

Carol Myers-Scotton has worked on code switching (CS) since 1972, when she was confronted with abundant CS data collected by her students in a seminar in Nairobi. The present two volumes summarize and report the results of her important work in the 20 years since then. One volume presents a model accounting for the social motivations for CS, and the companion volume focuses on structural constraints on intrasentential CS. The books under review are clear and easy to read, although sometimes a bit fragmented in their presentation. Judging from the references in recent articles concerning many different CS settings, Myers-Scotton's work has developed into the dominant paradigm for present-day research in this field, and it is appropriate to evaluate her contributions in some detail.

In some ways the publication of the material in two separate books has created a certain imbalance. Thus about half of *Social Motivations* is devoted to preliminary issues: an overly detailed sketch of the African setting (chapter 1, 9–44), and an interesting if somewhat biased history of the field (chapter 5, 45–74). The crucial chapters of the book, “Motivations for the markedness model” (chapter 4, 75–112) and “A markedness model of code-switching” (chapter 5, 113–149), are somewhat sketchy on important issues. Furthermore, the separation of social and structural concerns in separate volumes obscures some of the links between them. Two examples: on p. 4 Myers-Scotton defines CS somewhat controversially as “the selection ... of forms from an embedded language (or languages) in utterances of a matrix language ....” This definition is in line with the author's structural work and fits much of
the African material discussed (characterized by insertions) in that sense, the exception being example (5) on p. 123. It makes it necessary, however, to assume a going back and forth between different matrix languages where, for example, Spanish-English CS in the US is discussed (pp. 125–126). Yet it is not clear that the central notion of “unmarked CS” as such, described on pp. 117–131, requires the concept of a matrix language. Another example: on p. 6 Myers-Scotton briefly mentions the, again controversial, issue of whether CS and borrowing need to be distinguished but does not go into it, arguing that it is not relevant to the issue of social motivations. Yet, it surely must be if the psychological status of CS is different from that of borrowings, and indeed on pp. 129–130 the issue comes up in relation to the Ottawa study reported on in the work of Poplack and associates (Poplack et al. 1988). The distinction is the focus of chapter 6 of Duelling Languages.

High time to turn to the core of Social Motivations, which will become a central reference in the discussion of the social motivations for CS. Carol Myers-Scotton stresses the important point that CS is not merely a stage in the process of language shift or part of the performance of imperfect bilinguals. Instead she emphasizes the regular and in some sense unexceptional nature of CS in her markedness model. This model is very elegant in avoiding a mere listing of functions, and in being universally applicable (not just to CS but to all language use). It has the potential to do justice to the dynamic nature of interactions and avoids much criticized notions such as “we/they code” and “metaphorical vs. situational CS.”

On the other hand, it is also a static, nondevelopmental approach, leaving many potentially interesting situations of CS out of the picture. How is it possible that marked choices do not lead to an innovation in the system (p. 141)? It emphasizes transactional encounters as opposed to less risky ones. The emphasis on rights and obligations sets (RO sets) makes language use seem to be a mere index of changing social relations, neglecting other functions of language, such as creating a counter-discourse (Hill and Hill 1986), meta-linguistic commentary, clarification, emphasis, etc. The latter functions are acknowledged (p. 149) as part of unmarked CS; however, the possibility of a marked CS with such a function appears to be ruled out, since a marked switch, according to Myers-Scotton, is motivated by the wish “to negotiate an RO set other than the unmarked one” (p. 149). Yet, some pages earlier (pp. 139–140) she herself deals with marked switches creating aesthetic or stylistic effects. These marked switches are clearly not motivated by the speaker’s wish to negotiate a marked RO set but rather by the intention to “call
up 'something different' from what has been presented thus far or is expected" (p. 140).

The author avoids dealing with the concept of speech community, a concept crucial to the markedness model, which is based on sharedness of norms (p. 61). At the same time, the emphasis is on the speaker, rather than the audience. One place this becomes problematic is in a quote from a letter to the author by a Tanzanian friend (p. 117), in which a request for a loan goes with a switch from Swahili to English.

(1) ... Nina shida ya lazima sana ya pesa kwa sasa. Naomba sana unisaide [I have a great need of money right now. I ask you to help me]. Well, this is the first time since I knew you, I think, to borrow money. I know money can break our friendship.

The switch is interpreted as an attempt by the embarrassed writer to distance himself from the request, and no mention is made of the fact that the addressee is in fact a bilingual anglophone. To what extent are the two a speech community?

A somewhat distorted picture of Gumperz (e.g. 1982) is given (pp. 52–55), missing the correspondence between his framework and the markedness model, for example with respect to Gumperz's cooccurrence expectations and Myers-Scotton's unmarked choices. The lack of principled ways of analyzing specific interactions leads to the same ad hoc-ism of which she accuses Gumperz. In fact Gumperz's work on contextualization cues provides some actual methodological tools for penetrating deeper into the process of how interactants signal and interpret saliency and the relevance of situational factors to be used in inferencing the marked or unmarked status of a situation.

One of the strong points of this beautifully produced book is the elaborate examples, even if little phonological information is given about pitch contours and pauses. They are a bit difficult to follow in detail for a reader not familiar with Swahili or Shona, since they are only partly and not quite consistently glossed. The map of Africa on p. 11 does not give any language information, which would have been welcome and is suggested on p. 10. Also a table listing the noun-class prefixes in Shona and Swahili would have been useful.

