BEYOND PARSING AND LEXICAL LOOK-UP: AN ENRICHED DESCRIPTION OF AUDITORY SENTENCE COMPREHENSION

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Introduction

Sentence comprehension is like riding a bicycle— a feat far easier performed than described. Understandably, most psycholinguistic attempts to characterize the comprehension process have resorted to simplification. If—the tacit approach seems to be—we can isolate for experimental investigation the most basic components of comprehension, then on the basis of what we learn we can construct at least an outline model of the process; after all, any model can always be enriched.

This paper is an attempt at enrichment of the basic model. In fact, it is more than that, since it will argue that even the most basic model of auditory sentence comprehension must incorporate more than the minimal elements to which many descriptions have hitherto been confined. Take for example the following enumeration of the components of a sentence comprehension model:

The listener must recognize the appropriate set of words in the flow of speech directed at him. This will require him to find a match between some internal representation of the way each word sounds and properties of the incoming information about the speech waveform. Once a word is recognized, its meanings must be retrieved. If there are several such meanings, the one appropriate to the current context must be selected and combined with the meanings of other words in order to form an interpretation of the entire sentence. Wherever the appropriate manner of combination depends upon syntactic properties of the sentence, such as word order or the groupings of words into phrases, these syntactic properties must be determined and put to use. (Wanner, 1973, pp. 166-167)

Sentence comprehension consists according to this account of three stages—identification of word boundaries, lexical look-up, and perception of syntactic structure, or parsing. No argument can be raised with the inclusion of these components in the model. However, it will be suggested that these three stages do not suffice to characterise completely the process of sentence understanding. Take for example the sentence

(1) Cassandra is a real genius.
This sentence may be spoken in a tone of reverence and admiration, in which case it expresses praise of Cassandra. But it may also be spoken in a quite different manner, with what is known as an ironic intonation contour (nasalized, with heavy stress on certain words). In this case it is far from expressing praise of Cassandra: quite the reverse. Ironic intonation has the effect of producing a conveyed meaning which is the converse of the literal meaning (Cutler, 1974); and there is no doubt that a listener would apprehend this conveyed meaning, not the literal meaning, of such an utterance; that is, he would comprehend that the speaker intended to say that Cassandra was anything but a genius. It is difficult to see how this fact about sentence comprehension can be encompassed by a model which includes only the operations of word identification, lexical look-up, and parsing.

Similarly, suppose (2) to be spoken in such a way that the primary stress of the sentence falls on "above":

(2) The above sentence was ironically intended.

While the proposition expressed by the sentence can be retrieved by the three basic operations listed, an extra dimension has been added which they would not retrieve—the implication that some unspecified other sentence (or sentences) was not ironically intended. If, on the other hand, the word "intended" receives the primary stress, the implication changes: the reader will no doubt agree that (2) now suggests that the intention was not realized. Such variations are called changes in the focus of a sentence; it is surely the case that implications of the kind they express, like intonationally signalled irony, are computed when a sentence like (2) is heard.

The following pages contain some specific suggestions about the manner in which the basic parsing-plus-lexical-look-up model of sentence comprehension needs to be enriched. One suggestion will be the inclusion of a processing stage subsequent to the establishment of the literal meaning of a sentence in which this meaning may be revised. This stage will be called stage B; accordingly, "stage A comprehension" will refer to the construction of a sentence's literal interpretation. Most of stage A comprehension is accomplished before the utterance has been completed.

Making Use of Prosody

It will not have escaped the reader's notice that both ironic intent and focus information are intimately bound up with the prosodic, or suprasegmental, structure of a sentence: irony can be signalled by nasalization, exaggeratedly slow speaking rate, very heavy stress, or all of these, while the focus of a
sentence in general corresponds to the location of the main sentence stress. In order to examine how these phenomena might be registered in sentence processing, then, let us consider the suprasegmental aspects of speech.

These consist, it is generally agreed, of variations in pitch, stress and timing relations. Pitch variation is usually arbitrarily defined as variation in the fundamental frequency of a signal; the other two dimensions, however, are not so easily circumscribed. Timing, for example, is certainly expressed in the relative durations of the various segments of the speech wave; but silent intervals that can occur between segments also play a role in determining the rhythmic pattern that is an important aspect of a sentence's timing. Stress, again, is a perceptual feature which is manifested acoustically by an extremely complex interaction between all suprasegmental aspects of the utterance, not to mention segmental factors as well; vowel quality (formant structure) is a segmental phenomenon, but vowel reduction, namely a shift in formant frequency from the sounds which fall in the outer portions of the vowel quadrant towards those of the center (/a/, schwa), is a phenomenon determined by stress level in many languages. (For a comprehensive description of the nature of suprasegmental phenomena see Lehiste, 1970).

