CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS
AND THE ARAB UPRISINGS:
TOWARDS A NEW POLITICAL ORDER

January 2015

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Clients of Policy and Operations Evaluations Department (IOB)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Netherlands
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II. Biographical information authors

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Laila al-Zwaini (Arabist and jurist) specializes in classical and modern shari’a, Arab tribalism, rule of law, legal pluralism, intellectual and social change, religious discourse, constitutional law, Muslim women’s empowerment, and madaniya (‘civilism’, civil state) in the Arab and Muslim world. Between 2007 and 2009, she headed the Rule of Law Unit of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. From 2001-2005 she co-directed the action-research project “Rights at Home” for the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (Leiden). This project engaged Muslim intellectuals, women’s rights trainers, and young community leaders from Africa, the Middle East and Asia towards social change based on human rights. Her publications include The Rule of Law in Yemen: Prospects and Challenges (2012), Legal Pluralism in the Arab World (1999), and A Bibliography of Islamic Law, 1980-1993 (1994). She currently works as an independent scholar, lecturer, trainer, and advisor to international organizations and governments. She recently created the action-research bureau Re:Orient. Her contact-address is lailaz05@gmail.com.
III. **List of abbreviations**¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADFM</td>
<td>Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc / Democratic Association of Moroccan Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFA</td>
<td>Arab Forum for Alternatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMDH</td>
<td>Association Marocaine des Droits de l’Homme / Moroccan Association of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANDCM</td>
<td>Moroccan Association of Unemployed Graduates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATFD</td>
<td>Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates / Tunisian Association of Democratic Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTURD</td>
<td>Association des Femmes Tunisiennes Universitaires pour la Recherche et le Développement / Association of Tunisian Women for Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDH</td>
<td>Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l’Homme / Moroccan Consultative Council on Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDT</td>
<td>Democratic Federation of Work (Morocco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDH</td>
<td>Conseil National des Droits de l’Homme / National Council of Human Rights (Morocco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTUWS</td>
<td>Center for Trade Union Workers Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBDA</td>
<td>The Egyptian Business Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECESR</td>
<td>Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFITU</td>
<td>Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETUF</td>
<td>Egyptian Trade Union Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FJP</td>
<td>Freedom and Justice Party (Morocco)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNC</td>
<td>General National Council (Libya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCCNOP</td>
<td>Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (Jordan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Islamic Action Front (Jordan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>INRIC</td>
<td>Instance Nationale pour la Réforme de l’Information et de la Communication / National Council for Reform of Information and Communication (Tunisia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Import Substitution Industrialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHPDF</td>
<td>Libya Human and Political Development Forum</td>
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<td>LWF</td>
<td>Libyan Women Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLF</td>
<td>New Libya Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MALI</td>
<td>Alternative Movement for Individual Rights (Morocco)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCYU</td>
<td>Maspero Coptic Youth Union (Egypt)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCPR</td>
<td>National Council for the Protection of the Revolution (Tunisia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCR</td>
<td>National Coalition for Reform (Jordan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFA</td>
<td>National Forces Alliance (Libya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFR</td>
<td>National Front for Reform (Jordan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFSL</td>
<td>National Front for the Salvation of Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Salvation Front (Egypt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Transitional Council (Libya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODT</td>
<td>Democratic Organization of Work (Morocco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMDH</td>
<td>Organisation Marocaine des Droits Humains / Moroccan Organisation for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCOT</td>
<td>Parti Communiste des Ouvriers de Tunisie / The Tunisian Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDSP</td>
<td>Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJD</td>
<td>Parti de la Justice et du Développement / Party of Justice and Development (Morocco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSU</td>
<td>Parti socialiste unifié / The United Socialist Party/ (Morocco)</td>
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¹ Unfortunately, we have not always been able to find the French acronyms for Moroccan and Tunisian organizations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique / Constitutional Democratic Rally (Tunisia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAF</td>
<td>Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Egypt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Transitional National Council (Libya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>Unemployed Graduates (Tunisia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGTE</td>
<td>Union Générale Tunisienne des Étudiants / General Union of Tunisian Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGTT</td>
<td>Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens / General Union of Tunisian Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMT</td>
<td>Union Marocaine du travail / Moroccan Workers’ Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISDR</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Disaster and Risk Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFP</td>
<td>Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires / Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Morocco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTICA</td>
<td>Union Tunisienne d’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat / Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Crafts</td>
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INTRODUCTION

In 2011 the responses by the international community to the Arab uprisings (then called the Arab Spring) were generally speaking enthusiastic. The rulers in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were driven from power. New forms of protest showed that Arabs were capable of taking the reins in their own hands. Two years later, the atmosphere had changed. The spring had turned into a winter. Syria was being torn apart by civil war and Libya was disintegrating into violence and chaos. In Egypt, president Morsi was in the process of alienating most of the Egyptian population, leading to a military coup on July 3, 2013, while in Morocco and Jordan it seemed little had changed. The prospects for democracy seemed to be waning. In fact, in some countries such as Egypt, Libya and Syria, the chances for democracy looked bleaker than ever before.

This report will analyze the Arab uprisings and try to qualify this pessimistic view. Its central research question is: What is the evidence on internal actors and factors either supporting (democratic) transition or hindering that transition in five countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Jordan.

Although it is true that the high hopes of the Arab Springs have dissipated, it is also possible to retrieve the ideals of the Arab Spring and salvage its importance. The report will do this by focusing on the concept of citizenship that emerged as a central concept, unifying the demands of the people of the region for their rights as citizens and a new social contract with the state. The evidence of most of the literature consulted for this report supports the notion that the uprisings were in favor of equal civil, political and social rights.

This review is based on the following methodology and sources: a) consultation of the main and most important analyses of the Arab uprisings by Westerners and Arabs; b) relating them to the main political, economic and social structures in the Arab world; c) connecting them to citizenship literature; d) answering the main research question: which factors and actors support or block a (democratic) transition?

The report, written in nine weeks, is divided into four chapters. The first chapter deals with the basic concepts that are necessary to understand the situation in the Arab world and the major debates on the region before the uprising. The second chapter deals with the Arab uprisings and identifies the main new players and forces that have played a role during the Arab uprisings. Chapter three focuses on citizenship and why the concept of citizenship and citizenship studies are important for understanding the Arab uprisings, and it identifies the factors and actors supporting or hindering the transition in Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Jordan. Chapter four focuses on the role of the different factors and actors after the Arab uprisings and how they have affected the struggle for rights.

Three figures encapsulate the report. Figure 1 reflects the central argument that over the past thirty years Islamist, liberal and leftist currents have moved towards each other to develop an overlapping consensus on democracy. This consensus is necessary to bring about a democratic transition. Figure 2 represents a model how different factors and actors operate within the “virtuous circle of citizenship”, a model for bringing about a sustainable transition. Figure 3 represents the outcome of the uprisings and compares the five countries with each other.
1 FACTORS AND ACTORS BLOCKING A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

1.0 Introduction

Before analyzing the Arab uprisings as such and how citizenship functions as a means to analyze the transitional process, it is necessary to deal with the factors and actors that hinder a democratic transition. As the struggle for civil, political and social equal rights, and political accountability are seen as the hallmark of the Arab uprisings, all those elements opposed to those demands are regarded as blocking a transition.

Also, before starting this analysis, a remark is in order. The five countries are extremely diverse. Egypt is a country of 87 million people, Jordan 10 million, Libya a mere 6 million, Tunisia 10 million and Morocco 33 million people. Two of the countries are monarchies, Jordan and Morocco, while Tunisia and Egypt are republics and Libya was an idiosyncratic construction of Qaddafi. Libya has oil, Morocco and Jordan phosphate, while Egypt has become a net importer of oil. All are Sunni Islamic states, but Egypt is the only one with a large Christian minority, while Libya and Morocco have ethnic (Amazigh, Tebu, Touareg) minorities, and Jordan is divided in a Palestinian and an original Jordanian population. Not all of them are natural entities. Tunisia and Egypt have natural boundaries that have hardly changed. This not the case with Morocco, whose border has changed over the centuries while its heartland has remained the same.

Also the different geostrategic positions of the countries is important. The fact that Tunisia is geostrategically of less importance than Egypt explains why it has no army and has been left alone to sort out its revolution with little interference from outside, while Egypt as one of the crucial players in the region has attracted intensive international attention. The fact that Tunisia and Morocco are not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict also makes a difference for our analysis.

There are however also common features which will be dealt with below.

1.1 Islam

Traditionally, Islam had been given as the main reason for the non-democratic character of the Arab world, mostly by Western and non-Western secularists. The debate has become all the more consequential as the Islamic movement and Islamization of society (more intense religiosity) have become predominant political, social and cultural factors in the Arab world since the collapse of the secular pan-Arab project in the 1970s.

Most researchers now are of the opinion that there is no inherent reason why Islam cannot be democratic, on the ground that there is no ‘essential’ Islam; Muslims make and remake their Islam, according to their interpretations and different political and economic circumstances (Mandaville 2001). According to Bayat, “Nothing intrinsic to Islam—or, for that matter, to any other religion—makes it inherently democratic or undemocratic” (Bayat 2007: 4). The question should be: under which circumstances can Muslims make Islam compatible with democracy. This also applies to political Islam (henceforth called “Islamism” in this report), which is the main focus in this report.
Specialists on Islamism, like Bayat, argue that since the 1990s mainstream Islamist movements as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood have directed their attention from the implementation of the Islamic law (sharia) and the establishment of the Islamic state to a discourse of rights of believers versus the state, taking democracy and pluralism seriously (Bayat 2007; 2010).

An important shift is the acceptance of the “civil state” as opposed to the “Islamic state” (Harnisch & Mecham 2009). The acceptance of a civil state suggests that the “people” are sovereign and have the right to govern themselves (El-Ghobashy 2005; Wickham 2004, 2011, 2013; Hamid 2014), whereas the Islamic state is based on sharia (Islamic law) and in theory allows for little room for legislation. This new tendency is associated with “moderation” and a greater willingness to make alliances with non-Islamist currents, such as liberals and the left, who traditionally fear the views of Islamism on the position of women, minorities and individualism (Schwedler 2006).

This new pragmatic tendency is represented in such movements as the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco, Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan (Bayat 2013; Clark 2006, 2010; Wickham 2004; El Ghobashy 2005; Schwedler & Clark 2006; Hamid 2014: 108).

However, the extent to which these movements have actually made this transition before the Arab uprisings has remained heavily debated (Brown 2012; Wickham 2004; Meijer 2012). Ambiguity is the central term used to characterize the Islamist movement in this period. The Carnegie Endowment called the topics which remained unclear (women’s and minority rights, the extent of sovereignty of the people versus sharia, the role of the ulama, the role of politics versus movements) the “grey zones” (Brown, Hamzawy, Ottaway 2006; Hamzawy, Ottaway and Brown 2007).

The fear to slide back into sectarian politics and discriminate against heterodox Muslims and Christian populations which emerged after the uprisings has always been in the cards (Potter 2013).

1.2 Clientelism and patronage systems

Another theme that is often seen as hindering a democratic transition has been the persistence of clientelism in the Arab world. Clientelism and patronage seems to be more widespread in the Arab world than anywhere else (Spingborg 2014). Vertical, segmented relations of personal dependency are often seen as a barrier to the development of horizontal relations based on a notion of common interests and equality.

In politics, this means that rulers base their power on patronage and clientelism and rule through favoritism and the principle of divide and rule. Once it is adopted at the top, patronage networks and nepotism pervades the whole political and economic system. For instance, most political parties in the Arab world are based on personal and regional patronage networks and the division of material goods, rather than political programs for reform. Clientelism is also often associated with corruption (Bamyeh 2012: 53; Jebnoun 2012: 60; Sater 2009).
1.3 Tribalism

A third characteristic of Arab world politics is the influence of tribalism. Kinship and lineages of clans and tribes are stronger than modern organizations such as trade unions. Like clientelism and patronage, tribalism implies vertical relations of dependency rather than horizontal, voluntary forms of organization. Tribalism is also associated with a strong sense of honor and protection.

In the five countries surveyed, tribalism is especially strong in Libya (Pargeter 2012: 160-2; Lacher 2013a/b) and Jordan (ICG 2003; Valbjørn 2013: 315; Ryan 2011: 371). It is less pervasive in Morocco and Egypt (except for the Sinai and Upper-Egypt) and Tunisia.

1.4 Class relations

It is difficult to identify clear-cut classes in the Arab world. There are huge differences between different social groups, but it is not always easy to call them classes as the control over the means of production runs through the state rather than the direct possession of the means of production (Selvik & Stenslie 2011: 51; Springborg 2013).

Class relations also differ from one country to the other. In Egypt and Tunisia, where since the 19th century a working class has emerged, one can speak of classes. In most oil rich countries (Libya in our case) relations are not based on class but on patronage and dependency of clans, factions, and individuals.

Nevertheless, the introduction of the market economy since the 1970s and neoliberals reforms in the 1990s (privatization of the public sector) have sharpened class differences and a produced a deep sense of inequality and injustice. For many researchers the growing influence of the neoliberal economy lies at the bottom of the uprisings (Achcar 2013; Bogaert 2013; Bush 2011; Hanieh 2013; Ryan 2011: 384; Zemni 2013).

They argue that it is especially the resistance against neoliberalism that has united many different groups and classes during the Arab uprisings. In Egypt protests were directed against the “businessmen cabinet” of Ahmad Nazih (Lesch 2011; Kandil 2012), in Jordan against the cabinet of Samir al-Rifai with the same political and economic agenda (ICG 2012). Impoverishment and exclusion of the Egyptian middle classes provoked them to join the uprisings (Kandil 2012), while in Jordan it alienated the East-Bankers and pro-regime conservatives who traditionally depend on the public sector (Ryan 2011: 384; ICG 2012 i, 8). Even in Morocco, protests attacked the wealth and the class nature of the monarchy and its direct clients (Hoffmann and König 2013).

The strong social component of the uprisings also explains the negligible contribution of the business community to the uprisings in most countries (Springborg 2013; Hertog 2013; Luciani 2013; Brynen 2012). Tied to the regimes through patronage they were more often the object of anger than the forces of change.
1.5 Economics

If certain forms of Islamism, clientelism and tribalism have thrown up barriers for democratization, neither has the type of economic development in the Arab world been conducive to democratization. After independence the new states tried to implement the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), but when this project failed to take off in the second half of the 1960s, the Arab region was forced by the IMF and World Bank to liberalize and privatize its economies, with the purpose to make these more competitive and make the leap to an export-led growth (Richards & Waterbury 1998: 205-221).

The liberalization of the economy and this transition to a free market economy (and the retreat of the state) was extremely difficult as the bureaucracies had become bloated and many people became dependent on the state, while the elite used the state for its own benefit. Although economic growth during the past decade has been high in some countries (6 percent in Egypt; 4 percent in Tunisia), this development resulted in what has been called “crony capitalism”, a strong concentration of economic wealth in the hands of the ruling elite, increased corruption, impoverishment of the working class and middle classes, and a deepening of differences between rich and poor, giving moreover rise to a deep sense of injustice (Hanieh 2013: 60-2; Achcar 2013; ICG 2012; Ryan 2011; Kandil 2012).

The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and privatization led to deregulation of labor and lowering of wages and worsening of work conditions (Hanieh 2013: 52-3). They enhanced concentration of capital in fewer hands (Hanieh 2013: 60-2). Roll estimates that in Egypt 21 families own most of the private business economy. In 2010, 11 families owned the market capitalization of the Egyptian exchange (Roll 2013: 8). Much the same can be said of Tunisia (Beau & Graciet 2009) and Morocco (Graciet & Laurent 2012).

What has aggravated the economic predicament of the region, was the rise of rentier states in the 1970s. Rentier states receive their revenue from outside their own economy and distribute this income among their populations, without the people having much to do for this largesse or able to influence its distribution. Like crony capitalism, rentierism has enhanced the other banes of the Arab world: patronage, clientelism, nepotism, corruption, tribalism and patriarchy. The economy in that sense is “politically determined” rather than regulated by the market (Achcar 2013: 64).

Although rentier theory has been criticized over the past years for its disregard of agency and the potential of resistance of the population (Ross 2001; Gray 2011), it is still regarded as a major disincentive to political activism and opposition (Ross 2012; Davidson 2012 ). It is generally regarded as an explanation for political quietism in the Gulf states. Citizens are simply “bought off”, while the non-citizen expat workers are sent home when they protest (Sater 2013).

Statistics of economic development for the region are negative compared to other regions in the world. Between 1970 and 1990 GDP in the MENA region stagnated. The Human Development Index in the period 1980-2010 was far lower than East Asia. In 2008 the proportion of the population living below $2.43 and $2.70 per day is 40.9 percent in Egypt, 39.9 percent in Morocco, 11.3 percent in Jordan, 23.8 percent in Tunisia. Below $1 in Egypt, the official poverty line, the percentage increased from 20 to 22 from 2005 to 2008 (Roll 2013: 7). The labor force not covered by any form of social insurance is large: 24.7 percent in Tunisia, 34.5 percent in Libya, 44.5 percent in Egypt, 67.2 in Jordan, and even 80.1 percent in Morocco. More than half of Egyptian small farmers live below the
poverty line of $2 per day (Ayeb 2012: 77; Hanieh 2013: 82-86). Especially important is the high rate of youth unemployment. Unemployment among the young, and especially among university graduates, is very high compared to other regions of the world, between 25-30 percent. Many of these end up in the informal economy (Hanieh 2013: 72).

1.6 Authoritarian regimes

Most political scientists regard the authoritarian state as the major impediment to democratization. The assumption was that with the crisis of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) and economic liberalization after 1970s these countries would also experience a political liberalization, as had happened elsewhere in the world during the third wave of democratization. Indeed, most Arab world countries went through a brief period of political liberalization (Tunisia 1987-9; Egypt 1981-1990; Jordan 1989-1992; Morocco 1992-2005; Libya 2004-2007; Algeria 1988-1991).

The relation between economic liberalization and political liberalization has, however, never been established. Indeed, in Egypt and Tunisia economic reforms under pressure of the IMF during the 1990s are associated with greater repression (Kienle 2001; Camau & Geisser 2003). Only in Morocco is economic liberalization related to a (highly controlled) political liberalization after 1992.

Brief periods of political liberalization (“springs”) did occur later on in some countries, but these were often externally induced. Egypt witnessed such a period from 2004 to 2005, under pressure of the United States, but the relaxing of political controls was followed by the worst repression of the Muslim Brotherhood since the 1960s (Hamid 2013: 121-139). In the period 2004-2009 Libya opened up under the son of Qaddafi, Saif al-Islam (Pargeter 2012: 176-212), in an attempt to please the West but by 2009 these reforms had ended due to resistance of vested interest groups around Qaddafi (Chorin 201: 96-97, 117). In Jordan and Tunisia authoritarianism only deepened over the past twenty years.

In academia, the persistence of the authoritarian state produced a school of research that focused on the “durability” and “stability” of these regimes. It argued that the state had a “pool of strategies” for regime “maintenance” (Abrecht & Schlumberger 2004: 373-4; Schlumberger 2007). In his famous report for Brookings Institute Steven Heydemann coined the term “authoritarian resilience”, arguing that authoritarian regimes were always able to preempt, co-opt, and outmaneuver the opposition because of their capacity to “upgrade authoritarianism” (Heydemann 2007).

1.7 The unitary state

Arab states were not just authoritarian but also unitarian, or mono-cultural. Mostly this was the result of the struggle for independence against Western colonialism and the emphasis on political, religious and cultural unity. Arab nationalism upheld the Arab language, Sunni Islam, and secularism at the expense of other ethnic cultures (Kurds, Berbers/Amazigh, Touareg, Tebu) (Joffé 2013: 37-8), religions (Christianity, Judaism), and especially what it regarded as heterodox Islam, such as Shi’ism and its off-shoots, Alawism, Ismailism, or political Islam.
Minorities were allowed to join the nationalist movement but only if they became assimilated. In Egypt, the unitary state rejected any notion of pluralism, which it quickly regarded as undermining “national unity” or “national values”. Copts, the Egyptian Christian minority, for instance, were not allowed to be called a religious minority (Sedra 2007: 220; Tadros 2013). This image has been internalized by the Coptic church itself, which regards Copts as “sons of a single nation” (Sedra 2007: 221).

Over the past decades suppressed ethnic and religious minorities have become conscious of their cultural, political and social rights (Maddy-Weizman 2006; Tadros 2013). Their grievances were also raised during the Arab uprisings (Pföstl 2013; Tadros 2013: 119-138).

1.8 The authoritarian bargain

Perhaps the single most important concept that is necessary to take into account in order to understand the Arab uprisings is what has been called the “authoritarian bargain” (Heydemann 2007; Hinnebusch 2000). It has also been called the “populist authoritarian bargain” (Brynen et al., 2012: 149), the “ruling bargain” (Kamrava 2013: 363-5), the “social contract” (Vandewalle 1998: 23-30), or more ironically, a “social contract of sorts” (Ismail 2011: 847). Even if authors do not accept the term itself, from their descriptions it is clear it was also present in a country like Tunisia (Perkins 2006: 146-7; Alexander 2010: 40).

The authoritarian bargain is an exchange of rights that occurred between the state and its citizens (or their representatives such as trade unions) after independence in the 1950s and 1960s when the authoritarian state was built. According to this silent or informal agreement citizens exchanged their political and civil rights for social rights. The social services that the new state provided covered the reforms the colonial regimes had neglected: the expansion of primary and secondary education, the establishment of national universities, the creation of jobs in the public sector (especially after Europeans had left and after their property had been sequestered and nationalized), implementation of land reform and the introduction of cooperatives, massive public housing projects, free health care, in addition to the rapid expansion of the transport system, extension of roads, electrification of the countryside and bringing piped water to poor rural areas.

Not only were the middle and lower classes included into the nation as part of the authoritarian bargain, also neglected regions, such as Upper-Egypt (Fandy 1994), the interior of Tunisia (Dot-Pouillard 2013; Ayeb 2011), the Rif in Morocco (Pennel 2000) were incorporated into the nation-state. This trend would be reversed during the neoliberal phase of the past twenty years.

1.9 Unravelling of the authoritarian bargain

As the state had been so strong and dominant as provider of employment, free education and health services, its gradual retreat from these services had dramatic consequences for the population. Food subsidies were partially lowered in 1970s and 1980s in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco. As a result of the reneging on the social contract “food riots” occurred in Egypt (1977), Tunisia (1978 and 1984), Morocco (1982 and 1984), Jordan (1988 and 1996). More recently, public spending on health
care in Egypt fell by 25 percent over 2003-7 and state expenditure on education declined from 16.2 percent to 12.6 percent of the state budget in the same period (Bush 2012: 66).

