1. Introduction

(p. 779) The Taricco case is about VAT fraud. Since VAT revenue forms part of the EU’s own resources, VAT fraud is a matter of Union law. As a consequence, the duty to provide effective sanctions for violations of EU law applies to cases of VAT fraud. Because the duty under EU law to provide effective sanctions is usually based on Article 4(3) TEU, the primacy of Union law clearly precludes the application of national rules that would render sanctions ineffective.

Matters are more complicated, however, when the disapplication of the national rules would violate a fundamental right that is protected by national constitutional law. In that case, underlining the precedence of the duty to provide effective sanctions exposes the inherent tension between effective sanctions and fundamental rights. It moreover reveals that a tension exists between EU law’s principles of effectiveness and primacy on the one hand, and fundamental rights as protected by national constitutions on the other. This tension is clearly visible when EU law requires the imposition of criminal penalties, because these sanctions, by definition, have a serious impact from the perspective of the individual. In the field of criminal law it is therefore widely acknowledged that fundamental rights provide legitimate grounds for limiting the effectiveness of sanctions.

2. Cases of “ordinary primacy” could be distinguished from cases where EU law needs to be given precedence over national constitutional law, see Claes, “The Primacy of EU Law in European and National Law” in Arnell and Chalmers (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (OUP, 2015), pp. 187–199.
3. Cf. e.g. Gulliksson, “Effective Sanctions as the One-Dimensional Limit to the Ne Bis in Idem Principle in EU law” in Nergelius and Kristofferson (Eds.), Human Rights in Contemporary European Law (Hart, 2015), pp. 157–158.
4. The most obvious recent example of this tension is Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107.
That fundamental rights are allowed to limit the effectiveness of criminal penalties does not yet say anything about the particular limits they provide. These limits depend on the level of protection that is afforded to the applicable fundamental rights. The Taricco judgment shows that the ECJ is not always willing to provide a high level of fundamental rights protection. Instead, the Court here prioritized the primacy and effectiveness of EU law. In the interest of the effective penalization of serious VAT fraud, the Court, in fact, merely provided the ECHR’s minimum level of protection to the legality principle enshrined in Article 49(1) of the Charter. Since a higher level of protection would hamper the effectiveness of criminal penalties for VAT fraud, the Court, in effect, required Italy to make the protection of the, constitutionally enshrined, Italian legality principle conform to this minimum standard. In this regard, Taricco gives rise to comparable, yet more difficult, questions about the level of fundamental rights protection to those in the related landmark cases Case C-399/11, Melloni and Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson.

This case note discusses the duty to provide effective criminal sanctions for serious cases of VAT fraud, the Court’s interpretation of the legality principle, and the relationship between EU fundamental rights and more protective national standards.

2. Factual and legal background

Ivo Taricco and others were accused of having committed VAT fraud worth several million euros, through trade in champagne. The accused had allegedly set up an organization wherein different companies and shell companies conducted non-existent transactions, resulting in fraudulent VAT returns. Taricco and others were, therefore, alleged to have taken part in a form of fraud known as a “VAT carousel”. According to Italian law, VAT fraud constitutes a criminal offence and after preliminary investigations the case had arrived at the stage of the preliminary hearing before the Tribunale di Cuneo (i.e. the referring court). The Italian court needed to decide whether the accused were to be committed to criminal trial.

Although VAT fraud is clearly punishable under Italian law, the Tribunale di Cuneo was not convinced of its ability to commit the accused to a criminal trial due to the Italian rules on statutory limitation. The applicable Italian rules had relatively short absolute limitation periods and only allowed for a very

narrow extension of the limitation period after criminal prosecutions
had been initiated. Even after the initiation of a criminal investigation or
prosecution, the absolute period of limitation could generally be extended by
only one quarter of the original period (or, under the old rules, prior to 2005, by
one half). 6 Since the crimes of tax fraud involved very complex preliminary
investigations, a final verdict by the trial court was not to be expected before
the expiration of even the extended period of statutory limitation. According to
the Tribunale di Cuneo, the Italian rules provided so little room for
prosecution that they lead to de facto impunity for crimes involving
complex investigations like tax fraud and other economic offences.

