Some Long burning issues in the international cooperation of the Netherlands: An Introduction to Yearbook 2007

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As we will show in the last section of this yearbook 2006 was a year of praise and glory for Dutch development cooperation. The Netherlands were praised for the level of its contribution to development cooperation and international organizations, for the coherence of its policies and its alignment to the Paris Agenda. Praise came from independent bodies like the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD in its Peer Review of the Netherlands and from the Centre for Global Development in its Development Friendliness Index. This all seems to indicate that Dutch development cooperation, and its broader international cooperation, is beyond dispute. Some events in 2006 and articles in this Yearbook show that this is not, or at least not always, the case.

There are a series of issues that we might consider ‘burning’, in the sense that they have been subject of debate and critique during long periods in the history of Dutch development cooperation. These relate to amongst others: the goals and objectives of Dutch development cooperation and the role of poverty reduction in these, the selection of programme countries and the selection criteria used, the role of Dutch business in the implementation of the programme, the policies of multilateral organizations in particular the EU, the relation with private aid organisations and the ways in which they are subsidized, the way in which humanitarian and emergency assistance are provided, public support for development cooperation. Not all of these issues are or can be discussed in the first issue of this Yearbook. But it can not be a coincidence that some of these ‘burning issues’ are well presented here. We will introduce them with some historical, lightly impressionistic brushstrokes.

Country selection

One of the issues that have been ‘burning’ for nearly 40 years now in Dutch development cooperation has been the selection of programme countries. It was already in 1968 that then minister Udink found himself confronted with a growing demand for development assistance from as well governments of developing countries, as well as Dutch business firms active in those countries and Dutch embassies based here. He
decided to concentrate aid on a limited number of countries, called thus ‘concentration countries’. Among the first criteria used for this selection was the trade relationship with the Netherlands and the request for specific technical experience from the Netherlands. In the final list of criteria they were presented as: the existence of a consortium or aid-group of donors, the current level of development and economic relations with the Netherlands. In fact, however, the minister had a ‘lucky bag’ full of criteria at his disposal. In practice, trade relations with The Netherlands were found to play the most important role. This of course changed a lot in later years, but it showed the economic and commercial motives so present in the first years of Dutch bilateral assistance.

Under minister Jan Pronk in the seventies development criteria started to play a major role in the selection. At the same time however the number of countries to which the Netherlands provided assistance always tended to grow rather fast when Jan Pronk was minister. In the 1975 budget, three selection criteria were indicated. These criteria were further elaborated a year later in the Bilateral Aid White Paper. They were: the degree of poverty in the country in question; the actual need for foreign assistance; and ‘the degree to which the country in question is adopting policies especially beneficial to the poor (or the presence of a socio-political structure which offers perspectives for this, although policy is considered ultimately more important than such structure)’. In particular this third criterion was heavily debated. The conservatives in parliament saw it as a symbol for the assumed radicalism of Jan Pronk and his socialist choices. In practice, there was little change in the selection of aid-receiving countries with the application of these criteria. The third criterion was clearly sacrificed for political reality as it was unthinkable that countries such as Indonesia or Pakistan could be swept off the list in the existing political constellation. The maintenance of Indonesia’s position as an aid-receiving country in particular was seen as against the third criterion and created opposition from the Cabinet’s left wing. Only in the choice for Cuba and Jamaica could Pronk apply this third criterion. In the cabinet that succeeded minister De Koning was quick to introduce changes in the country selection. The 1979 budget stated that ‘the current number of 17 concentration-countries is too large’. The new criteria for selection, which also became threshold-criteria for the receipt of aid, were as follows: the income per capita could be no higher than 550 dollars, the country should be implementing a policy aimed at distribution, and human rights should be respected (Budget Paper, 1979). Pronk’s first criterion had been given a sharp and numerical expression in the form of GNP per capita; Pronk’s second criterion (the need for assistance) was dropped; Pronk’s famous third criterion had been toned down slightly; and a new criterion (human rights) which Pronk had seen as part and parcel of his third criterion was added. The implementation of the first threshold criterion made that Colombia, Jamaica, Peru and Tunisia were taken off the list as of the 1st of January 1979. Due to the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and, in particular, the election promises of the conservative VVD (anew in government), Cuba had already been removed from the list directly upon De Koning’s entrance into office. After some discussions in parliament, Colombia was reincorporated a little bit later into the list. The striking fact in this selection of countries is that the first criterion appears to have been strictly applied while
the second and third criteria were either not applied or certainly not applied as threshold criteria.