The other volume, Duelling Languages, represents a more recent research interest of Carol Myers-Scotton and is more elaborate in its structure. The main focus is described in the preface (p. vii): "... it approaches codeswitching as a product of the 'psycholinguistic stress' of two linguistic systems interacting." The model proposed in Duelling Languages has three important features:
First, there is always an identifiable base or matrix language (ML), and an asymmetry between that and the embedded language (EL). The two languages are separately processed in units called islands. The three types of constituents listed — EL islands, ML islands, and mixed EL + ML constituents — do not constitute an empirical claim by themselves, of course; they are simply the logical possibilities.

Second, there is a fundamental distinction between function morphemes and content morphemes in their distribution in CS utterances: function morphemes in mixed ML + EL fragments can only be drawn from the ML.

Third, there is a strong claim about the psycholinguistic basis in sentence production of the model. Thus there is “inhibition” and “activation” of languages, etc.

Problems for the model are attached to all three of these features. First, the definition of ML is not unproblematic. On p. 3 the ML is termed “the main language in CS utterances in a number of ways.” On p. 68 an “ML criterion” is proposed, leading to the definition of ML as “the language of more morphemes in interaction types including intrasentential CS.” It must be based on a discourse sample and exclude cultural borrowings and words for new concepts. Considering this definition, take an example like (2), cited in isolation (we follow Myers-Scotton’s practice of italicizing the embedded language material):

(2)  **Ni-check all that particular day’s constructions.**

    ‘I should …’ (Swahili–English, p. 146)

Since Swahili *ni* ‘first person subject clitic’ is a function morpheme, we must take the author’s word for it that the sentence was taken from a discourse that was mostly Swahili, since the matrix language in (2) is taken to be Swahili. A similar example is (3), again cited in isolation:

(3)  **It’s only essential services** ambazo zi-na

    COMP-cl.10 cl.10-PRES-function right now.

    ‘It’s only essential services which function right now.’

    (Swahili–English, p. 130)

Consider now a stretch of more extended discourse, for which again Swahili is taken to be the matrix language:

(4)  A:  Bwana O., niambie kuhusu mpango wa posta wa *save as you earn*.

    ‘Mr. O., tell me about the postal plan of “save as you earn.”’

    B:  Mpango huu ni *the customer fills forms and surrenders plan* this is
It is hard to see what purpose is gained and what criteria can be used to assume that Swahili is the ML throughout. Yet, this is what the author is implying.

A related issue is the relation between the definition of ML used by Myers-Scotton and the notion of “matrix clause” from traditional grammar. In the following cases, the matrix clause is in the EL, and the embedded clause in the ML:

(5) *Mais toi, on dirait que* ozokima te bajours oyo.

‘But you, one would say that you do not job these days.’

(Lingala–French, p. 132)

(6) *You didn’t have to worry que* somebody te iba a tirar con cerveza o una botella *or something like that.*

‘You didn’t have to worry that somebody was going to throw beer or a bottle at you or something like that.’

(Spanish–English, p. 128)

Given that genuine matrix/embedded clause asymmetries are generally assumed to have a correlate in sentence planning, it is difficult to conceive of a matrix clause being “embedded,” language-wise, in a complement clause. Furthermore, *somebody* cannot constitute an EL island, given Myers-Scotton’s definition of EL islands (p. 138): “All islands must be composed of at least two lexemes/morphemes in a hierarchical relationship.”

Thus there remains a tension between a structural view of ML and a view in terms of incremental sentence production, but the two cannot be entirely separate. The author even suggests that the ML could change during a sentence (p. 70). While this may appear to be correct, it limits the empirical scope of the notion “matrix”: it may be a notion primarily
relevant at the level of constituency. Change in ML is prevalent in changing bilingual communities (pp. 73–74). However, many bilingual communities, particularly migrant communities, are precisely characterized by rapid change. Thus models in terms of this notion may have a limited usefulness.

To sum up, although there is much evidence that indeed in many cases CS is asymmetrical and involves a "dominant," "base," or "matrix" language, the particular way Myers-Scotton defines it is fraught with difficulties. Indeed, it is problematic to adopt the notion as the fundamental basis for a theory of CS.

A second problem is that separating function from nonfunction morphemes is far from easy. The formal definitions of function morphemes in terms of quantification (reminding one of Jakobson's shifters) and theta theory (pp. 99–102) are more reminiscent of grammatical models of CS than of psycholinguistic models. The definition of quantifiers, for instance, as system morphemes, elements that cannot be embedded outside an EL island, immediately runs into empirical problems. The quantifier somebody in (6) is illicit, in Myers-Scotton's view, as in kuch 'some' in (7):

(7) Of all the places John has hidden kuch books bathroom men.

some in

(Of all the places, John has hidden some books in the bathroom.)

(Hindi–English, p. 43)

Strictly speaking, kuch is not illicit in (7) since Hindi is assumed to be the ML here by Myers-Scotton, but given the absence of context there is no reason for this latter assumption, except to save the definition of system morpheme.

Clearly, there is a need to distinguish content words from function words in some way when analyzing CS, but the distinction may well involve several dimensions and be in part language-specific.

