Preface

This volume is the result of a European network of excellence called CINEFOGO (Civil society and New Forms of Governance). The network was subsidized by the European Union from 2004 to 2009 and brought together over 200 researchers from 45 institutes across Europe to work in 50 ‘work packages’ and ensure a greatly increased output in the shape of planning sessions, workshops, conferences, policy briefings, publications and so forth (see www.cinefogo.org for a comprehensive list).

We, the authors of this book, started our discussions as organizers of a work package entitled ‘Between State and Citizens – The role of Third Sector Organisations in the Governance and Production of Social Services’ in the Deutsche Bahn lounge of Cologne Central railway station in the Spring of 2006. During the months that followed, we produced an initial note about civility and civickness and invited a small group of researchers to a small conference in Berlin in March 2007, which was facilitated by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung. The papers presented at this conference were revisited and fresh papers were discussed in a follow-up conference in Ljubljana in March 2008, hosted by the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana. A selection of papers was presented at the Conference of the International Society of Third Sector Research in Barcelona in July 2008 and we subsequently began work on this book at another meeting in the Deutsche Bahn lounge in Cologne and through many e-mails. We thank the co-organizers of our conference meetings for their help and the participants for their helpful comments.

We would like to acknowledge the European Commission’s financial support of the Cinefogo network and to thank Thomas Boje and his team at Roskilde University in particular for organizing the network so wonderfully and for mediating between Brussels’ desire for more figures and information and our limited time and patience for form filling. We would also like to thank Benjamin Ewert of Justus-Liebig-University in Giessen for all his help in organizing the work package, as well as Toby Adams for the linguistic editing, and Sjors Overman and Annemiek Lichtenberg for the work on formatting, indexing and so on.

Last but not least, we would like to thank the authors for the civility they have shown during our struggle with civickness and for their willingness to use this term as a point of reference.

Taco Brandsen, Paul Dekker & Adalbert Evers.
Contents

*Taco Brandsen, Paul Dekker and Adalbert Evers*
Civiness in the governance and delivery of social services 9

*Paul Dekker*
Civiness: from civil society to civic services? 19

*Adalbert Evers*
Civiness, civility and their meanings for social services 41

*Taco Brandsen*
Civiness in organizations: a reflection on the relationship between professionals and managers 67

*Evelien Tonkens*
Civiness and citizen participation in social services: conditions for promoting respect and public concern 83

*Victor Pestoff*
Civiness and the co-production of social services in Sweden 99

*Kai Leichsenring*
Introducing civiness in steering and managing social services. Cases from long-term care 113

*Ota de Leonardis*
Organization matters: contracting for service provision and civiness 125

*Stéphane Nassaut and Marthe Nyssens*
Civiness and service governance: the case of the Belgian quasi-market in the field of proximity services 153
Håkon Lorentzen  
Civisness and ownership. Volunteer Centers between state and civil society  181

Michaela Neumayr and Michael Meyer  
In search of civiness: an empirical investigation of service delivery, public advocacy, and community building by civil society organizations  201

Silvia Ferreira  
Researching civiness contexts and conditions: the case of the Portuguese welfare mix in social services  227

Bernard Enjolras  
Between market and civic governance regimes: civicness in the governance of social services in Europe  249

Janet Newman  
Civiness and the paradoxes of contemporary governance  273

Index  285

Authors  289
Chapter 1

Taco Brandsen, Paul Dekker, Adalbert Evers

Civicness in the governance and delivery of social services

The spheres of the state, the market and the third sector (or civil society) have all been heralded as breeding grounds for civility, as well as decried as sources of vice. We argue that sectorial perspectives should be left aside and examine how civil behaviour can be identified and encouraged in any institutional setting. To that end, this chapter introduces the concept of civicness, discusses its basic dimensions, and applies it to the area of social services. The chapter ends with a brief description of the other chapters in this edited volume.

1. Introduction

The spheres of the market, the state and the third sector have each been credited with the guardianship of civilization. Not only are such claims to exclusivity dubious in empirical terms, they also lead us into a conceptual dead end. This book aims to introduce the concept of ‘civicness’ as a means of helping to overcome these sectorial biases and taking theory-building in a new, more promising direction.

It has often been claimed that third sector organizations are carriers of civil values and that participation in non-political voluntary associations enables people to learn civic skills and, in effect, to be ‘civilized’. According to that line of thought, the third sector and its organizations have broadly been identified with civil society. Third sector organizations are termed civil society organizations (CSOs) and civil society itself, as an “organized civil society”, is associated with a sector of special organizations. However, as Dekker notes in his contribution to this volume, the evidence for the positive contribution that these organizations make to the civility of individuals and society is, at best, mixed. Any effects of internal socialization they might have appear to be quite limited and their often narrow representation of special interests in the public sphere does not necessarily advance a civilizing public discourse.

As for the market and the state, similar points can be made. In his chapter, Evers refers to claims about the civilizing effects of doux commerce, the ability of trade and commerce to mitigate conflicts and convert them into peaceful competition. Indeed, one of the assumptions behind the work of Adam Smith was that the market
system would free citizens from tyranny. Yet to others, the market represents greed and oppression, and is the world’s primary source of vice. Similar charges have been made against the state. It can be an instrument of oppression and bureaucratic imperialism. Yet, according to many political theories, as well as in legal and public administration literature, democratic states and their institutions are the ultimate guardians of civil virtues. People that become active in civilized ways do so as members of the citizenry that, as a collective, forms the state as a democratic republic. All of this is true, but none of it in an absolute sense.

We believe that such sectorial perspectives fail to address the real issue, and fail to reflect the realities of contemporary civility. Civilized forms of action may refer to peoples’ role in economic exchange, their role as active citizens and as members of one or more third sector organizations which advance special demands and represent special perspectives. And as some of the contributions to this book show, the degree of civility within social services, which we take here as a case in point, cannot simply be traced back whether these services belong to one or the other sphere or sector. Our concern should not be to promote the virtues of any one specific sector, but to examine how virtues and ‘virtuous’ behaviour can be identified and encouraged in any institutional setting.

We would like to introduce the unusual term ‘civicness’ as a catalyst for this crossing of spheres and cross-disciplinary discussion of modern civil society. We hope it will prove useful in liberating us from narrow sectorial approaches, and in connecting the knowledge we can use from philosophy, sociology and political science, social policy and even public management literature. But what is civicness? The book will address this issue both in theoretical terms through a discussion of concepts and academic disciplines, and in empirical terms through the analysis of its realization in various institutional settings. Empirically, our analysis of these processes and institutions focuses on the area of social services, because this is an area where (1) state, market and third sector combine, and (2) civicness is itself central to the delivery of services.

2. A working definition of civicness

The aim of our collective efforts was to take up and develop the notion of civicness as a point of reference for the analysis of services, especially in the field of social services. The notion of civicness is closely related to that of ‘civility’. When the latter term is debated, it is usually associated with the virtues and manners of individual citizens – commitment to other people, social concern, involvement and responsibility; the ability to refrain from aggression in conflicts, mutual respect – all these are associated with civility. Likewise, there is much agreement about what constitutes its opposite: selfish behaviour, indifference towards others, the inability
Civicness in the governance and delivery of social services

to refrain from aggression in conflicts, irresponsible behaviour, a low level of internalization of general moral rules, and other vices.

There is no generally accepted definition of the term. We will interpret civicness as the capacity of institutions, organizations and procedures to stimulate, reproduce, and cultivate civility. By using this definition, we want to spotlight the interaction between institutional settings on the one hand, and the behaviour of politicians, professionals and users on the other. Accordingly, our focus in this book is on the processes and institutions in society that promote the attitudes and values mentioned above.

On the basis of this definition, one can distinguish at least three dimensions of civicness:

- The social dimension of civicness includes issues like the overall degree to which a society or political community addresses citizens as equals, in spite of their differences. When it comes to service systems, the question is to what extent they contribute to social inclusion and integration. By contrast, the “uncivic” qualities of such systems would privilege or stigmatize specific groups.

- The personal dimension manifests itself in people’s everyday behaviour, from passivity and egotism to respectful and tolerant behaviour. In the area of services, this personal dimension of civicness concerns the extent to which the subjective points of view, personal situations and autonomy of users/ clients/ customers are respected, as opposed to authoritative or impersonal behaviour on the part of professionals and organizations.

- The political dimension relates to governance and its democratic qualities, and the degree to which people are addressed as active citizens. In the area of social services, there are issues about whether the structures of governance and service delivery include opportunities for public debates and processes of deliberation, forms of democratic participation by citizens, either in decision making or in the co-production of services.

Within the general theme of civicness, the various contributions to this book address a range of subject areas. In doing so, they cover both the level of service delivery and the level of governance.

At the level of service delivery, the civicness of organizations is related to their internal relationships (a point addressed by Brandsen in his chapter) and to relationships between professionals and users. What configurations of organizational characteristics and what forms of service interactions are most likely to cultivate civility? In social services such as education, health care, social services, welfare and other fields, there are some tough questions about the position of professionals and clients, especially after the rationalization imposed by the public management
Taco Brandsen, Paul Dekker and Adalbert Evers

reforms of recent decades. In elderly care, for instance, it is difficult to see the person in need of care as a member of a family at a time of scarce resources and tightened supervision. There are service areas where these issues are at the forefront of the debate, for instance, in discussions over the influence of social and community work in urban settings, or debates in health care over self-determination, privacy and lifestyles. In such cases, what is the proper role for managers and professionals? And which attitudes and skills make ‘good’ clients?

At the level of governance, a basic point of contention is the extent to which democracy needs civic virtues. For some, democracy can be brought about mainly by intelligent institutional arrangements that make it possible to turn a society of devils into a community that works for the common good, making the best for society out of people that may only be concerned with their own personal advantage. For others, democratic forms of governance are inconceivable without a culture of active citizenship and the civic virtues that go with it. The latter point of view has gained wider recognition over the last decade, as is evident, for instance, in the discussion on social capital. Our book also begins with this normative assumption. It emphasizes that any search for civicness, whether it be generally or in the field of personal social services, needs a basic public element – public spaces, where people can debate and participate freely and in which different sectors can be looked at from joint perspectives and be opened up to mutual influences. In this way, equality and respect can pervade business and, correspondingly, an entrepreneurial attitude can influence politics of state-institutions and third sector organizations.

3. How civicness is brought about

However, even when we accept this assumption, it is far from clear how a civic culture can be realized and what kind of balances and links are needed between public and private elements. With respect to the civicness of social services for instance, the predominant belief was that a completely state-public service and a professional public service ethos would – along with democracy – be best suited to bringing about a civic culture in social services. This was a central element of the welfare legacy, but an element that has now been called into question. But what can take its place? The reality, increasingly, involves hybrid system of service delivery – at times involving a greater role for market elements, private business and users as consumers, and on other occasions (but sometimes simultaneously) involving greater decentralization, local and more individual choices made by the users themselves in the co-production of services with a diversity of both public and private partners in mixed service systems.

How should such systems encourage civicness? Some argue for more active citizenship at higher levels of participation of individual citizens in governance and
Civiness in the governance and delivery of social services

through a more active role for third sector organizations. This important idea is taken up in this volume in particular by Pestoff and Tonkens. However, things become more complicated when the users of social services and the citizens also begin to act as consumers, and third sector organizations take on a role as consumer lobbies. More civiness in social services must remain based on public opinion building, but in this context of a public of citizens, consumers and co-producers, both voice and choice may have a role. What at institutional level(s) can be interpreted as the struggle between the relative impact of the state, the market and the third sector, develops as a complementary relationship at the personal level of individuals who must act simultaneously as citizens, consumers and members of a local setting or a special community of interest when it comes to using social services.

Given that background, it makes no sense to privilege or to talk down the role of one or other sphere or sector, because beyond some structural peculiarities their real natures are to a large degree historical, marked by the impact of policies, projects and movements and the mutual impact sectors have on one other in the context of the rise and fall of such historical projects and discourses – see the description of different ‘regimes’ of civility and civiness described in this vein in the contribution of Evers. Although there are many examples of the de-civilizing effects of big capital and/or big administration taking over and the impact of a critical public is on the wane, there are also many examples of the civilizing effects that both market and state intrusion can have if they are embedded in a wider civic culture.

All this leads us back to our initial hypothesis: civiness and civility should not be conceived as, first of all, the result of the structural specificities of special sectors but rather seen as by-products of social and political concepts, movements and projects that seek to strengthen civic virtues as they develop in the public sphere and cut across sectors. The degree to which society at large is civilized and civic is, then, ultimately to be understood as the result of the continuing interplay between this kind of self-production of society and the structural impact of basic spheres and sectors.

4. The structure of the book

The subsequent chapters (2,3) start by exploring the general concept of civiness in more depth. Paul Dekker challenges the traditional notion that activities in civil society, seen as the sphere of society in which voluntary associations are dominant, are the most important source of civility in modern society. By interacting and finding solutions to common problems, members of associations are believed to become citizens with an interest in the common good. However, the evidence for this is, at best, mixed. It is not voluntary associations in a separate societal sphere of
civil society, but combinations of associational with public and commercial modes of social coordination that appear to offer a more promising option for civilizing modern society. The chapter discusses examples of hybridity and concludes with a plea for a wider acceptance in social research of civi
cness as a normative perspective. Adalbert Evers also argues that reflection on the concepts of civi
cness and civility make a difference to the usual civil society and third sector debates. He argues that there are good reasons why some of the concepts of civil society are not confined to a specific sector, but rather, by making reference to images of society at large and/or the public space, affect all sectors, depending on their constellation and interplay. Likewise, civi
ness and civility cannot be understood as sectoral issues. However, beyond a fundamental consensus, civi
ness and civility can mean different things and the predominant meanings change over time. Evers discusses these with reference to changing discourses on welfare in the field of social services. He argues that, despite the contested meanings of civility and civi
ness, they are points of reference for a richer discussion about the quality and overall design of social services.

The following chapters (4,5,6) analyze the concept of civi
ness in more specific contexts. In his chapter, Taco Brandsen defines the meaning of civi
ness in organizations. In the process of delivering services, organizations have to deal with conflicts over competing and sometimes irreconcilable values, especially at a time when they are facing competitive pressure and diminishing resources. The civi
ness of organizations expresses itself in how they enable positive interaction concerning such conflicts between their members. The chapter focuses specifically on the relationship between professionals and their managers. By infusing social behaviour with civil values, organizations can contribute to a wider culture of citizenship. Again at the organizational level, Evelien Tonkens discusses the relationship between civi
ness and the participation of citizens in social services. The chapter starts with the question of how participation contributes to civi
ness. It concludes that participation has a higher chance of success, and of fostering civi
ness, when certain conditions are met: when participation is structured rather than organized on a laissez-faire basis; when it is based on experience rather than expertise; when representation is substantive rather than merely descriptive; and when it is recognized that all the actors involved struggle with the tension between public and personal/group interest, and not only citizens. In a different way, Victor Pestoff also takes up the topic of participation in relation to civi
ness. Many countries in Europe are searching for new ways to engage citizens. His chapter focuses on the political dimension of civi
ness and co-production in a universal welfare state – Sweden. Co-
production is a technique for promoting greater participation by citizens in the provision of public services. It implies a mix of both public service agents and citizens who contribute to the provision of a public service. A favourably disposed state regime and legislation are necessary for promoting greater civi
ness, co-
production and third sector provision of welfare services.
Civicness in the governance and delivery of social services

The next three chapters (7, 8, 9) move up to a level of analysis that focuses on the interaction of organizational issues and the system of governance. The contribution by Kai Leichsenring deals with the challenge of strengthening civicness in reformed methods of managing social services which seek to combine the advantages of market mechanisms, bureaucratic administration and third sector approaches. Such attempts obviously need the support of internal and external sources. Leichsenring describes two distinctive examples in the context of long-term care systems to show how a type of systemic organizational development that blends different perspectives can help to strengthen ‘civic’ elements – specifically communication, dialogue and shared responsibilities. Ota de Leonardis analyses the organizational dynamics of service provision in the framework of the welfare contractual turn in Italy, comparing two cases in order to examine when and how civicness is fostered. Particular attention is devoted to how power asymmetries on the boundary between the public and private realms are handled in organizational settings. The chapter also raises questions concerning justice vocabularies and choices. The role of service recipients – especially the least advantaged – proves to be a key issue in investigating the civicness of service provision. The interplay of state regulation and different organizations on service markets and its relationship to civicness is also the theme of the contribution by Stéphane Nassaut and Marthe Nyssens. The type of quasi-market which they look at involves the provision of personal social services at the user’s home and, at the same time, labour market integration services, since the workers hired in the framework of a service voucher system are mainly disadvantaged workers. In this type of regulated market there was no simple link between the institutional status of the service providers and civicness. The for-profit providers, for instance, operated with different business practices that contained various levels of civicness not only with respect to the profile of the services but also in terms of the way the organizations dealt with vulnerable employees.

The following three chapters (10, 11, 12) focus on the differences and relationships between sectors and the question of to what extent the civicness of organizations is linked to their (third) sector adherence. Håkon Lorentzens’ looks at the Norwegian volunteer centres that exist in different forms of ownership – as autonomous, voluntary and municipal organizations. It is usually assumed that when similar welfare services are produced by different institutions, their form of ownership will put some kind of distinctive stamp upon the service they provide. However, when this assumption was tested on the Norwegian volunteer centres, a striking degree of similarity was found. The question then became how we can explain the similarities in spite of the different forms of ownership. The similar type of professionalism to be found in all the centres is seen as a major element in explaining this – the cross-sectorial impact of a professional discourse that represents itself a hybridization of different perspectives and concerns. In their chapter, Michaela Neumayr and Michael Meyer report on a research project that was guided by the hypothesis that
in the field of social services, the attitudes found in and the forms of services provided by third sector organizations are characterized by a loss of civicism as they become more market-oriented. Civicism is conceptualized as an organization’s capacity to foster civility, which is understood as an individual attitude. The assumption was that CSOs would be characterized by higher levels of civicism if they were involved in advocacy and community-building activities, and by lower levels if they had a more market-oriented approach to their activities. However, to their surprise, the authors found no such negative correlation at the attitudinal level to support their hypothesis. Silvia Ferreira’s chapter indirectly takes up the finding that there is no clear link between sector adherence and civicism. Beyond simple indications that the type of ‘sector does not matter’, she makes the point that the civicism of an organization must be traced back to its position within a complex environment, where sectors are just one influential element among many others. By describing the features and trajectory of the welfare mix in social service provision in Portugal, she discusses what she calls the ‘contextuality’ of the conditions for civicism in social services. The co-evolution of state and third sector has hampered the emergence of an explicit civicism discourse in Portugal, but the issue plays a role in the present development of new welfare mixes.

The last two chapters (13, 14) focus on politics and governance. Bernard Enjolras analyses recent policy changes in the regulation and governance of social services in Europe. Their contested nature is reflected in competing methods of regulation: market-based or competitive governance versus civic-based or partnership governance. It is argued that the market and civicism constitute two distinct repertoires of action and coordination mechanisms which mobilize different justifications and which view persons and objects according to different value systems. Currently, the governance of social services in Europe seems to be based on a compromise between the market-based and partnership-based governance regimes. The civic dimension of this mixed governance is enhanced by the interplay of mechanisms of representation, deliberation and participation. Janet Newman’s chapter explores the paradoxes of contemporary public services in Britain and elsewhere. On the one hand, they are becoming less public because of a growing emphasis on competition and efficiency, and on the other hand they are being charged with more tasks relating to the interests of the public. As regards the public interest, they are supposed to serve civic values associated with citizenship rights and democracy, but are actually becoming more involved in managing and disciplining the public for the sake of civility. Newman deals critically with the still dominant trend of integrating third sector organizations in contractual relationships and with the dominant assumption that public interests can easily be realigned in hybrid public/private arrangements.

The final chapter leads us back to the first chapters dealing with the meanings of civicism and civility. In the real situations presented and analyzed in this volume, there seem to be more tensions and contradictions in efforts to become more civic
Civicness in the governance and delivery of social services

and civil – or in efforts to make others more civic and more civil – than acknowledged in our initial serene conceptualization of civicness as the capacity of institutions, organizations and procedures to stimulate, reproduce, and cultivate civility. A strong(er) focus is needed on the changing content of civic/civil ideals and the inconsistent capacity of policies to reduce uncivil behaviour and enhance active citizenship. This is of particular interest in terms of the governance and delivery of social services, as demonstrated in various chapters and in particular the comparison of welfare discourses in Evers’ chapter. They demonstrate a range of very different notions of what constitutes a civil or good society and a range of different models of service provision in the state-society nexus. We hope that this volume, with its variety of perspectives and empirical cases linked by a common concern, will stimulate further discussion and empirical analysis of what is civic and civil in the changing ideals, policies and practices of the delivery of social services.
Chapter 2

Paul Dekker

Civics: from civil society to civic services?

Activities in civil society, seen as the sphere of society in which voluntary associations are dominant, are viewed as an important source of civility in modern society. By interacting and finding solutions for common problems, members of associations become citizens with a broader perspective and interest in the common good. However, the evidence for this positive effect is, at best, mixed. It is not voluntary association in a separate sphere of civil society, but combining associational with public and commercial modes of social coordination, that appears to offer a more promising route to the ‘civilizing’ of modern society.

Civil and citizenship: two words which are closely linked in etymological terms and two phenomena which are both said to be in decline. However, the spontaneous associations they evoke can be quite contradictory: duties versus rights, politeness versus politics, passive acceptance versus active involvement, the preoccupation of conservatives versus the fixation of progressives. On further reflection too, civility and citizenship turn out to produce similar ambivalences. In addressing the theme of civicness that runs throughout this special issue, my focus here will be on the notion of civility and I will only bring in citizenship when some concrete embodiment is needed. Following a discussion of the concept of civility (§ 1), I will focus on the presumed civilizing effects of civil society (§ 2) and the evidence for this from empirical research (§ 3). The results are somewhat unconvincing, and we will look next at more fragmented and qualitative evidence for civicness in hybrid organizations in which elements of voluntary involvement are combined with the input of government and business (§ 4). This relates to the discussion about the civicness of social services in the other chapters of this volume. I will conclude with a brief discussion of the desirability of the explicit acknowledgement of civicness as a normative perspective in social research (§ 5).

1. Civility

In the introductory note, we defined civicness as the capacity of institutions, organizations and procedures to stimulate, reproduce and cultivate civility. But what
is civility? According to the *Collins Essential English Dictionary* (2nd edition 2006) ‘civility’ means ‘politeness, consideration, courtesy, tact, good manners, graciousness, cordiality, affability, amiability, complaisance, courteousness’.¹ In daily life, civility is associated predominantly with the virtues and manners of individuals. People demonstrate civility when they refrain from pursuing their own self-interest, are polite and helpful to other people, but on the other hand perhaps rather aloof, when they show an interest in public affairs but without becoming too fanatical, for example. People lack civility when they behave selfishly and aggressively, behave inappropriately in public (i.e. behave as if they were at home), and are indifferent to issues of communal and public interest.

These everyday manifestations of civility are reflected in the philosophical and social science literature, which occur in various guises and often accentuate the notion of the common interest and the link with public controversy and democratic politics.

Edward Shils, to quote one of the most prominent thinkers on civility, distinguishes between ‘normal’ and ‘substantive’ civility:

“… Substantive civility is the virtue of civil society. It is the readiness to moderate particular, individual or parochial interests and to give precedence to the common good. The common good is not susceptible to an unambiguous definition; consensus about it is probably not attainable. It is however certainly meaningful to speak about it. Wherever two antagonistic advocates arrive at a compromise through recognition of a common interest, they redefine themselves as members of a collectivity, the good of which has precedence over their own particular objectives.” (Shils 1997 [1991]: 337-338, 345).

Civility is of particular importance in public spaces since it regards relationships between people who may not know each other. Boyd (2006) describes civility as a

¹ According to the same dictionary the adjective ‘civil’ has more diverse meanings than the noun ‘civility’. Civil refers to ‘1. of or occurring within the state or between citizens: civil unrest; 2. of or relating to the citizen as an individual: civil rights; 3. not part of the military, legal or religious structures of a country: civil aviation; 4. polite or courteous: he seemed very civil and listened politely.’ The noun associated with civil, i.e. the state or quality of being civil, is not civility but the unusual term ‘civilness’. ‘Civil’ and ‘civic’ seem to be more or less synonymous, and for a non-native speaker it is sometimes difficult to understand when which term is used. It is civic action but civil obedience, civil society but civic culture and civic community, civil rights but civic duties, and there are is both a civil service (the public servants) and a civic service (the alternative to military service).
Civicness: from civil society to civic services?

way of coping with diversity. Carter (1998: 279 ff.) sees it as ‘an ethic for strangers’; it is a form of moral duty, independent of one’s liking the other person. The aspects of respect and courtesy or politeness, and self-restraint and moderation, are mentioned by many authors (cf. Banfield 1992; Billante/Saunders 2002; Sistare 2004; White 2006), not only as conditions for interpersonal and intergroup relationships, but also as conditions for political democracy and democratic culture in society. Civility is necessary for mutual understanding, searching for common interests and arriving at compromises between citizens, and it is required when agreement cannot be reached and people have to continue living with their conflicting interests and views on the common good. By supporting self-regulation and preventing social clashes, civility can help to obviate the need for state intervention.

A number of authors stress more active and assertive values as integral to civility. Inherent respect for others or beliefs about the common good suggests that civility could imply a duty to oppose common sense or state policies. Civility ‘values diversity, disagreement, and the possibility of resistance’ (Carter 1998: 242).

‘Civility is not about politeness; it is about responsibility, which is why disobedience can also be civil’ (Barber 1998: 122).

The latter view hints at some of the tensions and ambivalences within the concept of civility. It implies general norms of good conduct for everybody, but also refers to courtly distinction; it should be all-inclusive and yet it is used to exclude (White 2006). It calls for social conformity and acceptance as well as civic courage. It embraces a focus on common interests, yet requires ‘agreement only on means and not on ends’ (Hayek, quoted in Boyd 2006: 871). People should be tolerant and prepared to revise their opinions, but also self-confident enough to engage in political debates. The aspect of tolerance in civility contradicts the requirement for active citizenship and encourages passivity (Walzer 1974; Mouritsen 2003).

Conservatives and progressives, communitarians and liberals all take different positions on these issues, and there are shifts over time and differences between cultures as regards the priorities. This makes the notion of civility itself an issue of

---

2 Mutz (2006) finds empirical evidence for a kind of trade-off between the two (2006): in more diverse groups tolerance and mutual understanding may rise, but the ability to act collectively may decrease.

3 See the ‘civic culture’ of Almond and Verba (1989 [1963]). The book compares national political cultures with different priorities and develops the notion of civic culture as a combination of subject and activist orientations. See Pye (1999) for an intriguing comparison of civility in several Asian cultures. He analyses different patterns in the general norms of personal interaction in intimate relationships and public relationships, involving superior–
social and political controversy. It can be interpreted both as respect for the powerful and a desire to draw attention to the plight of the powerless. ‘Civility’ can be used equally well as an argument for demanding equal rights and as an argument to declare the act of claiming such rights itself to be unfit. Although interpretations differ, civility primarily – or exclusively – involves the attitudes and behaviour of individuals. In this chapter, we will examine this focus on the civility of individuals. We are interested in how larger entities influence this civility (in their ‘civicness’), but we do not address the civility of communities, institutions or societies.

4 A related idea is the ‘decent society’ of Avishai Margalit. He sees it as part of the more ambitious idea of a just society and distinguishes it from ‘… a civilized one. A civilized society is one whose members do not humiliate one another, while a decent society is one in which the institutions do not humiliate people’ (Margalit 1996: 1).

5 Deviations from the national average for all nine traits on a scale from 0 (not at all important) to 100 (‘very important’) replying to the question ‘There are different opinions on what it takes to be a good citizen. As far as you are concerned personally … how important is it …?’

### Table 1: The relative importance of nine features of a good citizen in twelve countries worldwide⁵

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>BR</th>
<th>MX</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>AU</th>
<th>JP</th>
<th>KR</th>
<th>RU</th>
<th>CZ</th>
<th>BG</th>
<th>PT</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always to obey laws and regulations</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never to evade taxes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always to vote in elections</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To help people in [your country] who are worse off than yourself</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To keep an eye on the actions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Civinnes: from civil society to civic services?

| to help people in the rest of the world who are worse off than yourself | 10 | 8 | -14 | -12 | -11 | -23 | -16 | -5 | -2 | -1 | -3 | -8 |
| to choose products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, even if they cost a bit more | -21 | -29 | -15 | -9 | -15 | -4 | -18 | -14 | -35 | -4 | -17 | -12 |
| to be active in social and political associations | -16 | -14 | -18 | -23 | -22 | -15 | -14 | -19 | -22 | -17 | -21 | -30 |

Country codes: BR-Brazil, MX-Mexico, US-United States, AU-Australia, JP-Japan, KR-South Korea, RU-Russia, CZ-Czech Republic, BG-Bulgaria, PT-Portugal, NL-Netherlands, SE-Sweden

Source: ISSP citizenship module (2004/5), population aged 18 and older, weighted results

Similar questions in European surveys also reveal that high priority is given to obeying laws, in addition to helping other people and forming one’s opinions independently of others. Voting in elections is also recognized as an important trait of good citizens, but being active in politics and in voluntary associations are seen as the least important in all the European countries surveyed. However, these surveys use closed questions with response options that reflect the interests and presumptions of social scientists; what happens to perceptions of good citizenship when a more open question is put? This has been done this in the Netherlands. Surveys held in 1996 and 2004 asked people to sum up in no more than five points what ‘a good citizen’ does and does not do (Dekker 2008). The answers can be categorized and combined in many ways, but politics, it seems, ranks as even less important than when using closed questions. If people are asked about voting, they may confirm the moral duty to vote, but they are less likely to come up with the notion of voting without prompting. The most important ideas that come out of these surveys concern responsible behaviour: not being a burden to other people, having a positive attitude (tolerance, understanding) and doing good to others. People mention volunteering, more in the informal sense of helping others than in the formal sense of acting for or within organizations. In addition to this social aspect to good citizenship, there is the aspect of obeying the law, not driving too fast, not breaking the law, and so on. It would seem that people see things more in terms of what a good citizen refrains from doing, than what he or she does. Some people mention that a good citizen treats his or her children well and does not beat his wife, for example, but these are exceptions. The large majority of respondents mention nothing about either the purely political sphere or the intimate sphere, and talk about attitudes and behaviour in the more or less public space in between. They seem to
focus largely on civic virtues, on responsibilities towards other people and the community.
Active political involvement does not form part of the public understanding of good citizenship (cf. Théiss-Morse/Hibbing 2005; Wuthnow 1998). We will nonetheless consider this as an important element of civility when we look at the civicness – the civilizing effects – of civil society in the following section.

2. The presumed civicness of civil society

Definitions of civil society vary enormously. A large number of descriptions centre on a societal sphere situated somewhere between economy, state and intimate private life, and these identify civil-society organizations that are based on some characteristic way of operating or functioning (such as being non-profit organizations, being run by volunteers, encouraging debate, being active in the public sphere, fostering solidarity, etc.). A smaller number of definitions describe entire societies as civil. The various meanings are also often conflated (Edwards 2004: 10), especially in simplistic suggestions that a vibrant voluntary sector is a vital element in the infrastructure of a democratic public sphere and a prerequisite, or at least a helping hand, for civil society in the sense of a civilized (entire) society. Being separate from the state is central to the notion of the civil society as a societal sphere. Where the boundary lies between the market (or ‘business’ or the economy) and the intimate private sphere is less clear. There may well be sound historical and political reasons for defining civil society as everything that is the opposite of an oppressive state. Equally, civil society could be defined as almost anything which is not governed by the market and which runs counter to commercialization. However, in highly differentiated Western societies, the sphere of the civil society occupies a more complex intermediate position.

Rather than being defined as the ‘non-state’, ‘non-market’ and ‘non-family’, civil society can also be described in more positive terms as the societal domain within which voluntary associations and associative relations7 dominate. There are no clear-cut criteria for deciding which associations, currently situated in that grey area

---

6 For instance Edwards Shils (1997: 322), who described civil society as a ‘... a society of civility in the conduct of the members of the society towards each other’.
7 Cf. Warren (2000) who puts ‘pure associative relations’ at the heart of civil society, besides states with power and markets with money. Associative relations are based on normative and discursive influence. They can be found everywhere in society in combination with the other means of social coordination, but are most purely found in voluntary associations.
somewhere between civil society and the other realms, should be included. Given
the importance of voluntariness in our conception of civil society, associations in
which one ‘grows up’, from which one can only extract oneself at considerable cost,
or which hold a monopoly in a given domain, would fail to qualify as civil-society
organizations. However, because of their strong relationships with real voluntary
associations and because they have similar functions and positions in society, they
can belong to civil society as a societal domain. The focus on a particular domain or
sphere in society goes against operational definitions of civil society as a tool for
classifying single organizations and deciding whether the Catholic Church,
monopolistic trade unions or the Ku Klux Klan are ‘in’ or ‘out’. In particular it goes
against the use of normative criteria such as ‘civility’ as a condition for inclusion.
Research into the role of organizations in a real civil society should not be confused
with their acceptance as part of a good civil society.8

The argument that a flourishing civil society sphere is the carrier of the ideal of civil
society as a civilized society, is an interesting area of research and has a long
history. Thinking on civil society has always been characterized by the double
reference to existing social relations and societal ideals (cf. Dekker 2004).
The modern idea of civil society has been developing since the second half of the
seventeenth century and was initially a means of acknowledging and seeking to
reduce the power of absolute rulers in favour of the freedom, self-regulating power
and political influence of the emerging bourgeois society.9 With the rise of the
capitalist market economy, the economy came to operate in an autonomous sphere
far removed from established forms of social relations and governed by amoral self-
interest. The polarity of state versus society developed into a more complex situation
in which the ideal and practice of civil society was in opposition to both the state
and the market. The economy and capitalist system became more important as

8 I am not sure whether it is a good idea to include ‘civility’ in definitions of civil society that
are meant to identify parts of social reality for empirical research. Anheier (2007: 11) adds
‘based on civility’ to his definition of global civil society to exclude, among others, violent
activists and hate groups. The risk is that political controversies between researchers about
the applicability of the negative adverbs may replace investigations into controversies in the
field of research, the combinations of civil and uncivil elements in organizations and
networks of organizations, trends, etc. Alexander’s (2006) almost teleological concept of a
‘civil sphere’ with intrinsic universalizing values of solidarity, equality and democracy,
seems to be more a framework for interpreting contradictory developments than a tool for
identifying good and bad organizations, but it would run the same risk if used in an
operational way in empirical research.

9 See, among many other publications, the beautifully short chapter by Taylor (2003 [1989]),
the more polemical book by Keane (1998) or the long treatises by Cohen & Arato (1992) and
Alexander (2006) for more thorough historical accounts of the concept of civil society.
driving of the activities of voluntary associations, but in a different sphere. For individuals this meant combining being a private *bourgeois* (or working) person with being a more public citizen, connected to politics as an individual and connected to politics and society through membership of associations. Civil society became a specific sphere of voluntary involvement for the benefit of small-scale common interests and pleasures as well as for society as a whole. In the second half of the twentieth century, this sphere of civil society also developed in opposition to the private and intimate sphere, in which people set aside their social obligations and public life. After the absolute ruler and the *homo economicus*, the uninvolved and indifferent private person now became the primary threat to civility and civil society.

Figure 1 shows the polarities of the sphere of civil society versus state, market and community. The polarities imply the aspects of civility in the broad sense used earlier: decent behaviour as opposed to the intimate and group-specific behaviour of a community, and the instrumentality of economic transactions; democratic involvement against the state.

**Figure 1:** The old debate: Civil society and civicness threatened and betrayed

Why do we expect civicness to result from participation in the civil society sphere? It is essentially because voluntary associations are supposed to bring people
Civicness: from civil society to civic services?

together, especially citizens from different social groups, to connect them, generate trust, and stimulate discussion. These organizations are supposed to connect to broader networks, influence the political agenda and hold governments accountable. As far as public discourse is concerned, much of the research focuses on the relationship between participation (membership or volunteering) in non-political voluntary associations and political involvement. In the literature, several reasons are discussed as to why participation in non-political voluntary associations fosters political involvement. People learn ‘civic skills’ (such as how to participate in meetings or write letters), develop ‘civic virtues’ (such as tolerating and dealing with diverging opinions), learn about what is happening in their neighbourhood and in the wider community, obtain political information and become politically mobilized within their organizations. (cf. Verba et al. 1995: 304-333). Warren (2001: 70-93) identifies three types of effects that voluntary associations have, as follows.

- Developmental effects on individuals: (developing, forming, enhancing, and supporting the capacity of individuals for self-governance; it is supposed that people involved in voluntary associations develop (feelings of) political efficacy, political skills (the practical civic skills of Verba et al. (1995), but also the ability to recognize manipulation and think strategically), civic virtues (a sense of the public interest, tolerance, reliability, readiness to participate), and critical skills (the ability to reflect on one’s own interests and identity).

- Public sphere effects (constituting the social infrastructure of public spheres that provide information, develop agendas, test ideas, represent distinctions and provide voice: voluntary associations do not contribute directly to people’s civility, but may be important as conditions; Warren mentions public communication and deliberation about public concerns, representations of difference (in particular easily ignored interests), and representations of commonality (the needs and interests of all people, advancing the common interest).

- Institutional effects (supporting and enhancing the institutions of democratic governance by providing political representation, enabling pressure and resistance, organizing collective action, and serving as alternative venues for governance: representation (political input and agenda-setting), resistance (organizing countervailing power), subsidiarity (producing collective goods), and coordination and cooperation (creating trust between groups; organizing collective action)).
Other theorists and researchers have presented similar lists of mechanisms.\(^\text{10}\)

3. *Doubts about the civilizing effects of civil society*

The civicness of civil society has been explored in empirical analyses in recent years in several ways. Social trust, feelings of solidarity towards strangers and political interest and involvement have been analysed in particular as possible products or by-products of civil society activities. Analyses have been conducted at the macro-level of territories, particularly nation states (countries with a larger and more active civil society should have higher levels of civicness, which will be reflected in greater social capital and public discourse), at the meso-level of organizations (non-profits should display more civicness than state or commercial organizations) and at the micro-level (individuals involved in voluntary activities should display greater civicness than individuals who are not involved.

At the macro-level, various publications have shown the positive statistical ‘effects’ of the density of voluntary associations at the national level of greater levels of social trust and political involvement, greater levels of prosperity and a better quality of political democracy (Putnam 1993). Putnam’s comparative analysis of twenty Italian regions revealed that the performance of regional government was strongly linked to the ‘degree of civic community’. Civic community refers not only to individual characteristics such as reading newspapers, voting and organizational membership, but also to collective characteristics such as the presence of a dense network of social organizations, including a broad spectrum of organizations, ranging from trade unions through to sports clubs to choirs. On the other hand, some economists have doubts in this area due to rent-seeking interest groups that disturb competition and slow down growth (Olson 1982). Furthermore, vibrant associational life has produced some worrying historical outcomes, from the Weimar Republic to Yugoslavia, which was ‘one of the most developed civil societies of any Eastern European country’ (Chambers 2002: 101).

\(^{10}\) Fung (2003) distinguishes six ways in which associations are presumed to enhance democracy: through the intrinsic value of associative life, by fostering civic virtues and teaching political skills, offering resistance to power and holding government accountable, improving the quality and equality of representation, facilitating public deliberation, and creating opportunities for citizens and groups to participate directly in governance.
Civieness: from civil society to civic services?

At the meso-level, it is difficult to make comparisons of ‘similar’ organizations. Even when the focus is on service providers in the same field, problems of comparability and measurement still detract from the findings. Overall, the results do not suggest that there is greater civiennes among non-profit organizations (Flynn/Hodgkinson 2001; Hupe/Meijs 2002).

At the micro-level, many researchers have worked on testing and retesting the conclusion of Almond and Verba (1989 [1963]: 265) that ‘membership in some association, even if the individual does not consider the membership politically relevant and even if it does not involve his active participation, does lead to a more competent citizenry’. For many countries, types of organizations and forms of involvement, reports are available about statistical relationships between participation in voluntary associations and indicators of social trust, pro-social attitudes and political involvement (see for instance Putnam 2000: 336-344; Dekker 2004). Generally, the relationship is positive but modest, and little evidence has been found for a causal relationship between voluntary associations and civil attitudes and political involvement.

Other research raises further doubts about the relevance of participation in voluntary associations for generating social capital and public discourse. To mention two findings: activities and volunteering often do not serve as an extra stimulus to go beyond passive membership, and ‘mailing list’ organizations have the same effect as face-to-face organizations, even though they provide hardly any opportunity to develop trust through interaction or political involvement through practice. These non-differences raise serious doubts about whether association is genuinely having any effect and whether we are seeing the results of self-selection (cf. Sobieraj/White 2007). More generally, we may question the importance of the direct causal mechanisms between involvement in voluntary associations and the purported benefits of civil society: could it not be that involvement in associational life and in politics, social trust and a positive attitude towards strangers are simply characteristics found in a particular type of person? It is easy to imagine that volunteers may share some personality traits that lead them towards social and political involvement: ‘joiners’, people who ‘want to make a difference’, strong personalities who tend to want to become ‘involved’ in all areas of life.

Voluntary associations are supposed to be of particular relevance to civiennes because they bring together people from different social groups as citizens, in a more or less public setting. Citizens can thus develop trust, broaden their perspectives and discover issues of common interest. In reality, associations nowadays are often quite homogeneous (Theiss-Morse/Hibbing 2005) and often cover limited areas of interest. The promotion of group interests may also lead to a narrowing of perspectives and act against the interests of the wider community (Bell 1998). A modern consumerist sports club is very different from the kind of voluntary associations De Tocqueville envisaged in the USA in the 1830s. Those were often focused on community problems – ‘build schools, hospitals, and jails’ –
which acted as a natural bridge to politics. Voluntary associations were often multipurpose groups (interest representation, socializing, etc.) with an important role in people’s daily lives, more important than modern specialist organizations that focus on a specific interest or leisure need.\textsuperscript{11} They are less important for people today, and the time spent in voluntary associations is generally very small compared to the many hours spent involved in paid work, study, family life and informal socializing.

The majority of today’s voluntary associations are not the ‘schools of democracy’ that De Tocqueville described all those years ago. Organizations that focus on community affairs and interests relating to government still demonstrate the expected relationships between associational and political involvement, but mainly as a result of self-selection. They are ‘pools of democracy’ (Van der Meer/Van Ingen 2009; cf. Theiss-Morse/Hibbing 2005).

There are even grounds to question the civicness of very dedicated forms of voluntary association, organizations and groups of volunteers who deal with social issues. This is what Nina Eliasoph (1998) found among a number of American groups:

‘Silencing public-inspired political conversation was, paradoxically, volunteers’ way of looking out for the common good. Volunteer work embodied, above all, an effort aimed at convincing themselves and others that the world makes sense, and that regular people really can make a difference. To show each other and their neighbors that regular citizens really can be effective, really can make a difference, volunteers tried to avoid issues that they considered “political.” In their effort to be open and inclusive, to appeal to regular, unpretentious fellow citizens without discouraging them, they silenced public-inspired deliberation, working hard to keep public-inspired conversation backstage ...’ (Eliasoph 1998: 63)\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11} Skocpol (2003: 5) refers to the mentioning of the membership of voluntary associations on a gravestone of two centuries ago, and adds that it is unimaginable that her membership of professional organizations will be mentioned on hers.

\textsuperscript{12} Another observer of the American scene: ‘Setting government to the side of one’s thinking may have become the condition for believing that civic involvement matters at all.’ (Wuthnow 1998: 57), and the conclusion from a study of a group of Japanese housewives who helped disabled people: ‘... the longer a woman participated in the volunteer world, the more likely she was to blame politics for social situations that she found unacceptable. Nevertheless, this blame seldom drove a volunteer to conclude that she must dedicate herself to changing the structure of politics and policy to eliminate those situations. Instead, she often remained committed to avoiding politics when possible. Volunteers spoke of the importance of individuals, of the world close to home, of “human networks”.’ (LeBlanc 1999: 112). Of course, these findings do not exclude the possibility of an overall positive statistical relationship between volunteering and political involvement. However, they cast doubt on the
Civics: from civil society to civic services?

Overall, then, there are good reasons to be sceptical about the civicsness of civil society as a sphere of voluntary associations and volunteering (cf. Edwards 2004: 82 ff.; Theiss-Morse/Hibbing 2005).

4. Crossing borders and the benefits of hybrids

Voluntary associational relationships are spreading throughout society, from negotiating in families to teamwork in business. Various developments suggest a kind of disappearance of civil society, with associations and activities becoming more business-like and boundaries blurring. These developments can often also be interpreted in a more positive light: associations are less important and more distant to individuals, but many more people are involved in them, and people are members of more associations or are connected in other ways to advocacy and interest organizations. Set against the possible drawbacks of less social trust and capital on a small scale, there are political benefits such as democratization and the stimulation of large-scale public debate.

Let us look at some phenomena which suggest an intermingling of roles and rationalities between civil society and the other spheres of society.

In various segments of the third sector, we are witnessing the emergence of ‘hybrid’ types of organizations, in which commercial and non-profit activities are combined and there is a simultaneous focus on meeting consumer demand and carrying out social tasks (Hupe/Meijs 2002; Dees/Anderson 2003; Brandsen et al. 2005; Evers 2005). In a country such as the Netherlands, these are mainly formerly ideologically institutionalized and private-initiative organizations which developed in the context of the post-war welfare state. A combination of subsidies, professionalization and mergers has transformed them into fully fledged social-service providers. Here and elsewhere, commercial players have also begun operating in what have traditionally been non-profit areas (insurance, consultancy), accepting that there are parts of their organizations that do not make a profit but which primarily serve social objectives.

Another example of commercial institutions entering areas that have traditionally been the preserve of civil society is ‘the rise of third places’ in America as a way of meeting the need of ‘new consumers’ for places where people who are relatively unknown to each other but who have shared interests can meet (Lewis/Bridger 2000: 121 ff.). American examples of such ‘neither home nor work, neither completely...
Paul Dekker

private nor entirely public’ (id.: 122) third places include the opportunities to read and talk at the Barnes & Noble and Borders bookshops and the Starbucks coffee shop chain. These will not necessarily become centres for civic engagement, but there is also no reason to assume that they are any less relevant for lighter forms of voluntary association than more ‘mainstream’ civil society organizations.

Further examples of civil society in the economy are political consumerism and consumer activism (Micheletti 2004). Rather than engaging in voluntary associations that develop political activities in civil society, individuals are beginning (not infrequently via the Internet) to take on a role as active consumers. This activism need not have an explicitly political or social purpose and may focus on personal safety or health, for example, but in order to increase the effectiveness of their efforts, consumers channel their personal interests through collective organization and communication, and this takes the active consumer into the sphere of civil society. Consumer activism is a manifestation of a broader socialization and moralization of economic life (Shamir 2008). The idea of a market which operates purely on the basis of direct economic and material need has become outmoded: buying and selling is increasingly involves elements such as anxieties, feelings of guilt and considerations relating to honesty, authenticity, exclusivity, solidarity and sustainability. All this means that economic transactions are no longer based on pure utility and ethical indifference.

A final selection of examples of blurring boundaries and hybrid organizations concerns the relationships of volunteers and activist citizens with government, public administration and (semi-)public service-providers. These providers organize voluntary work and turn school playgrounds, care homes and neighbourhood or service centres into meeting places for citizens where there are opportunities to develop civic engagement (cf. Evers 2005). The ties are probably looser and more functional than those between volunteers in traditional voluntary associations, but that is a benefit when mobilizing new groups and trying to build cooperation between groups with different cultures, ideologies and lifestyles. The service providers can also act as the infrastructure for social action in neighbourhoods and in a wider context (see Sampson et al. 2005).

Local government appears to be an essential partner for launching and maintaining all kinds of ‘citizen initiatives’. Recent research in the Netherlands suggests that pure citizen initiatives are the exception rather than the rule; institutions are normally involved from the start. It is not only their financial support and facilities that are important, but they also have a role in supporting professionals and ensuring
Civicness: from civil society to civic services?

a positive and responsive attitude on the part of policymakers. This may have drawbacks in terms of dependency and limited discussions and claims over what is politically feasible, but positive civilizing effects are also probable: to obtain public money and secure the ear of the authorities, active citizens have to demonstrate that they are non-discriminatory, open to other groups, ready to set their own interests within the context of what is reasonable for the wider community and willing to be publicly accountable. ‘Organizations independent from government don’t have a monopoly on civic qualities’ (Read 2006; cf. Bell 1998).

These kind of effects prompt Eliasoph (1998, 2009) to call for a more positive evaluation of the inclusion of volunteers in public-private hybrids or ‘scrambled institutions’ as opposed to the classic ‘avoiding politics’ volunteer groups already mentioned in this chapter. Participants in hybrid organizations have to talk about politics and the big issues of inequality and injustice in order to demonstrate why they need public support and to justify their actions publicly. Eliasoph (2009) also discusses the shortcomings of volunteers as compared to professionals. The professionals in these projects appear to be more committed, caring and respectful to the people they serve than the ‘plug-in’ volunteers with their temporary and often amateurish activities.

Sennett (2003: 191ff.) is also sceptical about volunteers and positive about professionals, basically because he prefers large-scale solidarity and considers voluntary support too personal. Underlying this are considerations about respect for people in a dependent situation and about their own self-respect. These are important questions relating to the notion of civility, but not directly relevant to hybrids, to which I will limit myself here.

The phenomena we have touched on here suggest a blurring of the boundaries between civil society and other spheres and a ‘dissolution of civil society’ (Dekker 2004). Together, they imply that we need to reassess the picture of ‘threats’ and ‘fronts’ shown in Figure 1 to take account of the blurring of boundaries and the initiatives and organizations that are crossing these boundaries. Figure 2 is an attempt to represent this. Rather than polarities, it shows some hybrid forms at the margins of civil society. Civicness is no longer expected of a core of civil society that is absolutely outside the spheres of the state and market (and community), but is

13 This is not new, and the idea of small independent citizens’ initiatives as the natural situation can at least not be founded on De Tocqueville’s diagnoses of the United Stated in the 1830s. De Tocqueville (1990 [1835]/1: 191 ff and /2: 115 ff; cf. Cohen and Arato 1992: 75 ff.) described a ‘political society’ with regular interaction between civil associations (churches, schools, professional organizations and papers) on the one hand and political associations (parties, local government and jurists) on the other.
expected from forms that blend voluntary involvement with the ‘state’ principles of public accountability and equality and the ‘market’ principles of openness and efficiency (and sources of affection and identity from the community).\[14\]

Differing views can be taken on the blurring of the boundaries around civil society and the mixing of its characteristic voluntary associations with coordination mechanisms and perspectives of action from other spheres – here mainly the market/economic sphere with its matching of supply and demand and its drive for profit. This has positive aspects and creates opportunities: the material basis of voluntary associations can be strengthened; effectiveness and efficiency can be enhanced; commercialization and a stronger focus on the customer can reduce the self-satisfaction of club life; and the openness to new groups in society and their social needs can be increased.

Warren (2003), however, gives a more critical account of hybrids, or ‘media-blended organizations’ as he calls them. He mentions a number of potential dangers in the alliance between the normative means of associational organization or in a third sector with the power of the state and the money of the market. These dangers include the exercise of public power with no parallel responsibility to the public, the inequitable provision of public goods and services, and disturbances in the representation of social and economic interests in the political sphere. ‘These are interesting dangers, however, because the blending is at the same time essential to the coordination among spheres in general, and crucial to […] democratic functions of the non-profit sector.’ (Warren 2001: 50).

The following chapters elaborate further on hybrid social-service organizations. These core institutions of modern welfare states are very interesting cases through which to view and discuss changes in the ideals of civility and civilizing interventions (Evers), intra-organizational mixtures and the contradictions of civility (Brandsen) and the diverse policy orientations towards the roles of these organizations at both the national and European levels (Enjolras). In the next and final section of this chapter, I return to the ideals of civility that may not materialize in this field.

---

\[14\] I have not yet mentioned community service and informal groups in Figure 2. I would include them as part of the dissolution of civil society, but as less relevant to the topic of civiiness. Community service(s) combine public regulation and coercion with activities that traditionally belong to civil society. Informal groups (self-help and support groups, (Bible) reading groups, people regularly playing music together, etc.) have a similar role to voluntary associations, but in a less organized way and on a smaller scale, often as friends.
5. Greater civicness

I have argued that the basic hypothesis on civil society – that a separate civil society sphere of voluntary associations is of unique importance in achieving a more civilized society as a whole – is an idea that has been superseded. We would do better to focus on the civicness of the hybrids at the margins of the civil society sphere, or the ways in which voluntary commitment and discursive coordination are being imported into other societal spheres. However, it would be wrong to assume that civility is an automatic output of these hybrid forms. Moreover, it is often not clear precisely what that output will be. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, a number of widely differing interpretations of civility are in circulation. Where those meanings embrace the notions of politeness, courtesy and respect, there will also often be a consensus between those concerned, or that consensus will be easily achieved. Active civility is much more complex and concerns the common good and political engagement, which might be seen as a contribution to the Shils’ ‘substantive civility’ (see quotation in the introduction).
This active civility receives little attention in public opinion (see table 1), almost as if it is surrounded by a ‘wall of silence’, even on the part of the active citizens and volunteers who are supposed to contribute to it the most. Based on qualitative research among volunteers carried out by others and myself, I would like to raise two related concerns here.

My first concern is that it is becoming ever more difficult to discuss the moral aspects of volunteering. The old moralist communitarian Amitai Etzioni (2008) writes about ‘the denial of virtue’. We live in somewhat cynical times in which motivations that do not derive from self-interest are suspicious and moral arguments may be viewed as irrational or pathetic. In the Netherlands, older and especially religious people from the countryside may sometimes still talk about moral and religious duties, but young, modern people do not. Young people in particular seem to find it difficult to explain why they volunteer. They seem to want to avoid moral reasons, which appear feeble to them. Why do you volunteer? Somebody has to do it; because it is fun; because it was my turn; because I wanted to do something else; or there is no answer at all – one ‘just does things’. This moral silence may be related to a growing absence of explicitly political arguments. There is no more discussion of dreams or controversies: ‘just do it’.

This leads me to my second concern, which is that of a growing distance between volunteering and politics. As Eliasoph (1998) and other researchers have suggested, we may find ever more deviations from the Tocquevillian pattern of voluntary involvement that leads on to broader involvement in other areas, with social volunteering potentially evolving from a basis of political participation into an alternative for political involvement. It may ultimately undermines civic virtues in relation to the political community, such as the ability to discuss ideological issues, take a stance on major controversies, or relate to the remote and sometimes dirty world of politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups.

Social scientists would also do well to ask themselves to what extent they are implicitly supporting processes that involve denying wider civic virtues and avoiding politics in volunteering through their use of the language fo rational choice and their inability to address virtues, values and political aspirations in a scientific way. In this regard, it is interesting to consider Robert Putnam’s development since his discovery of ‘civic community’ (individually measured as voluntary association membership, newspaper readership and political behaviour) in Italy (Putnam 1993) via ‘forms of social capital that, generally speaking, serve civic ends’ to something that ‘just like any form of capital’ can be used in a pleasant or an unpleasant way (Putnam 2000). This scientific neutralization has been a success in the sense that many more people are involved in social capital research than would ever have been drawn to research on the ‘civic community’; on the other hand, a price is paid in that issues of civicness are ignored and left to politicians and priests.

I think it is time for social researchers to return to the civic community and explicitly address the meaning of civicseness. In present-day empirical research on
Civicness: from civil society to civic services?

participation, ‘civic involvement’ often means nothing more than ‘not being political’. The examples given of this purely apolitical participation are often noble, but at a theoretical level more profane leisure activities are not excluded and these, in fact, often constitute the mass of the civic engagement activities measured in surveys. Lichterman (2005: 8; see also Eliasoph 2009) offers more focus by describing ‘civic groups’ as

“… groups in which people relate to each other and to the wider society primarily as citizens or members of society, rather than as subjects of state administration or as consumers, producers, managers, or as owners in the marketplace. They relate to each other ‘civic-ally’.”

This is not an operational definition simply to distinguish civic from non-civic groups, but it does direct the researcher’s attention to their inclusiveness and public orientation, and requires a discussion of how the various meanings of civility (cf. Section 2) apply and interact.

Alexander (2006) goes a step further by replacing the all-embracing neo-Tocquevillian civil society of voluntary associations with a civil sphere of public-minded ‘civil associations’ (Alexander 2006: 92 ff.) that are intertwined with communicative institutions, such as polls and mass media, and regulatory institutions, such as voting and offices with political power. Together, they form a ‘solidarity sphere, in which a certain kind of universalizing community comes to be culturally defined and to some degree institutionally enforced’ (Alexander 2006: 31). Civil associations express universalizing solidarity, are a vehicle for communication, and have an interest in political power. The normative directedness of Alexander may be disputed and will not be easy to handle in empirical research, but he offers a challenging perspective on civiness. The crisis that has occurred in the financial sector demonstrates the relevance of his sphere hybridity. Pressure for more civility in economic life seems to be developing primarily through a dynamic process involving public opinion, the media and politicians, with ‘civil society organizations’ playing only a minor role.

15 ‘… political engagement is actively aimed at influencing government policies or affecting the selection of public officials. … Civic engagement, on the other hand, refers to participation aimed at achieving a public good, but usually through direct hands-on work in cooperation with others. Civic engagement normally occurs within nongovernmental organizations and rarely touches upon electoral politics. The most obvious example of this kind of participation is volunteer work in one’s community.’ (Zukin et al. 2006: 51).
References

Civiness: from civil society to civic services?

Civicness and civility are discussed as intertwined notions. To the degree they flourish, societies can be seen as civil societies. These items are not based on or confined to a specific sphere or sector like the third sector; basically all social spheres can contribute to and be marked by them. However, beyond an overlapping consensus civicness and civility can mean different things and the dominant meanings change over time. This gets discussed with respect to competing discourses on welfare as they have crystallized in changing concepts of social services. There, the notions of civicness and civility, even though often contested, could help to enlarge quality concerns.

It may be both a strength and a weakness that the widespread discussion of civil society is seldom explicit about what the term ‘civil’ actually means, and that definitions and assumptions vary. On the one hand, this ambiguity enables a debate which escapes the usual state-against-markets discussions. On the other hand, excessive ambiguity may render the debate on civil society inconclusive and unconvincing. In this chapter, we will try to make the definition of the word ‘civil’ in the term ‘civil society’ clearer. To this end, two issues will be discussed: civility and civicness. The use of the term ‘civicness’, usually associated with citizens and the state formed by them, already indicates that the author rejects a narrow definition of civil society which equates civicness with the ‘third sector’, linking it primarily with ‘social’ and civil behaviour and divorcing it from the public and political sphere and people’s role as citizens. It will be argued here that it is necessary to re-include the public sphere, politics and state institutions in the debate on civil society. It is therefore not only civility, but the twin notions of civicness and civility which are considered in this attempt to bring the term civil society into sharper focus.

