are very minor differences between categories of urbanisation. People living in rural areas subscribe more to this view than people in large towns.
Except for the people who consider themselves to belong to the (far or moderate) left, all others generally subscribe more than average to the view that multicultural society has reached its limits, including the people who refuse to scale themselves politically and the people who do not know where they stand politically.

### 2.2.3 Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants

Now, let us turn to the opposition to civil rights for legal migrants comparable to the civil rights that national citizens (already) have. Previously, we reported that a vast minority of the general European public living in member states wished to deny such civil rights to legal migrants (EU mean=.41).
This diagram differs somewhat from the ones we have already described. Only among people who prolonged their educational career after the age of 22 and among those still studying do we find less opposition to granting these civil rights whereas all other educational categories are more opposed than the average. The score of people who finished their education between 19 and 21 is very similar to the grand mean.

We find that skilled and unskilled manual workers oppose civil rights for legal migrants more than in general which also holds true for people who depend on social security like unemployed and retired people. Professionals (both higher and lower) as well as students appear to disassociate themselves from this view.
We find hardly any differences between income brackets. The people in the lowest income quartile oppose the granting of civil rights to legal migrants a little more than the others.
Again, we find a monotonic relationship between age and this aspect of the majority’s attitudes: the older people are, the more they oppose the granting of civil rights to legal migrants. Only among people in their teens and twenties, do we find somewhat less opposition.

We have already ascertained minor differences between rural and urban areas regarding some attitudes to migrants and this finding turns out to be repeated. People living in rural villages are somewhat more opposed to civil rights for legal migrants than others.
People who consider themselves to be on the (moderate or far) right wing of the political spectrum oppose civil rights for legal migrants rather strongly, more than people on the left wing. The scores of people who consider themselves to be in the centre of the political spectrum are similar to the grand mean which also holds for people who refuse to take a stand or who do not know their political standpoint.

### 2.2.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants

Now, we turn to a rather drastic policy measure that was subscribed to by a minority of the European public living in member states: the repatriation of legal migrants (EU mean=.35).

Again, we find that those people who finished their educational career at or before the age of 18 are somewhat more in favour of repatriation policies, whereas people who enjoyed their education after this age support this view less.
A quite similar pattern is revealed when we look at differences between occupational categories. Again, we find that skilled and unskilled manual workers but also the self-employed people favour repatriation policies as well as people working in their household and people dependent on social security. Professionals (lower and higher) and routine non-manuals disapprove of such policies.
Again, we find minor differences between income brackets. People in the lowest quartile favour repatriation policies somewhat more than people in other income brackets.

People in their fifties, sixties and seventies favour repatriation policies more than younger age categories.
People living in rural areas support repatriation policies more than people living in larger towns and cities.

People placing themselves on the left wing of the political spectrum are less in favour of repatriation policies than all the other political categories.
2.2.5 **Insistence on conformity of migrants to law**

Let us turn to the stance on which so many Europeans living in member states turn out to agree: a vast majority supports the view that minorities should conform to the host society they live in, in order to become fully accepted (EU mean=.78).

**Figure 30: insistence on conformity to law by education**

Now, we find a pattern that deviates somewhat from the previous patterns where exclusionist stances were related to educational level. We find exceptionally minor differences between these educational categories. People who continued their education after the age of 22 are a bit more supportive of conformity to law than other categories.
Again, we find a dissimilar pattern to the ones we previously described for occupation. Although there are merely minor differences, we find that professionals who turned out to disassociate themselves from exclusionist stances are more in favour of conformity to law than self-employed people and people working in their household whom we often found to support exclusionist views.

Although it is very difficult to ascertain differences between income brackets at all, we find that the highest quartile insists somewhat more on conformity to law than the other brackets.
Figure 33: insistence on conformity to law by age

This pattern resembles the pattern we described above: the older one is, the more one insists on conformity to law.

Figure 34: insistence on conformity to law by urbanisation

People living in large towns turn out to insist somewhat less on conformity to law than people living in other areas.
Again, we find a pattern that is dissimilar to the patterns we previously described for exclusionist stances. Only people who place themselves on the far left insist less on conformity to law than those in all the other political categories. People who refused to place themselves have similar positions to the people on the far left wing.
2.3 Comparisons between member states and social categories: multivariate multilevel analyses

After this description of bivariate relationships between social categories answering our second general question, we set out to answer our third general question:

4) Which social characteristics are spuriously related to (different dimensions of) ethnic exclusionism?

Answers to these questions reveal which of the social characteristics have spurious relationships with (different dimensions of) ethnic exclusionism after controlling for each of the other social characteristics. Answers to these type of questions are useful to disentangle the direct effects on ethnic exclusionism of strongly associated characteristics like e.g. education, occupation and income that in previous paragraphs have all been shown to be related to variations in ethnic exclusionism. Simultaneously, we take the national context in which all of these people live into account, thereby answering our fourth and final general question:

4) To what extent do particular national characteristics affect (dimensions of) ethnic exclusionism?

For these purposes, we have executed multivariate multilevel analyses on each of the dimensions of ethnic exclusionism.

2.3.1 Resistance to multicultural society

Let us start answering our third and fourth questions regarding the resistance to multicultural society. We started testing four respective models.

| Table 1a: Different multi-level models on resistance to multicultural society in 15 European countries (*=significant improvement of model fit) |
| Models | -2*loglikelihood | ∆-2*loglikelihood | ∆df |
| 0 | Intercept (Individual-level variation) | 16529.2 |  |  |  |  |
| 1 | + random variation at country level | 15527.1 | 1002.1* | 1 |  |
| 2 | +individual characteristics | 15024.5 | 502.6* | 15 |  |
| 3 | +country characteristics | 15008.3 | 16.2* | 5 |  |
A comparison between Model 0 and Model 1 in this Table shows us that the variation between EU member states is strongly significant. Moreover, we can expect to find significant differences between social categories, as implied by a comparison between Model 1 and Model 2. Moreover, adding country characteristics to these previous models seems to have (significant) additional explanatory power.
### Table 1b: Parameter estimates from multi-level models on resistance to multicultural society in 15 European countries; standard errors in brackets (N=15096)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>0.36 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.33 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Individual characteristics</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower professionals</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine non-manuals</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed people</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manuals</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled manuals</td>
<td>0.07 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.02)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed people</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retired people</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>7.50 (0.00)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: male (female = ref.)</td>
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<td>0.02 (0.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urbanisation (rural area or village = ref.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small or middle sized town</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Large sized town</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment: 2002</td>
<td>0.11 (0.05)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP: 2002</td>
<td>-0.95 (0.36)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Western non-nationals: % in 2000</td>
<td>0.26 (0.11)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigration non-EU nationals: 1995-9</td>
<td>-0.16 (1.22)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asylum applications: 2001-2</td>
<td>-0.41 (1.59)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Variance components</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Percentage explained)</td>
<td>(3.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage explained)</td>
<td>(2.03)</td>
<td>(61.16)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.05.*

The parameters presented under Model 2 in Table 1b tell us that the effect of education, controlled for all other individual characteristics, is negative: the longer people enjoy education, the less resistance to multicultural society they harbour. Regarding occupational categories, we find strong differences. As compared to the reference category (higher
professionals), it turns out that unskilled manual labourers, skilled labourers and self-employed people have more resistance to multicultural society and this also holds true for housewives and people dependent on social security. Lower professionals, people performing routine non-manual work and students do not differ significantly from higher professionals in this respect. Next, we ascertained that the higher someone’s income, the less resistance to multicultural society they have. We find a slight positive effect for age: the older people are, the more strongly they resist multicultural society. Contrary to our bivariate analyses, we now find a difference between the sexes: males have more resistance than females. We also find that resistance to multicultural society is more strongly prevalent in the countryside as the parameter estimates for medium and large sized towns differ significantly from the reference category, i.e. rural villages.

The lower part of the Table shows the explained variance of Model 2. The explanatory power of the individual characteristics is very limited. Together, they explain only 3 percent of the differences between individuals within countries. Due to composition effects, the individual characteristics explain 2 percent of the variance between countries. This implies that to a small extent, the observed differences between countries in the mean level of resistance to multicultural society can be attributed to differences in population composition.

Even more interesting are the additional effects of country characteristics, presented in the column under Model 3. We find a significant effect for the level of unemployment rate in 2002, the year before these data were collected: the higher the unemployment rate in the country, the more widespread resistance to multicultural society is in countries, which explains (at least some) country differences. We also find that the effect of the GDP is negative: the higher the country’s GDP, the lower resistance to multicultural society is. The effect of the presence of non-Western non-nationals is positive: the more of them live in the country, the higher resistance to multicultural society is. The effects of the other country characteristics do not reach significance. These country characteristics account for 61 percent of the differences between countries.
2.3.2 Limits to multicultural society

Now, we will focus on the view that limits to multicultural society have been reached. Let us have a look at the tables.

Table 2a: Different multi-level models on limits to multicultural society in 15 European countries (*=significant improvement of model fit)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>-2*loglikelihood</th>
<th>Δ-2*loglikelihood</th>
<th>Δdf</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 Intercept (Individual-level variation)</td>
<td>15163.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 + random variation at country level</td>
<td>13270.3</td>
<td>1893.3*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 + individual characteristics</td>
<td>12491.0</td>
<td>779.3*</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 + country characteristics</td>
<td>12487.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The comparison between Model 1 and Model 0, allows us to deduce that the differences between countries are quite strong which also holds for differences between individuals, i.e. the comparison between Models 1 and 2. However, adding country characteristics to the equations appears to be futile. Let us look more specifically at the parameter estimates in Table 2b.

