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Chapter 1

Things to Remember

Introduction to Materializing Memory in Art and Popular Culture

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1 Things to Remember

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But when from a long-distant past nothing subsists, after the people are dead, after the things are broken and scattered, still, alone, more fragile, but with more vitality, more unsubstantial, more persistent, more faithful, the smell and taste of things remain poised a long time, like souls, ready to remind us, waiting and hoping for their moment, amid the ruins of all the rest; and bear unfaltering, in the tiny and almost impalpable drop of their essence, the vast structure of recollection.

—Marcel Proust (1956, pp. 57–58)

Stuff matters.

—Daniel Miller (2010, p. 125)

Dipping a ‘Petite Madeleine’ in a Cup of Linden Tea

From Pierre Nora’s lieu de mémoire and its many successor projects across the European and American continents to Raphael Samuel’s (2012) ‘theaters of memory’, the literature on memory intimates that remembering is entangled with things. This entanglement of memory with materiality can be illustrated by the souvenir that people buy as a memento on their travels; objects we keep so that they will remind us of a particular time, place, or situation we wish to remember. Built so as to make people remember, monuments and memorials further exemplify the interrelation of memory and materiality. Plaques commemorating writers and artists, statues of kings and politicians are a case in point. Perhaps the most famous literary example of this entanglement is the episode in Marcel Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu, when, dipping a ‘little madeleine’ cake in a cup of linden tea, Marcel unexpectedly remembers similar crumbs of the little madeleine which his aunt Léonie used to give him on Sunday mornings at Combray. ‘The sight of the little madeleine had recalled nothing to my mind before I tasted it’, Marcel observes (Proust, 1956, p. 57). But once he has recognized the taste of the madeleine soaked in linden tea, the memory of the old gray house in which his aunt used to live emerged before him, and with the house the town, indeed the
whole of Combray and its surroundings, ‘like the scenery of a theatre’ (58), inaugurating the narrative of his ‘remembrance of things past’, as Proust’s novel is called in English. ‘The past is hidden somewhere outside the realm, beyond the reach of intellect, in some material object (in the sensation which that material object will give us) which we do not suspect’ (p. 54).

Proust’s insight into the importance of things, and especially the sensation thereof, proves that the material, sensual, and sensory dimensions of memory in culture have long been known. As he makes clear, it is the feel, smell, and touch of things that trigger memory; it is the encounter between the embodied human being and the inanimate thing that occasions the act of remembrance, not some ‘exercise of the will’ (Proust, 1956, p. 53). Or, as Freeman, Nienass, and Daniell put it: ‘we rarely remember through ideas only, but rather through our encounters with things’ (2016, p. 3).

Like Proust’s madeleine, the mundane things we accidentally find while clearing out drawers easily lend themselves as vehicles of time travel. They make us relive, in a fraction of a second, memories of places and events, of feelings, and of people we have met but long forgotten. Susan Stewart’s poem ‘The Memory Cabinet of Mrs. K. 1960’, published as a prelude to this book, offers a poignant articulation of the mnemonic potential of things. Structured by the drawers’ location within the cabinet, the poem constitutes an inventory of things that Mrs. K. accumulated. Unlike the madeleine that pries open the recesses of Marcel’s memory in Proust’s novel, Stewart’s poem does not disclose Mrs. K.’s memories related to the objects in her cabinet. Instead, they are situated in the poem according to their location within the cabinet. The year 1960 serves as a temporal reference point, while the ‘memory cabinet’ suggests that these objects have been willfully retained. In Stewart’s inventory, none of them emerges as more or less important than any other. Rather, they form a metonymic chain of contiguity, held together by commas and semicolons. The fact that they are stored in the drawers of a memory cabinet, however, invests them with a mnemonic aura. Beyond the functions they serve as cosmetics, souvenirs, cloths, and knickknacks, they emerge in the poem as metonyms of past journeys, events, and relationships. Like the letter K., which marks and at once conceals the name that it stands for, the things in Mrs. K.’s cabinet are material markers of memories undisclosed to the reader. But even if they are silent about memories, these objects also mark Mrs. K. as a person. They bespeak her social standing, her taste, her sense of self, and above all, her will to remember.

Yet if the entanglement of memory and materiality has long been known and can be traced throughout the massive amount of texts that make up the field of cultural memory studies, so far this material dimension has remained relatively undertheorized in memory studies.
Materializing Memory in Art and Popular Culture seeks to remedy this situation. In this collection of essays, we examine practices of memory centered on the concept of materiality, by which we mean the concrete, material, and physical dimensions of acts of remembrance. As we shall demonstrate, this means that we regard materiality as the relations between people and things. As Ian Woodward asserts, ‘materiality ... refers to the relations between people and objects, especially the way in which social life is inherently structured by everyday dealings with objects, such as technology or objects of memory’ (2007, p. 55, emphasis in original). Important in this definition is the emphasis on the inherent relationality of materiality. Indeed, scholars tend to stress that matter is always embedded in its social relations. John Law, for example, defines materiality as ‘a way of thinking about the material in which this is treated as a continuously enacted relational effect’ (2004, p. 161). In The Oxford Handbook of Material Culture Studies, he writes that in Science and Technology Studies (STS), ‘materiality is usually understood as relational effect’ (2010, p. 173). Similarly, in their edited volume Material Powers, Tony Bennett and Patrick Joyce refer to the ‘intrinsic sociality of matter’ (2010, p. 15), while Giuliana Bruno argues that ‘materiality involves a refashioning of our sense of space and contact with the environment, as well as a rethreading of our experience of temporality, interiority, and subjectivity’ (2014, p. 8).

In this book, we focus on the interrelation of memory and materiality in art and popular culture to explore material culture as an integral aspect of memory practices. As such, we seek to account for the material world as a medium through which acts of remembering and forgetting take place. On the one hand, we investigate the ways in which objects and things are endowed with meaning and affect through the various memory practices that are centered on them. On the other hand, we are especially interested in the ‘agency’ of objects as a key element in practices of memory and forgetting. The theoretical and methodological apparatus of the book stems from the paradigm known as the ‘material turn’, which has gained substantial recognition in social and cultural research over the past decades but has received significantly less attention in the field of memory studies. According to Bennett and Joyce (2010), the material turn was instigated by the need to rethink anti-ontologizing dualisms, such as those between the natural and the social, the human and the nonhuman, the material and the immaterial. The material turn encompasses the so-called new materialism (Barrett and Bolt, 2013; Dolphijn and van der Tuin, 2012) or new materialisms (Boscagli, 2014; Coole and Frost, 2010; St. Pierre, Jackson, and Mazzei, 2016), which looks at how material powers affect our daily lives and discusses the agency of nonhumans. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost emphasize that ‘We live our everyday lives surrounded by, immersed in, matter’ (2010, p. 1), while Estelle Barrett and Barbara Bolt draw attention to the performative
power of materiality without, however, throwing out the discursive di-
mension of reality (2013, pp. 6, 7). Fully to acknowledge the role of
materiality in our daily lives ‘entails recognising distinctive forms of
agency and effectivity on the part of material forces’, as Bennett and
Joyce maintain (2010, p. 3).