The first part of the chapter will discuss the meanings attached to civicness and civility and show that the two topics are complementary. However, the meaning and impact given to the two items vary – in theory and in politics. We will therefore speak in plural terms about their meaning.
The second and main part of the chapter will demonstrate in more concrete terms how the emphasis on certain meanings attached to these two notions has varied. This is done with respect to a policy field in which Third Sector Organizations (TSOs), which are often seen as key agents for a more civic and civil society, play a major role – social services in health and education, child and elderly care or in labour markets. Reference will be made not to any country-specific history but to discourses in which social services are conceived and handled in specific ways and in which – mainly implicitly – civiness and civility are attributed with a different meaning and effects. Finally, we will show that today it is not simply the weight given to civiness and civility in the debate on welfare and social services that counts, but also the meaning that discourses attribute to them. A call for active citizens and more civil behaviour can have quite different meanings and therefore the political and analytical task is not only to bring civil society back in, but also to determine which position and role it is given.

1. On the meanings of civiness and civility

1.1 Civiness and civility – distinct but overlapping notions

In approaching this question, one may begin by identifying what is most associated with the notion of civility in both academic contributions and public debates. When civility is mentioned, the associated qualities are usually phrased in terms of the virtues and manners of individuals – tolerance, self-restraint, mutual respect, commitment to other people, social concern, involvement and responsibility. Likewise, there is much agreement about what constitutes the antithesis of civility: selfish behaviour, indifference towards others, the inability to curb aggression in conflicts, irresponsible behaviour, a low level of internalization of general moral rules, and so on (see: Shils 1997; Calhoun 2000; Forni 2002; Anheier 2007).

As far as civiness is concerned, the associated qualities differ in some respects and overlap in others. Civiness, unlike civility, tends to be associated with the state, citizenry and citizenship, the degree to which people identify themselves as citizens, or, vice versa, the degree to which public state institutions reach out to individuals as citizens. One could argue that on the one hand civiness is associated with qualities which approximate to Marshall’s (1950) concept of citizenship (personal, political and social rights), and on the other hand to active citizenship: voicing claims and needs, defending freedom and respecting duties. Civiness would thus seem to have simultaneously objective, institutional and subjective features.

As for the link between civiness and civility, it is often presupposed that civic action is (or should be) realized in civilized ways. Civiness in the form of active citizenship would then presuppose or help to foster civility. Unlike civility,
Civicness, civility and their meanings for social services

However, civicness is more tightly and directly associated with public institutional settings: public spaces to be guaranteed by state-power, forums for dialogue and coping with conflicts. As phrased in the introduction to this book with a reference to social services,

“a central question when asking about the ‘civic culture’ [...] would then be to analyse the mutual links of institutional settings on the one and the behaviour of politicians, professionals and users on the other hand. Civicness is the quality of institutions, organizations, procedures, to stimulate, reproduce, and cultivate civility.”

In contrast, when it comes to civility the emphasis is usually on forms of behaviour and a much broader range of processes and institutions are mentioned, notably the family and – among the state-based institutions – the educational system. Many indirect factors are also mentioned: institutions that allow for participation, or call for learning to cooperate with others. In a study on civility, social capital and civil society in Asia, Pye (1999) deals e.g. with a typical broad notion of civility as critical both, for private personal relationships and relationships of power and authority. In the famous work on civility by Norbert Elias (1982), mention is made of a broad range of public and private factors, and all spheres of society – the economic, social, cultural and political – effectively have an impact.

This may lead us to a first tentative definition of civility and civicness: while civility is a set of forms of learned behaviour which cross the boundaries of the public and the private, and enable both spheres to live together peacefully in spite of differences, civicness is associated predominantly with the public realm – people’s identities and roles as citizens and the respective public institutions which foster such behaviour and where it can be put into practice (see for the similar arguments in other contributions to this book, especially those of Newman and Enjolras).

1.2 Civility and civicness in historical perspective

However, the notions of private and public are themselves historical and were brought about by social change. Each reference to civility and civicness already implies that the behaviour of individuals, or the behaviour of collective organizations is created and constantly influenced by a culture of norms, orientations and frameworks. The notion of civicness underlines the constant challenge to create a link between the behaviour of ‘private’ individuals and some form of the ‘public’ – in terms of equal rights, duties or services. A ‘civic culture’ requires public action and debates to be produced and reproduced; hence the importance of a public sphere (see: Cohen 1999).

The processes that create this separation of and, simultaneously, new links between private orientations and shared public goals and commitments have been described by Michael Walzer (1984) as acts of the liberal “art of separation”.

In traditional authoritarian societies, there was no or little separation between the community of blood, religion and the political order, and little or no room for the
‘private’ to be safeguarded from the pressure of community and authority; pre-modern societies were structured primarily by hierarchical social orders. This affected the concept of civility in those times. Calhoun (2000) reminds us that notions of civility and civil forms of behaviour were viewed as class-demarcating features that separated the civilized from the ordinary or ‘barbarian’ masses. Furthermore, the rules of good conduct to be followed by civilized people at that time were deeply influenced by the fact that one had to serve authority – within the family and clan, the religious community and vis-à-vis a dynastic government. Under such circumstances, civility as the art of being a ‘gentleman’ implied the challenge of coping with an environment in which there was very little room to stand up as a private individual against external pressure. In such a setting, then, civicness was barely an option.

With the rise of liberalism and later democracy, the modern individual enters the stage. Institutional configurations and characteristics changed drastically, as did the concept of civility:

- a market sphere, with its own logics and codes and relatively free from political pressure and family-privileges, takes shape.
- state power is separated from the power of the church and the natural privileges of family dynasties.
- the community and society become separated – with the former characterized by spheres of intimate personal relationships and the latter by impersonal relationships between buyers and sellers, workers and factory owners, citizens and co-citizens; the fundamental differences between private and public became institutionalized.
- a public space takes shape due to these separations and the rules and laws that safeguard them; within this space there is room to associate, speak out freely and cultivate the right to differences – both in the dimension of individualism and pluralism and in terms of active citizenship and hence ‘civicness’.
- finally the modern notion of the citizen takes shape – it is based on a number of basic citizenship rights and some readiness to share purposes and duties across social cleavages and separations; civility and civicness interact.

All these basic institutional changes were interwoven with changes in both the general culture of society (civility) and of its political culture (civicness). There are new challenges to be met by new forms of civility and civicness: citizens need to learn how to live in disagreement with each other, compromise through dialogue and cope with conflicts in civilized ways; it is in the public space of democracies, that communication and practices are made possible which require both active citizenship and civility and which may help to cultivate these. As democracies take
Civicness, civility and their meanings for social services

shape, opportunities to oppose political authorities present themselves (see Calhoun 2000: 254f). The welfare state is based on the principle of treating fellow citizens, regardless of their cultural orientation and social status, as fundamentally equal. Given this background, one could argue that civility and civicness are located at the intersection of political culture and wider, general culture. While civility is associated with both spheres, civicness is more associated with political culture, the interplay of public institutional arrangements and the ways citizens correspond to each other and the public authorities.

To summarize this description of civility and civicness, one can say that with the movement towards a post-feudal society and later the emergence of the liberal and democratic society, a mutation has occurred. This mutation concerns the notion of civility and, along with it, the came the birth of the notions of citizenship and civicness. The process of separating state and religious power, society and community, civil society and the state, the market and the socio-political spheres, is essential insofar as it allows us to differentiate between the notions of civility as a form of class-demarcating behaviour and uncritical conformity to established rules, and the kind of modern political civility that is based on basic citizenship rights and presents the new challenges of modern active citizenship, such as the willingness and ability to act as a loyal citizen, compromise with others and exercise toleration and self-restraint. Civility, just like social capital, involves public and private behaviour. The notion of civicness is different, not because it excludes this larger area, but because it is more focused. It privileges the public side and the impact of democratic institutions.

1.3 Civility and civicness: which spheres and institutions play a role?

While it seems obvious that there is a special link between state-public institutional settings and civicness, the role played by other social sectors is less clear. What is the role of the family, communities and public associational life or the market sphere, in bringing about civility? This question only makes sense if one remembers that all these systems interact and influence one another – family life in an open democratic society means something different from family life in an autocratic system; and with respect to markets we should bear in mind that their ‘social embeddedness’ will affect the role they play.

Nevertheless there are more questions than definitive answers. Does an institution like the family contribute to civility? Do communities with their special inner ties contribute to civility? Or does this depend on the degree to which they open up to civil society and interact with public institutions such as school services that represent a public concern? To what degree is civility, as encountered in the private realm and the personal relationships within that realm, the product of the monodirectional influence of public values on community and family, and to what degree have communities themselves – which have proved more persistent in
modern societies than liberal modernization theory would have had us believe – been an essential ingredient in the processes that generate the complex co-product of civility and civeness?

Possibly the most controversial debates concern the role of the market. For some, the market represents a necessary evil which contributes to civility only in very indirect terms as a source of wealth creation; according to this perspective, markets require strong politics to set limits on their effects and thereby civilize them ‘from the outside’ by re-embedding them (Polanyi 1944/1978). Furthermore it could be argued that marketed services are of limited interest in terms of civiness because in ‘private markets’, the link to the ‘public realm’ and people’s roles as citizens is in many ways weaker than in public and third-sector-based service areas. However, throughout history, others have made repeated claims about the civilizing effects of doux commerce, the ability of trade and commerce to mitigate conflicts and to convert them into peaceful competition (Hirschman 1977). In that sense, markets should limit the impact of civiness but might well contribute to civility.

1.4 A more civil and civic society – an issue that goes beyond the third sector

Before the background of what has been argued it becomes clear that there is a strong but by no means an exclusive link between civiness and civility on the one and third sector associations on the other hand. Similar as it has been done by Edwards (2004) I would argue that the competing definitions that try to locate the “civil” in society have all their shortcomings; but they may complement each other

- those, who (alongside with Habermas) identify civil society with the public sphere may overlook that a civil society is not only made up by debating citizens but as well by associations and solidarities with social and economic purposes as represented by many TSOs
- those who identify the civil society with the third sector (see e. g. the notion of a “civil society sector” as it has been coined by Salamon/Anheier (1997) will have difficulties to prove why the contributions of (state) politics and state building should be less important, be it in terms of guaranteeing the respective legal and material basis for the third sector or be it by the degree of chances to learn civility and civiness that come along with a democratic state

As to other spheres and “sectors” such as markets, communities and the family it has been already argued, that they can also contribute to civility

In conclusion, civility, like civil society, is not a matter of any particular sector, but it is a quality-dimension of society as a whole, mirroring the impact of civic and civil values across sectors. They all may – depending from the historical constellation given – make their own contributions; but many of them depend from

---

Adalbert Evers

46
Civicness, civility and their meanings for social services

interactions across the sectors and the degrees a lively public sphere enables this. Civic and civil values are then co-products of historical processes, in which various sides and “sectors” have cooperated and coped with each other (for this interpretation see e. g. Kocka 2000; Dekker 2001; Gosewinkel/Rucht 2004; Evers/Laville 2004; Edwards 2004).

1.5 Civility and civicness – a complementary relationship that also involves tensions

Our argument thus far has shown that civility and civicness are contested issues. What actors and groups associate with these qualities today often differs from yesterday and continues to change over time. “A concern for genuine civility might lead us to critically reassess social norms of civility” (Calhoun 2000: 267), and similarly the norms of civicness. A liberal perspective on civility may, for example, prioritize tolerance, while a conservative one may insist on more self-restraint. With respect to civicness, a liberal perspective will prioritize negative freedom and people’s protection from state intervention, while a republican perspective will underline the need for mutually acceptable compromises between those in power and the citizens, with the latter being ready to take up not only rights but also duties. Civility and civicness may thus come into tension and conflict with one another.

- One such tension is between respecting individualism and requiring people to behave as ‘good citizens’; different images of ‘the good society’ and national cultures of civicness will involve their own concepts of how to balance these two elements; some prioritize the toleration of diversity and non-engagement, while others tend to associate civil behaviour with conformity and civicness with active compliance with rules and norms which are confirmed by public authorities.

- This leads us to a second and related aspect: where are the limits of tolerance and polite answers in pluralistic and multicultural societies? While over time democratic societies have, overall, managed to widen the spectrum of groups that are to be respected (witness for example the changing ways in which societies and their service institutions have dealt with and deal with homosexuals), civility will nevertheless always remain limited when it comes to what a large majority sees as a morally (un)acceptable behaviour. How tolerant can or should a civil society be towards, for example, ethnic communities that follow strictly patriarchal rules and are based on the absolute power of the family or the clan over its individual members?
Clearly, all this invites a study of how civicness and citizenship inter-relate. First of all, citizenship implies citizens’ rights – personal, political and social rights (Marshall 1950). One can illustrate the triad of rights that make up for the status of the citizen with regard to social services. It involves being protected as an individual with personal rights when interacting with ‘powerful’ professions; having guaranteed social rights to access basic services such as health, and finally having political rights such as participating in the planning and development of services. The right to build associations which create, innovate and provide services, touches on all these dimensions. Clearly, there is a link between the institutionalized status of citizens with rights and types of civil behaviour, and a civic culture of service touches on both elements. However, civicness is also linked to active citizenship, people’s willingness and capacity to use the aforementioned freedoms and rights in cultivating and building democracy. In terms of active citizenship, what is crucial about TSOs is their potential for community building, advocacy and being the kind of service organization that cultivates the social capital of networking, volunteering, or donations. However active citizenship is not simply about any variety of activism that enables one’s voice to be heard; active citizenship as civic action includes a sense for civilized ways to be active.

2. Civicness and civility in the various discourses on welfare and social services

The first section has attempted to sketch what we should understand by civicness and civility; the second part will now attempt to show how civicness manifests itself in one particular field – the field of welfare and personal social services. I will attempt to show how the influence of various notions of civicness and civility has grown or diminished, how they have changed in emphasis and how they are interlinked.

This will be done by making reference to a number of distinct discourses in societal and social policy. It would also have been possible to choose labels such as political concepts or ideologies; however, the notion of discourse (for the definition of the notion as it is used here, see: Laclau 1993; Howarth 2000) has been chosen here because it embraces both concepts and practices. A discourse takes shape in the public realm; it exists in opposition to other discourses, and there is rivalry among the various discourses for dominance – this has been said, for example, of the ‘neoliberal’ discourse. This chapter does not, then, use ‘discourse’ in the sense of Habermas (rational public deliberation beyond force and narrow interest).

Our argument builds on a stylized picture of these discourses in the field of social policy and more specifically in personal social services. It is assumed that the diversity of voices can be reduced to four discursive formations that have had and continue to have a significant impact. As shown in Table 1, each of these discourses
Civics, civility and their meanings for social services

will be sketched by referring to the same key issues: the Leitbild (strategic vision) of social services through which they operate; their understanding of the addressees of these services, the role of the professionals and the citizenry at large. A brief sketch will be made of what each discourse implies for the idea of governance and of the role of the third sector. Finally, I will touch on which ways these ideas relate to civics and civility, since according to our approach, they should all have an impact on these two notions.

2.1. The welfare legacy – a more civilized way of living through universal services for all citizens

Viewed over the longer term and in the light of other more recent discourses on welfare and social services, the classical welfare discourses are impressive in the power they have developed over decades. And even though the different variants have had to assume an apparently defensive position over the past decade, the central issue they have sought to address, social inequality, is again of increasing relevance today.

In the area of social services, the point of convergence of most welfare regimes has been to create services that were public and social – open to all with a strong equalizing effect; this has certainly been the case in the two key areas of health and education. Health and education have long set the Leitbild for other service areas that developed later – and to a different and lesser degree – labour market services, child and elderly care. Health and education systems assigned social rights to all as basically equal citizens. What is to be studied here are the links between a service system based on universal social rights and matters of civics and civility. Michael Walzer (1997: 133f) notes that the basic and integrative value of a public education system is not to be found in the utopian dream of giving everyone the same degree of qualification, but in the fact that – at least for a short time of their life – all young citizens participate in the system on an equal basis and have to learn to interact with each other in civilized ways across class barriers.

The addressees of the services were predominantly people in need, threatened by one of the evils portrayed by Beveridge, such as illiteracy and illness. The services were to offer protection and repair, in the case of the health system, or the basic means to participate in the labour market as well as in broader public life, in the case of the educational system.
Table 1: Civicness and civility in current discourses on society and social services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements Discourses</th>
<th>Service Leitbild</th>
<th>Addressee</th>
<th>Governance</th>
<th>Role of third sector</th>
<th>Civility and civility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional welfarism</td>
<td>Public services as social rights</td>
<td>Needy citizens and clients to be protected and compliant</td>
<td>Hierarchical structures of command and control towards uniform standards, often in corporatist settings</td>
<td>TSOs gap filling/complementary/part of corporatist public provision</td>
<td>Giving people a basically more equal status by strengthening social citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment and participation</td>
<td>A rich diversity of enabling and locally embedded services</td>
<td>Users empowered to become co-producers</td>
<td>Public policies open for voice; power decentralized towards local people, active citizens and communities</td>
<td>TSOs taking lead in advocacy, voice, well-tailored provision and innovation for new needs</td>
<td>Requiring active citizens and a civility that is more sensitive to personal needs and diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumerism</td>
<td>Social services meeting individual preferences</td>
<td>Competent consumer citizens</td>
<td>Regulating social markets for choice-led social services</td>
<td>TSOs adding up to service choice as providers, giving consumers a voice as lobbies</td>
<td>A minor role for civicness, collective and state action in bringing about civility in service cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The activating social investment state</td>
<td>Properly allocated and managed services helping to produce human capital</td>
<td>Activating and supervising the productive citizen</td>
<td>Systems of co-governance, negotiation and persuasion, aiming at public and private actors’ support for the government</td>
<td>TSOs as providers to be contracted in and as organizations that intermediate public policies</td>
<td>Strengthening notions of civicness that involve obligations, and notions of civility that involve proper self-conduct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The logic of coping with deficiencies and protecting those in need has characterized public social services since the outset. This is encapsulated in the seminal notion of the addressees as clients. The flipside of this is found in the image of the service
Civicness, civility and their meanings for social services

providers – professionals, the special group that developed alongside with the continuing expansion of social services such as public and social services: doctors, nurses, teachers and social workers. The professional discourses were and remain powerful insofar as they set the central standards for the service systems and the ways in which professionals and users encounter each other there. In the best cases, professional knowledge mirrored and intertwined various components, such as pedagogies – the science of learning – as well as ideas about learning, growing up and rights and duties in a society. But there was also a negative side – such as in medicine – where a historically bound scientific discourse on persons to be ‘repaired’ predominated, with scant knowledge of citizens and users as social beings. Examples from the field of pedagogy and medicine show that professional discourses can both support and restrict notions of civility. Given the generally weak position of the clients in need of services, welfare professionalism always involved a degree of paternalism, requiring what is known in medical services as ‘compliance’ (for changes in professionalism see: Kremer/Tonkens 2006).

Historically, the public service sector has made use of a tool which characterizes public administration: hierarchical decision making. However, later the systems of private industries and the market sector also left their marks. The classical hospital in fact mixes elements of administrative bureaucracy and Taylorism. Nevertheless, the standardization of services and their products has not only occurred along the lines of the standardization of marketed mass-products, but also with the idea of safeguarding equality within the service system and the aim of providing the same service and the same rights irrespective of location and circumstances. On the other hand, such a universalistic concept of a public service also has its limits when it comes to respect pluralism, an aspect of civility that is much more prominent in today’s society. As far as civicness is concerned, this was enhanced by a welfare state with democratic institutions and a great deal of public power over service systems. The governance of the service system, though, has taken place by and large through state or municipal officials. Possibilities for realizing aspects of civicness that were not represented by the democratic welfare state but by participative processes have been limited.

The ways in which third sector organizations (TSOs) in the social service field have co-shaped civicness and civility have also varied. Arrangements have depended on the compromises between the state and churches, the impact of a self-confident bourgeoisie and the orientation of the labour movement. The role of TSOs has ranged from a marginal, gap-filling role in a republican system like France, to the complementary role taken by charities that were seen as preparing the extension of public welfare as in England, to the corporate welfare states like Germany, the Netherlands, Austria or in parts Italy (for Germany see: Zimmer 1999). The different degrees of embeddedness of TSOs not only concerned the system of governance but also the status of users. They were addressed as citizens in some branches (such as education and health) but much more as members of a specific
milieu, religious or ideological camp in others (as in catholic church-based versus municipal kindergartens). Given the diversity of actors and links, it is hard to generalize about the impact on civicness and civility. Some social movements, like the labour movement, promoted both; other movements and organizations such as charity or church-based welfare may have contributed to more decent and civilized ways of living, but they were far from addressing people as active right-claiming citizens. Yet, notwithstanding the different forms of TSOs and theirembeddedness, they created channels for active participation. In early welfare systems, however, participation was throughout a matter for experienced officials at the top of umbrella organizations or on corporatist boards. Participation had little to do with the daily life of ordinary citizens and service users, who were left with little room to negotiate their role.

In the emerging democracies and welfare states between the two world wars, as in Germany’s Weimar Republic, in Britain, France, or the Scandinavian countries, it is the political system rather than the single service unit that is characterized by democratic values and, therefore, by some degree of civicness.

How to sum up all this with regard to civicness and civility? Political democracy was a first stride towards establishing a public of citizens and eliminating the class-limits of the concept of a civilized person. But it was the welfare state that, by guaranteeing some degree of social security for all and universal access to services like health and education, helped to widen the basic norms of civility and standards of community living. However, the classical welfare approach towards service support has also had its limits. The ordinary citizen, once (s)he had access to such services offered, experienced a service that was rather prescriptive and uniform. It was not concerned with personal rights and aspirations (a dimension of civility to be taken up later). In retrospect, the repercussions for civicness were more positive; a strong welfare state created ‘social’ services as a matter of public interest and concern, and the administration of welfare services provided enormous scope for people to organize and make their voice heard through various forms of TSOs. Participating in the politics of services had interrelated civic and civilizing effects. It called for developing the art of balancing conflict and cooperation, activism and self-restraint.

2.2. Empowerment and participation – a lively civil society that eliminates state coercion?

It was not only economic crises such as the oil crisis and later on the labour-market crisis that shook the well-organized world of welfare of the trentes glorieuses in the 1970s. ‘Student revolutions’ and ‘new social movements’ (Castells 1983) were the culmination of cultural transformations which still reverberate today. Both life conditions and life styles, both needs and aspirations, had changed. This had repercussions on both the inherited systems of TSOs and the social services

52
Civicness, civility and their meanings for social services

representing key issues for lifestyle and life expectations on behalf of health, education or care.

First of all, the idea of services as a universal system for what some saw as increasingly middle-class societies was irrevocably undermined. With greater pluralism and cultural heterogeneity, differences in location, circumstances and aspirations, Leitbilder for services also had to be thought of in more pluralist terms. Since then, any realistic Leitbild of social services has had to deal with a plurality of services, some of them locally embedded in communities, some self-organized and self-governed; it is no longer possible to talk exclusively about one public service in the singular. By this increasing pluralism of forms of ownership a situation took shape in which a large spectrum of services are civic insofar as they are publicly debated, but in which the role of civicness differs depending on the degree to which they are publicly controlled; only a part of them are ‘public services’ in the traditional sense of being provided by the state or the municipality. There are increasing numbers of ‘gliding zones’, such as between the municipal hospital, self-help groups and the fitness clubs, or between the school diploma and the training course offered by a private provider. Civicness counts here insofar as non-profits as well as commercial services are likewise issues taken up in public debates even though possibilities for state-regulations differ in both cases. One could thus say that civicness was no longer a matter linked exclusively to the public sector. Professionals were confronted with the manifold dangers and potentials of such changes. On the one hand, its basically anti-authoritarian character threatened their power of definition and called for an approach in which cooperation and negotiation would play a greater role. On the other hand, the struggle for better services, especially for minorities that had been neglected in the past, offered professionals the opportunity to become pioneers of innovation and to develop professional discourses that involved less normalization and assimilation and more respect for the claims and needs of their addressees, empowering them to become active and critical citizens.

As far as the addressees were concerned, the new middle classes whose skills and human capital had been to a large extent created by the welfare services, now became the challengers of these same services. They became more outspoken in voicing demands within movements and NGOs and – when it came to individual services – insisting on negotiating and having their own perspectives and experiences taken account of. In many respects, civility was not what was guaranteed by state-professionals but what had to be claimed from them. Civility underwent a transformation in meaning, with ‘respect’ becoming a much more personal notion with more impact, for example. Likewise, in the climate of social movements and solidarity, the weaker strata of society and the socially disesteemed groups were given much more attention. Standards of civility were claimed for hitherto neglected groups or lifestyles, such as homosexuals and ethnic minorities. And the fact that social work and services were not just about providing for them but also about enabling and empowering them, added to the changing impact and
meaning of civility. Gartner and Riessman (1974) encapsulated the spirit of that moment when they hoped for a service society as a basically less authoritative society, given the fact that social services – unlike mass consumer products – only work with the active consent of the users. With users changing from clients into co-producers, professionals either needed to seek ‘informed consent’ or adopt an approach that over time enabled addressees increasingly to become service-partners (Kremer/Tonkens 2006).

The principal tools used to improve social services were, then, the more widespread use of dialogue, decentralization to the street level and the introduction of ways of working that increasingly addressed groups and communities rather than simply addressing individuals in isolation. Participation was also installed at the level of single organizations and providers (such as parental participation on school boards). A whole new generation of ideas of user involvement (Evers 2006), participative planning, policy networks, community development or boards which opened up to new actors and TSOs played a similar role. Such strategies for organizing in terms of civic and community action were quite often linked with charismatic leaders of organizations and movements like Saul Alinsky in the US (Horwitt 1989). In terms of governance, it is however important to note that the movements of the 1970s, though culturally important, often remained politically weak. Some built new nationwide interest groups and NGOs, but these were mostly weaker than the long-established existing organizations.

As far as the third sector was concerned, the late 1970s saw the birth of many of today’s associations that are rooted in various communities of the civil society; their main aim was to debate and construct alternatives to the service routines that had been established by the welfare states. Maybe the greatest success of the new cultural and social movements came at a time when the peak of their activity was over: since the late 1980s, a semi-academic, semi-public discourse has developed that translates much of the experience of the past into a kind of general policy and governance mode. On the more academic side, there were the influential studies about the ‘civil society’ as an ‘active society’, and about ways of acknowledging the ‘moral economies’ (Bode 2007) of non-state and non-market resources. A tendency took shape that was critical of the welfare state but within a new ‘progressive’ perspective. According to this line of thinking, society had proved to be ready to administer itself in many areas; politicians should hand over much more power to citizens and their associations, partly because the latter know better, and partly because they had a stronger ‘morale’, a more original voice untainted by political considerations and niceties (as an example for this kind of ‘participationist’ thinking in the Anglo-Saxon realm, see the engagement and the many writings of Beresford 2002). From such a perspective, the third sector could easily become the very incarnation of the civil society, of what is civic and civil. Politicians can either support it, or they are to be seen as the enemies that try to assimilate and distort it. This split between the social and the political, the ‘good society’ and the ‘dubious
Civicens, civility and their meanings for social services

state’, has been further strengthened by the version of the concept of social capital, as popularized by Putnam (2000). There, as many critics have remarked (see e.g. Evers 2003; Mouritsen 2003), one can find a strong claim that what should be built up outside state politics – social capital in the social realm, brought about by associations – is not one component besides others but the foundation for the possibility of a new, democratic politics. The sector of associations is stylized as encapsulating the genes for the flourishing of a civil and democratic society.

To summarize these observations in relation to the civicens and civility one can say that the new cultural and social movements represented something that was both opposite and complementary to the welfarism that predated them. Welfarism strengthened civicens and civility within the framework of political democracy mainly by establishing social rights and equality through universal services. In the new movements of personal liberation, social and political claims in various forms, issues of personal rights, respect and democratic patterns within service institutions came to the fore. Issues of inequality and social rights were articulated differently in that services had to meet the needs and claims of hitherto neglected groups and minorities. The underlying concepts for service reforms were not so much based on universal and all-encompassing welfare, but more with regard to new specific needs and claims of situational groups: single mothers, ethnic minorities, gay communities or workless youngsters in decaying urban zones. What united them was a call for services built on respect. It is no wonder that these were developments that gave impetus to third sector research, because TSOs, as providers, innovators and advocacy groups seemed to be the ideal agent for bringing about this kind of change. Much of the today’s debate on the third sector still draws on these past claims for the self-administration of the social, even though the general political and social climate has changed considerably.

2.3. Consumerism – a better service landscape through the choices of consumer citizens?

It would be untrue to say that the basic concept of consumerism – measuring public services according to the criteria for quality as they have developed on consumer markets – is merely the rational outcome of neo-liberal thinking. Consumerism should also be considered as an attitude to be found among the service users themselves. From the Second World War until the end of the twentieth century, the services of the welfare state had been losing their original link with class distinctions; they had become universal services for most of the population. This was true of the hospital and the primary school, the kindergarten and the nursing home. However, the ways in which these services operated were now viewed against the background of the fully fledged consumer society, in the light of experiences of private markets and the constant presence of the mass media. Today, services have to survive in a society in which the key words are choice, quick and full service and
customer orientation (Hood/Peters/Wollmann 1997). In the light of such aspirations and promises, the performance of many public services was inevitably found lacking.

Orienting the Leitbild of public services towards that of privately provided ones had already been made easier by the cultural changes of the 1970s. These had led to the perception of increasing pluralism in terms of co-existing bundles of service images that were no longer parts of all-encompassing systems. In fact, the notion of giving the individual what (s)he wanted, abandons the educative approach always linked with public services that are meant to be equal for all but as well to make their addressees more equal. The various meanings of empowerment shifted from issues of ‘voice’ to issues of ‘choice’; they now range from giving a group more specifically what it wants or needs to “making the customer satisfied” (Starkey 2003). If a school system, for example, is to be made more responsive to individual talents, preferences and needs, then why not give parents more choice over the educational facility and arrangements to be used? The Leitbild of consumerism is, in essence, about social services that meet individual and group preferences to a greater extent by putting the users in command as consumers (or making them “queens” as Julian Le Grand (2003) puts it, adopting the language of chess). Issues of inequality then take a secondary position. Such a Leitbild also affects the status of the professionals; to the extent that their services increasingly become a matter of choice for their customers, the imperative of satisfying these customers may well threaten their professional power and autonomy (Foster/Wilding 2000). Even if they think they ‘know best’, they can only follow their own professional vision insofar as this vision can successfully be ‘marketed’.

Clearly, this challenge can be justified as an opportunity rather than a threat if one has an optimistic idea about the addressees, the skills of the users as consumers (Baldock 2003). They are expected to be able to acquire the respective knowledge about services offered. The civility of social services provided through private markets, however, stays to some degree a public matter. Ongoing public debates surrounding the markets for services will have an impact on consumers’ choices, but unlike in traditional welfare concepts these debates do not automatically translate into fixed rules for the services. This means that the addressees are not only consumers, but educated, concerned people, citizens that participate in a public debate, or through the action of consumer groups. But on the other hand they are likewise and foremost consumers. They are ‘consumer-citizens’ as Clarke et al. (2007) put it, still retaining basic rights and with varying degrees of influence as in other markets. Against this background, a programme that seeks to substitute the citizen-client with the consumer-citizen weakens the civiness of services and makes their civil qualities harder to influence through state action or collective negotiations. With the consumerist approach, the accent is increasingly on choice and to a lesser degree on voice. Yet, for the individual, such an approach may still
Civicness, civility and their meanings for social services

contain a liberating and enabling promise since it can mean less power for the type of professional that ‘knows best’, as more power shifts to the individual consumer.

When it comes to governance, the preferred tools of consumerist strategies in the realm of social services are quite well known. First of all, the voucher has traditionally been espoused as the ideal instrument. The voucher allows choice, as in private markets, but equally takes into account the fact that this consumer power is funded by the taxpayer and, so the choices can be limited. If one gives up this limitation and the sole aim is to initiate or promote the use of a service, then tax policies and public marketing may be the preferred tools. So far, however, the prevailing forms of a more market-oriented governance of services have brought little change for consumer-citizens, because the introduction of ‘quasi-markets’ (Brandsen 2004) still centres mainly on the public authorities. It is they who are the ‘purchasers’ and select their preferred provider through public competitions. In the governance of service markets, the overall quality of the services remains strongly dependent on the authority retained by regulatory public policies and the influence of public opinion building at large. From an optimistic point of view, it is hoped that public authorities could gain new powers both by setting appropriate rules for social markets and by strengthening the ability and rights of consumer-citizens through consumer protection and activation - through the creation of an infrastructure of rights, advice and opportunities for consumer groups to participate in regulation. The increased impact of such dimensions of civicness could turn consumer-citizens into citizen-consumers (for the tension between the roles of consumer and citizen, see Malpass et al. 2007). From a more pessimistic point of view, the consumerist reforms will inevitably weaken the impact of public and political elements and hence the civiness of services. Moreover, as Clarke (2004) argues on the basis of empirical studies, people are not happy to be treated as consumers given the fact that the civil qualities of the state and non-profit service institutions such as trust-based service relationships are brushed aside.

For various reasons, third sector organizations face a considerable loss of influence and attention under the consumerist approach. It is not collective self-organization and voice but informed and discerning individual choice that is the preferred tool for obtaining the best possible service. Furthermore, in an era of decreasing free time due to the pressures of work, "ready made" service offers and packages that save time may easily become more attractive than TSOs that call for time-consuming participation. In service markets, TSOs have to survive increasingly or even exclusively on reimbursements for specified services, just like their commercial competitors. It is therefore no longer up to them to define what a quality service is, but this is up to the public authorities and/or the markets. In the context of marketized social services, the claim to civicness and civility can only to a far lesser degree build on the civil society in terms of a third sector where TSO-based services cultivate such values; it has to build increasingly on the other dimension of a civil society – the impact of the public sphere and of debates where tastes and preferences
Adalbert Evers

are not only shaped by the promotion of the suppliers in the mass media but also by
the voices of the consumer citizens. From a consumerist perspective, the future of
TSOs lies not so much in their role as distinct service providers but as NGOs,
lobbies and advocacy institutions within social markets.

Summing up with regard to *civicness and civility*, this brief outline of the
consumerist discourse has shown that, like the empowerment and participation-
oriented discourse of the 1970s, consumerism is about self-determination and
individual rights. Yet this time, these elements of civility are articulated differently.
Reference is not made primarily to the voice of citizens but to the choice of
consumers. However, before dismissing consumerism as purely detrimental to
civicness and civility, we should remember what Hirschmann argued as early as
1970: choice and voice can be a means of claiming respect to be used
simultaneously. After either condemning or glorifying the effects of market
mechanisms on the quality of services, Hirschman’s position seems to be of new
relevance. Indeed, to the extent the argument for market-means is not made in the
name of efficiency but aims to create a space for individual autonomy, consumerism
may contribute to a contemporary notion of civicness. It is the role of the voice of
organized citizen-consumers and of TSOs as advocacy and consumer organizations
- the impact of civil society as a public sphere - that will determine what scope
remains for civic and civil concerns on social service markets.

2.4. The activating and social investment state – the strange return of civicness and
civility

Much of the trend towards consumerism was accompanied by a neo-liberal
discourse that was less about freedom and more about efficiency and rapid wealth
creation. As far as the latter is concerned, it has lost much of its glory and recent
years have therefore seen something of a ‘come-back’ for the state, which should
however not be confused with the return to the *welfare* state. The continued focus of
a managerial state (Clarke/Newman 1997) on competitiveness and effectiveness and
the attempt to use public policies to achieve this end in fact imply a move away
from both welfarism and consumerism.

- Welfarism is criticized as a system of public services that is oriented mainly
towards rights, protection and social consumption, adding little to growth
and being unwilling to install the means for the effective management of
resources, as have been developed in business.
- The limits of consumerism and market-based mechanisms are shown by the
fact that public authorities are only in control of the resources they allocate
for the use of social services; they have no control when it comes to general
Civicness, civility and their meanings for social services

While managerialism and public management, with their goal of getting more out of public money, may to some extent be in line with consumerism as far as (market) means are concerned, they are at odds with a consumerist agenda insofar as they retain the states’ task of setting explicit ends – to ensure the most efficient and effective use of public money with respect to goals and outcomes that go beyond the target group. Much of the discourse concerning the social investment state and good public management refer to a renewed idea of the public good. However, in times of harsh international competition such ends are not primarily about welfare but economic concerns. Welfare is secondary – an accepted instrument for a more effective economy, a cohesive society and competitiveness in global markets. This calls for public investment that complements private investment (e.g. investing in families for economic and demographic purposes). The notion of social investment or the social investment state (Giddens 1998; Esping-Andersen 2002) has thus come increasingly to the fore in recent years.

However, such new policies for an investing state are as well about a return of the citizen, of civicness and civility. Modernizing governance (Newman 2001) on terms like ‘the enabling state’, ‘activating policies’ or the concept of a ‘preventive welfare state’, recently coined by the German social democrats, focusses on participation, the public and private behaviour of citizens and ‘civic virtues’. However civility and civicness get a different meaning here. People should behave well, enhance their own employability, help to preserve public order, show an active readiness to learn and adapt to new challenges and environments. Labour market services are a good example – they are neither about rights nor about choice in the first place, but about activating a sense of duty and action among the unemployed. Something similar can be said about the politics of prevention in health that call for a healthier lifestyle and the willingness to follow individual health care plans (managed care). While the focus is on individual behaviour, collective and community action may also be involved. Public policies invite people to take part in campaigns to restore their neighbourhoods, where public and private investment is meant to complement the active self-help of the inhabitants.

As far as the Leitbild of personal social services is concerned, this combination of activating and social investment perspectives reconstructs a strong notion of public services, which are different from private commercial services. But this difference is set out within a new framework. It is not like the welfare-state tradition of a guaranteed right to a resource, presupposing that the user will make wise use of it. The new conceptual framework is a contracted working plan that links rights and duties, investments and outcomes. Public services are about ‘contracts for
cooperation’ within pre-formulated visions of a productive social and working life. Such an approach is also well suited to strengthen once again the role of professionals, which had been weakened under the consumerist and especially the participatory ‘grass-roots’ movements. As “case-managers” it is up to them to decide.

All this entails a different perspective on the addressees of service systems. The ‘citizen’ is once again valued, but this time by appealing not so much to rights as to duties and active participation. In such a context, choice means extending personal responsibility and being ready to accept the responsibility for the negative consequences of wrong choices. Such perspectives frame users as responsible risk-takers. As such, they act in service systems like health and education which give out strong messages about what choices and types of behaviour are expected and make it clear that it is users’ personal interest to cooperate. The extent of the civility of such arrangements is then very much dependent on their policy-context and on the status of the co-producing citizen. An individually tailored and managed health plan negotiated respectfully with an ordinary middle-class person may bring out the best side of a contracted and interactive co-produced service relationship. An integration plan for someone who is long-term unemployed, on the other hand, may entail all kinds of enforced conformity and humiliation (Berkel/Valkenburg 2007). There is only a thin line between an enabling service and a prescriptive one, between encouraging and enforcing service patterns.

Turning to the governance, this means that new organisational forms and modes have appeared such as networks, partnerships, deliberative forums and government led programs that seek for activating broad alliances. All this has, not coincidentally, led to a considerable revival of Foucault’s concept of analyzing social services and their governance as systems of outside introduced ‘self-guidance’, part of a new historical form of ‘governmentality’ (1991). However, ‘activating’ society and communities to reach out for a new road to social cohesion (Jenson/Saint-Martin 2003) also raises questions about the scope left for conflict, debate, individual and collective autonomy. The activating social investment state basically seeks to include everybody as ‘in’; however, non-cooperation can quickly mean being completely ‘out’. The concept of an all-encompassing differentiated system of cooperative governance with active individual and collective participants from civil society, who are at a time good citizens and willing followers, recognizes no adversary except inefficiency and ‘red tape’. But, as Chantal Mouffe has argued (2005), these kinds of politics in search of a very broad mainstream, where no alternatives are provided for, may in fact tend to corrode the democratic quality of politics, which depends on the possibility of reaching out for different methods and solutions.

Compared to consumerism and some of the welfare traditions, the third sector organizations are basically welcomed in such a context, and this manifests itself in the call for compacts, contracts alliances and other forms of cooperation. Aiming to
Civicness, civility and their meanings for social services

mobilize all resources and influencing ‘soft’ factors, such as attitudes and expectations, there is a new support for community activity, civil society, volunteering and the third sector, addressing people and TSOs as partners. However, within public-private-partnerships that network state action, community participation and private firms, many TSOs rightly fear a loss of autonomy and the reduction of their special role to one of translating and intermediating public policies which have been created ex ante, largely without any contribution or criticism from them.

To summarize with respect to civicness and civility, it is important to note firstly that in many European countries the reference to a more civic society and civicness has become an explicit part of the rhetoric of public policy, largely regardless of the ideology that current dominates. However, this renaissance of the discourse of the active citizen and its ‘virtues’, and of potential for public policies to foster the active citizen through special activation programmes and invitations to participate is deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, such policies are a way of upgrading and enriching notions of citizenship and civicness as well as components of civility such as self-reliance and self-restraint, by making more reference to what is called the public good, a common purpose and participation by activation. On the other hand, to the degree that future cooperation is defined in terms of economic battles without alternative and citizens are addressed mainly as citizen-workers, citizen-performers or citizen-entrepreneurs, such a discourse may get perverted into a sometimes coercive and top-down concept of civicness and proper civil behaviour. It is not wrong in itself to seek to create ‘good citizens’ and to promote civicness and civility in terms of a readiness to follow and adapt. But what of other ingredients, such as a respect for dissent and diversity?

3. Summary and Conclusion

It has been shown that contemporary meanings of civicness and civility rest on the separation of state and society, the public and the private. Their meaning is also influenced by the experience of democracy. While civicness concerns the impact and qualities of the collective action of citizens and the role of public institutions that provide a space for these actions, civility is a much broader notion that may be encountered in both private and public settings – something that is less about institutions but primarily about forms of behaviour and mutual recognition in a plural society where strangers may have conflicts but also depend on one other. Civicness and civility are intertwined. Restricting civicness will harm civility, and a lack of civility will affect civicness adversely. It has been argued that a civil society depends, then, on the possibilities across sectors of building such value orientations and forms of behaviour, something that underlines the key-role of a public sphere.
The importance attached to the respective contributions of state politics and the third sector may differ in the academic debates, but it would be misleading to equate the third sector with civil society.

However, civicness and civility may mean different things to different people. For some, civicness is more about rights and for others more about duties; and when it comes to civility some will emphasize a readiness to adapt while others will stress the ability to resist. This has been illustrated and shown in more detail in the second part. In the various discourses on welfare and social services that play a role today, civicness and civility are given different places and their impact and meaning varies. Obviously, the discourses we have dealt with are kind of ideal-types. In real politics one will find mergers, some of them more refined and reflected, others due to the attempt of party politics to catch the sign of the times and a wider electorate.

As for civicness, in traditional welfare state discourses it is mainly linked with the ability of public institutions to plan and maintain social services with the aim of securing social rights. In contrast to the heydays of welfare, the social movements that strive for empowerment and participation associate civicness less with the presence of state planning but much more with the active citizen. Under consumerist orientations, civicness with all its meanings plays a relatively small role. The public institutions and politics only have to guarantee service offers that are not defined by citizens but consumers, not by collective choices but individual choices. The impact and meaning of civicness is once again different in the activating social investment state. Here, civicness is awarded with a position of prime importance, but in terms of the role it plays in driving citizens to take their duties rather than rights.

As for civility, in traditional welfarism it is associated mainly with people’s readiness and ability to adapt to and identify with collective settings and agreements – whether this be as a workers to be taught and trained or as a client. The discourse on empowerment and participation, meanwhile, promotes civility more in terms of respect for individualism and diversity. The empowerment and consumerist movements both call for mechanisms that set people free through their individual actions or choices and demonstrate greater toleration of diversity. The discourse on activating social investment in human capital, however, takes a different stance. The insistence on civicness in terms of a broader set of duties for citizens soon becomes a moral discourse on civility – this time in terms of ‘good people’, being industrious, willing to take more responsibility for one’s own circumstances, health and employability and for keeping one’s neighbourhood in order.

Clearly behind the different – both – impact and meaning of civicness and civility that springs from each of the discourses, there is also a different idea and reality of civil society and of what it requires. While, for example, the empowerment and participation discourse will emphasize the tensions between state power and the needs and expectations of society and call for more autonomy vis-à-vis the state, the discourse on the activating investment state promises to build a state that takes a lead role in strengthening a world of cooperative citizens and TSOs. In conclusion, it
Civiness, civility and their meanings for social services

gets clear that a simple reference to civiness, civility and the values of civil society does not automatically make a clear difference. Various and even quite contrary discourses can refer to these topics because beyond an overlapping consensus they will emphasise different aspects and meanings.

All in all the introduction of the contested notions of civiness and civility could make a difference both in the debate on civil society and the third sector and in the debate on the future of welfare and personal social services.

With respect to the debate on civil society the kind of reference to civiness and civility that has been suggested may help to get rid of simplistic concepts that still largely identify a more civil society with a flourishing third sector and with strategies to curb the shortcomings of markets and state-policies mainly by its enlargement and influence. As it has been argued, the notions of civility and civness lead to emphasise other additional sources for a civil society - the impact of the public sphere and of democratic governance on both, the state and the market sector (but as well on the degree civiness and civility have an impact in the third sector itself).

When it comes to the debate on welfare and social services such reference points as civiness and civility help to overcome the traditional restrictions towards issues of security, equality and needs and to introduce a larger set of quality issues. By referring to civility, contemporary notions of human qualities of service-systems such as showing respect to the users and their networks, inviting them to dialogue and to develop their own capabilities would come into focus. Secondly, since civility and civiness are not restricted to a (public or third) sector; the private sector of social services could be included as well into the debates on the future of social services at large.

References

Adalbert Evers

Civics, civility and their meanings for social services


Chapter 4

Taco Brandsen

Civicness in organizations: a reflection on the relationship between professionals and managers

This chapter explores the meaning of civicness within organisations, focusing specifically on the relationship between professionals and their managers. The traditional position of professionals within organizations has gradually eroded, while external developments are simultaneously making it ever more difficult to maintain the balance between competing organizational values. As a result, there is more potential for internal conflict. The civic quality of an organization is important in dealing with the tensions that arise between its members and in achieving a high level of integration.

1. Introduction

Not long after I started a new job in the summer of 2007, one of the senior bureaucrats of my faculty strode into my office and angrily announced that I had violated internal regulations. Indeed, since these regulations were based on legal requirements, I had in fact breached the law. I was at a loss to think of what I might have done. As it turned out, it concerned my decision to change the design of a course by replacing an exam with a written assignment. Since the course design had been included in the internal regulations, and these were legally binding, we could in theory have been sued if a student had insisted on taking an exam. The official noted that I should have indicated my desire to make this change before April, when it could have been dealt with through the proper channels. My response that I had only started my job in July, that no one had informed me of internal procedures and that students were quite happy with the change fell on deaf ears. Later I received an e-mail (CC-ed to all those with formal responsibility in such matters – quite a number of people) that as a RARE exception (the capitalization is original) I would be forgiven this error of judgment.

What can we make of this? My first instinct was to dismiss the man as a petty bureaucrat and regard it as just one more example of an ignorant administrator’s impingement on my professional autonomy. But it is clear that the different perspectives adopted by my ‘colleague’ and myself are influenced by the different
trade-offs we had made. His concern was primarily to uphold the rights of students by maintaining a transparent curriculum, whereas I believed I had the discretionary right to make last-minute adjustments, when practical. Neither of our positions was inherently unreasonable and both were inherently connected to the division of labour within the organization (‘where you stand depends upon where you sit’). But clearly we were not inclined to deal with this difference in trade-offs in a useful manner. He made it no easier for me by strutting into my office with the air of a supervisor. For my part, I must admit to the tendency, shared by many colleagues, to regard every non-academic university administrator as an outsider with no understanding of the professional practice of teaching. However, and this is the important point to make here, there is apparently no mechanism, formal, cultural or otherwise, that could have helped us to communicate about this in a meaningful way. By ‘meaningful’, I refer to the sense of a shared understanding of a problem and mutual respect for the other’s position. Here we touch upon the concept of civicness.

As I will argue in this chapter, negotiations concerning the trade-offs made by professionals and managers within organizations are crucially influenced by the civic quality of those organizations. The concept of civicness helps us to discuss civil society without being bound to the traditional conceptualizations, specifically those that restrict it to informal communities and volunteering. This is why an analysis of professionals is in a sense the acid test of the concept. That civicness exists in professional contexts is intuitively obvious. After all, it is hard to maintain that love, care and commitment disappear as soon as people receive financial remuneration for their labour. This chapter will focus primarily on professionals in the public services, such as education and health care.

Professionals in these areas are currently under increasing pressure, which has led to a backlash against recently fashionable public management philosophies and their perceived champions, the managers. Yet the problem is more complex than a simple narrative of conflict between professionals and managers would suggest. Competitive pressure and a squeeze in resources have generally made it more difficult for public service providers to balance different values such as equity, efficiency and quality. This friction between values is, by extension, likely to increase the friction between groups with different positions within the organization. As clients demand better quality and managers cope with shrinking budgets, the potential for conflict grows, since people in different positions will tend to favour a different balance of values. The cleaner will favour different priorities to the surgeon, and the surgeon different priorities than the hospital managers. The civic quality of organizations is crucial in helping organizations to manage such tensions.

Civicness, as defined in the introductory contribution to this book, is the quality of institutions, organizations and procedures tend to stimulate, reproduce and foster civility. Civility refers to virtues such as commitment to other people, social concern, involvement, responsibility, the ability to restrain belligerence in conflicts [particularly relevant in my opening example – TB] and mutual respect. Civility is
Civics in organizations

the antidote to vices such as selfishness, indifference, aggression and a lack of responsibility. Civility, in these terms, is the ability to express certain values in our relations with other people.

As the traditional position of professionals within organizations diminishes in stature, while simultaneously the balance between competing values is increasingly difficult to maintain, civility becomes more important in containing potential conflict between different members of the organization. By implication, the civic quality of the organization will be increasingly significant in achieving a high level of integration.

2. Professionals under pressure?

Let me start my argument with a discussion of the position of professionals in the public services. There are various definitions of what it means to be a ‘professional’ (see e.g. Burrage et al. 1990; Freidson 2001), but definitions generally contain the following elements:

- A professional has specific knowledge and expertise, based on the application of systematic theoretical principles.
- The professional belongs to a closed community of people with similar knowledge and expertise. This community is characterized by shared norms and values, institutions for socialization and regulation.
- The closed nature of the community is considered legitimate by the wider society within which it operates.
- Both at the individual level and at the level of their community, professionals are allowed a broad measure of discretionary autonomy to manage their own affairs.

Of course, groups with these characteristics date back to the Mesopotamian scribes, but the rise of professional groups is particularly associated with the process of modernization. In a society characterized by increasing specialization, sociologists began to discern specific groups of occupations that had achieved sufficient social status to secure a high degree of self-regulation for themselves. The medical profession is the typical example. Its members have specialized knowledge that most people lack, they share certain cultural codes, symbolized by swearing the Hippocratic Oath, entry to their community is limited by medical schools with restricted access, individual members have the freedom to make highly personalized judgements in their daily practices, the community traditionally regulates its own affairs, including failures of judgement, and the rest of society has generally accepted this state of affairs, even if the legitimacy of traditional professions has over time diminished.
Perceptions of professionals in the public debate have varied strongly. According to some, professionalism is inherently (functionally) connected to the nature of particular services. At the other extreme stands the view that professions are no more than the institutional outcomes of conflict that protect the position of dominant groups. Such a political perspective inspired the widespread denouncement of professionals during the 1970s. Among the best-known criticisms is Illich’s assertion that professionalism is simply a cover for attempts to monopolize and commodify knowledge, robbing citizens of the power to solve their own problems actively (Illich 1977). Not only do professional methods encourage dependency among clients, but professionals also have an interest in keeping their clients in a state of dependency and may be suspected of actively maintaining it.

Criticism of professionals contributed to the support for public sector reforms, collectively known as the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM). Although these have often been presented as a coherent philosophy, it is more accurate to describe them as a collection of prescriptions for administrative reform with a focus on output-based performance measurement and competition (cf. McLaughlin e.a. 2006; Pollitt/Bouckaert 2006). When NPM was first launched, it was regarded as a liberating philosophy that would hold public organizations accountable and offer citizens protection from bias and incompetence. However, the effect of NPM on professionals is rather ambiguous (Trommel 2006). On the one hand, it has underlined the need for decentralized decision-making and autonomy, which can be seen as favouring professionals. On the other hand, and this is the interpretation stressed in much of the literature on professionalism, NPM also emphasizes output control and performance measurement, which potentially reduces professional autonomy when output is defined and measured in detail.

Indeed, one concrete result of NPM-inspired reforms has been that professionals have been brought under stricter control by the organizations in which they operate, although the lack of broad and systematic research in this area means that one must be cautious about making sweeping statements. Where they occur, the reforms entail performance measurement and stricter control over the type of activities that professionals should concentrate on. The extremities of such measures can be bizarre. There is the example of a domiciliary care worker who came to cook lunch for a client at the appointed hour, but was asked to do some shopping instead. When she emerged from the house, she was spotted by an auditor who argued that it was a breach of contract – it was lunch hour, not shopping hour – and then had the contract with the provider terminated (as told by Hardy and Wistow 1998).

1 There is evidence to suggest that broad organisational reforms have only a limited effect on professional practice (see e.g. Honingh & Karsten 2007)
Civininess in organizations

3. Relations between professionals and managers

The reforms have therefore given rise to a new wave of criticism, this time siding with the professionals and directed against champions of NPM, the managers. Sometimes the criticism has been overly sentimental, portraying professionals as innocent victims of managers’ influence. Professionalism, like managerialism, contains elements of ideology. Yet there are various reasons why, empirically, the opposition between professionals and managers should not be overstated.

To begin with, the distinction between professionals and managers is unclear and becoming increasingly blurred. It is difficult, in practice, to delineate specific groups within organizations. Even small ones tend to be composed of various layers and subunits, ranging from street-level workers through various strata of middle management to top management. The further one gets away from the extremes, the more difficult it becomes to identify positions, especially as everyone tends to be called a manager these days. Empirical evidence suggests that the division of labour is becoming blurred, with professionals picking up more management responsibilities and managers engaging more closely with service delivery (Noordegraaf 2008).

Furthermore, the available evidence shows that the extent to which NPM-inspired reforms have trickled through differs greatly between sectors, and that the relationship between managers and professionals differs accordingly (Ackroyd/Kirkpatrick/Walker 2007). This is not necessarily an oppositional relationship. There are, in fact, policy fields where managers and professionals operate as allies, co-operating to deal with common trends such as mergers and privatization. This has led Noordegraaf (2008) to argue in favour of contextualizing their relationship on the basis of further empirical evidence, rather than making prior assumptions about it. Rather than regarding each other as opposites, managers and professionals can engage in constructive coalitions. It is clear that the nature of actual relationships between managers and professionals varies greatly and so does the level of friction between them.

Finally, a development that complicates the presumed management-professional opposition is that nowadays many occupations have claimed professional status. As far back as the 1960s, Wilensky spoke of ‘the professionalization of everyone’ (Wilensky 1964). People in lines of work that were previously considered too ill-defined or low-skilled now vie for the prized label of professional. For instance, in

2 There is evidence to suggest that broad organisational reforms have only a limited effect on professional practice (see e.g. Honingh & Karsten 2007) gerialism “seems to have become an ideology, a goal in itself” (transl. TB; see Brandseen, 1998: 7)
Taco Brandsen

medicine, the icon of professionalism, professional boundaries are increasingly dynamic, with nurses and assistants taking over duties from traditional professionals (Nancorow/Borthwick 2005). Interestingly, the occupations claiming professional status include the managers themselves. They have their own curricula and degrees, their own networks and conventions, and increasingly identify themselves as a separate group independent from the policy fields in which they are active (Noordegraaf 2008).

The legitimacy of new professions, such as manager, is disputed. For example, the famous management guru Henry Mintzberg has accused management schools of training people out of context and argued that the common MBA training method of learning from case studies is not experience, but voyeurism (Mintzberg 2004). One could interpret the claim to professionalism as just another weapon in the competition for scarce resources, with all occupations scrambling for an upgrade of their status. Then again, it is also indicative of a broader development towards a society where expert knowledge is no longer confined to a select handful of occupations and where the classical status groups no longer have the legitimacy to uphold their privileged status. It has given experts cause to reconsider the concept of professionalism, a discussion to which I will return below.

For the sake of clarity, it is important to state that questioning the reasoning behind current criticism of managers is not to deny the current problems in the public services, such as high pressure and the loss of autonomy among professionals. Even though these are sometimes overstated, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that these problems exist in a number of policy fields (Duyvendak/Knijn/Kremer 2006). The question is which perspective can lead us to a productive analysis of these problems. It is, most likely, not one that is based upon a narrative of heroes and villains. Not long ago, managers were the supposed champions of reinvigorated public services. Now they have been revealed as traitors to the cause. At some stage, they will no doubt be rehabilitated. An analysis of civility in organizations must go beyond current fads and consider how tensions between different organizational members, which nearly always exist and which have been documented from the earliest beginnings of organizational analysis, can be dealt with in a civil way; that is, on the basis of mutual respect.

4. Bringing managers back in

What is mutual respect? At the very least, one would imagine, it implies recognition of the other’s existence as a fellow citizen. Yet here we run into a theoretical obstacle in resolving the perceived tensions between professionals and managers. Much criticism of managerial influence on professionals tends to focus primarily on managerialism and not on managers. As an illustration, let me take Lipsky’s classic
analysis of street-level bureaucrats (would they be called street-level professionals today?). In this inspiring book, he shows how workers face pressure from various directions, both from clients and managers (Lipsky 1980). They invent methods to deal with these pressures, and sometimes these are generally accepted methods (e.g. keeping spare capacity to deal with special cases), while at other times they are an outright violation of anything we can define as civic (e.g. deliberately humiliating clients). This is about retaining control, or, to be more precise, about remedying a lack of control. Otherwise the dispositions of the street-level bureaucrats remain rather obscure. Clients are only observed in terms of their outward behaviour, as in how they put bureaucrats under pressure. Managers are faceless and only described in terms of forces of control. Notwithstanding the high appeal and merits of Lipsky’s analysis, it leaves no room for any solution except that street-level bureaucrats must be relieved from outside pressure – and one of his starting assumptions is that such pressure is inevitable.

To some extent, this is a problem inherent in many studies of professionalism. In the words of Tilly (2005), they adopt a dispositional perspective that explains action on the basis of the orientations of the subject – in this case the professional. Orientations can be conceptualized as preferences or rationalities; action is determined by the incentives related to those orientations. Many critics of managerialism only discuss managers in the light of these incentives. In other words, they do not discuss the interaction between managers and professionals, but managerialist influences on professional behaviour. More specifically, they concern forces of control. Managers and their motivations are largely absent, except in a highly stylized form.