In the first Lubbers-Cabinet of the mid-1980s, with for the first time a VVD-minister for Development Cooperation the number of ‘concentration countries’, to be called ‘programme countries’ from then on, was once again to be reduced. This because the number of aid-receivers had been growing again despite the efforts to concentrate aid at a limited number of aid-receivers. The criteria for selection were now: a per capita GNP not exceeding 795 dollars; the implementation of a social and economic policy ‘clearly aimed at progress’; and the potential to continue or to establish ‘sustainable development relations’ between the Netherlands and the country in question. The last criterion clearly reflected the new consideration of the potential for present or future trading links. Both Pronk’s distribution and De Koning’s human-rights criteria were dropped. Three countries were removed from the list (Colombia, Zambia and Burkina Faso), although these would still receive aid from the regional programmes. The white paper identified three such regions for aid: Southern Africa, the Sahel and Central America, to which the Andean region would later be added. Aid should henceforth be provided to only the programme countries and programme regions. In all of these, the possibilities for the ‘contribution Dutch expertise, services and goods’ should be weighed and taken into consideration in the selection of countries and activities. It should be said that not much did change however, since the human rights criterion had not been applied to its full extent in the former period and since the new third criterion was too vague to present possibilities to select new countries.

In the years that followed there was pretty little discussion on country selection. Minister Bukman added some Central American countries with recently elected Christian Democrat leaders and during Pronk’s two terms in office in the 1990s again new sets of countries were selected to receive Dutch aid. With the provision of development assistance Pronk hoped to buy a place in the conference rooms or at peace negotiating tables for countries in civil war and thus Dutch aid was extended to countries like Rwanda, Liberia and Bosnia which were not on the receivers’ lists before. Furthermore the minister himself tried to play an active role in Sudan as well as in Rwanda.

Labour and the conservative liberal party VVD were the main winners of the elections of 1998. A second ‘purple cabinet’ was formed. The new Labour Minister for Development Cooperation, Eveline Herfkens, a former World Bank Executive Director, made aid effectiveness and efficiency key words of her policy already in the first weeks of her tenure, keeping a clear distance from her predecessor and party colleague directly. She announced a reduction of programme countries in all of her first interviews. It is this selection that has come under debate in 2006 in a report of the evaluation unit (IOB) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself and in two articles in this yearbook.

Wil Hout evaluates the implementation of the selectivity principle in Dutch development assistance policies since 1998, since Herfkens took office. The selection of aid recipients was initiated by her with the objective of rendering development assistance more effective, and was premised on the World Bank’s finding that aid works better in
good policy and governance environments (see below). The article discusses two rounds of aid selectivity, with the first resulting in the selection of 19+3 ‘preferential’ countries (during Herfkens rule) and the second in 36 ‘partner’ countries (in 2003 initiated by minister Van Ardenne), and Wil Hout analyses the role of the selection criteria (poverty, governance and policy) in policy formulation. It is found that the criteria have played a minor role in the process and that the methodology applied was flawed in some important respects. Empirical analyses of the two rounds of selection demonstrate that World Bank judgements about governance and policies (in the CPIA rating) as well as previous aid levels are important predictors for the selection of aid recipients and the subsequent allocations. A comparison of the Dutch experience with that of other donor countries indicates that the Netherlands, in terms of the application of governance- and poverty-related criteria, takes in a position halfway between more and less selective donors.