Third, embedding in a theory of speech production is problematic. We can grant that psycholinguistically there is an important difference between function and content morphemes. However, if we assume with Levelt, as Myers-Scotton does, that sentence production is "lexically driven," we are talking about the content morphemes (such as the predicate) that drive production, not the function morphemes. Why then should the latter impose the matrix language? Why are specialized morphosyntactic procedures triggered by lemmas? On p. 118 the author writes, "Either ML or EL content morphemes may be 'called' by ML or EL lemmas respectively, but they both appear in slots prepared by ML lemmas." Now take an example like
What Myers-Scotton would have to propose here is that the French elements are replacing abstract Arabic lemmas, which trigger the Arabic sentence frame, which then leads to the selection of Arabic system morphemes such as *dak* 'that' and *dyal* 'of'. Now that latter assumption seems correct, but the assumption that the medical discourse is regulated by abstract Arabic lemmas is implausible. If one examines the fragment from which the sentence is taken, from the work of Bentahila and Davies (1992), it is clear that the Moroccan doctors or interns are talking in Arabic about the French medical universe, implying the complete European medical vocabulary, set of concepts, etc., that they have received from their training. Selection of a morphosyntactic frame is not linked directly to lemma selection but is a separate process.

The same issue can be broached by looking at the precise definition of 'lemma'. It is not clear exactly what Myers-Scotton's view is on the lemma in relation to the bilingual. In figure 4.3 on p. 116, lemma selection triggers the calling of specialized morphosyntactic procedures. Hence one would assume that lemmas are language-specific. However, further down in the same figure we notice that the lexemes called by lemmas are realized. Where is congruency tested in the process of speech production? The notion of lemma fluctuates: sometimes it is abstract, as in Garrett's perspective (p. 48), and sometimes it is language-specific. If we take lemmas to be abstract, language-independent entities, congruency matching could take place quite early on. In that case, it is hard to see how they could trigger language-specific morphosyntactic procedures by themselves. If we take lemmas to be language-specific entities, it is not clear where and how congruency can be defined.

In addition to these three main problems, there are other problematic aspects of Myers-Scotton's work. A first one concerns variation. On pp. 2–3 the author relies on the competence/performance distinction to account for variability in CS: the model is supposed to provide the overall possibilities, while what actually occurs is determined by performance. While it is an empirical issue, yet to be settled, whether all cases of CS will be accounted for by the model, it is clear that some of the more interesting of present-day CS studies look at systematic variation between subgroups of speakers switching between the same two languages. The variation is associated with membership of different generations within a migrant community, bilingual dominance and proficiency, sociolinguistic and cultural orientation, etc. The present model, at first glance,
offers little in this respect. The weaker language of a bilingual can function as the ML, for instance (p. 67).

A further issue is the treatment of peripheral elements. At the same time Myers-Scotton establishes an implicational hierarchy of EL islands (pp. 144–147), which implies that peripheral elements can be switched more easily, but the notion of peripherality is not defined in terms of the MLF model itself. Myers-Scotton explains the implicational hierarchy of EL islands as follows (p. 144):

(...) the central constituents carry the main semantic weight of the sentence; it makes sense that they should be either in ML islands or possibly in ML + EL constituents. For the reasons outlined above (...) in defining the ML, the ML has more psycho-sociolinguistic dominance in the discourse under consideration. And to allow elements which are peripheral to the communicative intention to appear in the EL (as islands) seems a likely corollary.

There are two comments to be made on this functional explanation. First, the importance of switched elements as indices of (changing) RO sets (cf. Social Motivations) would suggest that switched elements must be central to the communicative intention of the speaker: one would, therefore, expect more central constituents to appear as EL islands. Second, the claim that peripheral constituents are also peripheral to the core of the communicative intention is disputable: time and manner PPs, for instance, add essential information to an utterance. A structural explanation of the hierarchy seems to be far more convincing: peripheral constituents such as time PPs are peripheral to argument structure and hence can be switched more easily.

In a number of places, it is clear from the presentation that the notion of island cannot be maintained. On pp. 112–115 the discussion of bare forms is not quite satisfactory. The forms are not always grammatical according to the ML grammar, and it remains unclear by what grammar they are governed. Conversely, on p. 150 the “leakage” from ML into EL islands is not predicted by the model. On p. 134 it is suggested under (c) that an ML procedure could provide an EL affix. What kind of ML procedure could this be?

On pp. 193–194 a distinction is made between CS and borrowing in terms of predictability: borrowings are assumed to be recurrent, switches not. Recurrent switching is definitely possible, however, and characteristic of many bilingual corpora, in line with findings from studies in corpus linguistics to the effect that recurrence is not a distinguishing characteristic of the lexicon in a strict sense.

Prosody is not considered in enough detail for a psycholinguistic model. Along the same lines, on p. 126 and p. 189 phonological factors are
adduced as an argument, but the status of phonology in the model is rather peripheral.

The extension of the model in chapter 7 to “deep grammatical borrowing” and other contact phenomena is rather sketchily worked out, but will surely stimulate much interesting research.

In spite of these critical remarks we wish to stress again the importance of Myers-Scotton’s work for the field. It has linked psycholinguistic, sociolinguistic, and grammatical concerns and contains a number of valuable ideas that can lead to further hypotheses and a clearer view of how bilinguals function.