Since the 1970s, as part of the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), housing laws, rent protection, restrictions on property ownership, cheap health care and equal educational opportunities were dismantled. During the 1990s, the last part of SAP was starting to be implemented: the privatization of the public sector. The assault on the welfare state and the reduction of the bureaucracy and public sector in the Arab world during the past decade led to economic exclusion, impoverishment, and the marginalization of the lower middle classes. It deepened the discrimination of minorities and exacerbated the deprivation of economically backward regions in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria (Achcar 2013; Bush 2012: 66; Hanieh 2013: 68-71; Bogaert 2013).

The “retreat” of the state led to the abandonment of neighborhoods in cities where millions of people lived, the shrinking of the formal economy and its replacement by a rapidly expanding informal economy of precarious work (Achcar 2012: 23-4; Kamrava 2013: 365-74). Impoverishment and growing spectacular wealth-inequality led to growing exclusion (Bush 2012: 62), directly affecting citizenship rights: “Citizens’ energies are channeled away from ‘demanding’ rights, either through political struggle or engagement with civil society, to seek subsistence on an individual basis” (El Mahdi 2012: 137).

In the meantime the state tried to invest in a new social contract. Over the years states would constantly announce new rounds of “national dialogues” ending in a National Charter in order to reach a new consensus to support a liberalized economy (Hamid 2014: 81; Ryan 2011: 372).

In reality, the new bargains were piecemeal and highly diverse and unequal, rewarding loyalist clients and punishing dissenters as outcasts. Because they enhanced the growing inequality, corruption and elitism, and established a hierarchy of privilege, they fed the anger of the people.

In Egypt, for instance, the Mubarak regime entered into an agreement with the Islamist movement that it could exist and pursue its educational, social work and charity activities, on condition that the movement would not use violence or try to topple the regime (Hamid 2014: 157). With the business elite the bargain was that the regime would allow them to enrich itself, provided it could produce high economic growth rates, and with political parties it had the “democratic bargain”, setting limits to the seats they could win (Brumberg 1995; Roll 2013). With the Coptic church another “entente” or “informal pact” had been made to tie Copts as a community to the state (Tadros 2013: 62, 87; Sedra 2007: 227-8). Finally, with the (then) quietest Salafi movement the government had an agreement that they could be played off against the Muslim Brotherhood (Lacroix 2012), while it had turned the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) into an organ of control rather than one of representation (Beinin 2012: 3). In this way, each sector had been tied individually in a hierarchical relationship with the authoritarian state, which could subsequently play them off against each other.

In Libya, Qaddafi made the same deals with tribes. Their leaders signed an agreement with Qaddafi to take responsibility for the behavior of their tribesmen, incurring collective punishments if they were disloyal (Joffé 2013: 23).
Given the piecemeal, diverse, unequal, and clientelist nature of these partial bargains, it is not surprising that the demand for a new social contract was one of the major demands of the Arab uprisings. It became part of the new self-awareness and politicization of citizens. At the basis of this, as mentioned, were economic grievances as one of the main reasons for the uprisings (Roll 2013: 7; Achcar 20123; Hanieh 2013).

In order to control society, authoritarian regimes expanded their security apparatus. During the past decade of Mubarak’s rule, the budget of the police increased from $583 million in 1999 to $2 billion in 2005, $3.3 billion in 2008 and $3.7 billion in fiscal year 2011-12, multiplying six fold over the past decade (ICG 2012: 10).

1.10 Civil society

Liberalization of the economy and politics directly affected the concept and practice of civil society in the Arab world. The rise of civil society and the focus on civil society as a motor of change and democratization was part of the optimism of the third wave of democratization of the 1990s that eventually passed the Arab world without much effect.

Civil society advocates of the 1980s and 1990s argued that organizations situated between the family and the state had been the basis of Western democracy and that this would also be the case in the rest of the world. They believed that civil institutions would provide “civility”, tolerance, pluralism, and consensus, all of which would be conducive to democratization (Saad Eddin Ibrahim 1995; Norton 1995 and 1996). Civil society in this period saw the rise of human rights organizations, women’s organizations, and communal welfare organizations. As membership was voluntary, horizontal civil society was regarded as the antithesis of the dominant political culture of clientelism and patronage (Bozzo & Luizard 2011). After 9/11, support to civil society was given a new boost especially by the US.

Civil society was, however, in many cases unable to withstand authoritarian upgrading. Gradually, civil society even became incorporated into the authoritarian bargain. This was the case, for instance with Tunisian secular nationalist feminism and the adoption of the highly progressive Code du statut personnel in 1958 (Khalil 2014: 191). In Libya, civil society hardly existed and had no legal basis (Pargeter 2012: 231). It only started to emerge after the reforms of Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, in 2004 (Chohin 2012: 94). In Egypt it expanded hugely in the 1980s, but most of the NGOs were charity organizations. In all countries their freedom was curtailed by repressive NGO laws, imposing strict controls over their financial resources, personnel and activities.

Besides imposing severe restrictions, authoritarian states also coopted NGOs, with the result that civil society was unable to fulfill its “mission” of liberalizing society and protecting the “common good” (bien commun), becoming instead narrow-interest associations (Hibou 2011: 4). In Morocco, this trend was strengthened after the bomb attack in Casablanca in 2003: NGOs were given the choice to become “loyal” opponents and have some of their demands met, or demand more far-reaching political reforms and be excluded. The result was a split within civil society. While the Organisation Marocaine des Droits Humains (OMDH) supported the monarchy and was incorporated into the royal patronage, the Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH) was excluded (Dalmasso 2012).
This also occurred with the Moroccan women’s organizations. The Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) supported the monarchy in its reform of women’s rights, culminating in the reform of the Mudawwana (personal statute) in 2005, but others did not (Dalmasso 2012: 224-6). In this way a “state feminism” arose that became isolated from society, channeling its efforts to state bureaucrats and foreign funds rather than mobilizing the population (Salime 2012: 107). This pattern was repeated in Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. Over time, NGO laws became increasingly more restrictive in the whole region (Brynen et.al 2012).

Another, more direct way of controlling civil society was to establish government-operated non-governmental organizations (GONGOs). In the monarchies these were often founded by the monarch or his wife, often in relation to women’s issues. They became an instrument to “disempower” existing NGO’s (Charrad & Zarrugh 2014: 232).

As a result, most of the activities leading up to the Arab uprisings took place outside civil society, although civil society in some cases did become involved. In Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan professional organizations such as the Lawyers’ syndicate, the Judges Club, and the Doctors’ Union played an important role in preparing the ground for the uprisings, either through ideas of equality, democracy and human rights, or as locations where cross-ideological, cross-sectarian coalitions were formed (see chapter 2). In Tunisia and Egypt, trade unions would play an important role during the uprisings (Beinin 2012: Zemni 2013; Langohr 2014).

1.11 Political parties

Despite the often heard narrative that political parties are foreign to the Arab world, political parties, pluralism and parliamentary elections had existed in Egypt (Meijer 2002), Morocco (Pennel 2000), Tunisia (Perkins 2006), and Syria and Lebanon before independence. Mostly, they were banned (except for Morocco) after independence when the military came to power and/or unified political parties were installed in the 1950s and 1960s. Typically for the authoritarian unified state, political parties were regarded as divisive. Qaddafi condemned parliaments “as misrepresentation of the people” and political parties as “the modern dictatorial instrument of governing” (Parfiter 2012: 86). One of his slogans was: “who forms a political party is a traitor” (Langhi 2014: 201). This negative attitude to political parties was common in the whole region until the 1970s.

Political parties re-emerged during the periods of political liberalization mentioned above but often were highly constrained in the subsequent periods of authoritarian upgrading. Moreover, they became less a means to influence policy and channeling grievances than as a top-down instrument of clientelism and patronage (Sater 2007). Thus, elections were marred by fraud, corruption, gerrymandering, and many other ways to manipulate them by the government. In Morocco, Egypt and Jordan electoral reform became a recurring theme between opposition and the government since the 1990s. In Jordan political parties wanted a proportional electoral system that would benefit political parties, instead of a system based on independent seats, which promotes clientelism.

As a result, political parties were regarded as a means of legitimizing the status quo (Posusney 2005), part of the “façade democracy” (King 2009: 145), “liberalized autocracy” (Shehata 2010), or simply a “pluralisation” (Hibou 2011: 2), rather than as an instrument to gain real power by the people. The term “learning to lose” became famous for the little hope Islamist parties had of winning
elections; they only participated to propagate their ideas (Hamid 2014: 115-6). The Danish political scientist Valbjørn states that Jordan was “less free in 2010 than in 1989”, when a brief liberal period was initiated (Valbjørn 2013: 315).

The disillusion with political parties and elections was expressed in the declining voter turn-out in the different countries, ranging between 17 percent in Egypt’s 2005 elections and 37 percent in Morocco’s 2007 elections (Brynen 2012 et.al 2012: 163). During the last parliamentary elections in Egypt under Mubarak in 2010 the “state party”, National Democratic Party, won 420 of the 502 seats through fraud and intimidations. The Brotherhood lost all 88 seats it had gained in 2005. The results were devastating for turnout. In Morocco in 2007 the voter turnout reached a historic low of 37 per cent, after having attained 51.6 per cent in 2002 and 58 per cent in 1997 (Sater 2009: 391).

Restricted political liberalization might however have backfired. By first introducing a multiparty system and then carefully controlling elections and their outcomes, façade democracy “fueled resentment against already highly unpopular hegemonic authoritarian regimes” (Brynen et al. 2012: 162). It has also undermined the function of political parties, which came to be regarded as “ineffective” and too tied up with the regime, becoming an “official opposition” (Ryan 2011: 381). For this reason, political parties, like civil society, did not figure prominently during the Arab uprisings.

1.12 Depoliticization

Depoliticization and demobilization of the citizen was essential in order to impose the political and economic restrictions. Depoliticization is one of the red threads running through most of the political literature on the Arab world before the uprisings, and is closely associated with clientelism, the personalization of politics, tribalism, corruption, and blocking any form of demanding citizen’s rights.

Depoliticization has become the main characteristic of Moroccan politics, and almost all researchers reflect on it (Maghraoui 2002; Maghraoui 2011; Hibou 2011: 3; Dalmaaso 2012; Tozy 2009). Hibou is surprised by the explicit apolitical attitude even of politicians, calling them “antipolitical” (Hibou 2011: 3).

As one Moroccan MP put it: “people at home would never forgive me if I were to take a strong stance on an issue that does not concern them directly [...] They did not elect me so that I engage in politics” (Willis cited in Sater 2009: 391). As a result most parties had become “little more than large-scale interlinking patron-client networks” (Sater 2009: 391).

In Egypt depoliticization is mostly associated with the prominence of technocracy, which rose under Nasser (Meijer 2002) and continued under Mubarak. All political decisions were taken out of the political sphere and made into technocratic problems that called for administrative solutions (Mitchell 2002). In the francophone countries technocracy was a way of hiding politics behind a mask of “modernity” (modernité) and eliminating the people from voicing demands (Hibou 2011: 4; Maghraoui 2002: 24). Depoliticization also affected the trade union movement in the region (Zemni 2013; Beinin 2012) as well as other partners in the partials bargains, such as the Copts, whose elite dampened every sign of protest to speak out and become involved in politics (Sedra 2007: 228). In none of the Arab countries did the youth engage in official party politics (Sika 2012; Desrues 2012).
But the power of the state was not simply upheld by the means mentioned above. The state also ruled by terror, violence, intimidation, and erecting what became later known as the “wall of fear”. This applied for most for Libya — often called totalitarian — (Poljarevic 2012: 12), but also for Egypt, and Morocco where security was leased out to thugs (baltagiyya) to intimidate opponents (Kassem 2007). As a result the people remained passive, preferring the political passivity to the risks of resistance (Poljarevic 2012: 30).

1.13 External influences

On the whole external forces have ignored the negative political culture in the Arab world. Oil has already been mentioned as an external negative influence (Ross 2011; Gray 2011). The many wars in the region have also helped to suppress political and civil rights.

The United States have pursued a contradictory policy. While supporting democracy through its aid agencies they buttressed the authoritarian regime of Mubarak and provided the Egyptian army with a yearly aid package of 1.3 billion dollars since 1979. In general, according to most commentators on the foreign policy of the United States and the EU, stability, economic relations, restricting (illegal) migration, and security, and more specifically after 9/11, “fighting terrorism”, have prevailed over the promotion of human rights, the rule of law and democracy in the region (Brownlee 2012; Bauer 2013: 5; Tömmel 2013: 23; Peters 2012; Isaac 2013a; Roy 2012b).

Transnational diasporas of minorities have also gained considerable influence over the years, especially after the introduction of internet. For instance, in 1972, the Coptic community in the United States founded the American Coptic Association to struggle for the citizenship rights of their co-religionists in Egypt (Sedra 2007: 230). Likewise, the Amazigh diaspora in France has played an important role in the Algerian “Berber Spring” and Berber studies (Pföstl 2013; Maddy Weitzman 2006).

1.14 Conclusion

By the end of 2010 a specific combination of factors had led to a perverted form of politics in the Arab world and a disastrous political culture based on clientelism, patronage, personalized politics, and a type of economy that was exclusive and highly imbalanced and whose benefits accrued to a small elite with political ties to the regimes. Increasingly, regimes were losing their legitimacy by not being able to deliver the services and goods to their populations, which were increasingly becoming impoverished, marginalized, excluded, and subjected to police brutality. This humiliation was made all the more grueling by the growing disparity in wealth on account of a neoliberal economic model that produced high growth rates at the expense of equity.

On the eve of the uprisings all attempts to include the population in this new model of development, either by political participation, civil society or economic development had failed because these sectors of participation were contained, controlled, and surveyed by an authoritarian state that led to greater marginalization, pushing a large section of the population into the twilight zone of the “non-citizen”. The population increasingly lived in the countryside and poor neighborhoods in the large cities, worked in the informal sector and took on precarious work.
As the grievances were primarily in the field of economic, social and political exclusion on the one hand, and vast accumulation of wealth and privileges by a small elite at the other extreme, it was highly probable that if an uprising would occur it would be in favor of social justice and civil, political and social rights. Protest would be aimed against the partial bargains establishing communities of privilege in favor of a new social contract based on inclusion, equality, justice, the guarantee of livelihood, political participation and accountability, but not necessarily liberal democracy.
2 THE ARAB UPRISINGS AND THE FACTORS AND ACTORS OF CHANGE

2.0 Introduction

Given the general economic, social, political and cultural malaise in the Arab world, due to the power of the factors and actors working against a transition, it was not surprising that the uprisings were enthusiastically welcomed by most commentators.

Needless to say, all of the issues analyzed above also gave rise to vehement debates on the nature of the uprisings. This was especially the case with the role of the Islamist movements later on, when they asserted their hegemony.

One issue, however, immediately provoked a major debate. This was the issue of the authoritarian resilience. The state-focused research, as it had developed over the past two decades, was criticized for its emphasize on “stability”, “resilience” and “durability” and the assumption of a passive population (Pace & Cavatorta 2011; Gause 2011; Hudson 2012: 26-7; Chomiak 2014: 47-8).

The pessimists were cautious. They argued that the uprisings did not disprove their earlier views on the resilience of the authoritarian state. It still was “robust” (Bellin 2012; Leenders & Heydemann 2012). The “deep state” was very much alive. Ominously, they warned that unless it was dismantled, democracy, was ruled out (Kandil 2012; al-Imrani 2012).

They also warned that the economic base of the societies was so destitute that the chances for democracy to emerge were bleak. In a rentier state the ruling elite was still independent from the people and could reassert itself as long as it obtained its revenue from outside (Ross 2012). And although the Arab uprisings had been horizontally organized, it was a moot point whether they could sweep away the ingrained political culture of clientelism, patronage, corruption and patriarchy (Springborg 2014).

2.1 Identifying factors and actors of change

In the years following the eviction of the dictators extensive research was undertaken on the Arab uprisings. An avalanche of monographs, anthologies, articles, reports, personal memoirs has been published, laying bare the history, organization, support, coalition formations and demands of the uprisings.

In this section I will identify the factors and actors of change prior to and during the uprisings. From the literature review, three factors were seen as most important in bringing about the uprisings and supporting the demands for change. The first was the emergence of social movements. The second was the emergence of coalitions between social groups and between especially Islamists and secularists that formed the backbone of the uprisings. The third was the emergence of a discourse of rights which united the different groups, tendencies and classes against the factors that hindered change, analyzed in chapter 1.
2.2 Social movements

A new trend in Arab world was the emergence of social movements. These are defined as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities” (Tarrow 1998: 4). Taking them into account was also a breakthrough in academia, where hitherto most of the attention was directed towards the classic themes of authoritarian state, civil society, and political participation.

Social movement theory has been prominent in Europe and the United States (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2006, 2007, 2009; Della Porta & Diani 1999). But it has always been problematic to apply theories that have been evolved in a democratic setting to an authoritarian one as the Arab world (Beinin and Vairel 2011; Wiktorowicz 2003). This was even more the case because in the Arab world social movements were mostly Islamist movements and usually social movements in the West were associated with positive and progressive movements. Tarrow even calls the Islamist movements “dark” movements (Tarrow 1998).

As Islamist movements were by far the largest social movements in the Arab world, most research focused on them (Wickham 2002; Hafez 2003, Wiktowicz 2004) at the expense of other movements. Theoretically, research on Islamic movements produced new openings, moving the discussion away from the Islamic specificity of the movements to regarding them as regular movements using the same techniques to mobilize people, find resources, and frame their goals as Western movements.

It is generally believed that those social movements which brought about the uprisings in 2010-2011 had stepped into the vacuum that the co-opted political parties and civil society had left behind. This applied from Morocco (Maghrouri 2011; Hoffmann & König; Salime 2012), Egypt (Gunning & Baron 2013), to Tunisia (Chomiak 2014; Zemni 2013).

2.3 The uprisings

The history of the movements that constituted the uprisings confirms the hunch that the agents of change came from outside the established parties, civil society organizations, and the established left. They usually consisted of networks and social networks that were able to evade the police and the surveillance of the state. All researchers trace the antecedents of the uprisings further back than was assumed.

In Egypt, the best documented country, Gunning and Baron (Gunning and Baron 2013) distinguish between four “protest waves” between 2000 and 2011. While the first wave (2000-2004) was directed against United States and Israeli policies in the region and started out with solidarity demonstrations after the Palestinian second Intifada in 2000 and the protests against the invasion of Iraq in 2003, during the second wave (2004-2006) they gradually turned against the government, targeting corruption and the friends around Gamal Mubarak, especially the son of Mubarak who was groomed to succeed him. In this period the demands became bolder, taking on the oppressive political climate in Egypt, lack of human rights and corruption.

Many of these protests were organized by youth from the middle classes. For instance, the Egyptian movement against Mubarak’s re-election called “Enough” (Kefaya) produced a founding document calling for economic and constitutional reforms. When the “businessmen cabinet” under premier
Ahmad Nazif was installed in 2004, different groups joined, opposing neoliberal reforms and corruption (Gunning and Baron 2023: 47-8).

The third wave (2006-2009) was dominated by industrial disputes and workers’ strikes, starting in 2006 in the provincial town of Mahalla al-Kubra, when 20,000 workers occupied its central square. Between December 2006 and September 2007 some 198,400 workers protested across the country in which civil servants, metro-drivers, cement-workers, etcetera, participated (Gunning and Baron 2013: 59). The most important movement to come out of this wave of protests was the April 6 Youth Movement (Gunning and Baron 2013: 66).

The fourth wave (2009-2010) was inaugurated by the election campaign of the liberal Mohammed ElBaradei, a former director of the IAEA in Vienna, who ignited the hope that things could change. It was given extra impetus with the death of Khaled Said, a youth in Alexandria beaten to death by the police. The campaign “We are Khaled Said,” mobilized middle class youth, while the bomb attack on the Coptic church in Alexandria on New Year’s Day mobilized Christians and Muslims (Gunning & Baron 2013: 78-80).

The sequence of resistance and the formation of coalitions have been somewhat different for the other countries. But it is clear that gradually protests spread to include broader sections of the population and that demands became more political, creating a threat to states which were based on vertical divisions, divide and rule, and relations of dependency and loyalty.

Although Tunisia is less well documented, like Gunning and Baron, Chomiak argues that there is “no single point of origin” for the Tunisian uprising. Rather, it emerged from “scattered activism in prerevolutionary Tunisia and certain moments of resistance under dictatorship that were closely connected” (Chomiak 2014: 23; Chomiak & Entelis 2011, 2012). Political activism picked up after 2002, and as in Egypt activists turned officially sanctioned demonstrations in support of the second Palestinian intifada against the regime. In this period, activism was mostly restricted to Tunis, and like in Egypt, the left was mostly active. 2005 marked a turning point. Activists started to connect to international activists groups and domestic oppositional actors (Chomiak 2014: 27).

Real protests, however, started in 2008 in the Gafsa mining area in the interior of Tunisia (Allal 2008, 2011; Ayeb 2012), led by workers (Zemni 2013). At this point strikes, sit-ins, and hunger strikes and eventually clashes with the police were supported by middle class movements such as the General Union of Tunisian Students (UGET) and a Tunis-based solidarity committee, but also the communist movement, Parti Communiste des Ouvriers de Tunisie (PCOT) (Chomiak 2014: 32). The National Bar Association, since 2000 involved in a struggle with Ben Ali, also joined the demonstrations in December and January 2010, as well as school youth (Zemni 2013: 130-31).

By that time “mobilization became much more sophisticated, linking cyber-activism with street-based protest or supporting street based rebellions with online activism” (Chomiak 2014: 37). This laid the groundwork for the spread of the protest movement after the death of Mohamed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010. Social grievances spread from the south and west of Tunisia to the meet-up with political grievances along the coast.

But, crucially, the course of events had not finished with the fall of president Ben Ali on 14 January 2011. The establishment of the National Council for the Protection of the Revolution (NCPR) on
February 11, in which Ennahda, the national trade union, the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), human rights’ organizations, as well as the National Bar Association, claimed to represent the “will of the people”. Further demonstrations, culminating in the 100,000 man strong demonstration on February 25, led to the fall of prime minister Ghannouchi two days later. Thus, whereas in Tunisia the revolution deepened (Zemni 2014), in Egypt it halted after Mubarak fell on 11 February.