‘Good Governance’ was introduced as an important criterion for selection of programme countries by minister Herfkens, in reaction also to World Bank publications like ‘Assessing Aid’. Joost Tennekes researches, in what could be read as a summary of his PhD-thesis, the way the concept of ‘Good Governance’ is used in the policy discourses of the Netherlands and Germany. He tries to track this by analyzing discourse not only as a conceptualisation or an ensemble of concepts, ideas and categorizations, but also as produced and reproduced practices. Relying on institutional theories, this leads to an analysis not only of formal positions of ministers or of official documents, but also to what possibilities these might open for legitimating or driving actions. One of the conclusions Tennekes arrives at is that in both countries discourse-shaping practices have strongly influenced the formation of policy discourse on ‘good governance’ in particular with regard to internal bureaucratic procedures.

One of the important differences between the Netherlands and Germany, as Tennekes sees it, is that in the Netherlands the discourse on good governance follows much more from the international debate while in Germany it seems to have been developed much more autonomously, in particular also because of the differences the countries attach to their own role. This is seen in several instances, e.g. in the discussion on the opposition between a technocratic and a political definition of good governance. This leads to a further conclusion about the use and role of scientific knowledge, which is in Germany, according to Tennekes, much more tied up with bureaucratic processes and this then leads to a dominance of politics over science in the German case. In the Netherlands World Bank studies (like those of Craig Burnside and David Dollar) could thus play a much more important role in the debate than in Germany.

Poverty and poverty reduction
The broad and official goal of Dutch development policy has been ‘Poverty Reduction’ for a long time. Jan Pronk introduced it very ambitiously in the 1970s as its only goal and objective, stating that Dutch development assistance should go ‘as directly and as much as possible to the poorest of the poor’. In later governments this changed to a two-track policy in which ‘poverty reduction’ was one of the tracks, next to economic
self-reliance. In the beginning of the 1980s it was assessed that only a very limited percentage of Dutch bilateral aid was aimed at the ‘track’ of poverty reduction. In the mid-1980s the two-track policy was merged into one, ‘structural poverty alleviation’, but they were entangled again in the following governments. It has been argued that the Netherlands never had a clear poverty reduction policy, in absence of a good analysis of what poverty is and was and lacking a clear strategy that could tackle it.’ It is easy to claim that very little has changed in the last years. The Netherlands are a generous donor in several respects: it adheres enthusiastically to the Paris Agenda, it participates actively in donor coordination, it gives nearly all of its bilateral assistance in the form of sector and budget support in sectors as education and health. This all seems to indicate that Dutch development assistance is indeed directed at poverty reduction, but that this is more part of an implicit than an explicit strategy. It is more adhering to an international agenda of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and Sector Wide Approaches, than having a specific Dutch agenda with specific emphasis on subjects, themes or objectives that are seen as important by the Dutch aid community.

Robrecht Renard of the University of Antwerp then comes with a very interesting article, because he tries to show that there are some fault lines in the ‘New Aid Paradigm’. He discusses the relation between the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the PRSPs, questioning if they are natural complements. He does so in particular under the angle of ownership: are the MDG goals and targets also owned by aid receivers? And are they easily to be translated in the PRSPs? Are they realistic for countries like Niger or Senegal? The New Aid Agenda, Robrecht Renard argues, is in clear contrast with the two preceding aid paradigms (project aid and structural adjustment), which are widely admitted these days as having failed in several aspects, but the reasons for their failure can be found in two, rather different narratives. The first is putting emphasis on dialogue, partnership and participation and on the failure of orthodox macro-economic policies contained in the ‘Washington Consensus’. The other however emphasises the failure of aid-recipient governments and their lack of commitment to development. The first narrative leads to the Paris Agenda of ‘harmonisation’ and ‘alignment’, to ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’, the other to new forms of conditionality and selectivity. All this ends into a conclusion that there are deep inconsistencies and contradictions in the New Aid Agenda and that these will undermine the effectiveness of aid. In particular because development cooperation has become much more a collective effort these future failures might also cause a more rapid disillusionment with aid, is the a bit gloomy warning.