*University of Amsterdam*

PIETER MUYSKEN

VINCENT DE ROOIJ

References


Poplack, Shana; Sankoff, David; and Miller, Christopher (1988). The social correlates and linguistic processes of lexical borrowing and assimilation. *Linguistics* 26, 47–104.


This book provides a new introduction to the study of pidgin and creole languages, written jointly by linguists at the University of Amsterdam, who are well known for their contributions to the study of these languages. Not surprisingly, given the focus of the work being done there, the book concentrates primarily on the Atlantic creoles. Although it is unusual for a textbook of this type to be an edited collection, this practice works very well and has many advantages in a field such as pidgin and creole studies that involves so many languages, thereby inevitably limiting the expertise of any one individual. In addition to the three editors, Lilian Adamson, René Appel, Peter Bakker, Adrienne Bruyn, Hans den Besten, Vincent de Rooij, Silvia Kouwenberg, Marike Post, Cefas van Rossem,
Hein van der Voort, Tonjes Veenstra, and Ludo Verhoeven serve as authors and coauthors of various chapters of the book. The resulting volume is both highly readable and informative, as well as timely in the way it addresses current theoretical issues in universal grammar. It covers most of the topics one would expect to find in an introductory text, such as theories of origin and structural features, as well as many areas not generally represented in textbooks such as the use of creoles as literary languages and in education.

The book is organized into five sections. Part I, "General Aspects," includes six chapters. There is an overview of the field (Muysken/Smith), a chapter each on pidgens (Bakker) and creoles (Arends), one on mixed languages (Bakker/Muysken), one on variation and the concept of the creole continuum (de Rooij), and two chapters dealing with education (Appel and Verhoeven), and creole literature (Adamson/van Rossem). Part II contains four chapters covering theories of genesis. These address the question of European input (den Besten/Muysken/Smith), non-European input (Arends/Kouwenberg/Smith), gradualist vs. developmental hypotheses (Arends/bruyn), and universalist approaches (Muysken/Veenstra).

Part III contains eight chapters with sketches of individual creoles including Eskimo Pidgin (van der Voort), Haitian (Muysken/Veenstra), Saramaccan (Bakker/Smith/Veenstra), Shaba Swahili (de Rooij), Fa d'Ambu (Post), Papiamento (Kouwenberg/Muysken), Sranan (Adamson/Smith), and Berbice Dutch (Kouwenberg). This select coverage give students a good sampling both geographic and linguistic of the diversity in the Atlantic region. Haitian, for instance, representing a French-based creole, has the largest number of speakers of any of the Caribbean creoles and is also one of the best studied languages. Eskimo is a case where creolization has involved an indigenous language known for its agglutinative structure. Similarly, Shaba Swahili has its base in contact between related indigenous African languages of the Bantu family. The fact that it is the outcome of adult second-language acquisition rather than children's first-language acquisition makes its status as creole problematic. Also representing a creole from Africa is Fa d'Ambu, a Portuguese-based creole spoken on the island of Annobon on the West African coast. Saramaccan, often thought of as the most African in its structure, is well known for being a radical creole, that is, the most grammatically deviant from its lexifier languages (English and Portuguese). Papiamento is a Portuguese/Spanish-based creole spoken on the Netherlands Antilles islands of Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao. Sranan is an English-based creole spoken in Surinam, South America. Berbice Dutch with its four or five remaining speakers is one of the few
surviving Dutch-based creoles. I think these sketches would be better placed after the discussion of grammatical features that follows in Part IV. This allows students time to acquire more knowledge of grammatical terminology useful in understanding the examples given in the sketches. Individual instructors can of course postpone assigning these chapters until they have covered the basic material.

Part IV concentrates on grammatical features and comprises five chapters dealing with major syntactic structures and categories: TMA particles and auxiliaries (Bakker/Post/van der Voort), noun phrases (Bruyn), reflexives (Muysken/Smith), serial verbs (Muysken/Veenstra), and fronting (Veenstra/den Besten). Part V contains a concluding chapter written by the editors, and an annotated list of creoles, pidgins, and mixed languages by Norval Smith, which is a welcome update and addition to Hancock’s repertory (1977). It provides some information on number of speakers and the linguistic status of the languages. There is also a map showing the location of the languages frequently cited in the text.

While the authors’ concentration on languages they know well avoids some of the pitfalls in trying to cover such a large number of diverse languages, there are still some problems with examples and data unfamiliar to them. It is striking, for example, that most of the examples from Tok Pisin are problematic for one reason or another. They gloss bin as an anterior marker with no comment (p. 123). I believe Sankoff (1990) is right in claiming that Tok Pisin has not yet grammaticalized an anterior marker. Where bin occurs, it is by and large used as a simple past rather than a past before past. In their discussion of relativization (p. 128) they have incorrectly glossed ia as a predicate marker, though I believe this is a typographical error. In any event, strictly speaking, ia is not a relative marker but simply reinforces or brackets overtly a clause that could be construed as relative on other grounds such as pronominalization or prosody (see Romaine 1992). In Muysken and Smith’s chapter on reflexives the Tok Pisin example my yet is glossed as ‘(1st sg head) myself’ (p. 271). I believe my must be a typographical error for mi, which is the first person singular pronoun. However, I don’t know of anyone who has proposed the derivation of yet from ‘head’. In the editors’ concluding chapter they cite (p. 321) Tok Pisin be as a future marker. I believe this is a typographical error for bai (or its reduced form ba). While the development of bai from the temporal adverb haimbai is often cited as a textbook case of grammaticalization, the facts are considerably more complex and rather messier than the standard account repeated here (see Romaine 1995). Nevertheless, I agree with the editors’ conclusions that grammaticalization is a promising approach for further research on pidgins and creoles.
While the exposition is generally clear and concise throughout, I have some doubt about the editors' claim that the book does "not demand a high level of previous linguistic knowledge" (p. v). Terms are often used with no examples or definitions. For instance, in Bakker's chapter on pidgins he states (p. 33) that the morphological process of reduplication is common but not universal in creole languages though rare in pidgins as a productive process. He then mentions a few languages where it occurs but gives no examples. Examples that make the process clear do not appear until p. 171. The book will thus be best suited to those who already have considerable knowledge of descriptive linguistics and some appreciation for current theoretical concerns.