In Morocco, the main protests movement, the February 20 Movement, has its history in different radical groups outside the establishment (Hoffmann & König 2004). Among these are the alternative trade unions, the political left, and rights' movements such as Alternative Movement for Individual Rights (MALI), and the unemployed graduates who have organized themselves in the Moroccan National Association of Unemployed Graduates (ANDCM) and have demonstrated since the 1990s (Bogaert & Emperador 2011).

Like in Egypt and Tunisia, mass demonstrations in Morocco started with solidarity with Palestinians, and against the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Gradually, over the years they acquired a more political character. In 2006 for the first time an attempt was made to coordinate these efforts in the Mouvement contre la cherté de la vie (Movement against the high cost of living). The Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH), which has 12,000 members and 90 local branches, played an important part in these activities. With these two movements activities shifted to smaller, regional towns, where 80 tansiqiyyat (committees) were founded. These tansiqiyyat were involved in 2006 and 2007 in several local protests against rising water prices, bread prices. They laid the ground for the mobilization of the February 20 Movement (Bogaert 2014).

Most commentators trace the uprisings in Libya back to the reforms of Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, who positioned himself at head of reforms after international sanctions were lifted in 2004 (Joffé 2013; Chorin 2012; Pargeter 2012). This brief opening allowed the opposition to organize itself. The most important source of resistance was the protests of the families of the victims of the Abu Selim prison massacre in 1996. By 2007, they started weekly demonstrations in Benghazi in front of the headquarters of the security services. They were led by the Benghazi-based lawyer Fathi Terbil, who had lost three relatives in the massacre. The demonstrations were supported by Libyan exiles. The Libya Human and Political Development Forum (LHPDF) and opposition parties such as National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL) spread information on corruption and facilitated contact between members of opposition in Libya (Chorin 2012: 148-50). However, like in Egypt (Dorsey 2011) Ultra football fans from Benghazi constituted much of the revolutionary force (Poljarevic 2012: 10). Also, alienated tribes played a significant role (Joffé 2013; Lacher 2013).

The largest protests in Libya in this period were the demonstrations of February 17 and 18, 2006, when the police killed eleven people during the protest against the Danish cartoons. To commemorate this massacre, the people in Benghazi organized the Day of Rage in 2011 (Pargeter 2012: 214; Chorin 2012: 50). The trigger of the uprising in Benghazi on 15 February was the arrest of the lawyer Fathi Terbil. During the next few days, protests spread from Benghazi to Tobruk and Al Beida, bringing down the ‘wall of fear’ (Chorin 2012: 192).

Even in Jordan, where protests in 2011 were relatively small compared to the other four countries, protests had a long history. Cross-ideological coalitions go back to the beginning of political repression in 1993. In 2010 public servants, Aqaba port workers and teachers went to the streets to
protest their working conditions. The Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, boycotted the November 2010 elections. However, like in Egypt, the IAF was reluctant to join the protest marches in January 2011 (ICG 2012c: 14).

2.4 The power of youth

Youth played a crucial role in the uprisings and it is therefore important to understand which structural reasons have been identified in the literature, because they are an important factor in explaining the uprisings. Over the past decade important research has been done on Arab youth (Meijer 2000; Bayat & Herrera 2012; Bonnefoy 2013). According to these studies the present youth differs psychologically and sociologically from previous generations.

An important factor for the participation and growing political awareness and interest in notions of rights is the fact that youth has a greater sense of their individuality and therefore of their personal dignity and self-worth. Social media and cell telephones have enhanced this process of individualization. Prolonged schooling leads increasingly to new forms of socialization among the peer group and less contact with the more traditional, hierarchical, patriarchal family structures. The new self-consciousness is strengthened by a much larger knowledge of the world than their parents. As a result, the young also have greater expectations of income, wealth and opportunities than their elders and therefore are easily more frustrated when these chances in life are not obtained (Desrues 2012; Meijer 2000). One researcher has called the expectations of youth a separate “social contract”, which the state has not been able to uphold from its side. Due to the high unemployment among youth, for which the MENA region stands out, the frustration to reach adulthood and the postponement to marry and start a family, is considered one of the reasons for the uprisings (Mulderig 2013).

The new self-consciousness among youth has also led to greater political consciousness and an awareness of the factors that keep them dependent, socially excluded, and economically marginalized. Islamist movements attract youth on account of their sense of “morality, social justice and equality among believers” (Desrues 2012: 29), in other words, the same more abstract ideas that are usually associated with citizenship rights. But also other youth cultures, hip hop and rap, with their own subcultures, indicate a rejection of the older political culture in the Arab world and a connection with the rest of the world (Meijer 2000). The history of the Ultra football fans in all countries in the Arab world shows a strong attachment to independence from state interference and patronage (Dorsey 2011).

In general, it seems that youth was also less ideological and more open to other political currents and were more prone to “political learning”. This was the case of the youth of the Muslim Brotherhood (Lynch 2007) and young members of Salafis in Morocco (Masbah 2015) and in Egypt (Lacroix 2012).

Another major change has been the increased presence of young women in the public sphere. Better education and policies promoting equality have had their effects on women in society in Morocco, Libya, and Egypt, and Tunisia (Desrues 2012, Langhi 2014: 202; Hafez 2014; Moghadam 2014; Khalil 2014b: 188-9). It is therefore not surprising that young women featured prominently in social movements and that they were open and daring in their activism, regardless of their political and ideological background.
However, it would be wrong to consider all youth in the Arab world as an actor of change. Many have pointed to sociological factors promoting massive long-term changes (Bayat Herrera 2013; Meijer 2000; Bonnefoy 2013), but the majority of youth is still brought up within a more traditional, hierarchical setting.

2.5 Workers

Often neglected as an actor of change are trade unions. The threat of the general strike in Egypt and Tunisia brought the regimes to their heels (Zemni 2014; Beinin 2012). Ann Lesch calls the workers (not trade unions per se) in Egypt and Tunisia the “backbone of many of the protests” (Lesch 2014: 65). Joel Beinin, who has spent his whole scholarly life studying the workers’ movement in Egypt, calls the workers movements essential for the uprisings. “They not only had a substantial presence in the mass demonstrations of January and February 2011, but strikes, which escalated after 1998, played a major role in delegitimizing the regime and popularizing a culture of protest” (Beinin 2012: 3).

In Morocco, the Moroccan Workers’ union/Union Marocaine du travail (UMT) Democratic Federation of Work/Confédération démocratique du travail (CDT) and Democratic Organization of Work (ODT) were represented in the February 20 Movement (Tourabi and Zaki 2011: 99; Hoffmann & König 2014: 7). In Jordan, trade unions took the initiative in the founding of the Jayeen (“We Are Coming”) movement in 2011 (ICG 2012c: 8).

It is also telling that the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) was founded on Tahrir on January 30, 2011.

2.6 Social media

Social media played a crucial role in the protests as an instrument of change and mobilization. Without them social movements would not have been able to mobilize people. In the decade before the uprisings, they allowed people to communicate with each other after they had been pushed out of the public sphere. They were crucial instruments in creating alternative bases of expression and discussion (Chomiak 2014: 25).

For instance, in Libya contentious actions against Qaddafi were only made possible through internet. Between 2004 and 2006 around 20 per cent of the population was connected to internet. In 2005 digital cameras and mobile phones were used to register police brutality and spread it through internet. In Egypt, Kefaya, one of the precursors of the Tahrir demonstrations, used internet to gather 17,000 signatures in 2005. The April 6 Youth Movement, which played an important role during the uprisings, started out as a Facebook page (Gunning and Baron 2013: 67). After 2005 internet became the main weapon against the regimes. In Tunisia, Slim Amamou “Slim 404” became famous for his defense of internet freedom. In this period, the illegal Unemployed Graduates (UDC) was established (Chomiak 2014: 28). In Libya, social media were crucial for communication between exiles and activists in Libya (Poljarevic 2012).
During the second half of the 2000s blogs became important, exposing regime flaws and human rights abuses. This was the case in Egypt (Gunning and Baron 2013: 57; El-Mahdi 2014) as well as Libya (Rajabany and Shitrit 2014). Chomiak shows that internet picked up after 2005 in Tunisia (Chomiak 2014).

Perhaps the best way social media relate to citizenship are the remarks by the scholars Linda Herrera and Saba Mahmood. They argue that social media created a “cultural, political and ethical universe of its own” (Herrera 2012: 92, 94) and a “new ethics of political engagement” (Mahmood 2012: 108). Desrues states that social media and cellphones in themselves create a space where “freedom of speech” prevails (Desrues 2012: 30; Benchemsi 2012).

Internet, weblogs, twitter and Facebook, however, are not in themselves responsible for the uprisings, as many have pointed out and this report makes clear. They can also be used to exclude, repress, and promote sectarianism. In addition, state media and repression of free media still played an important role in supporting the status quo.

2.7 Ideology, tactics, and common aims

Much more important than social media in bringing about change were ideological changes within major political movements in the region and among the population itself. It has often been remarked that the uprisings were less ideological, less interested in class, and more interested in specific issues and pragmatic (Rashidi 2012; Hudson 2012). All researchers agree that mostly secular movements were in the forefront of the uprisings (Gunning and Baron 2013: 36; Zemni 2013; Sika 2012). But they were not strong enough to topple regimes themselves. They needed the Islamist movement, as the strongest movement in the region. Cross-ideological relations and some form of agreement are crucial for the success of change.

As we saw in paragraph 1.1. the Islamist movement had already made an important shift towards a more pragmatic stance, accepting democracy as expressed in the “will of the people” and a “civil state”. In Jordan, the party of the Muslim Brotherhood, the IAF, turned down an offer to join the government because “we have to be sure the government is in line with the demands of the people” (ICG 2012: 14). Moreover, as Shadi Hamid says, “repression has a way of making ideological debates seem irrelevant” (Hamid 2014: 144).

During the demonstrations in the different countries, movements agreed to use common slogans, suppressing their own specific ones. In Egypt, on Tahrir Square, organizers had agreed not to use flags and other symbols that would distinguish the different currents from each other (Hamid 2013). “Egyptian-ness” united rather than divided participants in the sit-ins (Tadros 2013: 142). Likewise, in Morocco, the coalition of forces agreed not to use partisan slogans during the demonstrations (Salime 2012: 102), while in Jordan the youth gathering on 24 and 25 March 2011 at the Gamal Abd al-Nasser Square in Amman was politically “neutral”. The organizers had banned the carrying of flags, like in Tahrir in Cairo (ICG 2012: 16).

Unity and suppression of ideological differences, albeit temporarily, was one of the main factors for the uprisings to become effective. Their effectiveness centered on the notion of common belonging, citizenship and equal rights. This conceptual breakthrough was noticed by many commentators. The
well-known Dutch Palestinian researcher Mouin Rabbani called 2011 “the year of the citizen” (Rabbani 2012). Bamyeh states that the reason why the uprisings in Tunisia were not religiously inspired was because they were “more basic, even intuitive: the right to be respected as a citizen, to enjoy a decent life and to participate in the creation of the system which rules over the person” (Bamyeh 2012: 57). Tadros, in her insightful book on Copts, believes the common feeling of citizenship for the first time transcended the vertical sectarian cleavages that the authoritarian regimes tried to maintain between religions. According to her, during the 18 days of Tahrir, the Egyptian Christian Coptic minority acquired “an identity based on citizenship, not religious affiliation” (Tadros 2013: 131).

Others remarked on the “empowerment of the people” as a factor of change. For instance, the former Trotskite Gilbert Achcar in true Jacobinian fashion called the uprisings “the eruption of the popular will onto the Arab political stage” (Achcar 2013: 1). Salwa Ismail, a researcher of poor neighborhoods in Cairo, noted a new sense of solidarity among the poor and the emergence of “duties and obligations that follow from taking ownership and possession of that country.” She called these new demonstrations of solidarity “enactments of citizenship” and the “forging of a [new] language of citizenship” (Ismail 2011a: 989).

Also the type of demands seemed to confirm the emergence of the citizen. Michael Hudson, an American sociologist who in the 1970s laid the ground for sociological studies of the Arab world (1978), stated that the uprisings were more about “governance” than about identity. He claimed the demands focused on “meaningful popular participation, the condemnation of authoritarianism and corruption, the call for better governance, and demand for social and economic development” (Hudson 2012: 24). International Crisis Group argued that the demand for anticorruption measures, employment, economic reform, human rights, and political reforms, leading to greater accountability, were universal demands (ICG 2012: i).

The new solidarity and moral outrage brought down “the wall of fear” (Jebnoun 2012: 60). Moral outrage was also underlined in later works on the February 20 Movement (Hoffmann & König 2014: 3; Salime 2012).

2.8 New coalitions, a new consensus

Not just common goals, or what is called an “overlapping consensus” (for more on this, see paragraph 3.2) were important, also the strength of the coalitions was important for the outcome of the uprisings. Many have argued that the only way to break through the prevailing clientelist and divide-and-rule system of politics, as described in chapter 1, was to create horizontal, inclusionary coalitions of different classes, bridging the secular-religious and inter-faith divide (Lust 2011; Stepan & Linz 2013; Shehata 2010). If these broad based cross-ideological, cross-class, and interfaith coalitions emerged and held together the chances for a democratic transition would be much higher. If these alliances were weak and broke down at an early stage change would be limited and could be reversed when an authoritarian state reasserted itself.

In all the countries under study, except Libya, coalition-formation had been intensively experimented with over the decade prior to the uprisings and has been object of intensive studies over the past decade. These studies are situated around the highly contested ‘incorporation-moderation’ thesis in
which it is assumed that the more the Islamist movement is incorporated into the political process, the more moderate it would become. This fascinating debate has been evaluated in general studies (Schwedler 2011), and has been tested in the case of Morocco (Wegner 2009; Hoffmann and König 2013), Egypt (Abdelrahman 2009, 2011; Browers 2009; Hamid 2014; Shehata 2009; 2010; Clarke 2012; Pevná 2013), Jordan (Schwedler & Clark 2006; Clark 2006, 2010; Hamid 2014; Ryan 2011; ICG 2012), and especially Tunisia (Haugbølle, & Cavatorta 2011; Cavatorta & Merone 2013), where indeed a pact had been made in 2005.

Following this debate, the current report argues that instead of looking at the state and how resilient it is, formation of coalitions is crucial for a sustainable democratic transition. The formula is simple: without coalitions, no power, no consensus, and no social contract. Democratic transitions can only be “pacted” transitions.

In Egypt, the first wave of protests (2000-2004) had already brought together members of different political currents (Gunning and Baron 2013: 41). This was deepened in the subsequent period, when left-wing intellectuals and activists worked together with the Muslim Brotherhood in the Kefaya movement and the Movement for Change (Gunning and Baron: 47; Wickam 2013; Clarke 2011; Brower 2009; Shehata 2010). Gunning and Baron call Kefaya a “horizontal and ideologically inclusive umbrella organisation” (Gunning and Baron 2012: 51-2). In this period, the Muslim Brotherhood became involved in the United National Front for Change (UNFC) (Hamid 2014: 129).

Coalitions did not just take place between different currents, but also within the same political current. For instance, most of the Egyptian non-official left had coalesced into the Socialist Front, which consisted Popular Democratic Alliance Party, the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and the Revolutionary Socialists (Mellor 2014: 86).

In Egypt, critical members of the Coptic church joined these broad coalitions. As a result of the ineffectiveness of the Coptic church to defend its flock against bomb attacks, a lay Coptic movement arose during 2010 that went to the streets before 25 January 2011 (Tadros 2013: 125). For Copts Tahrir constituted “a moral economy of its own, a social solidarity across lines of class, gender, and religion” (Tadros 2013: 141).

In Tunisia, as well, most researchers agree that the revolution was a cross-class affair, uniting all classes—-at the end even splitting the ruling elite---in the toppling of Ben Ali, and spreading from the poverty stricken interior to the richer coast (Ayeb 2012; Zemni 2013: 132). In contrast to other countries the transitional period was supported by a secular-religious alliance. In Tunisia the left and Ennahda had made their coalition government long before the fall of Ben Ali in 2004 (Haugbølle & Cavatorta 2011; Stepan & Linz 2013).

In Morocco, the February 20 Movement was perhaps the longest existing broad coalition of a vast array of opponents of the monarchy, including the oppositional Sufi organization Justice and Welfare (al-‘Adl wa-l-Ihsan). The National Council of Support of the February 20 Movement contained labor unions, human rights organizations, women rights organizations (Salime 2012: 102). Cross ideological cooperation in the February 20 Movement had unexpected results. One female activist stated that “Islamists got over their initial aversion towards working, meeting or listening to secular women”, claiming that the perception of Islamists to secular women had “totally changed” (Salime 2012: 109).
The Amazigh movement was represented as well in the February 20 movement, making it a cross-ethnic movement (Hoffman & König 2014: 7).

Here, as well, the left was active. The United Socialist Party/Parti socialiste unifié (PSU), al-Nahj al-Dimuqrati (The Democratic Tendency/La Voie démocratique), the Socialist Vanguard Party (al-Tali’a) joined forces with the more radical independent labor unions (Maghraoui 2011: 688), mentioned above (Tourabi and Zaki 2011: 99; Hofmann & König 2014: 7).

Often the more radical youth of established political currents and parties joined the uprisings. This was the case of the Ittihadiyyun (youth of the political party Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires, USFP) (Maghraoui 2011: 688; Hoffmann & König 2014: 7), or the followers of the Mostapha Rami who as member the Islamist PJD ignored the ban on joining the demonstrations of his party (Tourabi and Zaki 2011: 100).

The human rights organization AMDH played a central role in coordinating the demonstrations of the February 20 Movement. The basic coalition between the Islamic Sufi inspired organizations al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan (Justice and Spirituality) and the Left remained intact until the elections of November 2011.

In Libya, the uprising consisted of different groups. The exiles in Europe, the US and Canada united in the National Front for the Salvation for Libya, the second consisted of defected officials such as Mustafa Abdel Jalil (former minister of Justice), Abdul Fattah Younes (former Minister of Interior) and several others. Among private companies, the Arabian Gulf Oil Company supported the uprising. Among religious leaders, the Network of Free Ulama-Libya supported the uprising (Poljarevic 2012: 29).

The uprising itself was highly dispersed and unorganized. It only became more organized when the National Transitional Council (NTC) was established in February 2011 (Poljarevic 2012: 19). However, the NTC was unable to provide leadership to the uprisings at large due to the military fragmentation of the opposition: various cities, regions and even some neighborhoods in larger cities started to form independent militias in 2011 (Poljarevic 2012: 22).

But in contrast to the class alliances between the interior and coastal regions in Tunisia or in Egypt, in Libya, youth took over the revolution when it turned violent (Poljarevic 2012: 19). Many would later join the brigades. Furthermore, once the rebellion had broken out, the Warfalla, Touareg, and Magarha, Zuwayya tribes announced their support.

In Jordan, coalition building did not have quite as dramatic consequences as in Libya, although the Islamic Action Front Party (IAF) had been active in forming coalitions after the period of repression had set in in 1993. In 1994, it organized together with 12 other political parties the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP) (Hamid 2014: 106). One year later, the left and the Islamists organized the Anti-Normalization Committee against Israel (Ryan 2011: 379). In 1997, it organized a general boycott of the elections with left and liberal organizations (Hamid 2014: 110), and in 2010 the National Coalition for Reform (NCR) advocated a new electoral law. By the time of the demonstrations in 2011, these coalitions had been in place already for some time (Ryan 2011).

The main challenge in Jordan was not so much to bridge the ideological cleavages, but in bringing East and West-Bankers (Palestinians) together. Jordanian youth movements played a role. They
included largely independent youth organizations such as the Karak Popular Youth Movement, the Free Tafileh Movement, and the Ma’an Popular Movement for Change and Reform (Ryan 2011: 384-5). In the words of Ryan, “the peaceful demonstrators represented the diversity of Jordan itself: men and women, young and old, rich and poor, Muslim and Christian, secular and Islamist, and included East-Jordanians, Palestinians and Circassians” (Ryan 2011: 385). The National Front for Reform, which included the IAF, leftist parties, trade unions, and independent opposition figures from East Bank and Palestinian backgrounds, put forward alternative, much fairer electoral laws than the present one which was based on exclusion (ICG 2012: 17-8).

2.9 Politicization

Finally, politicization was a precondition for the rise of the uprisings. An overall political critique of the prevailing culture of clientelism, patronage, identity politics of Islamism, and extreme dependency was an important factor in the rise of a discourse of rights and notions of solidarity and citizenship.

Politization as a factor of change took on many forms, depending on the actor:

Workers’ movement. Although the workers’ movement in Egypt first was largely apolitical and held strikes and demonstrations for economic reasons (against privatization, lay-offs, non-payment of bonuses, etc), during the strike-wave of 2007-2009, it gradually became politicized (Gunning and Baron 2013: 65; Beinin 2012: 6). The founding of the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) on 30 January on Tahrir Square was in itself a revolutionary act. It called for a general strike against the Mubarak regime on February 6 (Beinin 2012: 6).

In Jordan, trade unions helped to organize the demonstrations against the government in 2011 (ICG 2012c: 8). In Tunisia, the lower ranks of the UGTT became politicized over the decade prior to the ousting of Ben Ali (Zemni 2013: 139-40; Langohr 2014). Outrage of the sell-out of public companies was universal in the Arab world.

Human rights. Protests against human rights abuses, starting out as apolitical actions became gradually more political. This was the case in Libya with the Abu Salim prison massacre, but also elsewhere (Pargeter 2012: 213-4). In Egypt, the founding of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Study in 1994 marked a further politicization of human rights. As one of its leaders Muhammad Sayyid Sa’id said: “The more important human rights work is to actually have an initiative to restructure society and democratize it” (Stork 2011: 93). Other human rights activists were politicized in the years prior to Tahrir (Gunning & Baron 2013: 83).

Human rights were also a means to instill in the Islamist movement a discourse of rights (Stork 2011: 95). Precondition was that they would stay independent. The Moroccan AMDH, founded in 1979, was always bent on remaining independent and played a crucial role in the organization of the February 20 Movement (Hoffmann & König 2013).

Police brutality. This seems to have been especially an issue in Egypt and Tunisia. It had become a theme of the Islamist movement that had systematically been imprisoned and tortured. It also was important among other activists who were constantly surveyed. But also the marginalized in the poor
neighborhoods and youth subcultures, such as the Ultras who were the butt of police harassment, took to the streets because of police brutality (Ismail 2012; Dorsey 2011).