At worst, this can lead to a conceptualization of organizations as pineapples: a primary process surrounded by an unwholesome bureaucratic peel. According to such a perspective, managerial layers are at best a necessary evil. Such a conceptualization not only disregards the empirical developments discussed earlier, but also leads the discussion into a conceptual dead end. If our objective is to develop a theory of civicness in organizations, then the conceptualization should at least leave room for mutual respect – in other words, the managers should be brought back in, not as environmental influences, but as fellow citizens with whom professionals and others interact. In the following paragraphs, I will argue that this calls for a relational view of the interaction that occurs within organizations.

5. The ambiguity of man

This invites reflection on the internal relations within organizations. In the preceding paragraphs, it was noted that the distinctions between managers and professionals are empirically blurring. I argued that, conceptually, discussions of the current
problems of professionals tend to ignore the managers, focusing on the mechanisms rather than the men. This approach, as I hope to demonstrate in the remainder of the chapter, stands in the way of developing a theory of civicness in organizations.

Suppose now that we do bring the managers into focus, not as management tools or as abstract forces, but as individuals. What kind of people are they? Are they self-interested Machiavellians bent on exploiting other workers for their own ambitions? In the context of public services, this would accord with the image of the self-aggrandizing bureaucrat (Niskanen 1971). Alternatively, are they basically good, but misguided men and women who impose strategies and system without sufficient knowledge of their practical consequences? That would be close to Scott’s analysis of state failure, where the worst planning disasters (e.g. the collectivization of farm land or urban planning in the style of les banlieux) are the result of flawed visions driven by the best of intentions (Scott 1998). Or is the manager himself a victim of the system, an unwilling perpetrator of NPM reforms and an implicit ally of professionals? The latter is what Noordegraaf (2008) suggests in his call for the rehabilitation of managers. Clearly, these types are analytical constructs and real people are potentially all of the above.

One study in which these different types come together is Le Grand’s analysis of the motivations of professionals, managers and clients implicit in public policies (Le Grand 2003). He identifies four ideal-typical people, each with a particular kind of motivation. Knights are people who are predominantly altruistic, working for the common good. Knaves, by contrast, are people who base their actions purely on self-interest. Pawns are passive victims of circumstance, whereas queens are active citizens who take matters into their own hands. This typology neatly summarizes more complex philosophical positions. As one might expect, Le Grand’s evidence shows that clients, professionals and managers do not as a rule conform to any one of these stereotypes. They are just like real people: they are different and even individuals do not behave in a consistently self-interested or altruistic, passive or active way.

This may seem rather obvious. The plot of any decent novel relies upon the premise that all people have ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in them. The difficulty is to contextualize these different qualities without losing the analytical poignancy of the types. Obvious as it may be, there is as yet no generally applicable conceptualization of the essential ambiguity in man’s disposition. It is more usual to assume a more singular disposition – usually a knavish one – and then proceed from there. Different orientations then become the ‘other’ category or are simply redefined as a particular type of knavishness. Mother Teresa’s charitable works can, for example, be interpreted as an effort to secure her own salvation. Such analytical constructions are useful devices because we usually know little about actual motivations. It is impossible to look into the human heart.
6. Civility: mobilizing the knights

Fortunately, there is no need (at least not here) to delve deeper into the issue of inner motivation. When we speak of civility, being a knight or knave is conceptually not about inner motivation, but about conformity to certain values and norms. For example, non-aggression is a virtue because we define it as such. In other cultures, starting a fight may be construed as a sign of respect. I started this chapter by describing the dilemma between my orientation as a professional and my orientation as an individual human being. The ‘individuality’ refers not to personality, but to the status of a fellow citizen who is entitled to be treated with respect by other citizens, regardless of individual traits. In other words, it refers to an orientation based on a set of social norms and values which is (at least theoretically) different from those norms and values belonging to the professional community.

In practice, these sets of norms and values overlap, but this is not necessarily the case. Actions resulting from a professional orientation may be perceived as going against what is considered fair according to broader cultural norms. Consider the lawyer defending a proven criminal: in professional terms, his efforts to diminish the criminal’s sentence are laudable, but they are unlikely to engender a sense of justice (which is, in fact, one of the great dilemmas of legal systems). Stereotypical images of professionals tend to associate professions with certain civic orientations and their social standing differs between professions and between national cultures. For example, the status of judges varies widely between countries, but they are invariably ranked higher on the social scale than – say – estate agents and stockbrokers.

Then again, in some professions broadly held cultural norms can strengthen professional quality, especially in so-called ‘human services’. Consider, for instance, civility in its crudest form: the mannerisms of using polite phrases, addressing people by their surnames, shaking hands. It is pleasant when the doctor who is competent at mending bones is simultaneously a civil person – it would be nice if everyone were kind, but perhaps especially when we feel weak or ignorant, as can easily be the case when dealing with professionals. After all, what makes the professional what he is inherently creates some form of dependence, even if it is unintended. Better then to be treated as an equal, if only through a sense of shared humanity. Indeed, it goes further. Some definitions of service quality can hardly be separated from civil values. This is especially the case in social services, where being cared for is often an intimate experience where the line between professional and personal interaction is very thin, at least in the perception of clients. In social services, the link between civility and professional behaviour is a close one.

Such civil values expressed in professional behaviour have received much attention in the recent debate, in which professionals are sometimes presented as inherently committed and caring. In a theory of civics, such an assumption must be discarded. If institutions can encourage civil behaviour, it is also possible that
they do not encourage such behaviour, or indeed, that they elicit uncivil behaviour. If not, the concept of civickness would be redundant. Theoretically, one must then suppose that professionals can be both knightly and knavish as citizens. A theory of civickness must therefore discard predefined notions of professionals (or anyone else) as selfish, power-hungry, caring or loving. Rather, we should consider how such dispositions are influenced by the institutional environment. Hirschman (1982) has argued that, rather than assuming a fixed set of preferences, we should assume that initial preferences can be changed through experience, which leads to changes on the demand side and not necessarily to changes in supply. For instance, we may cast a vote during elections in the belief that this will bring us happiness, but having been disappointed over and over again, we may simply stop voting at some point. 3 This is intuitively obvious, but difficult to theorize. Certainly, one of the potential benefits of a discussion of civickness is that it can contribute to theory-building in this direction.

Essentially, then, civickness in organizations can be conceptualized as the conflation of roles: the role of a professional in an organizational capacity and the role of a fellow citizen. In organizations with a high civic quality, the behaviour of professionals expresses civil values. In organizations with a low civic quality, the behaviour of professionals is characterized by a lack of civility.

7. Civickness and integration

The effects of public sector reforms can be re-defined according to their effects on the expression of civil values. Whether or not such reforms have diminished the overall quality of services is difficult to judge on the basis of existing evidence. However, what is clear is that they tend to reduce the scope for individuals to display civil qualities. As an example, we can imagine a doctor who treats his patients with what the patients consider undue speed; who openly classifies them in terms of professional categories rather than holding up at least the pretence of individual judgement; who affords his patient only the minimum necessary treatment. It is possible that this doctor is simply an ill-tempered swine, but it is

---

3 One could of course argue that fundamental preferences have not changed in this example, simply our way of expressing them. That may be so, but in that case the question simply changes: why does the translation from fundamental preferences to practical preferences alter as a result of experiences? This does not make a significant difference for the theoretical problem.
Civicness in organizations

more likely that he is responding to the need to handle a large workload within the allotted time and to the organizational requirements for efficiency.

In a fundamental sense, this can be regarded as a clash of values. The values of managerialism are systemic, defining aggregate targets. These are translated into requirements at the individual level, but they remain individualized aggregate values, not personal values; civility, meanwhile, is all about relations at the personal level. In service delivery which is dominated by the need for efficiency, values such as commitment and mutual respect are likely to suffer. Lipsky’s street-level bureaucrats use control strategies because they must ration supply. They are in a bind that leaves little room for civility. If anything, it forces them to reinforce power differences and ignore the fact that their clients are human beings.

Yet to some extent this is unavoidable, because there is a broader range of values to be taken into account when organizing service delivery. An analysis of professional service delivery cannot be based on the primary process alone. Organizations constitute entities that integrate the various types of labour necessary to provide a specific type of product or service. Never mind that some have more exclusive knowledge than others: they are all necessary. A hospital needs good cleaners and bookkeepers, as well as good heart surgeons. The combination of different positions reflects the different goals that an organization needs to balance: not simply the quality of ultimate delivery, but also the efficient use of scarce resources, equality of access, protection from favouritism and arbitrary judgement, long-term sustainability. Depending on their position, one member of the organization will tend to stress certain values over others. This means that, to some extent, the interests of different participants reflect basic dilemmas in the provision of public services. All services have inherent dilemmas, but public services still more so, since demand often has no natural cap (in other words, resources are always insufficient) and definitions of quality are more complex. For such manifold and competing interests to be satisfied, it is unavoidable that there is friction within organizations.

There are several ways of dealing with such friction. It is partly a question of devising procedures, methods and systems that are sufficiently intricate. By virtue of their design, some organizations manage to achieve more satisfactory overall outcomes (and therefore lower the level of friction) than others. Partly, it is a political struggle over which values should receive priority. But dealing with conflict also calls upon ‘softer’ values such as commitment and mutual respect. In its most visible form, this can boil down to simple common courtesy: politeness can go a long way in dampening conflict. But it goes further, in expressing a basic attitude towards others that does not derive from their organizational position. Rather, it draws upon notions of citizenship which accords people equal status, regardless of whether they are manager, cleaner or doctor.

This points to another potential benefit of civility, in addition to its direct relationship with the quality of services. By preventing conflict and facilitating
decision-making among staff members with different interests, the expression of civil values is a mechanism that contributes to the integration of the organization.

If that is the case, then the question is under what conditions organizations encourage civil behaviour among professionals, managers and clients, and equally under what circumstances civility is disincentivized. Lipsky’s grim depiction of street-level bureaucracies is a typical example of the latter. If we are to truly understand civicism, we should be able to explain both the uncivic and civic qualities.

Members of the organization, professionals and managers alike, must learn to deal with friction both within different sets of values and between them. While such friction is inevitable, there are various developments that have made it more likely, since public service delivery has generally become more complex. Many services are delivered through a welfare mix that combines the mechanisms of hierarchy, competition and community (Evers/Laville 2004). Providers operate in complex networks where various parties are jointly responsible for the ultimate delivery (Brandsen/Van Hout 2006). An increasing number of organizations are becoming hybrid in nature (Brandsen et al. 2005). As a result, value clashes are ever more likely and, by implication, so is the potential for conflict between members of the organization who occupy different positions.

Of course, organizations will try to find a new balance between different values and some organizations will be better at this than others. However, as Evers (2005) has noted, although one can theoretically argue in favour of a perfect balance between contradictory values, it is more realistic to expect that such a balance does not exist. The real issue is how to deal with a situation of permanent and shifting imbalances. In addition to other mechanisms, such as formal procedures for conflict resolution, the civic quality of organizations is an important means of dealing with the resulting tensions. Given current trends in public service sectors, it is likely to be put increasingly to the test.

8. Redefining professionalism?

Finally, it is interesting to consider how this interpretation of civicness reflects back upon the common conceptualization of professionalism described in the second section of this chapter. In light of the increasing complexity of service delivery, Noordegraaf (2007) calls for a re-interpretation of the concept of professionalism. He identifies three approaches to the concept, which can be roughly described as follows: ‘pure professionalism’ advocates a return to the classical professions and rejects the ‘new’ professions; ‘situated professionalism’ expands the concept of professionalism to include experts working in an organizational context; and ‘hybrid professionalism’ sees professionals as reflective practitioners who construct and
Civicness in organizations

apply professional to symbolically structure their relations with the outside world. This third interpretation is a direction of thinking that is most relevant to the concept of civiness and is in line with broader discussions in the sociology of professions (Davies 2006). It sees professionalism as essentially relational, a way of sense-making in the interaction with others.

This reconceptualizes professionalism in a context where the ability to legitimize difficult choices has severely diminished and the symbolic control afforded by the classical professions is dwindling. It becomes ‘a search for coping with trade-offs in economized but ambiguous times’ (Noordegraaf 2007: 778). This re-interprets the concept of professionalism, not with reference to the status positions of closed occupations and standardized knowledge, but to its function in offering guidance for complex decisions and in creating communities that symbolically legitimize these decisions. Classic professionalism offered ways to deal with difficult decisions through shared scripts, institutionalized codes of practice. When the ever more complex and transforming organizational contexts no longer allows these scripts to function effectively, as may be the case in the public services, we need different ways of reaching agreed-upon principles to deal with trade-offs.

The fading distinction between professional and managerial positions is an expression of this, with professionals taking on more managerial tasks and managers engaging more with the issues of professionals. This is creating new professions, not in their classical form, but as flexible ways of coping with a more complex environment. This casts a different light on how recent public sector reforms have affected relations within organizations. On the one hand, these new professions have created pressures that put both professionals and managers in a bind. At the same time, however, they have provided the means by which occupational boundaries can be overcome and the internal frictions within the organizations can be jointly addressed. The managers’ problems become the professionals’ and vice versa. The effects of the emergence of new professions on internal relations are therefore equally ambiguous: they create the potential for more opposition between more occupational groups, but they also offer opportunities for transgressing traditional boundaries. The civic quality of the organization will help to determine which effects prevail.

9. Conclusion: towards civic organizations?

This chapter has been only an initial exploration of what civiness in organizations could mean. Of course, it will be necessary to develop more precise concepts to allow empirical study. However, it has become clear that the concept is highly relevant in the organizational context. As they deliver services, organizations have to deal with competing and sometimes irreconcilable values, and increasingly so,
due to recent reforms in the public services. Public services have to be delivered efficiently, effectively, accessibly, transparently, at a high level of quality and with a smile.

This means that the organizations in question will be the arena for various potential conflicts, since members of the organizations will emphasize different values. This is logical and even desirable. We expect the hospital manager to worry about cost containment, but most people prefer the doctors who treat them to be more concerned about quality. At a higher level of analysis, differentiation allows the representation of different interests within an organization. Yet this calls for powerful mechanisms of integration.

The ultimate trade-offs in service delivery will be controversial and open to continual renegotiation. The civiness of the organization expresses itself in how the organization enables positive interaction regarding such choices. By infusing social behaviour with civil values, the organization draws upon a wider culture of citizenship. This is an important link between the viability of organizations, as a means of coordinating social action, and broader social developments in society. An important benefit of the concept of civicness is that it can help to examine this link further.

References


Civicness in organizations


Chapter 5

Evelien Tonkens

Civicness and citizen participation in social services: conditions for promoting respect and public concern

This chapter analyses the relationship between civicness and citizen participation in social services. There is considerable debate how civic behaviour and civic culture contribute to public service performance. This chapter looks at the reverse question: how does citizen participation contribute to civicness? It is argued that citizen participation has more chances of success and fostering civicness when certain conditions are met: when participation is structured rather than laissez-faire, when it is experience rather than expertise-based, when representation is substantive rather than merely descriptive, and when public and personal/group interest are distinguished and treated as something that all those involved struggle with, rather than exclusively as a problem of citizens. This line of argument is based on an analysis of literature on citizen participation; whether they are indeed effective in practice needs to be subject to empirical research.

Citizen participation and civicness in social service organizations are widely supposed to be closely connected. Citizen participation is considered to contribute to civicness, both among citizens themselves and within social service organizations. Only when the voices of citizens are included, and citizens are given the power to really exert influence in social services organizations, can these organizations become civic.

The possibility for citizens to exert power and influence within social service organizations is generally considered to be an important reason for promoting it (Hogg 1999). Some even argue that this is the only proper legitimation for participation (Jones 2003). However, few authors claim that citizens exert much influence in reality (Fung 2003; Lenaghan 1999). Most authors are disillusioned about the lack of real power and influence of citizens. Some argue that those in power do not really seek to give citizens power and influence (Raco 2000); citizens are merely used as window dressing (Cochrane 2003); citizen participation is merely a theatre (Milewa 2004) and is part of chasing of the ‘holy grail of community control’ (Baggott 2005); those in power are only ‘playing the user card’ when it suits them to make a democratic impression (Harrison/Mort 1998).
Others argue that citizen participation does not empower citizens; in fact, it disempowers them. It is used as an instrument for the responsibilization of citizens (Kearns 1992; Paddison et al 2008), as a means of policing and disciplining them (Hodge 2005; Cruickshank 2003; Swyngeedouw 2005), incentivizing them to be prudent with public funds for example (Milewa 2004). Participation has even been labelled as ‘tyranny’, as it merely facilitates ‘an illegitimate and/or unjust exercise of power’ (Cooke/Kothari 2001: 4).

The lack of power and influence of citizens is sometimes blamed on new public management and its marketization or its centralized exercise of power. The marketization of the public service sector, it is argued, disrupts democratization: it is squeezed out by a ‘supermarketized vision’ (Cowden/Singh 2007), in which citizens are transformed into consumers who are not meant to and have not learned to use voice but only choice (Jenson/Philips 2002; Keat 1992; Hickman 2006; Raco 2000; Bagott 2005). Additionally, centralized governance and the stress on ‘zero tolerance of failure’ and on quick results does not favour participation, as this strengthens the risks of failure and tends to slow processes down (Foley/Martin 2003).

In this chapter, this dissatisfaction over the power and influence that citizens actually exert within social service organizations is analysed more closely, concentrating on the relationship between civicness and citizen participation. How can citizen participation indeed increase civicness of both the organizations and the citizens involved?

1. Civicness and participation

Let us first be clear what is meant by civicness in this context. In this volume, civicness is defined as ‘the quality of institutions and organizations to encourage and reproduce civil attitudes and behaviour at the individual and collective level’ (Evers et al, introduction). Civicness entails ‘conditions and resources that [state policies and economic development] often use but can not simply create or install: trust among citizen, commitment and solidarity, ability for cooperation, ethics of performance or entrepreneurial spirit’ (Evers, this volume).

As for civicness in relation to social service organizations, there has been a long-standing debate over how civic behaviour and civic culture may contribute to public service performance. Ever since Almond and Verba’s work (1963), much research has focused on how ‘the performance of public organization may [...] be influenced by the extent of a civic culture in local areas’ (Andrews 2007: 846).

In this chapter, the reverse direction is scrutinized: how do social service organizations themselves promote civicness? Citizen participation in social service organizations has been installed in order to promote the civicness in and of their organizations. The accepted definition of civicness has changed over the course of
Civics and citizen participation in social services

recent decades, however. In his chapter in this volume, Evers traces changes in the meaning of civics over the last decades within social services provision in welfare states in four discourses. Traditional welfarism stresses the way in which civics gives ‘people a respected status by democratic and social citizenship’. The following period of empowerment and participation stresses the way in which civics gives ‘personal respect and additional meaning and impact’; consumerism made ‘choice a part of civic rights and service cultures’, while the social investment state stresses civics as ‘making public concerns and the respective obligations of people as citizens part of the picture’. These four discourses were developed respectively, but each still lingers today. Overall, three aspects of civics stand out: respect, choice and public concern, the latter referring to an orientation towards public interest and the public good.

Since the rise of the second discourse, ‘empowerment and participation’, citizen participation in social services has been high on the agenda, resulting in various practices, often enshrined by laws, to install citizen participation in the services of modern welfare states, with the promise of both fostering respect and meeting public concerns.

From Evers’ analysis of civics in social service organizations, I distil two meanings of civics that are crucial in the relationship between civics and citizen participation: respect and public concern. I omit choice, Evers’ third aspect, since choice was not so much a promise of citizen participation, but rather of marketization as an alternative to participation. How, then, does citizen participation contribute to civics in terms of respect and public concern? And what prevents citizen participation from doing so? I will first examine the issue of respect, and then I will turn to public concern. My review of the literature on citizen participation concerning these questions results in the formulation of some conditions that may improve civics in citizen participation. Whether they indeed do so, has yet to be researched empirically.

2. Expertise

In order to foster respect, citizen participation should be organized in such a way that it fosters citizens’ respect for service providers as well as the reverse. In most citizen participation processes, citizens are given respect by putting them on an equal footing with professionals and policy makers. They are granted rights to deliberate on policy strategies and budget choices. Yet, their expertise on these issues is often limited. In recent research on clients’ participation in health care, Trappenburg shows that much of the work of clients boards involves financial, policy and planning issues, of which citizen know very little, with the result that they are very active but nevertheless fail to exert much influence (Trappenburg
Training helps, but will rarely put them on par with the real experts. Involving them in deliberations about these issues will not generate much new insights or knowledge.

Implicitly, citizen participation is often based on a model of expertise-based participation. The expertise-based model is built on the idea that citizens should have a fair amount of expertise: they should be able to discuss policy issues the organizations more or less on equal footing with managers. Only then can they exert real influence, only then will their interventions be taken more seriously. Citizens are thus treated as if they were accountants, financial or planning experts or other specialized professionals. Inevitably, citizens then fail to fulfil the expectations attached to them: they will hardly ever be as knowledgeable, informed and skilled as the professional accountants, financial planners or other paid, full-time experts.

This model thus tries to create an equal balance between citizens and managers by staging them as equal. Because in practice citizens tend not have the skills and knowledge that managers possess, the model stresses the importance of schooling and training for citizens in order to raise to the level of the people they talk with. Proponents of this model invariably stress this: if only citizens could receive better training and be given enough time to develop their skills, they could participate fully (e.g. Hunt 2007; Lenaghan 1999).

Most practices of participation are based on the expertise-based model. The setting is such that citizens are positioned as quasi experts. They are invited to deliberate on issues like planning, budgeting or long-term and abstract policy goals, issues in which their experience cannot easily be integrated. Bringing in one’s experience in these situations is almost inevitably destabilizing factor, as it distracts from the agenda.

Professionals tend to stress the importance of expertise above experience more to the degree that their own professional status is weaker – this was a finding of Brooks in research on patient and public councils in the UK (Brooks 2006). If patients bring in their own experiences, this tends to annoy nurses more than it disturbs medical doctors, for example. Nurses tend to dismiss these experiences as trivial, anecdotal and as an attack on their own expertise. Patients, in turn, do not feel that they are listened to by the nurses and become frustrated. Brooks explains this by the weak status of the nurses, whose own expertise is not highly valued in the hospital. Other research concludes in more general terms that experiences are often dismissed as ‘too distressing and disturbing’ (Carr 2007: 271). Patients then feel that unrealistic demands are made on them, such as having to express themselves in managerial terms.

The expectation that citizens deliberate on an equal footing, then, is hardly realistic. But why should they? Either they are inexpert, and thus inevitably fail as qualified partners in debate. Or they develop their expertise, either through training or because they are former professionals experts who now function as voluntary citizens in citizen participation projects. They may then be able to discuss complex
Civicness and citizen participation in social services

policy issues, but what is their added value as citizens? The assumption that citizens are willing and able to deliberate on issues like budgeting is simply wrong, argues Milewa (1997). Citizens are more motivated if problems are not too far from their own experiences (Lenaghan 1999; Milewa 1997).

There is an alternative model of the role of expertise, which claims that what citizens are expected to bring to the debate is their own experience as (potential) users of services. These experiences are needed because this is what professionals and managers cannot really know themselves – they need citizens to tell them about this. These experiences form the expertise of citizens, an expertise that the other parties involved can never master to the same degree: the one who wears the shoe knows best where it pinches. (Dzur 2004b) Officials should therefore create room for and value experiences of citizens (Maloff et al. 2000). Here, not equality but difference is the basis for interaction. An equal balance can only be attained if both parties bring in their particular expertise and do not try to emulate the other party. They will inevitably fail to attain an equal status as ‘experts’ and fail to have much influence.

A strong defence of the experience-based model is made by Sennett (2003), particularly for the interaction between professionals and patients. Sennett argues that both professionals and patients have their own expertise which should be mutually acknowledged: professionals are experts in diagnosis and treatment, but citizens are experts in ‘the experiences of these, in how it feels to live with a particular disease for a life time, how it is to lie in the operation room and without knowing what is going to happen, and when’.

However, to really make room for experiences and allow these to play a meaningful role appears complicated. At best experiences tend to play a legitimizing role: they are received as legitimating for the path already chosen. Experiences that do not fit that path are neglected and placed outside the order of things (Hodge 2005). Power imbalances between citizens and professionals or managers are not easily rectified by making room for experiences. Professionals and managers retain the power to ignore them. This may be different, Carr (2007) argues, if officials also discussed their experiences, and if passions and conflict were more generally present in participation. Carr, following Chantal Mouffe, argues that, in order to attain a proper power balance, all parties involved should bring in their emotions and experiences.

Some other research also suggests that it may help to explicate these two models. Brooks, for example, describes how professionals were irritated at first by what they perceived as trivial experiences of citizens. However, putting this issue explicitly on the agenda proved to be the turning point. Patients were invited to explain why they were frustrated and what they thought they could bring to the table: their experiences. One of them said:

“You didn’t want personal involvement but that’s all we can offer you really: personal involvement and feedback from other patients.” (Brooks 2006: 9)
This opened the eyes of the nurses and allowed them to learn things that they had no knowledge of before at all.

Of course, the experience-based model needs other organizational methods than the expertise-based model. With the expertise-based model, all participants need to share a certain level of background knowledge. In health care, this may involve some knowledge of the health care system, while in welfare it may involve some knowledge of welfare entitlements and procedures. This knowledge can be disseminated through training, as is quite common in citizen’s juries.

Citizens can add something (and therefore also feel they make a difference) when they are invited to talk about their experiences, about which they by definition know a great deal, and their narratives and ideas can add something new to the deliberations.

This calls for more attention to the experience-based model. Yet the experience-based model was introduced by social movements in the 1970s and was silently abandoned after it became the subject of interesting criticism. This criticism still needs to be dealt with. First of all the experience-based model has been criticized as essentialist. The experiences of citizens tend to be invoked as something deep, personal, fixed and therefore inaccessible to others and not at all open to debate. It was in other words criticized for closing down debates rather than opening them up, and therefore as unsuitable for deliberative democracy.

It is, however, possible to conceive of experiential expertise as a more postmodern, fluid concept. There is no need to treat experiences as fixed and deep. How a situation is experienced depends on many other factors, for example on changing ideas of what is considered appropriate to experience and feel (Hochschild 2003), and therefore the knowledge based on these experiences is also fluid and open to debate.

Firstly, on the issue of respect in the (unequal) interaction of patients and experts in health care, Sennett (2003) proposes acknowledging experiential expertise in the sense that the patient knows how it feels – how it feels to live with diabetes, with cancer, with a partner who suffers from dementia or with a handicapped child. The doctor should try understand by way of empathy, but – except for the rare case where she has suffered the same illness – should know that the patients knows better. Conversely, the patient should recognize that in questions of diagnosis and treatment, the doctor in the end, generally knows better.

Experiential knowledge can, secondly, be based on the notion of metis as developed by Scott (1998). Scott developed this notion for the field of planning but his concepts can easily be applied to other fields. He analysed why large planning projects, such as those undertaken in Tanzania in the 1960s or Russia in the 1920s, tend to fail. These projects were developed by drawing up plans and tables in architectural and planning offices, far away from practice, and, despite the best of intentions, these planners took pride in being so remote, and moreover, they take pride in a certain aesthetics that come with planning as if the world can be
reinvented. They then failed, Scott surmises, because they did not recognize the value of particular local, non-standardized knowledge of citizens – for example, the knowledge that one should, in a particular valley seed one particular plant after the other has blossomed or a particular migrating bird has been seen, rather than on a fixed date of the calendar that does not take into account that the seasons develop differently each year. Experiential expertise in deliberative democracy can also be understood as metis: as a particular, local knowledge that is very specific and therefore not transferable.

Organizing expertise also implies inviting participants not only in the early stages of a process, but also, and possibly more importantly, in the process of implementation, because it is then that the issue of metis becomes most important. Citizens are most often invoked in the earliest phases of a process, where a go or no-go decision is at stake, Archon Fung argues, while their voice is more useful and more necessary in the phases of implementation, when everyday experiences are most informative and bringing them in will be most beneficial (Fung 2003). Experiences do not need to be restricted to those of actual clients of a certain organization, but can also extend to past and possible service users are valuable to get a full picture of experiences of citizens that are meaningful for social service organizations.

However, experience and expertise do not operate on an equal footing. Expertise is generally considered to be more important, and it is also usually brought forward by voices (for example those of experts or managers) that are deemed more important. To create more balance between the different types of voices requires a well structured debate, as Archon Fung (2003) shows on the basis of a thorough analysis of participation in community safety and education. More often than not, Fung argues, participation has a ‘laissez-faire’ character: it is built on the naïve assumption that citizens can exert influence and power if they are only given the occasion to use their voice. Little thought is usually spent on the structure of the discussion and the overall process of participation. Power and influence can only be exerted if participation is well structured (Fung 2003; Cawston/Barbour 2003; Dzur 2004a, 2004b). Also, it cannot be assumed that citizens have the capacity to participate (Milewa 1997), since they are often easily intimidated (Hunt 2007). Much more effort should be put into training in order equip citizens with the capacity to exert influence. Fung shows in detail how training and structure have a direct influence on the power and influence citizens could exert. Training and structure are particularly empowering for less educated citizens.

Organizing structured participation rather than laissez-faire participation may help to balance the dominance of experience over expertise and thus to promote mutual respect.
Another issue that tends to weaken mutual respect between citizens on the one hand, and professionals and managers on the other, is the fact that the citizens active in boards and councils generally are far from representative of the group of users as a whole. This is true for most forms of citizen participation, whether in social service organizations or in other fora. On average, citizens participating in deliberative democratic procedures and boards, are older, better educated, more often white and male (Cooke/Kothari 2001; Raco 2000; Taylor 2003; Fung 2003; Gastil 1993; Sanders 1997) and they tend to have more radical ideas than the groups they are supposed to represent (Fiorina 1999). More highly educated men are not only more often present, but they also tend to exert more influence than the other citizens present. They talk more confidently, more loudly, and are more skilled in rhetoric; all this together results in their being listened to more and exerting more influence (Bovens 2006; Sanders 1997; Fung 2003). Harrison and Mort (1998) found that the argument of weak representation is often played out selectively and strategically: if citizens express opinions that the listeners disagree with, they tend to dismiss them as non-representative.

The problem of weak representation is so omnipresent and so difficult to combat that quick results cannot be expected. Incomplete representation is an inherent problem within democracy, since democracy always involves delegation of some kind (Ankersmit 2002); there is therefore always some distance between the representative and the represented. This distance needs to be recognized and valued rather than judged. It is part and parcel of democracy, otherwise we would have the dictatorship of single citizens who all expect their representatives to directly express their own views. This also demonstrates the urgency of attention to the institutional settings in which participation occurs, as it underlines that each form of participation is institutionally mediated. Again, some institutional settings favour representation, while others do not. Cowden and Singh (2007), for example, point out that in new managerialism, institutions tend to control who is participating and therefore whom they do or do not need to listen to; they tend to dismiss representation as irrelevant or at least do not put much effort into it.

However, in this justifiable reproach of weak representation, the argument is based on only one aspect of representation, that Hannah Pitkin (1972) calls descriptive representation, which must be differentiated from formal and symbolic representation. Descriptive representation concerns the characteristics of the representatives: the degree to which they differ from those they are supposed to represent. Formal representation concerns the formal process of selecting representatives, such as elections and random selection. And symbolic representation concerns the contents: the degree to which they express opinions that actually represent those of the group they are supposed to represent. These three together comprise substantial representation: the overall quality of representation.
Most of the debate on the representation of citizens in social service organizations is actually restricted to descriptive representation. It cannot of course be denied that this is an important aspect of representation, but, following Pitkin, it is not the only aspect of importance. Yet since all the weight of representation is put on this one aspect, and since this is where citizens almost always fail, representation cannot meet even the most timid of expectations.

However, more effort could be put into the other two aspects, to compensate for the lack of descriptive representation. If all three of these forms are considered and related, a richer practice of representation could be built, making it more likely that respect can be generated. As for formal representation, there are generally too few citizens willing to participate to organize elections – organizations are happy simply to find people willing to participate. They could, however, organize different forms of formal representation such as random selection. In the case of citizen juries and citizen forums’, random selection often works quite well (Lenaghan 1999). Along the lines of a jury model, an organization may select a random sample of the stakeholders, either fully random or selected from a particular subgroup for a particular topic – such as the elderly and their informal care givers for issues regarding improving services for the elderly. All receive a personal invitation making it clear that they have been selected and that their opinion is needed. Research indicates that if people know they have been selected this way, their willingness to participate is much higher than when they are simply given the opportunity to participate (Leyenaar 2007). This is also in line with the findings of research on volunteering, which indicates that two thirds of the volunteers started participating because they had been invited personally (Wilson 2000).

What is more, even with only a few candidates, elections can still be actively organized, thereby engaging citizens in the issue of formal representation. Here, it is not simply a passive approach that is required (setting a timescale for the elections to take place and providing the occasion to elect and be elected), but more actively by organizing campaigns and making clear what may be at stake.

An additional point made by Contandriopoulos is that representatives can compensate for their lack of descriptive representation by putting considerable effort into symbolical representation. (Contandriopoulos 2004). Either the organization or the representatives of citizens that were formed on the basis of both formal and descriptive representation can then go on to organize symbolic representation in addition to these two other kinds. The organization and/or citizens’ representatives can seek citizens in their ‘natural habitat’ and discuss the relevant issues with them.

So, rather than complaining that there are very few immigrants, parents, young people or vulnerable elderly people present (thereby causing a lack of descriptive representation), such groups can be actively sought. Immigrants can be addressed in mosques or language courses. Citizens can enrich their symbolic representation by looking for adolescents in the streets or youth clubs, and the elderly can be visited in
nursing homes to find out what their views and needs are there, rather than simply waiting for them to come to their representatives.

In the Netherlands, one welfare organization does something like this, with a (typically Dutch) delivery bicycle with a coffee and a few places to sit as in a café; professionals go out and find citizens with whom they can deliberate. This is known as ‘democracy on location’, whereby democracy is organized at the places people gather, rather than forcing them to leave these in favour of formal meeting rooms. Of course, these meetings should be structured in some way, particularly as ‘laissez-faire’ deliberative processes give most room to those who are already well represented in other ways (Fung 2003).

The problem of representation, it seems, has no perfect solution. There is always some kind of distance between those who represent and the represented. However, in order to build mutual respect, it may help to substitute the often implicit expertise-based model with an experience-based model, provided these are taken as material for reflection rather than as deep truths that speak for themselves.

4. Public concern

Having examined the issue of respect, I now turn to the other aspect of civicness scrutinized here: public concern. It is often argued that citizen participation has very little to contribute to an orientation towards the public good, or to public concern. It is merely an outlet for expressing self-interest or even NIMBY (Not in my backyard) attitudes (Wolsink 2006). Citizens tend to stress their own interests rather than the common good, or at best tend to conflate the two, officials complain. Deliberation should concern the general interest, but in practice this is very difficult since citizens stick to their own interests too closely, is the complaint. Citizens, on the other hand, may complain that what is presented as the general interest is really the interest of those who present it. Who is in the position to present their own interest as the general interest? In order to be heard, it is at any rate more effective to present one’s position as articulation of the general interest (Contrandripolous 2004).

Implicitly, these complaints correspond with the consensus model (Cohen 1991, 1997) of deliberation, as opposed to the agonistic model (Young 2002; Elstub 2006; Urbinati 2000; Hogg 1999). The consensus model, which is inspired by Habermas, claims that the strength of deliberative democracy lies in the need for all participants to formulate their arguments in terms that are also convincing to others. Personal interest cannot be convincing to others and so is not accepted as a valid argument. The consensus model therefore forces people to abandon their personal interest and take an impartial stance. In this manner, deliberative democracy is a good guarantee that participants will focus on the public interest. In the consensus model, citizens
Civics and citizen participation in social services

are approached as citizens, rather than consumers, who can and should take into account both their own interests and those of others and/or the ‘general’ interest. Research shows that citizens are on average very well able to make these distinctions (Wolsink 2006). Consumers do not have a great role to play in civic democracy, as they are not meant to deliberate on the public good (Walsh 1994). The consensus model leaves room for citizens and other stakeholders such as professionals to sit together on a stakeholders board and focus on shared interests and the public good, rather than group interests.

The agonistic model argues that what is put forward as public interest is simply partial, personal interest in disguise. The agonistic model does not require participants to put personal and partial interests aside, but invites them to articulate them. There is no point in only bringing in arguments that are acceptable to all, as the consensus model demands. The agonistic model does not deny the importance of public reason, but it claims that public reason does not arise out of consensus but out of confrontation between groups with divergent interests. It is from that confrontation and the related power struggle that wise decisions are born – this is the basic reasoning of the agonistic model. ‘It is only through allowing citizens to express their private interests in a deliberatively democratic arena where they will hear of the experiences and information of others that they might come to appreciate their private interests conflict with what they perceive the common good’. As such, deliberative democracy should not strive for impartiality but for ‘enlarged thinking’ (Elstub 2006: 27).

Most older forms of deliberative democracy, such as clients boards and platforms, are based on the agonistic model. Many newer forms of deliberative democracy, such as interactive policy making and joined-up governance, are built on the consensus model. Fung and Wright argue in the concluding chapter of Deepening democracy that most citizens’ groups start out with the agonistic (or, in their words, in an adversarial) model. After some time, these groups often gain some success and then need to modify their attitude to a more consensual (or, in their words, collaborative) one. Taking this step, they argue, is a rather complicated process. It demands different skills, and often new people are needed for this new role, who do not have a history of conflict with the former adversary, that has in the meantime partly become an ally.

The distinction between the consensus model and the agonistic model seems to imply that a choice must be made between them, and thus between two ways of civics: either to evoke self-interest or group interest; either conflict and self-centredness or altruism and an orientation towards the public good bordering on self-denial. But this is not necessarily the case. Deliberative democracy does not have to be set up either as a power struggle, where interests are staged as in opposition so that they can clash in a struggle for power, or on the other hand as a peaceful harmonious power-free Habermassian conversation. It can also be recognized that citizens have simultaneously personal or group interests on the one
hand, and be oriented to the public good on the other. Moreover, it is not only citizens that have interests, but other stakeholders too.

Rather than suggesting that a choice needs to be made, effort could be put into recognizing the interests of all involved as well as public interests, though not necessarily simultaneously. A discussion can be separated in a part in which all involved can address the issue from the perspective of their own interest – how do they personally feel about such a home in their street? – and then from the perspective of the general interest – what do they, as citizens of a given town, think would be a proper way to house these patients in that town?

5. Conclusion

Citizen participation and civics of and within social service organizations do not automatically reinforce each other. In this chapter I have identified some major and recurring obstacles to the contribution that citizen participation can make to civics in terms of respect and public concern. Firstly, following Fung, it was argued that the degree of structure of a participative process makes a considerable difference. Organizing fair and structured debate at the micro-level strengthens the inclination of citizens to identify and empathize with each other, particularly with those who are less outspoken.

Mutual respect is also hampered by citizen’s lack of expertise in many aspects of (managing) service delivery the issue of expertise versus experience, and acknowledging experience as the main asset of citizens, is helpful in strengthening citizen’s influence. Rather than demanding that citizens become ‘governors-by-proxy’, it should be acknowledged that their fundamental contribution lies in their experiences as the (potential, former or actual) users of services. This reminds us of the experience-based models propagated in the 1970s and 1980s which were criticized for their debate-blocking essentialism. However, it is possible to overcome this essentialism by treating experience as ‘raw material’ to work with, rather than as deep truth.

Lack of representation was identified as another recurring obstacle to mutual respect. This problem can be reduced, following Pitkin, by recognizing that the focus is generally too narrowly directed towards descriptive representation. The richer concept of substantial representation, including descriptive, formal and symbolic representation, is better equipped to contribute to respect in citizen participation.

Public concern is another hotly debated issue in citizen participation. To create more room and attention for public concern, it was argued that the particularized and generalized interests of all participants should be acknowledged, disentangled and debated separately.
Civicness and citizen participation in social services

Citizen participation does not automatically contribute to civicness. It was argued that it has a better chance of doing so if the conditions outlined in this chapter are met: if participation is structured rather than laissez-faire; if it is experience rather than expertise-based; if experience is not treated as ultimate truth but as something to be analyzed; if representation is conceived as more than just descriptive representation; and if public and personal/group interest are distinguished and treated as something that all involved struggle with, as opposed to being a problem of citizens only. We might well suppose that taking into account these conditions should increase the likelihood of improving civicness in citizen participation. Whether this is indeed the case is still to be researched empirically.

References


Civinness and citizen participation in social services


Chapter 6
Victor Pestoff

Civicness and the co-production of social services in Sweden

Many countries in Europe are searching for new ways to engage citizens and involve the third sector in the provision and governance of social services. This chapter focuses on the political dimension of civicness and co-production in a universal welfare state – Sweden. Co-production is a technique for promoting greater participation by citizens in the provision of public services. It implies the mix of both public service agents and citizens who contribute to the provision of a public service. A favorable state regime and legislation are necessary for promoting greater civicness, co-production and third sector provision of welfare services.

According to Brandsen, Dekker and Evers in this volume, civicness encompasses both the behavior and value orientation of agents and the related qualities of institutions and organizations. It cuts across three often separate dimensions of service quality and the roles of users and citizens. They include: a social dimension, a personnel dimension and a political dimension. The latter concerns the governance of service organizations and service systems as well as issues of how to make them more democratic. This can be achieved either by more participative forms of governance and/or greater support of third sector organizations (ibid.).

However, civicness is a concept that is closely linked to the notion of active citizenship, which attributes a potentially central role to third sector organizations in community building, advocacy and service provision. They cultivate the social capital of networking and volunteering (ibid.). One of the basic controversies about democracy concerns whether it requires civic virtues. For some, intelligent institutional design suffices to achieve the common good. Free and periodic elections combined with competitive political parties should guarantee the survival of democracy. For others, democracy and democratic governance are inconceivable without a culture of active citizenship. Calls for more active citizenship, strengthening citizen participation in governance and a more active role for third sector organizations have gained strength in recent years (Fung 2004). Thus, greater citizen and third sector participation in the provision and governance of social services are essential aspects of civicness.
This chapter focuses on citizen participation, user influence and co-production and it discusses the third sector and the role of citizens in the provision and governance of social services from the perspective of civicness. It begins by introducing the concept of co-production. It continues by exploring differences in parent and staff influence in four types of childcare organizations in Sweden. Finally it argues that a glass ceiling exists in public and private for-profit services that hinders citizen participation in the provision and governance of welfare services.

1. Background: citizen participation and user influence

Many countries in Europe are searching for new ways to engage citizens and involve the third sector in the provision and governance of social services. At a general level the reasons are similar throughout Europe. First is the challenge of an aging population, second is the growing democracy deficit at all levels, local, regional, national and European, and third is the semi-permanent austerity in public finances. In any given EU member state the reasons will vary and may be more specific; however taken together they reflect a major legitimacy crisis for the public sector as a provider of welfare services.

In addition to these three challenges we can also note two major historical developments. One was the rapid growth of the welfare state during the post war period and two, parallel with this, politics became more abstract and far removed from the daily problems of ordinary citizens. The growth of the welfare state in the 1970s and 1980s provided citizens with many new social services. But it also confronted them with increasing taxes, an expanding army of civil servants to provide these new social services, and the rapid professionalization of services that previously were provided at home. The provision of such services moved from the private to the public sphere as women began to enter the labor market and no longer provided such services at home, or at least not on a full-time or 24/7 basis. Citizens thereby lost insight into and influence on the provision of many personal social services. Then in the 1980s and 1990s, as a result of political changes, many of these services were privatized to a greater or lesser degree and/or subject to increasing market management, following the ideas of New Public Management. Exit rather than voice would give citizens greater influence and competition would make social services cheaper and more efficient, it was argued. However, the transaction costs of switching providers of most long term social services make exit prohibitive and the promised cost reductions were slow to manifest themselves. Rather public monopolies have often been replaced by private oligopolies of welfare services.

As a reaction many people came to feel that both public and private provision minimized their influence. With the growth of big public and private bureaucracies it became not only a question of ensuring access to good quality welfare services.
Civicness and the co-production of social services in Sweden

Many ordinary citizens also wanted to (re-)gain some limited influence on the provision of social services that comprise one of the most important aspects of their daily lives. In combination with a growing education level and reflexive individualism, this is often termed sub-politics or life politics (Giddens 1998). Many citizens therefore embraced the introduction and development of new possibilities to directly engage in and influence the provision of social services that they and their loved ones depend on today. As citizens of democratic welfare states they want to (re-)claim some of their influence and control over the services that they both support politically and financially with their taxes, regardless of who provides them.

The response to these challenges and historical developments will, of course, vary between countries and across sectors of service provision, but four general trends are observable. First is the growth of new and different ways to involve users of welfare services as co-producers of their own services. Second is the spread of new techniques of co-management and co-governance of social services in various European countries. A special issue of *Public Management Review* discussed these first two responses (Pestoff & Brandsen 2006, v. 8/4, reprinted in 2008). Third is the development of user councils at the local level to engage users in a dialogue about public services and to facilitate user participation both in the provision and governance of such services. However, user councils remain mostly consultative and they lack decision-making powers and their own budgets. Fourth is the gradual development of functional representation of users alongside territorial channels of representative democracy in some European countries, but far from all of them. This can involve local elections to school or eldercare boards or direct representation of engaged service users on various municipal boards. While some critics regard this type of functional representation as a threat to liberal democracy, others argue that it can provide a necessary supplement to territorial democracy and help to rejuvenate it (Pestoff 2008). As seen below, this chapter argues that greater citizen participation in the provision of public services, or co-production for short, is an integral part of the political dimension of civicness.

2. User Influence and co-production

Evers (2006) maintained that user involvement in welfare services is a general concern throughout Europe and that there are at least five different approaches to their involvement. They are partially overlapping and partially conflicting. They range from welfarism and professionalism, through consumerism and managerialism to what he called participationalism. They are based on different values and promote different degrees of user involvement. He states that these approaches will vary among sectors and over time. Their mix will probably differ among countries. Welfarism and professionalism are closely associated with each other and neither
leaves much room for user involvement. Rather clients are viewed as people with little competence of their own. Consumerism and managerialism call for giving users greater choice through more exit options and argue that the public sector needs to learn from the private sector (ibid.). However, they leave little room for voice or participation.

Participationalism (ibid.) encourages on-site participation by users of welfare services, based on the belief that citizens should engage personally in shaping the welfare services they demand. It emphasizes multi-stakeholder organizations and requires that users become co-producers. Evers warns that at the level of service provision a mix of these approaches may result in ‘hybrid’ organizations containing elements from many of them. However, some may work better together than others and they may, in fact, lead to ‘mixed up’ or disorganized systems where user involvement works badly (2006).

Welfarism and professionalism are usually promoted by social democratic governments, while consumerism and managerialism are normally championed by rightist governments. However, participationalism, or more simply co-production, lacks clear political proponents in most EU countries. In a service democracy of either the social democratic or rightist variety citizens are the consumers of public financed social services that are provided by municipal authorities, regional governments and private companies, or perhaps all of them. They vote every fourth year and in the meantime they choose between various public or private service providers. By contrast, in a participative democracy citizens are engaged in the provision of some of their own social services, in the development of the welfare state and, at the same time, the renewal of democracy. By including citizens and the third sector in the provision of welfare services the dialogue between the rulers and ruled takes on a new dimension and citizens can choose between more than company A and B to provide similar services or the two alternatives of more state or more market solutions to their social service needs.

Co-production or citizen involvement in the provision of public services generated a flurry of interest among public administration scholars in America in the 1970s and the 1980s (see Parks et al. 1981 & 1999, for a good overview). The concept was originally developed by the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. During the 1970s they struggled with the dominant theories of urban governance underlying policy recommendations of massive centralization. Scholars and public officials argued that citizens as clients would receive more effective and efficient services if they were delivered by professional staff employed by a large bureaucratic agency. But, this group of researchers found no empirical support for such claims promoting centralization (Ostrom 1999: 358).

They did, however, stumble on several myths of public service provision. One was the notion of a single producer being responsible for urban services within each jurisdiction. In fact, they normally found several agencies, as well as private firms, producing services. More important, they also realized that the production of a
service, in contrast to goods, was difficult without the active participation of those receiving the service. They developed the term co-production to describe the potential relationship that could exist between the “regular” producer (street-level police officers, schoolteachers, or health workers) and “clients” who want to be transformed by the service into safer, better-educated or healthier persons.

In complex societies there is a division of labor and most persons are engaged in full-time production of goods and services as regular producers. However, individual consumers or groups of consumers may also contribute to the production of goods and services, as consumer-producers. This mixing may occur directly or indirectly. Co-production is, therefore, noted by the mix of activities that both public service agents and citizens contribute to the provision of public services. The former are involved as professionals or “regular producers”, while “citizen production” is based on voluntary efforts of individuals or groups to enhance the quality and/or quantity of services they receive (Parks et al. 1981 & 1999). Co-production is one way that a synergy can occur between what a government does and what citizens do (Ostrom 1999).

3. Parent and staff influence

The TSFEPS Project permitted us to examine parent participation in the provision and governance of childcare in eight EU countries (Pestoff 2006 & 2008). We found different levels of parent participation in different countries and in different forms of provision, i.e., public, private for-profit and third sector childcare. The highest levels of parent participation were found in third sector providers, like parent associations in France, parent initiatives in Germany, and parent cooperatives in Sweden. We also noted different kinds of parent participation, i.e., economic, political and social. All three kinds of participation were readily evident in third sector providers of childcare services, while both economic and political participation were highly restricted in municipal and private for-profit services (ibid.). Vamstad (2007) compared parent and worker co-ops, municipal services and small for-profit firms providing childcare in Sweden. His study not only confirmed the existence of these three dimensions of co-production, but also underlined clear differences between

---

1 The TSFEPS Project, Changing Family Structures & Social Policy: Childcare Services as Sources of Social Cohesion, took place in eight European countries between 2002-04. See www.emes.net for details and reports. The eight countries were: Belgium, Bulgaria, England, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden.
various providers concerning the saliency of these dimensions in providing welfare services.

Parent co-ops in Sweden promote all three kinds of participation, economic, social and political. They provide parents with unique possibilities for active participation in the management and running of their child(ren)’s childcare facility and for unique opportunities to become active co-producers of high quality childcare services for their own and others’ children. It is also clear that other forms of childcare allow for some limited avenues of co-production in public financed childcare, but parents’ possibilities for influencing the management of such services remains rather limited. This in turn implies clear limits to political aspects of the civicness of such providers.

Similarly, differences in the type of service provider may or may not promote greater client and/or staff influence in the provision and governance of social services. Therefore, we will now turn our attention to the perceived and desired influence for users and staff in Swedish childcare. Vamstad asked parents and staff at childcare facilities he studied how much influence they currently had and whether they wanted more. Respondents to the question about their current influence could choose between seven alternatives ranging from “very little” and “little” at the low end to “large” and “very large” at the high end. By contrast, answers to the question about wanting more influence had simple “yes/no” answers. The results presented here only use some of the information about the current level of influence. Only the most frequent categories at the high end of the scale of influence are included in the two tables below. The first table reports parents’ influence and their desire for more, while the second one expresses staff’s influence and their desire for more.

Table 1: Perceived and desired user influence, by type of childcare provider.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider</th>
<th>Perceived Influence:</th>
<th>Much 2</th>
<th>average 3</th>
<th>(n)</th>
<th>Want more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parent co-op childcare</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>(107)</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker co-op childcare</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>(48)</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal childcare</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>(89)</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small for-profit firm childcare</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td></td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Tables 8.6 & 8.8 in J. Vamstad 2007.

2 Combines three categories: “rather large”, “large” and “very large”.
3 Based on a scale ranging from 1 to 7, where low scores means little influence.
Parent influence is greatest in parent co-ops and least in small for-profit firms. This is an expected result, and nearly nine of ten parents in parent co-ops claim much influence. However, this is twice as many as in municipal services. Half of the parents in worker co-ops also claim much influence, which is also greater than the proportion in municipal childcare. Finally only one of eight parents claims much influence in small for-profit firms. The differences in influence between types of providers appear substantial.

Turning to their desire for more influence, again we find the expected pattern of answers, which inversely reflect how much influence they currently experience. Very few parents in parent co-ops want more influence, while nearly three of five do so in small for-profit firms. In between these two types come the worker co-ops, where more than one of four wants more influence and municipal childcare where more than one of three does so. With as many as one-third of the parents wanting more influence in municipal childcare, a solid desire exists for increased parent representation in decision-making. Thus, it is not merely a question of selective choice between various providers, where the more active and interested parents choose the more demanding, participative forms of childcare, while the less interested and more passive ones choose less demanding forms. There appear to be widespread expectations of being able to participate in important decisions concerning their daughter or son’s childcare among parents in all types of providers. Perhaps these values reflect the spread of civicness to the provision of public financed welfare services, regardless of the type of provider. Certainly the Swedish reform known as “Councils of Influence” in municipal preschools would benefit greatly by including many motivated and active parents, if it were possible to offer them meaningful opportunities to participate and influence decisions. Similarly, worker co-ops would gain greater legitimacy and trust if they included the parents in a meaningful way.

Shifting to the staff of childcare facilities there were many more who answered that they had much influence, but with some notable differences in the distribution of the frequencies, so both the “large” and “very large” categories are included separately in the table below. Once again the logically expected pattern of influence can clearly be noted here, where the staff in worker co-ops claims the most influence and the staff in municipal facilities claims the least influence. Nearly nine of ten staff members claim large or very large influence in worker co-op childcare, while only a third does so in municipal facilities. Nearly three of five members of staff claim much influence in parent co-ops, while half of them do so in small for-profit firms. Again, the proportions of the staff desiring more influence inversely reflect the proportion claiming much influence. Few want more influence in either the worker or parent co-ops, while the opposite is true of the staff in the other two types of childcare providers. Nearly three of five want more influence in municipal childcare and three of four do so in small for-profit firms. Thus, there appears to be significant room for greater staff influence in both the latter types of providers of
Greater staff influence could also contribute significantly to improving the work environment in both these two types of childcare providers (Pestoff 2000).

Table 2: Perceived and desired staff influence, by type of childcare provider.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider/Perceived Influence:</th>
<th>Large</th>
<th>Very Large</th>
<th>av.</th>
<th>(n)</th>
<th>Want more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worker co-op childcare</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent co-op childcare</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>(44)</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small for-profit firm childcare</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal childcare</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Tables 8.7 & 8.8 in J. Vamstad 2007.

However, one interesting detail is the relatively low proportion of staff in parent co-ops wanting more influence. It is almost identical with that found for the staff in worker co-ops. The latter “own” the childcare facility themselves, not perhaps in the sense of being able to sell it, but they make the decisions and bear the ultimate responsibility for its survival. Clearly the staff of parent co-ops is in a very different situation, as the parents “own it”; they make all the decisions and bear the ultimate responsibility. The staff normally lacks a vote, but not necessarily a voice in the management of parent co-ops. But, the great similarity in the proportion of staff expressing a desire for more influence suggests that there must already be such a high degree of collaboration between the staff and parents in parent co-ops as to eliminate the need for greater influence. It seems important to explore this matter closer in future research.

Thus, we found that neither the state nor market allows for more than marginal or ad hoc participation or influence by parents in the childcare services. For example, parents may be welcome to make spontaneous suggestions when leaving their child in the morning or picking her/him up in the evening from a municipal or small private for-profit childcare facility. They may also be welcome to contribute time and effort to a social event like the annual Christmas party or Spring party at the end of the year. Also discussion groups or “Influence Councils” can be found at some
municipal childcare facilities in Sweden, but they provide parents with very limited influence. More substantial participation in economic or political terms can only be achieved when parents organize themselves collectively to obtain better quality or different kinds of childcare services than either the state or market can provide. In addition, worker co-ops seem to provide parents with greater influence than either municipal childcare or small private for-profit firms can do, and the staff at worker co-ops obtains maximum influence, resulting in more democratic work places. But the staff at parent co-ops does not express a desire for more influence. Thus both the parent and worker co-ops appear to maximize staff influence compared to municipal and small for-profit firms, while parent co-ops also maximize user influence.

4. Crowding-in, crowding-out or glass ceilings

Welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1996) and government policy can facilitate greater citizen participation and a greater role for the third sector both in the provision and governance of social services. Therefore, the differences between welfare regimes and differences in the sectoral context are important for providing welfare services and they need to be kept in mind. In particular, the role of citizens and the third sector will vary among welfare regimes, with a different emphasis on individual or collective provision of social services as well as different emphasis on public, private or third sector provision of welfare services. A country’s welfare regime in general and its social policy in particular can, thus, either enhance or hinder greater citizen participation, co-production and collective action.

A welfare regime and/or social policy can ‘crowd-out’ certain behaviors and ‘crowd-in’ others in the population. For example, a welfare reform policy that primarily emphasizes economically rational individuals who maximize their utilities and provides them with material incentives to change their behavior tends to play down values of reciprocity and solidarity, collective action, co-production and third sector provision of welfare services. Vidal (2008) argues that the lack of favorable legislation is a major obstacle for the development of social enterprises in Europe. It is impossible to isolate the development of social enterprises from decisions of government. The Italian law on social cooperatives provides a good illustration of this. It ensures social cooperatives with preferential treatment in public tenders for certain social services (ibid). The government alone can promote collective action, co-production and social enterprises among the different organizational options to provide welfare services.

However, co-production also implies different relations between public authorities and citizens as well as facilitates different levels of citizen participation in the provision of public services. Citizen participation in public service provision needs to be distinguished along two main dimensions. To illustrate matters only
three categories or levels will be considered, but there can, in fact, be greater differences between them. The first dimension relates to the intensity of relations between the provider and consumer of public services. Here, the intensity of relations between public authorities and citizens can either be sporadic and distant, intermittent and/or short-term or it can involve intensive and/or enduring welfare relations. In the former, citizen participation in providing public services involves only indirect contacts via the telephone, postal services or e-mail, etc., while in the latter it means direct and repeated face-to-face interaction between providers and citizens. For example, citizen participation in crime prevention or a neighborhood watch, filing their tax forms or filling in postal codes normally only involves sporadic or indirect contacts between citizens and authorities. Face-to-face interactions for a short duration or intermittent contacts are characteristic of participation in public job training courses or maintenance programs for public housing that involve resident participation in some aspects Alford (2002). By contrast, parent participation in the management and maintenance of public financed preschool or elementary school services in France, Germany and Sweden involves repeated long-term contacts. This places them in the position of being active subjects in the provision of such services (Pestoff 2006, 2008). Here they can influence the development and help decide about the future of the services provided.