Some evidence that suprasegmental factors play an important role in stage A comprehension of a spoken sentence has recently been collected from studies using the phoneme-monitoring technique. This is a task in which subjects are asked to understand a sentence and at the same time to listen within it for the occurrence of a specified word-initial target sound, and to press a button when they hear a word beginning with this sound. Reaction time (RT) to the target phoneme in this task, it is argued, is directly related to the difficulty of processing the sentence at the time when the target phoneme occurs—RTs are lengthened, for example, by the occurrence immediately prior to the target-bearing item of a low frequency word (Foss, 1969) or of an ambiguous item (Foss, 1970).

It was noticed in certain phoneme-monitoring studies that RTs were faster when the target-bearing item itself was an "open class" item (noun or verb) than when it was a "closed class" item (for example, a preposition or conjunction). It is generally the case that open class words carry a higher level of sentence stress than do closed class words. Accordingly, Cutler and Foss (in press) measured RTs to targets on open and closed class items while manipulating stress level of the target-bearing item independently. They found that RTs were significantly faster to targets on stressed items, irrespective of word class, whereas removal of the stress differences between open and closed class items also removed the RT difference between them.

It might be argued that this result bears no great import,
since there are notable acoustic differences between stressed and unstressed words. Stressed words are in the main longer in duration and higher in pitch than unstressed words, and their amplitude is somewhat greater; unstressed words, moreover, generally undergo vowel reduction. Thus one might wish to explain the Cutler and Foss result in terms of acoustic advantages of stressed items: heightened intelligibility facilitates identification of the phonemes, and location of a match for the phonemic string in the mental lexicon, thus allowing faster identification of the target phoneme in the required word-initial position.

That this is not the whole story, however, is demonstrated by a further experiment (reported in Cutler, 1975). In this study a number of sentences were recorded in two intonation versions, with the target-bearing item of each sentence receiving high stress in one version and low stress in the other. Thus in (3), in which the target phoneme is /d/, the target-bearing item "dirt" receives high stress in (3a) and reduced stress in (3b):

(3) a. She managed to remove the dirt from the rug, but not the berry stains.
   b. She managed to remove the dirt from the rug, but not from their clothes.

The stress assigned to the target item was determined, as can be seen from these examples, by varying the endings of the sentences to manipulate what is commonly called contrastive stress (Bolinger, 1961). The point at which the two versions of each sentence vary, however, occurs sufficiently later than the target for the response button to have been pressed by the time that part of the sentence is heard by the subject.

In addition to these two versions of each sentence, a third version, spoken in as neutral a tone as possible, was recorded. In this third version the stress level of the target item was intermediate, falling between the high- and low-stress versions. The actual target-bearing words were then removed from the high- and low-stress versions of each sentence by tape-splicing, and replaced by identical copies of the same target-bearing item taken from the intermediate-stress version of the sentence. As a result of this manipulation, the two experimental versions of each sentence contained acoustically identical target-bearing items. The two versions differed, however, in the intonation contour which preceded them, one contour being consistent with the occurrence of a high-stress item at the location of the target-bearing word, the other being consistent with reduced stress at that point.

If acoustic advantages of stressed items were solely responsible for the RT advantage of stressed target words in the Cutler and Foss study, no difference would be expected between the high- and low-stress versions of each sentence, since the
target-bearing items themselves were acoustically identical. In fact, however, significantly faster RTs were recorded for the items which occurred in high-stress position; i.e., the stressed words maintained their RT advantage, despite the fact that they had lost the advantages of greater intelligibility.

The sole difference between the high- and low-stress versions of each sentence in this experiment lay in the intonation contour preceding the target-bearing item. It must therefore be assumed that the RT difference reflects an effect of this contour variation. We must assume, in other words, that the subjects were making use of the suprasegmental information in such a way that their processing of the sentence at the point of occurrence of the target-bearing item was affected by whether that item was expected, on the basis of the intonation contour which preceded it, to carry high or low stress.