In its preliminary reference, the Italian court essentially asked whether the
applicable rules on statutory limitation, and the ensuing de facto impunity for
tax fraud, were in accordance with EU law. The reference for a preliminary
ruling indicated four grounds for a potential violation of EU law. The
Tribunale di Cuneo first wanted to know whether the rules on statutory
limitation amounted to either unfair competition for Italian economic
operators as prohibited by Article 101 TFEU or constituted prohibited State
aid under Article 107 TFEU (questions 1 and 2). In addition, the Italian
court asked whether the limitation rules violated Directive 2006/112 7
(question 3) or the principle of sound public finances enshrined in Article
119 TFEU (question 4).

3. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott

Advocate General Kokott found the referring court’s questions raised an
additional issue, concerning the conformity of the Italian limitation rules with
the EU law duty to provide for effective penalties for infringements of EU
law. 8 In order to give the referring court a useful response to its questions, a
large part of the Opinion is dedicated to the examination of the additional
question. 9 An equally large part examined the related issue of the possible

6. Prior to the revision of the rules on limitation introduced by Law No 251/2005, the
limitation period could be extended by no more than half in the event of an interruption of that
period. Opinion, para 31. See further Jarvers, “Verjährung in Italien” in Sieber and Cornils (Eds.),
den Ausschluss der Strafbarkeit, Aufhebung der Strafbarkeit, Verjährung (Duncker
added tax, O.J. 2006, L 347/1.
8. Opinion, paras. 73–78.
9. Ibid., paras. 79–105.
(p. 782) effects that a finding of incompatibility would entail for the criminal case in the main proceedings. 10

The Advocate General distinguished between a general duty to provide for effective sanctions and a specific duty to provide criminal sanctions for EU fraud. 11 The general duty to provide effective sanctions for violations of EU law is based on the duty of since cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU and obliges Member States to sanction EU infringements in a manner that is equivalent to comparable violations of national law, and is, in any event, effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 12 Subject to these conditions, Member States are in principle free to choose the type of penalties (i.e. administrative or criminal) and these penalties can, in principle, be subjected to limitation periods. 13 However, if the limitation rules have the general effect of precluding the sanctioning of individuals who commit VAT fraud, then VAT fraud would only be subject to penalties in theory, and the limitation rules would be contrary to the general duty for Member States to impose effective penalties for infringements of EU law. 14

Advocate General Kokott identified a specific duty to provide effective criminal sanctions for EU fraud in Article 2(1) of the PIF Convention. 15 Although the Council clearly wished to exclude VAT fraud from the scope of the PIF Convention, as appears from an Explanatory Report to the Convention, 16 the Advocate General dismissed that interpretation as non-binding. 17 Instead, she concluded that VAT fraud falls within the scope of the PIF definition on the basis of the wording and the objectives of the Convention. 18 The PIF Convention leads to the same conclusion as that based on the general duty to provide effective sanctions: if the Italian limitation rules would only allow for the imposition of adequate criminal penalties in rare cases, those rules would also be contrary to the specific duty to provide effective criminal sanctions inherent in Article 2 of the Convention. 19

The actual assessment of the effectiveness of the Italian penalties in light of the limitation rules is left to the referring court for obvious reasons. 20 The

10. Ibid., paras. 106–127.
12. Ibid., para 80.
13. Ibid., paras. 84 and 87–88.
14. Ibid., para 91.
18. Ibid., paras. 100–103.
19. Ibid., para 105.
(p. 783) Advocate General did, however, add extensive considerations on the potential impact that a finding of incompatibility with EU law would have on the dispute in the main proceedings. If the rules on statutory limitation were incompatible with the duty to provide effective sanctions for infringements of EU law, the referring court would either have to interpret those rules in accordance with EU law, or, if this proved impossible, it would be obliged to refrain from applying those rules.

The Advocate General then examined whether the duty for the national court to give full effect to EU law could conflict with fundamental rights and, more specifically, with the legality principle of crimes and penalties (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) as enshrined in Article 49 of the Charter. In her view, the EU legality principle does not provide protection against the extension of applicable periods of statutory limitation, because the legality principle only provides standards for rules that define criminal responsibility and prescribe criminal penalties. The rules on statutory limitation do not define crimes or penalties, but merely determine the legal possibilities for the prosecution of a crime. It is in this crucial regard that the present case should be contrasted with the famous judgment in Berlusconi of which it is “vaguely reminiscent”. Unlike substantive rules that define a crime and prescribe a penalty, procedural rules on statutory limitation are outside the scope of the EU legality principle. Therefore, a statutory limitation period is certainly extendable as long as the original limitation period has not expired at the time of extension.