Some additional historical notes

Five years ago the official Institute of Dutch History (ING) started to publish a series of books with source material of the history of Dutch development cooperation. Four volumes have been published up till now leading to 1997 and a new series spanning the 1980s is being prepared. It will give researchers a further access to sources like the minutes of cabinet meetings. The history of Dutch development cooperation has
so far been written in bits and pieces and some of these publications were highly con-
tested.

In this yearbook Inge Brinkman analyses the transition period between the Chris-
tian missions, the end of colonialism and the ‘new era of development’. Often this new ‘development era’ is seen as a sharp and dramatic break with the past. Brinkman however sees many links between development, colonialism and the missionary enterprise and insists on the importance for ‘development’ to study the debates on colonialism and missions. She thus delves in a series of late colonial development plans in coun-
tries like Kenya and Mali and in discourses and practices of the missionary enterprise. It leads to the conclusion that the development era was closely related and even over-
lapped the colonial epoch and the time of missionary presence in the (former) colo-
nies. Development organizations, and not only Christian ones, had to rely also in the Netherlands for a long time on missionaries, not only on their presence ‘in the field’, but also by taking (former) missionaries in their staff in field offices and at head quar-
ters. It leads to Brinkman’s recommendation to see development much more as an arena for interaction and struggle and to try to understand how the concept was formed and changed in its historical contexts.

In a short article, leaning also on some earlier work, I try to analyse and indicate the important changes that have been taken place in Dutch development Cooperation in the last 45 years. The bilateral aid programme of the Netherlands which started slowly in the early 1960s, was instigated by the employers’ federations and big indus-
try and was dominated in the first ten years by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. It meant a concentration on large projects and delivery of goods and services of a small number of enterprises. A combination of political and bureaucratic changes (in par-
ticular the transfer of the responsibility of financial aid from Economic Affairs to For-
egn Affairs), pressure from churches, aid organisations and researchers totally changed the bilateral programme over a period of three decades. With its emphasis on sector programmes and budget support Dutch bilateral assistance has been cleared of economic and commercial interests. The last small space available for Dutch business interests are the small Low Conditionality Loans programme (called ORET, Develop-
ment Relevant Export Transactions programme) and can be found in some pro-
grammes for investment subsidies or investment insurance. In the allegory used in this article, it indicates that the ‘minister’ (symbolizing the ethical and humanitarian ra-
tionale behind foreign aid) has chased the ‘merchant’ (standing for the economic and commercial rationale) to the outer corners of Dutch development cooperation.

Emergency and humanitarian assistance

Critique on emergency assistance internationally more or less started with Frederick Cuny’s book Disasters and Development. He was, based on some 15 years of oper-
tional experience in over 30 relief operations, one of the first to acknowledge: ‘Inap-
propriate responses, constituting a second disaster, occur frequently’. Emergency assis-
tance as a disaster after the disaster. His ‘concerns’ of those days are, unfortunately, still of great relevance today. In the quick-and-dirty operation that humanitarian or emergency assistance normally is or seems to be now even more than in the days of
the Managua earthquake (1972) or the Andhra Pradesh cyclone (1977), one sees that his first concern also now is often lost in the activism of the ‘relief workers without borders’. His first concern was that he considered it to be ‘imperative’ that an intervenor identified various coping mechanisms that exist in a community struck by disaster and tried to understand their role in the society. He observed that most interveners did not understand these mechanisms, also because as outsiders they were not familiar with the society and how it worked. He summed up some of the major problems this caused: the undermining of authority and prestige of local leaders, assistance that becomes a disincentive to self-help and undermined coping mechanisms like local institutions or organisations, reinforcement of the status quo and local authoritarian structures. He summed it up in 15 lessons on general aspects of the humanitarian intervention and nine lessons for aid and assistance. One tends to see them as obligatory reading for staff of humanitarian agencies still today.