Since the RTs were faster if the item was expected to bear high stress, processing at that point of the sentence was apparently facilitated in some way by the expectation of stress. A reasonable interpretation is that particular attention has been directed to locations of highly stressed items. Moreover, the effect was produced in this case solely by manipulation of the preceding intonation contour, indicating that an active search for the locations of high stress proceeds in the form of a tracking of the intonation contour. A model of sentence comprehension which incorporates a search for highly stressed items is obviously more complex than a basic parsing-plus-lexical-look-up model. However, the evidence of these phoneme-monitoring studies compels us to expand the model in this way.

**Semantic Focus**

In the introductory section of this paper the notion of semantic focus was introduced. Sentences (4) and (5), in which upper case letters represent highly stressed items, differ on this dimension, the focus of the former being "Felicity", of the latter "caviar".

(4) FELICITY eats caviar for breakfast.
(5) Felicity eats CAVIAR for breakfast.

Jackendoff (1972) defines focus as the information in a sentence which is assumed by the speaker not to be shared by him and his audience. Halliday (1967) draws a distinction between "new" and "given" information, where "what is focal is 'new' information; not in the sense that it cannot have been previously mentioned, although it is often the case that it has not been, but in the sense that the speaker presents it as not being recoverable from the preceding discourse" (p. 204).

Our current problem is the extent to which this notion
is relevant to the description of sentence processing. Can it be said, for example, that in order to understand a sentence it is necessary to have identified its semantic focus? If a hearer understands (4) and (5) as identical, can he be said to have understood them?

The position taken here will be that he cannot. That is, it will be argued that focus information constitutes an integral part of the semantic representation constructed by the sentence comprehension device. Successful comprehension necessarily includes the knowledge that (4) and (5) are different; further, comprehension of (6) will entail that the hearer realizes that

(6) Felicity eats CAVIAR for breakfast?

acceptable responses include (7) and (8), but not (9) or (10):

(7) Yes, she like to indulge herself.
(8) She's on a fish-only diet.
(9) Did you think it was Samantha who did?
(10) No, for dinner.

There is evidence from at least one psycholinguistic study that focussed items in a sentence are differentially represented from non-focussed items shortly after the completion of comprehension. Hornby (1974) presented subjects with cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences and required them to judge whether a picture presented for a brief interval beginning one second after presentation of the sentence accurately reflected the sentence's content. He found that subjects were more likely to make errors with respect to the noun phrase in the non-focussed part of the sentence than with respect to the focussed noun phrase. For example, a subject who had heard (11) would be more likely to respond

(11) It is the girl who is petting the dog.

"true" to a picture of a girl petting a cat than to a picture of a boy petting a dog.

Suppose, however, that it could be shown that whether or not an item is focussed affects the way it is processed during Stage A comprehension. As we have seen, the focus of a sentence and the location of that sentence's main stress coincide; would it therefore be beyond reason to suggest that the active search for the main sentence stress during sentence comprehension is in fact a search for the sentence's focus?

If this is indeed the proper explanation for the stress effect, we would expect an effect of focussing an item in a sentence analogous to the effect of assigning an item high stress. That is, we should be able to demonstrate that phoneme-monitoring RTs are accelerated if the target word is focussed.

The main problem with such an approach lies in the fact that sentence focus and primary sentence stress coincide; stress
produces an effect on phoneme-monitoring RTs, therefore to demonstrate that focus produces an analogous effect it is necessary to remove the confounding with stress, to keep item stress constant whether or not the item is focussed. Thus, focus cannot in this case be defined as the location of the main sentence stress; instead, an alternative means of focussing a particular item must be used. Among possible solutions is the use of the cleft (e.g., 12) and pseudo-cleft (e.g., 13) constructions, which are also considered to have a focussing effect (Jackendoff, 1972; Akmajian, 1970).

(12) It was cleft sentences that Portia refused to utter.

(13) The construction that Doris used most was the pseudo-cleft.

Two investigations provide evidence for an effect of focus in phoneme-monitoring analogous to the effect of stress. In the first (reported in Cutler, 1975), focus was manipulated by the use of cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences describing simple agent-action-object situations; RT to a target-bearing item which was clefted was compared to RT to the same item in non-clefted position. Since cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences cannot be spoken naturally without assigning high stress to the clefted item, the sentences were not spoken, but instead were generated on a speech synthesizer, with which it was possible to hold the fundamental frequency and amplitude inputs for a sentence constant, and to use identical durational specifications for each occurrence, clefted or non-clefted, of any individual item. Thus acoustic invariance of the target-bearing item across its various appearances was ensured. The results indicated that focussed (clefted) target-bearing items indeed elicited faster RTs than the same items when not focussed.