Similarly, the level of citizen participation in the provision of public services can either be low, medium or high. By combining these two dimensions we could derive a three by three table with nine cells. However, not all of them are readily evident in the real world or found in the literature on co-production. Moreover, a third dimension needs to be made explicit - the degree of civil society involvement in the provision of public services. This reflects the form of citizen participation, i.e., organized collective action, individual or group participation and individual or group compliance. (See Figure 12.2 in Pestoff 2007 for more details.)

In general, we can expect to find a trend between increasing intensity of relations between public authorities and citizens in the provision of public services and increased citizen participation. Sporadic and distant relations imply low participation levels, while enduring welfare services will result in greater participation. However, when it comes to providing intensive and/or enduring welfare services, two distinct patterns can be found in the literature. First, a high level of citizen participation is noted for third sector provision, since it is based on collective action and direct citizen participation. Parent co-op childcare illustrates this. Second, more limited citizen participation is noted for public provision of enduring welfare services. It usually focuses on public interactions with individual citizen and/or user councils, either on-site or at the city wide level. Citizens are allowed to participate sporadically or in a limited fashion, like parents contributing to the Christmas or Spring Party in municipal childcare. But, they are seldom given the opportunity to play a major role in, to take charge of the service provision, or
Civininess and the co-production of social services in Sweden

given decision-making rights and responsibilities for the economy of the service provision.

This creates a ‘glass ceiling’ for citizen participation in public provision and limits citizens to playing a passive role as service users who can make demands on the public sector, but make no decisions nor take any responsibility in implementing public policy. The space allotted to citizens in public provision of such services is too restricted to make participation either meaningful or democratic. Thus, only when citizens are engaged in organized collective groups can they achieve any semblance of democratic control over the provision of public financed services. A similar argument can be made concerning user participation in for-profit firms providing welfare services.

It was noted earlier that participation takes quite different forms in childcare services. Most childcare services studied here fall into the top-down category in terms of style of service provision. There are few possibilities for parents to directly influence decision-making in such services. This normally includes both municipal childcare services and for-profit firms providing childcare services. Perhaps this is logical from the perspective of municipal governments. They are, after all, representative institutions, chosen by the voters in elections every fourth year. They might consider direct client or user participation in the running of public services for a particular group, like parents, as a threat both to the representative democracy that they institutionalize and to their own power. It could also be argued that direct participation for a particular group would thereby provide the latter with a veto right or a “second vote” at the service level. There may also be professional considerations for resisting parent involvement and participation.

The logic of direct user participation is also foreign to private for-profit providers. Exit, rather than voice, provides the medium of communication in markets, where parents are seen as consumers. This logic excludes any form of indirect or direct representation. Only the parent cooperatives clearly fall into the bottom-up category. Here we find the clearest examples of self-government and participative democracy. Parents are directly involved in the running of their daughter and/or son’s childcare center in terms of being responsible for the maintenance, management, etc. of the childcare facility. They also participate in the decision-making of the facility, as members and “owners” of the facility.

5. Summary and conclusions

We noted at the outset the existence of a basic controversy about whether democracy requires civic virtues. For some, intelligent institutional design, based on free and periodic elections with competitive political parties, suffices to achieve the common good. For others, democracy and democratic governance are inconceivable
without a culture of active citizenship. This implies that greater citizen and third sector participation in the provision and governance of social services is an essential dimension of civility. This chapter explored the impact of participative forms of governance that allow for greater participation of citizens and more cooperation with third sector organizations. It took as its starting point that civility is an institutional quality that is strongly related to democratic participation. Moreover, it argued that co-production and third sector participation, particularly when it involves the members/users in the provision and governance of social services, provide the tools or techniques for promoting democratic participation and therefore civility.

Evers’ (2006) distinction between five different approaches to user involvement in the production of social services has clear implications for citizens’ possibilities to participate in the provision and governance of such services. Two of his categories for user influence are more closely associated with public production of social services, while two others are more closely related to market provision. All four of these approaches flourish in the European debate. However, his fifth approach to user influence is largely missing, i.e., greater citizen participation in the provision of social services, or co-production. The Swedish and European debate about the future of the welfare state is often highly polarized and ideologically divided between continued public provision or rapid privatization of social services, where the only options discussed are either more state or more market solutions. It is difficult, if not impossible, to promote a third alternative, e.g., greater welfare pluralism, more citizen participation and greater third sector provision of social services in this highly ideological context (Vamstad 2007). Thus, citizens are normally faced with simple black/white choices between more state or more market solutions to most problems facing them.

The influence of both parents and the staff was compared herein for four types of childcare providers: parent co-ops, worker co-ops, municipal services and small private for-profit firms. Both the parents and staff of parent and worker co-ops appear to have more influence than those of municipal services and for-profit firms. This chapter identifies some issues related to developing greater civiness. In particular, it considers certain aspects of greater citizen participation in the provision of welfare services. The concept of civil democracy was defined as: “… citizen empowerment through cooperative self-management of personal social services, where the citizens become members in social enterprises, where they participate directly in the production of the local services they demand, as users and producers of such services, and where they therefore become co-producers of these services.” (Pestoff 1998, 2005: 25). Seen from the perspective adopted in the introductory chapter to this volume, this definition reflects the qualities of civil society, but focuses more on civiness than civility. This is especially so if civility is considered mainly as a subjective feature related to citizens’ own values and behavior, while civiness also includes aspects of their collective action found in institutions and organizations. However, this definition also includes some expressions of agency
Civininess and the co-production of social services in Sweden

since citizens are directly involved in the process and organization of social service provision and even service governance.

Finally, this chapter also emphasized the importance of the interface between the government, citizens and the third sector and it noted that co-production normally takes place in a political context. An individual’s cost/benefit analysis and the decision to cooperate with voluntary efforts are conditioned by the structure of political institutions and the encouragement provided by politicians. Centralized or highly standardized service delivery tends to make articulation of demands more costly for citizens and to inhibit governmental responsiveness, while citizen participation seems to fare better in decentralized and less standardized service delivery.

However, one-sided emphasis by many European governments either on the state maintaining most responsibility for providing welfare services or turning most of them over to the market may hamper the development of civininess and co-production. The state can ‘crowd-out’ certain behaviors and ‘crowd-in’ others in the population. A favorable regime and favorable legislation are necessary for promoting greater co-production and third sector provision of welfare services. Greater co-production and welfare pluralism can promote greater civininess of welfare services.

References


Ostrom, E. (1999): Crossing the great divide: coproduction, synergy, and development, Ch. 15, polycentric governance and development. Readings from the workshop in political theory and policy analysis, McGinnis, Michael D. (ed.); Ann Arbor, MI.


Chapter 7

Kai Leichsenring

Introducing civicness in steering and managing social services. Cases from long-term care

This contribution deals with the challenge of strengthening civicness in steering and managing social services. Reforms in social services are seeking to combine the advantages of market mechanisms, bureaucratic administration and third-sector approaches. Such attempts obviously need support from internal and external sources. The author describes two distinctive examples in the context of long-term care systems to show how a type of systemic organizational development that blends different perspectives can help to strengthen ‘civic’ elements – specifically communication, dialogue and shared responsibilities.

1. Introduction

Given the modernization trends in social services over the past 25 years, the traditional ideological divides concerning the political economy of social services have become somewhat outdated. Empirically, we have observed the incursion of market mechanisms into state bureaucracy under the heading of ‘New Public Management’. Outsourcing, the promotion of new private – non-profit and commercial – providers and the regulation of quasi-markets by means of accreditation systems have left their mark on local and regional public administrations and the resulting efficiency gains have yet to be evaluated (van der Meer 2007).

The increasing participation of private providers in the provision of social services has had, at the same time, an impact on both commercial and non-profit organizations in the field. Commercial providers have had to deal, on the one hand, with state bureaucracy and the ‘social dynamics’ of the personal social service sector with its specific stakeholder structure, professional ethics and conditions of need. On the other hand, ‘social responsibility’ has also filtered into enlightened market thinking.

Third-sector organizations, particularly the newly emerging social firms and social cooperatives, were from the outset confronted with New Public Management rationales, since their relationship with the public administration has been mainly
shaped in terms of purchaser-provider relationships. This is in contrast with the mutual trust which had traditionally characterized the relationship between voluntary organizations, such as the Austrian, French or German associations or *Wohlfahrtsträger*, and the respective public authorities.

These aspects of political and social change have also been described as the hybridization of social services in terms of resources, goals, steering mechanisms and the search for a new and different corporate identity (see Evers 2004; Evers et al. 2002; Laville/Sainsaulieu 1998).

From the user’s perspective, these developments could be recognized by the mere fact that they are sometimes addressed as consumers or clients, sometimes as citizens and sometimes both at the same time. Indeed, when it comes to social and health services, the role of the user is increasingly defined in terms of co-production and co-financing, sometimes even as co-management – for instance if people with disabilities set up a cooperative to organize personal assistance (see www.independentliving.org). Still, this role may not yet be appropriate or even desired by the majority of people in need of care. In particular, a huge number of users (and their families) would need support in defining and enacting the new role of ‘prosumer’ of services, depending on their education, individual values and the cultural context. This feature will also influence the future of care professionals in terms of education, training and the contents of their work (Cameron/Moss 2007).

In this contribution I would like to interpret the hybridization of institutional arrangements, of expectations and of stakeholders’ objectives as an opportunity for strengthening civiness. The pro-active attempt to blend the advantages of market mechanisms, bureaucratic administration and third-sector approaches to govern, organize and provide social services should be done in a way that produces greater scope and support for communication, dialogue and democratic arrangements that cross public-private boundaries. Thus, services could be imbued with a quality that does not automatically result from, for instance, more choice, professional and administrative standard setting or non-profit orientation. Clearly, such attempts are not happening everywhere and are not automatic, but they need input and support from the internal and external sources of the system – for example, by applying organizational development approaches such as change and quality management based on systems thinking (Senge 1999; for public management, see Schiedner 2000; for health care, see Broome 1998).

We shall therefore argue that if “civiness is the quality of institutions, organizations, procedures, to stimulate, reproduce, and cultivate civility” (Brandsen, Dekker and Evers in this volume; Evers 2008: 4), it is useful to develop strategies that can be used in the institutional settings of social service provision. In this chapter, we will provide some examples of how systemic organizational development approaches may help to blend the different perspectives and values and further define ‘civiness’ in terms of communication, dialogue and shared responsibilities. This will be done by outlining two empirical examples that have
Introducing civicness in steering and managing social services

been established over the past few years in the context of long-term care systems. Both examples are linked to policy discourses related to 'empowerment and participation' as they promote participative services as a guiding principle, empowered users as co-producers, enabled professionals and a dialogue between all stakeholders.

The first example concerns the organization of institutional care for the elderly according to process-and resident-oriented quality management. The E-Qalin® model was elaborated by professionals and applicants with the specific aim of involving all stakeholders and continuously improving the quality of life and work in institutional care. Originating from a purely market approach, quality management in long-term care settings challenges existing professional knowledge and expertise, but also the bureaucratic approaches to inspecting and controlling service providers. At the same time, hierarchical and bureaucratic expert organizations are challenged by more participative leadership, which is no longer an exclusive asset of third-sector organizations. It will be shown, therefore, how methods that were originally inspired by market thinking have developed and changed, until they have finally played a part in cultivating civility and civicness in long-term care provision.

The second empirical example presented relates to the assessment of long-term care needs as an important steering mechanism of a new long-term care scheme in the Autonomous Province of Bolzano-Alto Adige in Italy. The methods and procedures developed in this context entail new methods of cooperation between health and social care professionals, as well as more discursive modes of approaching and dealing with applicants and their families. Here the challenge is how to reconcile the bureaucratic rationale of public administration on the basis of standardization and predictability and, at the same time, on democratic ideas of equal access, with professional values in terms of 'objective' expertise and methodology, and with the unique needs of users and their families. Here, the question is: which methods can supplement bureaucratic thinking to cultivate civility and civicness in long-term care governance?

On the basis of these elements, this chapter will conclude with some reflections on future opportunities to foster civicness proactively in the organization and governance of social services.

2. Organizational development as a tool to facilitate civicness in long-term care delivery: The example of E-Qalin®

Organizational development (OD) has a long-standing tradition in business consultancy but has increasingly been applied to public and private non-profit organizations during the past 30 years, in particular in the context of ‘New Public
Management’ approaches and the related need for change processes. OD can be defined as a process of change targeted towards clearly defined objectives by involving all the relevant stakeholders within an organization – in other words, by transforming actors into protagonists of effective and qualitative improvement (French/Bell 1973; Schiedner 2000). Such processes are only sustainable if new ways of learning and communicating are introduced to create new organizational cultures and ways to involve the knowledge of all stakeholders.

Since such approaches are to a large degree based on systemic and constructivist thinking (Bateson 2000; Watzlawick 1976), communication and the empowerment of stakeholders through dialogue and participative methods of problem solving play a decisive role. Organizations seeking to stimulate and cultivate civility often use methods and tools facilitated by external consultants to change organizational structures, optimize processes and procedures, and improve working conditions and cooperation.

However, as organizational development is not an end in itself, there often needs to be a specific motive to initiate such a process. The introduction of quality management tools, provided it is not viewed as simply one more bureaucratic exercise, is one of the potential starting points for empowering and involving staff in enhancing processes and service performance.

Though quality assurance in the area of long-term care often remains based principally on inspection mechanisms with check-lists to comply with ‘National Minimum Standards’, the use of some more advanced tools and methods has begun to become more common. Apart from adaptations of the classic ISO 9000 family (www.iso.org) or EFQM (www.efqm.org) approaches, a wide variety of sector-specific models have been developed in health care and long-term care, such as KTQ in Germany (www.ktq.de) or HKZ-V (www.hkz.nl) in the Netherlands.

Still, concrete models that address the need of stakeholders to describe and improve the quality of institutional care for older persons – as well as other social services – are scarce. The debate about quality in this sector is still very much based on beliefs and ideologies concerning, for instance, the legal basis of organizations, their size or their ownership, rather than transparent criteria that shed light on what kind of service is being delivered.

This situation has given rise to the development of a model for quality management in residential care for older persons called E-Qalin®. In the context of an EU Leonardo da Vinci Project, several training and consultancy agencies, national and European umbrella organizations and almost 50 pilot homes in Austria, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Slovenia were involved in designing the model, and training modules to facilitate the application of the model in the daily work of elderly homes and nursing homes.

E-Qalin® seeks to map the reality of institutional care by inviting representatives of all stakeholders to assess and improve 66 ‘enabling’ criteria (structures & processes) and 25 key-indicators (results) from five different perspectives (residents,
Introducing civicness in steering and managing social services

staff, management, social context, and ‘learning organization’). Following this self-assessment process, partly in small ‘specialist services groups’ and partly in the steering group, a list of mutually agreed improvement projects should guarantee enhanced services and the further involvement of stakeholders. A key-word and key-value within the model is ‘involvement’ because the participation of relevant actors in planning, implementing, monitoring and improving – the classical PDCA cycle (plan-do-check-act) of quality management – is considered an explicit asset and reflected in the results of the assessment.¹

The model and its introduction were evaluated very positively in the overwhelming majority of cases, although some difficulties should not be overlooked. The rising aspirations of users as consumers who assume a more important role in choosing, directing, and evaluating the quality of their own care have often been underlined. However, reality has also shown the limits of user involvement – for example, the fact that in nursing homes the average age of residents is over 85 years and more than two-thirds of residents suffer from dementia. The participation of staff is also limited, partly due to restricted levels of education, partly due to hierarchical leadership structures and, increasingly, to a high turnover of staff and outsourcing mechanisms. One example of this is in Italy, where staff in social services and residential care, even if the provider is a public entity, are often ‘hired’ from social cooperatives where they are employed – temporarily until the next tendering process, of course – and at lower rates than in public service.

These conditions are evidently obstructing participative leadership and civicness – in other words, approaches that seek to provide better links between the behaviour and orientation of individuals and public values such as social inclusion and solidarity. One tool that is commonly used to overcome these pitfalls and which aims to introduce civicness into the organization of social services is further training and education. E-Qalin⁶ seeks to enable relevant stakeholders by means of specific training modules to enhance communication, social skills and systems-thinking within the organization. These skills are particularly important in this sector because staff are working in surroundings which, more than any other personal service, deal with the confrontation between lifeworld and political/economic subsystems, and thus between the public and private spheres (Krøger 2001). Such training can take the following forms:

* Workshops, in which representatives of all the various professions and hierarchic levels learn to understand each other’s perspectives in terms of process and client orientation, and to learn how to give and take feedback;

¹ For more information, see the website www.e-qalin.net
• Quality circles, during which different perspectives on defined quality criteria are discussed with the help of a facilitator, involving residents or the representatives of family members and, where appropriate, other external stakeholders too;
• Shared learning to develop key performance indicators and tools to make results, including social accountability and sustainability, visible to internal and external stakeholders.

These and other mechanisms help develop communication skills and build civicness into the formal organization of social services, thus generating or enhancing what has been called democratic or civic professionalism (Dzur 2004; Kremer/Tonkens 2006: 131). This also means developing new forms of professional ethics, rationales and profiles. Workers become aware, for instance, that learning is part of working time and that communication about the resident does not necessarily mean less direct interaction with the resident.

As a corollary, it should be underlined that civility in terms of behaviour and value orientation does not develop of its own accord but requires proactive leadership, facilitating methods and supportive institutional settings. Clearly, such approaches are linked to the social policy discourse of empowerment and participation, but they also seek to connect this discourse to management approaches for building human capital. First, providers of residential care facilities who choose to apply the E-Qalin\textsuperscript{®} model have often developed a participative and community-embedded Leitbild – or they move in this direction during the implementation of E-Qalin\textsuperscript{®} (involvement, participation, process and user-orientation). Secondly, the fact that E-Qalin\textsuperscript{®} is based on training and OD enables staff and other relevant partners to use dialogue and continuous improvement to overcome conflicts and achieve shared objectives. Thirdly, the model promotes the concept of the ‘learning organization’ and the accountability of all those involved.

While competition (for residents) between residential care homes has started to intensify in some countries, it can be observed that new forms of competing on the level of quality are emerging. In many cases, however, the funding mechanisms for social services and residential care facilities disincentivize investment in human resources. Not all organizations have a sufficiently large budget to allow for training and OD to introduce quality management. This vicious circle is certainly unfavourable to the facilitation of civicness and calls for measures to modernize the governance styles of quality assurance in social services from “inspection towards quality management approaches” (Leichsenring 2007). Even though quality management methods originate from more market-oriented forms of production, their adaptation to the specific needs and characteristics of long-term care may offer an opportunity to foster more ‘civic’ methods of long-term care delivery.
Introducing civicness in steering and managing social services

3. Needs assessment as a dialogue between civil appeals, professional knowledge and bureaucratic requests: The example of VITA

The assessment of long-term care needs is an important steering mechanism in the introduction of long-term care schemes. Since there is no universally accepted definition of ‘care needs’, which care needs are assessed and prioritized depends ultimately on political decisions and definitions. Which sections of the population are eligible for care is thus a political decision. Furthermore, public administration requires at least some degree of standardization and predictability to comply with budgeting rules and values such as equal access and equal treatment. It is also important for professional groups who have to assess care needs to be seen to apply similar yardsticks and thresholds, and to demonstrate ‘objective’ expertise and methodology in front of the claimant. At the same time, the person in need of care and his/her family have completely different interests – in our experience (Leichsenring/Gluske 2005) their primary requirement is to find someone to speak to about how their care needs can be satisfied, by whom and what kind of support can be provided. They are not concerned with demonstrating as great a need for care as possible. Indeed, the assessment procedure is often the first contact between the informal (family) and the formal care system.

In Southern European countries, where family care is even more the norm, and where services are scarcer than in the rest of Europe, it is essential to contact people in need of care living at home to give advice and guidance, rather than ‘just money’. Indeed, since family care cannot always be provided, such as in the Autonomous Province of Bolzano-Alto Adige (Italy), private carers from third countries (badanti) are increasingly taking over the role of family carers who are unavailable (Lamura et al. 2004; Gori 2002; Toniolo Piva 2001). In this case, too, an allowance in cash alone would not suffice to support those involved, especially in a context where the number of service users is low and the average amount of home care provided is about four hours per week.

Within Italy, Bolzano-Alto Adige is an economically privileged region and has thus been able to afford the introduction of a provincial long-term care scheme. The law concerned was passed in 2007 and stipulated that “a regular need for long-term care is recognized if persons are unable to carry out activities of daily living (nutrition, personal hygiene, excretion, household and organizational matters, psychological and social needs) due to physical or mental disabilities, and if they need care or support regularly on a weekly average for more than two hours per day over a time-period of at least six months in prospective and/or since at least 6 months”. Entitlements stipulate four levels of care from €510 – €1,800 per month for residents in need of care at home and in institutional care.

Major efforts have been made during the past few years to develop an adequate tool with which to assess long-term care needs. A working group brought together
members representing all the relevant stakeholders (professional nurses, home helpers, social workers, medical staff, administrative staff etc.), who defined the key-features of the new tool as follows:

- It should be able to assess the entire care needs of the individual in terms of ‘time needed to care’; this should be broken down into daily activities (nutrition, hygiene, mobility and social needs, housekeeping but also professional health care).
- It should enable those suffering from dementia or other mental health problems to become eligible for benefits (existing tools had often privileged those with physical handicaps).
- The assessment should be carried out by health care staff in a team consisting of professional nurses and home helpers (geriatric aides, social workers, etc.), rather than by medical doctors.
- The assessment procedure should involve the individual assessed and/or his/her main carer (family or informal carers), and should take place at the individual’s home.
- The tool should stipulate the classification of entitlements into at least four levels.
- The assessment procedure should be a first step in planning the care to be provided – i.e. it should also serve to inform the beneficiary and carers about existing services and opportunities (e.g. also in relation to barriers, adequate technical aides etc.), and to establish relationships with existing providers.
- The tool should be easy to handle in order to store and to control data, in particular through the development of a PC application that, in future, could also be run as an intranet or internet platform.
- The tool should be applicable both in the community and in residential settings; in future it should be guaranteed that care needs of those moving to elderly homes or nursing homes will have been assessed before the move.

This tool was put in place and evaluated on three occasions in 2001 (about 220 persons both in the community and in nursing homes), in 2002 (about 3,000 inhabitants of elderly homes and nursing homes) and in 2003 (about 120 persons in need of care living in the community). After each evaluation, the tool was improved and now exists on paper and as an EXCEL-application under the title Valutazione Integrata dei Tempi Assistenziali (VITA), meaning ‘integrated assessment of attendence and care times’. A final evaluation was carried out in 2005 involving about 1,000 persons receiving disability pensions (Leichsenring/Gluske 2005).

The assessment consists of about forty items to assess the individual care needs in all daily activities in terms of “time needed to satisfy the individual care needs”: nutrition, personal hygiene, excretion, household and organizational matters, psychological and social needs. The last two items help increase the eligibility of
Introducing civicness in steering and managing social services

persons suffering from dementia and other mental health problems. Nursing care items are included though not calculated in the final result as these activities (and services) are covered by the National Health Service.

It is important to note that individual care needs are assessed in hours and minutes (per day, per week). The software automatically calculates data within a ‘time-corridor’ which is defined for each single item to guarantee standardization and comparability, and so that the tool can be used in both community and residential settings.

During several trial phases, ‘assessment teams’ consisting of nursing and social care staff were trained to put the new instrument into practice and manage the communication process with claimants and their families (carers) to consider individual care needs in consultation with those involved in the daily care processes. In general, the procedure was evaluated positively, in particular by staff who liked the exchange of professional perspectives – in some cases nursing and social care staff working in the same area had not even known each other previously. The claimants also provided positive feedback and generally perceived that their needs as carers and/or care-dependent persons were being taken seriously, rather than just being ‘checked’, and information on services and potential respite was given.

The methods and procedures developed in this context involve new methods of cooperation between the health and social care professionals as well as more discursive modes of approaching and dealing with applicants and their families.

Here the challenge is how to reconcile the different rationales of public administration and the individuals involved by means of dialogue. On the one hand, the fear was expressed on the public administration side, but also from professionals, that awarding claimants an important stake in defining the extent of their care needs provide scope for fraud and abuse. More control mechanisms were demanded and a paragraph was introduced into the law stipulating that each entitled person must make use of at least one home care visit per year.

On the other hand, professionals in particular feared the loss of their expert role. Indeed, at several points during the developmental process, local representatives of the Nursing Federation proposed the use of internationally validated tools such as, for instance, the interRAI assessment tool (www.interrai.org), which calls for an extremely specialist professional expertise, rather than the discursive VITA model.

It remains to be seen whether the ten-day training of the ‘assessment teams’ was sufficient to prepare the professionals for the intended dialogue with families and claimants or whether, in the end, the professional arbitrariness of ‘street-level bureaucrats’ will come to dominate. Additional contextual measures may thus be needed, such as the supervision of the assessment teams, and more information and training for General Practitioners, who play an important role in referral and medical diagnosis. Furthermore, support for applicants and carers themselves may be needed to reduce the existing information and power gap.
The specific purpose of this tool in the context of social policy discourses is its attempt to apply several elements of these discourses with the aim of improving social services for specific groups that are considered as competent consumers, if they are supported by advisors who sustain their choices. While many care and attendance allowance schemes have been criticized for being merely ‘consumerist’ policy choices, the aim of the dialogue with applicants in Bolzano-Alto Adige is to create trust and a formal relationship with formal services. This approach relates to empowerment and participation and is designed to enable partners to engage in a dialogue that runs counter both to traditional welfarism – with its trust on control and hierarchical steering – and to a purely consumerist orientation – with its emphasis on the beneficial effects of individual choices.

4. Conclusions

This brief contribution has aimed to show the usefulness of specific strategies for cultivating civicness, and that civil dialogue between representatives of different institutional rationales cannot be taken for granted in modern societies. Improving social skills and stimulating dialogue seem to be indispensable for organizations striving to boost their quality in terms of civicness, in particular in the area of long-term care in which poorly qualified staff is still a key feature.

Quality management in steering and organizing social services requires a broad movement towards new methods of shared learning which involve all stakeholders. But who is really interested in such a movement? And which kind of providers and institutions are best situated to promote such approaches? Is it the public sector with its ‘guaranteed’ career patterns, including regular further training? Is it the private sector which, driven by competition, is best placed to improve working conditions and, thus, space and time for feedback and the involvement of stakeholders? Or is it the third sector, which many say has the most participative approach to organizing work and democratic decision making? The answers to these questions are likely to be influenced by national traditions, understandings of (care) work and, perhaps most importantly, by the resources available. Legal regulations towards a training boom are unlikely to happen – we have seen that governments have become reluctant to increase the educational levels of staff as this would have an immediate impact on the costs of services. Lack of personnel resources, however, may contribute to a more enlightened form of governance and the provision of more rewarding working conditions.

Civicness is difficult to measure, since it concerns the competences of professionals and users, supportive institutional settings, and social and democratic qualities. However, we may consider the increase in numbers of social and health workers with burn-out syndromes, high staff turnover, the increasing difficulty of
Introducing civicness in steering and managing social services

recruiting staff (European Foundation 2006; Cameron/Moss 2007), and the growing dissatisfaction of patients with health and social care services almost everywhere in Europe (Alber/Köhler 2005) as indicators of a lack of civicness in social and health services. In order to counteract these phenomena we have argued in favour of mechanisms that are able to enhance ‘civic professionalism’ but also civic administration and civic provider-consumer relationships. This involves personal development and shared reflections in teams that are able to give and take feedback, learning to overcome prejudices and generalized images of ‘the other’ and practising inter-professional, intergenerational and intercultural dialogue. The methods and tools for supporting such processes are out there, but we must learn to use them properly.

References


Chapter 8

Ota de Leonardis

Organization matters: contracting for service provision and civicness

This chapter analyses the organizational dynamics of two service provision situations in the framework of the welfare contractual turn in Italy, comparing them to explore when and how civicness is fostered. Particular attention is devoted to how power asymmetries on the border between the public and private realms are dealt within these organizational settings, and questions concerning justice vocabularies and choices are raised. The role of service recipients – especially the least advantaged – proves to be a key issue in investigating the civicness of service provision.

1. Introduction

The main question addressed in this chapter concerns the influences that different approaches to organizing social and health-care services may have on civicness – by which we understand a certain quality of the relationship between citizens and institutions. I will develop my analysis within the context of the ‘new’ social policies in Italy. Italy is not generally famous for its civic virtues, as Putnam recently reminded us, and Italy’s ‘Mediterranean’ welfare system also appears to be affected by this lack of civicness. This situation serves as our starting point and the first section clarifies how the issue of civicness fits into the wider picture of the research into social policies. In this first section, I will also justify my decision to focus on the operative level of practices and relationships between service operators and users in order to investigate civic qualities at this level. In the second section, I will briefly outline the background research that my discussion will be based on. Regional devolution and the diversification of welfare regimes, another specific feature of the Italian case, have made it possible to conduct comparative research on social and healthcare policies in various Italian regions. The main results of the comparison of two Regional welfare regimes – those of Lombardy and Friuli – are synthesized. A more specific comparison between two corresponding service provision systems will be developed in the following section. The approach and analytical tools I will
use in this research will be presented and discussed in this second section. As we shall see, the focus on policy instruments in action and their ‘organizational effects’ in policy arenas produces several relevant insights into the organizational ‘shapes’ of service relationships and the values and norms that these shapes nurture. This is the analytical terrain that I propose to explore in search of civicness in service relationships.

This exploration is developed in the third section, in which I will analyse two different yet comparable policy instruments and compare the service relationships that take shape through their use. The analytical material that the research has produced on how these instruments work in practice provides us with a great deal of information concerning the civic qualities of relationships between service providers and recipients, as well as about the organizational conditions in which these qualities are played out. A thread gradually emerges over the course of my reasoning, and is reinforced by the immersion in this in-depth analysis: the recipients of the services, and the role they play in these service relationships, turn out to be a key issue for investigating the civicness of these relationships. In the conclusion, I will set out the relevance and implications of this key issue.

2. Conceptual tools and questions on civicness of service relationships

2.1 Civicness, and the specifics of the Italian case

Italy cannot boast of a good reputation when it comes to the subject of civicness. Interpretations of the Italian case have been strongly influenced by Banfield’s theory of the spread of “amoral familism” and the weakness of civic culture, which was formulated at the time of the Marshall Plan, mainly in reference to southern Italy. Since then, public debate in Italy has time and again returned to the lack of a civic culture. Recently, the issue has again grown in prominence following Putnam’s book on civic traditions in the Italian regions, which has propelled the subject of civicness into the international research debate. According to Putnam, the weakness of civic cultures in various regions may explain the poor performance of public institutions in terms of democracy. References to these cultural characteristics also occur in the interpretation of the Italian welfare system, which is considered representative of the ‘Mediterranean’ model – and is set apart from the ‘corporatist’ model in which Esping Andersen had included it. This Mediterranean model is characterized by the central role of family solidarity, the weakness of universalistic principles in the provision of social benefits, and the influence of particularistic and even patronage practices and cultures – a lack of civicness, as it were, which corresponds to serious inequalities in entitlements (Ferrera 1996; Mingione 2001).
Organization matters

The subject of Italy’s ‘lateness’ in the area of the culture and practice of citizenship – which remains debatable for reasons that cannot be discussed here\(^1\) – has in any case guided the efforts of Italian governments during the 1990s to respond to the obligations that stemmed from Italy’s entry into Europe. These efforts have resulted into an important cycle of administrative reforms, a national welfare law in 2000, and the reform of the Italian constitution in 2001. These reforms have all centred on the intention to transform the relationships between institutions and citizens, first of all through regulations that promote a more active role for the latter. The administrative reforms, inspired by the model of the New Public Management, have introduced norms of responsiveness for public administration in their relationships towards citizens. The national welfare law provides methods for the “activation” of the recipients, and for “participation” in the local implementation of policy. Furthermore, the principle of subsidiarity has been introduced into the constitution: both vertical subsidiarity, which entrusts many social responsibilities to local levels of government, considered “closer” to citizens; and horizontal subsidiarity, which fosters the self-organizing potential of civil society. Public institutions, as the new Article 118 of the constitution states, are charged with the task of “favouring the autonomous initiative of citizens, single and associated, to perform activities of general interest, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.” We may therefore recognize in these changes a strong desire to promote civicism in the relationship between citizens and institutions.

Social and healthcare policies constitute the main laboratory in which these principles are translated, both in governance and in the organization of services.\(^2\) It is thus these policy areas that are the most promising in terms of our analysis, and may allow us to establish whether the changes introduced are enhancing the quality of the relationship between citizens and institutions that we have agreed to refer to as ‘civicism’. This is the general question I would like to deal with here.

---

1. As for the Mediterranean welfare model, it should be noted that this refers principally to the social assistance sector. This should be balanced by considering strong universalistic elements introduced into the Italian welfare system during the 1970s, such as: the ‘Statuto dei lavoratori’ (workers’ statute of rights), the ‘de-institutionalization’ of total institutions for the mentally ill, the disabled, and minors (particularly the law that closed down psychiatric hospitals) and the institution of the National Health Service. (De Leonardis 1990, 2006; Briccoli, De Leonardis, Tosi, A. 2008)

2. In Italy, European social programmes and their directives have had a strong influence on these policies, mainly at the local level (Bifulco 2005).
There is an irony in raising this question with regard to Italy. In fact, when we observe this laboratory of new social policies to establish whether and how they generate civickness, we will no longer be looking at how the cultural legacy of weak civickness expounded by Putnam determines the “Mediterranean” characteristics of Italian welfare. On the contrary, what we will be looking at, is whether and how welfare nurtures – or does not nurture – civickness. Putnam’s argument is thus turned on its head, in that civickness is no longer treated as an *explanans* for the functioning of the Italian welfare system, but rather as an *explanandum* for the research on this topic.3 Furthermore, comparative research helps us to abandon widespread stereotypes on the subject. The notion of vertical subsidiarity mentioned above, and the subsequent de-centralization of these policies, which have now become the responsibility of regional governments, has brought about the emergence of a range of different regional welfare models. By comparing two of these – both in the north, which is richer in civic culture according to Putnam – we will discover important differences in the civic potential that these models are allowing to grow.

2.2 The choice of the analytical field: the civic quality of service relationships

My analytical investigation into the civickness of service relationships will be based on research conducted over the past few years into the design and implementation of new social and healthcare policies in various regions of Italy. I will briefly illustrate the set-up and the main findings of this research in the following section. In particular, I will focus on the level of service provision in order to examine the relationships between services and recipient citizens that take place in these public policy arenas. The importance of this analytical field lies in the fact that it allows the recipients themselves to become ‘part of the action’, as partners in the service relationships, and makes them a point of reference for questions of civickness. Focusing on this field, we are compelled to ask ourselves about the position of the recipients in these relationships, and how much and in what ways these recipients are recognized as citizens – that is to say, participants in civic relationships. Moreover, the social and healthcare sectors I will investigate are especially relevant to this subject since the recipients to be taken into account are the most deprived

---

3 As explained in the first Chapter, civickness is defined as the quality of institutions, organizations or procedures to encourage and reproduce civil attitudes and behaviour at the individual level, as well as a civic culture.
Organization matters

ones, the ‘worst off’, or ‘the least advantaged’, on the basis of Rawls’ theory of justice.\(^4\)

Since this analysis takes the perspective of service recipients, it raises two crucial issues regarding civicness. First of all, the service relationships stand on the border of the private and the public spheres, where civicness, as Tocqueville states, finds its main expression. Secondly, these relationships constitute a concrete situation in which the issue of power in relationships between citizens and institutions is at play, an issue that involves the political dimension of civicness and its links with democracy. Let us examine these issues in greater detail.

First of all, the interaction between service operators and citizen-users has two important characteristics: on one hand, it takes place in the arena of a public policy; on the other, it deals with problems that concern the private lives of individuals. Personal issues involving their health, their family, their emotions or their aspirations enter into play with the set of solutions – that is, resources, skills, regulations – as instituted by public policies and their methods of defining, treating, and may be of resolving these problems. The choices made in this process of handling the case of a real individual, and the arguments used to justify those choices, will refer back to general and abstract criteria of social justice. Take, for example, the real-life playing out of social and healthcare interventions that operators are engaged in – when they take care of an elderly person at home, for instance, or arrange his/her admission to an institution; or when they deal with schools or the behavioural problems of a minor, and those of his/her problematic family; when they work with a person who suffers from a physical handicap or mental disturbance. Within all such activities, that which belongs to the private sphere of an individual enters into a relationship with the professional skills, standards and resources that are mobilized by services and operators. These services and operators – whether public or private – embody the power of a public policy. At this boundary between private and public – or to use the terminology of the theory of justification (Thévenot 2006), between the regime of the familiar and the regime of the public – an area of tension is established. A rich body of research literature on social work has been devoted to pointing out such tensions. When interacting with users, operators are moving along the border between consideration of the ‘concrete other’ and the impersonality required by the professional role, between proximity

\(^4\) I refer to the Rawls’ second principle of justice, the ‘difference principle’ (Rawls 2005/1971).
and detachment, and even between roles of help and control. The ways in which these tensions and dilemmas are handled will generate different arrangements in terms of the norms they establish and the values they feed.

The issues raised by this boundary between two spheres relate to the topic of civickness. They mean we must ask ourselves, for example, whether these interactions generate relational goods such as trust and respect – and if so, in what form, and what are interdependencies between them. The question is raised of whether, for instance, there is respect on the part of the service and the professional for the user’s personal experience, and whether this corresponds to the recognition of his/her personal integrity and dignity (Sennett 2003; Castel/Haroche 2001); and whether, on the part of the user, his/her trust vis-à-vis the professional and the service is ‘focused’ or ‘generalized’ (a classic dichotomy in the literature on the subject); whether this trust nurtures a privatistic relationship, or whether it generates a reciprocal link of recognition between citizens and institutions. An important aspect of this subject is the vocabulary of services, which can be that of personal moral commitment, of economic transaction, or of public mandate, and the related hybrids. This means, for example, observing whether the recipient’s moral qualities or rights are involved, how responsibility is attributed and qualified, and whether and how there is co-responsibility. To summarize, this boundary between the private and the public, which we will illuminate by focusing on the interaction between users and operators at the level of service provision, can provide us with a greater understanding of civickness. We can observe whether the cultures of “privatistic withdrawal from citizenship” mentioned by Habermas are nurtured, or, conversely, whether cultures of co-responsibility and involvement in public life are stimulated.

Secondly, this boundary between private and public raises questions of power. The operative terrain of services constitutes a pertinent focus for these questions, since service relationships are based on a power asymmetry. An asymmetrical relationship is instituted between the user (often socially deprived and in any case

---

5 For instance, burn-out syndrome. I have analyzed these tensions and discussed the related literature in De Leonardis 1990. Also see more recent contributions in this issue: Breviglieri et al. 2003; Cefai 2006; Thévenot 2007; Eliasoph 2007

6 It should be remembered that these questions are intrinsic to welfare systems, even though they are expressed in different terms each time: with the vocabulary of rights – and of the law – as in the development of the classic welfare state; with the criticism of the authoritarian, paternalistic, and invasive ‘service bureaucracy’ during its ‘crisis’; it was not only the neo-liberal wave that made these arguments, as we can easily recognize from the anti-authoritarian motives of the movements of the 1960s and in feminist criticism of bureaucracy); and with today’s prevalent discourse in favour of reducing the state’s direct intervention and of ‘empowering’ citizens.
Organization matters

Weakened by a problem that may be more or less serious and urgent) and the operator who embodies the service authority (in both its specialized knowledge and institutional mandate). There is a consolidated body of research that has explored power in service relationships, ranging from the Foucault’s ‘pouvoir-savoir’ argument to the topic of ‘informational asymmetry’ (also see Dubet 2002). What form this asymmetry will assume, how it is dealt with by the actors in the field, and what relationships it will give rise to, are all questions that are pertinent to the subject of civics: we know, from Tocqueville once again, that the civic qualities of relationships between citizens and institutions go hand in hand with the limitation of public power, a critical attitude toward authority, and a tendency to enhance egalitarian relationships. When examining service relationships, we thus need to investigate whether and how the power asymmetry mentioned is dealt with. For example, are the authority and service of the operator of a paternalistic and authoritarian type? Or, on the other hand, does the user develop an orientation toward ‘dependency’, which at times may take on traits of opportunism? Is the user treated as, and does the user act as a passive target? Or is he/she is recognized and does he/she play an active role? Is her only available option ‘loyalty’, as discussed by Hirschman – a link with the service that may crystallize into a bond of subjugation, or do the conditions exist for the user to exert his liberties and/or capabilities and have a voice with regard to the interventions that concern him? Are service relationships oriented towards the empowerment of the weakest subjects, so that they become involved and participate in the services provided, and in a certain sense become co-producers of them? (Brandsen/Pestoff 2006; Pestoff 2006)

Such questions, even mentioned only briefly and certainly not exhaustively, represent an initial cross-section of the aspects of the service relationships that are capable of indicating their civic quality. This civic quality is, in any case, a quality of interplays, which is produced – if produced at all – through interaction, not through a demonstration of the virtues of discrete actors (individuals or organizations). Civics is clearly a complex and multifaceted quality that cannot be separated from the complete picture of the service provision. It must be treated as a by-product, and searched for through indirect indicators of the qualities of the relationships I have described above – such as trust, respect and co-responsibility. As we shall see, the indirect road I intend to take follows the line of the

---

7 Also in their typology of the cités, and in the corresponding grammars of justice, Boltanski and Thévenot recall the ‘worth’ equality as qualifying the ‘civic world’ (Boltanski, Thévenot 1991).

8 This is an effect, as Elster points out, that cannot be directly pursued. See Chapter 1.
organizational shapes of service provision, and of the relational qualities these shapes generate.

3. The research framework

My intention is to approach the topic of civicness by analysing the configurations assumed by service relationships in various regional policy arenas in Italy, examining the results of the research already mentioned above. Before addressing this approach in detail, it is necessary to briefly summarize the main aspects of method and the overall results of the research in question, to frame the closer comparative analysis that will be developed in the next section. This research was concerned with analysing the normative architecture of social and healthcare policies – both being the field of intense policy-making work over the past ten years – in three Italian Regions: Lombardy, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Campania.

3.1 An approach to social policies “based on instruments”

As mentioned previously, the diversification of the welfare regimes subsequent to the Title V reform of the Italian constitution, and the consequent transfer of related competencies to the regional level, provided the opportunity for developing a comparative study. More specifically, we compared the policy instruments adopted in various regional policies.

The “approach based on instruments” for analyzing public policies, formulated by Lascumes and Le Galès (2004, 2007), focuses on those normative tools which determine the action field of a policy by defining its actors, beneficiaries and benefits, instituting incentives, legal and technical constraints and resources for action, and establishing rules for access, competencies, standards, and so on. This approach treats public policies as forms of ‘long-distance government’, in which the activity of governing is entrusted not so much to directly authoritative acts, as to instruments that indirectly ‘make the actors do’, by orienting and incentivizing...
Organization matters

This is the approach that our research followed, by developing the analysis of these instruments along two lines (Bifulco/De Leonardis/Mozzana/Vitale 2007; Bifulco/De Leonardis 2006). The first line of analysis involves instrument design, and examines the way in which the policy frame of a regional policy is fixed, granting normative force to arguments and discourses concerning the problems, solutions, beneficiaries and actors involved with that particular policy; these are fixed in the instruments and translate into normative obligations for the actors committed in policy arenas. The second line of analysis involves instruments-in-action, and examines the way in which these actors put the instruments to work, reframe and adapt them to different situations through their actions and interactions, and in which these actors build up organizational settings. Through this second line of analysis, the organizational effects generated by the instruments-in-action have been investigated.

By monitoring the instruments, the analysis thus connects the macro level of regional legislation – the policy-framing level at which the instruments are fixed – and the specific, micro level of local contexts, enabling a close examination of “situated” interactions and practices, and what effects they generate within the contexts that they operate. The inquiry concerns the instruments that operatively translate the European imperative of ‘activation’ into regional policies. In particular, it focuses on those instruments that introduced contractual relationships for both service provision – between service providers and citizen-users – and for governance and local partnerships in the management of service systems.

3.2 Regional social policies: an overview.

Three different regional configurations of the social policies under examination emerged from the research, with reference to both the policy frames and the organizational effects of the instruments (Monteleone 2007). For the sake of simplicity, I will limit myself to an outline of the results that emerged from the comparison of two of the three regional cases – Lombardy and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. These regions will also be the main reference in the next analysis, which focuses on two instruments for regulating service provision, and organizing the relationships between service providers and users.

10 This approach lends itself particularly well to the analysis of the policies under examination here, in which the weight of direct intervention of public administration has been reduced for some time now, and value is given to the capacity for initiative on the part of civil society and the participation of the third sector in providing and managing services, in compliance with the principle of horizontal subsidiarity.
In both Lombardy and Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the respective regional governments consider social and healthcare policies to be a strategic political terrain, and use them as an important lever of change. In both the regions, these policies are subject to an intense policy-making process and oriented towards interpreting and implementing the European directives – first of all, the principle of activation – even though in different ways. Lombardy, the most densely populated and wealthiest region of Italy, presents itself as a political model: the ‘Lombard method of governance’, with a characteristically neo-liberal flavour. For ten years, Lombardy has been run by a well-established and dynamic centre-right coalition. In the far northeast of the country, the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, whose government has alternated between centre-right and centre-left coalitions, has a long tradition of public welfare and a wide supply of public services distributed throughout its territory.

The policy orientations that characterize these two regions provide quite a contrast with one another. The political strategy in Lombardy aims towards a reduction in public services and favours the building of social markets, mainly by moving public spending from direct provision towards the acquisition of services from private, profit and non-profit providers. In Friuli, the government aims at decentralizing public services to local contexts – ‘territorialization’ – so that they can function as a lever for building local communities in which citizens are encouraged to take an active role.\(^\text{11}\) In the policy frames, as expressed by the regional laws on health and welfare\(^\text{12}\), the key terms that define citizens’ relationships with service systems are ‘customers’ in Lombardy and ‘citizens’ or ‘social citizenship’ in Friuli. The terms that describe their agency are ‘freedom of choice’, ‘self-organization’, ‘autonomous production’, in Lombardy, and ‘due rights’, ‘possible autonomy’, ‘activation of both individual and associated citizens’ in Friuli. The policy instruments that translate these key words differ in their design and in their organizational effects.\(^\text{13}\) In the case of Lombardy, these instruments are designed to

\(^{11}\)Quoting only the main contributions on these two regions, see Tosi, S. 2007; Mauri 2007; Bifulco, De Leonardis 2006 a, 2006 b; Monteleone 2008; Bricocoli et al. 2008; Bifulco et al. 2008.

\(^{12}\)On the policy frame, see cognitive approaches to public policies (Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith 1993; Muller 2002). The legislative texts of the last ten years have been examined by applying techniques of in-depth textual analysis. Special attention was given to the “Social Healthcare Plan” of Lombardy (2004-6) and the Friuli welfare reform (2006) “Integrated Systems for Social Citizenship”.

\(^{13}\)We examined accreditation standards and procedures, evaluation procedures, monetary transfer measures, devices for the insertion of disabled people into the labour market and coordination instruments at the management level.
Organization matters

assign the third sector a central role in the system, and to unleash the dynamics of self-regulation between the supply and demand of services in order to build ‘social markets’ (see also Gori 2005). It should be specified that in this case the market acquires a ‘moral’ connotation, since it is understood to be enhancing the moral resources of solidarity and the altruism of Catholic organizations – the Comunione e Liberazione (‘Communion and Liberation’) movement is in fact a central player in this, together with its secular arm, the economic-financial holding company Compagnia delle Opere. The governor of the region, Roberto Formigoni, is the leader of this movement. In Friuli, policy instruments are aimed at incentivizing the integration of various actors in shared projects both among public services in various policy sectors, and among these and third-sector services (and citizen organizations more generally). Finally, the systems in the two regions differ with respect to the modes of governance of these policies, particularly with respect to the types of partnership in which they are organized. In Lombardy, governance is based on public-private partnerships between the competent public authority – which carries out the functions of planning, financing and control – and economic organizations, which are for the most part officially non-profit, that provide the services. Third-sector organizations are involved in formulating local programmes, but at the central level they play a role that is only consultative, while the regional government keeps close political control on the direction of processes. It must be added that – as often happens in modes of governance characterized by the market model – negotiations and agreements occur mainly outside official arenas, and tend to favour lobbying and political and business cross-alliances. In Friuli, meanwhile, partnerships between the public authorities of various sectors dominate at both the institutional and the management levels, especially at the local level. Such partnerships may involve, for example, the healthcare authority, the municipality responsible for welfare, the province for its skills in the area of job insertion, the Territorial Agency for public housing, and local police. The participation of third-sector organizations in deliberative arenas is not widespread, but strong decentralization favours a lively and constant dialogue among these organizations and local authorities, and the voices of citizens in general, with inquiries, claims, protests and proposals, also thanks to the widespread use of local and regional media. The participation of citizens in governance occurs more through channels of political representation than through forms of deliberative democracy.

3.3 Analysing organizational variables.

From the research carried out on these two cases and the comparison of the various policy instruments, a nexus has emerged between types of instruments and the organizational and inter-organizational forms that actors build up by using these instruments in their action contexts. We observed that some instruments orient the actors to build up market organization and coordination, while others boost actors’
skills in cooperating on shared projects and community building, some stimulate competition and others discussion and conflict, some encourage selective dynamics and others inclusion and membership (Monteleone 2007; Briccoli et al. 2008). In order to investigate the civic qualities of the relationships between service providers and citizens, I will focus on the organizational dimension. This analytical focus will now be specified and justified.

First of all, to analyse the organizational variables, I rely on approaches that shift the analytical focus from organizations – understood as structures, apparatuses, goal machines – to organizational processes, or ‘organizing’ as Weick refers to it (Weick 1995; Czarniawska 2008). Since these approaches stress the relevance of the cognitive and cultural features of organizations, and examine the involvement of the actors in ‘sense-making’, they enable the investigation of interactions and practices that unfold in the service organizations from the point of view of the cultures they nurture – in our case civic cultures.

Secondly, I draw some suggestions from research into civil society organizations that has questioned their civic quality, which currently tends to be taken for granted. This involves analysing their organizational features in close detail. This research suggests the following: (a) conducting a pragmatic ‘situational analysis’ of interactions and practices; (b) taking account of both the internal horizontal links and the vertical links that bind these organizations into the policy arenas and connect them to institutions; and (c) focusing on specific organizational variables. Skocpol’s research on the transformation of civic organizations in the United States offers some important insight on this last point (Skocpol 2003). Skocpol questions the schools of “communitarians and their social capital cousins” (particularly Putnam), for whom the presence of volunteer organizations and their local roots are sufficient to indicate civility and democracy. Instead, she returns to the historical role that these organizations have played in building American democracy, to show that it is only certain specific organizational features of this associationalism that have had a crucial influence on nurturing civility. These features include the degree of internal democracy within these organizations, such as whether they are open to differences and pluralism, whether they encourage membership and participation in the processes of organizing, defining and pursuing shared objectives, establishing rules, building and legitimizing the leadership. By examining how these organizations have changed over the last 25 years, she stresses the differences between those organizations that are grounded on membership and organizations

Organization matters

grounded on management. In the latter – organizations that she says are like “heads without a body” – civiness is no longer nurtured and democracy is in fact “diminished.”

Taking up these research suggestions, I will now proceed to compare the organizational effects of two different policy instruments, in order to identify what kinds of relationships take shape between users and service providers, when these relationships foster civic qualities, and which specific civic qualities are promoted.

4. In search of civicness in service relationships: a comparison

I will examine the two types of monetary transfer mentioned above: the vouchers and budgets for care adopted respectively in Lombardy and Friuli. Both of these instruments are aimed at less advantages members of society – the elderly, the disabled, mental patients – with the objective of supporting them so that they may as far as possible continue to lead a normal life and avoid being institutionalized. In both cases, the supply of services is delegated by the public health and/or social authority to third sector organizations, and in both cases a contract between the provider and the user of social services was established with the aim of conferring an active role on the user. However, these two instruments are designed differently and their use creates two different methods of organization for the services provided and for the relationships between providers and users (Monteleone 2005, 2007, 2008; Bifulco/Vitale 2006; Giorgi/Polizzi 2007).

4.1 Two types of contract

The voucher is a core-instrument in the ‘Lombard way of governance’, a leitmotiv, so to speak, and a powerful normative lever that causes the actors to build social markets and create the ‘citizenship of the consumer’. The voucher is used to acquire social and healthcare services provided by the public authority to the citizen-user, who is free to choose among accredited private suppliers that are in competition with each other. In this case, the contract that organizes the service relationship corresponds to the prototype of the market exchange relationship, in which the active role of the recipient is reflected in the freedom to choose the supplier to which he will be linked. The contract stipulated on the basis of the voucher is therefore of a private nature. The budget for care, meanwhile, is part of a set of various instruments, which are more or less connected to one other and are oriented in the same direction. It is fairly representative of the Friuli’s style of governance and of the political strategy of this Region regarding welfare, as outlined above. The budget for care is an item in the region’s social and health-care budget that the citizen-user may spend on any project of rehabilitation and caretaking that he/she chooses to
undertake. The contract that is stipulated for this use involves three partners: the citizen-user, the third-sector provider, and the territorial public authority responsible for the citizen’s well-being. This third partner plays a strategic role in the contract, as it guarantees and supports the citizen-user (i.e. the weaker contracting party), attributes the budget to the provider and monitors compliance to the terms of the contract. The involvement of this third partner confers a public nature on the contract.¹⁵

Even the subject matter of the contract differs between the two cases. The budget for care binds the contracting parties to the user’s ‘personalized project for care and rehabilitation’. Such a project regards changes in the life conditions of the citizen-user relative to three ‘axes’: ‘home, work, social life.’ The personalized project which is the subject of the contract must take all three of these axes into account in pursuing the improvement of housing conditions (‘the quality of social habitat’) of the person involved, the increase in his/her chances of working, or at least of conducting an active life, and the enrichment of his/her network of personal relationships. In the case of the voucher, the contract involves the supply of a package of social-healthcare services at home, which correspond to a standard assignment record. The service is only personalized insofar as the frequency of services provided and the package’s degree of ‘healthcare intensity’ can be modified.

4.2 On the position of the recipient

We can now begin to focus on the organizational setting of the relationships between service providers and users that are shaped by these different contract typologies. We will examine the position of the recipient in particular. Firstly, under the voucher-based Lombard system the relationship is organized by the voucher, meaning that the active role of the recipient is based on his/her freedom to choose a service provider. This “negative freedom”, as it was termed by Isaiah Berlin, protects the recipient’s private sphere from intervention imposed by an external authority, and is consistent with the neo-liberal criticism of the welfare state. The recipient is recognized under the statute of subject in a supply contract, which identifies him/her as customer and equates him to the position of market consumer. Accordingly, the recipient may change supplier at any time. To adopt the typology elaborated by Hirschman to distinguish the options that individuals have at their

¹⁵ On the privatization or publicness of service governance and provision in welfare mix and hybrid policy arenas, and on questions of what the notion of ‘public’ refers to, see Bifulco et al. 2006; also see Evers 2005
disposal in their relationships with organizations, we may say that this citizen-as-
customer has an “exit” option (Hirschman 1970).

Whether and when this freedom is effectively exercised are questions we will
return to at a later point. Now let us turn to the position of the recipient in the service
relationships instituted by the budget for care. The active role of the recipient, who
is entitled to the budget, and the contracting party is exercised not by choosing a
provider from which to acquire pre-packaged services, but in choosing the services
themselves: that is to say, the recipient participates in defining his/her own
personalized project, in realizing that project and, as we shall see, in evaluating its
effectiveness. To take up Hirschman’s typology once again, the recipient expresses
him/herself using the “voice” option. The user’s freedom – in any case established
by being the subject of the contract – is exercised not in at the point of choosing the
interlocutor with which to enter into a relationship, but rather over the course of the
relationship itself, and concerns the contents and rules of the game of this
relationship. The user’s freedom is such that it is ‘really exercised’ and grows with
use. It thus corresponds more to the meaning of freedom as capability, the
“capability to be and to do”, as elaborated by Sen. In the configuration of service
relationships assumed in the case of the budget for care, the freedom of the users, or
more generally their agency, is not an assumption, but is precisely what should be
practically supported and enhanced in such relationships. The option of ‘voice’ is
created by building in the appropriate conditions for the person involved to acquire
and enact his/her “capability for voice” within his/her own project.16 Different
organizational processes.

Let us now consider the position of the service organizations involved in these
relationships. This depends on how accreditation conditions, on one hand, and
evaluation procedures, on the other, are set up within the two instruments. In the
case of vouchers, providers are accredited on the basis of very generic standards17,
and evaluation is entrusted principally to a customer satisfaction questionnaire,
which the provider administers itself to the client. The provider is incentivized by
the customer’s freedom of choice and by competition with other providers to ensure
the quality of service supplied within the terms of the contract. The relationship with
the customer instituted in this way simply involves the provision of the expected
services and, though it takes place in the customer’s home, should not interfere with
his private life. This type of relationship does not oblige the operator or the services

16 See Sen 1994. On the application of the Sen’s capability approach to these matters see
Bonvin, Farvacque 2006; Bonvin 2006; Bifulco et al. 2007.
17 The legal representative must not have criminal convictions, and the company must be able
to certify at least two years of experience in the relevant sector.
provided to respond to any need for change in the service that may arise. The operator is not required to listen to the voice of the person involved. By exercising the freedom to choose and change providers, it is supposed that the recipient can influence the quality of interventions that he/she receives, and indirectly influence the quality of service and the overall providing system, in accordance with the self-regulating logic of the market.

Under the budget for care instrument, meanwhile, the realization of the project is evaluated every three months by an Evaluation Unit instituted by the contract, which involves the competent local public authority, the supplier and the user. The third sector organization to which the personalized project is entrusted is thus incentivized to acquire the skills that can change people’s quality of life conditions on the basis of the ‘axes’ provided for by the instrument. The relationship with the recipient does not hinge upon services to be provided that are fixed from the start, but rather on choices, actions, evaluations and changes to be performed together with the recipient.

4.3 On the quality of service relationships

Having broadly described how the two services that implement these instruments are organized, we may now analyze more closely the qualities of the relationships developed among actors. Let us consider the two questions formulated in the first section: (1) How is the power asymmetry intrinsic to service relationships dealt with? (2) How are the problems that arise between private aspects and public aspects of the relationship dealt with? Since, in the operative situations and practices that we will now look at, these two questions are interwoven, I will deal with them simultaneously.

In the voucher-based system, the reference to the prototype of the exchange contract presupposes the initial equality of the two contracting parties, an equal ‘autonomy of will,’ formally guaranteed with the freedom of choice and of exit, even for the traditionally weaker subject in the relationship—the user. However, our analysis demonstrates that, in reality this does not tend to happen. In the first place, two basic conditions for the exercise of freedom of choice are missing. Firstly there is the problem of ‘informational asymmetry’ in knowledge and skills. This impedes the user from choosing and evaluating the services offered with sufficient knowledge and understanding, an asymmetry that thus disadvantages socio-economically and culturally deprived users to a disproportionate extent. It is well-known that people who are more ‘fragile’ or who have more complex problems do not have great contractual power in dealing with services and service providers, nor the information, skills or ease to exercise their freedom of choice. This applies even more to the socially deprived, the people who tend to populate the world of welfare.