A new materialist approach to comprehending practices of memory
offers fresh perspectives on the study of memory in culture. The present
book seeks to open new horizons in memory studies by focusing on
materiality as an integral aspect of memory practices in a wide tempo-
ral and topographical range, from ancient Rome to contemporary Latin
America and Indonesia. Its scope entails fields as diverse as modern ruins,
the exchange and circulation of souvenirs, digitization and the Internet
of Things, the materiality of the body and traumatic reenactment, as
well as the material aspects of memory in creative performances, lite-
rature, film, and fashion design. As a whole, Materializing Memory in
Art and Popular Culture addresses four underlying questions: What is
the role of materiality in the mediation of memory at the individual,
social, and cultural level? What is the role of memory and forgetting in
the social and cultural life of objects? How do art and popular culture
use materiality to bring the past into the present in the service of the
future? And finally, in what ways are memory objects inscribed with
meaning, affect, and agency? The answers that this volume provides are
predicated on two premises: first, memory is performed, mediated, and
stored through the material world that surrounds us. Second, inanimate
objects and things also have a certain agency of their own, which affects
practices of remembering as well as of forgetting.

**Performance and Materiality**

If memory is a performance of the past in the present, it is essential
to account for the material world as a medium through which perfor-
ances of memory take place. Whereas the focus of our previous book,
Performing Memory in Art and Popular Culture, was ‘on the “act” of
memory, not its “theatre” or “palace”, as we wrote in its introduction,
‘inquiring into the processes of making, constructing, enacting, trans-
forming, expressing, transmitting cultural memory through art and
popular culture’ (Plate and Smelik, 2013, p. 3), this time we direct our
attention precisely to such theatres and palaces and look at ruins, sou-
venirs, interconnected objects, and other things to remember. Celeste
Olalquiaga, for example, argues in her chapter that modern ruins induce
a new form of memory—one that focuses on the brittleness of material
reality. It is a material reality, moreover, that has become infused with
an aura of ‘realness’ where perception is no longer a question of ‘seeing
is believing’, but rather ‘touching is believing’. This shift in focus, from
the performance of memory to its materiality, follows from the insight
that there is a material dimension to the performance of memory and that this material dimension has not been given sufficient attention in memory studies. This is not to say that material culture has been under-represented in cultural memory studies. On the contrary, objects have been central to the study of cultural memory, for instance, in the case of memorials, photographs, souvenirs, and books (Young, 1993; Hirsch, 1997; Sturken, 2007; Rigney, 2012). It is rather a matter of developing the ‘means by which to activate the implicit thing knowledge we already possess, as well as means to become more sensitive to the inherent qualities of things themselves’, as Bjørnar Olsen writes in In Defense of Things (2013, p. 18). In Death, Memory and Material Culture (2001), Elizabeth Hallan and Jenny Hockey discuss the role of the body and its material environment in the making of memory, focusing on how objects and the rituals around these objects shape the memory of past generations, dead friends, and lovers. In The Memory of Clothes (2015), Robyn Gibson has collected stories of the ways in which memories and traces of the past are, as it were, woven or stitched into the fabrics of our clothes. Such narratives follow in the tracks of Peter Stallybrass’s (1993) groundbreaking article on the pivotal role that clothes play in individual remembrance, as Lianne Toussaint and Anneke Smelik point out in their chapter on techno-fashion. On a different note, in his chapter Louis van den Hengel explores the potential of performance and re-performance to act as material processes of historical, cultural, and aesthetic memory—a multiple folding of time that carries the past into the present and affirms the presence of the present as the living force of memory. In contrast to the debates within performance theory that center on the ephemeral or fleeting nature of live art, he focuses on how memory is mediated through the distinct materiality of performance. Van den Hengel locates this materiality in the affective operations of performance as a time-based, yet profoundly untimely, art form. In this view, it is the expressive event of performance that creates an enduring archive in which the forces of matter and memory meet in a co-shaping dynamic.

Three works have been particularly influential in our project. The collection of essays edited by Marius Kwint, Christopher Breward, and Jeremy Aynsley entitled Material Memories: Design and Evocation (1999) anticipated and laid the groundwork for the present book by assigning crucial importance to the forms and materials of objects, their social, economic, and historic reasons for being, and the ways in which we remember by interacting with them through our senses, as did Bjørnar Olsen’s In Defense of Things: Archaeology and the Ontology of Objects (2013). In the realm of the arts, Lisa Saltzman’s (2006) discussion of material techniques of remembrance in her Making Memory Matter: Strategies of Remembrance in Contemporary Art has also been a source of inspiration for our project. It is this continued attention to the materiality of objects, and to the role of this materiality
in the process of cultural remembering, that we want to pursue in this volume. For example, in her chapter, Inge van de Ven argues that digitalization has enabled new possibilities for scale, which in turn has reinforced a widespread cultural drive to capture and preserve ‘everything’. She explores the effect of databases on literary representations in two ‘big’ novels—Knausgård’s Min Kamp and Bolaño’s 2666—that embody the monumental in a double meaning of the term: commemoration and material magnitude. She analyzes how the material dimensions of these works and their expansive scope relate to their workings as vehicles of cultural memory. The notion of scale plays a similarly central role in László Munteán’s contribution to this volume, albeit in the essentially different context of the miniature. Munteán uses the photographer David Levinthal’s 2008 project entitled I.E.D.: War in Afghanistan and Iraq as a case study that combines American soldiers’ blogs of their war experience with photographs of miniature dioramas depicting scenes of America’s War on Terror. Levinthal’s photographs, as Munteán demonstrates, monumentalize these miniature objects and render them uncannily realistic, activating ‘memories’ of a war experienced through mediatized representations.