Again, we find that the longer people were educated, the less they support the view that the limits to multicultural society have been reached. We find that some occupational categories differ significantly from the higher professionals like (unskilled and skilled) manual workers, self-employed people, but also housewives, the unemployed and retired people. People performing routine non-manual work also differ significantly from the higher professionals in supporting this view. The effects of income and gender do not reach significance. Age, again, has a slight positive effect. People living in large towns turn out to support this view significantly less than people in rural villages. However, we find that none of the country characteristics add to the explanation for holding this view: although most of these determinants, except for the unemployment rate, point in the direction that we expected, none of them reaches significance.
Table 2b: Parameter estimates from multi-level models on limits to multicultural society in 15 European countries; standard errors in brackets (N=15096)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.70 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.65 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.65 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.95 (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.95 (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.95 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation: (higher professionals=ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower professionals</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine non-manuals</td>
<td>0.06 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed people</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manuals</td>
<td>0.09 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled manuals</td>
<td>0.09 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>0.07 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed people</td>
<td>0.09 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired people</td>
<td>0.08 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.90 (0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: male (female=ref.)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanisation (rural area or village=ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small or middle sized town</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large sized town</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment: 2002</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP: 2002</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western non-nationals: % in 2000</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration non-EU nationals: 1995-9</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum applications: 2001-2</td>
<td>0.01 (0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance components</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage explained)</td>
<td>(4.81)</td>
<td>(4.81)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage explained)</td>
<td>(9.08)</td>
<td>(26.82)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.05.*
2.3.3 Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants

Previously, we ascertained that a minority of people living in EU member states oppose the granting of civil rights to legal migrants. Let us have a look at the significant differences between countries and categories of people.

Table 3a: Different multi-level models on opposition to civil rights in 15 European countries (*=significant improvement of model fit)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>-2*loglikelihood</th>
<th>Δ-2*loglikelihood</th>
<th>Δdf</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 Intercept (Individual level variation)</td>
<td>13441.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 + random variation at country level</td>
<td>12834.7</td>
<td>606.9*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 + individual characteristics</td>
<td>12457.0</td>
<td>377.7*</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 + country characteristics</td>
<td>12449.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3a tells us that we can expect major differences between countries as well as between social categories of people, but, again, we only see marginal additional explanatory power resulting from including country characteristics.

In Table 3b we ascertain similar effects and differences between categories as described in previous paragraphs. The longer people have been exposed to the educational system, the less they oppose civil rights for legal migrants. Many occupational categories are more strongly opposed to civil rights than higher professionals, except for lower professionals and students. Regarding this aspect of exclusionism, we find no significant effects for income (again) and age. Males appear to oppose more strongly than females and this kind of opposition is far more widespread in the countryside than it is in medium or large sized towns. However, we actually find that none of the country characteristics contribute significantly to the explanation of the variation in opposition to granting civil rights. All of the effects of the characteristics we proposed are in the direction we had expected. As yet, since these contributions do not reach significance, we refrain from attaching too much scientific value to the latter findings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>0.40 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.38 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.38 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.85^2 (0.14^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower professionals</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine non-manuals</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed people</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manuals</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled manuals</td>
<td>0.08 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed people</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired people</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>6.60^4 (0.00)</td>
<td>6.60^4 (0.00)</td>
<td>6.60^4 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: male (female = ref.)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanisation: (rural area or village = ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small or middle sized town</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large sized town</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment: 2002</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP: 2002</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western non-nationals: % in 2000</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration non-EU nationals: 1995-9</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum applications: 2001-2</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance components</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage explained)</td>
<td>(2.34)</td>
<td>(2.34)</td>
<td>(2.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage explained)</td>
<td>(22.67)</td>
<td>(22.67)</td>
<td>(22.67)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.05, Italic parameters indicate significance at p < 0.10.*
2.3.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants

Let us turn to the (harsh) policies of sending back legal migrants, i.e. policies that turned out to be favoured by a minority of the people living in EU member states.

Table 4a: Different multi-level models of in favour of repatriation policies in 15 European countries (*=significant improvement of model fit)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>$-2\log\text{likelihood}$</th>
<th>$\Delta-2\log\text{likelihood}$</th>
<th>$\Delta df$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 Intercept (Individual-level variation)</td>
<td>15408.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 + random variation at country level</td>
<td>14325.4</td>
<td>1083.5*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 + individual characteristics</td>
<td>13803.2</td>
<td>522.2*</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 + country characteristics</td>
<td>13799.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 4a the same picture emerges: large differences between countries and between categories of people, but only marginal additional explanatory power for the country characteristics.

In Table 4b we ascertain somewhat less significant effects than in previous comparable tables. Again, we find a negative effect for education, in this Table for support for repatriation policies. Once again, we ascertain that (skilled and unskilled) manual labourers and housewives differ from the higher professionals. Yet, the differences between self-employed people and unemployed people, on the one hand, and higher professionals on the other, barely reach significance in this case. The other individual characteristics do not reach significance either. Inclusion of these individual characteristics shows that differences between countries are partly due to differences in the composition of the samples, as can be derived from the percentage of explained variance in Model 2.

When we turn to the effects of the national characteristics, we find an unemployment effect: the higher the unemployment was in the year before data collection, the higher the support for repatriation policies. This finding may at least partially explain the relatively high levels of support for this type of policy in the Mediterranean countries as well as in Eastern Germany. The other characteristics are not significantly related to a favourable stance on repatriation policies.
Table 4b: Parameter estimates from multi-level models on in favour of repatriation policies in 15 European countries; standard errors in brackets (N=15096)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>0.35 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.33 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower professionals</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine non-manuals</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed people</td>
<td>0.04 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manuals</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled manuals</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>0.04 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed people</td>
<td>0.04 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired people</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: male (female = ref.)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanisation: (rural area or village = ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small or middle sized town</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large sized town</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment: 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.81 (0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP: 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western non-nationals: % in 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration non-EU nationals: 1995-9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum applications: 2001-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance components</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage explained)</td>
<td>(3.18)</td>
<td>(3.18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage explained)</td>
<td>(35.60)</td>
<td>(46.92)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.05, Italic parameters indicate significance at p < 0.10.*
2.3.5 Insistence on conformity of migrants to law

Finally, let us turn to the insistence on conformity to law, a view that is apparently supported by a strong majority of the people living in EU member states.

Table 5a: Different multi-level models on insistence on conformity to law in 15 European countries (*=significant improvement of model fit)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>-2*loglikelihood</th>
<th>∆-2*loglikelihood</th>
<th>∆df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 Intercept (Individual-level variation)</td>
<td>10801.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 + random variation at country level</td>
<td>9398.5</td>
<td>1403.4*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 + individual characteristics</td>
<td>9269.8</td>
<td>128.7*</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 + country characteristics</td>
<td>9268.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5a Model 3, once again informs us not to expect major effects of country characteristics although differences between countries are highly significant which also holds for differences between social categories.

In Table 5b, we ascertain the reoccurring effect of education, yet, this effect is much smaller than in previous analyses. However, looking at the occupational categories, quite a different picture emerges. None of the occupational categories differ from the higher professionals, except for students, which implies actually that all of these categories essentially agree on the insistence on conformity of migrants to law. Moreover, we find a slight positive effect of income: the higher one’s income, the more one insists on conformity to law. We also find a positive effect for age, which we have found previously. As yet, none of the effects related to country characteristics turn out to reach significance. Yet, we would once again like to mention that all of the effects are in the direction we proposed.
### Table 5b: Parameter estimates from multi-level models on insistence on conformity to law in 15 European countries; standard errors in brackets (N=15096)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.77 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.79 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.79 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.70⁻³ (0.00)</td>
<td>-2.70⁻³ (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower professionals</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine non-manuals</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed people</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manuals</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled manuals</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed people</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired people</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.30⁻³ (0.00)</td>
<td>1.30⁻³ (0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: male (female = ref.)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanisation: (rural area or village = ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small or middle sized town</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large sized town</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment: 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP: 2002</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western non-nationals: % in 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration non-EU nationals: 1995-9</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum applications: 2001-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance components</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage explained)</td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage explained)</td>
<td>(1.09)</td>
<td>(6.84)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.05.*

More in general, when we look at the explained variance of the various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, we have to emphasise that the effects of individual characteristics and consequently the percentage of explained variance at the individual level are rather modest, varying between .83 and 4.81%. Differences between countries due to different compositions also do not explain much of the variation in ethnic exclusionism, except for
the support for repatriation policies. Although many of the country characteristics do not reach significance, the amount of explained variance at the contextual level is less modest. When it comes to the significance of effects, we find that unemployment in the year before the data were collected affects the level of ethnic exclusionism, i.e. on resistance to multicultural society and support for repatriation policies, in EU countries. The presence of non-Western nationals appears to increase resistance to multicultural society. The effects of the GDP are rather consistently negative, but do not reach significance in any instance of ethnic exclusionism.

2.3.6 Evaluation of hypotheses

After this description of the results of the multilevel analyses, we turn to the evaluation of hypotheses we previously derived from theories on ethnic exclusionism. Regarding individual conditions, we proposed to test hypotheses on the social position of members of majorities: those social categories who hold similar positions to those of ethnic outgroups were considered to support ethnic exclusionism more strongly than people in more privileged social positions. First, we actually found that people who had finished their educational career young generally support many stances related to ethnic exclusionism. This supports Hypothesis 1a on higher levels of ethnic exclusionism among people with a low level of education. Secondly, we ascertained that people performing (skilled or unskilled) manual labour rather strongly favoured exclusionist stances, which supports Hypothesis 1b on higher levels of ethnic exclusionism among manual workers. The same pattern also held for Hypothesis 1c on the unemployed. We had not formulated hypotheses on the position of the self-employed who we quite consistently found to support dimensions of ethnic exclusionism which also hold for housewives. In relation to hypothesis 1d we found merely rather weak effects of the actual level of income. The results show that these effects become spurious after including education and occupation, that is, someone’s resources and positions on or close to the labour market. These results generally corroborate hypotheses on individual characteristics derived from Ethnic Competition Theory, pertaining to the level of ethnic exclusionism in the less privileged social strata. There is, however, one exception regarding the insistence on conformity to law: we only found non-significant differences between occupational categories, but as yet a significant positive effect of income, implying that people with high incomes insist more strongly on this type of conformity for migrants. Hypothesis 1e regarding support for ethnic exclusionism among people living in urban areas was refuted altogether: instead we found that people living in the countryside support various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism more than people living
in cities do. These findings imply that living close to minorities or even having (opportunities for) contacts with minorities, may reduce ethnic exclusionism.