Since the EU legality principle does not preclude the extension of a limitation period that has not yet expired, the national court is obliged to apply the rules on statutory limitations in a manner consistent with the duty to provide effective penalties for violations of EU law; in the Advocate General’s view, this could give rise to a duty for the national court to apply an “adequate limitation regime” instead of the applicable rules on limitation. Advocate General Kokott provides the national court with guidance on how to apply such an “adequate limitation regime”. She suggests three alternative

22. Ibid., paras. 107–112.
23. Ibid., paras. 113–120.
25. Joined cases C-387/02, C-391/02 & C-403/02, Criminal Proceedings against Silvio Berlusconi and Others, EU:C:2005:270.
27. Ibid., paras. 115–119.
28. Ibid., para 120.
29. Ibid., paras. 121–124.
The national court could, for example, apply the provisions on limitation of VAT fraud simply without the applicable absolute limitation period (suggestion 1), it could retroactively apply newly adopted rules, (from 2011), which have a longer limitation period (suggestion 2), or, alternatively, it could also apply the old rules on limitation, which existed prior to the 2005 revision (suggestion 3).

Although the Advocate General focused on the additional question about the duty to provide effective sanctions and its implications for national criminal law, she examined the referring court’s explicit questions as well. She concluded that the inadequate enforcement of VAT penalties did not necessarily promote collusive conduct between undertakings and was thus not contrary to Article 101 TFEU (question 1). The inadequate enforcement of VAT rules could not amount to prohibited State aid either, because the Italian rules applied equally to all undertakings subject to Italian criminal law and were, therefore, non-selective (question 2). Moreover, the Italian limitation regime did not infringe Directive 2006/112 (hereafter: “the VAT Directive”) – the fact that penalties for tax fraud were hard to impose did not in itself amount to a tax exemption, as it did not mean the right to levy tax no longer existed (question 3). Finally, the Italian rules did not infringe Article 119 TFEU, since the “soundness” of a Member State’s public finances is determined by an evaluation of the entirety of the national budget and not by exclusively looking at a specific part thereof, such as the failure to enforce the right to levy tax.

4. Judgment of the Court

Like Advocate General Kokott, the Court’s Grand Chamber focused on the compatibility of the Italian limitation rules with the duty to provide effective sanctions for VAT fraud and its effect on the main proceedings. Unlike the Advocate General, however, the Court did so by reformulating the referring court’s third question and taking it as the first element of its examination.

30. Ibid., paras. 125–126.
31. “… limitation periods applicable to tax offences, which have been extended by a third, as now provided for in Law No 148/2011”, ibid. para 126.
32. Ibid., paras. 57–73.
33. Ibid., para 60.
34. Ibid., para 61.
35. Cited supra note 7.
36. Ibid., para 66.
37. Ibid., paras. 70–71.
39. Ibid., paras. 34–35.
(p. 785) Citing Åkerberg Fransson,\textsuperscript{40} the Court indicated two sources that enshrine a general duty to provide effective penalties for VAT fraud. First, the VAT Directive when read in conjunction with the duty of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, and, second, Article 325 TFEU.\textsuperscript{41} Although these sources generally leave the Member States the freedom to choose between administrative penalties, criminal penalties, or a combination of the two, the Grand Chamber stressed that certain serious cases of VAT evasion could nevertheless necessitate the imposition of criminal penalties.\textsuperscript{42}

In addition to a general duty to provide effective sanctions for VAT fraud, the ECJ found Article 2(1) of the PIF Convention to enshrine a duty to provide specifically for criminal penalties.\textsuperscript{43} The Grand Chamber confirmed the Advocate General’s interpretation that the broad wording of the Convention’s definition of fraud, together with its objective of vigorously combatting EU fraud, justified the conclusion that VAT fraud fell within the scope of the Convention.\textsuperscript{44} As a result, the Court identified three separate sources that contain a duty to provide criminal penalties for serious cases of VAT fraud: the VAT Directive in conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, Article 325 TFEU and Article 2(1) of the PIF Convention.\textsuperscript{45}