Youth culture. In Tunisia, rap and other youth cultures had turned political in the years preceding the uprising in 2011. The same occurred in Morocco (Desrues 2012). In Libya, the commemoration of the killing of football fans in 2006 was the immediate reason for calling the Day of Rage on February 17, 2011 (Chorin 2012). In Egypt, the Ultras became politicized after the regime tried to coopt football for its own purposes (Dorsey 2011).

Cyberspace. Many actions otherwise not political became political in an authoritarian setting. For instance the “liking” of a Facebook page supporting the ‘Tunisia in White’-protest in 2010 was “in itself a political act”. Many of the anonymous debates on Facebook at the time turned into political debates about freedom of expression, political participation, and the meaning and duties of citizenship (Chomiak 2014: 36). As Herrera (2012) and Mahmood (2012) pointed out social media created new ways of becoming politicized.

Discourse of rights. In Morocco, the February 20 Movement was able to break the apolitical trend that held civil society and political parties in its grip. Although it did not call for the downfall of the king, commentators remarked on the “markedly political character of protestors’ demands” (Molina 2011: 435). During its demonstrations demands were made for a democratic constitution, popular sovereignty, independent judiciary, the separation of powers, and against corruption of the elite, especially businessmen (Hoffmann & König 2014: 2, 15). Bogaert argues that the local tansiqiyat (committees) of the half decade prior to the February 20 Movement helped promote “political awareness” in the localities throughout Morocco (Bogaert 2014). And although Hoffmann and König point out that while the concrete political results of the February 20 Movement might seem meagre, its major contribution was to a new “discursive field” in which it was possible to criticize the monarchy (Hoffmann & König 2014: 2, 15).

Poljarevic calls the uprisings in Libya “a radical change in people’s consciousness, a more profound and long-lasting change than mere regime shift” (Poljarevic 2012: 18). Also the specialists on Libya argue that the regime only became alarmed when the demands for housing, public services and justice became political and the fall of the regime was demanded (Pargeter 2012). Poljarevic states that “if we compare the most vocal demands of the popular protests in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya at the height of their respective revolts we see that calls for dignity, freedom and justice through the deposing of repressive regimes are the most frequent” (Poljarevic 2012: 17-18).

Even in Jordan, usually considered the least revolutionary country, Valbjørn states that “old tricks may not work in the same way if the audience or the broader context has changed significantly” (Valbjørn 2013: 315). Ryan seems to concur: it was clear that “time-honoured techniques of reshuffling cabinets, and blaming former governments” would be ineffective (Ryan 2011: 388). The taboo on criticizing the monarchy was broken - like in Morocco - and new groups now took part in protests not just in Amman but also in places elsewhere (Ibid). All oppositional groups demanded that parliament should become a legislative body rather than a tribal assembly (Ryan 2011: 383; ICG 2012c: 8-11).

Ethnic minority rights. Another demand made during the uprisings was for the recognition of cultural rights of the Amazigh (Berbers) and the recognition of Tamazight as a national language (Maghraoui
Due to the February 20 Movement in Morocco the king recognized Amazigh as the second national language in the constitution and allowed for the adoption of Amazigh as educational language in schools and special programs on national television.

Religious minority rights. Coptic lay activists emerged in the years before Tahrir as a result of the crumbling of the partial bargain, the so-called “entente” between the Coptic church and the Egyptian state. It then became clear that the state was no longer able to protect Copts from random attacks which grew from 2008 onwards, culminating in attacks at Nag’ Hammadi on Copts in January 2010 and the Alexandria church bombing on New Year’s eve in 2011 (Tadros 3013: 45-60)

Rule of law. Since the 1990s the call for the rule of law had become a common theme among Islamist as well as liberal movements in the Arab world. It was both the result of left-wing intellectuals moving into human rights organizations (Stork 2011) as well as the Islamists adoption of a rights’ discourse (Hamid 2014). In Morocco, Salime states that perhaps the most important cross-sectorial demand of the February 20 Movement was the demand for accountability before the law (Salime 2012: 105).

Gender rights. Gender equality was also one of the main slogans of the feminist movements that were involved in the protests. It seems that equal rights of women were on the whole part of the larger struggle for social and economic justice (Salime 2012: 105; Gray 2012; Charrad & Zarrugh 2014; Errazouki 2014; Hafez 2014; Khalil 2014a).

Economic and social rights. In Morocco the protests were directed at the economic policy of the regime. They focused on the inequality that neoliberalism produced, but also on certain “megaprojects”, such as the TGV that is being built between Tangier and Rabat (Hoffmann & König 2014: 14), or the Bouregreg development project (Bogaert 2011 ). It was also directed against certain businessmen, such as Mounir Majidi, and Fouad Ali El Himma, who were close friends and advisors of the king (Graciet & Laurent 2012). These campaigns always included the demand for greater transparency and accountability (Hoffmann & König 2014: 13-14).

Citizenship. Many demonstrators seemed to have been better aware of the claims they were making than most commentators, who on the whole have been slow to catch on the implications of the demands. The demonstrators explicitly regarded themselves as citizens and true representatives of the nation (Hoffmann & König 2014: 11-12, 14). Salime states that the February 20 Movement can best be understood as based on the notion of “critical citizenship” (Salime 2012: 106).

2.10 Conclusion

From the above it is apparent that the factors and actors of change had emerged during the previous decade, despite the efforts of the authoritarian state to suppress any notion of rights. The major factors that played a role in the uprisings were a growing political consciousness among youth, workers, middle classes and members of some human rights organizations, civil society, and trade unions that the regimes were not working in their favor. On the contrary, they were leading to greater economic deprivation, social marginalization and political exclusion. Police brutality, abuse of human rights, and daily humiliations led to what has been called the “dignity revolutions”. Concepts
and notions of citizenship, a civil state, and civil, political and social rights, however vague, stood at the basis of these uprisings.

To a large extent they were a reaction to the collapse of the authoritarian bargain and the failure of the state to fulfill its part of the deal by providing services and jobs. Otherwise they were the result of the process of globalization. Internet and social media made it possible for many youth to acquire better knowledge and communicate in ways that liberated them from the control of the regimes, clientelism, familial dependency, tribalism, and hierarchy, and develop different norms and values and other forms of solidarity. Through privatization, workers lost their jobs, but at the same time they became aware of new independent ways of organizing themselves and making new demands, while it allowed a younger generation of women to challenge so-called state feminism.

As a result, large terrains of societal activities became politicized. This was the case with human rights, demands for trade union freedom, gender rights, acceptance of youth cultures, the rule of law, religious and minority rights, and even a recognition of politics itself, which had largely been depoliticized.

The coalitions that came about also show the results of the previous developments. In many cases protests started with youth activists, youth sections of older parties, outcasts of established political parties or radical sections of existing trade unions, alternative independent trade unions, the non-coopted sections of civil society, the more critical members of religious institutions, and discriminated ethnic groups. When these were mobilized, more established sections of society joined and became affected by the uprisings, leading in most cases to broad coalitions of youth movements, civil society and trade unions.

Especially important in this regard is not just cross-sectarian and cross-class alliances or even inter-regional alliances, but the major cross-ideological alliances between Islamists, the left and the liberals. The uprisings would not have been possible without a decade of experimentation with these coalitions in the five different countries. Through what some have called “political learning” leaders of Islamist movements realized that politics demanded a pragmatic approach and that change could only be brought about by alliances.

On the other hand, even during the uprisings the alliances showed severe weaknesses. Once the uprisings had entered the phase of elections and renewed competition between the different rivals, old ideological, tribal, clientelist and sectarian cleavages reemerged. The consensus on a rights discourse, so crucial for a democratic transition, was not strong enough to support a more lasting revolutionary transition.
3 CITIZENSHIP

3.1 Introduction
The rise of a rights discourse analyzed in the previous chapter confirms the hypotheses that citizenship is the central theme of the Arab uprisings. The type of demands and politicization of the population demonstrate that the Arab uprisings aimed at a fundamentally different relationship between citizen and state. The Arab citizen had re-emerged (Meijer 2014a and b). The new citizen rejected the vertical relations of clientelism, patronage, and a political and economic system based on privilege and exclusion. Instead of unequal partial bargains with the state the new citizen demanded a new social contract based on inclusion and equality.

As Michael Hudson wrote so many years ago (Hudson 1977), governments will lose their legitimacy if their rule is not based on the consensus of their people. The rule of law, human rights, security, stability and economic development depend on a sense of solidarity and trust. Notions of common citizenship hold societies together.

Citizenship rights, however, do not necessarily have to lead to consensus and the establishment of a new social contract. Different currents entertain different, often contradictory views on citizenship. Some measure of consensus, however, is necessary to bring about a democratic transition. In this theoretical chapter the report will open new ground and apply citizenship studies to the Arab world. We believe that this can produce a new way to analyze the Arab world from the perspective of the people of the region.

3.2 Citizenship theory and the Arab world
Citizenship theory has not been applied to the Arab world, with few pioneering exceptions (Butenschøn et al. 2000). Citizenship is not just a matter of being a member of a nation and holding a passport (so-called ‘passport citizenship’) (Davis 1999, 2000). It is a much more complex phenomenon that is constantly changing in its three essential elements: extent, content and depth (Faulks 2000). Citizenship studies give an insight into the ways of analyzing these three elements in different contexts (for more in-depth analysis of citizenship, see Ingin 2012; Balibar 2004; Joppke 2010; Tully 2014). According to Butenschøn the essence of citizenship is expressed in the social contract between citizen and state (Butenschøn 2000).

Citizenship studies have been developed in the West and therefore are attuned to Western ideas of citizenship as they developed since the 17th century. A brief look at these theories is essential to understand how they can be applied to the Arab world and how we can identify factors and actors who support change and the foundation of citizenship in the Arab world.

The foundation of citizenship studies was led by the British sociologist T.H. Marshall in 1949 in his essay “Citizenship and Social Class” (Marshall 1949). In it, he made a distinction between civil, political and social rights. With regard to Great Britain, he discerned three phases: in the 18th century civil rights were developed and the principle of equality before law was accepted; in the 19th century political rights were extended to include larger parts of the population; while in the 20th century, with
the welfare state, social rights were introduced, covering the whole population. Marshall’s major contribution to citizenship studies was to make a distinction between these rights, while his teleological portrayal of these rights as cumulative and definitive, was criticized with the dismantling of the welfare state in Europe (Rosanvallon 2013a). The introduction of each new right marked another phase of inclusion and solidarity, dampening the class struggle.

Since Marshall, citizenship studies have taken a tremendous flight. It was picked up in the 1980s and 1990s, when Turner and Mann expanded upon the notion of citizenship. Turner, extended Marshall’s model to the whole of Europe (Turner 1989), and later the Arab world (Turner 2000). Mann did the same (Mann 1987). The difference was that Mann regarded rights as handed down “from above” by the state as part of “citizenship policy” of the elite, while Turner argued that rights, if they are to stick, must be won by social movements “from below”. Turner also introduced the notion of active and passive citizenship. In the next decennia, citizenship studies were expanded to include women’s rights, minority rights, and sexual rights. All of these rights revolved around concepts of exclusion-inclusion, active versus passive citizenship, politicization versus depoliticization, rights versus duties, and individual rights versus communal rights. During the last two decades citizenship studies have grown into a major academic discipline and have produced several handbooks (Isin & Turner 2002; Bellamy & Palumbo 2010).

However, citizenship rights are not simply a legal issue. They are also deeply political. Each political ideology has its own combination of rights, expressed in the combination of extent (who belongs to the political community?), content (in what way does he/she belong to the community?) and depth (what are the duties and responsibilities demanded of the citizen?) of citizenship (Faulks 2000). Liberalism is usually described as adopting a “thin” concept of citizenship in which content and depth are restricted. It, for instance, upholds civil rights as the basis of personal freedom, limits political rights to voting at intermittent intervals, and is critical of social rights as infringements on personal freedoms. In liberalism individual rights also trump collective and communal rights. The market is regarded as the best means to self-fulfillment. Finally, liberalism upholds personal freedoms, but it is not necessarily democratic, as the many liberals distrust the “mob” which does not have the knowledge to rule (Sandel 2009; Schuck 2002).

In the Arab world liberalism has never been very strong. It was elitist and exclusive on account of the threat from the “ignorant”, religious poor (Maghraoui 2006), the Arab “mob”. Today, liberals look to the state for protection against the Islamic movement and its populism (see figure 1) (Dunne & Radwan 2013).

Socialism and civic republicanism try to find a balance between individual and communal rights, social rights and duties. They have a more “thick” and demanding concept of citizenship (Dagger 2002; Pettit 1997). On the whole, individual rights are protected in these ideologies, but they are subordinated to communal rights. Also, in contrast to liberalism, human fulfillment is sought in political activity and the responsible citizen is expected to contribute to the “common good”. Finally, in communalism, the community dominates and the individual is believed to gain all his/her fulfillment from participating in the community. Communalist ideologies can be democratic and emphasize social responsibility but are mostly not liberal (Delanty 2002).

Civil republicanism and communalism are much stronger in the Arab world than liberalism. Since the acceptance of “the will of the people” and democracy in the 1990s as a source of legitimacy, Islamist
movements resemble in many ways civic republicanism. But as the famous American commentator, Fareed Zakaria, and following him, Shadi Hamid, point out theirs is an illiberal democracy (Zakaria 2003; Hamid 2014). The relations between liberalism and the left and the one hand and the Islamists on the other hand can be seen as a fundamental factor determining the outcome of the Arab uprisings. If they find a common ground as in figure 1, the chances are high that an alliance or an understanding will lead to a new social contract.

Rights and how rights relate to political ideologies are not the only issue. The nature of politics in itself is crucial for the political outcome. We normally assume that politics is about power. For that reason it has been regarded by most ideologies as suspect. They are based on the attainment of harmony and deny the existence of a clash of interests. New definitions of the political by French philosophers (Van Middelaar 2011), following Hannah Arendt, argue that strife and contrary interests as well as their peaceful resolution must be accepted as at the throbbing heart of politics. The political is a separate field of activity with its own rules and logic (Mouffe 1993; Rosanvallon 2013a and b; Lefort 1981). This means that the alliance of secularists and Islamists can only endure if they agree that politics is a separate field of activity with its own logic. Compromise is one of the least developed traits in Arab politics.

The long tradition of authoritarianism in the Arab world has completely destroyed the concept of politics as an agonistic process of the acceptance of the others’ interests and the peaceful resolution of conflict. A successful transition of authoritarianism to democracy can only be achieved on the basis of reaching compromises, but illiberal democrats and undemocratic liberals make it difficult to reach consensus and fulfil the promises of the cross-ideological, cross-sectarian and cross-ethnic coalitions that were the basis of the uprisings. So far, only Tunisia has been successful in taking steps along this road.

We should also draw attention to the critique of formal democracy. Much of the debate in the Arab world among political scientists has focused on the mechanisms of formal, parliamentary democracy, but it would be wise to look at informal politics and “direct democracy” (Della Porta 2012; Tully 2014; Isin 2012) as well. After all, Tahrir, Kasbah I and II, and the February 20 Movement are part of the international Occupy movement as manifested in Iceland, Spain, New York, and Greece and its alternative forms of politics (Castells 2012; Graeber 2013) based on direct democracy.

### 3.3 Overlapping consensus and democracy

Figure 1 (page 38) represents the ideological development of the three important political currents during the two decades prior to the Arab uprisings. Originally the three circles were separate from each other and did not overlap. Arab liberalism and the Arab socialism had certain elements in common but differed on social and economic rights.

The major differences were, however, with the Islamist movement, which in its classic form rejected democracy, party politics, and the concept of the people’s sovereignty and upheld the notion of the Islamic state based exclusively on Islamic law and God’s sovereignty. It is only with the acceptance of democracy and the concept of the “people’s will” and the embracement of the discourse of equal rights and the rule of law over the past thirty years that Islamism started to move in the direction of the other two political currents. The overlapping consensus on democracy and the multiparty system
(where the three circles intersect), reached during the past decade, constitutes the foundation for
the alliances prior to and during the uprisings.

Those factors pulling in the opposite direction, away from the overlapping consensus, undermine the
consensus and are incompatible with other currents. In the case of the Islamists they are the familiar
“grey zones” (implementation of the sharia, discrimination of minorities and women, the role of the
ulema, communalism), in the case of the left (radicalism, direct democracy, social rights) and in the
case of liberalism (seeking support from the authoritarian state to protect individual rights against
communitarian, collective rights of the Islamists, or social rights of the left). These countervailing
forces become stronger when the external pull factors, such as direct democracy, the military, and
foreign influences, start to exert greater weight on the actors and undermine the overlapping
consensus.

As we shall see in chapter 4, this overlapping consensus was only temporarily achieved in the case of
Egypt. After Mubarak had fallen, the Muslim Brotherhood still upheld democracy but it was an
illiberal, majoritarian democracy unacceptable to the other currents because it did not protect
individual and minority rights. The left drifted from the overlapping consensus because it did not
believe in the legitimacy of formal democracy and maintained that the only form of democracy was
direct democracy. It claimed its legitimacy directly from the revolution. Feeling threatened by the
electoral victory of the Islamists, the liberals turned to the military for support against majoritarian
rule. In the end, the military gained legitimacy from the liberals and the left that protested in June
2013 against the Morsi government.

In Tunisia, on the other hand, after two years of crisis, the overlapping consensus was saved and
reinstated and eventually laid down in a new social contract: the constitution of 2014. In Libya, no
consensus at all was reached because none of the parties and groups were able to reach a
consensus, and the state, insofar it existed, collapsed. Morocco was different in the sense that an
overlapping consensus had already been reached by the political parties during the 1990s and the
prospects of reform were still open. For that reason the Islamist Parti de la Justice et Développement
(PJD) did not join the demonstrations, while it did make sure that its bargaining position vis à vis the
monarchy was strengthened by them. In Jordan, on the other hand, the alliance between left and the
Islamists remained intact, but the state was strong enough to prevent reforms to take place and
outmaneuvered the Islamist Islamic Action Front (IAF).

These configurations demonstrate that coalitions are a crucial but not a sufficient factor in bringing
about change. The resilience of the authoritarian state, the coherence of the elite, the persistence of
clientelism, tribalism, and even piecemeal alliances, were important factors as well in determining
the outcome.
Figure 1. Overlapping consensus of political currents in the Arab world

Islamist movement
- Identity politics
- Religious civility
- Sharia, Islamic state
- Discrimination of minorities and women
- Communitarianism

The Left
- Revolutionary
- Predominance of social rights
- Against identity politics

The Islamic umma

Liberals
- Market economy
- Democracy
- Rights' discourse
- Political rights
- Equal rights
- Civil rights
- Rule of law
- Individual rights
- Individual freedom
- Passive citizenship, not opposed to authoritarianism

United States
- European Union

Military state

Direct democracy
3.4 The virtuous circle of citizenship

While figure 1 (p. 38) visualizes the overlapping consensus needed as a crucial factor to bring about change, institutionalize citizenship and create an independent political field, figure 2 (page 41) is designed to represent the factors that create full-blown citizenship as they have been expressed during the Arab uprisings. As all these factors reinforce each other in a continuum, the term “virtuous circle of citizenship” has been applied to this model. The term virtuous circle has been borrowed from Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu & Robinson 2012), but it has been adjusted to include citizenship-- a concept they do not use---and applied to the Arab world.

Citizenship is central to the model and is therefore placed in the middle of figure 2. Civil, political and social rights are the basic ingredients of citizenship and are placed directly around it and concrete actors. From the center they branch out to provide the foundations of other more institutional support systems and concrete actors. Civil rights, for instance, are the basis of the judiciary, transitional justice, the police and other institutions or actors such as human rights organizations; political rights branch out to constitutions, the electoral system, and concrete political parties; and social rights branch out to health care, education, pensions, and concrete actors as trade unions, or informal networks.

In turn, these rights and their branches are connected with each other in a circular movement, reinforcing each other: the workings of one factor or actor will immediately affect those factors or actors directly adjacent to it, or indirectly those factors and actors further removed from it. Their positive effect will radiate outwardly and inwardly to all other factors in the model, enhancing the concept and practice of citizenship and expanding and enriching its content. In the end, these elements constitute the bricks necessary for drawing up a social contract, which is also positioned at the center, just beneath citizenship. The blue arrows, pointing in two directions, indicate that the positive effects of the virtuous circle revert back to citizenship and lead to a new social contract.

The holistic virtuous circle demonstrates that human rights, transitional justice, and the rule of law are part of a much larger system of which citizenship and the social contract lay at the center. But not only are these connected to citizenship and the dignity and rights associated with citizenship, all other elements in the model are also connected. Thus, mass (illegal) migration can be limited if people have social rights and jobs and do not need to migrate, but also transitional justice and the reform of the police are necessary to limit the push factors in migration.

The model can also be read historically. For instance, during the Arab struggles for independence civil (equality), political (political sovereignty) and social (jobs, education, health care) rights were demanded. However, with the authoritarian bargain (see paragraph 1.8 and 1.9), an imbalance was created when civil and political rights were exchanged for social rights. With the collapse of the authoritarian bargain, the state withdrew from its social obligations while building up the police and the security sector.

Figure 1 can also be transposed to figure 2. The left in figure 2 will emphasize the right hand side of the model, focusing on social rights, jobs, social justice, health care, and looking at the same time at political rights. The Islamists are strong in the same areas, and weak when it comes to the left-hand side of the model, civil rights and individual freedoms. Conversely, liberals will be stronger on the left hand side of the model, emphasizing individual freedoms, human rights, independence of the
judiciary, as well as stability and security, while they are weaker in the area of social rights. Likewise, civil society (paragraph 1.10) in the Arab world has been strong in social services, and civil rights but weak in demanding political rights. The foreign policy of the United States and the EU can also be situated in the model. Both would figure prominently in social services and civil rights (minority and human rights) but weakly in political rights (paragraph 1.14 and 4.5.1 and 4.5.2).

Besides indicating where the factors and actors active in the Arab world can be situated, the model also indicates which factors should be reformed and how they influence each other and create a balanced practice of citizenship. For instance, better education and health care are necessary to create politically informed citizens, who will otherwise be led by populist slogans. Likewise, reform of the judiciary, the police and the security apparatus are preconditions for freedom of speech and for a political system to work. Social rights are a precondition for all the other factors and actors to function at all. Figure 3 shows how different countries have been able to implement reforms since the end of the uprisings.