Under the voucher-based system, the user acquires a pre-packaged set of services from the provider and may not negotiate any variations in this package. It must be
remembered that the needs and benefits catered for in this kind of exchange are highly relational: they involve relationships of caretaking and help that require trust and generate dependence, that have a high moral and emotional content and are therefore much more difficult to make and break. Building these relationships, and breaking them off, often has high costs for the user on a personal level. The ‘customer satisfaction’ questionnaires administered by suppliers record a ‘good level’ of satisfaction, but it is well established that a significant role is played in such cases by ‘adaptive reduction of preferences’, a phenomenon that remains widespread in the world of social services (see also Gori 2005). As for the possibility of exercising the exit option, this is made difficult by complicated bureaucratic procedures and it occurs rarely. The analyses conducted indicate that the use of this option is distributed unequally among recipients, and that those with a stronger socio-economic background are more likely to take such a course of action. Conversely, it has also been shown that beneficiaries who have more serious problems and/or less contractual power are exposed to the risk of the rescission of services, or the non-renewal of the contract by the supplier.

There now follow some excerpts from interviews with voucher customers: “[the operator] scolds me”; “He tells me if I continue to ... then I won’t be able to have help at home anymore and I’ll have to be put in an institution”; “They say that this situation... is a complication not provided for by the terms of the contract.” To put these quotes in context, it should be kept in mind that the freedom of choice that the voucher is supposed to promote concerns not only the customer but also the provider. The provider has only soft obligations vis-à-vis the citizen and can select and cream off customers. In the world of welfare, it is easy to risk becoming an undesirable client. In this regard, it is worth-noting that, even if the voucher is designated expressly to avoid institutionalization, this appears only slightly to have affected Lombardy’s high rates of admission to institutions (especially for elderly and disabled people) 18

In the budget for care, on the other hand, the freedom – or ‘the autonomy of will’ – of the weaker partner in the contract is not taken for granted, but is rather the objective of the contract itself. It is what the partners commit to nurture by means of

18 Lombardy is characterized by a high number of beds per inhabitant in these institutions, about 30% higher than Friuli even though the latter is Italy’s ‘oldest’ region. See Bifulco 2003; Bifulco et al. 2008. Even in the new Lombardy Regional Social-Health Care Plan 2007-9, it is recognized that the region has reached the maximum ceiling provided for by national guidelines in the ratio of inhabitants/beds (for the most part in private structures).
the personalized project. The power asymmetry between service providers and users is therefore taken into account, and questions and choices on how to treat this asymmetry, how to transform and reduce it, are an integral part of the questions and relative choices on the project, its realization and evaluation. From interviews and observations made in the field, it appears evident that this asymmetry is a problematic question to be dealt with in everyday service relationships. For example, the operator is led to ask the question: where do I cross the line in my intervention between supporting people’s autonomy and imposing a solution on them? Questions such these mean that service relationships are full of uncertainties and dilemmas, and at the same time make them an arena for discussion and choices. Clearly, these are choices that the operator makes together with the other partners of the project, including the user. I will return to this aspect of service organization later. However, it is mainly in the service relationship and faced with the issue of asymmetry that the user exerts and increases his ‘capability for voice’, and also increases his capability to choose and act in general by following his own life project. Over the course of our field research, we had the chance to observe how the voice of the user is expressed when communicating with operators and with the service providers involved. These interactions, at times, resemble a deliberative process. There is discussion and ideas are exchanged on the issues to be dealt with, and agreements are made on the subsequent action to be taken. However, evidently these deliberations concern very practical issues in people’s lives – the very issues involved in the ‘axes’ which the project is based on: where to live, how to organize one’s house, how to deal with difficult family ties, how to get around in one’s neighbourhood, in which work context to engage oneself in work experience, and so on. We are talking about truly ‘vulnerable’ people who have poor autonomy and capacity for control over their own lives, and are at risk of institutionalization. In this regard, it should be underlined that the budget for care was initially tested and implemented precisely to ‘de-institutionalize’ people who had been hospitalized (especially in psychiatric clinics) and to help them “to get back into the city”, as is stated in the contracts we examined. This background orients the use of this instrument both to prevent institutionalization of high-risk people, and also to change concrete aspects of these people’ lives.

19 From this point of view, the organization of the service configured by this instrument is in line with the format of public services in the welfare state, and with their mandate of increasing the contractual power of citizen-users

20 Friuli is well known for having been the region which led the way in the process of psychiatric de-institutionalization, which led to the adoption of the national law that abolished confinement in psychiatric hospitals in 1978. This experience has also being feeding professional and institutional cultures in other policy sectors by diffusing the values
Organization matters

It appears obvious that, in the name of privacy, the user keeps the keys to his own house and the operators entrusted with his home care have to ring the doorbell to gain entry. This is not the case for Mr. XY, who has spent more than 20 years of his life in an institution and continues to require intensive assistance. The fact that this person has learned again to use his own keys and acquired the capability to live in his own house, and the fact that the operator is required to ring the doorbell, is already a result of his personalized project and a measure of how his capabilities have increased. A second example is Mrs. YZ – elderly, poor, living alone in a run-down house, and whose health problems with her legs make it very difficult to leave the house. Firstly, since she lives on the fourth floor with no elevator, the operators discuss and arrange with her (and with the competent public housing authority) her move to the ground floor of the building, so that she can start going grocery shopping again and sitting in the park, perhaps with a friend. Secondly, one of the lady’s neighbours, an unemployed woman, may be available to help her take care of the house (in exchange for the compensation that comes from the budget). All concerned consider this opportunity together – the lady, the operators and the unemployed woman (plus the relevant public service).

As for the power asymmetry we were talking about, these examples show that in the interactions between users and operators on simple, daily issues with low technical content, this asymmetry becomes less pronounced, and the service provider’s power is exerted rather in activating other actors, resources, and responsibilities. These examples also allow us to see other features of the service relationships that the budget for care organizes.

One of the most evident features is the fact that these relationships involve all (or almost all) aspects of the person’s life, as ‘the axes’ imply. The service provider ‘takes global charge’ of the user, as operators put it. Unlike the range of action of operators working with vouchers, which is limited to providing a service while respecting the privacy of the recipient-client, what is striking in the case of the budget for care is the extension of the service’s presence in the lives of people, a presence that can sometimes resemble the invasiveness of welfare bureaucracy. In certain respects, the personalized projects also involve bringing the individual’s personal affairs into the public light, or more precisely, surrounding these affairs with a plurality of voices, the voices of all the people who participate in the personalized project in some way – most importantly, the contract partners. Another of social inclusion, the focus on the least advantaged people and the objective of allowing them to remain in their own life contexts (Mauri 2007).

It is important to specify that ‘taking global charge’ also means taking care of the person’s family and network of personal relationships, and his life context in general.
striking fact is the frequency of meetings, communicative interaction, and formal and informal exchanges between the many actors involved in the project. In our field observations of the relationships among these actors, we noted a low level of concern for users’ privacy. More than what is private, it is what is ‘in common’ – the project to be developed and carried out together – which attracts the actors’ attention and organizes their involvement (Bricocoli et al. 2008). The common focus on supporting the users’ ‘capability for voice’ seems to reduce the risk of paternalistic tendencies on the part of both the private and public services involved.

Let us now examine the service relationships in voucher setting, the defining trait of which is its prioritization of privacy. In one of the first and most precise analyses of the voucher instrument, Raffaele Monteleone (2005) underlined the similarities of this contractual formula to ‘adhesion contracts’ (Monteleone 2005: 106; Lantz 1999), in which clients adhere to a contract of which they cannot discuss the terms. In this case, for the customer, adhesion tends to become a bond of dependence on the provider, for reasons already given. If, in the words of Monteleone, “the exit is blind” and “the voice is mute,” then the only option left is that indicated by Hirschman: loyalty – by which we understand a link of dependence on the service on the part of the customer. Even if it is a ‘chosen’ bond – since it is based on a contract – it is difficult to break and it is a bond that, in any case, gives the service provider the power to decide on modes of intervention, on what has to be done to the customer, and on what the customer must do.

I believe it is important to add a qualification to this dependence. Since we are talking about a contract between private subjects, the private framework of their relationships qualifies this dependence as being between two persons – ‘personal dependence’ – as distinct from the ‘impersonal/institutional dependence’ that may be created in the public service provision of the welfare state. What must not be forgotten here is the fact that service relationships based on bonds of ‘personal dependence’ lose their institutional anchor to a third authority, the guarantor of the publicness of these relationships, of what they include and of the actors involved. Without this anchor, the service relationships assume those features of particularism, separation, and opacity that I have described elsewhere as ‘privatism’.

V. De Leonardis (2003). It is even possible to argue that this type of privatistic submission could be placed alongside those forms of ‘contract of subjection’ (contract d’allégeance) that Supiot identified in his analysis of the transformations of the law (especially the law on contracts, including work contracts) and its trend towards ‘re-feudalization’ (Supiot 2005, 2007). I would remember that Marx also focuses on the shift from ‘personal’ to ‘impersonal’ dependence when he analyses – especially in the Grundrisse – the dissolution of feudal bonds, and the rise of the modern proletariat, and of market capitalism. Lastly, perhaps it could also be worth noting that Mauss’ analysis of the gift relationship stresses a similar
Organization matters

4.5 Organizational shaping

Lastly, we will focus on the different organizational contexts that the service relationships shape and nurture in our two cases.

Again, we will turn to the recipients, to explore this difference.

As far as the voucher-based system is concerned, the user is only involved in a dual relationship with the operator, their exchange solely concerns the intervention to be performed, and the user has no way of knowing the service provider, and no way of interacting with or being involved in the organizational life of the service provider. The research has also shown that, often, not even the operator himself has an organic relationship with his own service organization. Operators work as employees but they are not involved in organizational life (Paci 2005), nor are they able to express their voice. The corporate prototype dominates in the field of service organizations, with a clear-cut separation between managers and operators, who are often foreign and underpaid, and whose positions are often precarious. This is consistent with the market configuration that the welfare regime in Lombardy has acquired overall. By contrast, service organizations involved in the budget for care have open and fluid borders and a clearly hybrid nature. The personalized project, as we have seen, multiplies the service relations in a variety of fields of action, and both operators and users interact repeatedly with other interlocutors. The opportunities for discussion and exchange among managers, staff and citizens (users and non-users) are frequent.

This relationship is based on inter-dependences, but when the gift is not ‘reciprocated’, a bond of subjection takes shape.

The reader may note that I omit to use the successful notion of ‘social capital’. It appears to me too large and vague a notion to be of any help here. Furthermore, I prefer to focus on organizations and organizing processes – on ‘collectives’ as I shall say by quoting Robert Castel – in order to have a more comprehensive and systemic view of the matter. With civiness, what we are searching for is a quality of social settings more than an individual relationship, and I therefore want to observe the social settings that take shape during the service-provision process. I want to observe the organizational texture of these social contexts to analyse whether and how our (least advantaged) recipients are involved. What organizations do they belong to? Where are they recognized as members? What organizing dynamics do they participate in? These are some of the questions relevant to civiness. In order to do that, I have taken the route of the organizational analysis, rather than that of social capital.

Several other aspects should be given attention: a) the public agencies that these organizations interact with are also oriented towards open and dynamic forms of organization; b) other policy instruments that revolve around the key word of ‘integration’ at the centre of Friuli’s policy frame promote inter-organizational networks for the
Skocpol’s dichotomy, which has already been quoted, is illustrative here. Skocpol points out that while the service organizations built up to manage the voucher-based system are based on management, those engaged in personalized projects are based on membership, and promote user membership. The ‘customers’ of voucher-based service relationships fit the prototype of citizen-consumer – they are valued as single individuals, sovereign in their choices but isolated and left alone.\footnote{Robert Castel speaks of “un individu par défaut” (Castel, Haroche 2001).} A number of factors contribute to building this picture: the system’s privatistic orientation, the emphasis on the exit option over the voice option, and the attention given to keeping the services provided separate from all other aspects of the recipient’s life. If the recipient has social ties, organizational affiliations, or even relationships with other welfare services, these are strictly the recipient’s own affair. The service relationship ends with the service itself and does not involve anything beyond the operator-customer exchange. By contrast, organization, or better still organizing, is precisely what the service relationships in the budget for care tend to generate and cultivate. Service relationships resemble a sort of construction site, full of situations involving exchange and interaction, in which organizational contexts are built and which are animated by relationships of cooperation and support, discussion and conflict, and joint responsibility. Various elements contribute to this orientation, including the frame of the personalized project and its planning, the fact that the project involves many different actors in establishing and pursuing shared objectives, and the emphasis on enhancing the ‘capability for voice’ of the least advantaged.

From the point of view of the recipients, the difference between the relationships that the budget and the voucher systems tend to generate becomes clearly apparent. During our field research, we experienced the difference between the organizational vacuum around the voucher user – and the density of the organizational texture that personalized projects generate around the budget user. As Robert Castel says in his study on current trends in the reorganization of welfare systems, the weakening or dismantlement of “collectives” and the rise of “collections of individuals” is leading to a weakening of social protection (Castel 2001). It could be argued, to conclude my analysis of the voucher/budget case study, that the voucher system produces “collections of individuals” – isolated consumers in the market, free but lonely – while the budget system generates real-life contexts that are dense with “collectives” management of integrated projects (which converge on single individuals, such as those whom I have referred to, or on neighbourhoods with difficulties, sometimes entitled to a ‘community budget’ in which membership and participation, cooperation and discussion are enhanced. To establish how civics is produced in a policy arena, these other organizational levels are crucial. But this would imply a shift in my analysis to the level of governance, a shift I cannot make here.
Organization matters

where people participate and are given support and recognition – “propriété de soi”, as Castel puts it.

5. Key Points on the Civic Quality of Service Relationships

The differences that have emerged in the organizational configurations that service relationships assume in the framework of the two policy instruments I have compared have produced much pertinent insight into the civickness of service relationships and on the conditions that promote this quality. To conclude, I will discuss the results of my analysis by continuing with the thread I have been following throughout my analysis, particularly along the analysis of the practices, relationships, organizational processes around the two instruments studied. This thread is constituted by the service recipient, who has proved to be a good guide to detecting civickness and specifying the main features of the service relationships. The key issue in this regard is the recipients’ position in these relationships, and the role played by the recipient. This is the key issue that I will examine, in order to highlight some of the knowledge gained about the civickness of service relationships that emerge from the comparison between the voucher and budget systems. What are the main features of the service relationships from this recipients’ perspective? What are the main features of the service provision more generally that can provide indicators on their civic qualities?

• The recipients’ perspective helps to clarify in what sense we are discussing civickness in relation to social services and policies, and what is relevant and why in this area. It reminds us that we are discussing civickness in the context of welfare systems, where questions of inclusion, social justice and citizenship are central. More precisely, this perspective requires the setting of the parameters of the civic quality of service relationships on ‘the worst off,’ Rawls’ ‘least advantaged’26. Let us recall the differences between vouchers and budgets with regard to the position of the ‘worst off’, the most deprived, the least autonomous, and the most at risk of institutionalization. Under the voucher-based service relationships, the risk of institutionalization is far higher, as we have seen, than in the

26 I point out that Amartya Sen first formulated the capability approach, which I have repeatedly called upon throughout my reasoning, discussing the way in which Rawls faces the issue of ‘difficult cases’ (v. Sen 1982). The worst-off represented the point of reference in his shift “from goods to what goods allow people to do” (Sen 1985).
organizational environment of the budget for care. This is because the voucher system encourages selection and discourages responsibility, on the part of the service, against this risk. If we are to look at the recipients’ perspective, this entails examining the civic qualities of service relationships and looking at the dynamics of selection and exclusion (or expulsion) that these relationships may feed, or conversely considering their inclusive vocation. We could argue that civiness implies a basically inclusive vocation, and that in the field of welfare, civiness inevitably involves the dilemmas and choices of social justice.

- From the recipients’ perspective, questions of freedom, power asymmetry, capability, and ‘voice’ are at the core of the civic quality of service relationships. We have seen how the practices involved in the voucher-based system and the budget-based system deal with these questions, and where they differ. This difference lies, for example, in the respect for the recipient’s private life and freedom of choice – his/her ‘negative freedom’ – that the voucher-based relationship grants and promotes, and the capabilities and ‘voice’ the budget-based relationship aims at acknowledging and promoting. Another difference concerns the different status that recipients, as citizens, are granted through the ‘exit’ or ‘voice’ options. These - and other - insights from the analytical field suggest that the civic quality of service relationships is a matter of supporting and promoting an active role for the recipients within these relationships, in order that they might participate in choosing and producing the services they need. The main point here is, as far as civiness is concerned, whether a service relationship takes its inner power asymmetry into account, and how it deals with this asymmetry, reworking it so that the stronger partner in the relationship may support the weaker (and the weakest!) in acquiring and enacting his/her capabilities as a citizen. Civiness implies citizens. However, as we have seen, this is a status that cannot be taken for granted in the world of welfare. Whether the least advantaged recipients are supported and encouraged so that they become citizens turns out to be a crucial indicator of the civic qualities of service relationships.

- Another question that our field analysis would suggest concerns the social environment that service relationships generate around the recipient. We have seen that the recipient’s involvement in the use of vouchers is confined to his/her dualistic relationship with the operator, with nothing beyond this relationship being generated. Around the personalized projects, by contrast, a dense organizational texture is generated, in which we observe the involvement of a variety of actors, and a great deal of interaction concerning the issues to be addressed and the choices to make. The difference between what the service relationships generate in both cases is well represented by the contrasting images of ‘vacuum’ and
‘density’ that summarize the social surroundings in which the recipients find themselves. The main point here is whether or not service relationships function as multipliers of relationships. From the recipients’ perspective, the density of the social contexts to which they belong appears to be a relevant measure of civickness: whether or not they – the least advantaged in particular – are involved as members of organizations, are part of ‘collectives’ that recognize and support them, and participate in organizing processes. One could say that the civic quality of service relationships can be measured – indirectly – in the civickness of the social settings that these relationships generate.

• Finally, several insights from our field analysis indicate that it would be useful to explore the nexus between the civic and the public dimension of services relationships and of their outcomes. To approach this question, we must remind ourselves of the privatistic nature of the voucher-based settings, and of the choices and actions that the recipient may undertake in them. This privatistic nature is well-represented by the ‘exit’ option as opposed to the ‘voice’ option. Exit is a form of communication that belongs to the register of the market, private transactions, and ‘bargaining’, while voice asks for participating and “arguing” in public (Elster 1999). As we have seen, the recipient’s ‘capability for voice’, which is cultivated and valued in service relationships, and more generally in the arena of service provision, may constitute an indicator of the civic qualities of those relationships. However, the recipient’s voice turns out to be a rather compelling indicator: it projects the image of the recipient as a citizen against the background of a public arena in which citizens are citizens because their voice is expressed and acknowledged in public. This public voice is an intrinsic aspect of civickness in relationships between citizens and institutions, an aspect that is now being revisited and emphasized in the current debates on deliberation, civil society and democracy, and also with regard to social policies (Newman 2005: esp. chapter 6). However, public voice is a quite demanding requirement for civickness, as far as the voice of the least advantaged recipients – who get usually silenced – is concerned. What are the conditions for these recipients to express this (important) capability for voice and be publicly acknowledged? The answer to this question requires an examination of the social settings that the recipients are involved in – to begin with the service relationship setting itself. Their voice only becomes public insofar as these social settings are configured as public arenas, as spaces of “arguing” and deliberating. Friuli’s budget-based service relationships, and the social settings they generate and organize, provide relevant examples of this configuration and of the organizing processes that shape and nurture it. To conclude, this last feature of the civickness of service relationships opens the boundaries of the
operative level, and connects it to the level of policy governance. This connection is made by the recipients’ voice that, as it is expressed and heard in public, participates in the public discourse on the policies that concern them. The more that the least advantaged recipients have their voice heard in service relationships, the more that public discourses and deliberations will confer civic and democratic qualities on policy governance.

References

Organization matters


Chapter 9

Stéphane Nassaut and Marthe Nyssens

Civicness and service governance: the case of the Belgian quasi-market in the field of proximity services

Many European countries have witnessed the introduction of quasi-markets in personal social services. Within a quasi-market, the state still contributes to the financing of the services in question, but provision is open to all kinds of organizations: public sector, third sector and for-profit sector organizations. In this chapter, the concept of civicness is approached through the prism of service governance, and defined by the triangular relationship between the employer, the employee and the user. The objective of the chapter is to examine the impact of the organizational mission of the provider on civicness.

1. Introduction

During recent decades, the system of public regulation for social policies has undergone some radical changes. Many European countries have witnessed the introduction of quasi-markets, which have essentially created a division between the roles of financing and provision of personal (social) services. Within a quasi-market, the state still contributes to the financing of the services in question, but provision of those services is open to all kinds of organizations: public sector, third sector and for-profit sector organizations all compete on the market. This chapter concerns the ‘service voucher scheme’, a Belgian public policy typical of the evolution mentioned, which was introduced in 2001 in the field of housework services. This

---

1 This publication is based on a research carried out within the programme “SOCIETY AND FUTURE”, implemented and funded by the Belgian SPP “Science Policy”. This research was developed by the CERISIS – Université Catholique de Louvain and the Centre d’Économie Sociale of the University of Liège

2 In this chapter, we make an important distinction between ‘housework services’ which cover services such as cleaning or ironing for non-dependent users, and ‘home care services’ which are targeted at dependent users.
public scheme aims to develop both ‘proximity services’ and employment, as recommended by the European strategy for employment.

Following the framework of this book, civics can be related to “the quality of institutions, organizations, procedures, to stimulate, reproduce, and cultivate civility”. Our contribution analyses the concept of civics at the level of organizational practices. Specifically, the civic contribution of providers on a quasi-market will be observed through the prism of service governance, as defined by the triangular relationship between the employer, the employee and the user. Indeed, the literature has underlined the specificity of this relationship in the field of personal (social) services delivered at the user’s home. This dynamic is all the more important because a significant proportion of beneficiaries (users as well as workers) are potentially vulnerable (the elderly and/or physically impaired, the long-term unemployed, etc.). In this chapter, we analyse how the nature of the organizational mission of the provider (profit or social) affects, through this service governance dynamic, the labour market integration of workers and quality of the services for the users in a quasi-market in proximity services.

This chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, we will describe the ‘service voucher’ scheme and consider why it can be defined as a quasi-market mechanism. Secondly, we will develop the concept of civics through the prism of service governance. The third section will examine the impact of the provider’s mission on civics. Finally, we will analyse the relationships observed between the types of governance and social missions with the types of public financing, which in turn reflect the diversity of types of public regulation.

2. The service voucher: a quasi-market mechanism

In Belgium, the service voucher system was launched on 1 January 2004. To date it has been an impressive success: by 2008, it was employing over 1000,000 workers, had over 750,000 users, and around 2,000 providers (including a significant number of organizations created specifically within the framework of this public scheme).

How does the ‘service voucher’ system work? Any person wanting housework services can buy vouchers at the price of €7.50 each – €5.25 after the 30% tax reduction – from the company that administers the system. This price was set in order to undercut the black market rate for housework services. Services can be

Civility is understood as the behaviour and value orientations of individual citizens, in terms of their commitment to others, social concern, etc.
provided inside the house (cleaning, cooking and ironing) or outside the house (mainly groceries services, ironing and transport for dependent persons). The consumer chooses an accredited provider which may belong to the for-profit sector, the third sector or the public sector. Every hour of service provided is then paid with one voucher. Finally, the provider redeems the vouchers through the company that administers the system and receives €20.80 of which €7.50 comes from the consumer plus an additional public subsidy of €13.30 to cover all the costs associated with one hour of housework (wages, social security contributions, training and supervision of the worker, transportation costs, etc.). The state therefore remains the main funder of the services and oversees the registration of providers.

According to Le Grand (1991), a quasi-market implies a split between the functions of financing and provision, which in the field of social services had traditionally both been dependent on the state. Within a quasi-market, the state still contributes to the financing of the service but provision is open to all kinds of organizations and public sector, third sector and for-profit sector organizations compete on the market. The Belgian service voucher system can be considered as a ‘quasi-market’ policy since a variety of for-profit, public and third sector providers (with a range of missions, legal forms and access to public funding) are now competing on the housework services market. A distinctive feature of the ‘service voucher’ lies in its allocation of subsidies directly the consumers⁴, who then pass it on to the provider. The system thus enhances the consumer’s power to choose.

2.1 A double-sided quasi-market

If the service voucher system was originally conceived as a quasi-market policy in the field of housework services, it could be argued that it is, in fact, a twofold quasi-market.

Firstly, the scheme, which provides a significant financial incentive to the consumer, introduces quasi-market regulation into the field of housework services. It must be remembered, however, that the service voucher system was not designed as a substitute for existing social policy programmes in the field of home care, under which only (public or private) non-profit organizations are accredited and financed by regional authorities to provide personal care to dependent users. The quasi-market schemes which have been developed in the field of home care in various other European countries (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, France, etc.)

⁴ And not, for instance, to the social departments of local authorities, which are in charge of implementing commissioning the services (Knapp et al. 2001).
during recent decades are generally considered to be an attempt to improve efficiency and quality in the provision of social services, but this is not the case of the service voucher system. Indeed, in the Belgian case, the newly created market aims to expand both the demand for and supply of housework services with the primary aim of undercutting black market labour and creating a large number of ‘new’ formal, salaried jobs for poorly qualified persons in the field of housework. The policy was also designed to improve the work-life balance of Belgian citizens through the provision of housework services and to improve the functioning of the labour market by making parents more available for work.

Secondly, it can be stated that the service voucher system has incidentally created another quasi-market in the field of labour market integration for poorly qualified workers. Indeed, even though there is no obligation for the accredited providers to hire any particular type of worker, the service voucher system, given the type of services concerned, is clearly targeted at disadvantaged groups such as the long-term unemployed, the low-skilled or immigrants. Although, unlike other quasi-markets in reintegration services (Struyven 2004; Georges 2007), the service voucher system does not provide coaching and placement services as such, workers can sometimes explicitly benefit from labour market integration services (coaching, training etc.), depending on the provider and the nature of its mission. This is the case when he/she works in a work integration enterprise, for example. One could also argue that some of the system’s characteristics introduce a quasi-market logic into the field of labour market integration. There is a ‘worker-linked’ subsidy, which allows the employer to cover the wages and supervision costs of the worker. Also, just as the customers are free to choose their provider, the workers are free to choose their employer, and even to move from one employer to another (possibly taking their clients with them), an effect that is magnified by the current shortage of labour in the market. Observations from the field provide evidence for that argument, by showing that workers actively compare working conditions offered by the various providers, playing the competition off against each other.

Given these two aspects of the quasi-market created by the service voucher scheme, it is not surprising to find – as well as for-profit providers – some providers driven by a social mission of work integration for poorly qualified workers, and others who pursue a social mission of providing home care services to vulnerable persons. Indeed, social enterprises that are involved in labour market integration are well-established within this quasi-market, as are accredited home care providers – namely the “accredited services of assistance for families and elderly people”. In addition to the national voucher accreditation, both types of organization are accredited and financially supported by regional authorities.

In terms of the services provided, work integration social enterprises aim to create temporary or long-term jobs for the most disadvantaged workers, notably those who have not reached the upper secondary school level. As for the accredited home care providers, they basically deliver comprehensive home care services; these include
Civicsness and service governance

housework, but also other services which fulfil users’ daily needs in terms of sanitary, social and administrative assistance. The accredited home care providers are (public or private) non-profit organizations that focus on vulnerable families and elderly people (those coping with financial difficulties or who have suffered a loss of autonomy, the disabled, the sick, etc.). The needs of potential users are assessed by a social worker and the hourly rate is set by law, according to the users’ income, in order to ensure universal access to these services. These organizations have entered the voucher system on the basis of their expertise in domiciliary care, but also in order to monitor the opening of their sector to quasi-market regulation. Specifically, they fear that other organizations operating within the ‘service voucher’ framework – though only authorized to deliver housework – actually offer home care services without being accredited for that purpose (and thus without offering any quality guarantee for the service and protection of the worker).

Table 1 provides a typology of the providers within the service voucher system framework according to sector (for-profit, public or third sector) and the mission of the organization (profit, work integration or home care). For-profit sector providers include temporary employment agencies and other types of private for-profit companies. Public sector providers include providers with a social mission of home care, local welfare services accredited as domiciliary care providers, and providers with a mission of work integration – such as some services developed by local welfare services, local public employment agencies or municipalities. The organizations belonging to the third sector are non-profit organizations accredited as home care providers and work integration social enterprises.

### Table 1: Typology of providers according to their mission and sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Public sector</th>
<th>Third sector</th>
<th>For-profit sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Home care</td>
<td>Work integration</td>
<td>Home care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provider</td>
<td>Accredited home care provider (local welfare services)</td>
<td>Local welfare services, local employment agency, municipality</td>
<td>Accredited home care provider, under the statute of a non-profit organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows the distribution of accredited providers and workers for each type of organization in 2006.
Table 2: Distribution of accredited providers and workers in the quasi-market by types of organization in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Distribution of accredited providers</th>
<th>Distribution of workers – number of individuals</th>
<th>Distribution of workers – full-time equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>For-profit sector</strong></td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td>55 %</td>
<td>41 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary employment agencies</td>
<td>3 %²</td>
<td>37 %</td>
<td>23 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other private commercial companies</td>
<td>30 %</td>
<td>18 %</td>
<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third sector</strong></td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>27 %</td>
<td>35 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accredited home care providers (non-profit organization)</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>17 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work integration social enterprises</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>12 %</td>
<td>13 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NPOs</td>
<td>7 %</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public sector</strong></td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>18 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local employment agencies, local welfare offices and municipalities</td>
<td>30 %</td>
<td>15 %</td>
<td>20 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accredited home care providers (local welfare offices)</td>
<td>7 %</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on the processing of ONEM database (2006)

Table 2 shows clearly that the public sector is the main sector in terms of the number of providers, followed by the for-profit sector and the third sector. In terms of numbers of employees, by contrast, the for-profit sector is the main contributor, providing 55% of the jobs created in 2006, while the public sector accounts for only 18.3% of employment. This picture changes, however, when we take into account the number of full time equivalent workers.

2.2 A lightly regulated quasi-market

Experience from quasi-markets across Europe shows that this type of arrangement, based on a purchaser-provider split, tends to be associated with fairly strict public

5 In terms of head offices, temporary employment agencies account for only 3.6% of all service voucher providers, but this figure increases dramatically when the branch offices are taken into account.
Civicness and service governance

regulation, in order to guarantee the quality of the service and ensure that the most vulnerable beneficiaries can access the services provided.

Quasi-markets involved in labour market integration differ significantly from one country to another in terms of the types of service provided, contracts and bidding processes. However, they are all closely monitored by public authorities to ensure that service providers act in the interest of the beneficiaries, and regulation has strengthened over time in order to tackle practices such as ‘cream skimming’. According to Struyven (2006: 5):

“countries that have chosen one or another form of market competition are entangled in an almost continuous process of adapting and adjusting the system.”

The cornerstone of such a process has been the progressive development by public authorities of a system to monitor the performance of the quasi-market. Consequently, an analysis of experience so far shows that quasi-market regulation in the field of labour market integration tends to rely on a mix of market competition and state interventionism. As Bredgaard et al. (2005) state:

"a well-functioning quasi-market [in labour market integration] is not a ‘free’ and unregulated market; quite the contrary, considerable public regulation will be required”.

A similar effect can also be observed in quasi-markets in the field of home care. Since the community care reform in the United Kingdom in the early 1990s, for instance, local authorities have been exercising their purchasing power through commissioning practices (long-term or short-term contracts, block or spot contracts, etc.). By pushing down costs, they have shaped the structure of the market to a significant extent (discouraging new providers from entering the market), but they have also affected the quality of the services provided (discouraging providers from investing in quality of employment and service, given the available resources) (Knapp et al. 2001). Equally, however, the quasi-market in home care also remains heavily regulated by central government. For example, the National Minimum Standards in Domiciliary Care is a set of government prescribed criteria which all types of provider must meet. Central government has also implemented a system to monitor performance at the local level (by means of user surveys and best value performance indicators), and a system to compare the local authorities between each other publicly. Finally, as stated by Le Grand (1997: 37), state regulation is so intensive in the British health care quasi-market that the model of coordination between buyers (local authorities), sellers (providers) and users can no longer be viewed as a ‘quasi-market’ in conceptual terms: “it [is] not a quasi-market but simply a representation of one. In the battle between market competition and central control, control won.”

Interestingly, the Belgian quasi-market in the field of housework services appears, by comparison, to be rather lightly regulated. The accreditation procedure for providers is not at all demanding. As far as the quality of work is concerned, providers within the framework of the service voucher system are simply required to
respect Belgian labour law on working conditions. Furthermore, providers are permitted to offer their workers employment contracts below the threshold of one third FTE, which is the usual minimum required by labour regulations. They can also offer the worker an unrestricted number of fixed-term contracts during a transitory period of three or six months, which constitutes another derogation of standard labour regulations. Consequently, it seems that in terms of labour law, the service voucher system actually introduces deregulation as opposed to a tightening of regulation. As far as service quality is concerned, certification criteria require the provider to deliver only housework services; if the provider already delivers other types of service, a distinct entity must be established to carry out the activities within the service voucher framework; there are no other obligations regarding service quality. The level of public financing is not linked to any quality considerations.

The official evaluation reports reflect this situation. They focus almost exclusively on the quantity and (to a more limited extent) quality of the work carried out, without reflecting on the quality of the services delivered. These reports seem to be intended primarily to provide information to the government on the public cost of the system and the number of jobs created; even though the reports are made public, they do not aim to provide relevant information for (prospective) users or workers.

Since the regulatory framework offers no guarantee in terms of the quality of employment or services, the question of the impact of the organization’s mission and practices appears crucial.

3. Civicness and governance in the service relationship

In our analysis, we will place the concept of civicness at the level of organizational practices. Specifically, the civic contribution of certain providers will be observed through the prism of service governance – defined, for the purpose of this analysis, by the triangular relationship between the employer, the employee and the user.

Much literature has underlined the specificity of the relationship between the user and the worker when the proximity services are provided – that is to say, services characterized by an objective dimension of proximity (here, the fact that the service is provided in the house of the user) and by a subjective dimension of proximity (the relationship between the user and the worker is central to the quality of the service) (Laville/Nyssens 2006). Zarifian (2000) distinguishes between three types of services: services that have been completely routinized and involve no interpretation of expectations; services that respond to an expectation that requires interpretation and comprehension; services for which, in addition to interpretation and comprehension, a unique solution must be conceived for and with the client-receiver. The unique solution in the latter type of service often means that the clients
Civleness and service governance

themselves become involved as a ‘resource’ in the search for a solution. The relational density of the service is of course greater in the latter scenario. How service governance takes account of the specificity of the service provided constitutes a central point of our analysis.

In terms of service governance, when designing the voucher system, public authorities were careful to create a framework that would avoid situations where the service relationship would be reduced to the direct relationship between the user and the worker, to a ‘black box’ so to speak, as is the case on the black market or in direct employment (such as the voucher system in France). Indeed, in these cases, the provision of proximity services is not subject to any kind of mediation. Even though a bilateral relationship could be viewed as being more flexible, some kind of organizational support is essential if one wishes to limit the risks of reciprocal abuse and improve the quality of both the employment and the service provided, by assessing the needs of the clients properly, for example, or by supervising and providing on-the-job training for workers. In the Belgian service voucher system, the worker must be employed by an organization; the employer supervises the worker and the client, and their bilateral relationship.

Service governance is all the more important because a significant proportion of the beneficiaries of proximity services – including both the workers and the users – are potentially vulnerable. According to the annual evaluation report (2007), a significant proportion of ‘service voucher’ workers belong to underprivileged groups: 67% are low-skilled workers; almost 60% had been unemployed for at least two years prior to being hired under the service voucher system framework; 27% had been unemployed for five years or more (the average period of unemployment being 3.7 years); and 13.6% of the workers are not Belgian citizens (with an additional 7.1% being Belgian, but with a non-European ethnic background). As for the users of proximity services, the reports highlight the existence of two major user groups. The first group – the largest – includes the relatively young couples in which both partners work. According to the report,

“the number of users reaches a peak around the age of 35 (when many individuals begin a family with one or more children)”. The second group consists of the elderly: 26% users are over 60 and nearly 8% are over 80. A second peak of users is thus reached at around 75 years old.” (Idea Consult 2007).

Within the framework of a quasi-market involving a variety of providers, does the mission of the provider affect, through the service governance dynamic, the labour integration of workers and the quality of the service for the users in a quasi-market for proximity services?

Even though the annual evaluation reports take into consideration the type of provider (for-profit, public or third sector provider), the question of how the provider’s (social) mission impacts on the provision of the service appears to be considered of minor importance: the providers’ mission is not even systematically identified. The lack of interest in the providers’ mission on the part of public
authorities could possibly be explained by the implicit premise that market competition always increases efficiency and the quality of the services delivered. Similarly, the federation of commercial enterprises delivering proximity services claims that its mission is to “promote the value of businesses and especially the quality of service, which is guaranteed by healthy competition”. Rather than assuming that market competition will result in the homogenization of practices, however, one could also make the case that the diversity of missions among the providers active in the market will result in various types of service governance. According to basic organization theory, such variety should in fact, in the context of fixed prices, be considered as a healthy business strategy.

In terms of service governance, our assumption will be that the quality of labour market integration improves when the provider provides individual and collective supervision for its workers. Indeed, in the case of housework and domiciliary services in general, workers provide the services in the house of the users. For these services whose proximity character, as already stated, is not only objective (they are provided in the user’s home) but also subjective, workers are expected to develop not only their technical skills, but also their behavioural skills. However, as Eymard-Duvernay (1997) pointed out, behavioural skills, while linked to the individual, are not static or set in stone and cannot be restricted to an individual’s own pre-existing behavioural skills. Rather, they depend as much on the organizational practices upon which the individual worker can rely as on the individual worker him or herself (Combes 2002). The organization therefore has a duty to provide collective support to help the worker understand (and, when necessary, constrain) the client’s demands and the potential uncertainty underlying the proximity-service relationship. In the absence of organizational support, workers can rely only on their personal experiences, which increase the level of work pressure. In this context, collective supervision plays a significant role, by offering the workers a space to exchange experiences or advice, by nurturing a sense of belonging, and by providing social support, especially to those disadvantaged workers (the long-term unemployed, the low-skilled, etc.) who may have difficulty complying with contractual requirements and whose position is thus the most precarious.

On the users’ side, service governance can also aim to provide services that are tailored to their needs, profile, and notion of a good housework service (which may vary substantially from one user to another), as well as to set clear boundaries for the service to be provided (such as which tasks are allowed and which are not, according to the service voucher regulatory framework). Such an assessment, in order to be effective, probably requires a visit to the home of the user before the service itself is delivered. This visit is all the more important when the user is potentially vulnerable. In the case of vulnerable users, a key issue is determining whether their demand involves housework, strictly speaking, or home care (social or sanitary aid, for example), even though this distinction is sometimes blurred. Demands for home care do not fall under the service voucher scheme, and in such
Civicness and service governance

cases the user must be redirected to an accredited home care provider. A monitoring of the service relationship will also allow the detection of any possible deterioration in the user’s level of dependency. Finally, it must be borne in mind that quality of work and quality of service are, very often, deeply intertwined. In this case, a home inspection is also relevant from the worker’s point of view, to enable the employer to verify the working environment and assess a fair workload, for example.

4. The impact of organizational mission on civicness in a quasi-market

Fifty-two providers were selected according to our typology (see above) and interviewed in the course of our research. To characterize the civic behaviour of providers, we need to look at indicators that show how the provider governs its relationship with both the worker and the user. The results of data processing show the existence of a continuum of service governance models with, at one end, a perfect ‘triangulation’ and, at the other end, a bilateral relationship similar to the one that can be observed in direct employment or on the black market.

4.1 Supervision of the user

A provider involved in the service voucher scheme can supervise the service delivered to the user through at least three channels: when signing a contract with a new user, in defining how much power users have to select his/her worker, and through the type of service that they allow to be provided.

4.2 The contract

Initiating the service entails the signature of a contract between the user and the provider, and, possibly, a home inspection. This procedure can take place between the user and a supervisor of the workers, or the worker herself. The following table summarizes the four patterns observed in our surveys.

Table 3: Patterns for the signature of the contract with the user

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention of a supervisor</th>
<th>Absence of intervention of a supervisor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At the user’s home</td>
<td>(1) At home, by a supervisor (2) At home, by the worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside the user’s home</td>
<td>(3) At the agency, by a supervisor (4) ‘At a distance’, by post or email</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In terms of service governance, the signature at home by a supervisor (case 1), allows face-to-face interaction between the user and the supervisor, and enables the latter to check the working conditions and decide which tasks will be carried out by the worker. In case one, civility is promoted as the dynamic implies a co-construction of the service involving both the client and the provider. Case one, then, involves the ‘triangulation’ of service governance, while the signature at a distance (case 4) leads to a ‘flattening’ of the service governance.

Our statistical processing (data reduction and cluster analysis) generated three groups of providers: the first group of 19 employers sign contracts at home and carry out a home inspection (case 1); a second group of 12 employers sign the contract at home by a worker or at the agency by a supervisor, and rarely carry out a home inspection afterwards (cases 2 and 3); and a third group of 13 providers set up the service at a distance, with no home inspection (case 4). Figure 1 shows a (statistically significant) correlation between organizational mission and the type of pattern for the signature of the contract. Providers with a home care mission are more likely than other types of provider to belong to the first group (signature at home and inspection), while providers driven by a for-profit mission use ‘distance’ patterns more frequently than other types of provider. It must be pointed out that temporary work agencies behave differently from other private commercial companies by relying exclusively on the setting up the service at a distance. For-profit providers – excluding temporary providers – belong to the three groups mentioned above in equal shares. Finally, the group of employers with an organizational mission involving labour market integration is close to the average profile.
Civininess and service governance

**Figure 1**: Relationship between provider’s mission and the type of service set up

Source: own data

### 4.3 Selection of worker by users

Another indicator of the nature of service governance relates to the extent to which the employer allows new clients to choose their home worker. When some power is given to users to select their own worker, we get closer to a situation where the user is the employer, thus flattening the service governance relationship. However, given the specificity of proximity services, it could be considered reasonable to take the clients’ preferences about the worker into consideration as trust plays a key role in the satisfaction of both client and worker. The question is, of course, to determine which criteria can be considered as playing a legitimate role in nurturing a trust relationship, and which are illegitimate, such as discriminatory considerations (e.g. ethnic origin of the worker). We expect a civic provider to reject any illegitimate selection of workers. These providers would in this way choose to subordinate a commercial principle (the client’s satisfaction) to their social responsibility and, in doing so, contribute to raising the ‘civic awareness’ of their clients. Although the service voucher registration procedure refers explicitly to Belgian anti-discrimination law, some providers are less cautious than others in banning discriminatory behaviour on the part of their clients. In particular, most temporary employment agencies openly decide to overlook this legislation and make the satisfaction of the customer as their overriding business priority.
Although such an issue – the power of the client in the selection of the worker – is rather difficult to grasp through a survey based on interviews with the sole employer, we asked the employers we surveyed whether they allowed their clients to choose ‘their’ workers independently. Figure 2 shows a statistically significant correlation between the provider’s mission and the extent to which clients are allowed to select workers. Indeed, in more than six cases out of ten, providers driven by a for-profit mission allow the selection of the worker by the user, while this is only the case for about 10% of providers with a social mission (labour market integration or home care). In particular, some temporary providers explain that they provide new clients with workers’ telephone numbers or send workers for an ‘interview’ at the user’s home. In such cases, the user is free to reject a worker for any reason, including for discriminatory motives.

Figure 2: Relationship between provider’s mission and clients’ ability to choose workers

Source: own data.

4.4 Type of services allowed

As we have explained, the service voucher is targeted at housework services and not at home care services. This is a key distinction since home care services require different forms of worker’s qualification and supervision. The regulation of home care services financed by regional public authorities is much more demanding than the voucher system for housework services. It is therefore of key importance for the
Civicness and service governance

governance of the service that the type of services provided be monitored. In this case, civicness relates to the provider’s willingness to protect vulnerable users such as dependent people from the provision of inadequate services. We therefore asked our surveyed providers if they allowed workers to carry out tasks beyond the scope of the service voucher system framework, such as helping people to wash themselves, get in/out of bed, take medicines, help to move around the house, or providing psychological support, administrative help, or child care. The following table shows the percentage of employers which stated that they authorized the provision of such tasks, showing that the service delivered is frequently beyond the scope of housework and enters the field of personal or child care:

Table 4: Providers authorizing or tolerating the provision of care services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Help moving in the house</th>
<th>Help getting in/out of bed</th>
<th>Help washing</th>
<th>Managing medication</th>
<th>Psychological support</th>
<th>Administrative help</th>
<th>Child care</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60.8%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own data

According to this typology of tasks, a multiple correspondence analysis followed by a cluster analysis produced a classification of providers into three groups. The first group (which includes 24 providers) is clearly aware of the extent of housework services and rarely confuses the two types of service. The second group (of 21 providers) mixes home care and housework services to some extent, by always allowing tasks such as help with walking in the house and psychological support, and to a much lesser extent, administrative aid and help getting in/out of bed. The third group (of 6 providers) confuses home care and housework to a greater extent, even allowing tasks such as managing medication and helping elderly people to wash themselves. Figure 3 shows the distribution of these groups between the various types of providers. A higher percentage of non-profit providers with a labour market integration or a home care mission distinguish correctly between the two types of service. By contrast, public sector providers are less careful in their definition of the service. As for providers with a for-profit organizational mission, temporary employment agencies, once more, differentiate themselves from other for-profit companies: in more than 50% of cases, the latter distinguish between the two types of service correctly, while all the temporary employment agencies confuse the two types of services to a moderate extent (and therefore belong to the second group). It must also be remembered that severe confusion only occurs among providers with a labour market integration or a for-profit mission, and not with
home care providers. Those results can be related to the motives behind the home inspection. Indeed, providers with a home care mission quote, more frequently than others, the motive of “delineating the service” when asked about their objective in home inspections.

**Figure 3**: providers’ confusion between a housework service and a home care service

![Confusion Between Housework and Home Care Services](source: own data)

These results are further supported by an in-depth study (Nassaut/Nyssens/Vermer 2008) of (public and private) non-profit organizations which are accredited both as home care providers and as ‘service voucher’ providers in the Wallonia region. That study analysed service governance and its implications in terms of service quality, in particular for vulnerable users, and showed the influence exerted by the initial social mission of home care providers on the governance of the housework service they delivered within the ‘service voucher’ system. First, when contacted by a new potential user, accredited home care providers are very careful to identify the type of home services needed (extensive home care or housework only) by analysing the user’s profile and requirements. Following this procedure, the service user is termed a ‘client’ if his/her needs are restricted to housework and the services can thus be provided within the framework of the ‘service voucher’ system, or termed a ‘patient’ if home care services are needed. Accredited home care providers differentiate carefully not only between these two types of users; they also replicate some dimensions of home care service governance within ‘service voucher’ governance,
Thus raising the quality of the latter. For instance, it is common knowledge that the co-construction of the service – involving both the service user and his/her family on the one hand, and the care worker on the other hand – is a characteristic unique to accredited home care providers and one of their main strengths. This co-construction process has been transposed, to some extent, to the services offered within the framework of the ‘service voucher’ system. In the case of the home care service, the role played by the social worker who carries out an assessment of the users’ needs at home and co-constructs a ‘care plan’ with the patient (and not for the user) is played, within the framework of the ‘service voucher’ system, by the ‘coordinator’ (often a social worker), who acts as an interface between the client and the ‘service voucher’ worker. The ‘social assessment’, meanwhile, takes the form of an ‘administrative and security enquiry’ which aims, among other things, to protect the worker by making sure that he or she does not work in an unsafe environment. Clearly, this enquiry takes place at the client’s home.

4.5 Supervision of the worker

Within the service voucher system, there are no specific legal requirements regarding the supervision workers, and the level of public financing depends only on the number of hours of service delivered. For the providers, the incentive is therefore to maximize the number of ‘productive hours’ – that is to say the number of hours of service effectively delivered at the users’ home – and to minimize the number of ‘unproductive hours’ dedicated, for instance, to supervision and training. Accordingly, the audit of the financial statements of service voucher providers which was commissioned by the federal government (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2007) measured the provider’s activity rate – the proportion of hours of housework delivered (and therefore subsidized) as a proportion of the total number of hours paid according to the work contracts. This ratio also provides an instructive indicator of the extent to which providers are ready to spend time on ‘non-productive’ activities, such as training and supervision. The higher this ratio, the less time is spent on non-productive activities. The typology used in the audit does not take into consideration the social mission of all providers (home care and labour market integration), but it shows nevertheless that the for-profit sector has the highest ratio of productive to non-productive hours – namely 94% for temporary work agencies and 88% for other commercial enterprises (see figure 4). Given their mission, for-

6 However, one could argue that to increase their income, providers could improve the quality of service (and thus client’s satisfaction) by investing in training and workers’ supervision.
profit organizations may be reluctant to provide activities such as supervision and training, which add no apparent or immediate commercial value and are not financed by the service voucher scheme. They may also rely on the public employment services to supply initial training to their workers. Social enterprises involved in labour market integration (third sector) and municipalities and local public entities that provide welfare services (public sector) have the lowest ratio of productive to non-productive hours (respectively 75% and 76%). This demonstrates that, in line with their social mission of labour market integration, they allow for more ‘unproductive’ hours.

**Figure 4**: Activity rate by type of provider

Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2007)

To understand the quality of the service governance better, we analysed some characteristics of the employment relationship on the basis of the data collected through our survey. The characteristics we analysed included the type of collective supervision, the type of training for workers, and the type of contract.

4.6 Type of supervision for workers

As mentioned above, collective supervision contributes to civiness to the extent that it enables workers to share work experiences, advices or concerns. Such a social
Civicsness and service governance

support is all the more important that a salient characteristic of this type of work is the isolation of the worker at the users’ home, from colleagues and supervisers. To that respect, we therefore collected data regarding such information. A multiple correspondence analysis followed by a cluster analysis generated a classification of providers into three groups: the first group (18 org.) offers no collective supervision to their workers; the second group (13 org.) mostly provides less than a collective supervision per month, generally included in the working time; the third group always offers a collective supervision of workers at a monthly rate (or above), included in the working time (14 org.). As shown by figure 5, providers with a social mission of home care offer a better quality of supervision to their workers than other providers, with 90% of them belonging to the third and second groups. Based on their practices related to their home care service, these providers consider workers’ supervision as a mean to guarantee the quality of a service targeted at vulnerable beneficiaries and, as we already explained, tend to replicate such practices to the housework service delivered within the ‘service voucher’ system framework, though this service is targeted to all types of users. To the opposite, 70% of employers driven by a for-profit mission offer low quality supervision. Once more, the group of providers with a labour market integration mission is close to the average profile.

Figure 5: Supervision of workers by provider’s mission

Source: own data
4.7 Type of training for workers

Providing training to workers appears to be an essential contribution to civicness, as most ‘service voucher’ workers are poorly qualified and consider the job as a springboard towards better quality employment. We asked our sample of providers whether they trained all or some of their workers before or after the start of a job. Three groups can be distinguished: one group of providers that offer no training at all; a second group that offer training to some of their workers; and a third group that offers training to all their workers. The results show that providers with a social mission (labour market integration or home care) belong more frequently to the third group than for-profit providers and, thus, offer more training. The good performance of the for-profit providers – with the exception of temporary providers – should be viewed cautiously, given that the number of hours of training provided is relatively low when compared to other employers.

Figure 6: Training practices by type of provider

Source: own data

4.8 Type of contract

The type of contract (fixed-term or open-ended contract) is an indicator of “the intensity of the link between the employer and the employee” and may be a sign of the intention of both parties to invest, in the long term, in service governance. As already stated, a sequence of fixed-term contracts is temporarily allowed by law for
Civicness and service governance

a period of three or six months, depending on which category which the worker belongs to. Beyond this period of time, the law states precisely that “the employer is required to offer the worker an employment contract for an unlimited period”. The Minister of Employment has clarified the meaning of this article of law, stating that providers within the service voucher system “are not required to actually sign [a permanent contract]; they only need to propose it.” A low rate of open-ended contracts could theoretically, then, be a result of workers’ own preferences. However, it appears, from official evaluation reports that 75% of workers who did not enjoy an open-ended contract in 2006 (beyond the three or six-month period) had not in fact been offered such a contract.

When the administrative database of the national employment services on the trajectories of the workers employed in the service voucher system was analyzed, it appears that the temporary employment agencies, probably in accordance with their core business service (temporary placement), offer their workers a significant number of fixed-term contracts in comparison to other providers, sometimes on a weekly or even daily basis, and for a period of time exceeding, by far, the maximum period of six months. This practice could be interpreted as a sign that this type of provider considers its workers as “external suppliers of labour on a permanent basis”.

Figure 7: percentage of fixed-term/open-ended contracts after 6 months

Source: based on the processing of ONEM database (2006)
5. **Social mission, tutelary regulation and access to public financing**

The results show that the nature of governance differs between types of organization: organizations with a social mission and, in particular, with a home care mission, tend to develop a more civic type of governance both in terms of supervising the user (through a home inspection, some scope for the user to choose the worker, and a better delineation of the housework service), or in terms of supervising the worker (through better supervision and training, and offering more open-ended contracts).

The introduction of a quasi-market regulation has thus revealed the peculiarities of the competitors, also in terms of access to public funding – which, in the case of the service voucher system, is a critical issue. Indeed, when the exchange value of the service voucher was still €21, a significant percentage of providers (over 60%) already claimed that this amount was insufficient to provide a decent salary to the workers and a service of sufficient quality to the user. This situation was obviously exacerbated when, for budgetary reasons, the government decided to cut the subsidy by one euro. In order to cover their costs, some providers rely on additional public resources, such as subsidies made available under the framework of active labour policies or regional subsidies linked to other accreditations (such as accreditation as a work integration social enterprise or home care provider).

However, from the point of view of for-profit providers, the variability of access to public resources is often seen as ‘over-subsidization’ which benefits certain providers and, consequently, as *unfair competition* for commercial enterprises. According to for-profit providers, subsidization is fair – that is to say, it does not undermine balanced competition – provided that all the providers have equal access to it. Gadrey (2004), by contrast, states that when for-profit organizations compete with public or private not-for-profit providers, the only justification possible for granting public funding to non-profit (public or private) providers without threatening the principle of fair competition lies in the demonstrable existence of a contribution to the general interest, which for-profit enterprises do not pursue, or at least less effectively than public or third-sector providers. From this perspective, additional public subsidies would only be legitimate insofar as we can observe that a more civic mode of governance is effective in that it leads to the better integration of vulnerable workers and users and thereby contributes to the general interest. First, we could take the view that the development of quality jobs for (very) poorly qualified people strengthens social cohesion. A second contribution to general interest relates to the quality of the service provided and, more precisely, to the attention paid by some organizations to the provision of a service that really meets the needs of the most vulnerable users.

The subsidy attached to the social mission – labour market integration or home care provision – of some providers which are accredited as such by regional authorities constitutes the main additional source of financing. However, in order to
be accredited, providers with a social mission must comply with a set of strict rules defined by regional public authorities. Social enterprises involved in labour market integration must adopt a commercial legal structure, but also be labelled as ‘social purpose companies’, which implies that the distribution of their benefits to shareholders is limited by law. They are also required to target workers with a very low educational level, hire a defined percentage of ‘target-group’ workers, and develop and implement adequate supervision of these workers. Their recognition by regional public authorities entitles them to various grants: a ‘seed subsidy’ to initiate the activity, a three-year grant for every worker employed, and an aid to finance the ‘social supervision’ of the workers. As for accredited home care providers, they are entitled to public funding aimed at supporting the provision of personal care (and not, directly, activity carried out under the ‘service voucher’ system framework), provided that they comply with a set of standards and requirements. Firstly, they must belong to the public sector or the not-for-profit sector (legal form of association). The quality of the service and employment provided is also heavily regulated: the care workers must have attained a minimum level of education and obtained a specific certificate; the level of supervision is fixed by the law; and an assessment of the user’s needs is required. The level of activity of these services is also limited in the sense that the amount of public funding remains relatively stable over the years, as does the distribution of this funding between accredited providers. This restricts the level of competition among providers.

Unlike the ‘service voucher’ scheme, these two kinds of accreditation are rooted in a ‘tutelary’ form of regulation, because we could say that the state protects the interests of the beneficiary by developing strong regulation to guarantee the quality of the service provided. This regulation differs in many respects from quasi-market regulation (Laville/Nyssens 2001, 2006). To differentiate between the two ideal-type forms of regulation (quasi-market and tutelary regulation), we have drawn up the following grid of analysis:

---

7 However, it is clear that providers that are accredited both as home care providers and service voucher providers pool some resources related to their home care services, such as human (social workers), material (premises) or financial resources. Conversely, a profit margin realized in their service voucher activity may be invested in their home care services. The same logic holds true for other providers that have not been created within the framework of the service voucher scheme, such as local employment agencies, temporary work agencies, public entities providing welfare services, etc.
Stéphane Nassaut and Marthe Nyssens

Table 5: Ideal-type forms of public regulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tutelary regulation</th>
<th>Quasi-market regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of providers</td>
<td>Only public and not-for-profit accredited organizations</td>
<td>Open access to every type of accredited providers, including for-profit sector providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service quality regulation</td>
<td>In-depth regulation of service quality through a strict regulatory framework</td>
<td>Very loose regulatory framework, if any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of competition among providers</td>
<td>Restricted</td>
<td>No restriction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor according to which the subsidy is given</td>
<td>The accredited provider itself</td>
<td>The consumer and the worker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a tutelary regulation, the counterpart of the allocation of subsidies to providers is the fulfilment of quality criteria. The civic performance observed among some types of providers therefore reflects, at least to some extent, the influence of a tutelary mode of regulation.

6. Conclusion

The service voucher quasi-market provides an interesting field of research, for two reasons. First, it is a quasi-market in two senses – it provides two kinds of services. On the one hand, proximity services, provided at the user’s home and, on the other hand, labour market integration services, since the workers hired in the framework of the service voucher system are mostly disadvantaged workers (the long-term the unemployed, immigrants, the low-skilled). Secondly, in comparison with foreign quasi-markets, the Belgian service voucher quasi-market is lightly regulated: the accreditation procedure is not demanding and the performance measures set up by the government focus mainly on the cost of the measure and its impact on employment. Indeed, the service voucher scheme can even, in many respects, be considered a deregulatory measure: it represents a deregulatory measure in Belgian labour law and the deregulation of the domiciliary care sector, since the services

8 However, a quasi-market can, in fact, strongly differ from the theoretical model. Le Grand (1997: 37) states, for instance, that English social welfare quasi-markets are so regulated that “in the battle between market competition and central control, control won.”
Civinness and service governance

provided within the service voucher system and extensive home care services overlap to some extent.