Merton College, University of Oxford

SUZANNE ROMAINE

References


Speech act theory, or rather theories — to acknowledge the many elaborations that the sketchy proposals found in the canonical texts have received — need no introduction. They are "one of the more lasting products of the linguistic movement in philosophy of the mid-twentieth century" (Price, p. 132). However, another book devoted to their reexamination and reassessment does need an introduction, especially given some recent caustic appraisals and subsequent theoretical developments:

Today few pragmaticists see speech act theory as anything other than a shorthand way of discussing speaker meaning: a helpful means of abstraction whose terminology lingers on because it is such common currency and useful for that reason

By way of introduction, the editor (pp. 1-25) of the present book attempts to argue that (i) the usual exclusive focus on propositional content is unpromising because (ii) illocutionary acts are meaning-determining acts and so (iii) the identification of what a speaker means in using a sentence of his or her language is not possible unless one further determines which from among the various acts he or she is engaged in performing but (iv) there are many fundamental questions concerning both the internal structure of speech act theory and (v) its external relations that have not been sufficiently investigated. Hence the need for the present book. It is a collection of 22 original papers on the foundations of speech act theories, but it must be said at the outset that the present reviewer finds that the attention paid to these matters does not always lead to conceptual advance.

The bulk of the papers are philosophical in character. On the one hand there are informal, ordinary language-type philosophy papers; on the other hand there are papers that make their case by exploiting the resources of formal languages. In the first category, William Alston, in “Illocutionary meaning and linguistic meaning” (pp. 29–49), indicates the general character, with appropriate simplifications, of his proposals to equate linguistic meaning with illocutionary act potential. He has pursued this topic for many years (cf. Alston 1963, 1964a, 1964b), and this paper is intended to serve as a prologue to a forthcoming book with the same title. John Kearns, in “Meaning, structure and speech acts” (pp. 50–79), presents some revisions, in an idiosyncratic notation, to Kearns (1984). He claims to have developed more adequate alternative conceptions of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, but these are introduced abstractly, with minimal illustration, and the ordinary working linguist is unlikely to find them very helpful. Huw Price, in “Semantic minimalism and the Frege point” (pp. 132–155), alleges that a move to what he calls minimal semantics allows the philosophical nonfactualist to sidestep arguments, in particular the Frege argument, that are usually regarded as extremely damaging to nonfactualism. This category also contains papers by Charles Travis (“On being truth-valued,” pp. 167–186), Jennifer Hornsby (“Illocution and its significance,” pp. 187–207), Steven Davis (“Anti-individualism and speech act theory,” pp. 208–219), Savas Tsohatzidis (“The gap between speech acts and mental states,” pp. 220–233, and “Speaker meaning, sentence meaning and metaphor,” pp. 365–373), Rod Bertolet (“Are there indirect speech acts?”, pp. 335–349), David Holdcroft (“Indirect speech acts and propo-

In the second category, the more formal studies, there are a number of interesting papers. D. Shwayder, in “A semantics of utterance, formalized” (pp. 80–99), outlines the basics of test-theoretic semantics, which he offers as an alternative to the more usual model-theoretic framework. The paper is, by the author’s own admission, “sketchy,” and Shwayder says that he will “not burden this paper with details, which [he has] found to be sometimes technically challenging” (p. 94). But it appears that “meaning, …, is to be secured, not by a prior selection of referable objects, but rather by indications of procedures for getting to such objects” (p. 94). The first volume of a fuller statement of this kind of semantics can be found in Shwayder (1992). Daniel Vanderveken, in “A complete formulation of a simple logic of elementary illocutionary acts” (pp. 99–131), presents a glimpse of a logic that is explained in more detail elsewhere (Vanderveken 1990, 1991; cf. Turner 1993). His aim is perfectly compatible with the model-theoretic semanticist but his ambition is to go beyond theories of truth and to design a theory of satisfaction. He argues that a semantic theory of truth for natural language is the special sub-theory for assertive speech acts of the more general theory of satisfaction for speech acts with an arbitrary illocutionary force. On my account, linguistic competence is inseparable from performance: it is essentially the speaker’s ability to perform and understand the illocutionary acts which are the meanings of utterances. Moreover, illocutionary logic is needed to formalize the practical and theoretical valid inferences that human beings are able to make in virtue of linguistic competence (p. 100).