About the same time a report of the Swedish Red Cross on natural disasters was discussed and later elaborated in a book, discussing mainly types and nature of natural disasters and ways to prevent them. The book contained however also a chapter with the intention to document ‘the ways well-intended relief schemes can go wrong’. The very first lesson presented also here was that of ‘the helplessness myth’: disaster victims are not a huddled mass of dazed humanity and in general there is virtually no panic, on the contrary mostly directly after the disaster people are quickly organising themselves in loose, informal structures to rescue victims and provide assistance. It means that external relief workers and humanitarian assistance, contrary to our eyes and minds set by disaster news reports, only provide a small proportion of assistance to disaster victims, the major part coming from the victims themselves. The chapter further documents a series of goods that were sent as assistance which were completely inappropriate, from polystyrene German igloo tents to potato chips.

In the Netherlands the discussion on emergency assistance started when I tried to sum up what went wrong with it in the disasters of 1985. It led to a television discussion and a few later to a booklet on emergency assistance and the Dutch players in it. The book presented some strong conclusions on emergency assistance as it was provided at that time. One conclusion amongst others was that emergency assistance in its traditional format of a temporary and specialist intervention was a natural enemy of development. Another that in most disasters medical emergency assistance was not necessary or needed, also in the sense that in most instances it would come too late.

Looking at the Indian Ocean Tsunami emergency assistance it seems that things are now even more complicated because of the enormous proliferation of international humanitarian and emergency organisations. The official evaluation of the international response to the tsunami indicates that also in this unprecedented disaster ‘practically all immediate life-saving actions and initial emergency support in the first few days (and weeks in some cases) were provided by local people’. Then the international community arrived and the report sums up:

‘The number of international agencies involved in the response grew unabated. Well-resourced agencies and very small ones, competent and incompetent, well-prepared and unprepared, secular and faith-based, reputable and disreputable, household names and
unknown, ambitious and humble, opportunistic and committed ... they all turned up ... In the case of Bandah Aceh, in addition to the cumulative number of registered agencies ... there may have been as many as 200 small international agencies that stayed only a few weeks ... Proliferation was evident everywhere. For example, there were 22 medical NGOs working in the health sector in one part of the west coast of Aceh." "

It could not be a surprise that competition between the international agencies for projects, ‘clients’, facilities, materials, staff, and, not to forget, publicity was very stiff. In addition a lot of aid was wasted, was unsolicited and many items distributed to the victims were inappropriate or distributed to them several times. A year after the disaster the warehouses were still full with large quantities of relief items that had not been distributed. The international NGO Pharmaciens sans Frontières presented a report and documentary film called ‘The Second Tsunami’ on emergency medical donations to Aceh. It found that more than 4,000 tonnes of drugs were donated, although no medicine was asked for. One out of four drugs was expired, six out of ten were not essential drugs in emergency relief, seven out of ten were written in languages that local medical staff could not understand. The costs of destroying these drugs were expected to cost €8 million.17 The international evaluation report indicates that not the least known organisations were making these types of mistakes or were not able to live up to their promises and international guidelines. The report in naming names mentions amongst others Red Cross Societies, the World Health Organisation and UNICEF.

Thea Hilhorst discusses in her article the participation of the ‘victims’ in post-disaster reconstruction in Sri Lanka. She describes the trends in participation in humanitarian aid and discusses different approaches used in the reconstruction. In Sri Lanka there was a declining level of satisfaction with humanitarian assistance. People considered the pace of recovery slow and complained about corruption and a lack of transparency. International agencies seem to have postponed participation mechanisms in the early phases after the disaster and then had an emphasis on participatory planning more than on implementation. Thea Hilhorst concludes that interagency competition leads to bad participation practices and often does not take into account local dynamics and power processes. The new emphasis on rights-based discourse in humanitarian assistance could be an improvement as it sees aid-recipients as valued customers, but could also lead to individualistic rivalry over aid.

