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Persecution in the Netherlands during World War Two
An Introduction
Cornelis J. Lammers

A Comparative Analysis of the Persecution of the Jews in
the Netherlands and Belgium during the Second World War
Pim Griffioen & Ron Zeller

Jewish-Gentile Intermarriage in Six European Cities 1900-1940
Explaining Differences and Trends
Wout Ultee & Ruud Luijkx

The Construction of a National Trauma
The Memory of the Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands
Ido de Haan

World View and Concentration Camps
The Men from Putten, Communists and the Relation
between War Trauma and Culture
Jolande Withuis

Abstracts

Who's Who in this Issue
1. From questions on class and the expansion of social rights to questions on minorities and the loss of civil rights

Sociology's findings on 20th-century Europe contradict the Marxist notion of class strife in market economies (Lenski 1966, Lipset 1981, Ultee, Arts & Flap 1992). Indeed, there is ample support for the Hegelian idea that wars between nations decide the fate of individuals. Early in the 20th century, Armenians were sent on death marches through the Ottoman Empire. In World War II, Germany deported Jews to extermination camps. At the end of the 20th century, Serbs cleansed Bosnia by executing Muslims.

Compared to its focus on universal suffrage and the expansion of social rights, sociology has assigned low priority to the denial of civil rights to particular inhabitants of 20th-century Europe. According to Marshall (1950), the expansion of social rights in the United Kingdom after World War II was the latest phase in an evolution covering 250 years. First, there were civil rights, which contributed to universal political rights, and they led in turn to social rights. This notion has guided a comprehensive research program comparing industrial societies (Korpi 1989). Yet, Marshall's thesis does not square with the gerrymandering in Northern Ireland from the 1920s to the 1960s, which diminished the effects of the Catholics' right to vote. In addition, Marshall's list of civil rights is uneven. Apart from the right to a fair trial, it includes the right to marry the person of one's choice irrespective of differences in class, creed, descent, or race.

This article addresses the right of Jews and Gentiles to marry each other, the extent to which it resulted in Jewish-Gentile intermarriages, and the factors influencing their incidence. To this end, time series for six European cities have been studied. These towns - all but one are capitals, each with a sizeable percentage of Jewish inhabitants, and varying widely in their timing of Jewish legal emancipation - are Amsterdam in the Netherlands, Berlin and Frankfurt-on-Main in Germany, Budapest in Hungary, Riga in Latvia, and Vienna in Austria. Cross-tabulations of the religion of husbands and wives for all marriages concluded in one year have been taken from governmental statistical
publications. The longest series pertains to Budapest in 1900-1943. The series for Berlin and Frankfurt continue into Hitler's rule and the ones for Amsterdam and Vienna include a number of years of German occupation.

Our findings on Jewish-Gentile intermarriage bear on two long-standing ideas (Katz 1972). The first is that Jewish legal emancipation inexorably leads to economic equality, social acceptance by Gentiles, and the eventual disappearance of Jewry. As regards the objection that the changes were not rapid and all-encompassing, this idea was augmented with the hypothesis that anti-Semitic prejudices gradually fade away. The second idea is that opposition to Jewish emancipation in once-Christian societies is inevitable, with unsuccessful Gentile attempts to revoke legal equality for Jews provoking ever more tumultuous anti-Semitic outbursts. Acknowledging that anti-Semitism was not manifest in some European states, this idea has been supplemented by the proposition that the longer anti-Semitism remains latent in a country, the more violence will eventually occur. Although these ideas contradict each another, they agree that 'things happen as they are bound to happen.'

This article pursues a middle ground between these two variations on the theme that trends are inevitable. It does so by stating hypotheses on conditions increasing or decreasing the degree of Jewish-Gentile integration. It probes these propositions by taking intermarriage as an indication of integration. Before presenting our propositions in section 4, in section 2, we outline the importance of questions about Jewish-Gentile intermarriage in Europe before and during World War II. We argue that they have been overlooked, although they are sub-questions of questions about the persecution of the Jews before and during World War II and these questions are in turn sub-questions of sociology's main questions. Section 3 depicts the changing legal position of Jews in our six cities. Section 5 discusses our research design, section 6 focuses on the measurements. In sections 7 to 10, we present research findings testing our hypotheses. Section 11 sums up the results.

2. Sociology's main questions, questions about the persecution of the Jews, questions about Jewish-Gentile intermarriage

Bauman (1989) holds that although questions about the Holocaust are sub-questions of sociology's central questions, sociologists have devoted little attention to the Shoah. He rejects interpretations that view the decimation of Jewry as an aberration on the path to modernity. His theory is that the Holocaust was 'a characteristically modern phenomenon that cannot be understood out of the context of cultural tendencies and technical achievements of modernity' (Bauman 1989: xiii). We concur that questions about the war Hitler won are sub-questions of sociology's main questions. These larger questions highlight inequality and strife (Ultee, Arts & Flap 1992) and the Holocaust is the extreme...
example of human degradation and violence. We nonetheless think that Bauman’s thesis that sociology has overlooked the Holocaust does not apply at all to a well-known debate in sociology. More importantly, Bauman confines the persecution of the Jews to the destruction of European Jewry. In this way, questions about earlier phases, for example before and after Jewish-Gentile intermarriage was prohibited, receive less attention. Yet, answers to questions about the initial stages do bear on the often implicit but rather forceful idea that things happen as they are bound to happen. Bauman briefly dismissed this explanation without developing a full-fledged alternative.

Is sociology’s interest in the persecution of the Jews as limited as Bauman assumes? Elias has asserted that the main question raised by the mass murder of Jewish men, women, and children in the name of the German nation is not the genocide as such. In the Ancient World, there were various instances of what is now called genocide. The question sociologists should address is why after World War II people could not believe these things had happened in a highly industrialized society (Elias 1989: 45-46 and 394-395). We agree with Bauman that questions about events on the way to and at the annihilation camps should be addressed. People did the inconceivable—why? Yet, persecution did not start in 1942 when Jews were first crammed into “showers” and gassed. So, in the line of Bauman’s reasoning, we contend that questions about what happened before the Jews were rounded up in camps are important as well.

Germany outlawed marriages between Aryans and Jews in 1935. How often did Jews and Gentiles marry each other before it was prohibited? Yet, Bauman’s thesis that sociologists have overlooked the Holocaust overlooks a marked moment. Popper’s 1961 address to Germany’s sociologists and Adorno’s co-lecture are not about how sociology should tackle its questions. They are about these questions themselves. Depicting the difference between his position and Adorno’s, Popper holds that the world we live in is the best ever, whereas Adorno disagrees. Adorno (1962: 141-142) finds it difficult to believe there was never a better world than the one, that begot Auschwitz. Is Adorno thus propagating Holocaust questions? Popper (1945) holds that social theorists postulating irreversible trends are enemies of societies that accept that knowledge is fallible, grant that their rulers are not always wise, and propagate free discussion. Popper also holds that the 20th-century popularity of the ideas on historical destiny that were propounded by Hegel and Marx promoted the rise of the closed societies of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Horkheimer & Adorno (1947) are steeped in Hegelianism and Marxism. Myths arise when people become enlightened and anti-Semitism is part of this dialectic development. Popper backs his hypotheses with an in-depth analysis of specific theories, Horkheimer & Adorno adorn theirs with obfuscating language. It is not surprising that Adorno’s appeal to upgrade questions on World War II only met with limited approval. Popper studied them thoroughly. Bauman’s thesis
that sociology overlooked the Holocaust overlooks this episode in sociology.