This work deserves more widespread acknowledgement but the technical expertise it requires to be appreciated is extremely high, and it is going to remain a minority interest in the absence of a reader-friendly introduction. Finally, an acquaintance with abstract algebra would assist the reading of “Algebra of elementary social acts” by Arthur Merin (pp. 234–263). This paper appears to be one that is conceptually distant from what goes normally by the name of speech act theory.

In addition to the mainly philosophical papers there are some, though few, contributions that orient very definitively toward linguistics. Jerrold Sadock, in “Toward a grammatically realistic typology of speech acts” (pp. 393–406), and William Croft, in “Speech act classification, language typology and cognition” (pp. 460–477), take Sadock and Zwicky (1985) as their point of departure and attempt to improve upon the numerous philosophical taxonomies of illocutionary acts by incorporating relevant facts from a broad diversity of languages. Both acknowledge the tentative character and limitations of their proposals, and they recommend that
further work be done. And Robert Harnish, in “Mood, meaning and speech acts” (pp. 407–459) sketches a theory of mood that satisfies certain intuitive conditions of adequacy that previous theories failed to satisfy. This is another paper that foreshadows a forthcoming book with the same title, and the reader is frequently referred to this work.

But once the philosophical and linguistic studies have been put to one side, there are five promising papers that examine aspects of the interface between semantics and pragmatics and that deserve careful attention. These papers are by Francois Récanati (“Contextualism and anti-contextualism in the philosophy of language,” pp. 156–166), Kent Bach (“Semantic slack: what is said and more,” pp. 267–291), Graham Bird (“Relevance theory and speech acts,” pp. 292–311), Asa Kasher (“Modular speech act theory: programme and results,” pp. 312–322), and Marcelo Dascal (“Speech act theory and Gricean pragmatics: some differences of detail that make a difference,” pp. 323–334).

Bird and Dascal are concerned with speech act theory’s “external relations.” Bird defends speech act theories against the relevance-theoretic claim that “[t]he vast range of data that speech-act theorists have been concerned with is of no special interest to pragmatics” (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 243). He reduces this general claim to seven more specific theses:

1a) Speech act theory has no place in linguistics.
1b) Speech act theory has a restricted role to play in linguistics.
2a) Speech act theory’s restricted role is a matter of its relative unimportance.
2b) Speech act theory’s restricted role is a matter of a necessary limitation on the range of speech acts that deserve to be accommodated within a linguistic theory.
3a) Speech act theory should be replaced by relevance theory.
3b) Relevance theory provides the proper theoretical foundation for the restricted role of speech act theory.
3c) Relevance theory adds a complementary psychological theory into which speech act theory can be incorporated.

And he demonstrates that arguments adduced to support the strong theses (1a), (2a), and (3a) are open to serious objections and that there remains considerable ambiguity as to how the weaker theses (1b), (2b), (3b), and (3c) are to be defended. He concludes that although “[t]here is room for a psychological supplement to speech act theory [à la thesis (3c)] ... it is doubtful that [the] P[rinicple of] R[elevance] provides it” (p. 310). This paper should be made compulsory reading, especially for the more strident relevance theoreticians, for it documents a number of
ambiguities within the entire program that need to be clarified before the theory can be properly evaluated. Recall an early warning: “Informal explanations, not based on formal theory, particularly those that trade on words like ‘relevant,’ are always liable to the fallacy of equivocation” (Gazdar 1979: 54).

Dascal’s is another paper that merits broad readership. He attempts to criticize a particular speech act theory and, by implication, defend the merits of the conversational hypothesis. He argues as follows: (i) Searle’s speech act theory and Grice’s theory of conversation have often been conjoined, or at least seen as complementary; (ii) this is an entirely natural manoeuvre as the theories are superficially quite compatible; (iii) both theories, for example, are reactions to the Wittgensteinian slogan that “meaning is use”; (iv) meaning is NOT use: semantics is emphatically NOT pragmatics; (v) but here the compatibility between the two theories ends; (vi) Searle and Grice distinguish between meaning and use in two, incompatible, and indeed sometimes inconsistent, ways; (vii) for Searle, for example,

[s]ometimes it is the distinction between truth conditions and illocutionary forces; sometimes, the distinction between the domain of logical relations and the domain of some “quasi-logical” relations; sometimes it has to do with what is and what is not “embedded” in the set of institutional conditions required for the performance of speech acts ... none of these pairs is exclusively on the side of use or meaning (pp. 328–329).

(viii) The difference between Searle and Grice, and in particular the differences in the kind of understanding they have of what is “use,” can be represented by a list of oppositions expressed by a number of key words:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Searle</th>
<th>Grice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>monological</td>
<td>dialogical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formal</td>
<td>informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conventional</td>
<td>nonconventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grammatical model</td>
<td>nongrammatical model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constitutive rules</td>
<td>heuristic rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>implication</td>
<td>implicature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>semantic</td>
<td>pragmatic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dascal’s conclusion is that

[s]peech act theory seeks to treat what it calls “use” by means of strict rules, which can be formalized into a precise illocutionary logic. It seeks to demonstrate that use can be treated as rigorously as meaning has been .... But it may have
gone too far in its reduction of use to meaning thereby proving rather than disproving the slogan it originally opposed (p. 333).