In Materializing Memory in Art and Popular Culture, we refer to an increasing body of research gathered under the rubric of ‘new materialisms’ as a terminological and theoretical apparatus fitting not only to discuss hitherto overlooked aspects of remembering but also to demonstrate the methodological value of studying materiality for a humanities and social sciences perspective on ‘memory’. Similar to other adherents of the material turn in the humanities and social sciences (e.g., Hicks and Beaudry, 2010; Boscagli, 2014), we draw on insights from a variety of sources and disciplines. These range from archaeological, anthropological, and vernacular theories about things to literary studies, material culture studies, science and technology studies, philosophy, political theory, and quantum physics, all of which regard things not as inert but as ‘vibrant’ matter (Bennett, 2010) and perceive things, people, and society as co-producing one another. In this latter respect, Arjun Appadurai’s edited volume The Social Life of Things has been a seminal text that pleads to ‘follow the things themselves, for their meanings are inscribed in their forms, their uses, their trajectories’ (1986, p. 5). The idea that a thing, a gift, or a commodity may have a social life is indeed illuminating, particularly in light of the distinction between what Appadurai describes as the social history of things, pertaining to longer-term shifts and larger-scale dynamics, and what Igor Kopytoff in the same volume calls the ‘cultural biography’ of things (1986, p. 34). In her contribution to the present book, Maggie Popkin follows Appadurai’s and Kopytoff’s example to show the evolving biographies and shifting functions and meanings over the course of the ‘lives’ of glass vases from ancient Pozzuoli. These vases were purchased as commodities but
were then transformed into souvenirs with greater sentimental value and, ultimately, into grave goods in some cases. The complexities of their biographies, however, do not change the fact that they spent parts of their ‘lives’ as souvenirs. Willy Jansen, too, traces the ‘social life of things’ in her chapter on religious objects used in rituals, such as a crystalline tear expressing the Virgin Mary’s suffering. She claims that groups create and sustain a symbolic focal point for their identity construction by exhibiting, describing, and photographing the biography of their most precious things. Through their care for things, groups develop internal cohesion and distinguish themselves from others. On a personal level, objects serve to symbolize the intimate suffering of mothers in everyday life and the emotional work involved in caring for one’s loved ones and keeping the memory of deceased or departed family members alive. Objects thus help to shape a variety of identities—individual and familial, social, spatial, political, and religious.

In everyday parlance, the terms ‘object’ and ‘thing’ are used interchangeably. Although this is often the case in scholarly literature as well, a theoretical tradition dating back to Heidegger’s work (2001) does distinguish between the two categories. Drawing on the conceptualization of objects as things that we think of as ‘relatively stable in form’ (Hodder, 2012, p. 7), Bill Brown’s seminal essay, ‘Thing Theory’ (2001), introduced literary scholars and cultural critics to a ‘sense of things’, which would become the title of his 2003 book. In ‘Thing Theory’ he writes: ‘We begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working for us. … The story of objects asserting themselves as things, then, is the story of a changed relationship to the human subject and thus the story of how the thing really names less an object than a particular subject-object relation’ (2001, p. 4). In her chapter on the Argentinian film Los rubios by Albertina Carri, Anna Forné draws on Brown’s thing theory in relation to the exposition of different kinds of memory objects that is carried out in a filmic display of cutting, reorganizing, and staging, not only of the objects of memory but also of the modus operandi by which those objects are remembered. The importance of materiality in collective as well as individual labors of memory is thus highlighted. Expanding on Brown’s thing theory, Forné argues that the object is revealed as a thing when the relationship between the human subject and the object is altered. She shows that the inevitable intertwining of personal and public narratives of memory in Los rubios, and the way in which the objects of memory are staged, emphasize the changed relationship between the subject and the object contemplated. The film thus changes the objects into things.

In his latest book entitled Other Things, Brown (2015) expands on the object/thing distinction through the works of Heidegger and Lacan, examining the force of material culture through a range of writers and visual artists. Tracing the etymological root of the word ‘thing’
in Old-High-German, Heidegger foregrounds ‘gathering’ as an inherent quality of thingness (2001, p. 172), thus foreshadowing that things are always already connected (Hodder, 2012) and entangled (Barad, Juelskjaer, and Schwennesen, 2012; Ingold, 2010). In their critical account of pioneering heritage work in the space of social media and the Internet of Things, for instance, Elisa Giaccardi and Liedeke Plate argue that ‘doing’ and ‘saying’ around connected objects creates new spaces of remembrance. Rather than using things to communicate with other people, people will communicate with things and things with people—and with other things. Within this landscape, the ontological distinction between human and nonhuman, animate and inanimate becomes blurred. This new relationship with ‘things’ is something that people increasingly have to negotiate, and it may well be the next step in digital heritage. In this sense, the distinction between people and things also becomes more blurred. People are things too, as new materialists like to emphasize (Frow, 2001, p. 285; Ingold, 2012, p. 438); we are ‘walking, talking minerals’ (Margulis and Sagan, 2000, p. 49, qtd. in Bennett, 2010, p. 11), ‘bundles of biochemical processes, flows of blood and nerves and cells temporarily coalesced into an entity that is thoroughly dependent on and connected to air, water, food and so on’ (Hodder, 2012, p. 9).