Given this oversight, it is striking that Bauman (1989: 17-18, 66) notes that bureaucracies were not a sufficient cause for the Holocaust. They were a necessary condition. The opportunities they provided were exploited by racism. This is a type of social engineering that is in keeping with modern culture. Following Popper, we insist that racism is pre-modern engineering and that modernity is more than bureaucracy.

According to Popper (1945), social engineering comes in two kinds. One form first selects its ultimate aims and then employs the most efficient means to put them into effect. This utopian engineering requires strong leadership, which makes for a closed society. Another type focuses on concrete social wrongs to be alleviated. It involves a choice of means and permits new priorities. This piece-meal engineering thrives in societies that separate powers and grant their inhabitants rights, i.e., in modern or open societies. Bauman (1989: 66) says racism only comes into its own if there is also a design for the perfect society and an intention to implement it through planned effort. In short, we hold that racism is utopian engineering that is out of line with modernity.

In addition, we maintain that contemporary societies display features that have been collectively termed modern. One is bureaucracy, the separation of powers is another, and so is a bill of rights. Were the Jews killed while they were citizens and while the powers of the state were separated? Nazism did away with independent powers by introducing the Führer-Prinzip. One by one, it deprived the Jews of their citizens’ rights. When Germany occupied other countries, it abolished the separation of powers and deprived the Jews there of their rights. However, individual rights, the separation of powers, and wars do not feature in Bauman’s answer to the question about the Holocaust. It ignores the fact that the persecution of the Jews was a process that gradually increased in strength.

So Bauman's answer to the question of why the Holocaust occurred is only a fragment, since his question remained so simple. Is the issue just why the Jews were murdered or is it also why the percentage of murdered Dutch Jews was higher than the percentage of murdered Belgian Jews? Is the question only about genocide or is it also about earlier phases? As Hilberg (1961) so extensively demonstrates, the murder of the Jews in World War II was the final stage in a process of legal exclusion and social isolation. Naturally, scholars have described the later phases in greater detail than the earlier periods. Yet the first steps are also relevant and Hilberg has detailed most of them. Bauman downsizes their importance when he notes that the Holocaust was 'so to speak, a logical (though, remember, unanticipated at the start) outcome of the many steps taken before (Bauman 1989: 192).’ This thesis seems incompatible with the idea that things happen as they are bound to happen. Yet it is so fuzzy that it cannot be seen as the outcome of a piece of research, but at best as the start of an exercise in theory formation.
However, if things did not happen as they were bound to happen, how exactly did they occur? Was it, as Bauman asserts, just because some ideology took advantage of the available technology? If questions about the early phases receive more attention, a full-blown alternative to predestination might emerge. This article focuses on one early stage, i.e., the extent to which Jews and Gentiles intermarried. Hilberg (1961) does not detail this phenomenon. We describe it here and we test explanations of the differences between the various cities and the trends within them.

3. The Jews of Europe: gradual emancipation and renewed exclusion

As a background to the hypotheses presented in the next section, we now sketch the legal status of the Jews in the six cities.

Human rights came to the Dutch Republic in 1795 and the 1656 ban on marriages between Christians and Jews was annulled. Later marriage laws never regarded denominational differences as an impediment.

The Jews of Frankfurt-on-Main obtained equal rights in 1811, but were denied them again in 1815. In 1853, Jews were granted the right to vote on the same terms as Gentiles, but not the right to be elected. Emancipation was attained in Frankfurt in 1864. In Prussia’s capital Berlin, Jews gained equal rights with the 1812 edict, although it postponed a decision about the right to hold public office. In 1822, Jews were explicitly excluded from them, but the 1850 Prussian Constitution granted Jews the right to hold civil positions. Since it stipulated that Prussia was a Christian state, these rights remained void. Jewish emancipation was part of the 1869 Constitution of the North German Confederation and Germany’s 1871 Constitution. The 1875 marriage laws of Germany no longer prohibited inter-denominational marriages.

The Vienna Congress of 1815 refused to upgrade the status of the Jews in Austria-Hungary. In 1848, a proposal allowing Jews to serve a public function was adopted by the Hungarian Parliament but rejected by the Hungarian King, the Austrian Emperor. The Ausgleich of 1867 resulted in a new Constitution for Austria-Hungary. Civil and political rights were not dependent on any religion whatsoever. Hungary introduced civil marriage in 1895, making marriages between Christians and Jews a legal option. Until the 1938 Anschluss, Austrian Civil Law made church marriage obligatory. According to Section 64, marriages between Christians and non-Christians were not allowed.

Before 1917, Riga was part of Russia, where Jewish-Gentile marriages were forbidden. In 1841, the first Jews officially settled in Riga. When Russia lost World War I, Riga became the capital of independent Latvia. Jews now had equal legal status. In 1934, Ulmanis curtailed the autonomy of Jewish schools and restricted Jewish economic activity by a permit system. In 1940, the Soviet Union invaded Latvia, and in 1941, Germany occupied Latvia.
In 1920, Hungary limited the percentage of Jews at the universities to six. In 1938, the First Jewish Law restricted the percentage of Jews in certain occupations to 20 and the Second Jewish Law limited it to five in 1939. In 1941, the third one banned Jewish-Gentile marriages, and in March 1944, Germany invaded Hungary.

Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in January 1933. A law passed in April that year authorized the dismissal of non-Aryan civil servants. The Nuremberg Laws of September 15, 1935 deprived Jews of citizenship and prohibited new marriages between Aryans and Jews. After the 1938 Anschluss, marriages between Aryans and Jews were forbidden in Austria. Germany invaded the Netherlands in May 1940. The Joodsche Weekblad of March 27, 1942 stated that the German authorities had forbidden Jews to marry non-Jews.

4. Exclusion and isolation, emancipation and integration

We have perused the literature for hypotheses on the propensity of Jews and Gentiles to intermarry, and for interesting parallels. We have welded what we found together by deriving all our hypotheses from a limited number of assumptions. It turned out that some current hypotheses only invoke certain kinds of factors. In addition, we have specified long-standing statements. We begin with a hypothesis on the year when particular laws were adopted. We then explain it and derive two additional hypotheses on opportunities for intermarriage. Expanding the proposition that opportunities shape behavior, we obtain two hypotheses on the likes and dislikes on the part of Jews and Gentiles.

The passage of time

Our initial proposition is that Jewish legal emancipation fostered the integration of Jews and Gentiles. Taking intermarriage as an indicator and assuming that it takes time for legal possibilities to turn into options that people perceive as practicable, we derive that the longer ago a city's Jews were emancipated, the more Jewish-Gentile marriages will occur. According to Katz (1973: 202-205), this hypothesis does not apply to 19th-century Europe. Even well-off Jews remained conspicuously separate. However, up to now we have not specified how long it takes for equal rights to have effects. A more informative hypothesis holds that integration increases minimally at first and then substantially, and flattens out in the end, but not necessarily at the point of panmixia.