The virtuous circle can also be reversed, setting in motion the vicious cycle of decline. The factors of decline are basically the factors analyzed in chapter 1: sectarianism, clientalism, tribalism, authoritarianism, patriarchy, police brutality, a skewed economic system that does not create jobs but only works for the rich and the influential, and the partial etatist bargains of privilege and hierarchy. When reform of the factors constituting the virtuous circle of citizenship are neglected, the vicious circle of decline will set in. For instance, civil rights and equality cannot be achieved if the judiciary is not reformed, and the police and the security apparatus, responsible for torture and repression under authoritarian rule, purged. A consensus cannot be reached if the political system is not reformed and free and fair elections take place. Finally, a liberal democracy cannot be installed if political, religious and ethnic minority rights are not respected.

There is another advantage to the virtuous circle: while it is a universal model the concepts acquire a local coloring. For instance, the Arab concept of civility (madaniyya) has both strong local and Western notions, and both must be reflected in the social contract and the concept of citizenship and its local meaning of muwatana. Including madaniyya also allows for a dynamic concept. Citizenship is not a final stage; it is a process of becoming a citizen. Its development depends not just on abstract concepts of civil, political and social rights but also on local notions of justice. It is not a Western yardstick but a universal model that must be based on local values. The Arab uprisings prove this.

For this reason civility (madaniyya) as an ethical foundation for the local meaning of citizenship has been inserted as a separate factor in the model on par with the more universal concepts of civil, political and social rights. The success of the virtuous circle depends on the support the concept citizenship will receive locally. Civility and its codes of behavior and attitudes has many local forms developed by religious movements, such as Salafism (with its concept of akhlaq), the Muslim Brotherhood, Sufism, youth cultures, professional organizations, civil society, and trade unions. These can feed into the concept of citizenship, dignity (karama), pluralism (ta’addudiyya) and the equality of rights to help reach a consensus and draw up a social contract.
**Figure 2. Virtuous circle of citizenship**

- **Judiciary**
  - Reform, purge

- **New coalitions, alliances, reform**

- **Trade unions**

- **Political parties/direct democracy**

- **Informal sector**

- **Police**
  - Reform, purge

- **External influences**
  - Affect on: Economy, Politics, Migration, Human rights

- **Human rights strengthening**

- **Civil rights**
  - Equal rights, pluralism, diversity

- **Social contract**

- **Civility**
  - Religious/secular

- **Social rights**

- **Jobs**

- **Economy**

- **Security**
  - Reform, purge

- **Migration**

- **Transitional justice strengthening**

- **CITIZENSHIP**
4 REFORM AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS

4.0 Introduction

Reforms are the main instruments of bringing about the virtuous circle of citizenship and achieving a new social contract that is the basis of accountability and democracy, but also of stability and security. In the Arab world the virtuous circle can only be brought about through reform of the political, the economic and social system. These reforms will replace a system based on sectarian divisions, tribalism, an iniquitous economy and political authoritarianism, by a system based on citizenship rights as represented in figure 2.

Reform in turn depends on the fate of figure 1 and the overlapping consensus, analyzed in detail during the Arab uprisings in chapter 2 and theoretically explained in chapter 3. If the alliances created during and after the uprisings are upheld, cross-ideological, cross-sectarian, inter-religious coalitions and a sense of solidarity can lead to a new consensus. These alliances in turn will set in motion the virtuous circle of reform, leading to a new social contract.

Concretely, a number of reforms must be made in order to achieve a new foundation of citizenship in the Arab world, leading to a new social contract. These are based on citizenship rights demanded during the Arab uprisings.

With regard to the influence of social movements political demands reform means:

- Legalizing and strengthening social movements insofar as they are supportive of citizenship rights and cross-ideological, cross-class, and inter-faith coalitions
- Building a political system that is based on political rights and accepts politics as a separate field and supports those political parties whose programs are based on inclusion instead of exclusion, uphold equality, minority and women’s rights, and accept accountability and aim at the formation of alliances and accept political compromises
- Supporting political consensus among political movements
- Encouraging illiberal democrats and undemocratic liberals to change their politics and resist the countervailing tendencies in their policies
- Supporting a true politicization of society where people take political positions based on political analysis rather than religious, tribal, clan, and clientelist interests
- Dismantlement of the authoritarian state and support of all those factors and actors that promote a fundamental reform of the state structure, such as an independent judiciary, reformist lawyers syndicates, and state institutions that support the rule of law and the civil, political and social rights of citizens

With regard to social and economic demands reform means:

- Establishing a productive economy that is at the service of citizens rather than a small elite
- Empowerment of a new generation and those actors who help to bring about a new sense of citizenship and civil, political and social responsibility among the new generation, whether among youth movements, women’s movements or new cultural trends
• Building a social system that is based on social justice and social rights and supportive of those actors that uphold such a system based on citizenship rights not charity

Reform with regard to the ethical system that support citizenship rights and attitudes means:

• Favoring local forms of civility (*madaniyya*) and civil responsibility based on an ethics of solidarity and equality are enhanced
• Supporting an independent civil society that is truly independent and includes those actors that refuse the prevailing patronage and clientelist system and enhance a sense of citizenship in the Arab countries and civil, political and social rights
• Supporting those forces that work in favor of a new social contract based on citizenship rights
• Creating an active citizenship and participative politics
• Introducing a form of pluralism that accepts cultural and religious differences

With regard to the legal system reform means:

• Supporting those institutions that help transitional justice and civil rights
• Supporting the rule of law
• Supporting equal rights for women and minorities

Unfortunately, many of these reforms have not been implemented and the uprisings have been reversed. The main reason has been the liberal, left split with the Islamist movement and the breakdown of consensus, which had been the main factor of change. A certain measure of consensus is the foundation for all of the reforms mentioned above, ranging from the effectiveness of social movements, political parties, the role of civil society, the position of minorities and the position of women, the dismantlement of the authoritarian state, the rule of law or transitional justice.

4.1 Social movements

4.1.1 Social Movements after the uprisings

Although social movements played a crucial role in the uprisings (paragraph 2.2), their role has not been very clear during the past three years after elections were held in October 2011 in Tunisia and November 2011 in Morocco, when formal politics reasserted itself again.

In Egypt social movements remained strong but were in the end ineffective. The demonstrations and protests on Tahrir continued throughout 2011, culminating in the Muhammad Mahmoud Street fights in November and December 2011. They declined afterwards only to re-emerge even more forcefully with the *Tamarrod* (Tamarod) protest movement against president Morsi, culminating in massive demonstrations on June 30, 2013. The National Salvation Front, which supported *Tamarrod*, was weakened internally, because it included leftists, liberals and supporters of the former regime who could only agree on ousting Morsi (*The Washington Post* January 21, 2013). It was heavily manipulated by the military, splintered after the military takeover on July 3, 2013, and failed to become a political party or present a presidential candidate against al-Sisi (*Dorman 2013; BuzzFeed News April 15, 2014; Al-Monitor March 4, 2014; Your Middle East April 14, 2014).*
One of the main problems since the coup d’état in Egypt has been state repression. This has started in March 2011 with the decree banning demonstrations and strikes (not enforced at first). After the suppression of the pro-Morsi sit-in at Rab’a Square, where between 800-1000 people died, it is clear that the wall of fear has gone up again. Some activists have stated that they are back at square one. The new anti-demonstration law promulgated in November 2013 prohibits gatherings of more than 10 people and the authorities must be informed three days in advance of any demonstration (The New York Times November 25, 2013).

But it seems that even if protest movements are suppressed, grassroots movements are able to survive. Since the uprisings, many other forms of citizen initiatives have taken over. An organization as Tadamun, an urban awareness center in Cairo, has emerged as a grassroots social movement. These organizations inform citizens of their rights, activate them, creating a platform for their activities. Collective resistance in order to improve daily life has been given a new impulse since the uprisings (al-Arabiya April 10, 2014). Egyptian workers who were laid off organized sit-ins in front of ministries. Independent trade unions stepped up their protests, demanding legal recognition, a minimum wage and the right to strike (Abdel Kouddous May 8, 2014). The economic journalist Wael Gamal in an interview estimated the number of protests between the inauguration of Morsi in June 2012 and July 2013 at 7,700, despite the increasing criminalization of social protest (Haddad 2013).

It is difficult to pinpoint specific movements in the Arab world that are still active and support a virtuous circle of citizenship. The Moroccan human rights organization AMDH plays a role in disseminating ideas of citizenship and rights. In Egypt, the Maspero Coptic Youth Union (MCYU) (Egypt Independent September 25, 2012), Copts 38, which focuses on civil marriages, the April 6 Movement (Abdel Kouddous October 31, 2013), the Center for Trade Union Workers Services (CTUWS), independent trade union movements, and the National Bar Association are a few of the movements and organizations that promote citizenship rights. In Libya, the Citizenship Forum for Democracy and Human Development has the same goals.

### 4.1.2 Youth and the effects of the Arab uprising

One of the important developments prior to the Arab uprisings was the greater political awareness among Arab youth. This is a reflection of the greater sense of their rights. Social media gave them a different relationship to society and different notions of themselves as citizens. They have different values than their parents. They are more horizontally organized, participatory, and open (Carnegie Endowment October 11, 2012), and they are no longer passive recipients of news and no longer accept authority without questioning (Herrera 2012: 335). Moreover, youth can actively contribute to notion of citizenship as a “process of becoming” rather than a legal status (Biekert & Fowler 2012: 14).

The major short term problem is that this youth has been unable to translate its informal networks which constituted the basis of their self-consciousness into more longer term, sustainable organizations that can channel their concepts of citizenship. Linda Herrera offers a solution to this

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2 During my visit to Egypt in November 2014, it appeared to have dissolved itself under pressure of the government, as so many other NGOs.
problem “to support citizens of Egypt’s wired generation in their pursuit of deep democracy by developing educational systems—informally and formally—that provide the conceptual, methodological, and critical tools necessary to understand how power and counter-power operate” (Herrera 2012: 349).

The immediate effect has been that youth hardly participates in politics. In Egypt, some have seen this as a positive development in the sense that youth was not duped by the military to vote for al-Sisi in May 2014. They believe that the new policy of the military to depoliticize youth will not work (Dunne & Williamson 2014). A poll by Al Jazeera, however, indicates a wide-scale alienation of youth from current politics in general. In Tunisia 80 percent of youth (17-30 years) and in Egypt 72 per cent did not feel represented in the Constituent Assembly. In 2013 (just before the military takeover) only 17 per cent felt of the Egyptian youth regarded the revolution as a success (Al Jazeera July 29, 2013). During the last Tunisian elections in October 2014, as well, youth hardly participated in the elections, feeling that political parties could do little to improve their situation (Baster & Merminod October 27, 2014).

A brief look at international development agencies shows that since the Arab uprisings youth participation and civility has become a major topic of international attention. All of these organizations have developed in one way or another support programs for what this report has called the virtuous circle of citizenship. UNESCO has developed youth programs based on “youth civic engagement”, which upholds “civic virtues” and promotes “critical consciousness” (UNESCO 2011). The Center for Mediterranean Integration (CMI) has developed a special youth program it is implementing with ministries of social affairs in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. The United Nations Office for Disaster and Risk Reduction (UNISDR) has also developed programs for enhancing equality and political participation in order to “empower children and youth with the skills, confidence and knowledge to strengthen their resilience” (UNISDR 2014).

Among these international agencies a certain urgency has sunk in that creative solutions must be sought to stem the exceptional high unemployment rate among youth in the Arab world. Solutions demand cooperation between the public and private sector to create new opportunities, develop new skills, and acquire greater job experience (World Economic Forum 2012). The International Labour Organization (ILO) held a special conference in Cairo on youth and emphasized that only cooperation between the private, the public sector and trade unions can tackle youth unemployment (ILO 2011).

A more optimistic account of the plight of youth and the effects of their participation in the uprisings is given by the well-known American Middle East specialist Juan Cole, who as author of a recent book on Arab youth, The New Arabs: How the Millennial Generation is Changing the Middle East (Cole 2014a), points out in a recent article that Arab youth still have the future. He argues that the effects of the recent events might take decades to become manifest when the present youth becomes the next generation of politicians. Nevertheless, despite the present counter-revolution, he still credits youth with three successes during the Arab uprisings: they ended attempts of presidents to let their sons take-over, as in the case of Gamal Mubarak in Egypt, or Saif al-Islam in Libya (political rights); they have succeeded in obtaining greater acceptance of accountability from rulers, who can no longer resort to previous policies as easily as before (civil and political rights); and the Arab world has
acquired greater respect for its religious and cultural diversity (cultural rights). While not achieving the goals of the uprisings the issue of citizenship rights have been put on the table (Cole 2014b).

4.1.3 New Women’s movements

The position of women has always been central to the Arab world where the struggle between secularists and Islamist centered on the role of women in society. After the Arab uprisings this contestation has only increased in intensity. Especially when the struggle moved from the streets to the parliament and constitutions had to be drawn up in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco the debates became fierce. In all these countries, it touched upon the central issue of citizenship between a universalist, Western notion versus local Islamist interpretations of citizenship. The debate was largely between elite westernized, liberals who were fearful of an Islamist majority and poor and lower middle class democratic Islamists who demanded recognition of their identity after years of persecution by the state (Charrad & Zarrugh 2014: 230; Khalil 2014; Gray 2011: 285; Zemni 2014b).

In Tunisia, the debates were completely open and had to be decided upon by consensus in the Constituent Assembly. They marked the transition from “state feminism” and “politics from above” under Ben Ali to “politics from below” after his fall (Charrad & Zarrugh 2014: 230). Above all, they give a good impression of the central role of the concept of citizenship in the post-Ben Ali period.

It seems that the debates were more symbolic than substantial. Neither secular not Islamist wanted to abolish the personal statute law. Both sides seemed to concentrate on the underlying principles of the code rather on its content (Khalil 2014: ). Women activists of Ennahda supported women’s rights, but at the same time they were much more concerned with rights of poor women than secular organizations (Gray 2011: 294).

The debate heated up after Article 28 in the constitutional draft law as issued by the Islamist dominated government in August 2012. In this draft law women were regarded as “complementary” to men. Secular women’s organizations protested against this article because “women are not given rights as individuals, only in reference to men”. They wanted to be considered first and foremost as “stand-alone citizen” rather than as a Tunisian or a woman (Charrad & Zarrugh 2014: 237). An online petition was circulated with the title “protect the rights of citizenship of the women of Tunisia!” (Protégez les droits de citoyenneté de la femme en Tunisie!). It acquired over 30,000 signatures. A sign of the distrust of Islamism was the accusation of Islamist women using a “double discourse” (la double langage), a typical French laïque term used against the Muslim Brotherhood (Meijer 2012).

The differences between secularists and Islamists were not only based on cultural, ideological, regional and class differences, but also on the relations with the former regime (Khalil 2014: 196; Charrad & Zarrugh 2014 ). Many secular women of Association of Tunisian Women for Research and Development (AFTURD) and the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD) were in favor state support of moderate Islam against the Islamist movement, accusing rich foreign Arabs of bankrolling the Islamist movement (Gray 2011: 290).

The conclusion Khalil draws of her research on women in Tunisia is illustrative of the whole debate between secularists and Islamists: “The quarrel was not about the presence of women in politics, but
rather the ideological difference between an Islamic versus a universalist, human rights reference. Yet, in the absence of any progress towards a deeper understanding of shared values or compromise between discourses of Islamism and human rights, this polarization only threatens to become increasingly contentious and unproductive for the advancement of women’s rights.” (Khalil 2014: 198). Here, as well an attempt to find an overlapping consensus was absent.

The Tunisian example shows how brittle the overlapping consensus of the revolution was. As with the political polarization, cultural polarization undermined the common themes and interests of the different parties across the board (Gray 2011; Charrad & Zarrugh 2014; Khalil 2014). The big advantage was that the debate in Tunisia was open and that the issue of women’s rights could be “appropriated” by civil society (Gray 2011: 286).

4.1.4 Ethnic and religious minorities

The issue of equal rights for ethnic and religious minorities has been one of the major themes of the post-Arab uprisings. It was a reaction against the imposition of the mono-cultural and mono-religious ideology of the authoritarian Arab state after independence on a multi-religious and a multi-cultural environment (see paragraph 1.7). In Libya Amazigh, Tebu and Touareg have demanded equal rights. The Amazigh have left the GNC in 2012, while Tebu and Touareg boycotted the elections held February of that year (Lesh 2014: 71).

In Egypt, Copts have been extremely active after Tahrir mobilizing for equal rights as a minority. Typical of the new focus on citizen rights was that demonstration were no longer in front of the Patriarchate in Abbasiyya, Cairo, or in the vicinity of a local church, with the purpose of mobilizing the church as intermediary with authorities, but that they were held in open public spaces where they could be directly heard by the state and other citizens (Tadros 2013: 164-5). For the Copts it was the only way to break out of their isolation (Delhaye 2012; Haddad 2013).

Another important result of the uprisings in Egypt was the establishment of new social movements and NGOs led by Copts that did not focus exclusively on Coptic issues but tried to become national movements of reform. Examples are the Maspero Youth Movement (Harakat Shabab Maspero) and the Coalition of Copts for Egypt. The first was founded in response to the burning of the Coptic church in Sol in March 2011. It tried to establish a branch in each governorate in the country. It also attempted to attract Muslims by demanding equal citizenship rights for all Egyptians and advocating a civil state. It was supported by the Coptic newspaper al-Katiba al-Qibtiyya and was openly critical of the military (Tadros 2013: 165-70).

But many Egyptians are pessimistic about the chances for change. Sectarian violence returned after the ouster of Morsi on July 3, 2013. Churches were burnt and shops ransacked and Copts killed (HRW July 23, 2013). As a result, the Coptic church has been able to reassert its authority and power over its community which has sought refuge at its traditional support. As important, the state still regards the church as the major in-between with Copts who are seen as a separate religious community rather than as equal citizens (Egypt Independent September 25, 2012).

In Jordan, the protest were mostly led by East Bankers. Palestinians did join the protests but were not strongly represented. Members of the reform movement Jayeen even criticized the Palestinians
for not joining the protests. Remarkably the critique was couched in terms of citizenship rights and responsibilities: “And even today, some Palestinian Jordanians talk about their ‘missing rights’ in Jordan. But what about missing duties, what about showing solidarity with other Jordanians? Many Palestinians feel this country isn’t theirs. This is dangerous!” (ICG 2012: 5).

4.1.5 Reinvigorating civil society

As we have seen civil society was not in the forefront of the uprisings. Civil society also was not strongly involved in the developments leading to the uprisings as it was controlled or co-opted by the authoritarian state. Civil society had, however, played a crucial role in disseminating certain ideas that supported citizenship. The many human rights organizations that had sprung up in the 1980s all supported civic rights of freedom of speech, equality before law and freedom from detention and torture (Stork 2012). Civil society became important again after the Arab uprisings and much of the legacy of the uprisings depends on civil society supporting citizenship rights. But in many countries it was hampered in supporting change by a reassertion of authoritarianism.

Egypt had, with Morocco and Jordan, the best developed civil society. But it was heavily restricted by law No. 84 of 2002 that had replaced the notorious law from 1992. Since the fall of Mubarak the situation declined rather than improved. The new civil society laws in Egypt are an example of a vicious cycle of decline.

The highly restrictive civil society law No. 84 of 2002 was never withdrawn after the uprising. This law restricted foreign funding, made registration compulsory, and made breaches of the law criminal offences. Alternative laws proposed since 2011 have been even more restrictive. Foreign funding has been made conditional on governmental approval, international human rights registration is restricted and even internal funding must be surveyed (Amnesty International 2014: 25; Elegaty 2013). Even in the transitional period civil society was cautious and fearful of governmental repression.

On December 29, 2011 the authorities (under temporary SCAF rule) organized a coordinated raid on the offices of 17 American, European and domestic NGOs (ICG 2012: 12). In June 2013, 43 members of NGOs were sentenced for accepting foreign funding without permission (Amnesty 2014: 23). A month before the parliamentary elections in 2011, the Egyptian government refused to license eight US civil society groups (Azzam 2012: 8). The second major raid occurred on December 18, 2013, on the Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR). On 23 December 2013 a court ordered the Central Bank of Egypt to freeze the accounts of 1,055 charities which were assumed to be affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood (Amnesty International 2014: 24).

Since the military coup on July 3, 2013 new restrictive laws have been initiated. In June 2014 a draft law was announced that would force all NGOs to be registered with Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS) which could deny them legal status if they “violate public order and morals”. The law would restrict foreign and internal funding (Majeed 2014). On July 23, 2014 MOSS announced that NGOs would have to register within 45 days to be recognized. Egyptian NGOs regarded this measure as a “declaration of war by the government on freedom of association and the work of civil society organizations in Egypt,” (Majeed 2014). The planned law envisages the creation of an official “Coordinating Committee” that would have the right to veto registration, funding and activities of foreign organizations in Egypt, and of any foreign funding of Egyptian organizations, in effect cutting
the funding of NGOs. Penalties for infringements are higher and NGOs must acquire permission before they can conduct research and surveys (Amnesty International August 30, 2014).

Law No. 107 of November 2013 regulating the Right to Public Gatherings, Processions and Peaceful Protest made it illegal to demonstrate unless permission was given by the Ministry of Interior. It requires protestors to give all information about demonstration that will include more than ten people, which the Ministry of Interior must approve. People who break the law face charges of up to five years in prison. Since then many demonstrators have been arrested and detained for “unauthorized protests” (Abdel Samei 2014; Amnesty International 2014: 16-17).

The liberal-Islamist split was also noticeable in Egyptian civil society, where liberal and important human rights organizations supported the military. Liberal ministers have taken the side of the military in adopting restrictive NGO laws in order to combat the foreign threat to undermine Egyptian society (Hawthorne & Gohary 2013).

Tunisia, despite the repression under Ben Ali, saw the emergence of a civil society in the 1980s. The Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (Association Tunisienne des Femmes Democrates, ATFD), established in 1989, is one such organization. The Ligue Tunisienne pour la Defense des droits de L’Homme (LTDH), established in 1977, was another. They were however strongly controlled.

In contrast to Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, the legal position of NGOs changed dramatically after the fall of the Tunisian regime. Tunisia has experienced, as two commentators remarked, a “sudden eruption” of the public sphere (Charrad & Zarrugh 2014: 232). New laws have freed Tunisian NGOs from state interference to an unheard of degree. Under the new law NGOs are allowed to obtain funds from foreign donors. Decree 88 also allows them to play political roles. By the end of 2011, 1,200 NGOs had been registered (Amnesty International 2012; Khosrokhavar 2012), at the end of 2012, their number had grown to some 2000 (Deane 2013: 23; Behr and Siitonen: 16).