Different types of providers – in terms of sector (third, public or for-profit sector), organizational mission, and so on – compete within this quasi-market. The lack of regulation of the service voucher scheme enables us to grasp the effects of the (social) mission of organizations on civinness. We approached civinness through the prism of service governance as the relationship built up between the three parties involved in the service: the user, the worker and the employer. A more civic form of governance implies that the employer supervises both the user and the worker, thus bringing about a triangular relationship. Rather than assuming, as in the for-profit sector, that ‘healthy competition’ homogenizes organizational practices among all providers, one should analyse whether different organizational missions do not result in differentiated contributions to civic governance. We have seen that the social missions of accredited home care providers and social enterprises involved in labour market integration – social missions themselves shaped by a tutelary mode of regulation – contribute to civinness by improving the triangulation of service governance. We have also observed that, at the opposite end of the spectrum, the for-profit mission of temporary employment agencies, whose core business is to provide temporary jobs – seems to prevail, despite the aim of the law to encourage open-ended contracts. Service governance in this sector flattens to a point that it becomes similar to the bilateral relationship that can be observed in direct employment: temporary employment agencies tend to place the user in the position of the employer; in other words, everything occurs as though the user has hired the worker in a direct employment relationship. In the light of these elements, we can thus conclude that the point is not, contrary to the for-profit sector’s claim, that the third and public sectors are over-subsidized. Rather, the better service governance provided by these sectors (to the advantage of the vulnerable ‘service voucher’ beneficiaries in particular) may legitimize additional financial support from public bodies, if one takes into account the contribution to the general interest that a more civic type of governance can yield. It must also be noted that, in the continuum of types of service governance, the intermediate position of the for-profit sector, with the exception of temporary work agencies, merits in-depth and nuanced analysis. Various types of ‘business practices’ were observed among that types of provider: a first category of for-profit providers sought to maximize its profits without paying attention to service governance; providers in the second category are willing to increase clients’ satisfaction by raising the quality of service governance (and, to the same end, appoint a ‘quality manager’, for example); and providers in the third category include social objectives in their practices by, for instance, providing a ‘social supervision’ expressly for their most vulnerable workers, or by redirecting dependent users to a more suitable form of service.
References


PricewaterhouseCoopers (2007): Audit financier du système des titres-services pour les emplois et services de proximité. Service public fédéral « travail, emploi et concertation sociale ». 

Stéphane Nassaut and Marthe Nyssens
Civleness and service governance


Struyven, L. (2004): Design choices in market competition for employment services for the long-term unemployed, OECD social, employment and migration working papers, directorate for employment, labour and social affairs, OECD.

Theories of non-profit and voluntary associations frequently assume that ownership form – as “voluntary”, “state” or “market” – is the basis of service qualities that produce a comparative advantage. However, data from volunteer centres in Norway do not show any positive correlations between ownership form and the activity profile of centres. On the contrary, there was a striking degree of similarity between them. The analysis shows that when organizational units with different ownership forms are situated within a segment where they share similar conditions, processes of isomorphism tend to weaken or even erase the ideal properties related to state, market and civil ownership forms.

1. Introduction

Most often, distinctions between state, market and the civil sector is founded upon assumptions of differences - related to properties that separate one sector from the others. For example: In literature, the civil sphere, civil associations and activities – voluntary and self-help groups, foundations, cooperatives and the similar - have particular advantages, compared to state and market activities. For those who believe in state welfare (a large group in the Nordic countries), progress itself has, for a long time, been related to the public conquest of civil, unregulated fields. And similarly, market believers usually perceive state and civil welfare as less flexible and adaptive, compared to services delivered by forprofit agencies.

From this point of view, the intellectual discourse consists of giving evidence or arguments for the comparative advantages of sector activities. Within the field of welfare, comparisons of comparative advantages are usually related to the provisions of services.

A loser look upon the theses of comparative advantages of civil, welfare providing agencies reveals that these rest upon assumptions that most often are regarded as a self-evident truths: The civil sector provides something that is basically different from what is produced by state and market. Civil agencies mediate qualities, properties or ‘logics’ which are absent or weak in ‘state’ and
‘market’. While ‘state’ ideally represents bureaucracy, professions, legal authority, and a mandate to use physical force to enforce rules, civil structures are based on moral obligations, citizen initiatives, donations and collective action, economies based on idealism rather than profit-making, moral norms rather than efficiency. Civic virtues belong to civic associations, merging civil and state activities will, more or less inevitably, lead to a breakdown of these qualities.

According to ideas of comparative advantages, one would expect voluntary, public or forprofit ownership in some way or other to influence the performance of welfare agencies. Or differently formulated: When identical welfare services are produced by different institutions, their ownership form, in some way or other, will provide some kind of distinctive qualities into the service.

This leads me to the following question: To which degree does civil engagement presuppose civil society? The question may seem strange, since civicness most often is regarded a sector-specific quality, something that only exist within the voluntary associations and other civil groups. But one may also assume, at least in theory, that some of these properties may exist within state or market, or be exported to these fields. Just to mention one example: Most often, voluntary work is regarded a particular quality of the civil sector. But voluntary work may also take place within public welfare agencies. As we mapped voluntary efforts in the Norwegian population in 1997, we found that 7 per cent of voluntary work (or 10 400 man labor years) was performed within public agencies. Which, again, illustrates the point: Since voluntary work also can be found within public services, it is not, as such, an advantage of the voluntary sector alone.

The intention behind this chapter is to explore relations between civic qualities and ownership forms further. My case is volunteer centers in Norway, a fast-growing field of welfare hybrids, situated in the grey zone between state and civil society. My basic question is, again: To which degree do civic activities presuppose civic ownership forms?

2. Theses of comparative advantages

Within the field of civil society research, the tradition following the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project has based its approach upon the particular advantages of this sector. One basic assertion here is that the nonprofit (civil) sector is based outside state and market (Salamon/Anheier 1994). In a condensed form, Salamon and Anheier (2004: 3) formulate their argument of comparative advantages like this:

Because of their unique combination of private structure and public purpose, their generally smaller scale, their connections to citizens, their flexibility, and their capacity to tap private initiatives in support of public purposes, these organizations are being looked to increasingly to perform a number of critical functions: ......
Civicness and ownership

Within the European context Evers and Wintersberger’s work *Shifts in the Welfare Mix* (1988) represents one of the most influential contributions to the early attempts of arguing comparative advantages of civil welfare providers. Inspired by Claus Offe and others, voluntary associations were primarily perceived as mediators between the *household* and state/market, or between the informal economy of the household and formal ones within state/market (Offe/Heintze 1986). In this perspective, third sector organizations were mainly seen as *mediating structures* between state- and household. In their work, Evers and Wintersberger focused the *communal system*, where they found new types of welfare activities:

> New collective actors as represented in ‘communal’ (local or regional) social movements and innovations have won a political impact. In the socialist countries, such bodies are today the representatives of a ‘civil society’, taking distance from the state and its organizations. In Western countries, they often represent innovations in the way of mutual exchange between societal and state institutions. Many of these new innovative groups and projects are visibly state dependent, but not part of the state; they are part of the social sphere, but at points, where state regulations play a more intensive role for its functioning.

Salamon and Anheier, as well as Evers and Wintersberger relate their assumptions about comparative advantages to the organizational level - forms which mediate initiatives, ideas, innovations and engagement and belong in the civil sphere. To a lesser degree do they ask how individual engagement is connected to organizational forms. Reading the early works of Robert D. Putnam makes it clear that *civic engagement* also can be read as an individual property – something that belong to each and one of us, being activated within different contexts.

In *Making democracy work*, Putnam leads our attention to the *civic engagement*, an individual interest in public affairs, a will to involve in public matters and initiatives. By re-vitalizing the idea of *social capital*, Putnam illustrates how civic engagement produces network participation (or vice versa), networks that transcend the borderlines of state, market and civil society. As I read Putnam, he implicitly argues that *civic engagement* should be read as an individual moral quality, a potential willingness to participate. Such engagement can be turned into practice within state, market or civil structures. We should, consequently, *not* regard civic engagement as an advantage of civil society alone, but as a human (or cultural) quality that can be converted into practice within the market sphere or public contexts, as well as in the civil sector.

The point I want to make here, is that moral deeds and properties which most often are presented as advantages of the civil sector alone, also can be converted into practice within ownership forms which belong to the market sphere or the “state”. By applying the Norwegian volunteer centers as an example, I want to development this argument further.
3. The volunteer centers

In Norway, the basic vision of the social democrats was, for a long time, to replace philanthropy with state-financed, value-neutral and professionalized welfare services. Between 1920 and 1970 we can observe an element of hostility from the Labor Party against philanthropic welfare solutions. The welfare regime that emerges after 1945 replaces philanthropic activities with public welfare services, and the idea of the welfare state as primarily ‘good’ tends to be rooted within all political parties¹.

In spite of this, civic traditions have, for more than 900 years, held a strong position in the Nordic countries. When looking at volunteer share of civil society workforce organizations, Sweden and Norway are ranked number one and four out of 35 countries. This ranking indicates that in Nordic countries, civil society is less professionalized than most other countries, it is still volunteers and not paid workforce that keep up the activities².

The years between 1980 and 1990 bring a shift in social democrats’ deeply rooted antagonism towards voluntary activities. Several reasons seem to lie behind. Important ideological impulses come with the new liberalism of Thatcher and Reagan, arguing a need for a broader specter of welfare activities than those provided by the state. A second, less visible motive is the growing acknowledgement of mutual dependence between public and civil welfare resources. Not even the oil-financed welfare budgets in Norway can stand the pressure from the never-ending stream of public welfare demands. Professions and politicians realize that civil welfare resources should be activated, but how? And without supporting philanthropic and liberal ideologies that will challenge the governments’ responsibilities for people’s welfare? After 50 years of belief in the all-embracing responsibilities of the state, a re-introduction of civic responsibilities was no easy undertaking. This is where the history of the volunteer centers begins.

In 1988, the Government launched the first White Paper ever on the role of the voluntary sector in Norway³. A positive analysis of the voluntary sectors’ welfare functions was presented, but the government did not really understand how governmental goodwill should be converted into policies. Voluntary organizations expected some kind of political gain, and in the absence of a defined strategy, the Minister of Health and Social Affairs arranged a hearing, a meeting where

---

¹ Friendly attitudes towards state welfare seem to be a Nordic sentiment, contrary to the ‘State – a necessary evil’. which is the title of Hirst’s (REF) book.
² See Salamon et. al. (2002)
³ NOU 1988:17: Frivillige organisasjoner (Voluntary organizations)
Civicness and ownership

representatives of voluntary welfare associations were encouraged to present their preferably innovative contributions to welfare problems.

Here, the Norwegian Red Cross forwarded the idea that, in some way or other, the governments ought to stimulate the manifold of community-based, voluntary activities. The Red Cross was inspired by the US model of voluntary clearinghouses, local centers that mediate between users and volunteers on the one hand, and between the multitude of local associations on the other. But in Norway, most cities and communities are not large enough to justify clearinghouses as separate units.

Instead, the idea of volunteer centers was launched. The government would pay the costs of an administrative leader, housing and operating expenses for a period of three years. The content of this organizational frame should be filled from below with new and innovative activities, support for existing ones was not accepted.

Voluntary organizations, municipalities, congregations and individuals were allowed to apply for public grants. By using a ‘bottom-up’ process, local initiatives were allowed to shape activities according to local culture, norms and practices.

The result of this process was around 400 applications, of which 93 were selected, mainly on geographical criterions, granted support for a trial period of three years. After three years, volunteer centers were accepted by the National assembly as permanent units, and between 1993 and 2003, the number of centers gradually increased by around 250 per cent, from 93 to around 240. Mediating between public and civil ownership, between civil enthusiasm and professional responsibilities, they surely enough deserve a status as welfare hybrids.

During the years between 1992 and 2003, the volunteer centers were evaluated continuously by Institute for Social research in Oslo. Every third month they reported results and development trends, and these reports laid the ground for reports from the researchers to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. Conclusions and figures cited below are all gathered from reports, books and articles from this evaluation.

---

4 In 1999, the National Government decided that 40 per cent of expenses for volunteer centers should be covered by local sources. For all practical purposes, municipalities are the instances that cover these expenses.
4. Basic structure

The first 93 centrals that were established followed the governments’ idea of a central consisting of ‘one paid, administrative leader, an office and a telephone’. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs also demanded that centers should have a board of their own. Apart from this, the idea of a voluntary center stood forth as empty, a solution without a defined problem, ready to be filled with local activities and solutions.

When the idea of volunteer centers was launched in 1991, some voluntary associations asked if this construction would become a competitor to an already scarce resource: Volunteers, willing to do unpaid efforts within the frame of local associations. Table 1 shows that the centers recruited volunteers with a different age structure than ordinary voluntary associations:

**Table 1:** Age distribution among volunteers, per cent. 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>All vol. organizations*</th>
<th>Humanitarian and social organizations.*</th>
<th>Volunteer Centers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below 24 years</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–49 years</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–66 years</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67 yrs and older</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Medborgerundersøkelsen (The citizenship survey) 1990.

**Table 2:** Share of employed volunteers in different age groups. Per cent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>24 years or younger</th>
<th>25–44 years</th>
<th>45–66 years</th>
<th>67 years or older</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All voluntary organizations*</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian and social organizations*</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer centers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Medborgerundersøkelsen, (the citizenship survey) 1990.

When compared to ‘traditional’ voluntary associations, center volunteers were recruited among the elderly part of the population. The most important explanation
Civininess and ownership

seemed to be that the centers were open at daytime, and consequently they recruited volunteers outside the 9-4 labor market.

Also another type of selection of volunteers took place. Table 2 shows that the percentage of volunteers with ordinary jobs in the paid labor market were considerably lower in the volunteer centers than in the voluntary sector. Volunteer centers recruited a significant higher share of their volunteers from outside the labor market, than did ordinary voluntary associations. In Norway, a high percentage of volunteers are active in leisure-time organizations (like sports- cultural-, hobby- music- or youth associations). “Leisure time” is a term complimentary to paid work, at the centers voluntary activities were mainly performed by those outside the paid labor market. One may therefore say that the centers, open as they were at daytime, filled a need for those without paid employment.

Activities. In appendix 1, the main categories of activities that were registered in the volunteer centers in 1997 are listed. Altogether 1709 activities were classified like this:

Table 3: Activities at volunteer centers, 1997. Total figures and per cent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-help</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social care⁵</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal service/excursions⁶</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure/hobby activities</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone services/counseling⁷</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>1709</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁵ 'Social care’ includes collective activities for particular groups, like elderly people, migrants, unemployed or other. Excursions, camps, entertainment, concerts, and all kinds of networking activities are placed here.

⁶ The term ‘personal service’ includes situations where one volunteer performs some kind of practical assistance to another, called the user. House painting, community transport, minor domestic repairs, mowing the lawn, snow shoveling and similar activities belong here.

⁷ This category rooms all kind of leisure and hobby activities, related to culture, song and music, gardening sports and games.
The conclusion from table 1, 2 and 3 above is that the volunteer centers seemingly recruited volunteers from groups and social strata that were underrepresented in ordinary voluntary associations. On the other side, the center activity profiles did not, contrary to the intentions of the government, represent a broad specter of innovations. Although some activities were new and innovative, the centers established a profile of activities well known, particularly by pensioners’ associations and social/humanitarian voluntary organizations. Activities can broadly be classified as 1) help/assistance related to material, physical or emotional needs, and 2) leisure and community activities.

5. Ownership structures

The 93 centrals that were established in 1991/92, had a mixed ownership structure. As new centrals were established and existing ones developed, the ownership structure changed. In 1997 and 2006, the picture looked as presented in table 4.

Table 4: Self-reported ownership forms, 1991/92, 1997 and 2006. 8
Totals (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership form</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1991/92</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>37 (14)</td>
<td>16 (10)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>52 (19)</td>
<td>24 (14)</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol. association</td>
<td>59 (22)</td>
<td>38 (23)</td>
<td>37 (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congregation or religious organization</td>
<td>15 (5)</td>
<td>15 (9)</td>
<td>20 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal ownership</td>
<td>101 (37)</td>
<td>73 (44)</td>
<td>35 (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/not defined</td>
<td>10 (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 shows since the start in 1991/92, about one third of the centers have been owned by municipals. The percentage of independent ownership forms (foundations 8

---

8 We chose to define 'ownership' by employer responsibilities for the engaged administrative leader of the center. Other criterions, connected to board- or financing responsibilities were hard to apply, since non of them reflected the real structures of influence within the centrals. The problems of finding well-working criterions for classifying these organization illustrate their diffuse status as straddlers, situated between 'state' and voluntary sector.
Civicness and ownership

and cooperatives) have been steadily increasing, while centers owned by voluntary associations have been decreasing. A common denominator is that they all have had their infrastructure paid by the government, and most of them have been more or less integrated into the public welfare system. Each center was lead by an administrative leader, who again was responsible to a board. Boards were most often composed by representatives of voluntary organizations, municipal authorities and religious associations. Activities were coordinated by the paid coordinator.

The legal ownership form of the centers varied. Those established as foundations were subject to the Norwegian Law of Foundations, while those owned by municipalities and voluntary associations were most often established as ‘centers’, separate units with a budget and, most often, a board of their own. A ‘center’ does not, however, correspond to a legal ownership form. In many cases, ownership was fragmented, board members reported to their respective organizations, but since all costs were covered by the government, the board-represented organizations perceived the centers as something external, outside their own day-to-day activities.

Table 4 shows that during the years between 1992 and 1998, we can observe a polarizing trend in the ownership structure. A first point is that new as well as established centrals moved towards independent ownership forms. Several were reorganized as foundations, which gave them a legal autonomy and a formal distance to public authorities. The foundation form was preferred by centrals that were established as joint ventures; between several voluntary organizations, or between voluntary and municipal units. But the status as ‘independent’ hides informal lines of authority and influence. The independence of volunteer foundations centers financed from above, were limited by the conditions that followed public grants. Also local board members mediated expectations from municipal authorities about profile and preferred activities of the centers.

A second trend is that the share of municipal ownership increased, in total figures from 35 to 73 per cent. This change reflects the increasingly positive attitudes from local authorities towards the centers during these years. A feeling of skepticism – philanthropic engagement as a threat to welfare state responsibilities – was gradually replaced by the idea that the centers may fulfill welfare functions that are complementary to those of state agencies. Helping elderly people at home, doing practical work in house and garden, visiting disabled and sick people or arranging leisure and self-help activities. Such ‘services’, provided by non-professional volunteers will, it was assumed, undoubtedly reduce the pressure on public budgets.
6. Ownership: Effects

According to theories presented above, one should expect that voluntary, public or forprofit ownership in some way or other will affect the performances of welfare agencies. Table 5 shows differences in activity profiles for volunteer centers, according to their ownership form.

**Table 5:** Number of voluntary center activities, according to ownership. Per cent. (Total figures). 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-help</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social care</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal service /</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>excursions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure/hobby</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone services/</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counseling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>100 (393)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows, rather surprisingly, an absence of significant differences in activity profiles as a result of ownership. Output profiles seem to be surprisingly similar for autonomous, voluntary and municipal – owned centers. This means that in this case, ownership does not seem to be an important factor for explaining differences in practice.

Table 6 shows the effects of ownership upon voluntary efforts. Neither did we find significant differences in the ways activities were performed. Self-help groups were, for example, organized in a similar manner by all centers, independent of their ownership forms. Also care and leisure activities were arranged more or less in a similar manner.

---

9 It should be mentioned that we also looked for effects of population density (or degree of urbanization) in the areas that were served by the centres, and found no significant effects of this variable.
Civicness and ownership

Table 6: Voluntary man-hours per week according to ownership. Average, total numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hours per week</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average per Central</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours per volunteer per week</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With focus on average measures, all centrals managed to fulfill governmental demands, independent of ownership forms. But average figures concealed considerable differences between centers. Table 6 shows that in 1997, less than one third of the centers managed to satisfy governments’ demands of 70 voluntary man-hours per week. The table also shows that municipal-owned centers have a non-significant higher production of man-hours than other ownership forms. The general impression is that centrals seem to reveal a similar profile of productivity, independent of their ownership form.

Table 7: Volunteer centers that receive assignments from public welfare agencies, according to ownership. 1997. Per Cent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignments</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive assignments</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not receive assignments</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows that between 80 and 90 per cent of all centrals receive assignments from public agencies. Strangely enough, municipal owned centrals seem to be the most independent ones from this point of view. Differences are, however, small and not significant.

The tables 5, 6 and 7 lead to the conclusion that ownership is not a very important variable when our purpose is to explain differences between centers. Autonomous centers, for example, do not engage in activities that are very different from those owned by municipalities. Voluntary efforts are, rather surprisingly, higher at
municipal centers that voluntary owned ones. A high percentage of all centers receive assignments from local authorities.

Departing from the point that ownership does not seem to affect the practices of the centers in a significant way, we may ask for factors that can explain the uniformity that we observe here. Firstly, we may assume that ownership – in this case – does not mediate ideological or political differences, or ideas about what a voluntary center ought to be. The choice of ownership form may be a pragmatic one, which means that the formal distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ (or municipal/voluntary/independent) not necessarily is accompanied by ideological cleavages, reflecting (or reflected in) distinct different practices. We label this the thesis of value-neutral ownership (VNO).

Secondly, we may assume that initially, different types of owners may did have different intentions. But governmental tools and other activities may start processes that weaken differences and make it difficult to keep up a specific, local policy. This is labeled the thesis of isomorphism (a term that is explained below).

6.1 Value-neutral ownership

What kind of data can support the VNO – thesis? Table 8 below shows from where board members are recruited:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Voluntary</th>
<th>Municipal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public employees and politicians</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees and leaders of vol. orgs.</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Users, volunteers and staff at center</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 shows that more or less half of all board members were recruited from voluntary associations. Even at centers that were owned or controlled by local authorities, 45 per cent of the board members were recruited from the voluntary sector. Around 20 per cent of board members at formally independent centers were recruited among public employees and local politicians. However, municipal centers
Civicness and ownership

recruited one third of their board members among politicians and administrative personnel, which is higher than in voluntary and independent centers. Still, the overall picture is that the recruitment of board members follow more or less the same pattern in all centers.

In 1998, we asked administrative leaders at the centers to give their opinion about those three instances that exerted the highest influence on the activity profile of the center. Table 9 shows the distribution of these opinions:

**Table 9:** The most important sources of influence for the centers’ activities, according to ownership.\(^{10}\) Per cent. 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal employees and politicians</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of vol. associations and congregations</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centers’ users and volunteers</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adm. staff at the center</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = number of responses</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9 shows that perceived influence on the centers’ policies was not related to ownership structure in a one-dimensional way. Rather surprisingly, municipal employees and politicians were regarded influential in 26 per cent of the independent centers, 30 in municipal ones but only 14 at voluntary centers. This distribution illustrates the point we made above: Most often, ‘independent’ centers were established in order to give different ‘owners’ an equal share of influence, and avoid domination of municipal owners. The table also indicates more active boards at independent centers, giving less influence to the coordinator.

\(^{10}\) Respondents were here asked to mark the three most important instances, with only one mark for each category. Not all respondents gave three marks, and this explains why percentages do not sum to 100.
Seen together, tables 8 and 9 seem to support the VNO – thesis: Since board members, independent of ownership form, had a more or less similar organizational background, it is reasonable to believe that also brought with them similar thoughts about what kind of activity profile a volunteer center should have. These data support the general impression from interviews, where the choice of ownership form seemed to be a pragmatic, rather than an ideological one.

7. Isomorphism and serviceification

The issue I want to address here is how the use of governmental tools and other processes eventually can explain the absence of variations in activities profiles among centrals with different ownership forms. Three tools will be discussed: 1) governmental expectations of ‘output’ or results, 2) the use of paid staff as administrative leaders and 3) the governmental-initiated, continuous evaluation from Institute for Social Research.

I will relate the discussion of these tools to what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) label processes of isomorphism. Their theory of institutional isomorphism is particularly well suited for explaining absence of difference within a ‘field’, like the volunteer centers. DiMaggio and Powell tell us (1983: 148):

‘In their initial stages of their life cycle, organizational fields display considerable diversity in approach and form. Once a field becomes well established, however, there is an inexorable push towards homogenization,’

The process that best capture processes of homogenization they label isomorphism, which describes

‘... a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions’ (1983: 149).

The authors describe three types of processes named coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. Coercive processes occur particularly where legal regulations force organizations within a field into a common practice. Mimetic isomorphism is most often a result of uncertainty, a field becomes ‘modeled’ as some organizations imitate others, preferably those who are perceived as successful. Normative isomorphism occurs where professions take over a field and establish norms for how things should be done.

Output expectations. From being an open-ended experiment where the government accepted trial-and-error as well as most kinds of activities, a measure of 2 man-years of voluntary work per year was introduced as a precondition for governmental support. This happened in 1995, after the first trial period of three years had come to an end. One man-year was set to 1750 hours, which meant that each center had to produce 3500 hours per year, or an average of approx. 70 hours voluntary efforts per week. In order to control this production, the centers had to register time spent on
Civinlessness and ownership

voluntarily activities and report to the evaluators every third month.11 This tool was invented by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, from where the centers were financed, and although not explicitly stated, one may assume that the intention was to legitimize the budget expenses vis-a-vis the Parliament. The idea seemed to be that the volunteer centers ought to be ‘profitable’, and ‘profit’ was here measured as hours of voluntary work that doubled the paid efforts of the administrative leaders.

Several centers discovered that, in order to fulfill their production goals, they had to put weight upon activities that had a favorable ‘output ratio’, which meant that paid efforts from administrative leaders that created a relatively high number of voluntary hours, was favorable. One example can illustrate this:

In interviews, administrative leaders told that connecting individuals in need of help, care or assistance to volunteers, was a time-consuming affair. When volunteers visited or helped elderly people at home, no more than 1–2 hours per week were registered, and this ‘product’ was regarded meager. Better then, to concentrate efforts on community events which, at times, produced several hundred voluntary hours in one day. Or arrangements which, once institutionalized, did not demand administrative efforts.

The output measure of two man-years of voluntary hours created irritation and frustration in many centers. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs from where this norm was formed, admitted that acceptable activity profiles did not always and under all circumstances lead to a sufficient measure of voluntary hours, and dispensations were granted to all central that did not fulfill the norm.

This tool, where public grants were linked to ‘outcome’ in the form of voluntary efforts, turned out to be one of the most molding factors for the centers. As a tendency, this tool pushed the centers towards (voluntary) time-consuming activities. Later, this measure was been dropped, but we do not have data that can show how, eventually, this affected the activity profiles of the centers.

In Powell and DiMaggio’s terms, this process resembles what they call coercive isomorphism. Two man-years voluntary work as a precondition for support can explain a general trend away from activities that generated few hours, but can not fully explain the similarities in activity profiles that were presented above.

11 At the beginning, the demand for registering voluntary hours created a great deal of confusion. Where does, for example, the border line between participation in a self-help group and voluntary efforts go? Should transport time to/from home to the volunteer center count as voluntary time? The questions were many, and registration practice varied from one center to another.
7.1 The use of paid staff.

One precondition for establishing a center, was a paid coordinator that should initiate activities, connect volunteers to users and administrate the centers. Table 10 shows from where the coordinators were recruited:

**Table 10: Background of coordinators. Per Cent**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Voluntary</th>
<th>Municipal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public sector: health/social services</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector otherwise</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business, commercial</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary organization</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed/other background</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than a third of all coordinators were recruited from public sector jobs, mainly from municipals’ health and social services. Approximately two thirds off all coordinators were recruited from the public sector, and it is not unreasonable to assume that this fact has colored their perception of problems and solutions, even in their new jobs.

But, when interviewed about half a year after the centers were established, many coordinators expressed great doubt and insecurity about their own role, and what kind of expectations they were intended to fulfill. Signals from the boards were, in many cases sparse, and the coordinators were more or less free to fill the centers with activities that they perceived as meaningful. From this starting point of insecurity and openness, it is even more astonishing that the centers ended up with more or less similar activity profiles. How can this fact be explained?

During the first three years of the centers lives, the Ministry of Health and Social affairs arranged several national conferences for the coordinators. One governmental intention was to give room for debate and discussions among them, and to present cases of ‘best practice’ for the coordinators. Later, also regular regional conferences were arranged.

The three first years of the centers’ existence were by the Government regarded as a test period, an in 1994, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs proposed to the national assembly that grants would be reduced. This proposal was perceived as a threat to the existence of the centrals and to the workplace of the coordinators.
Civincness and ownership

During the first months of 1994, a rather intense lobby campaign was brought into action. All coordinators contacted their local representatives to the National assembly, arguing continued national grants for the centrals. In March 1994, the Governments proposal of reduced grants was rejected by the national Assembly. The lobbying campaign was a success, and later these national grants were increased considerably, as the number of centrals went up.

National and regional conferences as well as the well coordinated lobbying campaign created a rather dense social network among the coordinators. The lobby campaign created a need for a unified argumentation, a shared perception of what centers are good for, their contribution to welfare and civil society. These processes may, in DiMaggio and Powell’s wording, be named mimetic. From being anchored in community practice and culture, the centers gradually developed a common identity and also a common profile of practices.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) also mention professionalization as an isomorphic process, where professional standards and techniques of problem-solution follows professionals when they go from one job to another. As coordinators were recruited from different sectors and fields, and since the centrals represented a new and innovative concept, coordinators can hardly be labeled ‘professional’ in their jobs as coordinators. In spite of this, they developed a strong solidarity with each other and their centrals. The absence of standards that formed professional norms of behavior, make it reasonable to talk about mimetic processes in this case.

The evaluation. A continuous evaluation of a field can be regarded a government tool in itself. The volunteer centers emerged as ‘bottom-up’ units, products of local culture and practices, reflecting informal structures of mutual help. But every third month, they had to report to Institute for Social research, using a form which was developed for this purpose. For the first three years, during the trial period, the Institute’s reports to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs consisted of only aggregated data. The point was that the centers should be free to experiment as they liked, and individual failures should not be reported. At the end of the trial period the evaluators’ professional secrecy was abolished, and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs were then able to control the production of each center. This, of course, produced a strain, and a pressure of fulfilling the Ministry’s expectations and norms of production.

Filling in the form created a lot of frustration among the coordinators. As they had to report their activities in a written and formal form, they were ‘forced’ to look at themselves from the outside, and to convert their self-evident forms of local practice into universal, bureaucratic categories. A common complaint was that the form did not provide a just picture of the many-faceted activities of the center. As numbers of voluntary hours, numbers of volunteers and users were used by the Ministry to legitimize the centers, the coordinators felt obliged to produce adequate numbers for these columns.
8. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to go deeper into arguments of comparative advantages of civil, versus state and market welfare production. My case has been the Norwegian volunteer centers in their identities as welfare producing units situated between state and civil society. Theories of nonprofits and voluntary associations, it is most often assumed that ownership form - as ‘voluntary’, ‘state’ or ‘market’ - produces service qualities which form comparative advantages for this type of ownership. Consequently, one should assume that when similar welfare services are produced by different institutions, their ownership form will, in some way or other, put some kind of distinctive stamp upon the production.

When testing this assumption on the Norwegian volunteer centers, we did not find any strong correlations between ownership form - as autonomous, voluntary and municipal – and the activity profiles of the centers. On the contrary, we found a striking degree of similarity, a finding that, in this case, seems to kill the thesis of comparative advantages. The question here becomes one of explaining similarities in spite of different ownership forms.

In order to explain similar activity profiles, we established two theses, one of value-neutral ownership and one of isomorphism. In our data, we found some support for the first thesis: The background of board members did not show any systematic variations between ownership forms. Representatives of public authorities influence the activities of voluntary centers, and vice versa. Neither did interviews reveal ideological motives behind the choice of ownership form. This lead to the conclusion that in many cases, the choice of ownership form has been a pragmatic, rather than an ideological one.

Investigating isomorphic processes, we found strong processes of professionalization; common interests and interaction between coordinators laid the ground for common identities and ideas of what a voluntary center ought to be. A frontier line was established between the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs of Social affairs and local centrals, and the national/local antagonism produced a strong coherence among coordinators, across ownership lines.

We also found that the Ministry’s use of two man-years voluntary work as a ‘production norm’ for the centers resulted in isomorphic processes: Reducing activities that produced few hours, increasing those who produced many. Also the continuous evaluation from Institute for Social Research contributed to isomorphic processes, as the evaluation form and its categories indirectly signalized ‘important’ activities as the evaluators and the department perceived them. Seen together, these findings lead to the conclusion that, in the case of the Norwegian Volunteer Centers, the use of governmental tools and other isomorphic processes have weakened, the assumed effects of ownership.

In the Scandinavian countries, community associations have, till now, lived a live of their own, mainly based on incomes from grass-root activities and some support
Civicness and ownership

from government. Amateurs, enthusiasts and non-paid volunteers have been the driving force behind the huge multitude of community activities. Recent observations indicate that the community field increasingly is perceived as uncharted land for professions and educational institutions. This study support DiMaggio and Powell’s suggestion: Professionalization within the community field leads to isomorphic processes which, as a general tendency, will weaken or erase the particular qualities of civil/nonprofit/voluntary ownership forms. If professional norms will ‘trump’ the particular qualities of ownership, we may expect a growing number of “straddlers” or hybrids within the field of local welfare.

References

Chapter 11

Michaela Neumayr and Michael Meyer

In search of civicness: an empirical investigation of service delivery, public advocacy, and community building by civil society organizations

This chapter contributes to the discussion of civicness from a theoretical and empirical angle: theoretically, we conceptualise civicness as a meso-phenomenon and assume service-providing CSOs to be characterized by civicness if they provide advocacy and community building activities. Hence, civicness constitutes a by-product of CSOs delivering social services. Referring to this concept, we empirically investigate whether higher levels of marketization of CSOs would reduce their contribution to civicness. The results of our bivariate analysis, however, contradict the widespread theoretical position in literature: the assumed negative correlation between marketization and civicness, i.e. advocacy and community building, cannot be supported.

1. Introduction

Among the welfare states of continental Europe, voluntary associations play a key role in the provision of social services. These civil society organizations (CSOs), however, do not only serve society by providing social services, but also provide a number of further assets, among which civic culture is often cited as CSOs’ special contribution. Following Putnam (1993), organized civil society is the best way of bringing about a civic culture of generalized trust and social solidarity – and it thus facilitates individuals’ civility. CSOs are therefore important components of civic vital life, promoting participation by local citizens, encouraging social interaction,

1 This research was made possible thanks to grant funding from the Austrian Ministry of Science and Research (Department for Social Sciences) under its program “New Orientations for Democracy in Europe – NODE”.

201
and creating trust and reciprocity. In doing so, they contribute to ‘civiness’, a quality which can then become inherent in individuals or communities.

In the last three decades, however, various changes in the governance of social services made it much more difficult for CSOs to contribute to this civic culture. As a consequence of the European Procurement Directive and the implementation of New Public Management instruments, CSOs in many countries now face stricter standards of governance and accountability. For example, service contracting and performance-related payments have taken on a more prominent role and CSOs increasingly have to compete with for-profit providers (Dimmel 2005; Schneider/Trukeschitz 2007: 15; Trukeschitz/Schneider 2003). While these tendencies, which can be covered by the umbrella term ‘marketization’, have been theoretically discussed in the third sector research, empirical studies on the topic are currently scarce. All the studies available focus on the effects of these trends on efficiency, accountability, legitimacy, or the targeting of services at clients in need. Empirical research that focuses on the effects of marketization on CSOs’ contribution to societies’ civiness is still rare.

Our chapter refers to this lack of empirical evidence and asks whether and how CSOs providing social services contribute to civiness as a by-product. Thus our research questions may be formulated as follows:

- How can civiness of CSOs be conceptualized theoretically, based upon a theory of CSOs’ societal functions?
- How are marketization and civiness related?

We assume that social service CSOs that display a higher level of marketization contribute less to civiness. We thus assume a negative correlation between marketization and civiness.

To this end, we will firstly demonstrate the multifarious functions of CSOs and introduce a theoretical framework of the functions of CSOs. We will then theoretically conceptualize civiness as a by-product of CSOs, based on a reflection of the meaning of ‘civiness’. Secondly, we will provide an overview of the main arguments in literature on how the marketization of CSOs has affected their contribution to civil culture. We will also investigate the relationship between the level of marketization of CSOs and their contribution to civiness, and examine whether the hypothesis that increased marketization comes along with lower levels of civiness can be verified. The findings and limitations of this investigation will be discussed in the final part of the chapter.
In search of civicness

2. The contribution of civil society organizations to society

Third sector organizations, also referred to as organized civil society (cf. Zimmer/Freise 2005: 2), constitute a central feature of European welfare states in terms of the governance and provision of social services. Although there is a large variety between individual countries, in Central Europe, at least, the delivery of social services is unthinkable without CSOs. CSOs are particularly strongly involved in the provision and governance of social services in those countries with corporatist welfare regimes. In Austria, for example, about 10% of all health and almost 55% of all social services are provided by CSOs (Neumayr et al. 2007: 10). The goods and services provided by CSOs, especially in the field of social services differ from those of other institutional providers. CSOs are said to serve society with additional values, as they pursue “more altruistic objective functions than for-profits” (James 1998: 271). They blend the provision of services with other functions, as it is possible for them to cross-subsidize other activities which do not generate income, as they receive donations and grants (Weisbrod 1998). In the following section, we will not focus on the distinction between third sector organizations, for-profit organizations, and public organizations; rather, we will give an overview of the numerous functions that have been attributed to CSOs in literature.

The most prominent role assigned to CSOs is the delivery of services. According to failure-performance models (cf. Hansmann 1987), this function contributes to explaining the existence of the third sector in general. While service delivery is part of all the existing concepts on CSOs’ functions, quite different additional functions are mentioned by the respective authors:

- James and Rose-Ackerman (1986: 9) differentiate between “service-providing organizations (such as schools and hospitals) and representational organizations (such as political parties, labour unions, trade associations, and interest groups)”. In this, they follow an approach similar to Salomon et al. (2000), who assign CSOs to the field in which they are active and restrict CSOs to being either service providing or representational.

In contrast, all other scholars view CSOs as fulfilling more than just one function:

- Wolpert classifies CSOs’ activities “within a triangle whose three corners present the alternative goals of philanthropy, charity, and service” (Wolpert 2001: 130). According to the location of CSOs within the triangle, they might accomplish one, two, or even all three functions at the same time. Land (2001: 66) changed Wolpert’s triangle to a rectangle by adding a fourth function called fellowship.
The categorization of functions presented by Frumkin (2002: 25) is the most systematic found in literature. He developed a matrix of four fields with one axis describing the demand/supply side and the other one the expressive/instrumental rationale. Alongside service delivery, the civic and political engagement, the values and faith, and the so-called social entrepreneurship function thereby arise.

Kramer (1981: 173ff) offers another approach distinguishing four roles. In addition to the service provider role, he quotes the improver and advocacy role, the vanguard role or service pioneer, and the value guardian role.

The functions mentioned by Kramer were also identified by Kendall (2003), although he uses different designations and splits the four functions into five. Thus, Kendall lists the service-provision, the innovation, the advocacy, the expressive, and the community-building function (Kendall 2003: 104ff). The community-building function therefore refers to a similar concept to that used by Land (2001) for fellowship, and innovation is just another term for the vanguard role.

The classification suggested by Salamon et al. (2000: 5ff) comprises an identical set of five functions. They, however, labelled them slightly differently and gave broader definitions of the expressive and leadership development role and the community building and democratization role. The three remaining roles (service, innovation, and advocacy) were defined quite similarly (Salamon et al. 2000: 5ff).

This literature review, while by no means exhaustive, includes a broad range of functions with some of them overlapping across various concepts. Table 1 summarizes the concepts given and collates those roles that seem to be identical by denomination.

While the table indicates the existence of a number of varying categorizations, a closer look at the definitions of the individual functions shows that the authors mentioned above operate with same definitions by using similar terms or identical definitions but different headings. Since the concepts lack of a common definition of the term ‘function’, it is quite a challenge for empirical investigations to operationalize and compare studies on CSOs’ functions on the basis of this colourful picture.
In search of civicness

Table 1: Concepts of the functions of CSOs identified in literature, by author

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function/Author</th>
<th>Salamon/Sośkowiński</th>
<th>Estelle Rose-Ackerman</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Frankkin</th>
<th>Kramer</th>
<th>Kendall</th>
<th>Salamon/Hems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service / Service provision</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressive role / Value</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philanthropy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improver/Advocacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanguard &amp; service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community building /</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social entrepreneurship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Neumayr et al. (2007: 3)

2.1 A triangular model of the functions of CSOs

In order to come to a common understanding of the term ‘function’, we refer here to a conceptual framework that introduces a systematic approach to assessing the contribution of CSOs to society. This approach was developed by Neumayr et al. (2007) based on a literature review and case studies in Austria and the Czech Republic.

It identifies the three most important functions of CSOs as service delivery, public advocacy, and community building. When compared to the most widely used concept in empirical research on CSOs’ functions developed by Salamon et al. (2004: 23f), the concept used here assumes that CSOs contribute to several functions at the same time. It thus assumes that CSOs’ are multifunctional, and contribute to up to three different aspects, albeit to varying degrees. Third sector organizations active in the field of social services therefore do not only provide society with social services, but also contribute to advocacy and community building, as our qualitative analysis on interviews with social service CSOs affirmed (Neumayr et al. 2007: 16f.).

The theoretical background of this conceptual triangle refers to social systems theory (Luhmann 1984, 1998), with each of these functions referring to the main subsystems of society: economy, politics, and community.
Service delivery is the function that refers to the economic subsystem, since CSOs deliver service outputs, which can be priced and are paid for in some way – either by the beneficiaries themselves or by some other public or private organization. These services are, for the most part, marketable, though often the positive externalities are even more important than the service itself (meritory goods), or in some cases non-marketable benefits are linked with these services (public goods such as social security or democratic participation).

The public good property is crucial to the second function, which is consequently tied to the political system of society: public advocacy. This concerns the contribution of CSOs to political decision-making and governance, thus to the making of collectively binding rules. There are various ways that they fulfil this function, ranging from formal legislative contributions and executive processes to informal lobbying and PR-campaigns to raise public awareness on specific problems.

Community building is the third function, which is directed towards enhancing social capital by establishing and consolidating relationships between individuals and/or organizations. This generally implies either strengthening groups (in-groups, bonding social capital) or fostering social inclusion and integration (bridging social capital).

This conceptual framework is graphically displayed in Figure 1. According to this model, all the decisions and actions of CSOs fulfil functions, and these functions can be directed towards one, two, or all three subsystems of society.

This conceptual framework, with its three major functions, somewhat resembles that of Edwards/Foley (2001: 5f) and Zimmer/Freise (2005: 8f), who stress CSOs’ multifunctional character by participating “in at least three societal spheres simultaneously” (ibid. 8). Referring to systems theory, we provide a systematic basis for this model. While this concept, which embeds the activities of CSOs in three societal systems, has similarities with the welfare triangle of Pestoff (1998: 42) and the triangle created by Evers/Laville (2004: 15), it is slightly different in theoretical terms. Their triangles draw on organizations which are situated between the market, the state, and the community and thus categorize organizations. Our model refers specifically to the decisions, activities and actions of CSOs, which serve individual surrounding systems.
3. Conceptualization of civicness based on functions

Although the triangular classification of the functions of CSOs demonstrates the main societal functions of third sector organizations, it does not demonstrate explicitly that they contribute to embedding civicness – even though this is assumed to be a major characteristic of CSOs. We argue that the contribution of CSOs to civicness constitutes a by-product of CSOs to the delivery of social services and closely refers to elements of advocacy and community building. This can be shown by tracing the roots and the definition of the term ‘civicness’ and by expounding the definitions of advocacy and community building.

3.1 Reflections on the meaning of ‘civicness’

Whenever the notion of ‘civicness’ is mentioned in literature on civil society, the term is traced back to Putnam’s book *Making democracy work*. In this seminal study on Italy’s stage of development, Putnam designed a so-called ‘Civic Community Index’ in order to measure “the levels of ‘civic-ness’ of each of Italy’s twenty regions” (Putnam 1993: 96f). This index consists of the following four indicators:
newspaper readership, the number of sports and cultural clubs, the turnout in referenda, and the frequency of preference voting at political elections (ibid.). Although Putnam’s main conclusions of the study relate to different levels of civicness in certain regions, he does not provide any clear definition of the term itself. Referring to the index, however, civicness can best be understood as a macro-level characteristic – a region’s aggregation of civic engagement – based on indicators measured at both the macro-level (associational density, political participation) and the micro-level (preference voting, newspaper readership).

The interpretation of civicness as a characteristic of communities can also be found in Putnam’s further studies on American civil society (Putnam 1995, 2000). Although he again measures newspaper readership, associational density and so on, in these studies he substitutes the notion social capital for civicness (ibid., cf. Portes 1998: 18; Zimmer/Freise 2005: 6; Ballarino/Schadee 2005: 245). According to Putnam, social capital refers to “features of social organizations, such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995: 67). In doing this, he uses the term in a completely different way from that known from the sociologists Bourdieu and Coleman, who conceptualized social capital as an individual asset that “secure[s] benefits by virtues of membership in social networks” (Portes 1998: 6). In addition to a variety of criticism concerning the transformation of social capital from an individual to a collective concept, some scholars have also suggested using different labels and distinguishing between ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ social capital. The latter – collective social capital – would then refer to what Putnam had termed ‘civicness’ in 1993 (Portes 2000: 4).

This understanding is similar to the definition of civicness provided by Brandsen, Dekker & Evers in this volume, who interpret civicness as the “quality of institutions, organizations, and procedures, to stimulate, reproduce, and cultivate civility” (see the introductory chapter). In this context, ‘civility’ refers to certain attitudes of individuals, such as commitment to others, social concern, and responsibility. Civility thereby presents a characteristic of individual citizens. Civicness, on the contrary, is a broader concept and constitutes a characteristic of

---

2 Putnam concludes that civicness, as it reduces transaction costs and contributes to efficiency, is the main cause for better political outcomes, good government and economical success in northern Italy – and thus constitutes the prerequisite for democracy (Putnam 1993: 176).

3 An aspect that is particularly strongly criticized is that Putnam never explicitly theorized the transition of the concept from an individual asset to a community or national resource, which is said to be a reason for the present state of confusion about the meaning of the term (Portes 2000: 3). The fact that Putnam did not disentangle the causes and the effects of his application of social capital is another point of criticism (Portes 2004: 4).
In search of civicness

institutions (ibid.). Obviously the unit of analysis concerning civility refers to the individual (micro) level, while those concerning civicness to the institutional (meso/macro) level. Thus civicness is a quality of organizations, of processes or – as described by De Leonardis in this volume – of welfare states.

That implies that CSOs, like other organizations, can bear the values of civicness and contribute to the civicness of society. Following Putnam, it is CSOs that most effectively embody civicness, since they enable and facilitate the (spontaneous) action, political participation, and cooperation of individuals for mutual benefit. Furthermore, they foster social trust (Putnam 1995: 67), which may lead to the development of solidarity and tolerance at the individual level (i.e. civility, as we have shown above).

However, it cannot be taken for granted that every CSO contributes to civicness. In order to identify whether and to what extent CSOs contribute to civicness, it is necessary to measure civicness at the organizational level. When measured at the individual level, as Putnam did, it is not civicness itself but its effects at the individual level – civility – that would be measured (cf. Portes 2004: 4f). Furthermore, this procedure wouldn’t allow disentangling whether citizens’ civility is affected by CSOs or by other organizations and institutions.

The contribution of organized civil society to civicness, as defined as the quality of CSOs to stimulate, reproduce, and cultivate civility, can thus best be measured by identifying networks, values, and norms at the organizational level of CSOs which in principle have the potential to stimulate and reproduce civility – no matter whether this happens in reality or not. This definition brings the civicness of CSOs close to what has been included in CSOs’ two functions of community building and advocacy; the first one refers to CSOs’ societal contributions to enable collective action and the second one to CSOs’ contribution to encourage political participation and engagement.

To elaborate further on this, community building refers to the role of CSOs in establishing and consolidating relationships between individuals and/or organizations. This includes the integration of individuals, most notably those who are active as volunteers in CSOs, into a larger milieu where they can learn norms and create trust and reciprocity. This generates a sense of community – either on a certain issue or within a geographical area (cf. Donoghue 2004: 8; Salamon et al. 2000: 7; Kramer 1981: 194).

Consequently, CSOs can fulfil the community building function by establishing networks which facilitate social interaction and promote opportunities for the communication of values and the formation of common norms. By that the definition, community building corresponds strongly with the definition of civicness, but is less normative (not assuming that the communities built up have to cultivate civility) and refers strongly to organizational activities which can be measured more easily.
Similarly, public advocacy provides no normative perception either, but refers to activities that “bring group concerns to broader public attention” (Salamon et al. 2000: 6) and “focus[...] on changing policies or securing collective goods” (Jenkins 1987: 297). Thus, public advocacy may either provide benefits exclusively for those belonging to a certain group or for the general public as a whole. Since advocacy does not only comprise activities that are addressed directly to “any institutional elite” (Jenkins 1987: 297), but also activities that increase public awareness or mobilize individual citizens’ advocacy, advocacy corresponds with the idea of civicness as “actively participating citizens with a concern for the common good of the whole society” (Boussard 2002: 159).

Though both definitions allow for the realization of community building and advocacy without contributing to civility, taken together, CSOs which provide society with social services will only contribute to civicness if the organization contributes to community building and public advocacy. Thus, in order to stimulate, reproduce and cultivate civility, an organization has to be open to interaction with the local community, with volunteers, employees and clients, former clients or relatives of clients, and has to bring the concerns of their clients to a broader public attention. Community building and public advocacy are therefore essential by-functions of organizations which provide social services in order to contribute to civicness, as Figure 2 illustrates. We thus suppose that community building and advocacy are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the provision of civicness, because they have the potential to encourage and cultivate civility at the individual level. For the identification of civicness at the organizational level, activities that contribute to advocacy and community building thus provide some proxy for the level of civicness in CSOs.
In search of civics

**Figure 2:** Public advocacy and community building as prerequisites for the civics of social-service CSOs

4. *The decline of civics in the age of marketization?*

A significant strand of literature focuses on discussing whether the potential of CSOs to contribute to the multifarious functions mentioned above is affected by the "increasing interdependencies and processes of convergence between the public, market and third sector" (Aghamanoukjan et al. 2007: 2). One feature of this process, which has been observed in the last two decades, is that CSOs have "become more market like in their actions, structures and philosophies" (Eikenberry/Kluver 2004: 133). Changes in the governance of public institutions – such as stricter reporting and quality standards due to the implementation of New Public Management instruments, tendering, and contracting – could be major causes of this process of change. Other causes of this development are the recent changes in the public procurement of services in many European countries, according to the European Procurement Directive or the European Competition Law (Herzig 2006: 97ff; Dimmel 2007: 20ff). This has resulted in increasing competition both amongst CSOs, and between CSOs and for-profit companies in fields that had previously been served by CSOs alone. The emergence of corporate models of governance, often accompanied by a loss of independence or spontaneity, are a further effect of
Michaela Neumayr and Michael Meyer


These developments can be summed up by the umbrella term ‘marketization’ (Salamon 1995: 220ff), although a number of different labels with more precise meanings and emphasis – such as professionalization (Hwang/Powell 2006), commercialization (Tuckman 1998) or managerialism – are also used (cf. Aghamanoukjan 2007: 2). All these concepts point towards the adoption of the approaches and values of the private market (Weisbrod 1998), including the engagement of professionals and highly specialized staff, most notably in managerial and administrative professions. Collaboration with for-profits as well as the increased ”degree of reliance on sales revenues rather than donations or governments grants” (James 1998: 271) also serve as indications of marketization.

On the one hand, CSOs are said to be benefiting from the trend towards marketization, as they receive more reliable funding, become more financially independent, recruit better qualified employees, and enhance their reputation (Guo 2004: 135f). On the other hand, however, it is possible that a significant outcome of the CSOs’ work is being lost – namely the stimulation and creation of civics.

Eikenberry/Kluver (2004: 135) describes the relative effects of increased marketization as follows:

> “Though these [increased legitimacy, greater accountability, greater efficiency and innovation, better targeting of services to clients needs] are important and much-needed contributions, their achievement at the expense of the nonprofit sector’s role in creating and maintaining a strong civil society – as value guardians, service providers and advocates, and builders of social capital – may be too high a price to pay.”

We have defined the public advocacy and community-building function of CSOs as prerequisites to their providing social services that contribute to civics. This unique quality of CSOs is said to be in danger of being diluted as an (unintended) side effect of increased marketization. There are two main arguments concerning why the increased marketization of CSOs’ should negatively influence CSOs’ contribution to civics, which we will explore in turn. Both arguments refer to the dependence and the adjustment pressures to which CSOs are subjected. These effects are described theoretically by the resource dependence (Pfeffer/Salancik 1978) and the institutional theory (Powell/Dimaggio 1991; Scott 1994). The first one assumes that organizations “require resources to survive and thus must interact with others who control these resources” – and they therefore depend on their environments (Eikenberry/Kluver 2004: 133). Institutional theory, meanwhile, focuses less on material resources, and more on the ”rules and requirements, to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy” (ibid.).

One of the supposed consequences of increased marketization involves ‘mission drift’. This refers to a shift in the relevance of the individual functions to which a CSO contributes. Of all the functions of CSOs, service provision fits best with the
In search of civicness

concept of marketization (Aghamanoukjan 2007: 9), and this means that a shift towards service provision at the expense of public advocacy and community building may be expected. Chaves et al. (2004: 296) and Salamon (1995: 103) argue that CSOs – due to the increased dependencies and stricter governance reflected in the instruments of public funding – fear sanctions if they become active in (undesired) advocacy, and thus reduce their advocacy activities. Another argument for the decreasing contribution of CSOs to civicness is based on increased professionalization in boards, management, and administrative work. As a consequence of this professionalization, volunteers are less involved in the daily work of the organizations, internal processes, and decision making. It is becoming more important to bring in people who have good contacts with potential funding sources, who are integrated into the business world and who have administrative skills. These kinds of individual are being installed on the boards of CSOs, rather than people from the community who would ensure representativity. As a direct consequence of this trend, local networks – and thus the possibility to contribute to social capital and community building – are being lost (Backman/Smith 2000: 358ff; Eikenberry/Kluver 2004: 137).

Another effect of marketization involves the crowding-out of CSOs’ contribution to any of the three functions. Since marketization is usually accompanied by increased administrative and management concerns (such as documentation, controlling, and participation in tenders), a huge amount of the resources and energy of CSOs is absorbed by these tasks. As a result, the resources available for the fulfilment of functions are shortened (Hwang/Suárez 2008: 7; Meyer 2007: 91). Frequently, it is CSOs’ core tasks, such as the actual delivery of goods or services, that become de-professionalized (Smith/Lipsky 1993).

Although there is ample literature concerning effects of marketization on the functions of CSOs, empirical evidence on the assumed effects is very scarce. In the following section, therefore, we will describe the contribution of social-service CSOs to civicness and the process of marketization on the basis of data from Austria.

5. In search of civicness in Austrian social service CSOs

For our empirical investigation, we will firstly describe whether and to what extent Austrian CSOs active in social services contribute to advocacy and community building, and whether these organizations can be assumed to be multi-functional or single-functional organizations. We will then examine whether those CSOs with a higher level of marketization contribute less to civicness than those with lower levels of marketization.
The hypothesis which we will test is as follows: the higher the level of marketization of CSOs active in social services, the less they will contribute in relative terms to civicness in terms of advocacy and community building.

5.1 The sample

To test this hypothesis, we will draw upon data derived from a survey of Austrian CSOs conducted between November 2007 and January 2008 (the Austrian part of the Czech–Austrian NPO-Survey 2007, Masaryk University & WU-Wien). The sample originates partly from the Austrian business register, which is administered by Statistics Austria. However, as this register only comprises CSOs with at least one paid employee, it misses a significant part of the third sector. We therefore generated a quota sample of CSOs without paid employees across Austria according to the population density of each federal region and its frequency of large and small municipalities. In total, 215 randomly selected CSOs from the business register and 37 CSOs operating with volunteer staff only were involved in our sample. For reasons of data security, Statistics Austria drew the sample and collected the data.

One of the aims of the survey was to investigate the influence of funding patterns on the functions of CSOs. It thus focuses on the revenue structure of CSOs and on the identification of the functions carried out by the organizations. In addition, data on the workforce, innovations and matters of professionalization were also collected. As for the analysis, both the hard facts on the CSOs and the ratings of representatives of the organizations were needed. The first part of the questionnaire was filled in using phone-interviews, and the second part via e-mail.

The 252 CSOs in the sample were active in a wide range of activities in the Austrian third sector. However, for this chapter we will focus on data from the 139 CSOs that stated they were active in – among other fields – social services. Of these, 54 stated they were active in the field of health, 41 in the field of jobs and qualifications, 31 in in-patient social facilities and 82 in other social services. Of these 139 CSOs, only 68 CSOs specified social services as their main field of activity.

The average number of employees (full-time equivalent) of all 252 CSOs in the sample was 34 (median 4.5), while social service CSOs seemed to have more full-time equivalent employees with an average of 48 (median 6.3). The average number of volunteers was 103 (though the median was 4), while in social service CSOs an

---

4 From individuals with a good overview of the organizations, such as the Chief Executive Officer, the Financial Executive Officer or the Chairman/woman (of the board) in smaller CSOs.

5 Multiple answers were possible.
In search of civicness

average of 89 were active (median 4). Data on annual total revenues and expenditure also indicate that those CSOs active in social services are on average larger organizations than those in the other fields (see Table 2a and 2b).

**Table 2a**: Sample characteristics of Austrian CSOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Percentiles (25th, 50th, 75th)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paid employees (FTE)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.705</td>
<td>1.5 4.5 11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers (headcount)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.500</td>
<td>0 4 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Revenues 2006 (€)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2,131,430</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>136,796,000</td>
<td>73,125 208,08 924,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Expenditure 2006 (€)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,482,574</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39,392,000</td>
<td>84,405 244,54 950,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Czech-Austrian NPO-Survey 2007, Masaryk University & WU-Wien

**Table 2b**: Sample characteristics of Austrian CSOs active in the field of social services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Percentiles (25th, 50th, 75th)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paid employees (FTE)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.705</td>
<td>2.1 6.3 17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers (headcount)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.500</td>
<td>0 4 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Revenues 2006 (€)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3,063,090</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>136,796,000</td>
<td>108,40 275,80 1,156,91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Expenditure 2006 (€)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,749,957</td>
<td>2,00</td>
<td>39,392,000</td>
<td>118,73 291,70 1,112,74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Czech-Austrian NPO-Survey 2007, Masaryk University & WU-Wien

Nevertheless, it has to be said that our sample also encompassed very small CSOs which are rarely included in studies as they are not registered anywhere. The sample therefore provides a corrective to the bias towards more established organizations on which most empirical studies are based.