Although historians have described the struggle for Jewish constitutional emancipation in great detail, we think that an emancipation hypothesis is less applicable than one about marriage laws and time. After all, a constitution may give Jews rights equal to those of Gentiles, but it takes time for this constitution to be supplemented by corresponding marriage laws. As we noted, Austrian law made marriage a matter for the clergy, rendering Jewish-Christian mar-
riages impossible. A more plausible proposition therefore refers to the amount of time since mixed marriage was first permitted. Religiously mixed marriages can be contracted if states force the clergy to perform them or if states conclude marriages themselves. Our hypothesis, first suggested by Ruppin (1934), is that the longer marriages between Jews and Gentiles have been legally possible in a city, the higher the chances of Gentile-Jewish marriages. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 1 provide the initial conditions for applying our emancipation and marriage laws hypothesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>(1) Equal political rights</th>
<th>(2) Right to Jewish-Gentile marriage</th>
<th>(3) Residential segregation</th>
<th>(4) Educational segregation</th>
<th>(5) Orthodox Judaism</th>
<th>(6) Political anti-Semitism</th>
<th>(7) Jewish-Gentile marriages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riga</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: see text.

One implication of our marriage laws hypothesis is that legal exclusion isolates Jews from Gentiles. This corollary seems trivial, but it is not without substance. To begin with, the interpretation of prohibitions can alter. We will see that Austrian marriage law was not what it seemed to be. In addition, it is possible that Gentile-Jewish marriages were increasingly avoided before they were prohibited. Our exclusion hypothesis is that before the introduction of the Nuremberg Laws, the chances of Jewish-Gentile marriage were high and stable, and did not drop until afterwards. According to this proposition, they were also high before the legal status of the Jews began to deteriorate.

Up to now, our statements have taken cities as the prime unit. They can be derived from the individual proposition that people do things they are allowed to do. If we generalize it into the hypothesis that the more opportunities people have to do something, the more likely they are to do it, and concretize this proposition, we arrive at two more hypotheses. They specify the link between the right to intermarry and actual intermarriage.
Additional opportunities

If people intermarry because they have opportunities to meet one another (Blau & Schwartz 1984), then one prediction is: the weaker the residential segregation of Gentiles and Jews in a city, the more likely Jews and Gentiles are to intermarry. This *residential segregation hypothesis* echoes Lieberson's (1961) finding for ten big cities in the United States in 1930: an immigrant group's residential segregation limits its degree of intermarriage. The residential segregation thesis implies that if for some reason residential segregation increases after emancipation, intermarriage may remain the same.

Another proposition pertains to a city's school system as an opportunity and holds that cities with separate parochial schools have less intermarriage than cities with mixed schools. Ford (1968) notes that in Great Britain comprehensive schools foster friendships between social classes. If education becomes more segregated after emancipation, then according to an implication of our *educational segregation hypothesis*, the likelihood of intermarriage might decrease.

Aversions

Up to now, our effort at theory formation only addresses opportunities for people of different religions to marry each other. A full theory includes desires and dislikes. In early 20th-century European Judaism, there was a Reform and an Orthodox current. There were also Jews who were indifferent. Assuming that Orthodox opposition to outmarriage is stronger than Reform resistance and that indifferent Jews are unconcerned, we derive our *orthodoxy hypothesis*: the more orthodox a city's Jews, the smaller the chance of intermarriage.

Our hypothesis on Gentile likes and dislikes assumes that voting for an anti-Semitic political party indicates an aversion to Jews. Thus the more votes there are for the anti-Semitic parties in a city's elections, the smaller the chances of Gentile-Jewish intermarriage. Paraphrasing our *anti-Semitism hypothesis*, in cities where more and more people vote for anti-Semitic parties, the legal exclusion of Jews is presaged in earlier lower chances of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage.

As was noted above, our hypotheses constitute a system. On its own, our first hypothesis says that the longer ago Jewish legal emancipation occurred in a city, the more likely Gentile-Jewish marriages will be. However, since it is part of a system, it assumes that the other factors of our theory do not change. Thus our theory does not predict an irreversible trend towards more mixed marriages after Jewish emancipation. It implies that if residential and educational segregation increase, the anti-Semitic vote grows and Orthodoxy spreads in a city, there will be a trend towards less outmarriage. Our theory does not say how these intermediate factors develop. It does hold that legal changes largely affect intermarriage in a roundabout manner. They primarily
influence Jewish-Gentile intermarriage by way of residential and educational segregation, as well as through anti-Semitism and Orthodoxy.

5. Research design

Our hypotheses on the strength of the tendency towards intermarriage have been derived from individual-level assumptions and we have data on several million couples. However, since these data come in bivariate tables for cities, our design pertains to five independent variables (marriage laws, residential segregation, educational segregation, anti-Semitism, and Orthodoxy) and six cities. Thus, our analysis may run the risk of drawing large conclusions from small numbers (Lieberson 1991) and of committing the ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950). However, our design allows for a more stringent test of our hypotheses than this methodological criticism might suggest. These remarks not only overlook the fact that we observed most of our cities some thirty times, they wrongly presuppose that causal hypotheses can be established empirically. We replace foundationalist by falsificationist methods. Truths never get proven, and there are no definitive tests. At best, up until a certain moment hypotheses have withstood tests against specific data. Yet, certain hypotheses are more testable than others and the more testable propositions are, the better starting points they provide for further research (Popper 1959).

Our anti-foundationalist stance leads us to elaborate five points.

1. According to falsificationist methods, causality cannot even be inferred from a high number of cases. The crucial thing about data is not the number of cases, but the severity of the test they entail. This is why six cities, with more than a century’s difference as regards the timing of laws allowing Jewish-Gentile intermarriage, constitute a particularly useful sample.

2. Lieberson’s remark that sociology is probabilistic is less than convincing. Given the yardstick of testability, deterministic hypotheses have an edge over probabilistic ones. As Popper (1959) demonstrates, probability statements are unfalsifiable. We add that although the proposition that Jews and people without a religion are more likely to intermarry than Jews and Catholics refers to chances, it is contradicted by research findings if in a large city with a sizeable percentage of Jewish inhabitants, for just one year Jews and Catholics are more likely to intermarry than Jews and persons who do not belong to a religious community. In this case, individual probability statements have deterministic implications at the level of cities.

3. In falsificationism, the argument of an ecological fallacy lacks force. The truth of a macro-proposition does not logically imply the truth of the corresponding micro-thesis. Yet, if intermarriage turns out to be stronger in cities with more residential segregation than in less segregated ones, it is difficult to maintain that Jews in mixed neighborhoods outmarry more than Jews in
Jewish ones. If macro-predictions are derived from micro-hypotheses, a test of the former is also a test of the latter. A test of a micro-thesis by aggregate data is more severe if hypotheses about the composition of neighborhoods or other contexts do not hold. In our case, we hold, contenders of this kind do not constitute strong competitors. The proposition that if more of a city's Jews are orthodox, the town's secular Jews are less likely to marry Gentiles addresses the composition of the city where Jews live and seems plausible. Yet this contextual hypothesis does not supplant the micro-proposition that Orthodox Jews are less likely to intermarry than secular ones. It is a supplement.