In collaboration with Madeleen Helmer Thea Hilhorst argues the need for systematic attention for disaster risk reduction in humanitarian and development policies and programmes. The authors state that the Netherlands are in fact involved in many disaster risk reduction activities but that it lacks a coherent policy guide by a clear vision. The activities seem to be scattered and not part of a strategy, based on context and a mix of different approaches. They arrive at a set of recommendations in which the hierarchy of measures is clearly stipulated and in which the importance of the structural reduction of vulnerability is emphasized.

Also in the Netherlands – a country in which private initiatives in development cooperation flourish – the Indian Ocean tsunami created a flood of donations and private initiatives. In a very short time more than xx 205 million were donated by a country of 16 million. Han Valk and Lau Schulpen analyse this enormous public sup-
port against the general public support in the Netherlands for development cooperation. They indicate that public support in itself is a multidimensional concept, involving knowledge, opinion and behaviour. They argue that support for development cooperation is high in the Netherlands with regard to knowledge and opinion, but less so with regard to behaviour. The last conclusion is based on the fact that private financial contributions are only a small part of total contribution. A conclusion that might be debatable since government support for private aid organisations in the Netherlands is very high and thus confuses the figures. An international comparison of per capita support for private aid organisations might give a better indication. Han Valk and Lau Schulpen are of the opinion that the Tsunami support might have little bearing on public support for development cooperation in the near future, since scepticism on the effectiveness of aid is rising. An exception however, they conclude, might be made for private initiatives, which in general raise more trust and offer the possibility for an active involvement.

Subsidising private aid organisations

This leads us smoothly to the next subject under debate in particular in the last ten years: the subsidy of private aid organisations. A large proportion, between 15 and 20 percent, of the development assistance budget of the Netherlands is destined at private aid organisation. The beginning of this programme dates back to 1965, when the first small amount of Dfl. 5 million was made available for projects of private aid organisations. Three were selected, mirroring the political constellation at the time: a Catholic, a Protestant and a non-faith-based organisation. Thirteen years later a humanistic organisation was added and the subsidy scheme changed from a project based to a programme based scheme, but very little changed over the years, only the budget grew twenty-fold. There were some internal debates on individual projects in the 1970s, but programme funding placed the organisations outside the scope for interference of civil servants and diplomats. In a country where associational life is present in every corner of society, subsidies for private organisations seem to have raised pretty little discussion indeed.19

This all changed in the 1990s. An evaluation, organised by the four co-financing organisations themselves, showed that their effectiveness was more questionable than the organisations made the interested community believe. The four organisations came to be seen as a ‘closed front’, a ‘gang of four’, that tried to reserve the subsidy scheme for themselves. Minister Eveline Herfkens caused a first breach in this front by granting Foster Parents Plan the status of co-financing organisation. This turned out to be an unlucky choice, because the organisation was and came under heavy fire and subsequently lost a major part of its sponsors and finally also its co-financing status.19 A new law on subsidies brought the minister to further changes in the subsidy schemes and finally to the Co-financing Schemes as they exist now from the beginning of the year 2007.

Lau Schulpens depicts in his article this ‘Werdegang’ of the subsidy schemes. He analyses the changes made and the assessment procedure of the NGOs applying for a subsidy. He also sketches the new special programme for ‘foreign’, non-Dutch,
NGDOs. All these changes are finally borne out of an entirely inward-looking Dutch exercise, in which lessons from other donor countries were not at all taken into account, is his conclusion.