Regarding contextual conditions, we proposed to test hypotheses on the economic and demographic situation of the countries involved. We found some support for the effects of the presence of non-Western non-nationals in just one of the five dimensions: it can be suggested that the more non-western non-nationals living in a country, the more resistance to multicultural society. This partially supports Hypothesis 3a. Other instances of ethnic exclusionism were also positively affected by the presence of non-Western nationals, however, these effects did not reach significance. We also found some support for Hypothesis 3d on unemployment: the higher the level of unemployment in the year 2002, i.e. before data collection, the more widespread resistance to multicultural society and the more widespread support for repatriation policies was. The effects of the GDP, referred to in Hypothesis 4b, appeared to be consistently negative but reached significance only with respect to resistance to multicultural society. Although we found that the effects proposed in the other hypotheses were quite often in the direction we had postulated, they did not turn out to reach significance levels. As far as there are significant effects for country characteristics, they indicate that ethnic exclusionism is stronger in countries with a higher level of ethnic competition which is in line with Ethnic Competition Theory. In particular, resistance to multicultural society is stronger in countries with a higher level of ethnic competition, as indicated by a relatively high level of unemployment, a relatively low GDP per capita and a relatively high proportion of non-Western non-nationals.

---

6 Hypothesis 3: Ethnic exclusionism will be stronger in countries where the actual level of ethnic competition is relatively high, more particularly in contextual conditions of: a) a relatively high proportion of resident migrants.

7 Hypothesis 3: Ethnic exclusionism will be stronger in countries where the actual level of ethnic competition is relatively high, more particularly in contextual conditions of: d) a high proportion of unemployment.

8 Hypothesis 4: Ethnic exclusionism will be high in contextual conditions where: b) the GDP is relatively low, so that economic prosperity cannot serve to soften or even reduce possible effects of actual levels of ethnic competition.
2.4 Comparisons over time within Member States: descriptive analyses

We have performed analyses of variance to calculate the mean scores for each country for each time period, i.e. each year of data collection. We will show these mean scores as deviations from the grand mean calculated for the Europeans living in member states as presented in Paragraph 1.1. We have also calculated whether the differences over time are significant. These tables are included in Appendix 7 to this report. If relevant, we will report on the significant developments in separate countries.

2.4.1 Resistance to multicultural society

Let us have a look at the resistance to multicultural society of which the general mean turned out to be .37 in 2003. Let us start with the countries with higher means than the general mean.

Figure 36: longitudinal changes per country

In Figure 36 we can ascertain that resistance to multicultural society has been growing (significantly) in Greece over the last 6 years which does not hold for Germany (East and West) and Austria where the general mean has not (significantly) changed over time. In Belgium, resistance to multicultural society has (significantly) decreased. In some countries well below the grand mean, we see that the mean scores have dropped (significantly) as in some Nordic countries (Sweden and Denmark). In some Mediterranean countries (Spain and Portugal) the scores have gone up (though non-significantly). In countries such as Great
Britain and the Netherlands, the overall increase in support is significant. Overall, resistance to multicultural society has remained rather stable as a result of a general increase between 1997 and 2000 and a general decrease between 2000 and 2003.

2.4.2 Limits to multicultural society

Let us have a look at the view that the limits to multicultural society have been reached which turned out to be widely shared by Europeans living in member states.

Figure 37: longitudinal changes per country

In many countries well above the grand mean of 2003, there have been minor yet significant fluctuations: Greece, Germany (East and West), the Netherlands and Great Britain appear to have had these high scores for some time already. In other countries, the view that multicultural society has reached its limits has become more widespread, as it has in Ireland and Northern Ireland, but also in some Mediterranean countries (Spain and Portugal). In some Nordic countries (Sweden and Denmark), this view has become significantly less widely held. Overall, the majority of Europeans living in member states who hold this view appears to be growing significantly.
2.4.3 Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants

Now let us turn to the opposition to civil rights for legal migrants.

Figure 38: Longitudinal changes per country

Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants is relatively widespread and rather stable over the period 1997-2003 in countries such as Belgium, Great Britain and Austria, but decreased somewhat in the Netherlands and Germany between 2000 and 2003. In other countries where this kind of opposition has been rather low, it has remained so as it has in Northern Ireland and Ireland. Significant increases have taken place in Finland, Spain and Greece. Significant decreases have been observed in Sweden and Denmark. Overall, this view has remained rather stable as a result of a general increase between 1997 and 2000 followed by a decrease between 2000 and 2003.

2.4.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants

Now let us turn to the policy measure that turned out to be the least favoured by Europeans living in member states: the repatriation of legal migrants.
Figure 39 shows us that the favourability of repatriation has grown significantly in many countries and has reached high levels in the Mediterranean countries, except for Italy where it has remained stable over time, and in countries in Western Europe, such as France and Austria, whereas it has remained stable over time in Germany. This view has also become significantly more popular in the Netherlands, Great Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland. In the Nordic countries, this view was adhered to by a rather small minority that has remained quite stable over time, except for Denmark. Overall, the minority of Europeans living in member states holding this view has grown significantly over time.

2.4.5 Insistence on conformity of migrants to law

Let us finally have a look at the view that is widely subscribed to by Europeans living in member states: the insistence on conformity to law of migrants. We would like to emphasise that there is a minor deviation between the results reported here compared to the results presented in Paragraph 1.1.5 which is due to the absence of measurement (v6) on the insistent view that minorities should give up particular religious and cultural practices that was absent from the 1997 and 2000 data collections. Therefore, we only present findings on the item (v5) containing the view that minorities should give up their religion or culture which may be in conflict with the national law.
This rather popular view has become significantly more widespread in most European member states over the period 1997-2003, in countries in Western Europe (such as Belgium, Germany and Austria) except for the Netherlands where it had already become widespread in 1997 and has remained stable since then. In all other countries where this view was relatively unpopular in 1997, such as in the Mediterranean countries, but also in the United Kingdom and Ireland, it has become significantly more widespread over the past few years. Overall, the majority of Europeans living in member states supporting insistence on conformity to law has grown significantly.
1 We used multi-level analysis that allows simultaneous modelling of individual-level and country-level effects and their interactions (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). To model these effects we used the software programme MLwiN (Goldstein 1995). Multi-level modelling enables to ascertain which part of the variation in the individual dependent variable is explained by country-level effects, and which part of the variance by individual-level effects. As the structure of the data is such that individuals are nested within countries (individuals are level 1 and countries level 2 units in the analysis), neglecting the error terms at level 2 underestimates standard errors of the parameters. This in turn could lead to incorrect confirmation of hypotheses and hence to wrong answers to research questions.

2 We started testing models. Goodness-of-fit statistics (-2*loglikelihood) of the different models are presented in the top of the tables (1a, 2a, 3a, 4a and 5a). Improvements in model fit are indicated by the difference (with the Greek letter Δ) in the loglikelihood statistic, which follows a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters to be estimated. Significant improvements in model fit are denoted with an asterix (*). We began by estimating a model, including an intercept with only individual-level variation. Next we estimated a model that also incorporates country-level variation in the intercept (model 1). Then we included all independent individual characteristics (like education and income) in our model (model 2). Finally, we included country characteristics in the model (3). We centred all individual-level variables (except for the dummy variables) by the overall mean across all countries. The parameter estimates accompanying the dummy variables, i.e. the different social categories of occupation or urbanisation, have to be compared to the so-called reference category to ascertain if and in which direction a particular category, i.e. skilled manual workers, differs significantly from the reference category, i.e. higher professionals, with respect to a particular dimension of ethnic exclusionism (Hardy, 1993). By including the individual variables in the model we can determine to what extent compositional differences between countries explain country-level variation in ethnic exclusionism. To test the effects on country-level effects we subsequently entered contextual characteristics into the multilevel model.
Appendix 1. List of countries and abbreviations

In the report’s figures ISO 3166-1-Alpha-2 codes are used to present the various European countries (International Organisation for Standardisation, 2004). These codes are listed below in geographical order from North to South and from West to East. To these standard codes we added Northern Ireland (NIE), Germany West (DEW) and Germany East (DEE). Countries are geographically distinguished (N=Nordic countries, W=Western European countries, C=Central European countries, M=Mediterranean countries).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>FI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>NIE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>IE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>BE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>LU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (West)</td>
<td>DEW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (East)</td>
<td>DEE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>AT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>PT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>GR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2. Data collection

The standard Eurobarometer 59.2 was collected in May and June 2003, carried out by the European Opinion Research Group, on request of the European Commission, Directorate – General Press and Communication, Public Opinion Analysis Unit.

We used samples in 17 areas in 15 countries. The samples of Norway and Iceland were not taken into account in our analyses. Separate samples were drawn for Northern Ireland and for East and West Germany, hence we analysed these separately in our (multilevel) analyses. Each target sample was 1000 interviews, except for Northern Ireland (300) and Luxembourg (600). Regarding the sampling method the European Opinion Research Group (2003) provides the following information:

‘Standard Eurobarometer surveys cover the population of the respective nationalities of the European Union member states, aged 15 years and over, resident in each of the member states. The basic sample design applied in all member states is a multi-stage, random (probability) one. In each EU country, a number of sampling points are drawn with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) and to population density.