This is a good, cautionary, paper that alerts the reader to the pitfalls of premature pick-and-mix pragmatic theorizing. The moral is simple: do not be too impressed by superficial theoretical compatibility: examine very carefully the background (cf. Searle 1980).

The papers by Récanati and Bach continue the exploration of the meaning/use interface. Récanati speaks in terms of contextualism (aka pragmatics, aka use) and anticontextualism (aka semantics, aka meaning) and suggests that anticontextualism is based on the following claim:

(a) For every statement that can be made using a context-sensitive sentence in a given context, there is an eternal sentence that can be used to make the same statement in any context.

In reply, the contextualist manufactures arguments having to do with the facts of reference, predication, quantification, standards of precision, and tense to deny (a). None of these arguments are controversy-free, of course, but Récanati's purpose is not to adjudicate on these factual matters. Instead, he wishes to focus attention on the nature of the methodological principles that are employed. He discerns two: the parallelism principle,

(b) If a (syntactically complete) sentence can be used in different contexts to say different things (to express different propositions), then the explanation for this contextual variation of content is that the sentence has different linguistic meanings — is semantically ambiguous;

and modified Occam's Razor,

(c) Senses (linguistic meanings) are not to be multiplied beyond necessity;

and he argues that (b) and (c) allow analyses to veer to conclusions of semantic ambiguity or to conclusions of a partition between sense and implicature. But these principles do not allow the possibility that the propositional content of an utterance depends upon context. He has no positive proposals to make about the nature of contextually variable truth conditions (cf. Récanati 1989 and especially 1993) but limits his ambitions to observing that this possibility has been eclipsed in the more orthodox discussions of the demarcation between meaning and use.

Bach, on the other hand, both here and in Bach (1994), has a lot to say about what he calls "the middle ground" between what is said
(meaning/semantics) and what is implicated (use/pragmatics). The argument attempts to establish a case for there being presemantic pragmatic processes in addition to the more usually acknowledged postsemantic processes (cf. Levinson 1988a). By way of explanation, consider the following examples:

(1) You're not going to die.
(2) I haven't eaten.

The literal meaning of the sentences expressed by the utterances (1) and (2), Bach argues, determines a definite proposition with a definite set of truth conditions as follows:

(1-TC) The addressee of the utterance of (1) is immortal.
(2-TC) The utterer of (2) has not eaten prior to the time of utterance.

(1-TC) and (2-TC) are what Bach calls minimal propositions. An utterer of (1) or (2) is understood to be communicating not the minimal proposition but some expansion of it:

(1') You're not going to die [from that cut on your finger].
(2') I haven't eaten [breakfast today].

Now consider the following examples:

(3) Steel isn't strong enough.
(4) Fred almost robbed a bank.

(3) and (4) are what Bach calls propositional radicals. An utterer of (3) and (4) is understood to be communicating not a propositional radical but some completion of it. The propositions themselves are semantically incomplete in that something must be added for the sentence to express a complete and determinate proposition:

(3') Steel isn't strong enough [for something or other].
(4') Fred nearly succeeded in/barely refrained from robbing a bank.

So the picture is one of at least two kinds of propositions — minimal propositions and propositional radicals — which, respectively, undergo pragmatic processes of expansion and completion and which in turn deliver fully fledged propositions, complete with the appropriate truth conditions, and these form the basis, in turn, on which the more usual implicature-generating pragmatic processes apply. There is a certain amount of additional attention that these ideas need to receive, of course. Bach, like Récanati and others who explore "the middle ground," speak somewhat pretheoretically about the different kinds of propositions and the presemantic pragmatic processes that serve to supplement them. But
this is a promising area for future research and we should wait impatiently for further results.

The last paper is "Modular speech act theory — programme and results" by Asa Kasher. It is a mainly programmatic paper about how speech act theory may be modularized and made compatible with a number of Kasher's earlier proposals (e.g. Kasher 1987, 1991a, 1991b, among many others). I have found the study of this work extremely rewarding and recommend it to anyone seeking a pragmatic extension to generative linguistics and modular psychology.

This book, to conclude an overlong review, will find a ready audience. EVERYONE working in semantics or pragmatics is conversant with the original theses, and contributions to the elaboration of these will be on every course reading list and in many research bibliographies. But I have to say that I believe an opportunity has been missed in this book. I am thinking of the issues attending to (i) the absorption of the notion of speech act and speech act theory more generally into the notion of face-threatening act and politeness theory more generally (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987): such an absorption makes the design of utterances addressee-directed and not just speaker-centered, with obvious advantages for a subsequent theory of conversation; (ii) the capability, or indeed incapability, of speech act theories in general to serve as the foundation of theories of conversation (cf. Levinson 1981a, 1981b; van Rees 1992); (iii) the projection problem for illocutionary forces (cf. Harnish 1979); (iv) elaborations of the standard model of participation (Clark and Carlson 1982; Fill 1986; Levinson 1988b; McCawley 1984; Zheng 1993); and (v) cross-cultural applications (cf. Blum-Kulka et al. 1989; Gass and Neu 1994). These matters are given scant, if any, attention in this book, and they are, in a wider context, very important. Although it was possible for John Searle to say, more than ten years ago, that speech act theory was "so much fun" (Searle 1984) because it had no history, and therefore it wasn't necessary to worry about what the great philosophers of the past had to say about it, the time may now have come to worry whether speech act theory has a future. Too many of the contributions to this collection look backward: too few point forward.