However, it is unfortunately also the case that varying the focus of an item by means of clefting makes it no longer possible to hold the item's position in the sentence constant. In the sentences used in this experiment focussed items occurred at the end of a clause more often than did non-focussed items. Phoneme-monitoring latency is known to decrease towards the end of a sentence or clause (Foss, 1969; Shields, McHugh & Martin, 1974; this effect will be discussed in greater detail below). In two pairs of items which differed in focus of the target but not in the position of the target with relation to a clause boundary, tests showed that the focussed member of the pair still elicited faster RTs; nonetheless, these results are suggestive rather than convincing.

A recent investigation by Jerry Fodor and myself, however, attacked the problem differently. In this study the means by which focus was manipulated was extra-sentential; a question was asked, immediately prior to the sentence, which directed the
listener's attention to one or another part of the sentence. Thus the problem of confounding focus with position of the target item within a clause was avoided, in that the syntax of the sentence remained constant regardless of whether or not the target-bearing item was focussed. It was also unnecessary to control stress by using synthesized speech; the experimental sentences were recorded exactly once, and each was spoken without applying particularly high stress to any item.

In each sentence two words were designated as target-bearing items, and two questions were formulated for each sentence, one of which directed the attention of the listener to that part of the sentence in which the first target-bearing item was located, while the other focussed attention on the part of the sentence containing the second target-bearing item. Thus, (14) could be preceded by the target specifications /b/ or /d/, and by the

(14) The woman with the bag went into the dentist's office.
(15) Which woman was it that went into the office?
(16) Which office was it that the woman went into?

questions (15) and (16), which focus attention on the two target-bearing items "bag" and "dentist's", respectively.

By means of tape-splicing, four materials sets were constructed; each experimental sentence occurred with a different combination of target specification and preceding question in each set. The splicing technique enabled the same recording of the base sentences to be used in each set, so that each subject heard an acoustically identical version of each sentence, regardless of which target-question combination preceded it.

If non-suprasegmental cues to the semantically most central portions of the sentence can be used in the same manner as suprasegmental cues, then we would expect that focussing a word within a sentence, by means of asking a question to which it provides an answer, would facilitate RT to that word's initial phoneme. For the example sentence (14), that is, we would predict that RTs to the first target, /b/, would be faster if the subject had heard (15) than if he had heard (16), whereas RT to the second target, /d/, would be faster if the subject had heard (16) than if he had heard (15). Since each subject heard the same recording of all experimental sentences, acoustic factors of course cannot be invoked to explain RT differences.

Exactly the predicted interaction was found. Thus we have shown that semantic focus can exercise an effect (on phoneme-monitoring RT) prior to the completion of Stage A processing. Moreover, by demonstrating an effect of focussing an item analogous to the effect of assigning high stress, we have provided support for the notion that the strategic value to the sentence processor of an active search for the locations of high
sentential stress is that the processor is thereby enabled to direct attention to the location of the sentence focus, to the semantically most central portion of the utterance. The greater attention paid to the stressed and/or focussed elements is reflected in shorter phoneme-monitoring latencies.

Does it seem far-fetched to envisage the sentence processing mechanism monitoring the intonation contour of an incoming sentence as part of an active search for the sentence focus? Some recent work (Allen & O'Shaughnessy, to appear) demonstrates that the acoustic prerequisites for this view are certainly fulfilled. Allen and O'Shaughnessy recorded a large number of sentences in which various devices were used to indicate the sentence's focus, including clefting, pseudo-clefting and preposed questions, and then measured the fundamental frequency contours of these sentences. They found that all methods of focussing produced reliable and similar effects on the pitch contour, with fundamental frequency accent falling in each case on the element which was focussed. In other words, speakers produce fundamental frequency cues to the semantically central elements of an utterance—is it surprising that the listener seeks to make use of these cues?

Presuppositions, Context and the Interpretation of Irony

The notion of focus is held to be accompanied by a corresponding notion of presupposition (Jackendoff, 1972), the presuppositions expressed by (4) and (5) being that somebody eats caviar for breakfast, and that Felicity eats something for breakfast, respectively. Jackendoff defines presupposition as the information which the speaker assumes his audience to share with him. Does the conclusion that the identification of sentence focus comprises part of Stage A comprehension imply that the presuppositions carried by a sentence are likewise identified during this stage?