4. According to Campbell (1975), if the number of cases is small, bringing in additional dependent variables can increase testability. In this article, the design does not simply involve Jewish-Gentile intermarriage, but Jewish-Catholic, Jewish-Protestant, and Jewish-Other intermarriage as well. In addition, we test whether hypotheses on differences between cities at one point in time explain trends in the course of time in these cities.

5. We amplify Campbell's argument by increasing the testability of our hypotheses. Our propositions not only say that factors have some effect, they specify the direction of these consequences. In addition, our theory specifies the time-order of factors. If this theory holds, deviations from the marriage laws hypothesis must be accounted for by one of our other theses. Note that in Table 1 the association between the factor 'right to Jewish-Gentile marriage' and our other independent variables is not perfect. So although we have five factors and six cases, we are well-placed to test our theory.

6. Data

We have tested hypotheses on time series for six major European cities with a sizeable percentage of Jews. We have taken cities rather than countries, because intermarriage measures should pertain to an actual marriage market. We have opted for large cities rather than small towns because in the countries and decades data are available for, Jews were concentrated in large cities. We have sought data for major cities with a sizeable percentage of Jewish inhabitants; otherwise the figures would wobble. We have tried to obtain time series for as many cities as possible that satisfy our requirements, but given the varying detail of their population registers, we have settled for data from Amsterdam, Berlin, Budapest, Frankfurt, Riga, and Vienna. We limit our series to the four decades before World War II, since data for a longer period were unavailable.

Intermarriage tables

Intermarriage tables have been assigned the same format by collapsing the religions into four categories, i.e., Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Other (includ-
ing persons without a religion). The Appendix lists the sources for these tables and the sources for the explanatory variables discussed below.

For some cities, certain tables are missing. Riga has the most missing years. The Riga series starts in 1911, skips 1919, and ends in 1938. For 1911-1915, 1916-1920, 1924-1925, and 1926-1927 it pertains to periods longer than a year. A city with fewer missing years is Vienna. Tables are lacking for 1921-1926, 1930, 1933-1934, and the year of the Anschluss. The series for Vienna begins in 1900 and stops in 1941. The Berlin series commences in 1900, the one for Frankfurt in 1901. They do not have any interruptions. Both of these series end earlier than we would have liked, but the effects of Hitler’s ascent to power should show up in the Berlin series, which stops in 1938, and the one for Frankfurt, which ends in 1935 (with 1938 added). The series for Budapest begins in 1900, stops for 1917-1919, and ends in 1943.

The data for Amsterdam cover the entire period from 1911 to 1943. Data for 1900-1910 are guestimates. For this period, there is data on how many Jews married Jews, Protestants married Protestants and so forth. However, in publications the number of Jewish males who married Protestant females was added to the number of Protestant males who married Jewish females and so forth. To arrive at frequencies for each separate possibility, we have taken the 1911-1939 tables as our starting point and then compute the ratio of the number of Jewish men who married Protestant women and the number of Protestant men who married Jewish women, and so forth. This ratio has been applied to the available summed frequencies for 1900-1910.

Our tables indicate the religion of people on the day when they got married. This raises a question as to what they reveal about integration. It is clear that if people convert before they get married so as to have the same religion as their future spouse, this does not show up in the intermarriage figures. The same goes for people who convert to their spouse’s religion after they get married. Thus it is possible that if rising chances of intermarriage were to be observed in a city, it might only be because the people there who used to convert before marrying no longer do so. However, we know of no theory that yields such a precise prediction. Indeed, if people no longer convert before they get married, in itself this indicates more integration.¹

To what extent the Viennese figures are useful for comparative research is a more complex matter. Austrian law made it obligatory to get married in church. It would allow for a couple involving at least one person without a religion to have a Notcivilehe. Given this legal option, the number of marriages with at least one person without a religion includes some marriages between Christians and Jews. If people convert to the religion of their spouse to surmount legal barriers, the Vienna figures underestimate the Gentile-Jewish integration there.

However, the assertion that marriages between Christians and Jews were prohibited in Austria should not be taken at face value. This is obvious from all
the Viennese figures since 1915: every year there are sizeable numbers of Catholic-Jewish and Jewish-Protestant marriages. Pisko (1933) states that although marriages between Christians and non-Christians could not be concluded in a routine way in Austria, this impediment was dispensable, and according to Section 83, municipal authorities could give dispensations without any interference from the judiciary. We assume that when the Social Democrats gained political power in Vienna at the start of World War I, dispensations were given for Gentile-Jewish marriages. The Vienna data for 1915 and later may be used to ascertain integration by intermarriage.

Residential segregation
Almost all the data on Gentile-Jewish residential segregation come from a census. The data for Amsterdam pertain to 1906, 1920, 1930, and 1941. They divide the city into some 50 districts. The figures for Berlin refer to 1910, 1925,
1933, and 1939 and involve 20 districts. The ones for Budapest refer to 10 districts and the years 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1941. Frankfurt's figures pertain to 14 districts in 1895, 1910, and 1925. The figures for Riga involve 12 districts in 1913, 1920, 1925, and 1930 and 39 in 1935. The data for Vienna cover 21 districts in 1900, 1910, 1923, 1934, and 1939.

Following the Pax Duncana, we have measured residential segregation with dissimilarity indices. The lower the index, the more mixed the housing is. It is not prudent to compare indices for cities that differ strongly as regards the number of districts. This is why we have regrouped Amsterdam's 50 districts into 11 ones. The indices are given in Table 2. All in all, residential segregation was strongest in Amsterdam and weakest in Budapest. We rank the cities according to the extent to which Jews and Gentiles live in different districts in column 3 of Table 1.

Table 2 shows that the dissimilarity index for Amsterdam decreased. We regard the rise in 1941 as an effect of the inflow in 1933-1939 of some 10,000 Jewish refugees from Germany into the newly-built suburbs. Berlin's index rose steadily; at first Budapest's dropped and stabilized in the 1920s, only to rise again in 1941. We cannot ascertain a trend for Frankfurt since the data for 1933 and 1939 are missing, but a rather strong overall increase in the dissimilarity index seems likely. Riga's index increased somewhat. In Vienna, there was virtual stability until 1934 and a rise in separation afterwards. The increases or decreases in a city's residential segregation are compared in column 2 of Table 3. Its column 1 ranks the cities according to the number of years that passed since the introduction of the right to enter into a Jewish-Gentile marriage. Both of the columns and other ones as well will be used to test dynamic derivations from our hypotheses.

Educational segregation
In Austria and Hungary, most schools were required to enroll pupils of all religions. Catholics, Jews, and Protestants attended the same primary schools. There were special teachers for religious instruction. In Germany (Field 1980), some Volksschule were Simultanschule, mixing Catholic and Protestant pupils. Most schools were either Catholic or Protestant. They had to enroll Jewish pupils as well and sometimes instructed them in Judaism. In the Netherlands, until 1918, the state partly subsidized parochial schools. Public schools were fully funded. Later, the Dutch State paid all the costs for the parochial schools as well. In independent Latvia, the state paid for Jewish schools too.