The Court qualified the VAT evasion by Taricco and others as a case of serious fraud. The ECJ did not, however, establish explicit criteria that could be relevant in concluding that a specific form of fraud deserved the label “serious”. The only reason for the conclusion that the main proceedings involved serious fraud was the determination that the alleged fraud amounted to several million euros. The ECJ then underlined that, for serious cases of fraud, only criminal penalties would result in effective and dissuasive penalization.\textsuperscript{46} Since Italian law provides criminal penalties for VAT fraud with a maximum prison sentence of seven years, the Court found no reason to doubt the dissuasiveness of the penalties in themselves.\textsuperscript{47} In the ECJ’s view, the fact that a limitation period is provided for by Italian law does not

\textsuperscript{40} Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson.
\textsuperscript{41} Judgment, paras. 36, 37 and 39.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., para 39.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., paras. 40–43. Unlike most literature and the Opinion of the A.G., the Court referred to the Convention drawn up on the basis of Art. K.3 TEU, on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, signed in Luxembourg on 26 July 1995, O.J. 1995, C 316/49, as the “PFI Convention”. I will nevertheless continue to refer to this Convention as the “PIF Convention”.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., para 41.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., para 47.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., paras. 42–43.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., para 45.
generally deprive the applicable penalties of their effectiveness and dissuasiveness either. 48

The general effectiveness and dissuasiveness of the Italian system of criminal penalties for VAT fraud could nevertheless be seriously hampered by specific circumstances. Such circumstances occur if Italian limitation rules result in impunity for perpetrators of serious fraud in a considerable number of cases because these offences are usually time-barred before a final conviction can be imposed. 49 The Court underlined that, in those circumstances, the Italian criminal penalties would not satisfy the requirements of effectiveness and dissuasiveness inherent in the EU legal obligation to sanction. The Italian rules would also violate EU obligations if the prosecution of fraud cases affecting national financial interests was not as severely impeded by limitation rules as those at issue. 50

In line with the Advocate General’s Opinion, the ECJ subsequently considered the impact that a finding of incompatibility of the Italian limitation regime would have on the dispute in the main proceedings. 51 The Court referred to Article 325 TFEU to stress that, inter alia, primary Union law imposes a precise obligation to provide for effective and dissuasive penalties for EU fraud. 52 By virtue of the principle of precedence of EU law, Italian rules depriving the criminal penalties for VAT fraud of their effectiveness are automatically rendered inapplicable by that provision. 53 This could result in an obligation for the national court to disapply the Italian limitation rules to give full effect to EU law. 54 If that were the case, the national court would also be obliged to ensure that fundamental rights are respected, and more specifically, the legality principle. 55

The Court found that the disapplication of the Italian limitation rules would not violate the legality principle however. Although a disapplication of the Italian limitation rules would allow for the imposition of a criminal penalty in circumstances that were not permissible under national law, the crime and the penalty itself would remain in accordance with the applicable Italian criminal law. The disapplication of the limitation rules would merely allow for the effective prosecution of the crimes and imposition of penalties which were, at

49. Ibid., para 47.
50. Ibid., paras. 43 and 48.
51. Ibid., paras. 49–58.
52. Ibid., paras. 50–51.
53. Ibid., para 52.
54. Ibid., paras. 49 and 52–53.
55. Ibid., paras. 53–54.
the time the acts were committed, undisputedly established by Italian criminal law.\textsuperscript{56} Therefore, the Charter’s legality principle would not be infringed by a disapplication of the Italian rules on limitation. In addition, and apparently as a secondary argument, the Grand Chamber referred to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights to underline that the legality principle under the ECHR allows the extension of existing limitation periods.\textsuperscript{57}

The Grand Chamber therefore answered the third question by stating that the national court would be obliged to disapply the Italian limitation rules if these rules deprive the criminal penalties for VAT fraud of their effectiveness and dissuasiveness. With regard to the first, second and fourth questions, the ECJ’s concise response is essentially based on the answers proposed by the Advocate General.\textsuperscript{58}

5. Comment

5.1. The duty to provide effective sanctions: obligations to criminalize VAT fraud

Ever since the famous \textit{Greek maize} judgment, Member States have been unequivocally obliged to impose sanctions for infringements of EU law.\textsuperscript{59} In order to ensure the effectiveness of Union law, violations of EU law are to be sanctioned in the same way as similar breaches of national law.\textsuperscript{60} In addition to this so-called “assimilation principle”,\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Greek maize} required the Member States to ensure that, in any event, domestic penalties were also effective, proportionate and dissuasive.\textsuperscript{62} Thus, \textit{Greek maize} provides two