As with focus, there is evidence that the presuppositions of a sentence are available to the hearer at least shortly after comprehension has been completed. Offir (1973) tested subjects' recognition memory of a sentence which they had heard embedded in a short paragraph. She found that changes which had been made in the sentence were more likely to be recognized if they affected the presuppositions carried by the sentence than if they did not—even though the sentence was often more greatly changed in the latter case. Hornby (1971) found that subjects asked to recall cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences may make mistakes in surface structure, but are unlikely to make mistakes about what the sentence presupposes and what it asserts.

There exists no evidence, however, that presuppositions of a sentence are computed during Stage A comprehension. Note that
the suggestion of an active search for, and the direction of particular attention to, the location of the focus implies that attention is directed away from the semantically less central parts of the utterance. It will be argued that the computation of presuppositions borne by these parts belongs, despite the intimate relation of presupposition with sentence focus, more properly with the interpretation of certain extra-sentential factors.

Although there exists no experimental evidence to buttress this argument, some circumstantial evidence can be called upon. A great many sentences do not carry presuppositions at all, whereas, in the broad sense of focus that has been used in this discussion, every sentence has a focus; in every spoken sentence there is a point at which the relative stress level is higher than in the rest of the sentence, and this point will always correspond with a semantically central portion of the message. Thus although each utterance will contain parts which are less central, these elements will not necessarily involve a presupposition, and the apprehension that a particular part of a sentence is less important does not entail that the sentence is thereby understood to involve a presupposition.

Note that this discussion has been in at least one respect greatly oversimplified. As Morgan (1969) has pointed out, there are two distinct types of presupposition, sentential and lexical. It is the former type that can be determined by the suprasegmental contour assigned to the sentence. The latter type is carried by a lexical item, for instance the word "stop", as in (17):

(17) Have you stopped beating your husband?

None of the points raised above apply to the lexical presupposition; there is surely a case to be made for inclusion of this type of presuppositional import in the entry allotted the particular item in the mental lexicon. The present discussion will continue to confine itself to sentential presupposition.

The computation of presuppositions of a sentence will be held to be similar to the computation of contextual effects on the interpretation of a sentence. It is surely true that many sentences cannot be said to be understood until they are understood in context. The host of a noisy party, interpreting a neighbor's utterance of

(18) I'm trying to sleep.

as a statement of fact rather than as a request to be quiet has not successfully comprehended it. Similarly, the ironically spoken (1) is misunderstood if it is taken as praise.

However the effects of irony and context on the interpretation of a sentence take place at a level which is certainly beyond Stage A. Ironic intonation, as we have seen, produces a conveyed meaning which is the converse of the literal meaning,
i.e., it negates the proposition expressed by the literal reading of the sentence. But the negation of a proposition cannot be understood without the proposition itself being understood— in other words, successful comprehension of the ironically intended message is contingent upon successful comprehension of the literal meaning of the sentence. Likewise, the context alone does not lead to apprehension of the request expressed by (18), despite the fact that, under the circumstances, the appearance of a neighbor in pyjamas amounts to a message in itself; after all, the hearer's reaction would be quite different if the utterance were (19) or (20). That is to say, the literal meaning of

(19) May I join the party?
(20) Do you realize the house is on fire?

the utterance must again be retrieved before the contextual interpretation can be applied to yield the final interpretation.

The interpretation of irony, context and presuppositional structure does not seem to comprise part of Stage A, the establishment of a sentence's literal meaning. To account for the obvious effects of these factors on the understanding of utterances, it is therefore necessary to enrich the sentence comprehension model by the inclusion of a stage, subsequent to the establishment of the literal meaning of an utterance, in which the literal meaning is embellished or revised in the light of extra-sentential considerations—i.e., Stage B.