This information on institutions has been expanded by school statistics. After World War I, in Vienna 5% of all the Jewish pupils attended a Jewish primary school, as was the case with 15% in Berlin, 30% in Frankfurt, and 80% in Riga. After 1920, 20% of the Jewish pupils attended Jewish schools in
TABLE 3
CHANGES IN JEWISH-GENTILE INTERMARRIAGE IN THE EARLY 20th CENTURY IN SIX EUROPEAN CITIES
AND POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>(1) Jewish-Gentile intermarriage allowed before or after 1900</th>
<th>(2) Decrease in residential segregation</th>
<th>(3) Increase in political anti-Semitism</th>
<th>(4) Increase in Jewish-Gentile intermarriage</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

1 = before 1900, 2 = after 1900, 1 = strongest increase, 2 = weakest increase, 6 = strongest decrease, 6 = weakest increase

Sources: see text

Budapest, before that 10%. These percentages placed Berlin and Budapest ex aequo. However, given the institutional differences between the two cities, educational segregation was stronger in Berlin than in Budapest. In Berlin, Jewish pupils probably attended Simultanschule, so that Christian children at parochial schools were not likely to encounter Jewish pupils.

It was difficult to place Amsterdam in our ranking of cities according to educational segregation. There 5% of all the Jewish pupils attended Jewish schools. This would put Amsterdam on a par with Vienna. But in addition to mixed schools, Amsterdam had special Catholic and Protestant primary schools. In 1900, 30% of all the pupils attended these schools, as did 50% in 1940. These children, unlike the Christian pupils in Budapest or Vienna, never met any Jewish pupils at school. We arbitrarily regard Jewish-Gentile educational segregation in Amsterdam as less sizeable than in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Riga, and more considerable than in Budapest and Vienna. In column 4 of Table 1 we rank the six cities according to the extent to which their primary schools segregated or mixed Jewish and Gentile pupils. We have been unable to rank cities according to the increase or decrease in school segregation.
Orthodoxy

It is safe to assume that in the cities considered here, Orthodox Judaism was strongest in Riga. The influx of Hasidim from the Pale of Settlement offset the effects of the German Reform. According to Vestermanis (1995: 25), in 1907, Riga had six large synagogues and six prayer houses for 25,000 Jews. In the 1930s there were seven synagogues and 27 minyanim for 40,000 Jews.

According to the official figures, in 1920 about 10% of Budapest's Jews belonged to the Orthodox community, the others were Neolog (László 1969: 142 and 150-151). The election returns for the Kultusgemeinde in the 1920s led Freidenreich (1991: 117 and 121) to guess that 20% of the Viennese Jews were orthodox. This makes Budapest Jewry less orthodox than Viennese Jewry.

Of Frankfurt's 28,000 Jews, 15% were listed by a separate Orthodox Jewish community, which owned a 2000-seat synagogue. Another Jewish community owned four synagogues with 4,000 seats, two of which adhered to the traditional rituals. They had 2,000 seats (Heuberger & Krohn 1988: 160-167). Thus 30% of the Jews of Frankfurt was orthodox, and 60% of all the synagogue seats were at the orthodox synagogues.

We have been unable to estimate the percentage of orthodox Jews in Amsterdam and Berlin. However, around 1930 some 20% of all the 21,000 seats for the 170,000 Jews of Berlin were at orthodox synagogues (Galliner 1987). This makes Berlin less orthodox than Frankfurt. Amsterdam had no separate Orthodox and Reform synagogues. We hold that the lower the number of Jews to one synagogue seat, the more orthodox a city's Jews. In 1900 (1938), the nine (seven) synagogues of Amsterdam held 4,800 (4,500) seats for 60,000 (70,000) Jews (Meijer 1935: 42). In Amsterdam, the number of Jews a seat was 14, in Berlin it was 8, and in Frankfurt 5. Thus, Amsterdam appears to have been less orthodox than Berlin.

In Vienna at the end of World War I, the seven synagogues of the official Jewish community had 5,000 seats for 200,000 persons or 40 persons a seat. However, Vienna also had 16 associational synagogues and 81 private prayer houses, which barely existed in Amsterdam. All in all, there were 20,000 seats for the Jews of Vienna or one seat for 10 Jews (Freidenreich 1991: 119-120). The seats at the associational synagogues and private prayer houses were not included in the Berlin figures. So if we are to merge our rankings, the figures on the number of Jews to each seat in Berlin will have to be revised. Berlin had 100 associational synagogues and private prayer houses (Galliner 1987: 92) and we assume that each of them had 100 places. This yields a figure of 5 persons a seat. Vienna appears to have been less orthodox than Berlin and more orthodox than Amsterdam. This leaves Amsterdam and Budapest. If there were seven synagogues and a few private prayer houses for 70,000 Amsterdam Jews and a total of 125 official and private places of worship for 215,000 Budapest Jews (Gruber 1994: 152), Amsterdam was less orthodox.
Column 5 of Table 1 ranks the cities according to the orthodoxy of their Jews.

**Political anti-Semitism**

Of the six cities, Vienna before World War I was the most anti-Semitic in a political sense. Although the Austrian Emperor twice refused to appoint Lueger—who opportunistically opposed Jewry—as Mayor of Vienna, he did consent in 1897. Lueger remained in power until his death in 1910. A plan to place Jewish pupils in separate classes was never approved.

In the 1920s, anti-Semitism was most evident in Hungarian politics. Jews were held responsible for the Red Terror of 1919 and a *numerus clausus* restricted their access to the universities. At the elections for the National Council, the party that backed this law received 18% of the Budapest vote in 1926, 21% in 1931, and 26% in 1935. Its successor at the 1939 elections, the Party of Hungarian Life, got 33% of the vote in Budapest. The more anti-Semitic Arrow Cross Party, which was forbidden to take part in the 1935 elections, got 25% of the Budapest vote in 1939.

Given the unique nature of the *Kristallnacht*, political anti-Semitism in the 1930s was strongest in Germany. In the elections for the Reichstag, the National Socialist Party got 3% of the vote in 1926, 18% in 1930, and 38% in July 1932. In 1932, the Swastika got 29% of the votes in Berlin and 39% in Frankfurt (Pulzer 1992: 300 and 314). In Austria, at several Reichsrat elections in the 1920s, the pro-German parties got 15% of the vote. At the 1930 Reichsrat election in Vienna, the sister party of the German National Socialists got 10% of the vote and 17% at the Landrat elections of 1932. It was outlawed in 1933.

The 1922-1934, Latvian Parliament consisted of 100 members representing 20 parties. The Farmers’ Union and the German Bloc adopted an anti-Semitic stand (Laserson 1971: 162, 171, 185). The parties of the Right Wing were supposedly even more anti-Semitic. For our estimate of the anti-Semitic vote in Riga, we have used use the classification of party names in Bilmantis (1951: 342-343) and the Riga results at the 1931 Parliament elections. In this way, we arrived at 20% for all the parties collectively. In 1927, a *putsch* by the fascist Thunder Cross failed (Laserson 1971: 143) and led to a ban on this movement.

In 1935, a National Socialist party took part for the first time in a Dutch election and got 11% of the Amsterdam vote for the Provincial States. At the National Parliament elections in 1937, it got 6% of the Amsterdam vote and at the 1939 elections for the Amsterdam Municipal Council it got 7% (De Jonge 1968: 101, 127, and 153).