The fact that Tunisia has established an open parliamentary system made it possible for NGOs to have direct access to power (Deane 2013: 23). In terms of an open public sphere, Tunisia scores high (Charrad & Zarrugh 2014: 232). The UGTT, the National Bar Association, and the human rights organizations, as well as the Chamber of Commerce played an important role in mediation between the political parties when they were unable to reach a compromise (Woodrow Wilson 2013).

In Libya, civil society had only barely sprung up during the brief period of liberalization under Said al-Islam. Although everywhere civil society organizations sprung up after Qaddafi’s fall and a FRIDE/Hivos Report called civil society in Libya “flourishing” (Mikail 2013: 2), the dire security situation and the lack of government has blocked its further development (Ali 2013). In August 2013, 3,000 new CSOs had been established since the overthrow of Qaddafi. Civil society is, however, ineffective in comparison to the militias in influencing government policies (Aliriza 2013).

In conclusion, there are many NGOs in the Arab world that are in the forefront of the struggle for civil, political, and social rights, such as Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, Al-Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence, Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR), Arab Forum for Alternatives (AFA), Tadamun and its campaigns for rights to an adequate standard of living, the New Libya Foundation (NLF) and its initiatives of Nonviolent Social Transformations and to establish National Civic Education Centers throughout the country, the Libyan Women Forum (LWF),
Libyan Forum for Civil Society (LFCS), or, in Jordan, the al-Quds Center for Political Studies. Many of these CSOs are, however, in deep trouble as a result of the backlash after the Arab uprisings.

4.2 Political Reform and the need for consensus

4.2.1 Political parties, elections and the importance of coalitions

One of the major issues after the Arab uprisings was to channel the political demands for accountability, social justice, change, inclusion, greater political participation and the end of corruption into a thoroughly reformed formal political system. This new political system would have to bring about a social contract between the population on the identity of the new society, the reform of state organs, and the division of power. Although the parliamentary system and elections had been delegitimized during the previous regimes due to electoral rigging and clientalism (see paragraph 1.11) the electoral process had been given a tremendous boost after the fall of Mubarak, Ben Ali and Qaddafi (Brynen et.al 2012; Dalmasso 2014).

However, very few social movements were able to make the transition to political parties and become organized political bodies instead of loose networks. Hardly any youth were able to establish their own political parties. In Egypt only two were able to gain seats in a parliament of 504 seats (Abdalla 2013), in Tunisia two youth members of the uprisings acquired seats on the ticket of other parties, while in Morocco only the United Socialist Party (PSU) and the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) made an effort to attract youth to their organizations (Monjib 2014).

Many activists for political reasons refused to take this road. They preferred the direct democracy of Tahrir. Revolutionary legitimacy was posited against electoral legitimacy.

But the success of the political system after the uprisings did not only depend on the degree to which it absorbed the leaders of the uprisings, it also depended on the ability to absorb the energy and ideas of the uprisings and create a more inclusive and open political system based on consensus. Only through compromise could political parties uphold the overlapping consensus that had been established prior and during the uprisings, leading to a social contract. As the two famous scholars on democratic transitions in Latin America and Europe, Alfred Stepan and Juan Linze, and others following them, stated in their analysis of the Arab world uprisings: those countries where pacts and coalitions came about had a far better chance to make a democratic transition than countries where politics became polarized (Stepan & Linz 2013; Lesch 2014; Haynes 2013).

It was for this reason that many observers had great expectations when after the fall of the dictators Islamic parties emerged from the shadows of repression and could take part in free elections for the first time. Finally, they believed, concrete answers could be given to such issues as the democratic inclinations of Islamist parties, their position on inclusion, and their willingness to engage in alliances and accept equal citizenship.

In many cases the polarization of “illiberal democrats” versus “undemocratic liberals” would be the undoing of the ideals of the Arab uprisings as represented in the overlapping consensus in figure 1. Some commentators have argued that liberals and Islamists were locked into a Kulturkampf (Beck...
However, as we have seen, alliances had emerged before the uprisings (paragraphs 2.6 and 2.7).

In Egypt, the rift opened immediately after Mubarak was ousted. The first seeds of distrust were sown during the referendum on the constitutional change in March 2011 (turnout 41 percent and 77 percent in favor), which was supported by the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis, but was opposed by the liberal and leftists who wanted an appointed Constitutional Committee to draw up a liberal constitution guaranteeing liberal rights. It deepened when the Brotherhood forbade its members from voting for any other than its own party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP).

The Brotherhood made two other mistakes that would lead to a breach of confidence with the secularists. First, its claim to legitimacy based on the “popular will” (iradat al-sha’b) would turn against it when it gained a landslide victory during the elections of December 2011 and January 2012, gaining 45 percent of the seats. Together with the Salafis, who won 25 percent of the seats, they acquired a vast majority of 70 percent (Hamid 2014: 150-1; Meijer 2013). In the new parliament youth, women (9 seats, 2 percent of the seats) and Copts (six seats, 1.2 percent of the seats) were marginalized (Tadros 2013: 224), while the left and the liberals were weak. The subsequent attempts by the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis to push through an Islamist constitution threatened the country with the replacement of the Nasserist authoritarian state by an Islamist authoritarian one (Tadros 2013: 248; Hanna 2013).

Second, exclusion has been the most widely held charge against the Muslim Brotherhood after it won the elections in May 2012. The Morsi government, installed in June 2012, had invited no outsiders. Moreover, Morsi increasingly labeled his opponents as “infidels” and “apostates” (Lesch 2014: 72), shocking Copts (as well as liberals and the left) by the sectarian character of the elections (Tadros 2013: 220-2), and setting in motion a vicious cycle of decline. The Brotherhood’s concept of majority rule excluded the opinion of the minority and broader concepts of inclusion (Meijer 2013).

The explanations for The Brotherhood’s political incompetence are diverse but boil down to the same reason. Many have called the Brotherhood a “secret society” in the sense that it is a closed community. It is a hierarchical society with complete obedience to the leaders. Being a member of the Brotherhood is a socialization process, a frame of mind (Harling & Shimy 2014). The liberal current which could have opened the Brotherhood to the rest of society and establish a broad coalition had been purged after the conservative group around Morsi had taken over power within the movement (Wickham 2011). In the end, the Brotherhood was unable to pursue the trend of the previous decade and make Egyptians feel they were equal citizens (Al-Awadi 2013; Khan 2013).

On the other hand, many liberals and left-wingers deepened the split by seeking support from the military (Hamid 2014: 160-5). As the American commentator Fareed Zakaria (2003), the German professor Martin Beck, and others have pointed out: “enlightened” liberals might not be democrats when unenlightened Islamists take over power (Beck 2013: 3). This is apparent from the National Salvation Front, which refused any form of negotiation with Morsi and was bent on his downfall (Baheya December 13, 2012). The total boycott of the Brotherhood included famous Egyptian writers such as Sonallah Ibrahim, but also the leader of the independent trade union movement Abou Eita, who became minister in the military government (Nessim, Bechler & Naguib 2013).
Only a very small group tried to overcome political polarization during this confrontation. The Way of the Revolution Front, to which Ahdaf El Soueif and several other intellectuals belonged, tried to create an independent third voice. It included organizations like the April 6 Movement, the Revolutionary Socialists, parts of Strong Egypt (Masr el Qaweya) (Nessim, Bechler & Naguib 2013; Amnesty International 2014: 8), and intellectuals, such as Amr al-Hamzawy, who refused to support the military against the Brotherhood (Abdel Kouddous February 12, 2014).

In contrast to Egypt, Tunisia has been able to break out of the authoritarian stasis, embarking on a virtuous circle of citizenship, when it comes to political rights. The major advantage of Tunisia was that none of the political parties were able to acquire an absolute majority after the elections in October 2011 (Ennahda 37 percent and 89 of the 217 seats, Congress of the Republic 16 percent and 29 seats and Ettakatol 9 percent of the votes). They were therefore forced to establish a coalition government. Another advantage in Tunisia was that there was no third party that could play the role of arbiter as in the case of the army in Egypt, or King Mohammed VI in Morocco, or Abdallah II in Jordan. In Tunisia, the three coalition partners were able to divide the spoils after the elections. Moncef Marzouki, leader of the Congress of the Republic, became president, the left-wing Ettakol produced the chair of parliament, while Ennahda delivered the prime minister.

Although Ennahda’s leader Rachid Ghannouchi has been accused of saying different things to difference audiences, he and the prime minister Jabali accept the civil state (Stepan & Linz 2013: 19). This has been more recently confirmed during Ghannouchi’s announcement of the constitution in January 2014, when he said the state should be “neutral” and that the task of the state was first and foremost to provide services to the people and not impose its ideas upon the population (Woodrow Wilson 2014). In the end, Ennahda was willing to compromise on the constitution and major issues, such as the position of women (Khalil 2014b). Most observers also agree that Ennahda is a much more inclusive and open political entity than the Muslim Brotherhood (Deane 2013: 18; Ottaway 2012; Alexander 2013).

For this reason Tunisia is perhaps the only country that saw the rise of an independent political field where antagonists recognized their differences but saw no other way to solve their differences than to make compromises. This development laid the foundation of true citizenship and the drawing up of a social contract. Stepan and Linz recognize the uniqueness of the Tunisian experiment in producing a “political society” (Stepan & Linz 2013: 23); others, following the German philosopher/sociologist Habermas, have characterized it as the rise of the “public sphere” (Charrad & Zarrugh 2014: 230).

This process, however, was not easy. Like Egypt, Tunisia experienced a deep political crisis in the two years 2012 and 2013 between liberals and leftists (called “modernists” in Tunisia) and Islamists. As in Egypt, liberals and leftists, fearing the electoral power of the Islamists, wanted to restrict the political scope of the Islamists before the elections by forcing them to sign a “republican pact” in order to preserve the “modernist achievements of Tunisia” (Zemni 2014). They refused.

As part of the liberal reaction, the anti-Islamist front Nidaa Tounes, led by the veteran politician Caïd Essebsi, was established in June 2012 (Ottaway 2013: 2). After the assassinations of the leftist leaders Chokri Belaid in February and Mohamed Brahmi in July Nidaa Tounes joined with other parties to form an even broader opposition front, the National Salvation Front. In October 2013 its members
organized mass demonstrations to bring down the government, very much like Tamarrud, the mass movement that emerged in April 2013 against Morsi in Egypt (Alexander 2013).

Eventually, civil society in the form of the trade union movement (UGTT), the National Bar Association and the National Businessmen Organization (UTICA) brought the coalition partners together and forced them to finish their assignment and draw up the constitution, which was accepted by referendum in January 2014. What helped to bring about this compromise was that before the uprisings the main partners in the coalition government had made a pact in 2005 that foresaw a sharing of power in case the regime would fall (Haugen & Cavatorta 2011; Stepan & Linz 2013: 23).

The Tunisian experiment, however, has not been a complete success in inclusionary terms. Like in Egypt, revolutionaries failed to establish their own parties and either joined other parties or opted out of politics altogether (Zemni 2014). It also has aspects of class exclusion. The government is mostly seen as a middle class coalition, while the marginalized poor have joined the Salafis or the more radical, anti-systemic Ansar al-Sharia (Lesch 2014: 70; Merino & Cavatorta; Marks 2013).

Moreover, despite the relative success of the political system, the revolution did not succeed in producing an active citizenry. In September 2013, Tunisians expressed their discontent with the politics in a Pew poll. The majority said they were economically worse off than under Ben Ali and that they preferred stability over democracy. On the other hand, roughly 70 percent of the interviewees upheld citizenship rights and realized it is important to have a judicial system that treats everyone equal, to have fair elections, and to have a free media (Pew 2013).

In Morocco, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco demonstrates that it is possible to benefit from the Arab uprisings, while not taking part in it at all. Its leader Benkirane even expressly forbade PJD members from marching in the demonstrations.

Two Morocco specialists, Beuhler (2013) and Dalmasso (2013), regard these moves by the PJD as a particularly clever. By threatening to join the February 20 Movement it was able to gain concessions from the monarchy. It succeeded in attaining two goals: first it eliminated its main rival, Foad Al al-Himma, a friend of the king who had founded a political party to support the throne; second, it succeeded in changing the constitution. The PJD long-term aim is to establish a constitutional monarchy. A step in this direction was made when the king accepted the rule that the majority party deliver the prime minister (Beuhler 2013).

During the elections of November 2011 the PJD won 17 percent of the votes, winning 107 of the 395 seats (against 46 seats in 2007), allowing it to form a coalition government for the first time in Moroccan history. 45.4 percent of the electorate had turned out to vote, more than the 37 percent in 2007, but less than the 51 percent in 2002 (BBC 2011). The difference with the Muslim Brotherhood became clear when PJD secretary-general Benkirane immediately after the electoral victory declared: "This is a clear victory, but we will need alliances in order to work together." A coalition government was formed with the Istiqlal Party, and two left-wing coalition partners. In the coalition government with the liberal Istiqlal party and left-wing parties, the PJD obtained for the first time the prime minister and 11 ministers (Desrues 2013).
Despite these short successes of the PJD, opinions on the long term consequences are divided. While Dalmasso and Beuhler believe that real change is taking place, although incremental, critics argue that the Moroccan monarchy is proving to be remarkably flexible and resilient, leaving power relations intact (Daadawi 2014; Maghraoui 2012). They also point out that while the PJD promotes political rights, in contrast to the Ennahda that has accepted the previous liberal legislation on women, the PJD has a conservative social and individual rights agenda (Beuhler 2013).

Finally, like Tunisia and Egypt, Morocco, as well, has seen clashes between the left and Islamists, undermining the overlapping consensus of the uprisings. On April 24, 2014, left-wing students killed a Islamist student leader (Masbah 2014). Earlier, the Istiqal Party had left the coalition government with the PJD after the coup d’état in Egypt.

In Libya, like in Egypt and Tunisia, the major challenge the country faced was to hold together the coalition of forces that had toppled Qaddafi in October 2011. Here the problem was not just the Islamist-secular divide, but also clan/tribal and regional divides.

At first it seemed Libya was going in the right direction. Experts as Vandewalle showed themselves optimistic (Vandewalle 2012). The reason for this optimism was that the elections for the GNC as the TNC held in July 2012 was successful. It had 200 seats (80 for party lists and 120 for independents). In total, 142 political parties were registered, and 1200 candidates contested 80 seats for political parties whereas between 2500-3000 candidates contested 120 independent seats (Poljarevic 2012: 8).

Libya was the only country where the political party that carried the revolution also won the elections. The National Forces Alliance (NFA) won half of the party seats list (39 seats) in the GNC in July 2012. The Muslim Brotherhood’s party, the Justice and Construction Party, won 10 per cent of the seats (19 seats), while independents won the rest. However, many of the independents were also Islamists and therefore the number of Islamists was much higher. Like in Tunisia the NFA the Brotherhood JCP and other partner formed a coalition government in November 2012. The NFA provided the prime minister Ali Zeitan, who as a long-time opponent of Qaddafi was respected. His government fell apart after the Brotherhood withdrew its five ministers (Lesch 2014: 72).

As in Egypt and Tunisia, Libyan politics became quickly polarized. The major difference is not so much between Islamists and secularists but between revolutionary fighters (thuwwar) and former supporters of Qaddafi, members of brigades and those outside, victims of the Qaddafi era and its beneficiaries (Otto, Carlisle & Ibrahim 2013: 26). The deep mistrust that has penetrated society in Egypt and to a lesser extent in Tunisia has torn Libya apart into a diversity of tribes, regional groups, and militias.

Exclusionary politics towards former Qaddafi supporters was also much stronger in Libya than in Tunisia. In May 2013, the JCP succeeded in pushing through the Political Isolation Law, which bans former government officials and bureaucrats from taking part in politics (Rosan et. al. 2013: 20), adding to the existing polarization. In Tunisia, leaders of Ben Ali’s party, the RCD, were banned from participating in politics for five years.

In contrast to the PJD in Morocco, the Islamic Action Front, the party of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, followed a completely different tactic, joining the street demonstrations, expecting
that the success of Egyptian Brotherhood would frighten the government in making concessions (ICG 2012a; Valbjørn 2013). When the government only tried to buy time, the IAF decided to pursue a confrontational political line and boycott the parliamentary elections of January 2013, together with an alliance dating from the uprisings in 2011. The results were the total opposite from Morocco. Instead of gaining access to parliament and broadening political rights, the IAF was ostracized. As Martin Valbjørn, a well-known Danish political scientist remarked, “the voting was more about tribes and families than about ideologies and party affiliation”, indicating the little impact the uprisings had made in Jordan (Valbjørn 2013: 314).

Since the boycott, the Brotherhood has seen its popularity decline as competition arose from more liberal groups as the ZamZam Initiative and the Wasat Party, which won 16 of the 150 seats in parliament (Schencker 2013). When Morsi was ousted on July 3, 2013, the IAF not only lost a powerful regional ally, it also was exposed to the wrath of the government, which, supported by the Gulf states, turned to repressing the Brotherhood (Al-Monitor July 19, 2014). After a rally in August 2014 calls went up to ban the movement like in Egypt (Al-Akhbar August 25, 2014).

On the whole, one can conclude that the military coup d’état in Egypt on July 3, 2013, has dramatically changed the prospects of cross-ideological, inter-faith alliances in the whole region. As mentioned above, the Istiqlal Party in Morocco immediately left the coalition government with the PJD, it emboldened the liberals and leftists in Tunisia to oppose Ennahda and it provided the Jordanian King to exclude the Islamists (Boukhars, et. al. 2014). It also opened the way for a return of clientelist politics of divide and rule.

Remarkably, Salafism seems to have benefited to a far greater extent than the other Islamists from the Arab uprisings. The position of politics in this is essential. Paradoxically, for the Salafis, who concentrate on religious doctrine and purification more than on politics, it was easier to make the step to politics. In Egypt the Nour Party in the end appeared to be more pragmatic and more open to accept politics as a separate field than the Muslim Brotherhood. When at a certain point the sheikhs of the movement objected to compromises, the “politicians” split off and created their own party (Lacroix 2012). In Tunisia, however, the Salafis have not been integrated in the political process, leaving them outside the system kicking against it. In Jordan, they have become a severe competition for the Brotherhood. Remarkably, the Salafis have made a more important shift to a discourse of rights than the Muslim Brotherhood (Meijer 2015).

4.2.2 Reform of the state, and state building

The major test case whether the factors and actors of change were able to start the virtuous circle of reform was their ability to dismantle the authoritarian state. This should start by reforming the Ministry of Interior, which runs the police, the security forces and the intelligence services, the main forces of repression (Ashour 2012). Reform depends on setting up a successful parliamentary system that is able to wrest power away from the dominant executive (Schwartz 2005: 429). This can only be done on the basis of consensus.

The dismantling of the authoritarian state also means implementing far-reaching decentralization (Bouziane, Harders & Hoffmann 2013). Essential in this process are local elections. While in early 2014 Libyan citizens were able to vote for municipal elections (Lesch 2014: 72), no regional and
municipal elections were held in Egypt or Tunisia. In Jordan, protests broke out when King Abdallah announced the postponement of local elections and the reform of the local electoral (ICG 2012: 4).

However, due to the long tradition of authoritarian state it was almost impossible to tackle its structures without encountering wide scale protests once the momentum of the uprisings had gone. In Egypt, the State Security Investigation Services (SSI) count over a 100,000 personnel. The police has 800,000, and the army 500,000, and 6 million employees of the bureaucracy. These institutions are hardly interested in civil and political rights of citizens and are only interested in maintaining the power of the authoritarian state. They represent the interests of the state versus the citizen and as such constitute the counter-revolution. Dismantlement would mean purging and reeducating major sections of these institutions.

In Egypt, the problem of reform is exacerbated by the heavy presence of the military as a state within the state. The armed forces have their own hospitals, villages, complexes, social clubs, education institutions, petrol stations, factories and companies. They own restaurants and football grounds. They also have a stronghold in business, engaging in road and housing construction, production of consumer goods, resort management and maintaining extensive tracts of real estate (Ramadan 2014). According to some, since the revolution its part in the economy has grown from 40 percent to 45 percent (Hauslohner 2014). Moreover, during the past three years the military have succeeded in securing its position and preventing the legislative from gaining control over its budget and finances (ElManshawy 2014). Even Morsi was unable to reform the security police during his in government and bring those accused of killings, torture, and abuse to trial (Amnesty International 2014: 6).

With the restoration of the authoritarian state under president al-Sisi also its paternalistic rhetoric has returned. The state has asserted its power over citizens in name of stability and protection of the Egyptian citizen against foreign threats and internal chaos. In the conservative chauvinistic discourse of the military social and sectarian conflicts are regarded as the products of foreign conspiracies (Adly 2014).

Although in Morocco and Jordan the military are not as important as in Egypt, and the continuing factor is the monarchy, in both cases the uprisings have had little impact on the structures of the state. Only in the case of Morocco has a slight change occurred in the power of the parliament versus the King in the sense that the King must accept the leader of the largest party as prime minister. However, the shadow cabinet is still the strongest governing informal institution and the king still appoints all governors, military personnel, diplomats, and judges (Maghraoui 2012).

Tunisia has been partially transformed after the elections. It is the only Arab country that has seen shift in power from the executive to the legislative. Still, here as well, it seems difficult to purge and reorganize the security forces and police (Ashour 2012; The Economist March 23, 2013). Despite certain reforms, such as the abolition of the Department of State Security (DSS) in March 2011, responsible for human rights abuses in Tunisia (Amnesty 2012), reform of the Ministry of Interior and police has not progressed as fast as was hoped by most citizens (Deane 2013: 16; Amnesty international; Human Rights Watch Year Book 2014).

Nevertheless, the situation in Tunisia is much better compared to Jordan. The Islamic Action Front boycotted the elections in 2013. Other parties have not been able to pressure the state to make
substantial changes. Accountability of the government to parliament is minimal (Valbjørn 2013; ICG 2012c).

The biggest problem of Libya is not that an authoritarian state has remained intact but that it has collapsed. Qaddafi left no institutions ("stateless state"), as his power was built on patronage and therefore disappeared when he died. As Stepan and Linz state after the attack on the American embassy on 11 September 2012: “The Benghazi attack reveals in the harshest terms that without a useable state there can be no safeguards for human rights, law and order, consolidated democracy, or effective governance” (or we can add, citizenship) (Stepan & Linz 2013: 27-8) The challenge over the next years is to build a state that is capable of kick-starting a virtuous circle of citizenship. The reassertion of tribalism and regionalism has led to a vicious spiral of decline and chaos.