It is likely that Stage B consists of a number of different operations. The effect of ironic intonation in reversing the literal meaning of a sentence is presumably the result of a different sequence of operations from those producing the effect of context on the interpretation of (20). (However, note that ironic effect can also be achieved by context: when two people walk into an empty bar', the utterance (21) will be understood as

(21) Sure is lively here tonight.

ironic regardless of the intonation used.) The identification of the presuppositions carried by the sentence, and the checking of these against the hearer's knowledge and beliefs, result no doubt from a different set of procedures again. It is therefore quite possible that Stage B is not a unitary stage, but that there are multiple independent serial stages which a basic semantic representation passes through before the sentence comprehension device is completely finished with it. However, the point of these brief remarks is just that comprehension cannot be considered to be complete once the literal meaning of the sentence has been established. Revisions of this representation do take place as a result of such factors as ironic intonation and the influence of context, although it is not necessarily the case that every sentence undergoes such revisions. (It is worthy of note that one of the few instances in which such effects would
be almost if not entirely absent is the processing of isolated sentences during a typical sentence comprehension experiment.) The stage at which these revisions take place is subsequent to lexical look-up and the establishment of syntactic structure, but it must nevertheless be considered an integral part of the model of the comprehension process.

Implications of the serial position effect

One of the most reliable findings in sentence comprehension tasks using RT methodology is that stimuli in the later portions of a sentence produce shorter response latencies than do stimuli in the earlier portions. Thus, Foss (1969) reported longer phoneme-monitoring RTs to targets occurring earlier in the sentence than to targets occurring later, a result also found by Shields, McHugh and Martin (1974). Holmes and Forster (1970) found that clicks in the second half of a sentence were detected faster than clicks in the first half. All of these writers discussed the serial position effect in terms of facilitated processing towards the end of the sentence; Foss successfully disposed of three possible objections: that the effect merely reflects the subjects' lower criterion for response later in the sentence; that it reflects differential occurrence of target items with relation to surface structure phrase boundaries; and that it results from a reduction in the number of possible structural continuations following target items in the later part of the sentence.

A further possible explanation for the serial position effect arises from the phenomena discussed earlier in this paper. In a sentence in which no particularly heavy stress is applied to any element, the point at which the stress level will be highest will lie at or near the end of the sentence. The expected semantic effects accompany the suprasegmental: in the unmarked case, given information in a sentence precedes new information (Halliday, 1967). An experimental result which supports this explanation is that of Hornby (1972); in a task involving subjects' judgements of various surface structure expressions of simple agent-action-object sequences, Hornby found that active sentences in which the agent was heavily stressed produced results similar to those produced by cleft-agent sentences, whereas active sentences in which no heavy stress was applied were treated similarly to cleft-object sentences.

It is reasonable to assume that the serial position effect in part reflects the fact that the point of highest stress, the semantic focus, to which the sentence processor seeks to direct attention, lies unless otherwise determined in the last part of the sentence. Where sentential stress was not specifically manipulated, experiments in which the serial position effect was
reported can be presumed to have used sentences in which the focus occurred at the end of the sentence.

It is unlikely, however, that a focus explanation can account entirely for the serial position effect. The phoneme-monitoring experiment reported earlier, in which focus was manipulated by means of preposed questions, exhibited a strong serial position effect despite explicit extra-sentential cues to the semantic focus. While focus exerted the predicted effect, RTs to the later-occurring target were overall faster than to the earlier-occurring target. It would appear that there is some further component of the serial position effect besides the search for the semantic focus.

In what way might completed processing of earlier parts of a sentence facilitate processing of later parts? There exists a considerable body of evidence that just such facilitation does not happen when one might on common-sense grounds expect it to be particularly useful, namely in the resolution of lexical ambiguity. Phoneme-monitoring RT is lengthened immediately following the occurrence of an ambiguous lexical item (Foss, 1970), and a preceding context which renders only one reading of the ambiguous item acceptable does not remove the ambiguity effect (Foss & Jenkins, 1973; Cutler & Foss, 1974).

This effect presumably reflects retrieval from the mental lexicon of all the readings listed for the particular item. Although it may be impossible to use biasing context to limit retrieval to only the relevant reading, another kind of facilitation from preceding context is conceivable. Imagine, for example, that one of the operations of the sentence processor is the construction of hypotheses about the content of the incoming utterance (cf. Forster, 1975). The strategic value of such hypotheses might lie merely in reducing uncertainty about the incoming message, given the degraded nature of the signal upon which the speech processor operates. After all, the most salient and at the same time most amazing fact about speech comprehension is its speed, even though in real speech situations sounds, syllables, even words are missing from the spoken realization of the message, the sounds that are present may be distorted or compressed, and the whole signal is, on top of this, received often through considerable extraneous noise. The determination of word boundaries in this degraded input, and hence of the strings which are to be sought in the mental lexicon, might reasonably be considered a highly tentative operation; the retrieval of a reading which matched the semantic hypothesis constructed for that part of the sentence would presumably encourage the processor to accept that interpretation and to refrain from trying alternative patterns of segmentation.