For doing so, points are drawn systematically from each of the ‘administrative regional units’, after stratification by individual unit and type of area. Hence, they represent the whole territory of member states according to EUROSTAT NUTS 2 (or equivalent) and according to the distribution of resident population of the respective EU nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each of the selected sampling points, a starting address is drawn at random. Further addresses are selected as every Nth address by standard random route procedures, from the initial address. In each household, a respondent is drawn at random. All interviews are face-to-face in the respondent's home and in the appropriate national language.’

The provided fieldwork control report from the Standard Eurobarometer shows that the response rate varies from a low 27% in Great Britain to a rather high 88% in France (see Table A2.2.1). Note that figures on Luxembourg are lacking.
### Table A2.2.1: Number of completed interviews and response rate by country: EB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total number of completed interviews</th>
<th>Response rate</th>
<th>EU population aged 15+ (x 1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>4,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>7,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>4,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>1012</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>46,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>1,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1004</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>2,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>12,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1051</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>8,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>not available</td>
<td>not available</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany – West</td>
<td>1014</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>55,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany – East</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>13,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1029</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>6,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>46,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>33,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>8,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1013</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>49,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>8,793</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.1 Weighting

For each Standard Eurobarometer survey, weights are constructed by the European Opinion Research Group, based on a comparison of the sample with population statistics from Eurostat. For each sample, a weighting procedure was carried out, using marginal and intercellular weighting, to adjust to distributions of gender, age and NUTS 2 region. From Eurobarometer 55 onwards, the weights to adjust to standard sample size of 1000 interviews (600 for Luxembourg and 300 for Northern Ireland) were dropped from the delivered weights with the Eurobarometer data set. Therefore, we constructed such a weight ourselves, using the variable w1 (wsample; weight result from target). In multilevel analyses, the individual level weight (w1) and country weight (to adjust all countries to the same standard sample size) are separated from each other into two different weights, though having the equal impact.
2.2 Selection of majority population

In the standard Eurobarometer, only respondents that had a nationality of one of the member states (in 2003) were interviewed. So, non-EU non-nationals were not taken into account (e.g. Turks with a Turkish nationality living in Germany were dropped from the sample). As the reports are intended to describe the majorities’ attitudes of each region or country, we decided to select only those respondents with the nationality of the respective country. In most samples less than 2% of the respondents had an EU-member nationality other than the country where the sample was drawn from. Only for Luxembourg a large number of respondents was dropped from the analyses, because of the chosen selection (24.2%). For Belgium the percentage of EU non-nationals was second highest with 5.4%.

2.3 Missing value treatment

We selected respondents based on their valid scores on the dependent variables. We first tested whether the items referring to ethnic exclusionism can be regarded as valid, reliable and cross-national comparable measurements. In these analyses, as extensively described in appendix 3, we only included respondents that answered all 11 items. Respondents with missing answers on one or more of the 11 items were excluded from these analyses. Having assessed that these 11 items indeed form a cross-national comparable measurement for various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, we treated respondents with missing answers as follows. In order to avoid severe reductions in the numbers of respondents, we performed a well-considered procedure previously used and published in scientific journals. From the 11 items on exclusionist stances, we took the criterion that at least 6 out of the 11 items should have been answered. This leads to an acceptable selection of approximately 96% of the respondents. It was only slightly less in Germany East, Austria and Ireland, and somewhat higher in Sweden, Luxembourg and Denmark.

Missing values of respondents, providing that they had answered more than half of the items, were replaced by missing value substitution based on regression estimation. As the items correlated positively with each other (as expected), we regressed an item on all ten other items referring to exclusionist stances. In this manner, a missing score of a respondent on a particular item referring to ethnic exclusionism was replaced by an estimate based on the answers that this respondent provided on the other items referring to ethnic exclusionism. Finally, substituted values were rounded into the valid values of the original item.
Table A2.2.2  Percentages of respondents with missing values on the measurement of the dependent variables, percentages of respondents with 5 missings or less (which were substituted) and percentage of respondents with no missing value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% respondents with 6 or more missing values (dropped from analyses)</th>
<th>% of respondents with 1 to 5 missing values</th>
<th>% respondents with no missing values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>57.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>57.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany – East</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>7.3</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>51.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>38.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>53.3</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4.2</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>45.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3. Measurements of ethnic exclusionism

The Eurobarometer surveys provide measurements of most of the phenomena described in Report 1. The questionnaire of 2003 contains a set of questions regarding attitudes toward migrants and minorities. However, not all of these items can be regarded as valid, reliable, and cross-national comparable indicators of exclusionist stances. In section 3.6 we explicate why some of these items were excluded from our analysis. We focused on a set of 11 items covering exclusionist stances. In Figures 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 we present which particular dimensions of ethnic exclusionism are theoretically expected to be measured by the items. This conceptualisation of items and dimensions builds on the conceptual analysis provided in Report 1.
Figure 2.3.1 Theoretical measurement model
‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’ and ‘limits to multicultural society’

1: It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures (reversed coding)

3: (COUNTRY)'s diversity in terms of race, religion or culture adds to its strengths (reversed coding)

5: In order to be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up such parts of their religion or culture which may be in conflict with (NATIONALITY) law

6: In order to be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up religious or cultural practices such as polygamy or female circumcision

8: There is a limit to how many people of other races, religions or cultures a society can accept

9: (OUR COUNTRY) has reached its limits; if there were to be more people belonging to these minority groups we would have problems
**Figure 2.3.2 Theoretical measurement model**

‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’

| v13: Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the same social rights as the (NATIONALITY) citizens |
| v14: Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the right to bring members of their immediate family in (OUR COUNTRY) |
| v18: Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be able to become naturalised easily |
| v16: Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be sent back to their country of origin if they are unemployed |
| v17: Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should all be sent back to their country of origin |

- **opposition to civil rights for legal migrants**
- **favour repatriation policies for legal migrants**
In this section, we test whether the items presented in figures 3.1 and 3.2 can indeed be applied as valid and reliable measurements across countries. We test this by means of structural equation modelling (Jöreskog, 1977; Jöreskog, 1993), applying the LISREL computer programme, as developed by Jöreskog and Sörbom (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993a, 1993b). The measurement sub model of a full structural equation model describes the causal links between the unobserved theoretical concepts or latent variables and the observed or manifest variables. Whether, and to what extent, the applied indicators indeed refer to the same theoretical concept (or dimension thereof) can be examined by means of the measurement model.

An important question in international comparative survey research is the degree of comparability of the measurement instrument: Is it possible to construct an international comparable measurement of exclusionist attitudes? If it can be demonstrated that theoretical concepts are measured in a quite comparable or equivalent manner in different countries, then we have a basis for valid cross-national comparisons. By means of multi-sample analysis, that is, the simultaneous analysis of independent random samples from several populations (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993a), it is possible to empirically test the equivalence of the measurement instrument in the different countries, and to assess whether, and to what extent, the measurement instruments operate in a similar fashion in these different national settings.

The causal relationships between latent and manifest variables are modelled in measurement equations, generally denoted as (cf. Bollen, 1989):

\[ x_q = \lambda_{q1}\xi_1 + \lambda_{q2}\xi_2 + ... + \delta_q \] (with \( q = 1, 2, \ldots \), the number of manifest variables \( x \)).

The entire set of measurement equations for all manifest variables written in matrix notation is:

\[ x = \Lambda_\xi + \delta \]

Consequently, the covariance matrix of observed variables (\( \Sigma \)) is defined as:

\[ \Sigma = \Lambda_\xi \Phi \Lambda_\xi' + \Theta_\delta \]
The terms in the measurement model are defined as follows:

Variables:
- $x$ is a $q \times 1$ vector of observed indicators of $\xi$
- $\xi$ is a $n \times 1$ vector of latent variables (common factors)
- $\delta$ is a $q \times 1$ vector of measurement errors (unique factors) of $x$

Coefficients:
- $\Lambda_x$ is a $q \times n$ matrix of coefficients (factor loadings) of the regression of $x$ on $\xi$

Covariance matrices:
- $\Phi$ is a $n \times n$ covariance matrix of $\xi$
- $\Theta_\delta$ is a $q \times q$ covariance matrix of $\delta$

The parameters in $\Lambda_x$ (lambda x), $\Phi$ (phi), and $\Theta_\delta$ (theta-delta) can either be fixed, constrained, or freed. That is, parameters can either be given specified values (i.e. fixed), or parameters can be constrained to be equal to one or more other unknown parameters. Free parameters are neither fixed nor constrained. The scale indeterminacy of the latent variables is eliminated by giving the latent variable the scale of one of the observed variables (i.e. fixing a factor loading to one).

To take into account the dichotomous scale scores of the measurement items, we analysed the matrix of polychoric correlations with the Generally Weighted Least Squares method with a Correct Weight matrix (Jöreskog, 1990). In this approach, for each variable $x$, it is assumed that there is an underlying continuous variable $x^*$ that is standard normally distributed. The polychoric correlations are the theoretical correlations of the underlying $x^*$-variables (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993b).

The fit of the measurement model is assessed by means of the Chi-square statistic. This statistic can be used for a goodness-of-fit test of the model against the alternative model that the covariance matrix of the observed variables is unconstrained. However, such a test is only justified if all the model assumptions are satisfied, if the sample size is sufficiently large, and if the model holds exactly in the population. Consequently, Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993a, p. 122) suggested that in practice it is more useful to regard the Chi-square statistic as a measure of fit rather than as a formal test statistic. In this view, the Chi-square statistic is a measure of the overall ‘badness-of-fit’ of the model to the data; the larger the Chi-square value, the worse the fit of the model.