This entanglement of things both human and nonhuman is crucial for our understanding of memory, not as a pure neurological event, but as the ‘intra-action’ of people and things. We borrow the term ‘intra-action’ from Karen Barad, who introduces it to signal how people and things are not separate entities that interact, but constitute each other in the process. As Barad maintains, ‘Intra-actions are causally constraining nondeterministic enactments through which matter-in-the-process-of-becoming is sedimented out and enfolded in further materializations’ (Barad, 2003, p. 823). Barad’s nondeterministic and nonrepresentational understanding of materiality provides a useful platform to rethink the role of things in the memory process. There is increasing recognition that we would not be who we are without things; that ‘things are us’ (Webmoor and Witmore, 2008, qtd. in Ingold 2012, p. 438). We are living in a society not only of consumption (Baudrillard, 1990, 2005) but of hyperconsumption (Lipovetsky, 2005), with more things than we know what to do with. In his historical and encyclopedic overview entitled *Empire of Things*, Frank Trentmann (2016) analyzes how consumers become more and more overwhelmed by possessions. Consequently, the question of how this surplus of things affects our ability to remember—individually as well as collectively—poses itself with increasing urgency. Surrounded by stuff, with more images in our computers than we can look at in a lifetime and more artifacts in depots and documents in archives than we can process, the question begs the answer as to how and what do we recollect? How, indeed, does ‘peak stuff’ (a term used by Steve Howard, head of Ikea’s sustainability unit) relate to (cultural) memory?
We do not need to refer to complex philosophical arguments to understand the basic truth of the insight that human life is entangled with things. Just think of how, physiologically, the things we ingest literally make us; or how the things we learn, memorize, and think about shape our brain. Without the insights of the (neuro)sciences, Deutscher Werkbund, the German industrial design association founded by artists and industrialists in 1907, maintained in its 1955 catalogue Deutsche Warenkunde that ‘we not only shape things, but things shape us’—a belief that led to the Werkbund controversially attempting to influence people’s lifestyles through design—through the aesthetics of things, such as a ‘beautifully set table’, with which they interacted and surrounded themselves. More recently, Marie Kondo’s popular best-selling book, The Life-Changing Magic of Tidying Up: The Japanese Art of Decluttering and Organizing (2014), not only articulates readers’ concerns about being overwhelmed by the things they have accumulated, but does so in terms distinctly similar to those of the new materialists, by speaking of ‘belongings as if they were alive’ and demanding that we acknowledge the support we receive from the things that surround us (pp. 169, 181). For Kondo, whose mission in life is to declutter homes, it is clear that memory—or, more specifically, the will to remember that attends the fear of forgetting—plays an important role in the accumulation of things in our lives and why we hold on to them. ‘Starting with mementos spells certain failure’, she heads one of the sections in the book, explaining that ‘more often than not, it’s one of your favorite comic books, an album, or some other item that brings back fond memories’ that holds people back from making a clean sweep of their homes (pp. 44–45). As she writes, ‘The thought of disposing of them sparks the fear that we’ll lose those precious memories along with them’ (p. 114).

Fittingly titled The Comfort of Things (2008), Daniel Miller’s anthropological study of networks of relationships woven around simple household objects in a London street attests to the entanglement of people and things, things and memories, and of people’s dependence on things (for memory) (see also Miller and Parrot, 2009). In an earlier book, Miller (2005) admits that he cannot give a definition of what a ‘thing’ is beyond ‘a commonsense rather than academic presupposition of what we mean by the word thing. Is an ephemeral image, a moment in a streaming video, a thing? Or if the image is frozen as a still, is it now a thing? Is a dream, a city, a sensation, a derivative, an ideology, a landscape, a decay, a kiss? I haven’t the least idea’ (Miller, 2005, p. 7). Similarly, a few years later he exclaims to please not ask for a definition of ‘stuff’ (Miller, 2010, p. 1). This aversion to clear definitions does not prevent him from claiming that ‘things make people as [much] as the other way around’ (p. 42), and that ‘things … make us the people we are’ (p. 53). In her chapter on the documentary The Act of Killing, which features perpetrators of mass killings that happened nearly five
decades ago in a post-coup purge in Indonesia, Aleid Fokkema discusses how the film engages with ‘objects that matter’, a phrase she borrows from Miller (2005). Everyday objects, Miller argues, matter in a personal way and ‘at the scene of action’ (2005, p. 13). The Act of Killing can be taken to illustrate this with excessive performances where props and buildings come to figure significantly as the scene unfolds. The houses, offices, town squares, or patios that form the casual backdrop to the scene and the objects used for ‘dressing up’ performances appear to be mundane and generic but become uncannily meaningful because of the way they come to matter to the people who interact with them. In The Act of Killing, place, the lieu de mémoire, is intrusively present in collective space, with former locations of torture and killing simply extant as ordinary buildings and offices that in the film become suffused with their somber history through reenacted memories. The film visualizes how place has a way of invading the body in the act of retrieving and re-living memory. Such bodily affect is momentary and transient, as is the transformative power of things that matter. The film shows that memory retrieval does not provide closure and does not appear to have any lasting effect, but is restricted to the scene of action; to performance as it happens, as it is witnessed.

And indeed, what is the lieu de mémoire, if not the recognition that we need things to remember? According to Pierre Nora, the interest in lieux de mémoire occurs at a specific historical juncture, ‘a particular historical moment, where consciousness of a break with the past is bound up with the sense that memory has been torn—but torn in such a way as to pose the problem of the embodiment of memory in certain sites where a sense of historical continuity persists’ (1989, p. 7). Recognizing the material and embodied nature of memory, Nora acknowledges the way in which mind, body, and world work together to produce memory: ‘We speak so much of memory because there is so little of it left,’ he aphoristically writes. ‘There are lieux de mémoire, sites of memory, because there are no longer milieux de mémoire, real environments of memory’ (p. 7, emphases in original).

Although many people in the Western world still adhere to the (modernist) idea that mind, body, and world are separate and distinct, there is also an increasing recognition that this metaphysics can no longer be maintained and that it has reached the limits of its explanatory powers. To be sure, there are those who, like the Nestor of Cultural Memory Studies, Jan Assmann, continue to hold on to the ontological differentiation between mind, body, and world, asserting that “Things do not “have” a memory of their own, but they may remind us, may trigger our memory, because they carry memories which we have invested into them’ (2008, p. 111). Yet, there has been increasing dissatisfaction with such a view among scholars of memory and material culture. Katrina Schlunke introduces the readers of the dedicated journal Memory Studies to the
idea that ‘memory and materiality are better understood as intertwined producers of memory effects’ because, as she argues, it ‘provides us with a more telling idea of why memory constantly exceeds any easy division between individual and collective and between the unconscious and conscious’ (2013, pp. 253–254). Seeking to understand the relationship between human memory and material culture in a more complex and satisfying way, archaeologist Andrew Jones draws on philosopher Andy Clark’s (1997) theory of the extended mind to argue that memory is produced through the encounter between people and the material world. As he explains, ‘The mind is best understood as emergent in its interactions with the world’ (2007, p. 10). This theory implies that knowledge ‘is dependent upon contingent interactions amongst brain, body, and world’ and that remembrance can best be understood as a ‘dialogue’, ‘a process distributed between people and objects’ (2007, pp. 10, 26). As Marius Kwint writes elsewhere, such a view ‘opens up the proposition that human memory has undergone a mutual evolution with the objects that inform it; that, in other words, the relationship between them is dialectical. Not only does the material environment influence the structure and contents of the mind, but the environment must also have been shaped along the lines of what persists in the mind’s eye’ (1999, p. 4).