Further, the semantic hypotheses could be more specifically useful in expediting the choice between alternative readings retrieved from the lexicon for ambiguous items. In the
phoneme-monitoring experiments on ambiguity, biasing context exercised a facilitating effect on RT to targets in both ambiguous and unambiguous control sentences. The context effect did not remove the RT lengthening due to ambiguity, which we take to be a lexical effect, but it did slightly reduce it. On the view proposed here, this reduction would be due to an effect at the point of choice between the alternate readings.

The serial position effect can be considered to reflect the operation of semantic hypotheses in the following way: in the early part of the sentence the constructed hypotheses may often prove wrong and need to be revised, thus adding to the momentary processing load and leading to slower RTs in phoneme-monitoring and click detection tasks. As the sentence is decoded, however, the hypotheses are more likely to be correct and to need less revision, so that less of the available processing capacity is taken up with hypothesis formulation and testing, and the detection of phoneme or click targets can be accomplished more rapidly.

Strong support is provided for this view in the work of Forster on the effects of plausibility (reported elsewhere in this volume). Subjects asked to judge whether or not a string of words is an acceptable sentence of English produce longer RTs to sentences which are implausible in content—though completely grammatical and meaningful—than to sentences which are plausible. An implausible input will on the average generate more hypotheses before the correct one is hit upon than will a plausible input.

That phoneme-monitoring is sensitive to the effects of plausibility has recently been demonstrated by Morton and Long (1976), who found that target-bearing items which had a lower probability of occurrence in a particular context elicited longer RTs than items with a higher probability of occurrence in that context. If the above view of the serial position effect is correct, it might be expected that RT to phoneme (or click) targets in implausible sentences would show a lesser reduction towards the end of the sentence than RT to targets in plausible sentences. This hypothesis awaits experimental investigation.

The testing of semantic hypotheses during Stage A comprehension is independent of the similar notion of testing of syntactic hypotheses suggested for example by Bever (1970), although the two suggestions are of course compatible. Forster and Olbrei (1973) have shown that semantic variables do not simplify syntactic processing; but it is conceivable that the reverse may be the case.

Finally, a conception of the sentence comprehension process which involves the formulation and testing of hypotheses about the content of the input is highly compatible with the notion put forward above: that an active search is undertaken for the semantically most central parts of the sentence. These elements
would be of more use than any other in the construction of the correct hypothesis; thus it makes eminent sense for a hypothesizing processor to search for them.

Conclusion

It is a truism to state that sentence comprehension is an extremely complex process. Nonetheless, psycholinguists are all too prone to lose sight of this complexity. A simplified conception of the components of a comprehension model may seem to be desirable as a basis upon which research hypotheses may be formulated. But an adequate model of parsing and lexical look-up simply does not constitute an adequate model of auditory sentence comprehension.

The research reviewed here has shown that the model needs also to take into account the processing of the prosodic structure of an utterance, which takes at least in part the form of an active search for the location of the main sentence stress. We have seen that this effect appears to reflect the coincidence of main sentence stress and sentence focus; i.e., that the search for the primary stress is in fact a search for the semantic focus. It has been suggested that the comprehension of spoken sentences involves the construction and testing of hypotheses about the content of the input, and that the location of a sentence's semantically most central portion is actively sought in order to facilitate the construction of the correct hypothesis. These phenomena properly belong in even the most basic model of auditory sentence comprehension.

Further, it has been noted that the proper understanding of certain sentences must be based on a semantic representation which is not identical with the literal meaning of the sentence, and that some sentences bear presuppositions which are demonstrably available to the listener once the sentence has been comprehended. It was suggested that the sentence comprehension model be enriched by the addition of one or more stages subsequent to the identification of the literal meaning in which transformations of this meaning on the basis of various factors, some of them extra-sentential, may be accomplished. It should be noted that this latter type of enrichment of the model is not confined to the comprehension of speech, but applies also to reading.

A description of auditory sentence comprehension enriched in the directions suggested in this paper may still be a far from complete one, deficient in countless aspects. But it will certainly be closer to the truth than the unimproved model which preceded it.
References


Wanner, E. (1973) Do we understand sentences from the outside-in or from the inside-out? In Haugen, E. and Bloomfield, M. (Eds.), Language as a Human Problem, New York: Norton, 165-185.