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., para 55–56.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., para 57.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., paras. 59–65.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., para 24.
\textsuperscript{62} Case C-68/88, \textit{Greek maize}, para 24. The reference to the need for sanctions to be proportionate is not focused on in \textit{Taricco}, see judgment, para 43. This is probably a result of the referring court’s focus on the effectiveness of penalties, see judgment, para 26.
distinguishable obligations for Member States to provide certain
types and
levels of sanctions.\(^6\)

The Taricco judgment confirmed that the two Greek maize criteria provide
grounds to dismiss certain types of national sanctions for infringements of EU
law as inadequate.\(^6\) In addition, Taricco makes clear that the two Greek maize
criteria can independently oblige the Member States to prescribe criminal
penalties for violations of EU law. Although it was already obvious that the
Member States could be obliged to provide criminal sanctions for violations
of Union law on the basis of the assimilation principle,\(^6\) the Court had not
expressly determined that an obligation to provide criminal penalties could
be based independently on the requirement that penalties are effective and
dissuasive.\(^6\)

Taricco does, however, identify the requirements of effectiveness and
dissuasiveness as the reason for providing criminal penalties.\(^6\) In the Court’s
view, VAT evasion amounting to several million euros constitutes a form of
serious fraud for which only criminal penalties could be sufficiently effective
and dissuasive. This means that, even when a Member State might have chosen
to sanction forms of VAT fraud administratively, or by a combination of
administrative and criminal penalties, EU law demands serious forms of VAT
fraud to be sanctioned by criminal penalties. The ECJ thus clearly
requires the criminalization of certain forms of VAT fraud.

Article 325 TFEU has codified the Greek maize duty to provide equivalent,
effective and dissuasive penalties for the specific case of EU fraud.\(^6\) Although
it is generally denied that this provision adds substantively to the general Greek
maize duty to provide sanctions for infringements of Union law,\(^6\) the
provision is not completely without purpose either. Since Article 325 TFEU
underlines that the effective enforcement of EU fraud is especially significant,
it fulfils a symbolic function. This symbolic significance is, arguably,
perceivable in Taricco, because the Court exclusively refers to the Greek
maize duty in the form of Article 325 TFEU in most of its considerations.\(^7\)
With regard to substance, however, the judgment treats the general Greek


\(^{64}\) Judgment, paras. 37 and 43.

\(^{65}\) See e.g. Case C-186/98, *Criminal proceedings against Amélia Nunes and Evangelina
de Matos*, EU:C:1999:376, paras. 7 and 14.

\(^{66}\) Judgment, supra note 61, pp. 80–82.

\(^{67}\) Judgment, para 39. This confirms the view formulated by A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer

\(^{68}\) See paras. 1 and 2 of that provision and cf. judgment, para 37.

\(^{69}\) See Dougan, op. cit. supra note 61, p. 79.

\(^{70}\) Judgment, paras. 50–52 and 58.
(p. 789) maize duty, which is based on Article 4(3) TEU, and the codified Greek maize duty of Article 325 TFEU as co-existing duties with the same content.71

In addition to the Greek maize duty to provide criminal penalties for serious forms of VAT fraud, the Grand Chamber identifies a second obligation to criminalize serious cases of VAT fraud. The Court finds Article 2(1) of the PIF Convention to contain such a duty, as VAT fraud is within the scope of the definition of fraud in Article 1 of the Convention.72 The conclusion that VAT fraud is within the scope of the PIF Convention is certainly significant, because the Convention provides additional room to oblige the Member States to impose criminal penalties. Article 2(1) of the Convention requires the criminalization not only of the committing of the forms of conduct described in Article 1(1), but also of the participation in, and the instigation and attempt of, these acts. The Convention moreover requires heads of businesses to be held criminally liable if their companies commit EU fraud.73