Based on the aforementioned notions, we therefore preferred not to search for a measurement model with a ‘perfect’ fit (i.e. a non-significant Chi-square value), but instead to start with a model without correlated error terms, and to examine whether such a model has an acceptable model fit, as indicated by several fit indexes. In addition to the Chi-
square statistic, we assessed the fit of the measurement model applying other goodness-of-fit measures such as GFI and RMSEA.\(^1\)

As stated in the previous section, we started the search for an internationally comparable measurement instrument of ethnic exclusionism with an original pool of items. Each item is assumed to indicate one and only one theoretical variable. To select the best cross-nationally equivalent indicators for nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism we applied the following procedures and criteria. Step-by-step, we excluded indicators that were less suitable, as judged by the goodness-of-fit of the LISREL model and a detailed examination of the parameter estimates. That is, we subsequently removed items that were hardly affected by the latent variable, as shown by a low explained item-variance \((R^2 < .20\) on average in the samples), indicating that this item cannot be regarded as a reliable indicator for the proposed (dimension of the) theoretical concept. However, before excluding such an item from further analyses, we checked whether the specific item should not in fact have been regarded as an indicator of a different (dimension of a) theoretical concept than the one we initially presumed. If this was the case, this is indicated by a considerable high modification index for a zero-element of the matrix of factor loadings, indicating that freeing and estimating this factor loading (i.e. allowing a relationship between the item and a different concept than the one originally proposed) will improve the fit of the model considerably. The modification indices for factor loading parameters were also examined in order to check whether items – on average in the different samples – referred to more than one latent variable, indicating that the specific item cannot be applied to discriminate between the different theoretical concepts (or dimensions thereof). In this manner, we selected a set of indicators that – on average in all the samples – can be regarded as valid, reliable, and one-dimensional indicators.

Firstly, we assumed that the form of the measurement model is the same in the different countries.\(^2\) That is, the parameter matrices \((\Lambda_x, \Phi, \Theta_\delta)\) of the measurement models in the different countries have the same dimensions (in other words, each model has the same numbers of observed and latent variables) and the same pattern of fixed and freed elements. Consequently, in this model, an observed variable is regarded as an indicator of the same theoretical construct in the different countries. Each observed variable is strictly one-dimensional, referring to only one theoretical variable. Furthermore, following the theoretical expectations, the theoretical variables are allowed to covariate: the model therefore gives an oblique solution. In addition, the measurement errors of the observed variables are assumed not to be correlated with each other. With respect to comparability across different countries, the model only assumes comparability in model form, and not in parameter values: all non-fixed parameters are allowed to vary across countries. If we found problems for countries with respect to relatively bad fit, we decided to add country specific
error variance correlations or double loadings. For the double loadings we used the criterion that it should be at least .20 smaller than the loadings of the other indicators on the same phenomenon.

The second model assumes not only an invariant model form, but also invariant relationships between indicators and theoretical variables, in other words, invariant factor loadings across countries. In this model, there are no cross-national differences with respect to the (relative) degree in which indicators refer to a theoretical variable. If this model is acceptable, it seems more likely that the same latent variables are tapped in the different countries (Williams & Thomson, 1986).

We have to remark that the item-categories which are dichotomous (having only two categories: agree or not agree) creates some limits to statistical research. Though asymmetric measures are used which account thereof, minimal variation in answering patterns puts limits on distinguishing clearly between items and consequently, between theoretical phenomena. It was this lack of variation, which we believe is due to bad fit of LISREL analyses when testing models on all items (of the two different sets) simultaneously. Similarly to previous reports on measurement instruments based upon these sets of indicators (SORA 2000), we decided to test on distinction of factors within subsets of indicators. Hence, we tested the theoretically expected models as provided in figures 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
3.1 Invariance in measurement models in EU member states 2003 regarding measurements of ‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’, and ‘limits to multicultural society’

Initially, we included an additional item (v4) to indicate the ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’. The item formulation read: “In order to be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up their own culture”. However, in our analysis it turned out that this item not only referred to the dimension of ‘insistence on conformity’, but the item also loaded on other dimensions. Therefore the item could not be regarded as a valid one-dimensional indicator of ‘insistence on conformity’. When we dropped this item from the analyses we found a satisfactory RMSEA statistic of .032. Some Heywood cases forced us to fix the error variances of v1, v5 and v9 to .05, after which the RMSEA hardly changed (.031).4

To test equivalence of the model across all countries, the multi-sample procedure has been followed. Tests provided satisfactory results, implying that in all member states of the EU, similar phenomena are measured with the six items: the presented model form in figure 2.3.1 is equivalent across countries.5 Similarly, the statistics for invariance on factor loadings met the expectations. Nevertheless, we inspected deviations for specific countries. It turned out that the results for Northern-Ireland and Austria differed relatively strongly from other countries. Although for Northern-Ireland an argument for the relatively bad fit is the small number of cases, we traced for both countries the identification of the problem as provided by the modification indices. Freeing the correlation between the error variances of v3 and v9 improved particularly for Austria fit statistics, and an overall decrease of the RMSEA statistic to .041. Fit statistics remained somewhat problematic for Northern Ireland, but as the modification indices did not identify serious problems and given the small number of cases for this country (due to listwise deletion of missing values), we decided to leave the model as simply as possible for all countries.

We can conclude that ‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’ and ‘limits to multicultural society’ can be equivalently measured in all countries by the same indicators.
### Table A2.3.1  Invariance in measurement models of attitudes towards minorities: 'resistance to multicultural society', 'insistence on conformity of migrants to law' and 'limits to multicultural society'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>Problem identification</th>
<th>Problem solved by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model A1: EU-wide</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>785.17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.9911</td>
<td>Bad fit for item v4</td>
<td>Leaving out v4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model A2: EU-wide</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>63.00</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.9992</td>
<td>Negative error variances (v1, v5, v9)</td>
<td>Set error variances to value .05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model A3: EU-wide</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>70.56</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.9991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Multi-sample models

- **Model A3**
  - **form equivalence**
    - RMSEA: .045, $\chi^2$: 262.38, df: 122
  - Note: multi-sample analyses of 17 samples; Source: EB59.2

- **Model A3**
  - **invariant factor loadings**
    - RMSEA: .045, $\chi^2$: 373.36, df: 171
    - Relative bad fit for Northern Ireland and Austria
    - Covariance between error of item V3 and V6 in both countries

- **Model A3**
  - **invariant factor loadings**
    - RMSEA: .041, $\chi^2$: 332.15, df: 169
    - Relative bad fit for Northern Ireland and Austria

Note: multi-sample analyses of 17 samples; Source: EB59.2

1 GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to be larger than .99 for each sample except Austria and Northern Ireland. After including a covariance between the errors terms of item V3 and item V6, also for these countries GFI statistics increased to over .99.

2 GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to be larger than .99 for each sample.
Model I Unstandardised measurement model of dimensions of attitudes towards ethnic minorities ‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’ and ‘limits to multicultural society’
3.2 Invariance in measurement models in EU member states 2003 regarding measurements of ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’

The procedure to test invariance of the measurement model among countries of set 2 has been comparable to the one described for set 1. Initially, we included two additional items regarding illegal immigrants (v19 “All illegal immigrants should be sent back to their country of origin without exception” and v20 “Employers who hire illegal workers should be punished more severely”). However, it turned out that these two additional items could not be regarded as a valid and cross-national comparable measurement of the attitude regarding illegals. The question wording of v19 refers to ‘illegals’ as well as ‘send back’ and therefore formed a double loading on both the dimension of ‘opposition towards illegals’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’. The remaining item measuring ‘opposition towards illegals’ (v20) was in most countries so differently related to the other items and measures punishment attitudes towards employers rather than an attitude towards illegals that we decided to leave the items v19 and v20 out the analyses. The remaining phenomena of ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’ turned out to be two distinguishable concepts. Over all countries from the Standard Eurobarometer (EB59.2) the fit statistics show satisfactory results. The multi-sample procedure showed however deviations particularly for Spain, and to a lesser extent for Greece. Statistics provided that we had to specify a correlation between error variances and a double loading for Spain (v17 on ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’). This double loading was quite large, but met the criterion of a larger difference of .20 with the smallest loading of the other items on the same dimension. We can conclude that ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’ can be equivalently measured in all countries by the same indicators.
Table A2.3.2  Invariance in measurement models of attitudes towards immigrants: ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model B1: EU-wide</th>
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<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>Problem solved by:</th>
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**Multi-sample models**

Model B1

*form equivalence*

<table>
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<th>Model B1</th>
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<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>Problem solved by:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>148.89</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Relative bad fit for Spain and Greece covariance between error terms of v14 and v17 in both countries

Model B1

*invariant factor loading*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model B1</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>Problem solved by:</th>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Relative bad fit for Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.043</td>
<td>241.78</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Relative bad fit for Spain cross-loading of v17 on ‘civil rights’ in Spain

Note: multi-sample analyses of 17 samples; Source: EB59.2

1 GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to be larger than .99 for each sample except Spain.

2 GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to be larger than .99.
Model 2 Unstandardised measurement model of dimensions of attitudes towards ethnic minorities ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’
3.3 **Sum indices of dimensions of ethnic exclusionism.**

The previous analyses were conducted among respondents without missing answers. Having assessed that these 11 items indeed form a cross-national comparable measurement for various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, we can now use this result to estimate missing answers of respondents. A missing score of a respondent on a particular item referring to ethnic exclusionism was replaced by a regression estimate based on the answers that this respondent had provided on the other items referring to ethnic exclusionism. However, this procedure was only followed if a respondent answered more than half of the items referring to ethnic exclusionism. Respondents with less valid answers were excluded from all analyses.