**Peace keeping and development cooperation**

The last and, in a certain sense rather new, topic is dealing with the issue of the relation between peace keeping and development cooperation, and thus with the relation between defence, foreign and development policies. Of course, since 1989 this topic is not ‘new’, but in the Netherlands debates between ministers, between ministers and parliament, between opinion leaders and politicians seem to have been concentrated mainly on the question ‘who has to pay for what?’. The Ministry of Defence confronted with Post-Cold War budget cuts, always seemed to hunt at the coffers full of money at the other side of the fence, in the development cooperation budget. It often got support, already in the Lubbers-Kok Cabinet of the beginning of the 1990s, of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs who also like to break through the fence. The reverification of Dutch foreign policy in 1995 in the first so-called ‘Purple Cabinet’, a cabinet of the liberals and Labour, also was more about (the distribution of) money than that it came to new policy lines and tried to debate the relation between the three policies in the new era. This was amplified when minister Van Ardenne declared her intention to get in the Development Assistance Committee a wider definition of Official Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, including more aspects of peace keeping operations. It could be concluded that ‘money debates’ for a long time overshadowed a debate on content and on new forms of international cooperation in the 21st century.

Uli Mans tries to break through this impasse by depicting six dilemmas for foreign, development and defence policies, gained from the experiences in Afghanistan. The Netherlands are heavily involved in the peace keeping operations in Afghanistan, employing 1,600 troops in Uruzgan and donating around $ 85 million development assistance annually to the Afghan government. In analysing the emergent Dutch policy on peace-keeping and reconstruction Uli Mans postulates dilemmas like the merger of the different departments involved, the alliances with the different players like NATO, EU and UN. Also guidelines, tools and the integrated policy at the local level are discussed. He concludes that a fully integrated policy at all levels is wishful thinking at best, but that it is necessary to rethink and reorganise policy regarding fragile states.

**Conclusion**

A wide range of subjects is dealt with in this first Yearbook. It shows that the Dutch research community is still actively involved in research and debates on international cooperation and Dutch policies with regard to these different fields of international cooperation. For a long time there was rather little debate between researchers, policy makers and politicians. Several new initiatives are trying to regain lost territory. The Directorate General for International Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is now financing several, what is called ‘International Cooperation Academies’, research programmes with Dutch university institutes on subjects like poverty, majors diseases,
multilateral organisations and Civil Society. Research programmes that not only should bring new knowledge and insights, but also raise debate and discussion between departments of the Ministry, researchers and other interested audiences. A Development Policy Review Network (DPRN) was created and received subsidy from the Ministry to organise encounters between staff of aid organisations and researchers. These and other initiatives show a new openness in which also this Yearbook will try to regain its own space. The quality of the articles presented and the broad range of subjects they deal with, should give hope that this will be a successful enterprise.

Notes

1. The Paris Agenda stems from the Paris Declaration of March 2003, in which bilateral and multilateral donors as well as aid recipients promised to raise aid effectiveness. Donor should contribute by coordinating more, by aligning to recipient country’s goals, objectives and priorities, and by harmonizing procedures.

2. For a list of ministers and cabinets in the Netherlands see my article in this Yearbook.

3. For a full list of ministers see my article in the ‘Forum section’ of this Yearbook.

4. Up until that moment, the criteria were only used to select developing countries which would receive Dutch foreign aid. From 1979 onwards they should be used also as threshold-criteria, meaning that countries that would not fit in one of the criteria, e.g. would have a GNP per capita of more than $550, would not receive any Dutch aid anymore.


8. This not to indicate imperialistic tendencies that we want to integrate Flanders in the Netherlands, but that we are well interested in opening the pages of this Yearbook for contributions of colleagues from Flemish universities.


10. Under the Dutch information law researchers already could have individual access to a major part of the documents in the ministry.


12. E.g. my PhD-hesis: Geven is nemen: de Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp aan Tanzania en Sri Lanka, Nijmegen: Stichting Derde Wereld Publikaties, 1988. And also: The humanitarisation of
19 Television reports and an evaluation of its programmes in Haiti and Colombia, as well as reports on the high salary of an interim-manager were causing this disappearance of trust in the organisation.