5.2 Measures of civicness and marketization

Civicness, as our dependent variable, was measured by the proxies of advocacy and community-building: we therefore compiled two indices based on thirteen single items of our survey which capture the complex meaning of civicness at the meso-level. To recapitulate, our understanding of civicness refers to the quality of CSOs to establish networks, norms, and values which have the potential to facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit – in other words, to facilitate civility.

The items we used for the indices refer to subjective measures. Interviewees were asked to rate the significance of given statements within the mission of their
organization on a five-point-Likert-scale – from very important to not important. Of 24 statements, the following eight were incorporated into an index of community building: (1) forming/establishing friendships within the organization, (2) integration of our members into a group, which carries out common activities, (3) connecting people with common interests, (4) promoting solidarity within the municipality, the district, the country, (5) overcoming boundaries between different groups, (6) counteracting processes of exclusion due to activities taken, (7) fostering regular meetings of members of the organization, (8) building trust between people with different backgrounds.

Another five items were incorporated into an index on advocacy: (1) influencing political and statutory decisions on behalf of our stakeholders, (2) raising citizens’ awareness and motivating them to act, (3) being a public voice for a certain group or issue, (4) sensitizing the general public on a certain issue, and (5) seeking to amend political changes.

In order to compare CSOs’ contribution to civicsness with the relevance of the service function within the organization, we also compiled a service-index, which also consisted of five items: (1) improving the life of our clients through the services offered, (2) continuous advancement and diversification of services offered, (3) initiating offers according to the desires and needs of our target group, (4) offering individual assistance for our target groups, and (5) providing the services which are required by our clients.

As shown in Table 3, the indices we developed show a satisfying reliability with Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.836, 0.790, and 0.713, respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indices</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cronbach’s Alpha if item left out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Index on community building</td>
<td>(1) Forming/establishing friendships within the organization</td>
<td>.818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Integrating members into a group, which carries out common activities</td>
<td>.819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Connecting people with common interests</td>
<td>.827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Promoting solidarity within the municipality/district/country</td>
<td>.822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5) Conquering/overcoming boundaries between different groups</td>
<td>.812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6) Counteracting processes of exclusion due to activities taken</td>
<td>.811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7) Fostering regular meetings of members of the organization</td>
<td>.826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8) Building confidence between people with different backgrounds.</td>
<td>.801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronbach’s Alpha (8 items)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.836</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In search of civicness

| Index on advocacy | (1) Influencing political and statutory decisions on behalf of our stakeholders | .741 |
|                  | (2) Raising citizens’ awareness and motivate them to act | .720 |
|                  | (3) Being a public voice for a certain group or issue | .763 |
|                  | (4) Sensitizing the general public on a certain issue | .785 |
|                  | (5) Seeking to amend political changes | .735 |
| Cronbach’s Alpha (5 items) |                     | .790 |

| Index on service delivery | (1) Improving the life of our clients through the services offered | .668 |
|                          | (2) Continuous advancement and diversification of services offered | .696 |
|                          | (3) Initiating offers according to the desires and needs of our target group | .634 |
|                          | (4) Offering individual assistance for our target groups | .678 |
|                          | (5) Providing the services required by our clients | .644 |
| Cronbach’s Alpha (5 items) |                     | .713 |

Source: Own Source

According to the definition of marketization given above, the concept includes the professionalization of staff – especially in the areas of administration and management, reliance on revenues from commercial sources, the increasing importance of tenders, and the incorporation of market values. Since the questionnaire contains several items connected with these issues, we made use of the following five variables in order to create a measure of the ‘level of marketization’ of the CSOs.

- Did the organization participate in public tenders? (1=no/2=yes)
- Did the organization offer vocational training in business-related topics for their employees? (1=no/2=yes)
- What share of paid employees in the executive board had a business education? (if this share was smaller than 25%=no=1, otherwise=yes=2)
- What share of revenues did not originate from donations or public grants? (if this share is smaller than 65%=no=1, otherwise=yes=2)
- What is the legal form of the organization? (corporation=no=1, otherwise=2)

To create a simple measure of marketization from these items, we defined all organizations which answered at least three of these variables with ‘yes’ as ‘highly marketized CSOs’, while we assume those CSOs which answered two or less of them with a ‘yes’ to be ‘less marketized CSOs’. To calculate correlations, we summed up the scores of each of the five questions to a second marketization-measure.
5.3 Results

Examining the correlation between the three indices for CSOs active in social services, we found that the advocacy and the community building indices showed the strongest correlation. The rather low coefficients between all three scales indicate that the dimensions we derived from theoretical considerations corresponded empirically to more or less independent positions of CSOs (see Table 3). The relationships between these dimensions differ between CSOs active in social services and the total sample: among CSOs in general, the correlations between the three indices were almost of the same strength, whereas within CSOs active in social services the strongest correlation was between community building and advocacy.

If we compare the CSOs providing social services with the rest by using these three indices, we find – as expected – that the first group shows a much higher average value on the service-index than the latter. CSOs providing social services contribute significantly more to the service function than the other group. For both other functions the results were surprising, since CSOs active in social services also had higher values in advocacy and community building. However, it is only the higher value of the advocacy function that differs significantly, while the slightly higher relevance of community building does not (see Table 4).

Table 4: Correlation matrix of indices for CSOs active in social services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indices for social service CSOs (n=139)</th>
<th>Community-Building Index</th>
<th>Advocacy-Index</th>
<th>Service-Delivery Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community-Building Index</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy-Index</td>
<td>.316(**)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service-Delivery Index</td>
<td>.165</td>
<td>.263(**)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indices for all CSOs (n=252)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-Building Index</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy-Index</td>
<td>.298(**)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service-Delivery Index</td>
<td>.301(**)</td>
<td>.336(**)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the service-index and the community-building index are not normally distributed, we apply the Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation.

significant at p<0.01. Source: Czech-Austrian NPO-Survey 2007, Masaryk University & WU-Wien
In search of civicness

**Table 5:** Comparisons of the relevance of the three functions between CSOs active in social services and those not active in social services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>CSOs active in social services (n=139)</th>
<th>CSOs not active in social services (n=113)</th>
<th>Difference (significance and p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community-building index</td>
<td>2.8966</td>
<td>2.7723</td>
<td>+ 0.311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy-index</td>
<td>2.7468</td>
<td>2.4304</td>
<td>+ (*) 0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service-Delivery index</td>
<td>3.3266</td>
<td>2.8814</td>
<td>+ (**) 0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Czech-Austrian NPO Survey 2007, Masaryk University & WU-Wien

We can increase our understanding of the diffusion of marketization within CSOs active in social services by comparing this group with CSOs not active in social services. The u-tested differences in the level of marketization between both groups are displayed in Table 5. All indicators of marketization show higher average values for CSOs active in social services, suggesting that marketization is more widespread among the CSOs active in social services. The level of marketization calculated shows a significant difference between both groups.

**Table 6:** Comparison of marketization by field of activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of activity</th>
<th>CSOs active in social services (n=139)</th>
<th>CSOs not active in social services (n=113)</th>
<th>Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal form: corporation (y/n)</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>+ (*** )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in public tenders (y/n)</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional staff in executive board (y/n)</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>+ (*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offering vocational education on business</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance on commercial income (y/n)</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of marketization (scores)</td>
<td>6.37 (av. value)</td>
<td>5.92 (av. value)</td>
<td>+ (**)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 As the service-index and the community-building index are not normally distributed, we applied the Mann-Whitney-U-test.
9 Average values (the higher the value, the more important)
10 (*) significant at p<0.05, (**) significant at p<0.01
11 Mann-Whitney-U-test.
12 Percentage of CSOs answering ‘yes’ = average value.
13 (*) significant at p<0.05, (**) significant at p<0.01, (*** ) significant at p<0.001.
Michaela Neumayr and Michael Meyer

Source: Czech-Austrian NPO-Survey 2007, Masaryk University & WU-Wien

We analysed whether CSOs active in social services that responded to trends of marketization to a greater extent contributed less to civicness by firstly calculating the correlations (Table 6) and by comparing the average values of the advocacy and community-building indices between the less marketized and highly marketized CSOs active in social services (Table 7).

Table 7: Correlation of marketization and the functions of CSOs14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Advocacy-index</th>
<th>Community-Building index</th>
<th>Service-Delivery index15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total sample (n=252)</td>
<td>.102</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>.172(**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Service CSOs (n=137)</td>
<td>.102</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.231(**)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Czech-Austrian NPO-Survey 2007, Masaryk University & WU-Wien

These analyses reveal no correlation between marketization and civicness – thus falsifying our hypothesis for the moment. Neither is the assumed negative correlation between marketization and advocacy/community building apparent. Nor did we reveal significant differences in advocacy and community building between highly marketized and less marketized CSOs.

Table 8: Comparison of community building, advocacy and service delivery between high and low marketized CSOs active in social services16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CSOs with lower levels of marketization (n=74)</th>
<th>CSOs with higher levels of marketization (n=63)</th>
<th>Differences18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community-Building index</td>
<td>2.8615</td>
<td>2.9385</td>
<td>n.s. (0.694)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy-index</td>
<td>2.7189</td>
<td>2.7905</td>
<td>n.s. (0.621)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service-Delivery index</td>
<td>3.2189</td>
<td>3.4476</td>
<td>(*) (0.020)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Czech-Austrian NPO-Survey 2007, Masaryk University & WU-Wien

14 Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation.
15 (***) Significant at 0.01.
16 Mann-Whitney-U-test.
17 Percentage of CSOs answering ‘yes’ = average value.
18 (*) significant at 0.05 (p-value in parentheses).
6. Discussion

This chapter contributes to the discussion of civicness from a theoretical and an empirical angle: theoretically, we have conceptualized civicness as a meso-phenomenon, and specifically as an organization’s or institution’s capacity to foster civility, which is understood as an individual attitude. We assume that CSOs will be characterized by civicness if they are involved, even if only marginally, in advocacy and community-building activities.

We have thus integrated the organizational concept of civicness into a more established concept of the functions of CSOs and the contributions they make to society. Within our model, civicness relies on both community building and public advocacy activities, including in the field of social service production, where the service function is expected to be central. We further assume that these CSO-specific functions help to distinguish ‘civic’ social service providers from mere market-oriented or costumer-oriented organizations. Here, we refer to a non-normative concept of civicness which goes beyond integrating costumer needs into the design and delivery of social services but also integrates co-production, the empowerment of client communities and the promotion of customers’ interests in political decision-making processes. We do not assume that civiness equals community building plus public advocacy, although these activities are an indispensable prerequisite for civicness.

Empirically, we have constructed reliable indicators of community building and public advocacy, which – taken together and according to our concept – could also provide a proxy for CSOs’ civicness. We then addressed the question of whether market-orientation and civicness are, in fact, contradictory concepts within CSOs.

Some of our results point into the expected direction, and unsurprisingly, CSOs active in social services are more service-orientated than others. However, it is surprising that they also play a greater role in public advocacy and community building. This latter finding points towards the empirical relevance of ‘civil elements’: CSOs which provide social services also tend to give voice to otherwise neglected interests and to strengthen communities and foster social capital within their various stakeholders. Additionally, they stress the advocacy and community building function more than other CSOs not involved in social services. This finding could be due to the specific characteristics of the Austrian third sector, which is heavily dominated by social service provision, but it also highlights the multifunctionality of CSOs.

CSOs active in the field of social services also showed a higher degree of marketization. Since there is no empirical evidence that marketization hinders CSOs from public advocacy and community building, we may argue that there is also no overt conflict between civicness in the provision of social services and market-orientation of CSOs. Rather surprisingly, our results concerning the relationship between marketization and civicness (i.e. public advocacy and community building)
show no negative correlation. Our core assumption – that CSOs active in the field of social service would focus less on advocacy and community building when they become more marketized – cannot therefore be confirmed.

These findings contradict the widespread theoretical position in literature. Other empirical studies, however, have shown diverse results. Guo, for example, who investigated the effects of commercialization in CSOs involved in human services in the US, could not verify that increased levels of commercialization influenced the mission and the tasks of the organizations (Guo 2006: 132ff). Hwang/Suárez (2008: 16), on the other hand, found that the professionalism and commercialization of CSOs had a significant negative effect on their advocacy activities. On the basis of data from service-providing CSOs in the US, they concluded that more market-oriented CSOs concentrate on the provision of qualitative services at the expense of engaging in advocacy.

Hitherto, our analyses suffer from some limitations. In this chapter we only rely on subjective assessments of the positioning of organizations. In further analyses, we will have to include the more objective ones (e.g. budgets, training days, specific key figures in use), which were also gathered in our questionnaire. Neither did we control for organizational size, which might have an effect on a CSOs’ level of marketization. Finally – which is a challenge for further research – longitudinal data have to be gathered in order to assess the development of civicness in the provision of social services by CSOs.

There are many caveats to our results, then, the most significant of which is in our estimation the subjective measurement of service, advocacy and community-building, since it is (still) socially desirable for CSOs to go beyond mere service provision. Given that marketization contributes positively to this service orientation, which is shown in our results, and given the limited resources and energy available to CSOs, one might also suspect that efforts towards advocacy and community building are diminishing despite the ‘Sunday sermons’ to the contrary. This would also affect civicness.

References


In search of civicness


Trukeschitz, B./Schneider, U. (2003): New forms of financing social services: The impact of service-contracting on the provision of social services in Austria. Paper prepared for
In search of civicness


Chapter 12

Silvia Ferreira

Researching civicsness contexts and conditions: the case of the Portuguese welfare mix in social services

This chapter describes the existing arrangements and recent trends of reform in the welfare mix of social services in Portugal, using the analytical frameworks provided by welfare pluralism and governance literatures. It considers the features and trajectory of this southern European welfare state to discuss the contextuality of the conditions for civicsness in social services, arguing that the co-evolution of state and third sector has hampered the emergence of a civicsness discourse in Portugal. However, new mixes between state, market and society forms of welfare, some of which have been inspired by European social policies, are bringing changes in which the concept of civicsness can be perceived.

1. Introduction

In the current period of welfare state restructuring, new semantics are emerging, old frameworks are being revisited and existing relationships reinterpreted. The traditional competencies of the state, the market, community and civil society are being challenged by new concepts. One such concept is that of civicsness, which seems to behave like the ‘joker in the box’ (Baecker 2002): we do not know how it operates, although we can see the results of its operations. Scientifically, the challenge is to research civicsness in concrete complex contexts, which are shaped by specific institutional arrangements and trajectories. In order to do this, my choice here has been to relate civicsness to a set of relationships that are taking place in the context of the modern welfare state and to the roles of the state and the third sector. This leads me to three interconnected themes which will guide my analysis in this chapter. The first theme is the relationship between civicsness and the third sector, since social relationships, organizations and rationalities in this arena have often been associated with features of civicsness. The question here is whether a strong third sector contributes to civicsness or whether specific qualities must be present in the third sector in order to do so. The second theme is the link between civicsness and the idea of a ‘public’, which is broader than the interests represented in the state, that
is, the notion of a general interest. Even though the notion of general interest is contingent, contextual and disputed, the existence of this semantics helps to give coherence to a differentiated society (Münkler/Fischer 2002), which, ultimately, does not need to agree about everything all the time. Thus, the question arises of which contextual conditions are necessary in the state and civil society for the existence of civicness conceived as general interest. The third theme is a conception of social services as social relationships involving a civic attitude of commitment to others and a sense of community – local, national or global – and mutual respect. This relates to the capacity of the ‘other’ to participate in the definition of the social relationship of care in the context of a community where these relationships are articulated.

In this chapter, I will describe the existing arrangements and the trends of change in social services in the Portuguese social protection system, and the relationship between the state and the third sector shaping and being shaped by these arrangements. Portugal is an interesting case because despite displaying the general features of the European social model, it has not followed the typical path of welfare state modernization that can be discerned in the core European countries (Santos 1991). Portugal has had particular mixes between the state, the market, the family and the third sector that has led some authors to place it in the Southern European welfare model (Andreoti et al. 2001). This case is useful, then, to investigate whether the discourses and practices associated with the idea of civicness depend on a specific trajectory and configuration associated to liberal democratic states and developed welfare states, even as those welfare states are being restructured. In Portugal, the liberal separations between state, market and society are more recent than in many core European countries as a result of Portugal’s recent historical trajectory – a 41-year dictatorship followed by a revolution which initiated the processes of democratization and modernization towards the European social model. Although change was already being made in the 1960s, particularly by the modernizing elites within the political system, the Carnation Revolution of 1974 lent considerable impetus to the modernization of the welfare state. However, the international context was no longer favourable and the national context presented structural handicaps. These handicaps included a lack of industrial development and substantial rural population, the celebration of a culture of isolation and social backwardness by the Dictatorship, a division of work between the state and the Catholic Church which delegated control over many areas of welfare (poverty, health, social services) to its organizations, and a highly fragmented social structure, with the coexistence of various political models during and after the Revolution. Despite these initial conditions, the country has been approaching the core European welfare states, although some social indicators still reveal major handicaps, particularly relating to poverty and inequality. An important element in this process was Portugal’s accession to the EEC in 1986. Recently, Portugal’s social security system has begun to depart from its almost exclusive focus on work-related benefits.
Researching civics contexts and conditions

and introduced the guaranteed minimum income, measures against poverty and social exclusion, as well as welfare policies and public-private partnerships, inspired to a significant extent by the European social policy. This adds to the impact of structural funds in promoting infrastructural development, local development, anti-poverty measures, training and qualification, project-led third-sector organizations (TSOs), as well as the insertion of welfare professionals in European epistemic communities.

The case of Portugal exhibits variety in relation to the trajectory of the core European countries, sharing aspects and processes both with the other countries of the Southern European model in terms of history, as well as with some of the newest members of the EU in terms of the accession process. It demonstrates the contextual nature of definitions of the state and civil society, and of the semantics of separation and the idea of civics.

In this chapter, I use the distinction between provision, funding and regulation developed in theories of welfare pluralism and mixed economies of welfare (Powell 2007). This distinction provides a useful heuristic tool with which to observe the interdependency and co-evolution of the state and the third sector, as well as the way the distinctions between state and third sector have been used in shaping governance and reform in discourses and in practice. I will consider the governance logics typical of the state and the third sector, and consider the growing trend for mixes between the different modes of governance. Inspired by the strategic relational approach (Jessop 2007), I will argue that mixes of the typical modes of governance (Jessop 1998) of the state (command), the market (exchange), the community (love) and of networks and associations (dialogue) can be found within the different sectors, particularly as specific governance logics are being strategically mobilized in the processes of change in specific sectors.

I will analyse the case of social services, where the mixing between state and third sector has been significant. As in other countries, this area has not been at the core of the welfare state’s traditional responsibilities and mixing between the private and public sectors has been common. However, it is also clear that this mixing is growing in importance, specifically due to its framing in certain European policies including the European Employment Strategy and the Lisbon Agenda. Here, I will consider ‘social services’ to mean those which are institutionalized and placed under the responsibility of the state, or given a more generic quality of public interest and, thus, state-provided, state-funded or state-regulated. This is not to say that other forms of care, such as care which takes place in the family, are irrelevant. Nor does it imply that the specific nature of the state’s responsibilities are immutable. As for informal care, there are interdependencies between the ‘public’ forms of care and the arrangements which take place within families and communities, particularly since informal care and the ‘welfare society’ have been identified as significant elements of the Portuguese welfare system. However, due to the specific features identified in this welfare society (Wall et al. 2001), I will exclude it from the
concept of civickness. As for state responsibilities, any particular group of social services can only be contextually defined after a debate about what is to be considered a collective responsibility. It is this public quality of social care that I will focus on.

The field of social services is undergoing changes in many societies, but these changes seem to pull in opposite directions (Bahle 2003). On the one hand, there is a growing variety of providers, public and private, and the participation of a wider number of state departments and other levels of government. On the other hand, there is a trend towards increasing state control, particularly at the metagovernance level – the level of the organization of governance (Jessop 1998) –, over which services are provided, who provides them and how they are provided. These changes can be seen either as an attempt to restrain the expansionary logic of the welfare state or as a reorientation of priorities and strategies of public welfare.

In the next section, I will describe the existing mixes in provision, funding and regulation in social services in Portugal, with an emphasis on the issues involved in the concept of civickness – namely, the public quality of social services. I will point out recent reform trends which are relevant in the way that they articulate developments in the governance of social services and what the idea of civickness actually involves. In the second section, I will discuss the changes in the relationship between the state and the third sector and how the current changes are impacting on existing relationships, particularly in the marking of the borders between state and third sector.

This text is based on an analysis of secondary statistical data and legal and other official documents, along with information and statements from the actors involved which have been circulated in the press. I used content analysis of documents and narrative policy analysis as methodologies, particularly devoting attention to the discursive and material aspects provided by the official documents and utterances from different collective actors, in indications of the effectiveness of policies, in the emerging tensions and resistances and in the quantitative data related to policy outcomes.

2. Mixes in social services: quasi-market, quasi-state, quasi-community

This section will describe mixes in social services, the outcome of these different mixes from the point of view of different governance logics, and the trends of change in these relationships. Even if we regard provision, regulation and financing autonomously as part of a heuristic strategy by which to trace the contours of the welfare mix in social services, in reality these elements interact in many complex ways. What becomes clear is that we cannot place civickness within a particular sector or particular institutions, neither is civickness necessarily the outcome purely
Researching civeness contexts and conditions

of the existence of mixing, including combinations which involve the state and the third sector. On the contrary, these mixes may contribute to producing service relationships which are characterized by the exact opposite of civeness: stigmatization, inequality, injustice, passivity, clientelism and paternalism. It is thus important to consider how the different sectors interact and influence each other to produce the qualities of social services.

3. The mixes in provision

Social services were provided mainly by TSOs before a modern system of social protection was set up and this keeps being so. This is in contrast to the situation of health and education services which have stronger state provision. In 2000, 80% of social services were provided by non-profit organizations, 15.4% by for-profit organizations and 4.6% by public services (DEPP/MTS 2000a). Figure 12 shows the evolution in these figures over recent years: an increase of 146 non-profit organizations per year and 178 new services, mostly provided by TSOs. It is revealing that government reports do not distinguish between public and non-profit provision, merging them under a ‘solidarity network’. However, the public ownership of social services is residual and, in some cases, publicly owned services are managed by TSOs through management agreements.

The decline in the number of non-profit services in 2006 is explained by, among other things, the impact of state policies in the area of after-school care as well as the fall in demand for some services in parts of the country affected by demographic trends. On the other hand, although the commercial sector has more than doubled in size since 1998, this growth has not been followed by a corresponding increase in the number of services because enterprises are very small. This sector has been having difficulty in sustaining its services as exemplified in the fact that in 2005, 19% of for-profits’ services were shut down due to non-compliance with legal demands concerning quality (DGEEP/MTSS 2005). This illustrates the weakness of provision in this sector and the difficulty of expanding commercial provision.

1 The increase in the number of organizations despite the closure of services is due to the fact that organizations are not immediately dissolved, or the fact is not reported. The same factor explains the data on for-profit organizations, as the number of services is lower than the number of enterprises.
In terms of the type of services, as shown in Figure 2, services for the elderly are strongly represented – these include day centres, homes or domiciliary care. Children’s services, such as nurseries, crèches, after-school care and childminders are also strongly represented. This type of services, which relate directly to supporting the care work of families, account for 87.9% of total services. In 2000, crèches and homes for older people accounted for 84% of services provided by for-profit organizations and 49% of those of non-profit organizations.

In recent years, under the aegis of the social investment philosophy and as proposed in the European Employment Strategy and the Lisbon Agenda, the Portuguese government, like governments in other countries (Evers et al. 2005), has been promoting the expansion of children’s services by increasing the availability of care services and the transformation of care services into education services (in the form of pre-school and after-school activities). State investment in services for the elderly is also increasing to match unmet demand related to demographic trends, and is also meeting new objectives and services. In all these cases, the existence of

In the National Action Plan for Social Inclusion the government committed to doubling available places in crèches to match the Barcelona target of 33% (as it is mentioned) and, in the National Employment Plan, it committed to reaching 90% coverage in pre-school – also the Barcelona target - and 100% for 5 years old children.
mixes in provision was retained or widened to include other actors such as for-profit providers and local authorities, and stronger mechanisms for the coordination of existing providers were put in place by the state.

**Figure 2.** Relative weight of social services by area, 2005

[Diagram showing relative weight of social services by area, 2005.]

Source: DGEEP/MTSS (2005)

The third significant group of services is for people with disabilities, namely occupational support, homes or domiciliary care. Important providers in this area are parent associations, professional associations and cooperatives for people with learning disabilities, the latter being the best example of social enterprises in Portugal (Perista/Nogueira 2006). Services to tackle poverty or social exclusion and advocacy services are residual. None of these areas had been a priority of the public system until recently, and the mobilization of public opinion around these issues has been weak, although the role played by specific TSOs to include them on the political agenda has been crucial. Both mental health services and services for people with HIV/AIDS are often provided by TSOs which are led by users and advocate their interests. However, they are also weaker in terms of organizational capacity, have an historical lack of recognition by the state (Lopes 2001), and suffer from the lack of public investment and responsibility in this areas. Large bureaucratized non-profit organizations are also developing new services and projects alongside family services, for instance in providing support to victims of violence or establishing community projects in deprived neighbourhoods.
To sum up, significant investment is going into services to support working families in the context of an economic model traditionally based on low wages, feminized economic sectors and the dual-income family. Many of the services that directly address the social exclusion of specific groups are relatively new and less developed, and this is reflected by the low priority given to the poverty and social exclusion agenda before the first European anti-poverty programmes (Rodrigues 1999). Furthermore, if the state fails to acknowledge and support provision, TSOs can hardly flourish given the scarce resources of the bulk of the population and the lack of any philanthropic and volunteering tradition (Franco et al. 2005).

The identification of gaps in provision was made possible with a governmental tool consisting of a database that included information about all the services and providers (called Carta Social). As the state acknowledges more responsibility, other features of provision also become more problematic, such as the territorial distribution of provision. While some municipalities are well above the national average in terms of coverage of the population, others – particularly the big cities – are well below. For instance, in the case of child care the range of coverage is 7% to 125%, with a national average of 22.3%. In services for the elderly the range is 5.6% to 63% with a national average of 11.1% (GEP/MTSS 2006). Although there are also demographic effects, such as population ageing and migration, the local logic for setting up these services has contrasted with the rationality of public provision which prioritizes national cohesion. Non-profit services often emerge as a result of local identity issues, local capacity and the role of local leaders.

On the other hand, as the state assumes more regulatory control over provision and reorients priorities, the existing relationships are challenged. This has been apparent in recent changes towards transforming a section of children’s care services into universal and free education and placing these services under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. This has given rise to problems for non-profit providers and tense political relationships, though there were at times positive effects for the public interest. In one case, the generalization of pre-school care led to the extension of the availability of existing care services provided by TSOs to public schools. In another case which involved a two-hour increase in primary school hours, many non-profit organizations providing after-school services were threatened with the possibility of closure. With some organizations struggling for survival, one of the TSO’s confederation promoted a petition to change the law, which included demands revealing a mix of logics such as users right to choose the provider, the assessment of the new services according to the same criteria as those in place for the TSO-provided services, the preference for TSOs as providers, and a quite novel demand for universal and free access to pre-school care, education and after-school care. In these two cases the changes did not imply any increase in direct state provision, but rather more mixing of providers – particularly in the second case, since commercial providers for the additional hours were often preferred to the non-profit organizations.
Researching civicness contexts and conditions

4. The mixes in financing

In the ‘social action’ section of the Social Security Budget of 2005, 76% of all expenditure was related to cooperation agreements, the contract-type arrangements between the public administration and the organizations with the status of IPSS (Private Institutions for Social Solidarity) for the provision of social services. For each organization, these cooperation agreements stipulate which service is to be provided – from a limited range of services –, the number of users and the rights and duties of both state agency and provider. For TSOs, they also include transparency rules, the amounts payable and other aspects related to their duty of assisting lower-income groups. Once established, the agreements remain in place indefinitely, unless serious problems arise in terms of lack of compliance or if the government decides to discontinue the service. Despite this privileged relationship between IPSS and government, the data from the Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-Profit Sector Project in Portugal shows that non-profit organisation’s income from private sources, particularly fees, totals 66%, while government subsidies represent only 36% and philanthropy 7% (Franco et al. 2005). Because of the significant proportion of user fees, Portugal is quantitatively closer to the funding mix of liberal welfare regimes like those of the US or the UK (Ferreira 2006).

In considering the governing logic of the funding relationships, we also observe rather complex mixes. Under the terms of the typical cooperation agreement, the state pays a fixed amount per user (which is annually nationally agreed with the main associations) for a specific set of services. Organizations charge fees to the users according to their family income and there are ‘non-mandatory’ public guidelines to establish what proportion of the user’s income should be used as fee, with variations between services. In the best situations, organizations have a quota for the various income levels and operate on the basis of internal redistribution, so that low-income users can access the services. In these cases, a maximum number of lower-income users is set. Thus, access to the services depends on a number of factors: the balance between the pressure to attend to the most in need, the amount of funding that is allocated by the state, the resources and needs of the clients and the specific community, the organizational survival strategies and the relationships between the local population and leaders of the organization. All these variables that go towards shaping concrete circumstances are not prone to the establishment of a single institutionality for civicness, but may create the opportunity for local solidarity and quality concerns, provided that lower-income users or the more expensive needs are not creamed out. Access to the services depends on a mix of norms and particularistic relationships. Generally, users interact directly with the TSO, which decides whether the user can access the service and the amount of the fee. Normally, this decision is made on the basis of the tax declaration, but local knowledge and moral considerations about the user and his/her family are also taken into consideration.
Even if they are highly reliant on market resources, the services provided by non-profit organizations are different from those offered by the commercial organizations. Comparative data from 1998 shows that in many cases, non-profit fees are lower than the for-profit charges, with differences between services. The biggest difference lies in the minimum values charged to the users, meaning that people with lower incomes can only access the services of non-profit organizations. In pre-school care, for instance, the minimum charge levied by for-profit organizations was ten times higher than the fee of non-profit organizations. As for the maximum fee, a substantial number of non-profit organizations were charging the same amounts as for-profit organizations. In elderly homes, the difference in the minimum payment was around eight times higher in for-profit organizations, while the maximum fees of non-profit organizations were about half of the maximum fees of for-profit organizations (DEPP/MTS 2000b). The effect of the state transfers is thus very evident in reducing the prices of non-profit organizations, even if user payments still play an important role. The internal redistribution operated by TSOs means that they compete with the commercial providers for the same higher-income users.

It is now publicly acknowledged that these arrangements create negative outcomes, both in terms of a state rationality and of the sustainability of organizations and their public interest status\(^3\). A report by the Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Contas 2001) made it officially known that the contractual arrangements between public administration and the TSOs raised problems of justice and accountability, specifically in terms of fairness and equity of access. The report stated that the state was unable to determine who benefited from the services that it was impossible to guarantee that beneficiaries were those most in need, that organizations were discourage from focusing on the most disadvantaged groups of the population and territories (since the amount paid by the state fails to take account of the differences between users and territories).

The growing acknowledgement of these problems has meant that some attempts at changing the funding relationship are underway. There was a Compact in 1996 between the government and the three representatives of social services TSOs, which, however, failed to make much impact and, more recently, there was the annual cooperation protocol, signed between the government and the three national peak organizations which states:

Given that all citizens should have equal access to social services, this new model of financing, through direct state support to families according to family income, aims primarily at facilitating the increased access of those citizens with less resources to social services,

\(^3\) Research noted similar issues, see Hespanha et al. 2000.
Researching civics contexts and conditions

making state support to families most in need more transparent, and reinforcing the principles of equity and social justice.

To implement a new financing model which prevents negative discrimination in access to services, it is fundamental to establish clear rules about how families are supported by the state as well as the way families participate in financing the various social services.

The principle of direct subsidies to families is contentious as it threatens TSOs and the model of the relationship between the state and organizations. The major peak organization claims:

There has been talk about subsidizing families. Let us discuss how to take the family into consideration when we define the frameworks to support organizations, so that these can continue without major changes in providing the services that families and communities need.

When the state finances a service, it acknowledges duties and acquires obligations: to support the organization to which it grants social and civic competencies and to which it delegates responsibilities (CNIS n.d.).

Little, then, seems to have changed in the semantic competition for the privileged relationship with citizens. In practice the measures that have been implemented so far have consisted of introducing a variation in the amount paid per user according to the intensity of the user’s needs and the nature of the services provided, although reforms are still underway.

5. The mixes in regulation

Whether social services are social rights has traditionally constituted one of the cleavage lines between the political left and right in Portugal. After 1974, political programmes pointed to universalistic models which were operationalized through various pragmatic mixes with different outcomes in different sectors of the welfare system. The social services sector, with its predominance of non-profit providers, was brought under the aegis of the same local bodies of the national public administration, called Social Security, that managed contributory and non-contributory benefits. Social services played a residual role in the public system, managed by a sub-sector of the social security administration called ‘Social Action’, which organized its relationship with users according to a discretionary logic.

Since the mid-1990s, an attempt has been made to change the governance logic in the field of social services through the use of new governance tools and, particularly,

4 Cooperation Protocol from 2006 between the Ministry of Work and Social Solidarity and the National Confederation of Solidarity Institutions, September 2006.
of a mix of these in the shadow of hierarchy, that is, coordinated by the national state. This has been accompanied by the explicit formulation of social services as social rights and a stronger regulatory role for the state. The 2000 Social Security Act stipulates that the state will coordinate a network of public and private non-profit providers, that ‘Social Action’ is a state responsibility, and that provision is carried out by public providers or in cooperation with private non-profit providers under state planning. The guiding principles for this provision are the satisfaction of basic needs, prevention, equity and social justice, social development, contractualization, personalization, selectivity and flexibility, partnership and volunteering. These are all characteristics that we can recognize as the institutional conditions for civickness.

These changes are part of a wider international trend (Bahle 2003). As states acknowledge that provision can be carried out by private actors, it strengthens its own role in coordinating and monitoring provision, and framing the features of social services. Many of these policies take place at the metagovernance level, which allows decentralization without loss of control. Responsibility is transferred from central government to local government and governmental capacity is distributed to a range of actors at the local level through partnerships.

These trends are well illustrated in the reframing of the principle of subsidiarity, which has only now been explicitly mentioned in social security legislation despite being present for much longer, not least because it constitutes a central element in the social doctrine of the Catholic Church5. Thus, in the 2007 Social Security System Act, the principle of subsidiarity means that it is the state that defines the objectives:

The principle of subsidiarity is based on the acknowledgement of the essential role of people, families and other non-public institutions in pursuing the social security objectives [my emphasis], namely in the development of social action (Lei 4/2007, January 16th).

The state has used two main mechanisms to shape the nature of the services provided by TSOs. The first is to guarantee that TSO’s workers are qualified – this forms part of the conditions for the cooperation agreements. The intended effect is institutional isomorphism with the public sector through introducing principles of provision that privilege techno-professional norms. The second mechanism by which the state shapes TSO-provided services involves the use of cooperation agreements. Typical cooperation agreements – which are the subject of national negotiations between the government and the peak organizations – concern only a

5 Catholic Church organisations and church inspired organisations have a strong presence in social services TSO (Capucha 1995).
limited range of services such as crèches, after school care, children’s homes, elderly homes, day centers, domiciliary care, centres for occupational activities and supported housing for people with disabilities, which are the substantial part of social services as seen before. These services are highly regulated through guidelines which include norms on the numbers and qualifications of staff, on space distribution, on the provision of care, on the relationship with users and so on. These norms also produce institutional isomorphism. Nevertheless, mechanisms are in place for more flexible and less standardized provision. These are known as atypical cooperation agreements and allow the specificities of provision to be taken into account and, ultimately, the capacity of users to participate in defining the nature of the services according to their needs and aspirations, depending on the internal governance of the TSO. However, these contracts are harder to elaborate and negotiate, and depend on highly developed technical skills, good relationships, and closely monitoring the services. The services are developed on a one-to-one basis and regulation is displaced from the national corporatist arrangements to the level of the specific relationship between the TSO and the local public agency. These arrangements are in place for services for people with disabilities, mental health services, community services and support for people with HIV/AIDS or drug abuse, which are the residual part of the social services subsystem.

Notwithstanding the existing regulations, there was a lack of control over the quality of services, which became increasingly unacceptable by the state and the public. In 1998, a more proactive scrutiny body began regular assessments in cooperation with the peak organizations. These assessments, in addition to monitoring quality, also brought to light practices of mismanagement, non-compliance with the contracts and the abuse of user’s rights in some organizations. This led to a more critical public view of social service provision, and pressure on both the government and providers.

There has recently been a debate on quality assessment and certification for all types of organizations – public, profit and non-profit. There are several competing initiatives by consultancy enterprises, peak organizations and individual TSOs and the government producing quality standards and quality measurement procedures which may jeopardise attempts at state regulation. Nevertheless the government, in cooperation with the peak organizations produced a ‘Cooperation Programme for the Development and Quality of Social Services’ which has led to the publication of some models for quality assessment which are to apply to all types of providers. The norms of quality published in the context of the governmental quality programme are illustrative of the changes underway, although it remains to be seen what will actually be put into place. The quality models create a differentiation between mandatory elements and voluntary elements, the former being a condition for entering into cooperation agreements and the latter assigning a ‘quality mark’ to the organisation. It is at this level that many often claimed attributes of the third sector are to be found while at the mandatory level we find attributes theoretically more
typical of commercial enterprises. For instance, in the case of the model for day centres for older people, the mandatory level includes current norms of quality, health and safety, and new elements that regulate the relationship between the organization and the user, such as Individual Development Plans. These Individual Development Plans are monitored and regularly reassessed by all those involved, with client satisfaction taking priority. They create the possibility of changes in the content or price of the services. At this mandatory level, there is also a stronger emphasis on the management of organizations (e.g., having a document stating the mission, vision, values and quality policy), labour legislation, communication channels and working meetings, strategic and operational objectives and action plans. The voluntary elements for day care centres emphasize the efficiency of processes, user participation, the involvement and participation of families, and matching the expectations and needs of clients, workers, providers, partners, the community and the wider society (ISS/MTS 2006). They epitomize ‘good practices’ in the management of organizations, such as the participation of all stakeholders, accountability, motivation on the part of workers, social responsibility and partnerships. At the level of the specific service provision, what is valued at this voluntary level is the co-production of services, volunteering and personal development activities, the involvement of clients in assessing the overall service and indicators of and processes for improvement. It also includes other service quality indicators such as the satisfaction of users and workers, the participation of workers and users in assessment and improvement processes, the participation of the community in the activities of the service, the assessment of the impact of the service on the community, environmental concerns and benchmarking.

This model of quality is exemplary of the current mixes and particularly of strategies for mixing elements typical of one governance mode with another. It is presented explicitly as a market mechanism to support state objectives and seeks to go beyond the aspirations of the community. Two main ideas can be picked out: the first is the metamorphosis of ‘citizen’ into ‘client’ which the document creates. In the paragraph entitled “Focus on the citizen/client”, it is stated that “the client is the final referee of the quality of the service and clients’ loyalty, like their retention and increases in market share, is best maximized through a clear focus on the needs and expectations of current and potential clients” (ISS/MTS 2006); the second is the reframing of the relationship between the state and the community in a paragraph entitled “public responsibility”: “the long-term interests of the organization and their staff are better served if an ethical approach is adopted and the expectations and regulations of the community are largely exceeded” (ISS/MTS 2006). It is this mix
Researching civicness contexts and conditions

between market and state governance, then, which mitigates the shortcomings of the elements of community governance present in the social services system (amateurism, particularism, paternalism).  

6. Changes in the borders of social services’ governance

Many of the arguments used to justify the place occupied by the third sector in welfare have implied the establishment of a separation between state, market, community and the third sector, which welfare pluralism has helped to support (Perri 6/Leat 1997). However, in recent trends – described as ‘the shift from government to governance’ – new methods of public management and the increasing role of for-profit providers point to the need for a new justification of the role of the third sector. However, besides the specific tensions associated with the changes in existing relationships, there are contradictory trends in policy. The most obvious of these is that which, at the same time as blurring the roles of public, private and third-sector providers and the framework in which they operate, also rearticulates these differences by making an appeal for shared responsibility between the three sectors in the governance of welfare.

I will now consider the trajectory of the governance mix in social services in Portugal. This section will examine the trend towards the growing separation between service and provider, which is also present in the idea of civicness as a quality of social-services relationships which has no specific sectoral setting although it can have its own institutional conditions.

During the dictatorship, non-profit organizations, which at that time had the status of ‘administrative public utility’, were delegated the task of organizing and providing social services. The government intervened in the boards of the organizations but hardly intervened in the governance of services, since the subsidiarity principle meant that the state had a supplementary role. After the revolution in 1974, when the system of social protection based on the notion of social rights began to take shape, the first framework for service-provider TSOs placed them under the aegis of the welfare state – which, in any case, the TSOs also helped to shape –, but removed state control over the boards. In the context of the statist emphasis, the first statute of the IPSS, in 1979, defined the identity of the TSOs and placed them within the social security system, under state control over

6 The aspects pointed out by Salamon (1987) as voluntary failures.
services and organizations. The cooperation framework also included close monitoring of the organizations’ activities by public officers with the power to propose changes to services, to define or support the staff qualification plans of the organizations and, if requested by the organizations, support the launch of new programmes, support the administration and evaluation of the organization and even the design of the organizational action plans. Soon, organizations were pressing for greater autonomy, which coincided with a change in policy orientation towards a residual role for the state in welfare. During the first half of the 1980s, the statute and the framework of the cooperation agreements were revised. In the statute, organizations were removed from the public system and in the cooperation agreements, the supporting role of public agencies, the obligation to accept users according to state guidelines and the obligation to comply with the norms regarding quality and staff were removed. Responsibility for services and governance was put in the hands of the organizations, but the state retained most of the financial responsibility, as organizations were ‘entitled’ to state funding in 70% to 80% of the cost of the service, unless they could find additional funding. The rest was to be covered by users payments.

In the late 1980s, the government increased the centralization of control and strengthened the mediating role of the national representatives of the TSOs. This was done by negotiating and signing the annual protocol that governs the provision and by sharing the governance of social services through participation in consultative bodies and in policy development. However, the corporatist relationship is tense and often emerges through the discourses mixed with elements of other governance logics. The TSOs claim that the statute of the IPSS implies excessive state control over them and that this control is only appropriate in the case of the services that fall under the cooperation agreements, which should be treated as market-type contracts. On the other hand, under the semantics of community and the subsidiarity principle, they claim their ‘right’ to state funding and to take priority in provision, on the grounds that it is the responsibility of organizations to ‘help’ and that they must be enabled to do this.

As described previously, recent policy changes, particularly since the mid 1990s, have included an acknowledgment of the varying types of providers along with a strengthening of state metagovernance. This shift was marked by the separation between service and provider in 1997. For the first time, the services of profit and non-profit organizations were grouped within the same licensing framework for

---

7 The Statute is ascribed to organizations which contribute to the objectives of the social security system or the health system, which includes specific social services, and have the organizational form of association, foundation, mutual or Catholic Church organization.
Researching civickness contexts and conditions

health and safety rules and the same specific service requirements were applied concerning space, staff and the number of users. The services, and not organizations, were given the status of ‘public utility’. Thus, under the new framework, it is increasingly difficult to argue that the organization is of public interest simply because of the services it provides, which is in conflict with the statute of IPSS whose revision has also been a contested issue. Furthermore, as the quality framework for social services shows, even the qualities normally ascribed to TSOs as part of civil society are no longer exclusive to the TSOs, and may be present in any type of provider. However, the voluntary aspects of this framework, which we could associate with civickness in social services, have been removed from the core of the service relationship between the state and the providers. The voluntary aspects are considered in isolation from the mandatory elements, and recognized with a ‘quality mark’ which in practice has no concrete implications.

At the level of the service relationship, the separation between service and provider means that there is generally an increasing propinquity to the governance logic typical of the market. This is used strategically to manage the stickiness of the existing relationships in this area, particularly as these conflict with the new public objectives. Simultaneously, there are other policy trends which can be described by the ‘shift from government to governance and metagovernance’, particularly in the case of the local partnerships for policy development. These partnerships include public administration and TSOs as privileged partners. The best example is the national programme of the Rede Social (Social Network), a policy partnership established at the local level. The Rede Social identifies local needs, establishes priorities, develops medium-term strategies, makes decisions regarding local provision and coordinates work between partners. But these innovations also impact on traditional corporatist relationships. Third-sector service providers are no longer the only privileged partners and there is a broader agenda, including an orientation towards the local community, local development and the fight against social exclusion. This also means that the TSOs must look beyond their interests as providers or beyond the interests of the specific group they serve, and incorporate the wider local interest. However, local solidarity, participation and civickness do not emerge simply because partnerships are in place, but depend on the local context. In some cases, then, partnerships may restrict the number of actors playing the community governance role to those which are interested in and capable (resourced, skilled) of participating, and thereby reproduce corporatist arrangements or reinforce the power of certain actors. The partnerships themselves are a stage in the local struggle for control over the field of social services, particularly in the context of competition between the different providers. Organizations which do not usually see themselves as part of the public sphere may develop an attitude which is purely instrumentalist and self-interested, rendering the development of any idea of a local common interest impossible. The partnership may become a purely formal exercise
in complying with the demands made by national government and does not necessarily reflect any real desire to be effective and implement real change.

7. Conclusion

The previous sections have described the mixes in social services in Portugal. The case of Portugal includes complex arrangements for the provision, financing and regulation and mixes of governance logics in state, community and market. It also reflects historical trajectories with the path-shifting trends of a society in the process of modernization, reinforced by the process of ‘Europeanization’. Underlying this case is the idea that the structural conditions, the institutional framework and the relationships between the actors are all of importance in a discussion of the possibilities of civicness in social services in concrete social systems. Our conception of civicness thus implies that social services are inserted into the framework of the ‘imagined’ public interest, as represented by the state, and that civil society actors contribute to framing civicness in an inclusive way. Social services in the Portuguese welfare system are undergoing modernization, recently having been framed by a semantic of rights and social justice between groups and territories, but this is happening under a new policy framework for welfare, more attentive to the aspirations of users. However, it is ‘modernity’, here conceived of as including liberal separations under functionally differentiated systems, which seems to lack in the relationship between the state and the third sector. The place of the third sector in the Portuguese welfare state is contradictory because it occupies a central role in the state as the main provider and has an important role in the regulation of social services but has, at the same time, a conflicting relationship with principles of state regulation. We can discern a pre-modern version of the subsidiarity principle, one that does not incorporate a notion of the public sphere but aims to shape definitions of the public interest, placing relationships between providers and users in a private sphere. Furthermore, the discourses of antagonism and separation between the state and the third sector disguise the fact that state and third sector are in fact co-evolving and mutually shaping each other. It is thus also clear that the existing mixes serve important purposes: 1) it is helping to reduce the care responsibilities of women, allowing them to enter the labour market more easily, which will contribute to making Portugal an atypical case in the Southern European welfare model (Trifiletti 1999); 2) it is helping alleviate pressure on wages by allowing the possibility of the dual breadwinner model in a low waged, low qualified labour market; 3) it is allowing the state to maintain its legitimacy as a welfare state without incurring the costs of the equivalent financial investment or the responsibility for the way services were being provided; 4) it is reproducing the situation which has traditionally characterized the Portuguese welfare state, whereby
Researching civics contexts and conditions

citizenship is associated only with the condition of being a worker while leaving significant gaps for the remaining population; 5) it is creating a substantial TSO sector to provide core public services, characterized by a hierarchical standardized nature of state governance mixed with elements of community and market governance.

The prevalence of social inequalities and the ineffectiveness of social benefits in reducing poverty and inequality in Portugal (Ferreira 2006) raise doubts about the existence of a civic culture of concern for a general other, as well as the conditions for the development of such a civic culture. Oorschot/Arts (2005) find that the indicators of social capital which relate to participation in associations, political engagement and trust tend to be found in more generous and egalitarian welfare states, whereas the indicator of social capital which is strong in Portugal is the reliance on family networks, which is not a good substitute for welfare in the notion of civics. Nevertheless, we can find signs of change in social services and in the relationship between state and civil society, with conceptions of rights in new areas, a public opinion that is more attentive to issues of quality, policies of devolution, local partnerships, community participation and other initiatives that are creating new public spaces and broadening the participation of civil society actors. In many of these new arenas, there are new participants alongside the old participants and new needs and issues may emerge. At the level of metagovernance, the state plays a central role, in shaping these new arenas by defining: who are the members and the stakeholders, where does accountability lie and which accountability rationale will prevail, how are these networks of governance interconnected and connected to the national and the supra-national levels, what is their remit and their real capacity to shape the conditions for their success. Interestingly, in Portugal, stronger state regulation and a broader assumption of state responsibilities seem to have been made possible through the alchemy of governance mixes. This mixing has allowed the destabilization of the existing institutions by establishing institutional ambiguity (Hajer 2003). This may help to render institutions less sticky. However, the conditions for civics in social services remain to be seen at the level of implementation, and also depend on the emergence of a discourse on civics which still lacks a place to be originated.

References


DEPP/MTS (2000b): Carta social – Rede de serviços e equipamentos. Lisbon: Departamento de estudos, Prospectiva e planeamento/Ministério do trabalho e da solidariedade.


Researching civicsness contexts and conditions


Chapter 13

Bernard Enjolras

Between market and civic governance regimes: civicness in the governance of social services in Europe

Modernization processes within the field of social services in Europe are developing according to two radically different regulatory conceptions, which are reflected in two different governance regimes: market-based or competitive governance versus civic-based or partnership governance. The governance of social services in Europe seems to be based on a mix or compromise between these two idealtypical governance regimes. The civic dimension of this mixed governance is enhanced by the interplay of institutional and political mechanisms of representation, deliberation and participation.

1. Introduction

This chapter addresses policy changes relating to the regulation and governance of social services in Europe, changes that are usually presented in terms of ‘modernization’. ‘Modernization’ is a contested process involving a range of stakeholders, interests, ideologies and conceptions of the architecture and modes of organization of service-delivery. The development of the regulatory state, in combination with the new institutional landscape which characterizes the provision of social services, has led to a shift in the focus of attention from the internal workings of public organizations to the networks of actors on which they increasingly depend and to the issue of governance. The new governance paradigm has contributed to a transformation of our understanding of policy-making and implementation processes.

The dominant view of the policy process has long been that of pluralism. According to the pluralist perspective, power is not hierarchically arranged, but stems from a bargaining process and competition between numerous groups which represent different interests. The pluralist approach to public policy tends to assume that public policy is the outcome of a free competition between ideas and interests. Pluralist approaches have led to the development of new models such as those of policy networks and communities (Rhodes 1987) which aim to take account of how policy-making processes and structures evolve. These concepts indicate in some
way the link between government agencies and organized groups and underline the fact that policy is made within a complex setting and involves the interaction of many actors. The policy network approach, on the other hand, is an approach to governance which underlines both the interactive nature of policy processes and the institutional context in which these processes take place. In order to take into account these evolutions and to compare the governance issues associated to these services from a cross-country perspective, this chapter develops a conceptual framework around the notion of governance regime. This approach is based on the analysis of the institutional frameworks for the provision of social services (mainly long-term care services, child care services and labour market services) in eight European countries: the UK, Germany, France, Sweden, Italy, Belgium and Slovenia. The first section develops a conceptual framework of governance regimes that aims to understand the institutional changes taking place in the countries under review. The second section analyses the main trends that characterize the regulation and governance of social services in these countries. The conclusion identifies a new governance-mix resulting from the compromise between two ideal-typical governance regimes.

2. The civic dimension as repertoire of action

Actors can face recurring situations in which they are better off if they coordinate their actions. As a reaction to this, these actors may also tend to adopt the same behaviour each time they encounter the same situation. However, insofar as actors interact in different types of situation which require them to coordinate their actions, they need to rely on a common understanding of the situation. The understanding of the situation is itself facilitated by the coordination mechanism, which is perceived by the actor as institutionalized. These patterns of coordination may be seen as institutionalized, since from an ethnomethodological approach, “reality, while socially constructed is experienced as inter-subjective world known-or-knowable-in-
common-with-other” (Zucker 1977: 727). These coordination patterns are institutionalized acts since they are perceived as both objective and exterior. They are objective to the extent that “they are repeatable by other actors without changing the common understanding of the act”; they are exterior because their subjective understanding is reconstructed as inter-subjective understanding, so that they are seen as part of the external world. Coordination mechanisms result from behavioural conformity to a convention, but appear as objective to the actor. The term ‘convention’ must be understood here according to its general meaning and covers the generalized use of several phenomena (norms, rules, law, price) as coordination devices in recurring situations. These take on the role of signals according to which the actors orient their actions.

The “Economy of Grandeur” model (Boltanski/Thévenot 1991) extends the issue of coordination to all types of human activity. Human actions are conceived as a series of sequences where the persons involved have to mobilize a repertory of “justifiable actions” (Thévenot 1989) defined as reasonable actions to the extent that (i) the person who acts has good reasons for acting, reasons that are expressed in action registers, and (ii) the good reasons for acting have to be understandable and acceptable – that is to say, justifiable in the eyes of other persons.

When acting, individuals interact with other individuals who mobilize different action registers. When two persons mobilize the same register—in other words, when they use the same principles to justify and coordinate their actions— they are coordinated. When the justification principles which they use differ, on the other hand, one is confronted with a ‘dispute’.

The registers or worlds involved in justified actions are characterized by their objectivity. In order to be justifiable, the action needs to be based on forms of generality that go beyond contingency (Thévenot 1989). A form of objectivity is attached to each register or world. Coordination mechanisms that characterize a repertoire of action are common frameworks that allow transcending contingent particularities. Each register or world is characterized by a principle superior common that constitutes an order of the importance of the persons and objects qualified by this principle superior common. This quality of importance is consequently named grandeur. In the market world, the objects (the goods) and the persons (economic agents) are ordered according to their grandeur defined according to the principle superior common (the market). In the case of the market, then, persons are ordered according to their wealth and objects according to their prices. Wealth and prices are the sole grandeurs acceptable on the market.

The civic dimension may be also conceptualized as a ‘repertoire of action’ constituted by three features: (i) the pre-eminence of collectives (collective good, general will, public interest, solidarity, etc.); (ii) the prevalence of democratic rules of governance (representation, participation, deliberation, election) and (iii) the qualification of the persons and the regulation of relations between persons according to their rights and legal rules (law, citizenship, civil rights, social rights,
etc.). According to Boltanski/Thévenot (1991), in the civic world, the objects (legal forms) and the persons (collective persons and their representatives) are ordered on the basis of the grandeur defined by the principle superior common (the common will). The persons are ordered according to their representativity and the objects according to their legal forms.

On the basis of this analytical perspective, market and civicness therefore constitute two distinct repertoires of action and coordination mechanisms. They mobilize different systems of justification and deem persons and objects according to different value systems. These different repertoires of action may create conflict and lead to ‘critical’ situations. More generally, the existence of several coordination mechanisms opens up the possibility of interplay within a universe of several kinds (in which confrontation between several coordination mechanisms will occur) and which is characterized by ‘critical’ situations (Thevenot 1989: 175). In fact, the same person can successively or even simultaneously be involved in a market transaction and act according to civic principles.

Going from one coordination mechanism to another is destabilizing because it leads to a change in objectivity. In other words, the common presupposition on which an agreement or an equilibrium can be based is relinquished in order to provide room for another common presupposition. If there is a shift from a market transaction to a civic action, one proceeds from an agreement based on the terms of the exchange to a relationship based on rights. The meeting of the two logics brings with it the possibility of a crisis, since the very nature of what is probable is cast into doubt. Nevertheless, a crisis does not always occur. It is possible to try to avert a crisis through a compromise operation (Thevenot 1989). Such a compromise operation involves attempting to go “beyond the critical tension between two repertoires of action (coordination mechanism) by aiming for a common good which would not belong to either one of them, but which would include both of them” (Thevenot 1989: 177). Institutional forms and institutional regimes can therefore be analysed as arrangements which are able to include and stabilize (i.e. to realize compromises between) several coordination mechanisms and repertoires of action.

3. Conceptualizing institutionalized governance regimes

According to Wilson (2000: 255), “regime models are prominent in the international relations literature, have a small place in the urban policy literature, and are quite new to the policy literature”. In the literature on international regimes, these regimes tend to be organized around specific issue areas. Several dimensions of an international regime emerge from the literature. First, there is an organizational dimension which consists of states, social or political institutions. Second, regimes consist of mutually accepted decision-making procedures and agreed upon rules for
action. Third, regimes contain shared principles, norms and beliefs. Finally, regimes are organized around a particular issue. Regimes may be formal and the result of an established international organization, or they may be informal, loose arrangements around common interest and involve collaboration, mutually agreed organizational arrangements, goals and principles. In the literature on urban policy, a regime is defined as the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out the decisions necessary to govern. Harris and Milks (1996) define a regulatory regime as a constellation of (1) new ideas justifying governmental control over business activities, (2) new institutions that structure regulatory policies and (3) a new set of policies impinging on business.

For Wilson (2000: 257-258), policy regimes consist of four dimensions. The first is power or the arrangement of power. These arrangements involve the presence of one (or more) powerful interest groups which supports the policy regime. The second dimension is the policy paradigm. The dominant policy paradigm shapes the way problems are defined, the types of solutions offered, and the kind of policy proposed. The third dimension is the organization within government, the policy-making arrangements and the implementation structure. The fourth dimension is the policy itself. The policy embodies the goals of the policy regime. It also involves the rules and routines of the implementing agency. These goals, rules and routines legitimize the policy.

Building on these different regime definitions, we will characterize a governance regime by:

- The actors involved in the provision of services for the public interest and their characteristics (their goals and values, their institutional forms, their resources, the type of incentive they respond to, their legitimacy).
- The policy instruments used in order to reach public interest and how they are combined. It is possible to distinguish following three types of policy instruments (Peters/van Nispen 1998): regulatory instruments that seek to normalize the behaviour of social actors and are coercive in character; financial incentives of a non-coercive character and finally information transfer which are based on their force of conviction.
- The institutional modalities according to which the actors are coordinated and according to which they interact within a policy network. Policy instrument are not ‘self implementing’. Applying them requires organizational efforts. Organizational aspects are linked to the way in which policy formulation and policy implementation are institutionally linked.
3.1 Typology of governance regimes

A regime of governance may be characterized by three dimensions: the type of actors involved, the type of policy instruments used to implement the policy, and the type of institutional coordination used for policy making.