Data on political anti-Semitism around 1930 are summarized in column 6 of Table 1. Table 3, column 3 gives the ranking of the six cities after the increase in the support for anti-Semitism in the period from 1900 to 1940.
7. Testing hypotheses on differences between cities

We now test hypotheses on the differences between the cities as regards Jewish-Gentile intermarriage. In section 8, we determine how well the best hypothesis of section 7 performs when explaining trends within the cities. Section 9 focuses on Jewish-Gentile intermarriage just before it was banned. In section 10, we view trends in Catholic-Jewish and Jewish-Protestant intermarriage against the background of changes in Catholic-Protestant intermarriage.

Jewish-Gentile intermarriage ascertained by odds ratios

To determine the extent of intermarriage within a city at specific points in time, we have computed log odds ratios (discussed by Blalock 1987: 311-312). Take a 2*2 table classifying the religion of husbands (Jewish or Gentile) against that of their wives (again: Jewish or Gentile). The total number of Jewish men who marry Jewish women is \(a\), \(b\) represents the number of Jewish men who marry a Gentile woman, \(c\) stands for the number of Gentile men who marry a Jewish woman, and \(d\) is the number of Gentile-Gentile weddings. In this case, the odds of a Jewish man marrying a Jewish instead of a Gentile woman are \(\frac{a}{b}\) and the odds of a Gentile man marrying a Jewish rather than a Gentile woman \(\frac{c}{d}\). Then the ratio of these odds is \(\frac{a}{b}\) \(\frac{c}{d}\) and the log odds ratio will amount to \(\log\left(\frac{a}{b}\right)\left(\frac{c}{d}\right)\). A log odds ratio of zero indicates random mating. A relatively low figure in a table or a downward sloping line in a graph indicates more intermarriage and a line that goes up or a higher figure indicates less intermarriage. In order to test our hypotheses more severely, we have determined trends in log odds ratios for Jewish-Protestant, Jewish-Catholic, and Jewish-Other marriages separately.

The emancipation and the intermarriage laws hypothesis

We now test whether our hypothesis about intermarriage laws is more applicable than our hypothesis about the date of emancipation. To reduce zigzagging of the lines on the graphs, we have computed three-year averages of the log odds ratios. We have not been able to represent values of infinity for Vienna and Riga before World War I. When testing the hypotheses, we obviously disregard data from the later 1930s. We return to these figures in section 8 when testing our exclusion thesis.

Figure 1 shows that during World War I, there was a rise in Jewish-Protestant intermarriage. From 1900 until the 1930s, the lines go down, indicating more intermarriage. More to the point, the lines hardly cross. The ranking of the six cities from more to less Jewish-Protestant intermarriage is: Budapest – Berlin – Frankfurt – Amsterdam – Vienna – Riga.

Figure 2 for Catholic-Jewish intermarriage yields the same grading of the cities as Figure 1. Figure 3 is a bit blurry, which is not surprising given the low
Figure 1
Jewish-Protestant intermarriage 1900-1943

Figure 2
Jewish-Catholic intermarriage 1900-1943
percentage of people of Other religions in our tables. This percentage was lowest in Budapest, i.e. 2% around 1930. Given the Austrian marriage laws, it is not surprising that Jewish-Other marriages were most widespread in Vienna. Riga had the least intermarriage, Amsterdam the lowest but one. Berlin, Budapest, and Frankfurt are more or less on a par. Before World War I, the chances of a marriage between Jews and Others were lowest in Budapest and highest in Berlin. After World War I, Budapest had the highest chances and Frankfurt the lowest. Frankfurt had less Jewish-Other marriages than Berlin. We take the grading of the six cities according to the incidence of Jewish-Other marriages to be the same as their ranking according to Catholic-Jewish and Jewish-Protestant marriages. We add this order as column 7 to Table 1.

Our grading of cities according to intermarriage is subject to certain exceptions. For instance, since 1927, Jewish-Protestant intermarriage was more likely in Amsterdam than Frankfurt. We list and address these anomalies in section 10.

To test the ranking of the cities according to intermarriage as predicted by our emancipation hypothesis against the intermarriage ranking we just obtained empirically, we compare columns 1 and 7 in Table 1. Riga is predicted correctly, Vienna is half a place off the mark, Berlin and Frankfurt one place, Amsterdam three, and Budapest three and a half places. Does our marriage
laws hypothesis perform better? Comparing columns 2 and 7 in Table 1, Riga and Vienna are predicted correctly, Berlin and Frankfurt are almost on the mark, Amsterdam and Budapest remain three places off. Jews and Gentiles from Amsterdam had lower chances of intermarrying than expected, in Budapest they had higher chances than predicted. Our marriage laws thesis fares better than our emancipation hypothesis. But it does not fully fit.

The anti-Semitism and the orthodoxy hypothesis
Which of the other hypotheses does account for the Amsterdam and Budapest anomalies? Does the anti-Semitism hypothesis point towards the crucial intervening factor? According to column 6 in Table 1, Amsterdam had the lowest anti-Semitic vote and relatively low chances of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage, and Budapest had relatively strong anti-Semitism and a relatively high chance of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage. Our hypothesis on Gentile dislikes has not been confirmed. Our orthodoxy hypothesis does away with the exception of Budapest: Budapest Jewry was the second least orthodox. However, in column 5 of Table 1, Amsterdam remains an outlier. Its Jewry was the least orthodox of all the cities.

Segregation hypotheses
To test our educational segregation hypothesis, we turn to column 4 in Table 1. This hypothesis seems to explain our anomalies for the intermarriage laws hypothesis rather well; Amsterdam and Budapest are both only one place away from where they should be. However, Berlin and Frankfurt are now two places off the mark, and Vienna four. This is quite unsatisfactory.

Our residential segregation hypothesis best explains the Amsterdam and Budapest anomalies. In column 3 of Table 1, Amsterdam has the highest residential segregation of the six cities and Budapest the lowest. Other information in this column also supports the hypothesis that residential segregation is the most important intervening factor between the introduction of laws permitting Jewish-Gentile marriages and their actual prevalence. Residential segregation was the second lowest in Berlin, the third highest in Vienna and the second highest in Riga. As to the rankings in columns 3 to 6 in Table 1, all in all the ratings in column 3 for residential segregation coincide the closest with the order in column 7 of this table.

8. Trends explained by changes in residential segregation?

Our provisional explanation of Gentile-Jewish intermarriage differences between cities yields dynamic derivations. One of them holds that in cities where the laws permitting religiously mixed marriages were passed most recently, the increase in Jewish-Gentile intermarriage will be stronger.
Another one holds that if residential segregation increased or decreased, so did intermarriage. To test these new predictions, we add a column to Table 3. It ranks cities according to the increase or decrease in Jewish-Gentile intermarriage between 1900 and the early 1930s.