In other words, to take the materiality of things seriously means to be able to ‘have finally and fully transcended the dualism of subjects and objects’, in the words of Daniel Miller (2005, p. 43). An early problematization of this dualism can be found in Michel Serres’s The Parasite (1982) where, through the example of the ball used for playing games, he comes to the realization that ‘The ball isn’t there for the body; the contrary is true: the body is the object of the ball; the subject moves around this sun. … Playing is nothing else but making oneself the attribute of the ball as a substance’ (p. 226). The ball, in Serres’s sense, operates as a ‘quasi-object’ and ‘quasi-subject,’ an entity constitutive of the subject that engages with it in the game. Drawing on this subversion of the conventional subject/object divide, Bruno Latour (1993) furthers the concept of quasi-objects and quasi-subjects by recognizing their role as catalysts of exchange within larger networks: ‘They are real, quite real, and we humans have not made them. But they are collective because they attach us to one another, because they circulate in our hands and define our social bond by their very circulation’ (p. 89). This formulation later became one of the conceptual pillars of his actor-network theory (2005), which grants equal agency to objects within intricate human-nonhuman networks, providing a widely applied model to overcome the subject/object dualism in social science research. Reverberations of this thinking can be felt in a renewed interest in ontology and the ontology of things in particular, as evidenced by the proponents of Speculative Realism and Object-Oriented Ontology (Harman, 2002, 2010; Bryant, 2011; Bogost, 2012).
Coming from a wide range of disciplines, the theories we have discussed here highlight two aspects of the interrelation of performance and materiality. First, performance is no longer conceived of in terms of human agency in relation to the object world. It is reconceptualized as an attribute intrinsic to both humans and nonhumans whereby they entangle to form networks (Latour, 2005) and meshworks (Ingold, 2010), destabilizing conventional ontological distinctions between subjects and objects. Second, these theories of materiality underline the indispensable role of objects and things in performances of memory that needs to be contended with. Understanding performance in terms of material agency, however, implies that objects and things are no longer regarded as mere expedients for memory work but as potential agents of memory themselves, an issue to which we turn next.

The Agency of Objects

A central debate within material culture studies revolves around the issue of whether objects can be said to have agency (Knappett and Malafouris, 2008). Whereas there is general recognition of the ‘vitality’ of things—their capacity, as Jane Bennett puts it, ‘not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own’ (2010, p. viii)—this does not mean everyone agrees that we can speak of the agency of objects. On the one hand, there are those, such as Daniel Miller, who do not refrain from speaking of material culture as ‘having agency all of its own. Things do things to us, and not just the things we want them to do’ (2010, p. 94), a proposition for which Bruno Latour’s (2005) discussion of both humans and nonhumans as ‘actants’ had already set the stage. Alfred Gell can be credited with being the first anthropologist to have developed a theory of art focused on the agency of art objects in his posthumously published Art and Agency (1998). On the other hand, Tim Ingold maintains that ‘The idea that objects have agency is at best a figure of speech, forced on us (Anglophones at least) by the structure of a language that requires every verb of action to have a nominal subject’ (2010). For him, the emphasis on material agency is ‘a consequence of the reduction of things to objects and of their consequent “falling out” from the processes of life’ (2010, p. 3). It is a way of giving things their due but only partly. For as we mistake things for objects—as we think of them as discrete objects rather than gatherings of materials and forces—we overlook the life of things, the flow of materials, the transformation of matter. As he states, ‘In effect, to render the life of things as the agency of objects is to effect a double reduction, of things to objects and of life to agency’ (p. 7).

Crucial to the debate is, of course, what one understands by ‘agency’. In Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, political theorist
Jane Bennett surveys the philosophical literature on the subject to conclude that ‘No one really knows what human agency is, or what humans are doing when they are said to perform as agents. In the face of every analysis, human agency remains something of a mystery. If we do not know just how it is that human agency operates, how can we be so sure that the processes through which nonhumans make their mark are qualitatively different?’ (2010, p. 34). In consequence, she chooses to utilize anthropomorphism strategically, as ‘a counter to human exceptionalism, to, that is, the human tendency to understate the degree to which people, animals, artifacts, technologies, and elemental forces share powers and operate in dissonant conjunction with each other’ (p. 34). As she maintains, ‘We need to cultivate a bit of anthropomorphism—the idea that human agency has some echoes in nonhuman nature—to counter the narcissism of humans in charge of the world’ (Bennett, 2010, p. xvi). Similarly rejecting its alignment with human intentionality, subjectivity and the autonomous will, Karen Barad redefines the term altogether. In her definition,

Agency is a matter of intra-acting; it is an enactment, not something that someone or something has. Agency cannot be designated as an attribute of ‘subjects’ or ‘objects’ (as they do not preexist as such). Agency is not an attribute whatsoever—it is ‘doing’/‘being’ in its intra-activity. Agency is the enactment of iterative changes to particular practices through the dynamics of intra-activity. (2003, pp. 826–827)

We can thus understand the nonhuman agency of things as something that interacts with us as much as we interact with it.

This debate is important for rethinking the role of things in memory practices. It signals the importance of acknowledging this role in the first place, recognizing that, for better or for worse, things shape human memory. According to Marius Kwint, ‘In Western traditions, objects serve memory in three main ways. Firstly, they furnish recollection; they constitute our picture of the past. … Secondly, objects stimulate remembering. … Thirdly, objects form records: analogues to living memory, storing information beyond individual experience’ (1999, p. 2). Such enumeration of the ways in which things serve memory places them firmly in the category of aide-mémoire, that is, of things designed to help remember (the term ‘aide-mémoire’ originally designated an abstract containing the essence of what the student had to know). Rather than conceiving of things as props for memory, however, in the present book we maintain that without things, there would be no (cultural) memory. Earlier, following Marita Sturken’s (1997) application of the Foucauldian notion of technology to cultural memory, we discussed the dependency of human memory on things in terms of ‘technologies of memory’ (Plate and Smelik, 2009). In this book, we push the argument
of our previous work further by pursuing not only the materiality of technologies of memory involved but also their sociality.