By concluding that VAT fraud is within the PIF definition of EU fraud, the ECJ has created an obligation to criminalize not only VAT fraud itself, but also the instigation and attempt thereof, as well as the participation therein. With that interpretation, the Grand Chamber clearly disregarded the views that the Member States expressed about the desirable scope of EU fraud. The Member States had already made it clear that they deemed VAT fraud to be beyond the scope of the PIF Convention.74 This unequivocal position has been maintained ever since. In fact, the issue whether VAT fraud is to be included in the definition of EU fraud proved highly controversial in the negotiations on the PIF Directive, which is intended to replace the PIF Convention. Contrary to the Commission’s proposal for the PIF Directive,75 and the European Parliament’s position,76 the Council (i.e. the Member States) explicitly wish to exclude VAT fraud from the scope of the definition of EU fraud in the PIF Directive.77

71. Ibid., para 47.
72. Ibid., para 41.
73. See Art. 3 of the PIF Convention.
77. For a description of the ongoing negotiations about the PIF Directive and the position of the Member States about the inclusion of VAT fraud in the new PIF definition, see Note from
The unresolved debate about the scope of the PIF definition shows that the Taricco case influenced the legislative process. Following Taricco, the Luxembourg Presidency issued an immediate response asking the Member States to reflect on its significance for the ongoing negotiations. With this sensitive political context in mind, which is moreover influenced by the fact that the PIF definition determines the competence for the future European Public Prosecutor, one would expect the ECJ to substantiate its interpretation of PIF fraud elaborately. Unlike the Advocate General, the Court did not employ an extensive reasoning to justify its interpretation. Instead, it used a single paragraph to conclude that VAT fraud fell within the scope of the PIF Convention. Unsurprisingly, the Court’s reasoning has not convinced all Member States. The Taricco judgment has, therefore, settled the debate about the possibility of excluding VAT fraud from the scope of the PIF definition. As a consequence, this issue remains a focal point of the ongoing negotiations that resumed under the Netherlands Presidency in February 2016.

5.2. The relationship between effective criminal penalties and the legality principle

After its considerations about the distinct duties to provide for effective criminal penalties for VAT fraud, the ECJ provided the national court with guidelines to establish whether the Italian limitation regime violated EU law. The Court used the Greek maize obligations as possible grounds for an

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81. See Note from the Presidency to the Delegations, cited supra note 77, pp. 5–6.
83. Tridimas would probably label the specificity of the Court’s answer as a “guidance case”. See about the distinguishable forms of preliminary rulings Tridimas, “Constitutional
incompatibility with Union law. The national court could be obliged
to disapply the Italian limitation rules either if these rules violated the
assimilation principle \(^{84}\) or if they violated the duty to provide effective and
dissuasive sanctions. \(^{85}\) Unlike the Advocate General, the Court did not give
general suggestions to the national court on how to give full effect to EU law if
it were obliged to disapply the Italian limitation rules. \(^{86}\) The ECJ did, however,
lay down additional considerations about the relationship between, essentially,
the effectiveness of Union law and the legality principle. \(^{87}\)

The duty to provide effective criminal sanctions for serious forms of VAT
fraud, coupled with the duty to give full effect to EU law, increases the
repressiveness of national law in the Taricco case. This increased
repressiveness leads to a tension with fundamental rights protection in the
main proceedings, because EU law’s effe utile might require the imposition
of a criminal sanction that would not be possible under the applicable
Italian rules. \(^{88}\) EU law therefore radically alters the legal possibilities to
impose a criminal sanction to the detriment of the accused. \(^{89}\) That
references to Union law can seriously harm the legal position of the
individual in a national criminal case is certainly not without precedent. \(^{90}\) It
is nevertheless important to recognize that, within the criminal sphere,
negative effects on the position of an individual have a high impact. The
impact on the legal position of the accused is even more dramatic where
EU law requires the alteration or disapplication of the applicable national
rules in a way that might violate a national constitutional standard. The
Court’s judgment shows that it is nevertheless willing to accept such a far-
reaching negative impact on the legal position of the accused.

That the Court might require the national court to alter the legal position of
the accused in violation of a national constitutional standard is the result of a
diverging interpretation of the legality principle in EU law and in Italian law.