In Figure 1, the log odds ratio for Jewish-Protestant marriages drops from 9 to 5 in Amsterdam, from 7 to 5 in Budapest, from 7 to 6 in Berlin, and from 8 to 7 in Frankfurt. For Riga it drops from 12 to 10 and, for Vienna from infinity to 8. Figure 2 for Catholic-Jewish intermarriage affirms that for Berlin and Frankfurt, the log odds ratios decrease the least. For Berlin, the log odds ratio drops from 8 to 7, for Frankfurt from a bit above to a bit below 8. Amsterdam exhibits a decline from 9 to 7, Budapest from 7 to 5, Riga from infinity to 11, and Vienna from infinity to 8. Figure 3 for Jewish-Other intermarriage corroborates that changes are smallest in Berlin and Frankfurt: the lines hover around 6. The overall increase in Gentile-Jewish intermarriage in Frankfurt is smaller than in Berlin. According to Figure 3, the log odds ratio for Jewish-Other marriages in Amsterdam drops from 9 to 6 and in Budapest from 7 to 6. All in all, the chances of Gentile-Jewish intermarriage increase more in Amsterdam than in Budapest. In Vienna, not unexpectedly, the log odds ratio for Jewish-Other marriages increases from 3 to 6. The log odds ratio for Riga falls from infinity to 9. The overall increase in the chances of Gentile-Jewish intermarriage is larger in Riga and Vienna than in Amsterdam. The increase in these chances for Vienna is larger than for Riga. We now fill column 4 of Table 3.

Which of our hypotheses explains the changes in the chances of intermarriage best? We hold that the strong increase in Jewish-Gentile intermarriage in Riga and Vienna can be explained by the recent introduction of laws permitting this type of marriage (compare column 1 with column 4 of table 3). To explain the weak and sometimes non-existent trend towards more Jewish-Gentile intermarriage in Berlin and Frankfurt, our anti-Semitism hypothesis might be applied (column 3 of Table 3). However, this hypothesis cannot explain the increase in intermarriage in Budapest in the 1920s, when political anti-Semitism was on the rise there. Our residential-segregation hypothesis does explain the stability of the chances of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage in the German cities and their increase in Amsterdam and Budapest. Jewish-Gentile residential segregation decreased in Amsterdam and Budapest and rose in Berlin and Frankfurt (column 2 of Table 3).

Until now, we have only considered trends in intermarriage during 1900-1943. In the next section, we study changes just before Gentile-Jewish intermarriage was banned. Section 10 examines the extent to which intermarriage became more common in all the cities after World War I.
9. Shortly before Jewish persecution: the exclusion hypothesis

Our exclusion hypothesis holds that Jewish-Gentile intermarriage did not decrease before the laws forbidding it were introduced in the 1930s or 1940s, nor did it decrease before the legal position of Jews began to otherwise deteriorate. Its incidence did not decrease until afterwards. Table 4 gives all the available log odds ratios for each of the six cities for all the years from 1930 to 1943. Shadings indicate the years when specific measures were taken against Jews.

In Table 4, there is no decrease for Amsterdam in Jewish-Protestant intermarriage before the German occupation of the Netherlands, nor in 1940, and a strong decrease in 1941. In early 1942, Jewish-Gentile intermarriage was prohibited in Amsterdam, and Jewish-Protestant intermarriage witnessed a sharp fall. Jewish-Protestant intermarriage remained stable in Berlin from 1930 to 1933, but decreased drastically after 1933. In Frankfurt, Jewish-Protestant marriage remained stable from 1930 to 1933 and fell sharply in 1934. Intermarriage thus decreased before the introduction of the Nuremberg Laws, but not before Hitler became Chancellor. Jewish-Protestant intermarriage in Budapest was stable before the First Jewish Law and declined from 1938 on with a sharp decrease after Jewish-Gentile marriages were forbidden in 1941. In Vienna, Jewish-Protestant intermarriage began to decrease after the Anschluss, not before it. Jewish-Protestant intermarriage was stable in Riga.

Our hypothesis can also be tested against the figures for Jewish-Catholic intermarriage in Table 4. Almost the same results have been obtained. There is one difference, i.e. Jewish-Catholic intermarriage began to diminish in Amsterdam in 1940. In addition, are the high log odds ratios for Amsterdam in 1936 and 1939 statistical wobbles? The figures for Jewish-Other marriages in Table 4 reinforce these impressions. All in all, the part of our exclusion hypothesis that holds that Jewish-Gentile intermarriage did not decrease before the adoption of laws forbidding it can be rejected. The part stating that it did not diminish before the legal status of Jews began to decline in other respects is confirmed. We test the latter part more stringently in the next section.

10. Jewish-Gentile compared to Catholic-Protestant intermarriage

In section 8, we have noted the changes that took place from 1900 to 1943. In Figures 1 and 2 if we only focus on the 1920s, Jewish-Protestant intermarriage remains stable in Berlin, as does Catholic-Jewish intermarriage in Berlin and Frankfurt. Both of these types of mixed marriages increased elsewhere. This finding is quite striking.

In section 7, when ranking the cities according to the chances of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage before National Socialism in Germany in 1933, we alluded to certain exceptions to the rule. In the early decades of the 20th century, inter-
**TABLE 4**

LOG ODDS RATIOS FOR JEWISH-PROTESTANT, JEWISH-CATHOLIC AND JEWISH-OTHER INTERMARRIAGE IN SIX EUROPEAN CITIES 1930-1943

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<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
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<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riga</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legal position of Jews begins to deteriorate

* missing data

Jewish-Gentile intermarriage is forbidden

Sources: see Appendix
marriage was less common in Amsterdam than in Berlin and Frankfurt. We also observe a general increase in intermarriage. However, starting in 1927, the chances of Jewish-Protestant intermarriage were higher Amsterdam than in Frankfurt. In addition, from 1926 onwards, Amsterdam had higher chances of Catholic-Jewish intermarriage than Frankfurt. And after 1931, the chances of Catholic-Jewish intermarriage were higher in Amsterdam than in Berlin. Given that the category ‘Other’ is so mixed, we do not consider the findings on Jewish-Other intermarriage. Were the reversals just freaky aberrations? If not, what do they indicate?

Until now we have only considered the integration of Jews and Catholics, and Jews and Protestants. We have not focused on the distance between Catholics and Protestants. Perhaps as far as marriage goes, the distance between Catholics and Jews and between Protestants and Jews was vast. But how large was the distance between Catholics and Protestants? And how much larger was the distance between Catholics or Protestants and Jews than the distance between Catholics and Protestants? In other words, how large was not only absolute, but also relative Gentile-Jewish intermarriage? In addition, to what extent does the grading of the cities according to the distance between Gentiles and Jews remain the same if the extent of relative rather than the extent of absolute Gentile-Jewish intermarriage is studied? For which years do the rankings of Amsterdam and Berlin and of Amsterdam and Frankfurt reverse in this connection?

Figure 4

Jewish-Protestant intermarriage 1900-1943

after taking Catholic-Protestant intermarriage into account

YEAR
We do not present a graph, but in our cross-classifications of the religions of husbands and wives, Catholic-Protestant intermarriage is the most widespread in Budapest (a log odds ratio below 1) and the least frequent in Vienna (a log odds ratio of 5, increasing a bit with the passage of time). The log odds ratio is somewhat lower for Berlin than for Frankfurt (both a bit below 2 and demonstrating a drop). The log odds ratio is slightly above 2 in Amsterdam, with a slight increase after World War I. The log odds ratio for Catholic-Protestant intermarriage in Riga is 4.