We may recall how materiality is always already embedded in social relations. Writing in the 1920s, French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs already pointed out that it is in society that people acquire their memories, just as it is ‘in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories’ (1992, p. 38). For him, this means that individual memory is entangled with that of others; that individual memory is always already social, shaped by social frameworks. As he writes, ‘our recollections depend on those of all our fellows, and on the great frameworks of the memory of society ... there are no recollections which can be said to be purely interior, that is, which can be preserved only within individual memory’ (pp. 42, 169). Halbwachs evidently stands in the ‘amnesic’ tradition in social and cultural studies that looks at societies as if ‘operating without the mediation of objects’ (Olsen, 2013, p. 2; see also St. Pierre, Jackson, and Mazzei, 2016). Nevertheless, rejecting the distinction between interiority and exteriority, and faulting psychology for considering people as ‘isolate beings’ (1992, p. 38), he in effect lays the foundations for understanding human memory as entangled, not only with other humans, but also with nonhuman things. ‘Wearables’ are a case in point. As Lianne Toussaint and Anneke Smelik argue in their chapter on techno-fashion, contemporary technologies embedded in gadgets or garments display a specific and nonhuman kind of agency. Agency pertains to quite different ‘things’: the designer, the body of the wearer, the garment, but also the materials like fiber, fabric, and the hard and soft technological artifacts embedded in them. These technologies are not inert but have been created to act, do, and remember. The notion of agency highlights the fact that the technologies establish an interaction between the garments and the body, between human and nonhuman entities. Material agency, in other words, is not located exclusively in the technology but in the assemblage of wearer, fashion, and technology.

The architect Eyal Weizman’s project called ‘forensic architecture’ further attests to this entanglement in the realm of human rights. Operating in a wide range of conflict zones around the world, Weizman’s team examines material remains to find evidence of crime that belligerent powers seek to conceal from the public. In doing so, the ruins of a building and material traces of violence are called for as ‘“material witnesses”’: that is, they bear witness not only to the alleged criminal events but to the very sorting process they underwent in order to qualify as evidence’ (Weizman, 2014, p. 21). Architecture, Weizman claims, ‘is both sensor and agent.’ It is “political plastic”—social forces slowing into form’ (2012, p. 7, emphases in original). In this sense, architecture performs a tripartite function insofar as it ‘registers the effect of force fields, it contains or stores these forces in material deformations, and, with the help
of other mediating technologies and the forum, it transmits this information further’ (Weizman, 2014, p. 15). The forum, which stands at the root of the term ‘forensics’, is a discursive site where the ‘interpreter’ and the thing ‘make up an entangled rhetorical technology’ to facilitate the transmission of information (2012, p. 9). Weizman’s project exemplifies how the prevalence of survivors’ testimonies is entangled with the voice given to materiality in a legal setting.

Here, we may refer back to Appadurai’s notion of a ‘social life of things’ (1986). For both Appadurai and Kopytoff to trace the cultural biography of a thing entails the unraveling of the specific value it has acquired in the course of its life. This seems to be a particularly relevant point for a materialist perspective on cultural memory. The practice of remembering endows a thing with affect and hence with psychological importance. The thing, however, may also have agency on its own not only in precipitating remembrance but also, potentially, in remembering on its own. At stake here are not only practices of memory woven around objects but memories gathered, stored, conveyed or concealed by objects as part and parcel of their social life.

Distinguishing between objects and things is, therefore, quite literally a matter of agency. As evidenced by the ever-growing body and interdisciplinary nature of theoretical works on the agency of objects, there are differing views as to what agency exactly means in the context of material culture and what effects this agency has on practices of memory. On the basis of the works above, however, a certain tendency becomes manifest. Whether construed as a rhetorical means to counter human narcissism or dismissed as a figure of speech that reinforces anthropomorphism, the burgeoning discourse around material agency has destabilized the centrality of the human as the arbiter of material processes and employed entanglement and intra-action to give rhetorical voice to nonhuman powers underlying humans’ relation to objects, as well as objects’ relations to each other. Memory is thus no longer conceived of as a sole privilege of human beings who use objects to remember but rather as an activity deeply entangled with nonhuman things and processes. Besides foregrounding the role of objects in human practices of memory, our use of the phrase ‘materializing memory’ in the title of this book also indicates our intention to locate and trace memory as a practice of and within the material world.

The chapters in Materializing Memory in Art and Popular Culture examine practices of memory through a focus on their very materiality. Multidisciplinary in scope, they account for the material world as a medium through which acts of remembering and forgetting take place. The authors testify to the diverse ways in which cultural memory is being formed and performed in the materiality of the object, be it ancient souvenirs, modern ruins, the Internet of Things, creative performances, literature, film, or a fashion design. The chapters address the ways in
which objects and things are endowed with meaning, affect, and agency through the various memory practices that are centered on them. Some of the chapters show how memory is performed, mediated, and stored through the material world that surrounds us. Other chapters analyze the agency of objects as a key element in practices of remembering and forgetting. In pursuing the interrelation of memory and materiality within the realm of art and popular culture, this volume aims at opening up new horizons in memory studies.

**Material Remains: Ruins and Souvenirs**

The chapters in the first part of the book, ‘Material Remains: Ruins and Souvenirs’, present the entanglement of memory and materiality in remains such as modern ruins and ancient souvenirs. This section opens with Celeste Olalquiaga’s evocative essay ‘El Helicoide: Modern Ruins and the Urban Imaginary’. While much attention has been paid in the last few years to modern ruins, the connection between their literal manifestations and their figurative use as concrete vestiges of cultural memory has yet to be established. Olalquiaga discusses why modern ruins elicit a mix of fascination and repulsion, and how this ambivalence underlies the impact of modern ruins on the urban imaginary. Outlining a chronology of the conceptual use of ruins in cultural theory—from Walter Benjamin’s ‘dialectical image’ to Raymond Williams’s ‘residual sensibilities’ and Jacques Lacan’s psychic ‘leftover’—she analyzes this use in relation to George Bataille’s and Julia Kristeva’s notions of the abject. Olalquiaga illustrates the inextricable relation between matter and concepts, and memories and objects, through El Helicoide de la Roca Tarpeya, an emblematic modern ruin in Caracas, Venezuela. A fallen star from the bright universe of modernity, El Helicoide represents not only the contradictions and shortcomings of the modern impulse, but also the complex relationship between modernity and memory. In a cultural moment when the perception of material reality is being reconfigured by digital technology, modern ruins recall the organic nature that industrialization set out to conquer, which now comes back residually in the conceptual and material leftovers of a modernity that attempted to erase the living memory of things.