After substitution of missing values, we computed summated indices for each dimension of ethnic exclusionism. The indices are recoded on a scale from 0 to 1. Throughout this report, these indices are applied to measure exclusionist stances. The mean score on these indices across all countries and per country are displayed in Appendix 6. Table A.2.3.3 displays the overall relationships between the indices of the dimensions of ethnic exclusionism.

| Table A2.3.3 Relationships between dimensions of ethnic exclusionism |
|------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
|                        | A      | B      | C      | D      | E      |
| Resistance to multicultural society (A) | 1.00   |        |        |        |        |
| Limits to multicultural society (B)      | .28    | 1.00   |        |        |        |
| Insistence on conformity of migrants to law (C) | .06    | .19    | 1.00   |        |        |
| Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants (D) | .41    | .26    | .12    | 1.00   |        |
| Repatriation policies for legal migrants (E) | .28    | .29    | .01    | .32    | 1.00   |

*Note: EU-average. National samples were given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size: all countries were given a standard sample size of 1000, whereas Luxembourg and Northern Ireland were given a standard sample size of 600 and 300 respectively.*
The strongest relationship exists between ‘resistance to multicultural society’ and ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’. The more people oppose to cultural, ethnic and religious diversity as an enrichment for society as a whole, the stronger their opposition to granting civil rights to legal migrants. ‘Insistence on conformity’ has remarkable low correlations with the other dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. A vast majority of the EU population (67%) strongly insist that minorities conform to law, but this does not necessary imply that they share other exclusionist stances.
3.4 Invariance in measurement models in EU member states over time, regarding measurements of ‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’, and ‘limits to multicultural society’.

The survey questions were also included in previous Eurobarometer surveys in 1997 (eb47.1) and 2000 (eb53). For more information on the data collection of these surveys, we refer to the respective codebooks (Melich, 2000; Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, 2000).

When comparing the responses over time, the question to be answered is whether measurements in 2003 (eb59.2) are equivalent in form and invariant in factor loadings compared to measurements in 2000 (eb53) and 1997 (eb49.1), in each of the countries. With multi-sample analyses, we tested for each country whether the phenomena are equivalently measured over time. The model as tested for 2003 (eb59.2) and presented in figure 3.1 is adjusted only to the extent that item v6 had to be dropped, as this measurement lacked in the surveys of 2000 and 1997.

For 11 out of 17 samples, the measurement model turned out to be stable over time: it was equivalent in form and the factor loadings turned out to be invariant. For the other six samples, correlations between error variances or double loadings needed to be specified to meet the criteria. However, in none of these samples the violations were so severe that we had to construct another model form. The double loadings (specified for Spain, Luxembourg, East Germany and Austria) were at least .20 smaller than the smallest other loading on the concept. Hence, we can conclude that dimensions of ‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’ and ‘limits to multicultural society’ can be equivalently measured over time in all countries by the same indicators.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>RMSEA Equivalent form</th>
<th>RMSEA Invariant factor loadings</th>
<th>RMSEA invariant factor loadings after accounting for identified misfit</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>.070</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>28.40</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>8.68</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
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<td>.036</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>27.17</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>32.01</td>
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<td>.038</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.046</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>29.29</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>11.25</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>.060</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>29.61</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>.045</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>21.57</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>.085</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>20.62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>.045</td>
<td>35.70</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<td>.043</td>
<td>27.06</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
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<td>.038</td>
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<td>.009</td>
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<td>.050</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>27.81</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: multi-sample analyses of 3 samples over time in each country; Source: EB49.1, EB52 and EB49.1
Table A.2.3.4b  Identification of problems of the models in Table A2.3.4a according to Modification Indices and adjustments until RMSEA criterion is met

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgiumcovariance between error terms of:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v5 and v8 in 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v1 and v8 in 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v3 and v9 in 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaincross-loading of v8 on ‘resistance’ in 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cross-loading of v1 on ‘insistence’ in 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irelandcovariance between error terms of: v1 and v9 in 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourgcovariance between error terms of: v1 and v9 in 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cross-loading of v8 on ‘resistance’ in 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germanycross-loading of v8 on ‘insistence’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria cross-loading of v9 on ‘resistance’ in 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cross-loading of v8 on ‘resistance’ in 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cross-loading of v9 on ‘insistence’ in 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cross-loading of v1 on ‘insistence’ in 2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5 Invariance in measurement models in EU member states over time, regarding measurements of ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’

Also for set 2 we need to answer the question whether measurements in 2003 (eb59.2) are equivalent in form and invariant in factor loadings compared to measurements in 2000 (eb53) and 1997 (eb49.1), in each of the countries. With multi-sample analyses, we tested for each country whether the concepts of model 2 (‘oppositions towards civil rights’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’) are equivalently and invariantly measured over time.

For 9 out of 17 samples, the measurement model turned out to be equivalent over time and the factor loadings turned out to be invariant. For the other samples, correlations between error variances or double loaders needed to be specified, to meet the criteria. However, in none of these samples the violations were so severe that we had to construct another model form. The double loadings (specified for Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland and Austria) were at least .20 smaller than the smallest other loading on the concept.

Hence, we can conclude that ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’ can be equivalently measured over time in all countries by the same indicators.
Table A2.3.5a  Invariance in measurement models within countries over time (1997, 2000, 2003) of attitudes towards immigrants: ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>RMSEA Equivalent form</th>
<th>RMSEA Invariant factor loadings</th>
<th>RMSEA Invariant factor loadings after accounting for identified misfit</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.52</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>47.29</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.34</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.59</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>.068</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>41.99</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.050</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.73</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.99</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>32.25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.23</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.06</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>37.54</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.051 (close fit)</td>
<td>38.15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>31.13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>47.29</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td></td>
<td>26.87</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>28.76</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: multi-sample analyses of 3 samples in each country; Source: EB49.1, EB52 and EB49.1
Table A2.3.5b  Identification of problems in Table A2.3.5a according Modification Indices and adjustments until RMSEA criterion is met

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>East Germany</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
3.6 Overview of survey questions

The Eurobarometer Survey 59.2 (2003) contained the following questions regarding minorities and immigrants.

“Now we can talk about the place of people belonging to minority groups in terms of race, religion and culture within (NATIONALITY) society. For each of the following opinions, could you please tell me whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?” (Answer categories Tend to agree / Tend to disagree / Don’t know)

V1 It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures
V2 (COUNTRY) has always consisted of various cultural or religious groups
V3 (COUNTRY)'s diversity in terms of race, religion or culture adds to its strengths
V4 In order to be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up their own culture
V5 In order to be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up such parts of their religion or culture which may be in conflict with (NATIONALITY) law
V6 In order to be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to minority groups must give up religious or cultural practices such as polygamy or female circumcision
V7 In two or three generations' time, people belonging to these minority groups will be like all other members of society
V8 There is a limit to how many people of other races, religions or cultures a society can accept
V9 (OUR COUNTRY) has reached its limits; if there were to be more people belonging to these minority groups we would have problems
V10 Not everybody belonging to these minority groups wants to be a full member of (NATIONALITY) society
V11 Whether people belonging to these minority groups can be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society depends on which group they belong to
V12 People belonging to these minority groups are so different, they can never be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society
“For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?” (Answer categories Tend to agree / Tend to disagree / Don’t know)

V13 Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the same social rights as the (NATIONALITY) citizens

V14 Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the right to bring members of their immediate family in (OUR COUNTRY)

V15 Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be sent back to their country of origin if they have been convicted of serious offences

V16 Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be sent back to their country of origin if they are unemployed

V17 Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should all be sent back to their country of origin

V18 Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be able to become naturalised easily

V19 All illegal immigrants should be sent back to their country of origin without exception

V20 Employers who hire illegal workers should be punished more severely

V21 As regards illegal immigrants, whether they are allowed to stay in (OUR COUNTRY) should always depend on their personal circumstances

V22 All immigrants, whether legal or illegal, and their children, even those who were born in (OUR COUNTRY), should be sent back to their country of origin

V23 The right to asylum in (OUR COUNTRY) should be easier to obtain

We constructed indices of dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, based on eleven of these items. The other items were excluded from our analyses due to lack of validity and reliability or because they cannot be regarded as a cross-national comparable indicator.

An attitude, by definition, contains an evaluative component. However, some of the items lack a clear positive or negative evaluation of minorities or migrants (v2 and v7), and (also) refer to factual circumstances (v2) or expectations (v7). Furthermore, some item formulations (v7, v11, v21) are cognitively complex and may be sensitive for multiple interpretations. These doubts regarding the validity were supported by low correlations of the specific items with the others indicators. Item v22 is not applicable because it refers to both legal as well as illegal migrants, whereas there is a strong difference in people’s opinions of legal versus illegal migrants.
Other items that – regarding face validity – might refer to the same dimension as some other items had to be excluded since they did not strongly correlate with the other indicators of that dimension. As our goal was to construct multi-item indices in order to increase reliability of our measurements, we had to exclude some single items that were not strongly related to any of the other indicators. Finally, based on the results of previous analyses, we had to exclude some additional items. As described in section 3.1, item v4 could not be regarded as a valid one-dimensional indicator of ‘insistence on conformity’ and was therefore excluded. In section 3.2 we explicated that items v19 and v20 could not be regarded as a valid and cross-national comparable measurement of the attitude regarding illegals.
Appendix 4. Measurements of independent variables at the individual level

In this study we focus on the attitudes of the ethnic majority population in various countries toward migrants and ethnic minorities. In order to select respondents from the majority populations, we restricted our analyses to citizens with the nationality of the country of residence.

To measure the first of our independent variables, *educational attainment*, we used information on the age at which respondents had stopped their full-time education. In the descriptive analyses, we distinguished five ordinal categories, ranging from the lowest category ‘education stopped at age 6 to age 14’ to the highest category ‘education stopped at age 22 or later’ and an additional category consisting of respondents who were still studying at the time of survey. In the explanatory analyses, we regarded educational attainment as an interval variable. In order to assign a numerical value for the respondents who were still studying at the time of survey, we took their age. Furthermore, to prevent extreme high scores on the educational attainment variable, we regarded the age of 30 as an upper-limit.

A measure of *social class* was constructed, using the available information in these secondary data, to resemble the cross-national comparable categorisation of Erickson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1983). We distinguished a number of categories, based on their actual social position in the labour force: the higher professionals (including professionals, business proprietors and top management); the lower professionals (middle management); routine non-manuals workers (people with an employed position at a desk, in service jobs or travelling); self-employed people (farmers, fishermen and shop owners); supervisors and skilled manual workers; and a category of other (unskilled) manual workers and servants. To these classes we added as distinct categories the people who were momentarily not active in the labour force: people working in their own household; students; unemployed people; and lastly, retired people and disabled people.