The types of actors may be categorized according to the nature of their institutional form, for-profit, public and non-profit. Each institutional form may be characterized by a specific structure of governance\(^2\). It is possible to identify five dimensions of a governance structure: the distribution of property rights, and in particular rights to residual claims; how decision making power is vested; the dominant mechanism of coordination that characterizes the institutional form; the principles of accountability; and the type of incentives that motivate the members of the board of directors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For-profit firms</th>
<th>Public enterprises</th>
<th>Non-profit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property rights</td>
<td>Shareholders</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>No owners of the residual claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(residual claims)</td>
<td>Proportionate to the share of the capital</td>
<td>Members of the board appointed by public authorities</td>
<td>Members of the board elected by the general assembly of members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision making</td>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Capitalist</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Monetary</td>
<td>Monetary and axiologic</td>
<td>Axiologic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first dimension that characterizes the governance structure of an institutional form is the distribution of property rights. It is usual within property rights literature to classify institutional forms according to the institutional arrangements that characterize the rights to residual claims – that is, the sum that remains when those with fixed pay-off contracts have been paid. Whereas in for-profit firms the owners bear the wealth consequences of their action, members of a non-profit organization, or civil servants in the case of a public firm, do not bear the economic consequences of their action.

\(^2\) Governance here refers to the meaning of the concept as used in the literature on "corporate governance" and has to be distinguished from its meaning as used in the literature on "public management".

254
The second dimension concerns decision making. The various institutional forms are characterized by different principles concerning the nomination of decision makers and the way their power is legitimized. Whereas in for-profit firms power is distributed proportionally to the share of the capital, decision makers in public firms derive their power from politically legitimated nomination and decision makers in non-profit organizations derive their authority from being elected by the general assembly of members.

The third dimension is that of the coordination mechanism which is associated with the institutional form. In addition to the market mechanism, it is possible to identify two institutional patterns of coordination: hierarchical and reciprocal (Enjolras 2000).

Whereas market and hierarchical coordination is achieved by the interplay of the price mechanism and coercion, respectively, reciprocal coordination is achieved by obligation. Transactions occurring within the family or the personal network and involving personal links are not coordinated by price considerations but by social and moral obligations (norms, convention). Each institutional form is characterized by a dominant coordination mechanism, even if some institutional forms may allow for compromises between several coordination mechanisms (Enjolras 2000). For-profit firms are dominated by the market mechanism, public firms by the hierarchical mechanism, and non-profit organizations by the reciprocal mechanism.

The fourth dimension is that of accountability – that is, the modalities by which decision makers account for their action. In the for-profit firm, the decision makers are accountable before the shareholders (capitalist accountability). In the publicly owned firms, the decision makers are politically appointed and politically accountable, while in non-profit organizations the decision makers are democratically accountable before the general assembly of members.

The fifth dimension concerns the incentives that are built into the governance structure. Whereas for-profit firms are characterized by monetary incentives, public and non-profit firms combine monetary and non-monetary (axiologic) incentives (Enjolras 2004). Incentive theory is based on a behavioural hypothesis – that of the rational, self-interested individual. In order to be motivated by extrinsic incentives, an individual’s behaviour must aim at maximizing benefits. However how an individual behaves is not based on instrumental rationality alone, but also on value (axiologic) rationality – that is, action that is determined “by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other form of behaviour, independently of its prospects of success” (Weber 1978: 24-25). Axiologic incentives may be defined as external rewards that reinforce individual’s commitment to internalized values. Whereas instrumental incentives involve increasing the benefits that individuals derive through carrying out a given action, axiologic incentives involve reinforcing individuals’ adherence to a value.

The types of policy instruments used for the implementation may be defined along three dimensions:
Bernard Enjolras

- Coercive vs. incentive
- Direct vs. indirect government
- Competitive vs. non-competitive regulation

Table 2: Types of policy instrument for implementation (Idealtypes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Competitive</th>
<th>Non competitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Coercive</td>
<td>Entry, price and output regulation; regulation of non price behaviour (standards);</td>
<td>Direct government Public insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incentive Quasi-market Contracting</td>
<td>Public ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Coercive</td>
<td>Vouchers</td>
<td>Guardianship regulation Social regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incentive Incentive regulation; Tax incentive</td>
<td>Third party payment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following Salamon (2002), it is possible to characterize a policy instrument according to its degree of (i) directness – that is, the extent to which public entities are involved in carrying out a policy, whereas the degree of (ii) coerciveness measures the extent to which a policy instrument restricts individual or group behaviour, as opposed to encouraging or discouraging it (incentive). A third dimension is added that indicates the extent to which a policy instrument employs competitive or non-competitive regulatory mechanisms. Policy instruments deal with market failures, but while some of them aim at correcting dysfunctions of the market or to create the conditions for a market to exist, others use institutional mechanisms that do not involve market-like mechanisms.

The types of institutional coordination for policy making may be defined according to two dimensions:

- Monist vs. pluralist
- Informal vs. formal

Policy making by pluralist institutions involves a plurality of actors in the process of policy making, whereas in monist institutions policy making relies on one privileged actor.

Policy making which is informal and relies on a privileged actor may be defined as technocratic. That is the case when, for example, civil servants in a central administration design policies by relying on the analysis provided by the decision makers of a publicly owned firm.
Between market and civic governance regimes

Corporatism characterizes “the linkage between state and society through privileged participation of organized interest in policy, and through mutually supportive arrangements between the machineries of government on the one hand and on large, centralized interest organizations on the other” (Streeck/Schmitter 1991). Corporatism is undergoing a transformation from a system that integrates ‘representative’ interest organizations and into a system of ‘competitive pluralism’ under which interest associations no longer have any monopoly of interest representation and must compete with a wide variety of players of different and uncertain status: local organizations, professional lobbyists, non-representative organizations. This competitive pluralism in policy making may be analysed in terms of policy networks (Rhodes 2001) – that is, in terms of self-organized, inter-organizational networks. These networks are characterized by (i) a form of interdependence between organizations; (ii) game like interactions rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network participants; (iii) a significant degree of autonomy from the state.

Policy networks are informal and self-regulated by the actors. In contrast, ‘institutionalized partnership’ supposes a formal setting with regulation by the public authorities. This kind of policy making links the relevant actors of a policy field to the policy-making process by instituting official committees on which they are represented and play an active role.

Table 3: Types of institutional coordination for policy making (Idealtypes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monist</th>
<th>Pluralist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Technocracy</td>
<td>Policy network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Corporatism</td>
<td>Institutionalized partnership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken together, the three dimensions, the type of the actors involved, the type of policy instruments used for the implementation of the policy and the type of institutional coordination used for policy making define a regime of governance. It is possible to distinguish four ideal-types of governance regime according to those three dimensions:
Table 4: Types of governance regimes (ideal types)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors’ institutional form</th>
<th>Public governance</th>
<th>Corporative governance</th>
<th>Competitive governance</th>
<th>Partnership governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Public Non-profit</td>
<td>Public For-profit Non-profit</td>
<td>Public For-profit Non-profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy implementation</td>
<td>Direct government</td>
<td>Guardianship regulation</td>
<td>Contracting Incentive regulation</td>
<td>Quasi-market Price regulation Non-price behaviour regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public ownership</td>
<td>Third party payment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy making</td>
<td>Technocracy</td>
<td>Corporatism</td>
<td>Policy network</td>
<td>Institutionalized partnership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public governance involves public actors only, relies on direct government and public ownership and relies on a technocratic policy-making process. This type of governance is best exemplified by how public services have traditionally been run. Corporative governance means that the state awards a monopoly of representation and implementation to a non-profit umbrella organization within a certain policy field (for example health or social services). Policies are implemented by means of coercive instruments, and public bodies usually fund and regulate the activities, while non-profit organizations provide them. With competitive governance, public authorities intervene in order to create and regulate the ‘market’ by means of incentive instruments. Competitive governance relies on competitive, market-like mechanisms. Finally, institutional partnership regulates the potential competition between actors by means of political mechanisms (negotiation, deliberation), while public authorities use direct and coercive policy instruments to achieve goals that agreed.

3.2 Governance regimes and accountability

Kearns (1996: 7-9) distinguishes two interpretations of the notion of accountability. According to a narrow interpretation, accountability involves answering to a higher authority in the bureaucratic or inter-organizational chain of command. This formal definition of accountability draws a very clear distinction between two fundamental questions: to whom (in the hierarchical chain of command) are organizations accountable and for what (activities and performance standards) are these organizations responsible?

A broader definition of the term accountability generally refers to a wide spectrum of public expectations dealing with organizational performance,
responsiveness, and morality. These expectations often include implicit performance criteria that relate to obligations and responsibilities that are subjectively interpreted and sometimes even contradictory. Within this broader conception of accountability, the range of people and institutions to whom organizations must account for their actions includes not only higher authorities in the chain of command but also the general public, the news media, peer agencies, donors and many other stakeholders.

An even narrower conception is proposed by Samuel (1991: 2):

“Accountability means holding individuals and organizations responsible for performance measured as objectively as possible. Public accountability refers to the spectrum of approaches, mechanisms and practices used by government to insure that their activities and outputs meet the intended goals and standards. [...] The effectiveness of accountability mechanisms will depend on whether influence of the concerned stakeholders is reflected in the monitoring and incentive systems of service providers.”

This conception of accountability is based exclusively on instrumental rationality and efficiency and does not take into account the democratic and the moral dimensions of accountability. Samuel (1991) argues that the public’s use of exit (competing source of supply) or voice (participation/protest) will enhance public accountability in a given situation, when this is consistent with the characteristics of the services and the publics involved.

“Viewed from the standpoint of the public, there are two basic factors that influence accountability. One is the extent to which the public has access to alternative suppliers of a given public service. The question is whether there is potential or scope for the public to exit when dissatisfied with a public service. The second is the degree to which they can influence the final outcome of a service through some form of participation or articulation of protest/feedback irrespective of whether the exit option exists. In other words, can they exert their voice in order to enhance accountability?” (Samuel 1991: 11).

From this point of view, the public’s decision to use exit or voice or a combination of both will depend on two factors – namely, the expected return that may result from improved accountability and the costs associated with the use of exit and voice. The relative costs of exit and voice may depend on the degree of market failure affecting the services. This conclusion presupposes (i) a narrow definition of accountability (ii) a vision of the determinants of exit and voice based solely on a cost-benefit analysis and (iii) the hypothesis that both the costs and benefits of exit and voice are functions of the degree of market failure.

Although it may be useful to distinguish, as Romzek (1996) does, hierarchical, legal, political and professional accountability relationships within organizations according to the source of control (internal and external) and the degree of control (high or low), the accountability of governance regimes that concerns the provision of services of general interest is primarily external accountability. It relates to what Romzek (1996: 102) terms “political accountability relationships” – that is, relationships that “emphasize being responsive to key actors from outside the administrator’s office or agency. Depending on the situation claimants can include
citizens, constituents, clients-taxpayers, customers, elected officials and other external stakeholders”. It is worth stressing that how claimants are qualified is not neutral for the conception of accountability that is associated with the nature of the claimants.

Maes (1998) distinguishes three models of accountability according to the conception of citizenship they imply. The first model is that of the voter and subject of law. In this model, citizens elect political leadership, while neutral bureaucrats execute policy and are politically controlled. The second model is that of the tax payer and client or consumer. The assumptions of this model are that politicians seek to maximize votes, while citizens seek to maximize utility and want value for money. The third model is that of opponent and partner. This model implies a vision of society where civil society is based on solidarity and responsibility. Citizens are co-responsible for making and implementing public policies. It is worth noting that the models of the voter and that of the partner are two modalities of voice (direct voice vs. indirect, through representation, voice), whereas the tax payer model relies on exit.

The various conceptions of accountability that have been surveyed here differ in three dimensions: (i) what is accounted for, (ii) to whom is it accounted, and (iii) how – by which procedural means – is it accounted? Summing up these different approaches of accountability and contrasting them with the various ideal-types of governance regimes allow us to identify four accountability models.

Table 5: Governance regimes and accountability models (Idealtypes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public governance</th>
<th>Corporative governance</th>
<th>Competitive governance</th>
<th>Partnership governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accountable for what</td>
<td>Fit between public services and politicians expectations</td>
<td>Fit between public services and constituents’ interest</td>
<td>Efficiency of public services</td>
<td>Fit between public services and citizens’ expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountable to whom</td>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>Constituents</td>
<td>Consumers/clients</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How accountable</td>
<td>Indirect voice (political representation)</td>
<td>Indirect voice (monopolistic interest representation)</td>
<td>Exit</td>
<td>Direct voice (Participation, empowerment)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each governance regime privileges a certain model of accountability to the extent that the inner logic of the governance regime excludes other modalities of accountability. Each accountability model has its shortcomings. Political representation does not protect against the risk that politicians may pursue their own
Between market and civic governance regimes

interests rather than the public interest, or that they may be corrupt or use their position in order to achieve personal goals. Corporatist representation operates outside the cannons of democratic accountability to a very considerable degree. “In corporatist relations, where much bargaining is conducted sub rosa, such forms [parliamentary and associated forms of accountability] are even less value than elsewhere” Lewis (1990: 93).

Competitive interest representation may be even more opaque than corporative relationships. Exit is a poor accountability mechanism, in informational terms, since it would seem to indicate discontent but provides no the reasons for that discontent. Direct voice is associated with the shortcomings of deliberative democracy – that is, the risk that the unequal opportunity of access to resources (money, time, cultural and political skills) may lead to power being appropriated by experts and passivity on the part of non-expert citizens.

3.3 Governance regimes and civicness

By recalling the three dimensions of civicness introduced above – (i) the pre-eminence of collectives; (ii) the prevalence of democratic rules of governance and (iii) the qualification of the persons – it is possible to deduce for each governance regime a conception of civicness that also fits with the main discourses that characterize social services, as identified by Adalbert Evers (see the table below).

Table 6: Governance regimes and dimensions of civicness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourses (cf Evers’ typology)</th>
<th>Public governance</th>
<th>Corporate governance</th>
<th>Competitive governance</th>
<th>Partnership governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfarism &amp; Professionalism</td>
<td>Welfarism &amp; Professionalism</td>
<td>Consumerism &amp; Managerialism</td>
<td>Participationism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the collectives</td>
<td>Public interest</td>
<td>Collective interest</td>
<td>No collectives</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social rights, patients' charters &amp; public service ethos</td>
<td>Social rights, patients' charters &amp; voluntary ethos</td>
<td>Consumer protection &amp; complaint management</td>
<td>Direct voice, direct participation, empowerment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect voice/political representation</td>
<td>Indirect voice/ interest representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualification of the persons</td>
<td>Users</td>
<td>Beneficiaries/Members</td>
<td>Consumers</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The main insight which stems from this typology is that each governance regime entails a given conception of civicness which is embedded in the prevailing institutional logic that characterizes a given governance regime. In addition, both the institutional logics and the conceptions of civicness are related to the different conceptions of democratic policy making, which we have conceptualized along three sets of distinctions.

The two first distinctions characterize the institutional setting within which policy making takes place and are expressed in terms of the distinctions between (i) the electorate channel and the corporate channel and (ii) within the corporate channel, between corporatism and pluralism. Traditionally, policy making in democratic representative systems has been understood as the result of parliamentary activities. However, Rokkan acknowledges the role of civil society in policy making (1999). Rokkan identifies three channels through which political influence can take place: the electorate channel, through representative institutions; the corporate channel, through civil society organizations; and the mass-media channel. Additionally, within the corporate channel, two classical institutional models of relationship between civil society and government have traditionally been distinguished by opposing neo-corporatism and pluralism (Hill 1997). In his comparison of 19 democracies, Wilensky (2002) defines neo-corporatism (democratic corporatism) as a structure that provides for the interplay of strongly organized interest groups with a centralized government. Pluralism (Dahl 1982), by contrast, provides no institutional structure for interest representation or the interplay of government and organized interests.

The third distinction refers to the normative conceptions of democracy and identifies three normative models: competitive democracy, participative democracy and deliberative democracy (Allern/Pedersen 2007; Mandbridge 1992; Bohman/Regh 1997). Theories of democracy that consider democracy as a decision-making process which aims to find solutions in presence of contradictory interests may be labelled competitive democracy, since they focus on contradictory and competing interests. Competitive democracy emphasizes the role of voting as a mechanism which enables the aggregation of political preferences, the choice between competing interests, and the selection and accountability of political leaders. Theories that consider democracy as a decision-making process which aims to achieve a common good or common interest, and that emphasize deliberation as a means of attaining this goal, belong to the deliberative conception of democracy. Deliberative democracy accentuates the possibility of solving conflicts of interest through rational discussion and deliberation in the public arena. Rather than involving preference aggregation (as it is the case with voting), deliberation leads to preference transformation. Participative democracy, by contrast, focuses on the active participation of all citizens in political activities and decision-making processes.
Between market and civic governance regimes

In our typology of governance regimes, public governance entails a conception of competitive democracy operating within the electorate channel. Corporative governance is associated with a deliberative conception of democracy through the corporate channel and within an institutional structure, enabling interplay between organized interests and government. Both competitive governance and partnership governance involve a pluralist institutional setting for policy-making, but they are based on different conceptions of democracy. Whereas partnership governance involves both participative and deliberative conceptions of democracy, competitive governance is based, at best, on a competitive conception of democracy but can also be implemented solely through market-based mechanisms. The main issue, then, is to determine what differentiates political behaviour from market behaviour.

Jon Elster (1997), in his essay “The Market and the Forum”, answers that question by emphasizing that politics involves a public activity that cannot be reduced to the private choices of consumers in the ‘market’, and that political engagement requires citizens to adopt a civic standpoint, an orientation toward the common good, when considering political issues in the forum. The competitive governance regime is characterized by both the lack of public activity and of a civic standpoint which leads to the absence of collectives (a common good). From this viewpoint, pure competitive governance as well as pure consumerism and managerialism do not create space for civickness. The inner logic of market-based governance is individualism and atomism, a logic which is opposed to that of civickness – which is based on collectives and the community. Having identified pure types of governance regimes and discussed their relationships to civickness, we now turn to the empirical transformations that are affecting the governance of social services in Europe.

4. The changing forms of regulation and governance of social services

Social services provision in Europe has traditionally involved public and corporative governance regimes. The modes of organization involved in the production of social services have undergone substantial change during recent decades. These changes must be related to more general structural changes affecting European societies. In this context, arguments in support of a retrenchment of the state as a provider of social services have been advanced by the tenants of the New Public Management. Incentive regulation and voluntary provision have usually been seen as more efficient than public provision. At the same time, globalization and individualization may be viewed as driving forces behind the reduction of the role of the state as a direct provider of social services. Decentralized solutions appear to be more effective and best suited to the needs of the individualized consumer, while supranational (European) regulation is driving the introduction of market-based
regulatory mechanisms. However, maybe as a reaction to the increasing role of the market, new forms of partnership-based governance have developed alongside and in complement to market-based regulation.

4.1 The increasing importance of market-based regulation

Throughout Europe, market mechanisms have been introduced for the provision of social services, in many cases by creating quasi markets that are regulated by public authorities with a broad set of rules about accreditation, pricing and territorial planning. One crucial aspect in this regard is budgeting mechanisms: a more market-oriented regulation implies an inclination towards the needs of users and free choice among users. This constitutes a change from traditional budgeting. The introduction of market mechanisms appears to be a way of reforming the management of the public sector management, achieving increased responsiveness and efficiency in the provision of services and ensuring freedom of choice for users. However, social services are characterized by caring externalities (the fact that people feel concern for the care and treatment of others, even though they themselves are not directly affected), and by informational asymmetries (the fact that the provider has more information about the nature and quality of the service than the beneficiary). Since social services involve asymmetric information between providers and beneficiaries as well as external effects, purely market regulation fails in supplying an optimal amount of these services.

The introduction of market-based mechanisms into fields where public-programming regulation has been customary is based on the idea that competition enhances efficiency, innovation and responsiveness by giving incentives to the providers. Social services are characterized by caring externalities and informational asymmetries that lead to market failures and require the public regulation of the delivery system of services. The extent of the regulation of social services by public programming alone has been decreased during the last decades in Europe, as market-based regulation has expanded. Indeed, governments responsible for the provision of social services are able to make contracts for the delivery of those services with private firms and non-profit organizations. Since pure market regulation usually fails in the context of social services, governments can use two main regulatory mechanisms in this ‘contracting-out’ of public services: public-programming regulation and market-based regulation. Public-programming regulation is based on budgetary, planning, certifying and control procedures that define and assess the needs that are to be met, habilitate the producers, and impose quality and processes standards. This type of regulation involves reimbursed cost contracts (cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts), whereby producers are automatically reimbursed for the costs they incur and therefore have no incentive to increase their efficiency. Alternatively, government may set up quasi-markets in which public authorities play the role of purchaser on behalf of the beneficiaries and where
Between market and civic governance regimes

private for-profit and non-profit organizations compete for contracts. This type of regulation involves incentive contracts (fixed-price contracts). In such market-based regulatory frameworks, public authorities use various mechanisms in order to correct market failures.

By enhancing competition, market-based regulation is expected to lead to lower costs and increased responsiveness. However, insufficient competition among suppliers due to high entry costs and dependence on public funding, as well as limitations on performance evaluation, may limit the efficiency of competitive regulation. In addition, since continuity is an important consideration in the context of social services, long-term relationships usually develop between providers and the public regulator, and this limits the effect of competitive tendering and contracting. The difficulties of performance and the evaluation of service quality within the field of social services (the effects of interventions usually only appear in the long term, outcomes and service quality measures are complex and costly to obtain, informational asymmetries between provider and regulator limit the regulator’s ability to assess performance, quality and costs) may also limit the effectiveness of market-based regulation.

Quasi-market regulation may be exemplified by the English regulatory framework within the field of long-term care services. The process of accessing public services involves an assessment of care needs and the arrangement of a package of care required to meet those needs. A care manager (typically a social worker employed by the local authority) may be involved in coordinating the assessment and organization of care. (This care manager may have a devolved budget with which to purchase services). Users, their families and potential providers are all involved in the process of decision making. Once a care package has been agreed, the user is means-tested. The majority of services are contracted following a formal tender procedure. The accreditation criteria for providers include minimum standards and a minimum level of training among staff members. Contractors negotiate contracts with accredited providers. Bids to provide services are assessed chiefly according to cost, geographical coverage and past performance.

Market-based and quasi-market regulation is extending its scope in most European countries. In the field of long-term care, market-based regulation has been introduced in the UK, France (home-help services), Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Market-based mechanisms are also being implemented for the regulation of child care services in France, Italy and the Netherlands. They are also used to regulate labour market services in Germany, the UK and Sweden. At the same time, new forms for partnership-based governance are being developed throughout Europe.
4.2 New governance practices and cooperative partnerships

Both the development of the regulatory state and the new institutional landscape that characterizes the provision of social services have contributed to shift in focus from the internal working of public organizations and towards the network of actors on which they increasingly depend and towards the issue of governance itself. The concept of governance can be defined in several ways and there is a good deal of ambiguity between its different usages (Pierre 2000). However, most of those meanings cluster around what might be termed a ‘post-political’ search for effective regulation and accountability (Hirst 2000). Indeed, the privatization of publicly owned industries and public services, and the consequent need to regulate service providers in order to guarantee service quality and compliance with contractual terms, as well as the introduction of commercial practices and management styles within the public sector, have contributed to the emergence of a new model of public service which is distinct from the traditional pattern of public administration under hierarchical control and directly answerable officials (Rhodes 1997: 48-60). The privatization process also involves a radically different conception of the relationship between ‘customers’ and services providers, compared to the conventional view of the relationship between citizens and the welfare state (Pierre 2000). At the same time, new practices of coordinating activities through networks, partnerships, and deliberative forums have emerged to replace centralized and hierarchical forms of representation. This negotiated social governance embraces a diverse range of actors such as labour unions, trade associations, firms, local authority representatives, social entrepreneurs, civil society organizations and community groups. Governance focuses on various forms of formal and informal types of public-private interactions and on the role of policy networks. According to Rhodes (1999: xvii), governance refers to “self-organizing, inter-organizational networks”. Traditional public management, with its focus on the operation of public agencies, emphasizes command and control as the modus operandi of public programmes. While stressing the continued need for an active public role, however, the new governance approach acknowledges that command and control are not an appropriate administrative approach in the world of network relationships that we now live in to an increasing extent. Given the pervasive interdependence that characterizes such networks, no entity, including the state, is in position to enforce its will on the others in the long term. Under these circumstances, negotiation and persuasion replace command and control. Public managers must learn how to create incentives for the outcomes they seek from actors over whom they have only imperfect control (Salamon 2002; Kickert et al. 1997).

In order to implement such policy changes, governments need intermediaries close to the ground, and they need to engage relevant stakeholders with whom they can work in partnership. Governance implies that governments, rather than acting alone, foster institutional mechanisms that favour co-regulation, co-steering, co-
Between market and civic governance regimes

production, cooperative management (Newman 2004), institutional mechanisms that transcend the boundaries between government and society, as well as those between the public and the private sectors (Kooiman 1993). This new governance approach is being translated into policies based on 'partnership' that privilege 'joined-up solutions' to complex social problems (Goldsmith/Eggers 2004; Newman 2004). Complex problems cannot, from this vantage point, be solved by governments acting alone. Rather, governments need to mobilize a wide range of actors that are willing to cooperate, including actors from civil society (Newman 2004). The modernization of governance in the context of social services serves to emphasize the role of social investment and the need to encourage a flourishing civil society (Lewis/Surender 2004). Civil society, government and the economy are viewed as interdependent and partnership solutions that cross the boundaries between state and society must be promoted and supported by public policies.

Several initiatives in the European countries under review in this book appear to demonstrate a shift towards new forms of local governance in social services. In the UK, in the field of long-term care, new types of agreements between local authorities and the national government have been developed in recent years, focusing on the promotion of well-being, the coordination of local service delivery and joined-up working by local partners. In addition, these agreements provide a new framework for the relationship between central and local government which aims to improve the delivery of local public services. The Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) mechanism is particularly important within this delivery framework. This is a single body that brings together at the local level the various public-sector actors as well as the private, business, community and voluntary sectors. The body is responsible for developing a local vision for the area across all public services, including social care and health services.

In the field of labour market services, new governance practices which aim to link services and create more horizontal integration – this has been especially true in health and social care but also the connection of work to other social issues (for example, the importance of childcare for parents seeking work) – have created a greater need for more partnership working across previously impermeable institutional boundaries. LSPs are tending to bring together third-sector and state providers involved in skills training in a number of new partnerships (e.g. schemes in Nottingham and Bristol). The altered policy environment emphasizes the development of more horizontal connections between organizations engaged in combating poverty. This can be seen, for example, in cross-cutting initiatives to bring together the previously separate arenas of health and care; partnerships involving different providers of social projects – particularly local government and third sector organizations – and a move from ‘reducing poverty’ to the more complex idea of ‘combating social exclusion’, which has implied the involvement of a wider range of actors in planning services (Kendall et al. 2003: 59).
This has produced a range of government initiatives: imperatives to develop ‘compacts’ to agree the principles of the relationship and roles between the municipal and third sectors; the growth of joint planning through Local Strategic Partnerships; area initiatives in the fields of employment and urban regeneration (including the government-funded New Deal and Neighbourhood Renewal programmes). In fact, Stoker (2004) suggests as many as 5,000 such partnership bodies have emerged in the delivery of public services. In short, this is an emergent form of governance characterized by the weaker role of the state (local or national) in delivering services while retaining a strong strategic planning role.

In France, in the field of child-care, shifts in the role of public authorities are characterizing emerging new forms of local governance. Along with the diversification of providers that can be seen in the development of this sector, more emphasis is being placed on the role of public authorities in terms of coordination and governance. This trend had been apparent since the decentralization process of the 1980s, but coordination is becoming more crucial given the increasing role of non-profit organizations, the involvement of private enterprises and the expansion of the number of child minders. From this perspective, the recent institutionalization of the departmental commission on childcare appears to be an interesting tool that has yet to be analysed. At the municipal level, a new coordinative function, that of childcare coordinators, has been created. The role of childcare coordinators is to facilitate the implementation of the contrats-enfance and support the development of a common culture of childcare at the local level and they work mainly with non-profit organizations that are part of the contrat-enfance. Locally, these institutional tools are being implemented in different ways, leading to forms of governance that vary greatly from one area to another.

In Italy, special arrangements have been introduced to support civil society initiatives within the field of child-care. The Lombardy Region, for example, has introduced a regional law which defines a new legal entity – the ‘association of social solidarity’ – self-help associations of families, also known as the Fourth Sector, to which a proportion of regional funding is often reserved already in the laws or in the bidding criteria. According to the Regional law on family policies, for instance, in 2000 more than €48 million were destined for the creation of services for families (family crèches, company crèches, child minders’ lists, time-bank, parenthood support). In the bid, 50% of these were reserved for these associations of social solidarity, which were invited to come together formally to create family-crèches.

To sum up, two parallel trends seem to characterize transformations affecting the governance of social services in Europe. The first major trend we can discern is the expansion of market-based regulation as well as the consequent reduction of the scope of public-programming regulatory mechanisms. Market-based regulation, as a means to allocate resources within the field of social services, seems to be supplanting public-programming. Market-based regulation does not, however, take
Between market and civic governance regimes

the form of pure market regulation. In most cases, it requires the use of corrective mechanisms to tackle the market failures prevalent in social services which arise from asymmetric information. Secondly, beyond the introduction of market-based regulation, social services require new forms of governance in order to promote cooperative and strategic partnerships between a range of actors, to enhance horizontal coordination and foster civil society initiatives. These new forms of governance entail the development of institutionalized partnerships which transform the role of public authorities from hierarchical centralized command into horizontal network-based coordination.

5. *Conclusion: the emergence of a new civic-market governance-mix*

The emerging civic-market governance-mix that is coming to characterize social services in Europe involves a market-based allocation of resources and regulation of service provision, as well as civic-based horizontal coordination of the various stakeholders involved in order to foster cooperation and promote community-based initiatives. The regulation and governance of social services in Europe appears to reflect a compromise between two ideal-typical governance regimes: the market-based and partnership-based governance regimes. Compromise operations attempt to go “beyond the critical tension between two worlds by aiming for a common good which would not belong to either one of them, but which would include both of them”. (Thevenot 1989: 77). It seems that the civic dimension which typifies the partnership-based governance regime helps to mitigate the shortcomings of the market-based governance regime. Indeed, market mechanisms enhance competition and are non-cooperative in nature, whereas partnerships aim at participation, deliberation and cooperation.

It is worth noting that this compromise between different ideal-typical governance regimes also involves two different conceptions of citizenship. It is possible to distinguish two dominant models of citizenship (Stewart 1995; Delanty 2000). On the one hand market and state-centered conceptions of citizenship involve a formal, legally coded status and a set of rights and duties. On the other hand, there is the conception of citizenship which involves the more substantive dimension of *participation* in the civic community. Citizenship in the liberal tradition refers to a particular relationship between rights and duties. Under this tradition, the emphasis has been on a market-based reduction of citizenship (the citizen being replaced by the consumer, in neo-liberal discourse). However, in its social democratic form (Marshall 1963) the emphasis has been on the welfare state and social rights. Recently, the renewal of civic republican ideas has led to a new emphasis on citizenship as participation in the civic community.
This new governance-mix may be interpreted as the result of the contested nature of the ‘modernization’ processes taking place within the field of social services, as well as the consequence of trade-offs between policy objectives. One characteristic of the field is that the nature of the policy instruments implemented has an impact on how the (social) policy objectives are met. This is particularly true when it comes to the provision of services by voluntary organizations and organizations in the social economy. Those organizations argue (and correctly in most cases) that not only do they provide services, but they also contribute, through their particular organizational features, to developing solidarity, social networks and bonds, voluntarism, democracy and participation, cultural specificity, and so on. Civil society initiatives and the voluntary organizations that provide social services are said to have ‘civic added value’ which contributes to wider social policy objectives such as social integration, empowerment and social participation. At the same time, many of the ‘modernization’ reforms involve the introduction of market-based mechanisms in order to regulate the provision of social services. From this viewpoint, market-based allocation mechanisms undermine the very specificity of the social contribution of civil society organizations. The contradictory nature of these processes is reflected in the institutional constructions that govern the provision of social services, since different institutional logics (market-based and civic) prevail. These tensions between the market-based and civic-based governance of social services are exacerbated at the European level by the ongoing debate relating to the Social and Health Services of General Interest (SHSGI). This debate is presumably a result of the European Commission’s initiative to develop a common regulatory framework in order to make the internal market for services fully operational, while preserving the European social model. This debate mobilizes both market and civic repertoires of justification and illustrates the difficulties associated with the definition of the ‘general interest’, a collective, through the use of market-based mechanisms alone. Civicism at the level of social-services governance has to find its way through political mechanisms of representation, deliberation and participation. Beyond the issue of implementing a common governance framework for the provision of social services in Europe, it is this that constitutes the main challenge to the European construction.

References


Between market and civic governance regimes

Chapter 14

Janet Newman

Civicness and the paradoxes of contemporary governance

This chapter suggests that public service organisations are faced with a paradox: how to cope with their declining ‘public’ role, at the same time that they have to take on new roles of engaging, managing, disciplining and ‘responsibilising’ the public’. This paradox opens out a tension around the concept ‘civic’ and its possible articulation with the idea of ‘civility’.

1. Introduction

This chapter sets out to explore the paradoxical qualities of ‘civicness’ in public services. One dimension of this paradox lies in the potential articulation of ‘civicness’ and ‘publicness’. Here the civic qualities of public service organisations rely on their positioning in a public sphere expressing collective, rather than individual, interests and orientations. The dominant narrative here is the potential loss of such orientations as public services become realigned in hybrid public/private arrangements, and as civil society/third sector organisations become implicated in contractual relationships that foreground service delivery roles, rather than advocacy or mobilisation activities. In each case their ‘civic’ qualities may become subordinated to business rationales. Such qualities may be squeezed as the organisations in which they were invested become subject to new performance regimes and pressures towards consumerist understandings of the service relationship. The challenge, then, is to specify ways in which civic qualities may be defended, re-imagined or restored – a challenge addressed by several of the contributions to this volume.

However there is a second meaning of civicness that takes us closer to concepts of civility. The focus here is on ways in which individuals and groups behave in the public sphere, and the dominant narrative concerns images of an increasingly uncivil public. Indeed a focus on civicness as civility now underlies a range of policies concerned with ‘governing the social’ – policies on anti-social behaviour, on conduct in the public sphere, on inculcating responsible community self governance and active citizenship.
Civicness and the paradoxes of contemporary governance

My purpose in highlighting these issues is twofold. First, I want to argue for the importance of trying to understand the changing role of public/social service organisations in a post welfare world. The approach of this chapter is to suggest that public service organisations are faced with a paradox: how to cope with their declining ‘public’ role, at the same time that they have to take on new roles of engaging, managing, disciplining and ‘responsibilising’ the public’. Second, this paradox opens out a tension around the concept ‘civic’ and its possible articulation with the idea of ‘civility’. These two terms are very close – at least in English language - and have the same linguistic roots (cīvis, meaning citizen). But there are some subtle differences. Civic is defined as ‘pertaining to the city or citizen’, while civil as ‘pertaining to the community; polite..., pertaining to private relations among citizens…’ (Chambers English Dictionary). Both have been taken up in public and social policy in ways that exacerbate these differences.

The civic is, as Evers argues in this volume, something that is associated with citizenship and democratic values. These formed the historical roots of the development of public services and welfare states; the modernising reform I referred to earlier, then, imply a sense of loss, leading to the question of how far, and in what ways, might public services reengage with notions of civic norms and values given their detachment from these historical roots? I will address this question in section 1, below, focusing in particular on the extent to which civic, rather than market, values can be inscribed in the service relationship.

The civil, however, directs attention not to the conditions in which the service relationship occurs, but to the behaviour and comportment of citizens, both individually and within communities. The focus shifts from the organisations and staff who deliver services (for example how far they can transcend consumerist rationales in order to address wider social and civic issues) to individual citizens (their comportment, behaviour and attitudes) and to communities (as the presumed repositories of moral and ethical values). I address this feature of current public and social policy in section 2. In the conclusion I tease out some of the conflicting orientations towards the publicness of public services these different orientations produce.

2. Civicness and the public dimensions of public services

Public services that are undergoing some of the profound transformations associated with the modernisation of welfare states face contradictory imperatives. The dominant narrative focuses on ways in which modernisation is associated with the roll out of neo-liberal forms of governance that have challenged the publicness of public services. Much has been written about the processes of downsizing, marketisation, and the development of hybrid organisational forms that bring public
Janet Newman

and private authority into new alignments. While these have not, as some argue, led to a wholesale abandonment of the publicness of public services, such services are now characterised by managerial, business and consumerist rationalities that have made it difficult to sustain notions of a public ethos or public service orientation (du Gay 2000) or to support a wider politics of the public domain (Marquand 2004).

In Newman and Clarke (2009) these transformations are analysed in terms of concurrent processes of decline and proliferation. The decline of a distinct public sector, public ethos, and of the legitimacy of a collective public sensibility is located not just in transformations of the state but also in the rupture of notions of a unified public based on national belonging. Also at stake are multiple challenges to the liberal democratic values that supported notions of a ‘general’ public, values which took little account of the politics of difference (see also Newman 2007). These three sets of transformations (to state, nation and liberal public sphere), and their mutual entanglement, trouble any simple story which lays the decline of the public to the roll out of neoliberalism. Such a narrative tends to be rooted in nostalgia for the social democratic welfare state, a nostalgia that often fails to take account of its paternalism and its frequent refusal to acknowledge the claims of social movement activists. The overlaying of multiple transformations also challenges the idea that demise of welfare states can be directly attributed to the decline of national solidarities produced by inward migration.

This form of analysis opens up a crucial analytic and political question: how to take account of the challenges from social movements that have challenged unitary notions of the public, while also continuing to struggle to renew and revive the political importance of publics and publicness. The challenges ‘from below’ raised issues about the politics of difference and identity that cannot be tidied away in current concerns about ‘democratic deficits’ or ‘community cohesion’. But at the same time the decline of public institutions (including, not but only, the public sector) raises the equally troubling questions about how to speak – and defend – public norms and values, and a wider politics of the public. Notions of civic and civility may offer an alternate vocabulary; but it is important, I argue, to be alert to their possible dangers.

These struggles are played out in many sites, but especially in the current transformations of public services. In particular, the publicness of public services is hard to sustain in the context of modernising strategies that privilege their role as service providers and that conceptualise service users as individuated consumers. The turn towards a consumerist orientation for public services has been widely critiqued (Needham 2003, 2007; see also review in Clarke et al 2007). Public services have an ambiguous relationship to consumers – needing to recruit and satisfy them, while trying to manage levels of collective and individual demand downwards (since use of a service often consumes budgets rather than generates income). But this is not the only difficulty. Our study of citizen-consumers in England revealed people who were profoundly reluctant to identify themselves as
Civicness and the paradoxes of contemporary governance

‘consumers of public services’, rejecting the impersonal and transactional model that such an identity implied (Clarke et al 2007). This research showed people looking for relationships with public service that involved respect, fairness and forms of partnership, mutual deliberation and co-production. Such relationships, however, need to be negotiated not only in the context of the policy drive towards consumerism, but also against older professional attachments to power over users, and against managerial and corporate powers that assert the overriding obligations of professionals to the employing organisation.

In this context, there are risks that a user-centred or civic focus may be overpowered. I want to follow De Leonardis in this volume in arguing that wider questions have to be addressed in order to create the conditions that might enable public elements to be inscribed in marketised or ‘hybrid’ service arrangements. These include questions about how far welfare policies nurture democracy, helping to produce ‘collective’ attachments and identifications; and how the organisational forms through which welfare is delivered contribute to – or undermine – democratic values. In civil society and ‘third sector’ organisations, new contracting and commissioning practices that privilege business and performance rationales may serve to detach such organisations from their membership roots.

Such points underscore the importance of a wider politics of the public. But such a politics tends to be absent from debates about how to reinscribe publicness (or, in the context of this chapter, civic values) in the service relationship. Responses to the idea that public services are, as in the word of several of our respondents, ‘not like shopping’, are manifold. They include initiatives and policies that feature concepts such as:

- personalisation (ensuring the tailoring of services to individual needs: Leadbetter et al 2008 and Barnes 2008 for critique).
- co-production (implying a relationship of partnership between service provider and service user).
- democratic professionalism (featuring, in particular, the enhancement of service user power, choice and voice: Kremer/Tonkens 2006).
- public value (itself a highly contested concept, denoting practices as diverse as programme evaluation, cost benefit analysis and deliberative engagements with the public to determine what value might mean in a particular context: see Horner et al).
- and the strengthening of public governance arrangements associated with ‘delivery organisations’ in order to assure transparency, probity and accountability (Newman/Clarke 2009, ch 8).
Each of these is open to many inflections, with different degrees of ‘empowerment’ of the service user, and/or different relationships to the wider polity. For example public participation initiatives raise many questions about whose voice is to be heard, through what means, and based on what models of representation or representativeness. Public services, I argue, cannot simply reach out to an authentic, preexisting public in order to consult, involve or empower it; public services work to constitute the public into categories that fit bureaucratic imperatives and that enabling the ‘targeting’ of services to appropriate groups. But they are also engaged in mediating norms of what it means to be public and act publicly, so demarcating between desirable and undesirable publics, between publics who fit the image of the ideal service user and those at risk of exclusion, and between those that are able to fit the mould of the responsible, active, workerist citizen that can take their place in the post welfare, modern and globalising world.

3. Civility and the governance of populations

At the same time that welfare states are supposedly in retreat and the public sector increasingly residualised in relation to the corporate landscape of service provision, so a range of policies concerned with ‘governing the social’ and managing and regulating populations have come to the forefront of the policy portfolios of many governments. From obesity to parenting, dietary management to the control of drinking and smoking, civil renewal to community safety, public policy is increasingly concerned with the regulation of personal lives. Citizenship as a rights bearing status is dissolving into notions of the responsibility of individuals and families to the wider community and nation, with numerous forms of active citizenship (from work oriented to community focused) populating the policy landscape. The control and regulation of ‘antisocial behaviour’ is now at the centre of crime control policies in the UK and other nations. ‘Community empowerment’, ‘respect’ and ‘responsibility’ are all central to the image of the good society and, paradoxically, the means through which the good society is to be brought about. The state is to remain in the background, shaping the conditions that might make such things possible, only intervening directly where forms of coercion are required.

Efforts to manage and regulate populations and their behaviours and practices are evident in a whole range of governmental institutions and apparatuses, not just those concerned with social services: for example some commentators have argued that strategies of crime control and criminalisation have displaced ‘welfarist’ institutions as the primary mode of social regulation (Garland 2001; Rodgers 2008). Rodgers, for example, argues that:

‘The public sphere of dominant opinion, which in the past has supported social policies that seek to steer social behaviour towards ends considered desirable by the
Civicness and the paradoxes of contemporary governance

state, such as family policies aimed at improving the health, education and moral well being of children, has today become preoccupied with matters of ‘moral regulation’ and requires policies that target social discipline rather than social justice’ (2008: 199).

We might quibble whether this represents a wholesale shift from one policy orientation to another, or the emergence of complex entanglements between different policy orientations, institutions and sectors. The specific entanglements between welfare and crime control strategies are explored further in relation to social justice (Newman/Yeates 2008); security (Cochrane/Talbot 2009) and community (Mooney/Neal 2009).

As a result of the increasing focus on safety and the turn towards ‘moral regulation’ in public and social policy, ‘changing people’s behaviour’ is becoming an important dimension of public service work. And the production of ‘civility’ is, implicitly or explicitly, one of the core goals of behaviour change work. While civicsness, discussed above, directs attention to the service relationship and the wider politics in which this relationship is shaped, civility direct attention to the behaviour and comportment of citizens. For example Burney (2005) points to how the UK has developed a policing and criminal law centred approaches to ‘making people behave’ organised around the image of ‘anti-social behaviour’. Under the 2003 Anti-Social Behaviour Act parenting contracts for those viewed as unable to control the behaviour of their children were introduced. ‘Social landlords’ (third sector bodies providing social housing, many of whom took over housing formerly controlled by local authorities) were given wider powers to evict ‘anti-social tenants’. Anti-social behaviour orders and on the spot fines became part of a new array of behaviour control strategies. These, and other, measures were all ‘civil remedies’; a form of regulation that, in Burney’s words, mean that ‘third parties (parents, landlords, liquor stores etc) could be made to bear the brunt of prevention and can be punished if they fail’ (2005: 29).

‘Community’ forms the centrepiece of such strategies, with community being an idealised entity in which civil behaviour is required and active citizenship exercised. For example the primary focus of community safety partnerships is crime prevention, but much more is at stake; they are oriented towards the production of certain forms of civil attachment and comportment as well as the regulation of those behaviours that infringe it. Civil, then, denotes not the institutions and bodies involved in regulation (civil rather than criminal), but a normative sense of proper behaviour and respectful attitudes. It is associated with the kinds of neighbourly behaviour that watch out for – and watch over – potentially unruly youth, ‘problem’ families, truanting children, street drinkers, disruptive tenants. Residents become responsible for working with each other and with ‘officials’ to change behaviour – and to apply a range of coercive and exclusionary measures if this does not succeed. It is also denotes ways in which citizens enact their citizenship, becoming active in both the economy (through work), community and civil society. Citizens are
expected to be busy, not only engaged in volunteering but also in organising and managing the cleanliness and appearance of their neighbourhoods.

Municipalities in several countries – including the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands – have policies designed to encourage ‘civil’ behaviour. Some of the most widely commented on schemes are those in Rotterdam in the Netherlands. These began in 1999 with the development of what were called ‘street etiquette’ schemes that set out how residents in a street could meet and discuss what they considered to be ‘normal’ public behaviour (Müller 2003). After 2002, and the election of the populist, right wing government, this was reframed to emphasise the prevention of undesirable behaviour – ‘the ambition to create a positive atmosphere and to promote friendliness appears to have been dropped’ (Uitermark/Duyvendak 2008: 1497). Related policy developments included ‘Opzoomeren’, a programme focusing on disadvantaged neighbourhoods that mobilised citizens to clean their streets, organise youth and sports activities and to hold barbecues and other social events to enable greater contact between neighbours. Following elections in 2006 the focus shifted, with the orientation towards social cohesion shifting to a focus on social control (Uitermark/Duyvendak 2006). This is, in the view of these authors, a turn towards a more ‘revanchist’ agenda (Uitermark/Duyvendak 2008). As such it was also more explicitly racialised: ‘The biggest change we observed was on the symbolic level: the Rotterdam government distanced itself from reformist and emancipatory politics and active confronted minority groups, especially Muslims. [But] these changes are not merely symbolic because they have severe repercussions on citizens’ feelings of belonging’ (2008: 199).

Other European municipalities are also involving residents in programmes to keep streets clean and free from litter, and to act as informal, unpaid ‘wardens’ or inspectors of their local area. In the case of Antwerp in Belgium, the ‘Opsinjoren’ rationale also had a trajectory in which the possibilities of using public funds to promote social activities to bring neighbours together were dropped in favour of an emphasis on volunteering and social control. As Loopmans (2006) notes, this programme has had both benign and less benign dimensions. Benign elements included the mobilisation of active citizens; the encouragement of respect; the fostering of pride in the neighbourhood such that people were encouraged to take better care of their environment, and the development of networks between active citizens and local officials, thus alerting officials to local needs and problems. In Loopman’s terms, active citizens are not only efficient but also act as ‘eyes and ears’ on the street; eyes and ears that are ‘eagerly made use of’ by politicians, city officials and the local police (2006: 113). But this also has less benign consequences, leading to tensions between active and less active citizens. ‘Their [active citizens] partial incorporation into government networks and the right they obtain to exert a certain level of control over “their” public space seems to be a thorn in the side to the less “active” residents’ (Loopmans 2006: 119). It also introduces the possibility of more explicit form of social control. And it may,
Civics and the paradoxes of contemporary governance

ultimately, fail to produce greater levels of satisfaction; residents may come to expect more, not less, of city officials and the public services they manage, and heightened expectations bring the possibility of dissatisfaction and disappointment—and, one might suggest, disengagement.

Less benign elements also include the possibility of discontent being recast in ways that could be exploited by right wing parties. As in Rotterdam, the Antwerp programme has to be situated in the success of right wing, populist municipal and/or national governments:

‘The electoral success of this party was linked by social scientists and political analysts to a range of ‘minor’ issues that provoked discontent among residents of deprived neighbourhoods, such as street litter, feelings of anomie, intercultural conflicts, vandalism and petty crime. Liveability was introduced as a container concept that made it possible to talk about the same problems while naming them differently, and has now become a central concept for urban governance in Antwerp’ (Loopmans 2006: 112).

The idea of governing the social traceable in each of these policy areas is one that is at the centre of important debates in and beyond social policy; notably debates between, on the one hand, normative orientations towards the creation of a ‘good society’ in a post welfarist world; and on the other, Foucauldian perspectives that highlight new forms of power and control at stake in the ‘empowerment’ of individuals to become new kinds of subject. Governing the social involves installing particular normative views of personhood: as active rather than passive or dependent, as responsible rather than rights bearing citizens, as ‘civil’ rather than antisocial subjects, as neighbours rather than residents, as workers rather than benefit claimants, as in charge of one’s own development rather than being limited by one’s finite capacities, and so on.

But this does not tell us much about how governmentalities are lived and how people respond to the subject positions offered to them. It is here that empirical work—of the kind cited in this chapter, but also in the rest of this volume—is enormously beneficial, highlighting the complexity of the ways in which notions of the public, the civic and the civil are lived, taken up, realigned and reassembled—in uneven ambiguous articulations—with other ideas and practices. No single normative template can sustain the transformation of public services in ways that can defend them from neo-liberal, communitarian or populist political projects. But struggles to offer a new vocabulary may offer spaces in which alternative projects may unfold.
4. Conclusion

This chapter has traced some contours of the increasing focus on civility, exploring how far public service organisations can succeed in reconciling a focus on civiiness in their own practices with their role in producing civility among potentially unruly populations. The boundaries between civic and civil may seem like little more than a linguistic nicety, of interest to discourse analysts but of little practical or political utility. Both civiiness and civility are concerned with a normative framing of public life – with what it means to be public rather than individual, to have respect for public values and public actions rather than to allow the wholesale denigration of publicness in the face of the roll out of neo-liberalism. However while a focus on the civic qualities of public services implies attention to institutional norms and practices, a focus on civility directs attention to the behaviour of individuals – including those in need of and/or receipt of social services.

The challenge, then, is how far public service organisations can succeed in reconciling a focus on civiiness in their own practices with their role in producing civility among potentially unruly populations. Loader and Walker (2007) propose a concept of ‘civilised security’ rooted in political and legal institutions that would make associational democracy possible. The civil, however, directs attention not to political institutions, nor to service delivery organisations, but to the behaviour and comportment of citizens. The focus shifts from the organisations and staff who deliver services (for example how far they can transcend consumerist rationales in order to address wider social and civic issues) to individual citizens (their comportment, behaviour and attitudes).

This can, of course, be turned on its head, opening up questions about the behaviour and comportment of public service organisations. The Creating citizen consumer research project (Clarke et al 2007) highlighted the significance of ‘respect’ and ‘partnership’ in the expectations that publics brought to their relationships with public service providers in health, policing and social care. This, we suggested, produced new alignments between New Labour’s own discourse and that of the public:

New Labour’s ‘Respect’ agenda was primarily addressed to issues of public conduct, aiming to regulate anti-social behaviour and promote civility in public spaces. It was not directed to relationships between government, public services and the public. It did, however, emerge as a consistent theme among people who used the services. It centred on how they felt they were perceived, addressed and treated in the service encounter. Perceived indifference, impersonality, inattentiveness or rudeness constituted a lack of respect: they felt they were not ‘being taken seriously’ as needs or rights bearing individuals. This desire for ‘respect’ was not the same as an expectation that all the needs or wants would be met. … [But] respect identified a key processual and relational dimension that people valued highly in public services. (2007: 145).
Civicsness and the paradoxes of contemporary governance

This suggests that one way forward may be to try to re-couple concepts of civic and civil in the service relationship. Rather than ‘civil’ being viewed as a desired property of citizens, residents, neighbours and the ‘antisocial’, or of service users towards staff, it would become an aspiration concerning how services should be delivered: a property of the organisation not just those that are the objects of its interventions. But this would make front line staff the target of yet more performance rationales and add yet more responsibilities to an already overburdened and strained cadre of professionals. As we noted in the Clarke et al study, such an orientation would

...clearly require more effort, energy and emotional labour than does efficient ‘people processing’ (but such people processing is only ever efficient from the perspective of a managerialised organisational calculus). Nevertheless such investment of time and resources might deliver a variety of public goods, ranging from perceived customer satisfaction to deepened attachments to public services and their ‘publicness’ (2007: 146).

References

Index

Accountability, 34, 96, 118, 202, 212, 236, 240, 245, 254, 255, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 266, 271, 272, 276
Childcare, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 112, 152, 267, 268
Citizenship, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 31, 38, 39, 42, 44, 45, 48, 50, 61, 65, 77, 80, 85, 96, 99, 110, 127, 130, 134, 137, 147, 186, 245, 251, 260, 269, 271, 272, 273, 274, 277, 278, 283, 290
Civil society, 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 52, 54, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 68, 81, 108, 110, 127, 133, 136, 149, 178, 181, 182, 183, 184, 197, 198, 201, 203, 207, 208, 209, 212, 227, 229, 234, 244, 245, 247, 260, 262, 266, 267, 269, 270, 273, 276, 278, 289, 290
Civil society, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 75, 76, 77, 78, 110, 114, 115, 116, 118, 154, 201, 208, 209, 210, 215, 221, 273, 274, 275, 277, 278, 281
Commercialization, 24, 34, 212, 222, 223, 225
Coordination, 14, 16, 19, 24, 27, 34, 35, 134, 135, 159, 233, 250, 251, 252, 254, 255, 256, 257, 267, 268, 269, 271, 272
Co-production, 7, 11, 12, 14, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 221, 240, 267, 276
Corporatism, 65, 257, 258, 262, 271
Corporatist, 50, 52, 126, 203, 242, 243, 261
Democracy, 12, 16, 21, 25, 28, 30, 38, 39, 44, 48, 52, 55, 61, 64, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 109, 110, 111, 112, 126, 129, 135, 136, 149, 152, 183, 199, 201, 207, 208, 222, 223, 224, 261, 262, 263, 270, 271, 276, 281, 283, 289
Democratization, 31, 84, 204, 228, 290
General interest, 92, 94, 127, 174, 177, 228, 259, 270
Healthcare, 81, 125, 127, 128, 129, 132, 134, 135, 137, 138
Housing, 96, 108, 135, 138, 143, 185, 239, 278
Hybrid, 12, 16, 19, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 78, 81, 102, 123, 138, 145, 151, 273, 274, 276
Hybridization, 15, 114
Hybrids, 31, 33, 34, 35, 81, 130, 182, 185, 199
Manager, 71, 72, 74, 77, 80, 177, 265
Managerialism, 59, 71, 72, 73, 77, 90, 101, 102, 212, 222, 261, 263, 290
Marketization, 81, 84, 85, 201, 202, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223
Modernization, 46, 69, 113, 228, 244, 249, 250, 267, 270
New public management, 84, 271
Organizational development, 15, 113, 114, 115, 116
Partnership, 16, 135, 238, 243, 249, 257, 258, 260, 261, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 276, 281
286
Volunteering, 23, 27, 29, 30, 31, 36, 38, 48, 61, 68, 91, 99, 234, 238, 240, 279, 289
Volunteers, 24, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 91, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 192, 193, 195, 196, 197,
199, 209, 210, 213, 214, 215
Welfare pluralism, 110, 111, 227, 229, 241
Welfare state, 14, 31, 34, 45, 51, 52, 54, 55, 58, 59, 62, 85, 99, 100, 101, 102, 110, 111, 112,
130, 138, 142, 144, 184, 189, 201, 203, 209, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230, 241, 244, 245, 246,
266, 269, 271, 272, 274, 275, 277, 290
Authors

**Taco Brandsen** is Associate Professor in Public Administration at the Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University Nijmegen (The Netherlands). His research interests include public service delivery, urban regeneration, governance and civil society.

**Paul Dekker** is Professor of Civil Society at Tilburg University (The Netherlands), and head of the Participation and Government research group of The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | SCP. His current research focuses on public opinion and civic involvement.

**Bernard Enjolras** is Research Director at the Institute for Social Research (ISR) in Oslo (Norway) and Director of the Research Center on Civil Society and Voluntary Sector at the ISR. His fields of research are civil society, voluntary organizations, public policies, and governance.

**Adalbert Evers** is Professor for Comparative Health and Social Policy at the Justus-Liebig-University in Giessen (Germany). His research interests include the field of social policy and social care services, especially with respect to the role of the third sector, civil society, democracy and governance.

**Silvia Ferreira** is Lecturer in Sociology at the Faculty of Economics of Coimbra University and researcher at the Centre for Social Studies of Coimbra University, Portugal. Her research interests include welfare mix in social services, local governance and the third sector, social policy and social entrepreneurship.

**Ota de Leonardis** is Full Professor of Sociology of Culture at the University of Milano Bicocca (Italy), and director of the Research Centre on Sociology of Public Action Sui Generis. Her main research interests include social policies, institutions and the third sector.

**Håkon Lorentzen** is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Social Research in Oslo (Norway), and professor at The Norwegian School of Theology. His main themes are civil society and modernism/individualism, governance, volunteering and non-profit economy.
Michael Meyer is Professor for Non-profit Management at the Vienna University of Economics and Business (Austria). He is the head of the Research Institute for Non-profit Organisations at the WU and an experienced lecturer and researcher in the field of Organisational Behaviour and Non-profit Management. Areas of specialization and current research include managerialism, non-profit organisations, civil society and civic participation, social systems theory, organisational theory and careers.

Stéphane Nassaut is Research Assistant and Guest Lecturer at the « Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Travail, Etat et Société, Université catholique de Louvain (Belgium). His research interests include the third sector and public regulation in the field of social policies.

Michaela Neumayr works as a research assistant at the Research Institute for Nonprofit Organizations, Vienna University of Economics and Business (Austria). Her research topics include the relation between nonprofits and the government, public finance, gender budgeting and charitable giving.

Janet Newman is Professor of Social Policy and Director of the Publics Research Programme within the Centre for Citizenship, Identities and Governance at the Open University (UK). Her research centres on questions of new formations of governance, professional and organizational change, and the transformations of notions of publics and publicness.

Marthe Nyssens is Full Professor of Economics at the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium). Her research interests include third sector, public policies, and the delivery of personal services.

Victor Pestoff recently joined the Institute for Civil Society Studies at Ersta Sköndal University College in Stockholm (Sweden) as a Visiting Professor. He specializes in social economy, the third sector and the democratization of the welfare state.

Evelien Tonkens has an Endowed Chair in Active Citizenship at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Amsterdam (The Netherlands). Her main area of research concerns interactions between citizen participation and professional and social change.