In ‘Souvenirs and Memory Manipulation in the Roman Empire: The Glass Flasks of Ancient Pozzuoli’, Maggie Popkin discusses how souvenirs are a commonplace of contemporary life in many parts of the world. As a result, there has been a tendency to universalize the phenomenon of souvenirs—to suggest that souvenirs, no matter where or when they exist, capture a fleeting experience and eternalize it as something extraordinary. Yet souvenirs, like all objects of material culture, are products of specific cultural and historical contexts, and while similarities might exist between souvenirs from different times and places, Popkin suggests
seeking in souvenirs the historical and the particular rather than only the universal. This chapter offers an example of what might be accomplished by historicizing souvenirs: it examines a series of glass vases produced in the Roman city of Puteoli (modern Pozzuoli) on the Bay of Naples in the third and fourth centuries. These ancient Roman souvenirs challenge ideas that souvenirs ‘capture’ or ‘freeze’ memories and that the roots of modern souvenirs extend back only as far as Christian pilgrimage relics. Popkin argues that the glass flasks exported a vision of Puteoli as a miniature Rome—a city that enjoyed a special, favored relationship with the Roman emperors. The Puteolan flasks provide an object lesson in how souvenirs in the Roman world did much more than commemorate people’s visits to places; they also constructed people’s perceptions and memories of those places. The glass vases from Puteoli thus provide a secular precedent for souvenirs in the modern world and demonstrate the extraordinary potential of souvenirs to shape actively how we remember places.

Entangled Memories

In the second part of the book, ‘Entangled Memories’, we have brought together essays that pursue the ways in which memories are entangled with material and immaterial objects. In their chapter ‘How Memory Comes to Matter: From Social Media to the Internet of Things’, Elisa Giaccardi and Liedeke Plate discuss how social media and the Internet of Things change the complex set of memory practices through which we give meaning to the past in the present and thus shape our image of the future. They first consider the ways in which social media enable ordinary people to participate in the construction of memory through shared activities of collection, preservation, and interpretation. They maintain that a participatory approach to memory practice empowers people to engage in an active relationship with heritage objects: ‘doing’ or ‘saying’ around the object begins to become more important for human practices of remembering than the object in its straight materiality. With social media, memory is not just communicated, but actively constructed and performed through participatory practices of remembering. The Internet of Things works further the active, performative relationship between people and heritage objects that social media have introduced into digital heritage. As physical objects are connected to the Internet and can collect and exchange data, performances are carried out within a socio-material configuration in which objects are at the same time tangible (that is, embodied and localized) and intangible (that is, embedded with code, instructions, and histories). As objects begin to be constituted with code and algorithms, and to remember more about themselves and likely ourselves, Giaccardi and Plate argue that ‘doing’ and ‘saying’ around connected objects creates new spaces of
remembrance. The authors conclude with a theoretical speculation on how shared practices of remembering between humans and nonhumans have the potential to create spaces of remembrance that challenge our anthropocentric understanding of what is ‘possible’ and ‘worthwhile’ to remember.

Lianne Toussaint and Anneke Smelik shift the focus to fashion in ‘Memory and Materiality in Hussein Chalayan’s Techno-Fashion’. They use the case of a now iconic series of self-transforming dresses from the British-Turkish fashion designer Hussein Chalayan to explore how the integration of technology reshapes processes of memory through fashion. Chalayan’s ‘One Hundred and Eleven’ collection (2006) takes the audience on a time travel through a hundred and eleven years of fashion history. A high-necked Victorian gown transforms into a 1920s beaded flapper dress in mere seconds, a 1950s hourglass dress suddenly changes into a 1960s metallic sheath, and so on. The authors show how cultural memory—in this case, the recent history of Western fashion—is performed and mediated by the combination of fashion and technology. Fashion entertains a particular dialectical and ‘promiscuous’ relation to time and history. Using Chalayan’s collection as a case study, Toussaint and Smelik explore techno-fashion as a performance and technology of memory. In discussing the particular force of technology’s as well as fashion’s materialism, the analysis brings to the fore the ‘agency’ of things in highly technological times. As techno-fashion intertwines the embodied, technological, and cultural manifestations of memory, it paves the way for novel, softer and ‘agentic’ processes of memory.

In ‘Size Matters: Karl Ove Knausgård’s Min Kamp and Roberto Bolaño’s 2666 as (Anti-)Monumental Novels’, Inge van de Ven reflects on different meanings of monumentality in an age of digital proliferation of data. In cultural memory studies, the notion of the text as a monument is well established. It refers to literature’s capacity to transmit historicity and to the ability of novels to achieve artistic greatness in their own right, thus assuring their proliferation. Van de Ven brings the monumental in terms of magnitude of length and scope into this discussion. She analyzes Karl Ove Knausgård’s My Struggle (Min Kamp) series (2009–2011) and Roberto Bolaño’s 2666 (2004), asking how the ‘monumental effects’ of these works—in size, scope and commemorative focus—come about. How do the material dimensions of these novels relate to their workings as vehicles of cultural memory? The author puts forth the argument that the increasing importance of the cultural form of the database in the current media culture influences the ways in which narratives are structured. The quantitative ordering principles identified in these novels—listing, the anaphoric singulative frequency, and interminable narration—are akin to the ‘paradigmatic’ structuring principles of the database and go against the compressions
and selections of ‘syntagmatic’ narrativity. Where narrative meets the database, the result is a more inclusive textual monument that combines commemoration and bigness: a monumental novel in both senses of the term.

Reenactment, Affect, and Remembrance

The third part of the book, ‘Reenactment, Affect, and Remembrance’, shifts the focus to the material dimensions of corporeality and traumatic reenactment. Louis van den Hengel, in his chapter ‘Archives of Affect: Performance, Reenactment, and the Becoming of Memory’, addresses the potential of performance and performance reenactment to act as material processes of historical, cultural, and aesthetic memory that unfold onto a new ethics of art conservation. In contrast to traditional ontologies of performance as well as to the debates in the professional field that center on the so-called ephemeral or disappearing nature of live art, the chapter examines how memory is mediated through the distinct materiality of performance as an affective event. To this end, Van den Hengel brings postcolonial and queer contestations of traditional archival logics developed within contemporary studies of cultural memory into dialogue with the Deleuzian concept of affectivity as a material force of becoming. He argues that reenactment, by activating the sensations and affects of the body across multiple time zones, holds the power to open minoritarian modes of producing and proofing performance art histories. This argument is substantiated through the analysis of a number of performance works by Marina Abramović, Mary Coble, and a series of reenactments of Abramović’s works by emerging artists from New York’s radical queer underground. Van den Hengel develops a new materialist ontology of performance that considers performance not as the ‘dematerialization’ of the art object, but as a material practice for the transmission of affect, knowledge, and cultural memory.