Gross monthly household *income* was measured with a country-specific question so that the number and range of the income categories varied over countries. To enable cross-national comparisons, we took the mid-value of each separate income category and divided the income by the mean income of the specific country concerned. Furthermore, missing values for household income were – for each country separately – imputed by an estimated value based on other information that is available for the respondents. We estimated missing income values by means of a regression analysis of household income on four variables that are related to household income.6
Urbanisation was measured by means of three categories ranging from ‘a rural area or village’ or ‘a small or middle sized town’ to ‘a large town’, as judged by the respondent. In the Standard Eurobarometer dataset no information was available regarding religious denominations and church attendance. Political self-placement was measured by asking respondents to place their own political viewpoints on a ten point scale, ranging from left (score 1) to right (score 10). Finally, we include gender and age as variables in the analysis.
Appendix 5. Measurements of independent variables at the contextual level

Individuals, as social beings, are affected by their surrounding social contexts. In this report we focus on the impact of the national context on individual attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immigrants. In order to explain cross-national differences in ethnic exclusionism, we searched for appropriate operationalisations and measurements of national contextual characteristics. However, one should be cautious when comparing national statistics. The comparability of national statistics can be problematic, due to cross-national differences in applied definitions, modes of registration and classification. Furthermore, there can be sizeable differences in the reliability of national statistics between countries. In order to minimise these problems of comparability, contextual data are primarily derived from internationally recognised organisations, such as Eurostat, the United Nations Population Division and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The statistical departments of these international organisations have put a lot of effort in the standardisation of definitions and data collection methods in order to improve consistency and comparability of indicators across countries.

In the Standard Eurobarometer sampling design, separate samples were drawn for West and East Germany and within the United Kingdom separate samples were drawn for Great Britain and Northern Ireland. We analysed the German data separately for (former) West and East Germany, due to the large differences in political and economic developments that took place after the Second World War, as well as the vast differences in economic and demographic circumstances that still exist between East and West Germany today. Similarly, data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland are analysed separately. Hence, East and West Germany, Great Britain and Northern Ireland are all regarded as separate ‘national’ contexts. However, some contextual variables, such as the number of asylum applications, are by definition only defined for Germany or the United Kingdom as a whole. The national statistical data for the countries included in the Standard Eurobarometer are displayed in table A2.5.1. Figures on the unemployment rate in 2002 were taken from Eurostat (2003a) and they refer to the number of unemployed persons as a share of the total active population. The estimates of the number of unemployed are based on the results of the European Union Labour Force Survey. Unemployed persons are those aged 15 to 74 years not living in collective households who were without work within the two weeks following the reference week and have actively sought employment at some time during the previous four weeks or who found a job to start within a period of at most three months. We applied the unemployment rate in 2002, since this is the latest available annual figure on the unemployment rate.
We applied data from the German national statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt) to derive the unemployment rate in (former) West and East Germany. The unemployment rate for Germany as a whole, as reported by Eurostat (2003a), was adjusted for the ratio in unemployment rates in West Germany and East Germany, as reported by the Statistisches Bundesamt (2003a). Likewise, the unemployment rate for the United Kingdom, as reported by Eurostat (2003a), was adjusted for the ratio in unemployment rates in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as reported by the Office for National Statistics (2002).

Figures on Gross Domestic Product were taken from Eurostat (2003b). GDP is measured per head in thousands of PPS (Purchasing Power Standards) at current prices, indexed at 100 for the 15 EU members, in the year 2002. These relative figures are multiplied with the actual GDP per head in thousands for the EU (Eurostat 2003c) to derive the actual GDP for each country. The German figure was adjusted for East Germany and West Germany by the GDP ratio for the regions as reported by the Statistisches Bundesamt (2003b). Similarly, the GDP for the United Kingdom was adjusted for the GDP ratio in Great Britain and Northern Ireland as reported by the Office for National Statistics (2003a), based on figures of 1999.

As a measurement of the presence of ethnic minorities in a country, we took the number of *non-nationals with a non-Western citizenship* as a percentage of the total population and accounted for the number of naturalisations in the last 15 years. The latest available figures from Eurostat (2003d) refer to January 1, 2000. In this measurement, non-nationals with a citizenship of Western industrialised countries are not taken into account. That is, non-nationals with a citizenship from one of the European Union countries, the European Free Trade Association countries, or the United States, Canada, Australia or New-Zealand are excluded from the total number of non-nationals. For Austria and Luxembourg, the figures refer to the percentage of non-EU nationals. We derived separate figures for former West and East Germany based on the figure for reunified Germany, as reported by Eurostat, and the ratio of the percentage of foreigners in former West and East Germany, as reported by the Statistisches Bundesamt (2003c). Similarly, separate figures for Great Britain and Northern Ireland were derived by adjusting the figure for the United Kingdom with the ratio of ethnic minority groups in the UK and the respective regions, as found in the UK Census of April 2001 (Office for National Statistics, 2003). As in some countries the number of naturalisations is much larger than in others – particularly in Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands (Eurostat 2003d; OECD 2004) – and most naturalisations are applied to non-Western citizens (OECD 2004), we included these numbers of naturalisations in our measurement of *non-nationals with a non-Western citizenship*. For Greece, the statistics on the number of non-nationals provided by Eurostat from 1998 turned out to deviate strongly from the latest Greek Census data (2001). Therefore, we decided to take into account the latter statistics. The Greek Census results report the number of inhabitants by citizenship to
which we added the number of naturalisations as reported by Eurostat (General Secretariat of National Statistical Services of Greece 2004; Eurostat 2003d).

To take into account the effect of immigration on ethnic exclusionism, we took the average annual number of migrants and related it to the total population. A distinction could be made between immigration of nationals, other EU-nationals and non-EU nationals. As a measurement of foreign immigration, we applied the figures regarding the number of non-EU immigrants. To adjust for strong yearly fluctuations, we took the average annual immigration of non-EU nationals in 1995 to 1999 as registered by Eurostat (2003d). To compare the burden of the absolute numbers of immigrants across countries, we related these figures to the size of the total population in order to derive the average annual immigration of non-EU nationals in 1995 to 1999 per 1,000 capita.

Finally, we took the average number of asylum applications in 2001 and 2002 per 1,000 capita as an additional indicator. Figures regarding the number of asylum applications are quite suitable for international comparison as compared to other figures on asylum seekers, such as the number of admitted refugees. It is much more complicated to produce comparable figures regarding the number of admitted refugees, due to cross-national differences in legal regulations, residence permits (e.g. provisional versus durable permits), as well as differences in registration, classification and political circumstances in general.

The number of asylum applications in each country is registered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2002, 2003). To take into account strong yearly fluctuations, we took the average number of asylum applications in the two years preceding the time of survey, that is in 2001 and 2002. To compare the burden of the absolute numbers of asylum applications across countries, we related this to the size of the total population as derived from Eurostat (2003d).
Table A2.5.1  Contextual characteristics of EU Member States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Unemployment rate in 2002&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>GDP per capita in 2002&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Non-Western non-nationals in percentage of population in 2000&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Average annual immigration of non-EU nationals in 1995-1999, per 1,000 capita&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Average annual number of asylum applications in 2001 and 2002, per 1,000 capita&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>24.79</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<td>4.48</td>
<td>1.73</td>
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<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>5.1&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>24.77&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.4&lt;sup&gt;k&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>7.4&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>19.20&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.3&lt;sup&gt;k&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>30.12</td>
<td>1.1&lt;sup&gt;l&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>3.53</td>
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<td>3.70</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>45.46</td>
<td>12.0&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany West</td>
<td>6.5&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>26.50&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>8.5&lt;sup&gt;n&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany East</td>
<td>15.2&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>16.45&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.6&lt;sup&gt;n&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>26.90</td>
<td>10.2&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>4.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>24.65</td>
<td>5.0&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>20.23</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.20</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>16.49</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>24.55</td>
<td>2.0&lt;sup&gt;n&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>15.82</td>
<td>6.7&lt;sup&gt;p&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population. Source: Eurostat (2003a).
<sup>b</sup> GDP per capita in purchasing power standards. Source: Eurostat (2003a).
<sup>c</sup> Non-nationals with a non-Western citizenship and the number of naturalisations between 1995 and 1999 as percentage of total population on January 1, 2000. Only non-nationals with a non-Western citizenship are displayed: non-nationals with a citizenship from one of the European Union countries, the European Free Trade Association countries, or the United States, Canada, Australia or New-Zealand are not taken into account. Figures for Luxembourg and Austria refer to non-EU nationals. Source: Eurostat (2003b).
<sup>d</sup> Source: Eurostat (2003b).
<sup>f</sup> Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Office for National Statistics (2002).
<sup>g</sup> Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003a).
<sup>h</sup> Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Office for National Statistics (2003a).
<sup>i</sup> Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003b).
\[ \text{i} \text{ Data January 1, 1999} \\
\text{k} \text{ Data spring 1998. Source: Eurostat (2003b) and Office for National Statistics (2003).} \\
\text{l} \text{ Data April 1999} \\
\text{m} \text{ Source: Eurostat (2003b) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003).} \\
\text{n} \text{ Data on naturalisation for 1995 and for 1999 imputed by average of 1996 to 1998} \\
\text{o} \text{ Data on naturalisation for 1995 to 1999 taken from OECD (2004) Trends in International Migration.} \\
\text{p} \text{ Data January 1, 2001, Greek census data; data on naturalisation for 1995 and for 1999 imputed by average of 1996 to 1998} \]
## Appendix 6. Grand means, means per country and percentages of support for exclusionist stances

### Table A2.6.1 Mean score and percentage support on ‘resistance to multicultural society’ and ‘limits to multicultural society’ per country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>resistance to multicultural society</th>
<th>limits to multicultural society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean a % support b</td>
<td>Mean a % support b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.322 23.5</td>
<td>0.319 21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.288 12.5</td>
<td>0.509 40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.301 22.3</td>
<td>0.660 55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0.305 20.3</td>
<td>0.759 68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>0.261 7.1</td>
<td>0.627 48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.257 16.9</td>
<td>0.805 72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.334 21.6</td>
<td>0.778 67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.480 37.3</td>
<td>0.781 69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.274 16.2</td>
<td>0.739 63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany West</td>
<td>0.443 32.6</td>
<td>0.813 71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany East</td>
<td>0.487 36.2</td>
<td>0.825 74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.391 27.0</td>
<td>0.742 61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.317 22.2</td>
<td>0.733 64.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.263 14.6</td>
<td>0.625 49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.324 18.2</td>
<td>0.734 59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.370 23.9</td>
<td>0.570 45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.698 59.0</td>
<td>0.878 80.6</td>
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<td>0.366 25.2</td>
<td>0.702 59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU member states</td>
<td>0.363 24.9</td>
<td>0.713 61.2</td>
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<th>Country</th>
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<td>981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>292</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td>923</td>
</tr>
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<td>968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany West</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany East</td>
<td>939</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>944</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>1011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU member states</td>
<td>15118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on a three-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.