The resistance to reform does not mean that all governmental institutions are opposed to citizenship rights. In Egypt, the Governance Center, and the Illicit Gains Authority work against corruption (Foreign Affairs, February 7, 2014). As Brown suggests (July 17, 2013), the state is fragmented. It works at cross purposes and is less coherent and monolithic than is usually assumed and represented in such terms as the “deep state”.

4.3 Economic reform and social justice

4.3.1 The need for economic reform
One of the major reasons for the Arab uprisings was the deplorable economic situation, the high unemployment, especially among youth, and increasing inequality. People demanded a fundamentally different type of economy that is more just, more inclusive, more dynamic, and less dependent on clientelist networks and cliques.

In a perceptive essay Lahcen Achy (Achy 2013), fellow of the American liberal think tank Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, expounds on what must be done to reform Arab economic structures to meet demands of the Arab uprisings. He argues that economic reform should be based on a “shared and inclusive prosperity” and aim to create a “vibrant, innovative, and socially responsible private sector.”

Most importantly economic reform should overhaul the authoritarian bargain (and not just replace it with the partial bargains based on inequality privilege and crony capitalism). The lack of transparency, corruption, privileged access to resources of the elite which has connections to the state, has impeded structural transformation and has led to the further growth of the informal sector. Moreover, distorted forms of economic allocation in industries have further strengthened rentierism, one of the banes of the region. The Gulf policy to bail out Egypt with 18 billion dollars, Achy believes, is only a temporary palliative, and if not buttressed by reform will be wasted. He argues that fundamental economic changes must be made for a social contract to come about.

Achy is not alone in his critique of the business sector and economic policies after the uprisings. A report of the German Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik states that most businessmen in Egypt benefited from “the lenient stance on fraud and corruption of the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces (SCAF)” (Roll 2013: 5). Only four members of the 21 most wealthy Egyptian families were convicted for corruption (Roll 2013: 11). Little has been done to bring about social justice by reforming the income and business tax system. Here, as well, Morsi failed.

The call for economic reform by Achy is borne out by economic figures. On the whole the economic growth has declined over the past years. But even if the growth statistics are positive, as in Morocco, they conceal structural problems: dependence of Arab countries on labor intensive, low wage activities, which explains the high unemployment among educated; concentration on market reforms while maintaining elite privileges; weak and even decreasing indigenous and foreign investments; preponderance of small informal businesses, weak intermediate companies, and the domination of huge, monopolistic private companies (Carnegie Endowment June 4, 2013).

In Egypt, the economy dropped from 8 percent growth in 2008 to 2 percent in 2011 and 2013. Typically, big firms predominate and small ones have bad access to loans. As expected, under president al-Sisi, privatization will be pursued much less vigorously. The strengthening of the paternalistic state, however are a throwback to the earlier socialist days (The Economist July 2014). In an attempt to revive the authoritarian bargain, the government has recently decided to raise the minimum wage—long time demand of the trade unions, to 12,000 Egyptian pounds per month (170 dollars) (Al Arabia September 19 2013). The economic prospects are bleak: Public debt has reached 100 percent in 2014, budget deficit in 2013 was 13 percent, youth unemployment has grown, reaching 39 percent (age group 20-24) (African Country Outlook 2014a). Not only did foreign direct investment decline by 80 percent between 2009/2010 and 2011/2012, but also Egyptian firms were reluctant to make investments, some of them pulling out of Egypt entirely (Roll 2013: 23). The government under al-Sisi has announced that it will resume privatizations (Reuters June 6, 2014).

In Tunisia, growth reached only 2.6 percent in 2013, down from 3.7 percent in 2012. In 2011 it was 1.8 percent. In the summer of 2012, 170 foreign firms closed down in Tunisia and left the country. In 2013 foreign investment in Tunisia decline by 25 percent. The debt ratio to GDP was 47.2 percent (Deane 2013: 19; African Economic Outlook 2014b).

In Morocco, the GDP grew with 2.6 percent in 2012 to 4.7 percent in 2014 (World Bank 2014). In Libya, oil revenues have been halved due to insecurity and occupations of oil fields. On the other hand, the private sector witnessed an unprecedented boom after the restrictions of the Qaddafi era had vanished.

In none of the countries has employment increased over the past years. On the contrary, in Tunisia, unemployment has increased from 13 percent in 2010 to 18 in 2012, reaching a total of 800,000 persons, although it dropped to 15.7 percent in 2013. But unemployment among graduates remains high, 34 percent, one in three (Deane 2013: 19; African Economic Outlook 2014), almost the same as in Morocco (World Bank 2014).

4.3.2 Political and social role of businessmen
Businessmen in Egypt belong to the richest in Africa. Over the past year they have been able to take back much of the power they had lost during the uprisings. Members of the “businessmen cabinet” of Ahmed Nazif (2004-2011) which was the focus of the anger, have also sought reconciliation with
the Egyptian government which was desperately in need of new investments (Global Times May 13, 2013).

Businessmen in Egypt have mostly financed the opposition parties when the Muslim Brotherhood came to power (Roll 2013). Naquib Sawaris, a Coptic billionaire and one of the richest persons in Egypt, financed the Free Egyptians Party in the 2011-2012 elections, which, nevertheless won only 15 seats (Roll 2013: 19). He also supported the Tamarudd movement, which led the protests against Morsi (The Wall Street Journal, August 6, 2013). The same occurred in Tunisia, where the major political party Nidaa Tounis is supported by family run business groups in Tunisia (The Economist June 24, 2014).

The Muslim Brotherhood launched its own businessmen association the Egyptian Business Development Association (EBDA) in 2012, to show it was in favor of the free market. It tried to win back businessmen who had fled Egypt after the fall of Mubarak (Businessweek April 19,2012), but with little success.

In Egypt, most businessmen seem to have welcomed the military takeover and the installation of competent group of ministers as the first step to stability and regaining the confidence of foreign investors (The National World, July 17, 2013). Many of them had been convicted of corruption started to return to Egypt, offering investments and millions in exchange for freedom (Foreign Affairs, February 7, 2014). Others have settled their taxes, but no structural reform of the tax system has taken place.

Besides in politics, businessmen are also active in social work. The Mansour Group, one of the biggest companies in Egypt, has several foundations among them the Mansour Foundation for Development, the first NGO financed by a family business.

The role of businessmen in the Arab world, however, is not well understood. The main problem is that all countries suffer from a tiny, very rich economic elite, and a vast majority of small businesses that employ only one or two employees.

4.4 Legal Reform

4.4.1 Rule of Law and human rights

Another test case for the success of the uprisings was the establishment of the rule of law and maintaining human rights. Establishing the rule of law is seen as the best means of gaining trust from its citizens (ICG 2013: ii). In general, it means that people feel that justice is on their side. In a broader perspective, the rule of law guarantees their civil and political rights and their participation in a political community in which they have a stake. In figure 2 (page 41) the rule of law covers the whole left half of the model.

The rule of law has been a major problem in the Arab world. Laws are often drawn up in favor of the elite. It protects their interests. In general, the actions of the state are above the law. Crucial for the success of reform is therefore the establishment of an independent judiciary. In Tunisia, for example, the judiciary had been co-opted and become an instrument in the hands of the authoritarian state,
while in Egypt it was divided between Mubarak nominees and independent judges (Rutherford 2008). In Morocco, judges are appointed by the King (Vermeren 2007).

As Tunisia has been the most successful country in the transitional political process, it is useful to take a closer look at the Tunisian reform of the judiciary. Since 1967 the president presided over the Supreme Council of the Judiciary (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature), a body that appoints, promotes and transfers judges. This rule was rescinded in 2012 when the Minister of Justice replaced the presidency, a measure denounced by judges and lawyers as insufficient to guarantee the independence of the judiciary from the executive. In the meantime, the first round of cleansing the judiciary was made in March 2012 when 82 judges were dismissed for corruption. In September 2012, 700 judges were moved around, but the Ministry of Justice never published the reasons for these measures (Amnesty International 2012: 20). Finally, in April 2013 the government appointed an independent High Temporary Judicial Council to appoint and promote judges (Human Rights Watch 2014).

These reforms were part of larger reforms to push back the role of the state. State censorship was dismantled and replaced by the INRIC (Instance Nationale pour la Réforme de l’Information et de la Communication). INRIC passed two new laws on the press and audiovisual freedom which were praised (Human Rights Watch 2014). Many of these measures, however, were undermined by older practices or laws that had not been rescinded. For instance, the state still appoints heads of state radio and broadcasting, while an older law No. 121(3) of the Penal Code, which criminalizes publication, distribution or sale of information that “disrupts public order or public morals”, “insults the police”, or “offends state officials” has been repeatedly used to restrict freedom of speech and expression, especially of artists and journalists who produced art or articles considered insulting to Islam. Several of them received prison sentences (Amnesty International 2012: 23-28). The Human Rights Watch Yearly Report of 2014 on Tunisia was still critical on this account (Human Rights Watch 2014).

Although police brutality is not as excessive as during the time of Ben Ali, an Amnesty report of October 2012 gives a list of police abuses (Amnesty International 2012). These continued in 2013 but on a more limited scale (Human Rights Watch 2013). By the end of 2012, however, it seemed that torture had still not been eradicated (Amnesty International 2012: 22) or even in 2014 (HRW 2014).

In Egypt, the rule of law remained weak during the transitional period between the fall of Mubarak and the presidential elections in May 2012. From February 2011 to the end of 2011, 12,000 civilians were brought before military courts (HRW 2011). The massacre of 27 Coptic demonstrators in October 2011 at Maspero in Cairo has been called “the single worst assault by an Egyptian ruling authority against a non-Muslim minority in modern Egyptian history” (Tadros 2013: 183).

Neither did the election Morsi as president make a difference. Many believe he tried to make an alliance with the deep state in an attempt to use it for his own purposes. In November 2012 he made the crucial mistake to issue decrees which placed him above the law, enraging the judiciary and his many opponents and seemed to confirm their suspicions that the Brotherhood was out for a power grab.
After Morsi’s ouster in July 2013, the situation deteriorated further as a vicious cycle of decline was set in. In September 2013 the Muslim Brotherhood was designated as a “terrorist organization”, and it has been calculated that 16,000 followers of the Muslim Brotherhood are detained on accusation of being member of terrorist organization. The death toll since the military takeover is staggering. Amnesty has calculated that between June 30 and the end of December 2013 1,400 people have died as a result of police violence. It is estimated that between 16,000 and 41,000 people are in custody (Amnesty International 2014).

Repression increased after measures were adopted to ban demonstrations in November 2013. Since then many demonstrators have been arrested and detained on charges of “unauthorized protests”, “destroying property”, and “disturbing public order,” (Abdel Samei 2014; Amnesty International 2014: 16-17). In September 2013 several TV channels were closed because they were “spreading false information which threatened the national security” and “disturbed the public order” (Amnesty International 2014: 20-1). Every form of political activity on universities has been banned and the military has been trying to reimpose a rigorous policy of depoliticization to return to the era of Mubarak (Mada Masr September 1, 2014) (see paragraph 1.12).

Disconcertingly, many judges have become involved in the political campaign to eradicate the Muslim Brotherhood (Brown & Dunne 2014). On December 5, 2013, three activists were sentenced to a year imprisonment for a gathering that supposedly “endangered the public security” (Amnesty 2014: 34). On March 24, 2014, a court in al-Minya (Upper Egypt) sentenced 529 followers of the Muslim Brotherhood to death (Amnesty International March 24, 2014). The verdicts were later changed to 37 death sentences (Amnesty International June 21, 2014), but by that time a trend had set in. On March 19, a Cairo court sentenced 26 people to death, while on June 9 a criminal court in Shubra sentenced 10 Brotherhood members to death, and on June 18 a court in Giza sentenced another 18 Morsi followers to death. According to Amnesty International, since January 2014 the Egyptian judiciary has recommended the death penalty for 1,247 men, pending the Grand Mufti’s religious opinion, and upheld death sentences against 247 men. All of them are Morsi supporters (Amnesty June 21, 2014). As yet, it is unclear how many of these death penalties will be executed.

Persecution of the Brotherhood led to heightened sectarian tensions. Seen as the supporters of al-Sisi, Copts have been targeted by Islamists. After the August 14, 2013 clampdown on Rab’a Square 200 Coptic businesses and 43 churches have gone up in flames and four Copts have died.

Not surprisingly, the rule of law was the worst in Libya under Qaddafi. During Qaddafi’s regime it was blatantly trespassed by “people’s courts” which worked closely with the regime and passed revolutionary verdicts (Otto et. al. 2013: 27). In his early years Qaddafi would imprison judges if they did not give the penalties he found fi (Chorin 2012: 33). An ICG report states that “under Qadhafi, the judiciary suffered from politicization of appointments, rampant corruption and the use of extrajudicial means to target political opponents” (ICG 2013: 1).

There have been major steps for improvement after Qaddafi’s fall. The GNC initiated several steps towards establishing a High Commission for the Application of Standards of Integrity and Patriotism. It also initiated reform of the Judicial system by proposing the establishment of the Supreme Council for the Judiciary.
The major problem was the rise of the militias, which “operate outside state control and put themselves above the law, frustrating the state’s law enforcement” (Otto, Carlisle & Ibrahim 2013). They have threatened the parliament, hijacked the prime minister, killed judges and police, threatened lawyers. This process has been partly the fault of the Transitional National Council (TNC), which recognized the brigades, gave them immunity from crimes they had committed during the uprisings and allowed them to seize suspects, even paying for the activities (ICG 2013: ii). Many of these brigades have been able to apply “victors’ justice”. Some 7000 people are in detention who have been arrested as “anti-revolutionaries” (ICG 2013: 4).

The so-called Isolation Law of 2012 also seems to be punitive and vindictive rather than being based on justice. Some believe that while in Egypt and Tunisia the wishes of the population and “revolutionaries” were not met all, in Libya the revolutionaries have taken over (Carlisle 2013: 45). The Isolation Law also prevents rebuilding the state as it bans all former higher employees of the former regime to hold functions in the administration and the army (Gaub 2013).

In Jordan, little was done to change the law and punish corruption and abuse of political power, let alone persecute police and intelligence services accused of torture. In response to the outcry against corruption the mayor of Amman was arrested in December 2012 and refused bail. In 2012, a travel ban was imposed on the former General Intelligence Directorate and his assets frozen (ICG 2012: 4).

Typically, in Morocco, changes did occur, but they were minor. An example was renaming of the Moroccan Consultative Council on Human Rights (CCDH) the National Council of Human Rights (CNDH). The latter was formally more independent (Molina 2011: 438).

4.4.2 Transitional justice

The weakness of the rule of law is reflected in the difficulties to establish transitional justice in the Arab world (Fisher & Stewart 2014). Since the Arab uprisings transitional justice has become an important topic. It is an essential part of the virtuous circle of citizenship and has been a fundamental demand of the uprisings.

Here, as well, Tunisia is a pioneer. After the fall of Ben Ali a committee was established to investigate the abuses by the police during the uprisings. A decree of January 2012 created a Ministry for Human Rights and Transitional Justice. In October 2012 the Constituent Assembly adopted a law to create National Authority for the Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, consisting of 6 persons who are allowed to investigate any site where it suspects that the law has been infringed.

Despite these measures, few of the family of the victims were satisfied by the trials that were held in Tunis and Kef during which 43 and 42 accused stood for trial. The procedures were not transparent, the evidence produced by victims was not used and none of the accused were suspended from their official functions during the trials. In the end, few of them were convicted (Amnesty International 2012: 17-20). During the past three years few security personnel were convicted for tortures they committed during the long reign of Ben Ali (Human Rights Watch 2014). When in a rare case they were convicted April 12, 2014, the military appeal tribunal sharply reduced the sentences of
policemen, military, and officials. The families of the victims went on hunger strike, demanding that the trial be transferred to a civil court (Baster & Merminod October 27, 2014).

In Egypt, at first, it seemed that transitional justice extended to the highest regions of the previous regime. Many of the companions of Gamal, the son of president Mubarak, who had been accused of corruption and plundering the country and leading “crony capitalism” were put on trial and convicted (Lesch 2011). The fact that Mubarak was put under house arrest and later would be brought to trial indicated that no one was above the law (Azzam 2012). Mubarak, however, was acquitted in a court of cassation in January 2013 and released briefly afterwards. In November 2014 it was announced that he would be released.

By that time, it was clear that transitional justice would remain a dead letter. The military remained outside the rule of law with the continuation of the emergency laws. Only a few security personnel were sentenced to low periods in jail for abuses during the 17 months of transitional military rule after the fall of Mubarak. No security personnel have been brought to trial for the al-Rab’a Square massacres (Amnesty International 2014: 30). Copts complain that the informal reconciliation committees that try to reach agreement on the burning of churches and Coptic property seldom lead to convictions of perpetrators of violence and should be replaced by normal law courts and the rule of law (Tadros 2013: 247).

The human rights situation in Libya under Qaddafi was so bad that it is believed that only a reconciliation commission can bring about a new consensus between victims and supporters of Qaddafi (Carlisle 2013: 43). The NTC passed Law 17/2012 concerning the National Reconciliation and Transitional Justice but the law seems to be flawed and nothing has come of the initiative (ICG 2013: 18).

4.5 Security and external influences

4.5.1 Security and stability

Security in the Arab world is often seen by Europe and the United States as separate from the political situation. Security, stability and implicitly the support of authoritarian states, are regarded as inseparable. As we have seen in this report, the authoritarian state is part of the problem. Not for nothing the uprisings were directed at the dismantlement of the authoritarian state. They have learnt us that security and stability can only go hand in hand with citizenship rights. An authoritarian state, lack of rule of law, and turning transitional justice and human rights into a farce, will in the long run undermine stability. The tendency among security specialists is always to start at the end of the sequence (violence and terrorism) and not to look at the roots of violence in the lack of citizenship rights, and the degradation of people to the level of the “non-citizen”, as a result of the deeply flawed relationship between citizens and state.

Insecurity in the region comes from three sources. The first is the collapse of the state in Iraq, Syria, and Mali. In these countries ideological movements have taken over. The second is when state power is taken over by unruly militias as is the case in Libya. The rise of militias and “brigades” have led to the collapse of the state, increasing the number of assassinations of politicians and potential
leader. The third is related to the unaccountability of the state itself which exerts uncontrolled violence. In Egypt, the taking of power of the military has increased insecurity rather than decreasing it. Since the police retreated during the 18 day uprisings daily security has collapsed and people and especially women are threatened and molested (Tadros December 2, 2013). In Tunisia, the stalled reforms of the police have not only led to the continuation of deaths in police stations but also of assassinations of policemen (Joyce 2013).

In all cases, the solution to the deteriorating security is political and the setting in motion of the circle of virtuous citizenship leading to a new social contract. In Libya, as Carnegie Endowment fellow Wehrey states “a broad political pact, a constitution, and a representative government” is the only solution to the problems (Wehrey 2014). In Iraq the rise of the Islamic State was made possible by the government of Maliki excluding Sunni Muslims (Mandour September 25, 2014). In Egypt, as Maha Yahya correctly points out, security and freedom go together. The current repression and politically motivated trials of members Muslim Brotherhood do not contribute to security and stability in the long term. Exclusionary politics in the end create more problems and the choice the current military government posits between freedom on the one hand and security and stability on the other is a false one (Yahya 2014). We know from previous waves of repression, mass arrests and especially torture, that they lead to radicalization and more violence (Dunne & Williamson 2014; Brown and Dunne 2014).

4.5.2 External influences
External influences have been highly important in the Arab world in the past. During the Arab uprisings they were less important but with the current “restabilization” and reassertion of authoritarian states the influence of external influences is increasing. The danger is that the United States and the EU fall back on the policies they had pursued before: supporting authoritarian regimes because they can assure stability and security at the cost of democracy, which brings to power illiberal Islamist movements.

The Gulf states have been able to take advantage of the crisis to expand their influence in the whole region, largely taking over the role of the United States as the main political and financial (if not military) source. On the whole they have supported counter-revolutionary forces. Their offer to incorporate Jordan and Morocco in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 2012 should be regarded as an attempt to buttress the conservative monarchies against demands for change (Colombo 2012). Gulf financial support of the military regime in Egypt after the military coup against president Morsi with 18 billion dollars directly supports the authoritarianism and runs counter to the demands for equal citizenship and civil, political and social rights (Rohac 2013).

The Gulf states have also played a crucial role in extending and deepening sectarianism. By portraying the social and political conflict in the area as a sectarian struggle between Sunni and Shi’ite Islam (or its offshoots as the Alawis) they have directly contributed to the present crisis in the Levant and the Gulf and served the vicious circle of decline (Potter 2014).

The European Union has played a minor role in the region in the post-uprisings period. After Mubarak was ousted from power the EU drastically changed its European Neighborhood Policy towards the Arab world. Its earlier program had been adopted in 2004 and was based on maintaining
stability without interfering in internal political affairs. The new policy, laid down in the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PDSP) in March 2011, tries to reach out to the population and create a “deep democracy” (Bauer 2013: 7; Isaac 2013: 43). In contrast to the previous period, financial support has now been linked to democratization, and security is related to democracy and human security. Support of civil society is based on a “bottom-up” approach. In this sense, the EU would seem to support a virtuous circle of citizenship.

Critics, however, point out that the EU policy for democracy promotion has not been clarified. For instance, the concept of “deep democracy” has not been defined. Neither have conditions for funds been laid down (Bauer 2013: 13). One of the main concerns of the EU, as before, is illegal migration to the EU either through Syria or North Africa. A content analysis of the crucial documents supporting the new policy demonstrates that democracy in the EU definition is based on procedural criteria rather than substantial ones based on citizen rights (Teti, Thompson and Noble 2013). Neither has the EU developed a method to evaluate the Arab countries’ reform and democratization progress (Isaac 2013a: 56; Elagaty 2012). As damaging is that the funds available for democracy promotion are far too low to have any practical effect. They do not offer sufficient incentives for democratization in the region (Isaac 2013a: 48) and are negligible in comparison to the sums the Gulf offers. Richard Youngs, a renowned specialist on EU policy towards the Arab world is more mild, but in the end also critical (Youngs 2014).

In fact, some critics point out that the EU lacks any foreign policy towards the Arab world since it has given up on its common foreign policy towards this region since the Lisbon Treaty. The EU policy has become reactive. In Tunisia it acted as a “helpful helper in the transition process, but not as an actor”. In other cases its actions were not very well coordinated and inconsistent (Pierini 2014).