\(^{84}\) Judgment, para 48.
\(^{85}\) Ibid., para 47.
\(^{86}\) Cf. Opinion, paras. 121–127.
\(^{87}\) Judgment, paras. 53–57.
\(^{88}\) The ECtHR acknowledged this effect of extending limitation periods, by deeming an
extension of an applicable limitation period to have a detrimental effect on the situation of
the accused, in particular by frustrating their expectations, see ECtHR, Coëme and Others v.
Belgium, Appl. Nos. 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and 33210/96, judgment of
22 June 2000, para 149.
\(^{89}\) Cf. Spaventa, “Opening Pandora’s Box: Some reflections on the constitutional
\(^{90}\) See e.g. Lenaerts and Corthaut, “Of birds and hedges: The role of primacy in
The ECJ concluded that the EU legality principle does not provide protection against the extension of applicable limitation terms to the detriment of the accused. Underlying this conclusion is a distinction between rules that define crimes and penalties (i.e. rules of *substantive* criminal law) and *procedural* rules. Limiting the protection of the legality principle to rules of substantive criminal law is in line with the Court’s previous case law and with the ECtHR’s case law on Article 7 ECHR. The ECJ’s interpretation of the legality principle’s scope is therefore certainly reasonable.

The conformity of the ECJ’s interpretation of the legality principle with that of the Strasbourg Court, is, moreover, in accordance with the ECJ’s previous case law. In the existing case law on the EU legality principle, the Court has explicitly reiterated parts of the ECtHR’s general considerations on the ECHR legality principle. That the ECJ generally follows the ECtHR’s interpretation of the legality principle shows that it is only willing to provide the minimum standard of protection. Although reasonable, the Court’s decision to provide merely the minimum standard of protection, reflects a clear choice in light of Article 52(3) of the Charter. This choice entails the possibility that the ECJ’s interpretation of the legality principle conflicts with national interpretations of that fundamental right even though these may be equally reasonable.

5.3. *The potential for constitutional conflict after Taricco*

An actual conflict between diverging interpretations of the legality principle could indeed be a direct consequence of *Taricco*. Such a conflict is likely to arise because Italian law includes rules on limitation periods in the protection

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91. See Case C-105/03, *Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino*, EU:C:2005:386, para 46 and cf. A.G. Kokott’s Opinion in that case, EU:C:2004:712, paras. 41–42. The distinction between substantive and procedural rules in the *Pupino* judgment has been criticized by commentators, see e.g. Mitsilegas, op. cit. supra note 61, pp. 30–31.

92. Judgment, para 57 and the ECtHR case law referred to there.


94. The notable exception is the *Berlusconi* judgment, where the ECJ provided more protection than the ECtHR by including the *lex mitior* principle in the legality principle, see Joined cases C-387, 391 & 403/02, *Criminal Proceedings against Silvio Berlusconi and Others*, para 68.

95. That ECHR rights are only intended to provide minimum standards is clearly confirmed by Art. 53 ECHR, as well as Arts. 52(3) and 53 of the EU Charter.

96. See about diverging reasonable interpretations as the source of constitutional conflict Claes, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 203.
(p. 793) provided by the legality principle.97 The ECJ’s legality interpretation, which might even be regarded as absolutely excluding extensions of limitation periods from its scope,98 therefore seems to fall short of the protection that is provided by the Italian legality principle.99 Since the Italian Corte di Cassazione nevertheless declared the contested limitation rules inapplicable after the Taricco judgment, the Milan Court of Appeal (la Corte d’appello di Milano) immediately asked the Constitutional Court (la Corte costituzionale) to rule on the conformity of the Italian rules ratifying the EU treaties with the legality principle enshrined in the Italian Constitution.100 The Constitutional Court is basically requested to give effect to its controlimiti doctrine, by which it, in essence, reserved the power to disapply EU law when it violates core constitutional principles.101 The Taricco judgment could therefore lead the Italian Constitutional Court to specifically reject the absolute primacy of Union law in order to save its interpretation of the legality principle.

The potential constitutional conflict after Taricco bears resemblance to the conflict following Melloni.102 As is well known, Melloni and the related judgment in Åkerberg Fransson103 established that, when the Charter applies,104 more protective national constitutional standards can only apply as long as they do not compromise the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU


98. The ECJ’s focus on the text of Art. 49(1) of the Charter, which requires crimes and penalties to be established by law at the time of the accused conduct, could imply an absolute exclusion of limitation rules from the scope of protection of the legality principle, see judgment, paras. 55–56. Although such an interpretation would potentially violate the ECtHR’s interpretation of Art. 7 ECHR, the ECtHR has never ruled explicitly that the extension of limitation periods for offences that have become time-barred is excluded by the legality principle, see e.g. Coëme and Others v. Belgium, cited supra note 88, para 149 and ECtHR, OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, Appl. No. 14902/04, judgment of 20 Sept. 2011, paras. 563–564, 570–571 and 575.