* To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been dichotomised: each value above the middle range value indicates support, and each value on or below the middle range value indicates a low score.

* To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except Luxembourg and Northern Ireland) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, all countries were given a standard sample size of 1000, whereas Luxembourg and Northern Ireland were given a standard sample size of 600 and 300 respectively.

* To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to their population size.
### Table A2.6.2  Mean score and percentage support on ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’ per country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>% support</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>% support</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.436</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>926</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany West</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>960</td>
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<td>46.4</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>32.6</td>
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<td>0.437</td>
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<td>944</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>0.388</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>1011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>0.437</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU member states</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>15118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU member states</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>15118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Based on a four-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.

*b* To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been dichotomised: each value above the middle range value indicates support, and each value on or below the middle range value indicates a low score.

*c* Based on a three-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.

*d* To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except Luxembourg and Northern Ireland) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, all countries were given a standard sample size of 1000, whereas Luxembourg and Northern Ireland were given a standard sample size of 600 and 300 respectively.

*e* To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to their population size.
Table A2.6.3  Mean score and percentage support on ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to laws and conventions’ per country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mean a</th>
<th>% support b</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.856</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.908</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.923</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0.786</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>0.669</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.725</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.858</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany West</td>
<td>0.812</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany East</td>
<td>0.860</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.772</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>1011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.788</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>926</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>59.1</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>27.5</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>46.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU member states</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU member states d</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>15118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on a three-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.
* To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been dichotomised: each value above the middle range value indicates support, and each value on or below the middle range value indicates a low score.
* To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except Luxembourg and Northern Ireland) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, all countries were given a standard sample size of 1000, whereas Luxembourg and Northern Ireland were given a standard sample size of 600 and 300 respectively.
* To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to their population size.
Appendix 7: Test for significant over time changes within countries

Table A2.7.1. Changes in resistance to multicultural society

Average EU-level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V1 It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures</td>
<td>.264</td>
<td>.304</td>
<td>.303</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V3 (COUNTRY)’s diversity in terms of race, religion or culture adds to its strengths</td>
<td>.447</td>
<td>.457</td>
<td>.429</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index on Resistance to multicultural society</td>
<td>.355</td>
<td>.381</td>
<td>.366</td>
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Changes in index per country

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>.270</td>
<td>.355</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td>.085*</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>.052*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>.314</td>
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<td>.288</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>-.042*</td>
<td>-.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>.412</td>
<td>.318</td>
<td>.301</td>
<td>-.094*</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>-.111*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>.233</td>
<td>.311</td>
<td>.305</td>
<td>.077*</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.072*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>.255</td>
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<td>.036</td>
<td>.005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>.223</td>
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<td>.257</td>
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<td>-.117*</td>
<td>.034</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.307</td>
<td>.334</td>
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<td>.026</td>
<td>.047*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>.552</td>
<td>.490</td>
<td>.480</td>
<td>-.062*</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>-.073*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>.251</td>
<td>.370</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>.118*</td>
<td>-.096*</td>
<td>.023</td>
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<td>.443</td>
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<td>-.007</td>
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<td>.029</td>
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<td>-.013</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>.301</td>
<td>.320</td>
<td>.317</td>
<td>.019</td>
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<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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<td>.270</td>
<td>.263</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>.027</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.324</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.030</td>
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<td>.374</td>
<td>.370</td>
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<td>-.004</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.069*</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.093*</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU (country average)</td>
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<td>.381</td>
<td>.366</td>
<td>.026*</td>
<td>-.015*</td>
<td>.011*</td>
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### Table A2.7. 2. Changes in limits to multicultural society

**Average EU-level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V8 There is a limit to how many people of other races, religions or cultures a society can accept</th>
<th>Average EU-level</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>V9 (OUR COUNTRY) has reached its limits; if there were to be more people belonging to these minority groups we would have problems</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Index on Limits to multicultural society</td>
<td>.659</td>
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</table>

**Changes in index per country**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Difference</th>
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<th>2000</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>1997-</th>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>.310</td>
<td>.319</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>.653</td>
<td>.557</td>
<td>.509</td>
<td>-.096*</td>
<td>-.048*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>.730</td>
<td>.699</td>
<td>.660</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>-.039*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>.699</td>
<td>.752</td>
<td>.759</td>
<td>.053*</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.475</td>
<td>.540</td>
<td>.627</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.087*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>.579</td>
<td>.766</td>
<td>.805</td>
<td>.187*</td>
<td>.039*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.701</td>
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<td>.778</td>
<td>.089*</td>
<td>-.012</td>
</tr>
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<td>.796</td>
<td>.781</td>
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<td>-.015</td>
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<td>.771</td>
<td>.739</td>
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<td>.813</td>
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<td>.036*</td>
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<td>.825</td>
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<td>.742</td>
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<td>.202*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.619</td>
<td>.734</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.115*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>.607</td>
<td>.626</td>
<td>.570</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>-.056*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>.823</td>
<td>.878</td>
<td>-.034*</td>
<td>.055*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU (country average)</td>
<td>.659</td>
<td>.683</td>
<td>.702</td>
<td>.023*</td>
<td>.019*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A2.7.3  Changes in opposition to civil rights for legal migrants

### Average EU-level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V13 Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the same social rights as the (NATIONALITY) citizens</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.059*</td>
<td>-0.054*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V14 Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the right to bring members of their immediate family in (OUR COUNTRY)</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.075*</td>
<td>-0.102*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V18 Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be able to become naturalised easily</td>
<td>0.534</td>
<td>0.551</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>-0.039*</td>
<td>-0.105*</td>
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### Changes in index per country

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### Table A2.7.4  Changes in favour repatriation policies for legal migrants

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**Changes in index per country**

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Table A2.7.5  
Insistence on conformity to law
(Since item v6 was not measured in 1997 and 2000, only item v5 was applied.)

Average EU level

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V5 In order to be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up such parts of their religion or culture which may be in conflict with (NATIONALITY) law

Per country

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Notes appendices

1 We applied the goodness-of-fit measure GFI of Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993a). GFI is a normed statistics ranging from zero to one. As a rule-of-thumb, a minimum value for GFI of 0.90 has been proposed. Browne and Cudeck (Browne & Cudeck, 1992) proposed a fit measure that takes account of the error of approximation in the population. They suggested using Steiger’s Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) as a measure of the discrepancy (due to error of approximation) per degree of freedom. RMSEA will be zero only if the model fits exactly. It will decrease if parameters are added to the model that substantially reduce the discrepancy due to approximation. If, however, the additional parameters reduce the discrepancy only slightly, the RMSEA can increase. Based on practical experience, Browne and Cudeck suggested that a value of 0.05 or less indicates a close fit of the model in relation to the degrees of freedom, whereas values of 0.08 and lower indicate a reasonable error of approximation.

2 As Bollen (1989, p. 356) pointed out, the comparability (or invariance) in models represents a continuum. He distinguished between two dimensions of comparability: model form and similarity in parameter values. Models for different samples have the same form if each model has the same parameter matrices with the same dimensions and the same location of fixed, free, and constrained parameters. The invariance in model form is a matter of degree. On the one hand, the invariance in model form can be rather low if models have very different numbers of latent variables or if observed variables load on different latent variables in different models. On the other hand, the invariance in model form is rather high if the model forms are identical except for the pattern of correlated measurement errors. Models can also differ with regard to the parameter values, from the one extreme where no parameters are equal across the populations under study, to the other extreme where all are invariant.

3 Since only ratios of factor loadings are identified – and not factor loadings themselves – the model assumes invariance of factor loading ratios across countries. Invariance of all factor loadings across countries is not a testable assumption. However, if the assumption of invariant factor loading ratios is justified, then it is probably safe to assume invariance of the factor loadings themselves (Bielby, 1986).

4 In some instances, the programme may provide a negative variance estimate for the measurement error of a particular item. This situation is called a Heywood case (Boomsma & Hoogland, 2001). This anomaly can be solved by setting the specific error variance to a fixed value, for instance zero. Since fixation of error variances to zero would imply absence of measurement error, we prefer to set negative error variances to a value of .05.

5 Country specific fixations were allowed to control for Heywood cases.

6 Based on the available information in the Standard Eurobarometer dataset, the following variables were applied in the regression analysis of household income: ‘years of fulltime education’, ‘age’ (divided into six categories); ‘social class of the person in the household who contributes most to the household income’ and ‘marital status’ (with categories (i) married / remarried / unmarried, living with partner, (ii) unmarried, never had partner (iii) unmarried, previously had a partner (iv) divorced/separated and (v) widowed). A random normal deviate was added to this estimated income
value to prevent a drop in the standard deviation of the income variable. Finally, the range of the imputed income values was set equal to the original range of the income variable.