University of Brighton

KEN TURNER

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Everyone will agree that there is need for further research into the period in which the social structures and much of the linguistic makeup of modern Britain were formed — the nineteenth century, which saw the development of an agrarian society into an industrialized, urban one. The somewhat disappointing account of the time by Phillipps (1984), which was almost exclusively based on literary sources, and the sketches by Honey (1988, 1989), which outlined the main trends in the establishment of accent as a sociolinguistic marker in the nineteenth century and the function of the schools in the process, left room for further and more detailed explorations. Mugglestone set out to fill at least some of the remaining gaps. She sketches the prescriptive tradition of the eighteenth century, giving due weight to the authoritative statements by Sheridan and Walker as to the accepted or preferable pronunciations of problem sounds and individual words, and then follows up nineteenth-century attitudes in great detail on the basis of a notably comprehensive collection of relevant statements drawn from the spate of conduct books that so vividly express the concerns, especially of social climbers, about proper pronunciation. The selection and interpretation of these passages, many
of them hitherto virtually unknown (the anonymous booklets often erroneously catalogued in individual libraries, or not listed at all) certainly make up the most informative part of the book. There is, in addition, a great amount of information on how these attitudes relate to passages in the major nineteenth-century novelists, ranging from Jane Austen to George Gissing; much of Mugglestone’s interpretation is excellent and stimulates us to reread the novels with a wary eye (and ear) tuned to social differences linguistically signalled in the speech of the characters.

There are, however, a number of reasons that make the book not quite as useful as an analytical tool for applied historical sociolinguistics as many readers might have wished:

1. The huge amount of complex material (which was difficult to structure according to individual features, social and attitudinal relevance, changing evaluation, and relevance/reliability of sources used) is not arranged in an ideal way. Readers are likely not to see the forest for individual trees, with hundreds of individual quotations crowding in on them, some of them repeated, and without a clear organization helping them to digest this *embarras de richesses*. For instance, I would like to have had an extensive justification of why certain markers were selected and then the stigmatized variants of the variables (h-), (-ng), (a:), (Vr), (l), and (wh) were discussed together, combined with their changing evaluations. In the book under review, no coherent sociolinguistic picture evolves, nor are the limits of reconstruction discussed. In particular, the significance of the great divide of 1830–1840 is not sufficiently indicated, with the material ranging from 1750 to 1900 interpreted en bloc.

2. Most of the discussion rightly concentrates on the nineteenth century, but Mugglestone is surprisingly silent on grammar books of the time; not even Michael’s fundamental work (1987), which lists 800+ such reference books dating from the nineteenth century and analyzes their relevance for the teaching of English, is mentioned. (Note that basic reference books for the eighteenth century, like Alston’s bibliography and Leonard’s and Sundby et al.’s analyses of eighteenth-century prescriptivism, are also omitted.)

3. Mugglestone includes Phillipps’s and Honey’s works in her references, but she does not discuss how her research relates to that of these predecessors. In particular, although there are many details on the function of the schools, especially the public schools, in the teaching of correct pronunciation in chapter 6 (pp. 258–315), there is no coherent account of how the antecedents of R.P. came to be planted and cultivated. Is Honey right in his plausible but not uncontroversial claims? A book that takes up in its title the phrase “Talking proper” of Honey (1988) would
lead us to expect a thorough discussion, and possibly correction, of the earlier hypotheses.

4. There is no exploration of how the shibboleth of proper pronunciation came to replace earlier concerns about "correct grammar." Was it because all the other fields had been properly regulated, pronunciation being the only section in which variation was not yet completely diagnostic of social class and proper education? How do we explain that some features were oriented to spelling, as (h), (ng) and (wh) obviously were, but (r), lost after vowels in the southern standard, developed in the opposite direction? How do we explain the wavering of (l), and how the rise of (a:) from stigma to respectability? The sources quoted in the book do not provide any coherent answers.

5. If information on the function of the schools in the standardization process is incomplete, there is even less on social history in general. What are the consequences of industrialization, urbanization, and drastically increased mobility (regional and social)? What was the status of surviving traditional dialect, and the emergence of continuation of "modified" R.P., for instance in the new industrial centers of the North?

6. What was the regional and social provenance of the authors of grammar books and conduct books? How do we explain the acceptability of an Irish Sheridan and a number of Scotsmen as umpires of correct pronunciation for English society — the views on the provincial pronunciations of these regions being what they were?

7. Mugglestone refers to modern sociolinguistic research by Labov, Romaine, and Trudgill, but where she does, it is to point out superficial similarities that implicitly accept that the notions of "standard," "prestige," and "stigma" are the same in nineteenth-century Britain and the modern world, whether Britain or the US. However, a more thorough sociolinguistic analysis of her data would have been in order, which might then have provided arguments for discussing the change (or stability) of sociolinguistic correlations.

The book under review has brought us forward a great step toward understanding both nineteenth-century social psychology as related to linguistic features stigmatized as shibboleths and the urge of the middle classes to overcome these discredited features — only to find that new linguistic barriers had been raised by the elite. However, many gaps remain, and are waiting to be filled — there is certainly room for another book on the same topic.

University of Cologne

MANFRED GÖRLACH
References