The foreign policy of the United States towards the region has been as contradictory as before. The American military aid to Egypt became an issue of public controversy after the military coup on 3 July 2013. Influential commentators such as Marc Lynch advised against continuing the aid of 1.3 billion dollars (Plumer 2013). Amnesty International published a report accusing the US of being complicit in Egyptian abuses (Amnesty 2014), and many others advocate the US attaching conditions of support for human rights to military aid (Dunne 2014; Khalifa 2013; Teti & Thompson & Noble 2012).
CONCLUSION

The central question of this report was: What internal actors and factors supported or hindered a (democratic) transition in Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia?

The report is divided into four chapters dealing with the period prior to the uprisings, the period during the uprisings, a theoretical chapter on citizenship and a chapter dealing with the period after the uprisings. The report argues that a) the main reason for the uprisings was the problematic relationship between citizen and state, and b) they were based on the demands for civil, political and social rights.

Chapter 1 analyzed the different factors that prevented a democratic transition prior to the uprisings. We identified seven factors in this category: 1) sectarianism and exclusionist tendencies in Islamic movements; 2) clientelism; 3) tribalism; 4) economic inequality and skewed economic development, leading to exclusion and marginalization; 5) authoritarianism and its offshoot, the authoritarian bargain; 6) the blocking of civil society and the political system; 7) and finally, external factors, such as the foreign policy of the EU and the United States, which did not address the problems in the Arab world consistently.

We argued that together these factors produced a particularly destructive political, social and economic system that has undermined citizen rights. Most institutions not directly connected to this system were unable to escape its influence. Civil society and political parties were increasingly coopted by this system. The only way to escape from its control was to establish social movements and networks, which since 2000 became increasingly politicized and directed their grievances against the state. The collapse of what has been called the “authoritarian bargain”, here defined as an exchange of political and civil rights for social rights (job security, free education, health care, pensions, subsidies on basic foodstuffs), fed these grievances. Although the five countries are highly different from each other in political and economic structures, the common denominator of all the uprisings was to achieve a new social contract with the state based on the recognition of citizenship rights.

In chapter 2 we analyzed the factors and actors that played a role during the uprisings, demanding change and calling for civil, political and social rights. The initial demonstrators mostly belonged to the fringe of society who were most severely affected by the political system and were willing to go out on the street: youth activists, youth sections of Islamist organizations, youth sub-cultures as the Ultras, left-wing movements, critical, often younger members of feminists movements, groups within political parties, independent intellectuals, unofficial or break-away trade unions, or the lower echelons of official trade unions, populations of marginal or discriminated regional areas, poor neighborhoods in cities, and people working in the informal economy. During the uprisings mobilization spread to other sections of society, such as the middle classes, represented in civil society organizations, and in some cases, as in Tunisia, the elite.

One of the major findings of the report is that cross-ideological, cross-class and interfaith alliances and coalitions were crucial to bring about the uprisings. It was clear that in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia these broad coalitions were based on a certain agreement on such crucial issues as the necessity of accountability, equal rights, acceptance of difference, and a greater degree of political
participation. Rather than pursuing identity politics, as has been the case during the 1980s and 1990s, governance and politics became the main focus. Much of this had been the result of the rise within the Islamist movement of a new generation of Islamist leaders which emerged in the 1990s and underwent a process of “political learning”. This generation entertained new ideas about politics and recognized that it was based on compromise and reaching consensus. Although there were doubts about the so-called “grey zones” (equal rights for women and minorities and the role of sharia, and to what extent people’s sovereignty reached), the fact that they had been discussed and had been addressed in political programs of many Islamist movements, which over the past decade became increasingly more elaborate, opened the way for a rapprochement between the left, the liberals and the Islamists prior and during the uprisings. This we have named after Rawls the “overlapping consensus”.

The development of this so-called overlapping consensus, represented in figure 1 (page 38), basically set the stage for the grievances of the movements to be framed in such general slogans as “freedom, social justice and bread”. During the uprisings differences fell away and demonstrators felt they had re-appropriated the nation and reconstituted themselves as “the people”. The literature analyzed in this report confirms the recognition of participants of each other as equal citizens. This was especially important for those actors who had been discriminated against or had been physically assaulted, such as members of ethnic and religious minorities and feminist movements.

Chapter 3 is a theoretical exposé of citizenship studies and how it can be applied to the Arab region. We decided to insert this chapter on account of the saliency of the concept of citizenship in the uprisings. Citizenship rights can be defined in terms of extent (who belongs to the nation? Which ethnic and religious groups are included?), content (on what ground does one belong to the political community? Nationalism, Islamism? ) and depth (what right can the citizen claim and what is expected of a citizen in the form of obligations and duties? Should thin or thick concepts of citizenship be introduced?).

In this chapter it was also argued that rights are deeply political in character and that liberalism, socialism and communalism hold divergent views on civil, political and social rights and who belongs to the political community and what commitments that entails. In the Arab world, these differences are represented by the left, the liberals and the Islamists. The formation of coalitions prior to and during the uprisings was explained by the development of an overlapping consensus on a parliamentary system, equal civil rights, social rights and the rule of law, presented in figure 1 (page 38).

It was argued that in addition to a certain degree of consensus between civil, political and social actors, political actors must also support a range of factors that lead to the constitution of full citizenship. These factors constitute the building bricks for reaching a new social contract between citizens among themselves and between citizens and the state, the main goal of the Arab uprisings. Figure 2 (page 41) explains the workings of what has been called the “virtuous circle of citizenship”. In this model citizenship and the social contract are placed at the center of the figure. Abstract civil, political, social rights radiate out of the center and influence other, more concrete factors and actors that are involved in the constitution of full-citizenship. These include the judiciary, the police, ministries, social movements, constitutions, political parties, trade unions, etc. They, in turn, are connected and reinforce each other to reflect back on lynchpin concepts, leading to a new social
contract. Conversely, the “vicious cycle of decline” is set in motion if these factors and actors do not support citizenship rights and the social contract, leading to the unravelling of the body politic and society itself. For instance, if the judiciary is corrupt, and civil rights and freedom of speech are not guaranteed, the press and political parties cannot function.

In chapter 4 we analyze the factors and actors which have influenced the virtuous circle of citizenship after the Arab uprisings. It shows how the elements of change defined in chapter 2 have battled with the elements of status quo analyzed in chapter 1. We noticed that the role of social movements has declined in the post-revolutionary period but did not end. In those cases where they were not strong enough to topple the regime itself (and not just the ruler) most of the power shifted to political parties and the parliamentary system, conform the general consensus on democracy and the multiparty system. In some cases, the political situation hung in the balance for quite some time. In Egypt, for instance, social movements, especially labor movements struggling for social rights, remained an important factor in the post-uprisings phase.

In general, the report concluded that where the authoritarian state remained intact, also the rulers could manipulate the seven banes of Arab political culture, mentioned above, against the opposition, with the result that a three-way struggle for power ensued with changing coalitions between either liberals and the state, or Islamists and the state. In Egypt, the overlapping consensus dissolved in this conflict and the traditional polarization between “illiberal democrats” (the Muslim Brotherhood) on the one hand, and “undemocratic liberals” (represented in the National Salvation Front to oust Morsi) on the other hand, re-emerged. The result was that neither side won and that the military took over on July 3, 2013.

In other countries, such as Jordan, where the alliance did hold out but the forces participating in the demonstrations were weak, the state was able to play liberals and Islamists off against each other and sideline the Muslim Brotherhood. In Morocco, another scenario unfolded: the Islamist PJD benefited from the uprisings to force the king to make concessions, but was unable to push through significant reforms and change the rules of the game. If for the first time an Islamist prime minister was appointed to head a coalition government and small changes were made, the PJD now became responsible for the failures of the whole regime. In Libya, the coalitions supporting the transition were weak and fell apart at an early stage. Polarization quickly overtook all attempts to bridge the ideological gap and the country dissolved into chaos due to the reassertion of clientelism and tribalism.

Thus, the weakness of the coalitions not only allowed the state (or monarchies) to reassert itself, they also allowed the old factors opposing citizenship rights, as described in chapter 1, such as clientelism, patronage, sectarianism, authoritarian partial bargains, corruption and big business to reassert themselves and to thwart the necessary reforms as represented in figure 2. Disappointingly, hardly anywhere a start was made of the dismantlement of the Ministry of Interior, reforms of the economic system in the form of the introduction of an equitable tax system were neglected, a more inclusive political system remained unimplemented, and businessmen, often held responsible for the inequitable and skewed economy before the uprisings, were allowed to return in exchange for paying meagre fines, while corruption continued unhindered. In the meantime, sectarianism reappeared and Christians were being attacked again in Egypt. Moreover, the resilience of the former authoritarian structures was apparent in the failure to install the rule of law and establish
transitional justice. In most of the five countries the virtuous circle of citizenship had hardly begun to be set in motion. In some cases, such as Egypt, it was even reversed and the vicious cycle of decline was set in motion, leading to a deeper repression than existed under Mubarak, with dramatic consequences for civil, political and even social rights.

The report demonstrates that only in Tunisia a major breakthrough occurred. The liberal-left-Islamist alliance was maintained, third parties were held at bay, and reforms were set in motion in the political system, the rule of law, transitional justice, and civil society. As a result, the virtuous circle of citizenship gradually evolved, eventually leading to a social contract in the form of the constitution adopted in January 2014. Only in Tunisia have political parties succeeded in bringing about the independence of the political field where compromises can be made, or what Stepan and Linz have called “political society”.

The above analysis has consequences for identifying actors of change. The report argues that forces of change are those actors that support not just the rule of law, human rights, transitional justice and security but uphold in one form or another the virtuous circle of citizenship. This model is the basis for reforms. In the present political circumstances this means that actors must support the overlapping consensus and must be willing to form alliances that support a democratic transition and uphold the main aims of the Arab uprisings by promoting civil, political and social rights.

For social movements this means that they must be inclusive and aimed at forming cross-ideological, cross-class, cross-ethnic and interfaith coalitions with other informal and formal networks and are willing to subsume their individual wishes and interests under common goals. Although these movements must be principled in their goals, they must be flexible in the way they attain them. They must also be wary of the dangers of clientelism and the power of the state and its endless possibilities of manipulation. Each learned this the hard way. The Egyptian mass movement Tamarrod, which helped to overthrow the government of Morsi, learned that it is possible to mobilize huge masses of people while losing the political struggle. The Moroccan February 20 Movement was able to express its demands for reform, but in the end mostly the Islamist PJD benefited from the protests.

All movements nowadays have been dissolved or have experienced increasing problems in mobilization. Despite the greater restrictions, they still play an important role in disseminating the ideals of the Arab uprisings by promoting political consciousness, critical thought, public awareness, and communal responsibility. We have seen that in all countries numerous movements exist that uphold the notion of common citizenship and civil, political and social rights. In Egypt, these are the April 6 movement, Maspero Coptic Youth Union, the Tadamun urban civil awareness project, in Morocco, the AMDH, Mali, Attac, and others mentioned in the chapters, in Jordan, the Al Quds Center.

As the report shows, new movements, through critique and new forms of activism, have been able to give older movements, such as the feminist movement, which were often heavily influenced by the culture of authoritarianism, new impulses and new ideas, enhancing the drive for greater independence from state sponsorship and clientelism. In the trade union movement, as well, through activism of the last decade new impulses have led to the creation of independent trade unions, such as the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU). These are not coopted by the state and directly serve the interests of their members. In this manner, the tactics and concept of people
as independent citizens who stand up for their rights have been able to transform their grievances into concrete, institutionalized forms, a development which should be supported as a means of protecting the movement for change.

The report has also shown that one of the reasons why the Arab uprising had such limited results was because none of the movements succeeded in becoming political parties and take part in elections. In contrast to Spain, where the Indignados movement has become a highly successful political party Podemos, which has set Spanish politics on a new footing, in the Arab world this possibility was blocked. Although multiparty politics had been given a new impulse, the political system in countries as Morocco and Jordan remains largely unchanged. Bringing about a greater connection between the much more critically inclined social movements and the more conservative political parties is a way to reinvigorate and rejuvenate the political system.

On the other hand, the report argued that political parties have their own responsibilities. Basically, politics in the Arab world has suffered from two problems. One of the problems of the political system before the uprisings was that it was depoliticized. In the case of the Islamist movement the relations between movements and political parties was too close, suffocating the room for religious political parties to manoeuver and become independent and acquire a wider following. As the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has made clear in several of its reports, the democratic turn of the Islamist movement must be accompanied by a separation between movements and politics, comparable to Christian Democratic parties in Europe after they liberated themselves from the Church after World War II. Only in this way can religious political parties free themselves from the iron grip of absolutist, totalizing ideas.

Of the Islamist parties, Ennahda party has been the most successful in this respect. The PJD has also been willing to form coalitions, although it has been less willing to make concessions, especially on the issue of individual freedoms and rights. The Muslim Brotherhood has been the least successful, because its most rigid conservative wing won the internal struggle for control before the uprisings. One of the reasons for the success of Ennahda has been its willingness to accept terms as the “civil state” and “civility”, whereas for the Muslim Brotherhood these terms remained hollow. In addition, the Brotherhood’s majority strategy completely fitted the model of the illiberal democrats. In the case of Salafism, all tendencies to “honesty” and “good morals” (akhlaq) must be promoted, if they are also accompanied by recognition of equal rights for women and minorities.

However, we have also shown that secular political parties have not been more successful than the Islamist ones in their tasks to lead their countries. They often did have closer connections with social movements but they were unable to translate their ideas into the political arena. Few were able to absorb the youth of the uprisings. Most remained in the hands of older generation of politicians. And in almost all cases, they have been as bad as their Islamist opponents in forming alliances with the counterparts and in creating an overlapping consensus. In Egypt, the coalition of political parties and political leaders, the National Salvation Front, was responsible for giving the military the opportunity to take over power. In Tunisia, Nidaa Tounes almost demolished the chances for bringing about a new consensus. We concluded that secular fundamentalism can be as rigid as religious fundamentalism and shares some of the same sectarian characteristics. Only those parties working for a consensus and towards a new social contract in which equal citizenship rights are guaranteed should be supported.
This means that political parties should not only be willing to engage in coalition formation and put national interests above their own interests, they must also strive to fundamentally reform the political system and turn it away from authoritarianism, clientalism, patronage, and the pursuit of adverse economic programs, and try to achieve the well-being of the nation as a whole. A renewed sense of the “common good”, so well represented in civic republicanism, but also grounded in Islamic political thought (al-maslaha al-‘amma), is a concept that should be promoted in the region. Given the major shift that has taken place over the last two decades towards a discourse of rights, political parties must also support those other elements which are part and parcel of the Arab uprisings: promoting the rule of law, transitional justice, and the respect for human rights. In view of the demands of the people for justice, they should find a balance between the factors that support the virtuous circle of citizenship, in which an equitable political system figures prominently.

Finally, the report argued that civil society should be promoted. As we have seen, civil society was largely bypassed by the Arab uprisings but it mostly asserted its role afterwards. One of the reasons was that it had been completely depoliticized. The vibrancy of civil society, however, was confirmed in Tunisia when after the uprisings the NGO law was liberalized and thousands of new NGOs sprang up. The same occurred in Libya. From what we know about these new NGOs, many of them have acquired a much broader perspective on society. They have become focused on citizenship rights, the promotion of civil consciousness and civic responsibility, and no longer just concentrate on charity and providing social services as such. A good example of a NGO that puts its experience in the service of the larger whole is the Moroccan human rights organization AMDH. It helped to organize the February 20 Movement and train the members of the local leaders of the tansiqiyyat. These examples indicate that large scale cooperation between different NGOs, trade unions, and activists groups of different stripes can be productive.

An important aspect of the uprisings has been the part that youth has played in them. What their role will be in the future of the Arab world has been subject of attention of internal debates, national programs and international organizations. Here as well, it is remarkable that many international organizations play on the general trend that has come out of the Arab uprisings and support programs that promote concepts as “civic virtue”, “critical consciousness” and “youth civil engagement”.

As the central feature of the uprisings has been focused on citizenship rights, the achievement of full citizenship and drawing up a new social contract between the people themselves and between citizens and the state, support should be given to those factors and actors that promote those goals. These goals are not imposed from outside but have been produced by the uprisings themselves. However, due to the long history of the concept in Europe we should grasp this opportunity to help the Arab world to bring the present interest in the concept to a good conclusion. Insight into the background of the meaning of citizenship in Europe, its legacy in the Arab world and how it has evolved on the other side of the Mediterranean, can be a fruitful basis of a dialogue with the Arab world. In this sense it could be the basis of the new European Neighborhood Policy that is being drawn up in the coming months.
**Figure 3. Index of the results of the Arab uprisings**

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<th></th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Dismantling authoritarian state</strong></td>
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<td>The state was weak, but collapsed</td>
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<td><strong>security/stability</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Weakening tribalism</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Weakening clientalism</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Freedom of political parties (political rights)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strengthening Civil society (civil rights)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Successful alliances</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>New social contract</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Rule of law</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Improvement human rights</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transitional justice</strong></td>
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<td>Already in 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economic reform</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Minority rights</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Improvement youth</strong></td>
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Explanation: * = positive; ** = better; *** excellent; - = bad; -- worse; --- disastrous; a blanc means no change.

Figure 3 represents the results of the uprisings as they have been presented by this report. The overall conclusions is that Tunisia has achieved the best results, Morocco has made some progress, Libya’s development has been completely arrested after security has broken down, and in Jordan little has changed, while Egypt’s initial gains have been erased since the military coup. Important indication for future developments is that the position of youth has not improved, while authoritarianism still is strong and the economic reform has nowhere gotten off the ground. As a new discourse of citizenship gains ground this could have consequences for the stability and security for the region in the future.
APPENDIX 1

In the following bullet points we have summarized the conclusions of the report and how they can affect Dutch foreign policy.

Civil rights

Policies:

- Accept that civil rights are obtained by means of a power struggle and cannot be simply given from above by paternalistic states. If they are to stick citizenship rights have to be fought for
- Support the dissemination of all concepts that reinforce the idea of citizenship as a contractual relationship between citizens among themselves and citizens and the state
- Support concepts of the general welfare and the common good
- Support equal cultural rights of ethnic and religious minorities and the acceptance of “difference”. It is only through equal citizenship that they can become part of the political community
- Support pluralism and the indigenous idea that “God created people differently”, in opposition to the unitary, authoritarian state that only unites on the basis of assimilation
- Support equal gender rights of women as citizens who are part of the nation/political community and as such have equal rights
- Support notions of civic responsibility and “civic engagement” among youth
- Support indigenous religious and non-religious concepts of civility (madaniyya) and solidarity
- Support solidarity organizations based on broad concepts of citizenship
- Support social movements that uphold civil rights and greater civic awareness and political consciousness
- Support those organizations that promote the rule of law, human rights and transitional justice, because these not only satisfy a sense of justice among the population but also instill a common sense of citizenship and rights and therefore enhance the virtuous circle of citizenship
- Support efforts to reform the authoritarian state and especially the Ministry of Interior and the police, and security sector. This should be done with the aim to instill the idea that this sector should work in the service of citizens rather than trample on their rights
- Support efforts to reform practices of clientelism and patronage and keep people dependent
- Support the legal underpinning of freedom of organization and freedom of speech not just for legally recognized organizations but also for social movements
- Support an independent civil society

Research and training:
• Support research in the Arab world on concepts of citizenship and the history of citizenship in the region in order that Arabs acquire a better understanding of their own position as citizens
• Support research on political vocabularies and discourses of hierarchy and how movements have tried to subvert them
• Support local organizations that research local ethical ideas of solidarity and civility (madaniyya and akhlaq) and see how they compare to European ideas of civic awareness
• Support broad comparative studies that research the history of citizenship and compare them with other continents such as India or Europe
• Support research on how notions of authoritarianism, clientelism, tribalism and patriarchy hold together and reinforce each other
• Promote a European policy that is based on citizenship as the foundation for engagement with the Arab world
• Organize training sessions and summer courses on citizenship and how it can practically benefit civil society organizations, trade unions, and other organizations
• Organize training sessions for civil rights movements not just on civil rights in the US but also in the Arab world
• Encourage social movements to become legal political parties and their possibilities to channel their grievances and ideas into the political arena

**Political rights**

**Policies:**

• Support the concept of consensus and especially the idea of the overlapping consensus
• Support the idea of coalitions and how they should replace notions of majoritarian democracy
• Support the idea of politics as a separate field of logic that is independent from ideological movements and should be in support of the political community as a whole
• Support greater political consciousness in the region in order that the attempts at depoliticization and the re-installment of identity politics do not succeed
• Counter authoritarian solutions of political problems
• Counter sectarian solutions to political problems
• Support freedom of thought and the acceptance of difference (ikhtilaf)
• Support political parties that underwrite the discourse of the overlapping consensus
• Be aware of “undemocratic liberals” and “illiberal democrats” and that fundamentalism can have secular as well as religious forms
• Beware of majoritarian democratic political movements, which are much more threatening than “fundamentalist” movements
• Support political parties that demand the dismantlement of the authoritarian state
• Support all those political forces that demand political accountability
• Support the drawing up of constitutions based on broad consensus rather than those that are imposed form above by rulers, minority governments or even majority governments
• Encourage all attempts that support the virtuous circle of citizenship and lead to a new social contract

Research and training:
• Support research on political practices in the Middle East and how they often fail to achieve consensus
• Support research on political vocabularies and discourses that support citizenship
• Support research on the counter-discourses of stability, security and unity, and how they operate and become effective and undermine citizenship rights and practices of negotiated consensus
• Support conflict resolution on local notions of citizenship, rights and notions of justice
• Organize summer courses and training sessions on political history of movements
• Give training courses for political parties on finding common grounds
• Take advantage of the new wave of politicization by giving training courses on the meaning of politics to larger audiences, schools, universities in the region

Social rights

Policies:
• Support local concepts of social justice
• Support social rights and incorporate them into policy measures
• Support activities geared to community awareness in a broader context of citizenship rights
• Develop an eye for the adverse effect of the economic policies in the Arab world which undermine citizenship rights and the right to livelihood
• Develop social policies for unemployed youth
• Develop guidelines for a social and economic policies that also has strong social development side
• Support social policies of independent trade union movements and other organizations that support the interests of their members
• Strengthen actors which identify and enhance social rights
• Support cooperation between social and economic actors to develop economic plans that benefit the nation
• Combat attempts to re-install the authoritarian bargain and exchange of social rights for political and economic rights
• Finds ways to counter the effects of the rentier economy and the “oil curse”
Research and training:

- Support research on social rights and social justice and how they have developed in the Arab region historically
- Support local institutions that do research on social rights
- Give training in modern concepts of social justice


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