101. See about this doctrine Claes, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 186 and 195.

102. Case C-399/11, Melloni.

103. Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson.

The Court’s reasoning in *Taricco* certainly implies that the application of the more protective Italian legality principle would indeed compromise the primacy and effectiveness of EU law. This is because the ECJ found the application of the Italian limitation rules to be at odds with the duty to provide effective sanctions, which has the status of primary law, and with the precedence of primary Union law that enshrines that duty. As a consequence of *Melloni* and *Åkerberg Fransson*, the national court will thus be required to disapply the Italian limitation rules even if this would violate the Italian legality principle.

In this regard, *Taricco* is merely a logical consequence of the reasoning in the related ECJ judgments in *Melloni* and *Åkerberg Fransson*. Nevertheless, *Taricco* contains potential for further controversy, because it appears to require the disapplication of a constitutionally protected fundamental right in favor of the minimum protection provided by EU law. Unlike *Taricco*, the judgments in *Melloni* and *Åkerberg Fransson* involved fundamental rights that, arguably, provided more protection than the minimum ECHR standard. *Melloni*, on the one hand, concerned a fundamental right that was explicitly harmonized by secondary Union law “in order to enhance the procedural rights of persons subject to criminal proceedings whilst improving mutual recognition”. *Åkerberg Fransson*, on the other hand, concerned the *ne bis in idem* principle, which has been given an expansive protection under EU law in light of its free movement enhancing potential. One could therefore argue that, since EU law itself provided more protection than the required minimum in *Melloni* and *Åkerberg Fransson*, the possible disapplication of a more protective national standard was not that problematic in those circumstances. That argumentation is, however, clearly unavailable in *Taricco*, since the ECJ is generally only willing to provide the minimum ECHR standard of protection for the legality principle. As a consequence, *Taricco* explicitly

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106. Judgment, para 47

107. See Arts. 4(3) TEU and 325(1) and (2) TFEU.


109. As mentioned above, the ECJ’s case law has generally adopted the ECtHR’s standard of legality protection and it thus merely provides the minimally required protection.


111. See Case C-617/10, *Åkerberg Fransson*, paras. 32–42.

(p. 795) involves a constitutional conflict between the minimum fundamental rights protection provided by EU law and a more protective national constitutional standard.

Since Taricco implies that, by virtue of Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson, the minimum protection provided by EU law’s legality principle precludes the application of the Italian constitutional standard, it would have been reasonable to expect the Court to have recognized the potential for constitutional conflict. Had the ECJ indeed proceeded that way, it should have examined the Member States’ common constitutional traditions with regard to the relationship between the legality principle and limitation rules. A reference to the common constitutional traditions could have increased the legitimacy of the Court’s interpretation of EU law’s legality principle. It might have, moreover, convinced the Italian Constitutional Court to bring its interpretation of the Italian legality principle in conformity with that standard or, conversely, it might have put the Italian court in the position to explicitly justify its deviating interpretation by referring to, for example, Italian constitutional identity. Although the ECJ missed the above-mentioned opportunities to open a judicial dialogue about a potential conflict, it may get another chance if the Italian Constitutional Court refers its case on the impending constitutional conflict for a preliminary ruling. The ECJ could then clarify its interpretation of the legality principle and the relationship between effective criminal penalties and the standards of fundamental rights protection.

6. Conclusion

Since Taricco apparently requires Italy to lower its legality protection to the minimum standard in cases of VAT fraud, the Court could have explained its approach to the national legal order with a more elaborate reasoning. Such a reasoning might have, moreover, avoided or diminished the looming conflict with the Italian Constitutional Court. The absence of an elaborate reasoning is


115. The Italian Constitutional Court might then invoke Art. 4(2) TEU. Such an argumentation might be acceptable to the Court, although the literature is divided on the matter, cf. e.g. Besselink, “The parameters of constitutional conflict after Melloni”, 39 EL Rev. (2014), at 549 and Claes, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 204–206.

116. See also Scalia, op. cit. supra note 97, at 107.
therefore not only disappointing from a legal perspective, it is also, possibly, conflict enhancing. It is interesting to see whether primacy and effectiveness will continue to allow the ECJ to disregard national concerns over the lowering of fundamental rights protection.