In ‘Crystal Tears and Golden Crowns: Materializing Memories of the Suffering Mother’, Willy Jansen explores the memory work done through art objects in an important ritual in Spanish popular culture: the Holy Week processions in Andalusia. In recent decades, a material expansion of this ritual has taken place. An analysis of this change, based on data gathered during several ethnographic field studies of this event in Andalusia between 1976 and 2013, reveals its connectedness to a wide array of identification processes. Jansen argues that the objects simultaneously serve multiple memories on different levels. The first level is that of materializing a history and enacting specific social, religious, economic, and political identities. The second level is that of the materialization of personal emotions and family relations. By constantly elaborating on or renewing these objects, people
remember where they belong. The Virgin Mary’s crystal tears illustrate the ways in which these levels are intertwined. While symbolizing the suffering of the Mother of Christ and thus reminding participants of their collective religious and social history, they also symbolize the intimate suffering of mothers in everyday life and the emotional work involved in re-membering the family.

Anna Forné takes us to Argentina in ‘The Staging of Memory in Los rubios by Albertina Carri’. This chapter deals with the materialization of memories in the feature film Los rubios (2003), in which the Argentine director Albertina Carri stages the story of the disappearance of her parents during the Dirty War (1976–1983) through the assemblage of different kinds of archival material, sewed together in a way that blurs the line between documentary and fiction. Moreover, in the movie Carri appears as herself (the director) accompanied by her crew, but she also introduces an actress, Analía Couceyro, who plays the role of Albertina Carri in search of the story of her parents. In other words, Carri not only searches for memories in the things of the past, but also turns herself into the object of the search when the camera loops and crosses the boundaries between the real and the constructed. Forné first examines the ways in which memories are materialized in Los rubios through the recovery and exposition of different objects of remembrance. She then looks into the strategies and effects of self-reflexive enactment in the film.

**Corporeality and Objects of Trauma**

In the fourth and last section of the book, ‘Corporeality and Objects of Trauma’, we turn to reenactments of violence. In her chapter, ‘Chilling Burlesque: The Act of Killing’, Aleid Fokkema discusses the documentary The Act of Killing (Oppenheimer, 2013). The film records the process of how perpetrators look back on the crime of killing (the allegedly communist) opponents of the military regime in Indonesia after the army’s coup d’état in 1965–1966. This film is distinct from many other documentaries about war and conflict in that it uses neither the expository mode often employed for historical documentaries—the mode that tells the viewer confidently what happened, often by using survivor interviews, reenactment, and iconic historical props—nor the observational or ‘fly-on-the-wall’ mode dominant in contemporary war documentaries resulting from embedded journalism. Instead, this documentary employs a mix of performative and poetic frames. The challenge of ‘representing the unpresentable’ visibly informs the structure of the film, while the scope of the historical drama is evoked, not represented, by the materiality of props, costumes, and setting, which unsettles the viewer. The concepts of materiality and abjection help to account for this
affective response. Fokkema discusses how such material scaffolding allows the main participants in *The Act of Killing* to reenact the drama of the past as the perpetrators they once were. Reenactment is in fact one of the key terms in the film, as it quietly establishes a veiled connection between trauma and performance (or performativity) that allows for a sense of continuity between the past and the present, on both the personal and political level.

In the final chapter, ‘Modeling the Memories of Others: David Levinthal’s *I.E.D.: War in Afghanistan and Iraq*,’ László Munteán discusses miniature dioramas and their photographic representations as vehicles of memory work. Ever since the early 1970s Levinthal has been known for his photo series of miniature dioramas depicting Western themes, pornography, the eastern front in World War II, and the Holocaust. *I.E.D.: War in Afghanistan and Iraq* differs from his earlier work in that it incorporates soldiers’ first-person accounts of the war taken from the online military blog *The Sandbox* and re-creates these scenarios by using miniature figures and vehicles released by model kit companies. Instead of merely focusing on the photographs as re-mediations of soldiers’ memories of the war, Munteán approaches Levinthal’s work as a multifaceted and multilayered mnemonic device operating at the intersection of text, the miniature object, and photography. The memories that are performed materially and photographically are not Levinthal’s own, nor do they constitute postmemories in Marianne Hirsch’s (2012) sense. Rather, at stake here is the appropriation of the memories of others through the textual and photographic inscription of mass-produced model kits.Conventionally attributed to photographs, the affective quality of indexicality imbues the static model with documentary value, which is simultaneously undermined by the painted plastic surfaces of the model figures and military vehicles exposed by Levinthal’s close-ups. Munteán investigates how the materiality of the model, filtered through photography and text, acquires the quality of ‘thingness’ in Bill Brown’s sense—that which is unnamable and yet demands to be contended with.

Throughout *Materializing Memory in Art and Popular Culture*, the authors maintain a focus on materiality as an integral aspect of memory practices. The chapters attest to a large variety of disciplinary and theoretical approaches to the interrelation of memory and materiality, as well as to different understandings of material agency in processes of remembering and forgetting. Although the focus of these chapters is based on specific case studies, the materialist sensibility that they embody, as well as the theoretical apparatuses that they mobilize, transcends the individual works of art and popular culture discussed here. It is our hope that they will serve the reader as discursive models to continue ‘materializing memory’ in areas of culture beyond the scope of our volume. If they do so, we have already achieved our aim.
Notes

1 The classic example of brain plasticity is the larger hippocampus of the London taxi-driver due to spending years training the brain to remember the complex topography of London streets, as researched by Eleanor Maguire. See also Malabou (2008).

2 As a panel in the Museum der Dinge in Berlin explains, ‘The “beautifully set table” was supposed to encourage or stabilize an intact family’. The Werkbund’s ambition persisted well into the 1960s, when this agenda was criticized even within the Werkbund (‘The Werkbund Boxes’, Museum der Dinge, Berlin; visited on 25 October 2015).

3 Influential works rejecting the mind/body dualism include neurologist António Damásio’s Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (1994).

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