For Figure 4, we have subtracted the log odds ratio for Protestant-Catholic intermarriage from the log odds ratios for Protestant-Jewish intermarriage presented in Figure 1. For Figure 5, we have done the same for Catholic-Jewish intermarriage, as represented in Figure 2. Once again, Figures 4 and 5 show that in all six of the cities, the lines go down over the whole period. But in the 1920s the lines for Berlin and Frankfurt look quite horizontal.

The surprise in Figures 4 and 5 is Vienna. In section 7, of the six cities Vienna is the one where Jewish-Gentile intermarriage is least common after Riga. However, the extent of Catholic-Jewish and Jewish-Protestant intermarriage, as compared to Catholic-Protestant intermarriage, is weaker in Vienna than in the other cities. The superficial explanation of this finding is that in Vienna there was not only a large distance between Gentiles and Jews, but also between Catholics and Protestants.

Figure 5
Catholic-Jewish intermarriage 1900-1943
after taking Catholic-Protestant intermarriage into account
In Figures 4 and 5, as in Figures 1 and 2, the Budapest and Riga lines do not cross the Berlin and Frankfurt lines. The Amsterdam lines do. They intersect in Figures 1 and 2 as well. Exactly when did the extent of absolute and relative Gentile-Jewish intermarriage become larger in Amsterdam?

**TABLE 5**

YEARS WHEN CATHOLIC-JEWISH AND JEWISH-PROTESTANT INTERMARRIAGE BECAME MORE WIDESPREAD IN AMSTERDAM COMPARED WITH BERLIN AND FRANKFURT, TAKING (1) AND NOT TAKING (2) CATHOLIC-PROTESTANT INTERMARRIAGE INTO ACCOUNT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic-Jewish intermarriage Amsterdam-Berlin</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic-Jewish intermarriage Amsterdam-Frankfurt</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish-Protestant intermarriage Amsterdam-Berlin</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish-Protestant intermarriage Amsterdam-Frankfurt</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We list the findings in Table 5, where we compare Amsterdam with Berlin and Frankfurt as regards Catholic-Jewish and Jewish-Protestant intermarriage. For both types of intermarriage, Amsterdam comes to exceed both Berlin and Frankfurt. This happens for the extent of relative Gentile-Jewish intermarriage earlier than for the extent Gentile-Jewish intermarriage, which does not take Catholic-Protestant intermarriage into account. This pattern is consistent.

So in the 1920s, Jewish-Gentile intermarriage was stable in two major cities in the country where National Socialism came to power in the 1930s, before the other countries considered here came to be governed by National Socialism. In that decade, the distance between Jews and Gentiles remained so large in Berlin and Frankfurt that the Jews and Gentiles of Amsterdam came to intermarry more than the Jews and Gentiles of Berlin and Frankfurt.

It might be relevant to note here that although Jewish-Gentile intermarriage did not decrease absolutely before National Socialism rose to power in Germany, it did not increase as fast in Berlin and Frankfurt as in Amsterdam. Indeed, given our figures, it remained rather stable in an absolute and even more so in a relative sense in Berlin and Frankfurt throughout the 1920s. A new political party was campaigning against the Jews at the time. It did not get a lot of votes. Yet, the country where Jewish-Gentile intermarriage remained relatively stable in the legally liberal 1920s was the first to adopt laws forbidding Jewish-Gentile intermarriage in the 1930s. The smaller the chances that the right for Jews and Gentiles to intermarry is exercised in a country, the higher the likelihood this country’s Jews will later lose their right to marry Gentiles.
11. Summing up

Maintaining that the distinction between Jews and Gentiles was a dimension of stratification in various European countries in the early 20th century and that intermarriage indicates integration, this article has analyzed data on Jewish-Gentile intermarriage in Amsterdam, Berlin, Budapest, Frankfurt, Riga, and Vienna from 1900 to 1943. It has thus addressed the extent to which Gentile-Jewish intermarriage actually occurred in the years when it was permitted by law and tested hypotheses explaining the extent to which the right of Gentiles and Jews to intermarry was actually put into effect. Our findings are six-fold.

To begin with, in the early 20th century, the chances of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage were on the rise. This finding supports the idea that integration was the destiny of emancipated Jewry.

The second finding contradicts the hypothesis that the longer ago a city’s Jews were legally emancipated, the more socially integrated they are. Jewish-Gentile intermarriage was rather unusual in Amsterdam, where Jews were emancipated relatively early and pretty widespread in Budapest, where intermarriage did not become permissible until rather late. In this respect, the idea of integration as the destiny of Jewry after emancipation has not been confirmed.

Thirdly, a factor that better accounts for differences and developments than emancipation and laws is a city’s residential segregation. Since this factor does not feature in hypotheses postulating a prime mover, things do not always happen as they are bound to happen.

Fourthly, we have not found much evidence to support the hypothesis that the chances of intermarriage decreased as the anti-Semitic vote rose. Although the Nazis came to govern Germany first, there is no indication that Jewish-Gentile intermarriage was less likely in Berlin and Frankfurt than elsewhere. Intermarriage in Berlin and Frankfurt did not decrease in the years just before Hitler came to power. Nor did Jewish-Gentile intermarriage decrease in Vienna before the Anschluss or drop in Budapest before the 1938 First Jewish Law.

The fifth finding is that politics influences intermarriage. Not only in Berlin and Frankfurt, but in Amsterdam and Budapest as well, the chances of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage fell shortly before mixed marriages were forbidden and after other anti-Jewish measures had been taken.

The sixth finding is that Germany was exceptional. After the early 1920s, Jewish-Protestant intermarriage remained stable in Berlin, as did Catholic-Jewish intermarriage in Berlin and Frankfurt, and both types of intermarriage increased in Amsterdam, Budapest, and Vienna. Before World War I Jewish-Gentile intermarriage was stronger in Berlin and Frankfurt than in Amsterdam, but in the early 1930s, Jewish-Gentile marriages were more common in Amsterdam. This was even more so if Jewish-Gentile intermarriage is compared to Catholic-Protestant intermarriage.
Our prime new hypothesis is as follows. We initially viewed the rise of an anti-Semitic party as a factor that might limit Jewish-Gentile intermarriage. We now think it is more accurate to say that a stronger dislike of Jews on the part of a city's Gentiles not only increases the percentage of votes for anti-Semitic parties, but also lowers the extent of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage. An increase in anti-Semitism due to a country losing a war and an economy collapsing for whatever reason first manifests itself as less intermarriage and later as more votes for an anti-Semitic party. It takes time to launch an anti-Semitic party, but it is easy for a Gentile to avoid a Jew. Things do not happen as they are bound to happen. But a weaker trend towards more Jewish-Gentile intermarriage portends official persecution of the Jews in the near future.

APPENDIX ON DATA SOURCES

The intermarriage data were taken from: Statistisch jaarboek der gemeente Amsterdam; Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin; Statistisch-administratives Jahrbuch der Haupt- und Residenzstadt Budapest; Statistisches Handbuch der Stadt Frankfurt am Main; Tabellarische Übersichten betreffend den Zivilstand der Stadt Frankfurt am Main im Jahre 19xx; Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Riga; Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Wien. Data on the missing years were found in: Die Geburten, Eheschliessungen und Sterbefälle im Freistaat Preussen während des Jahres 19xx (Berlin data); Monatsheft des Budapester Kommunalstatistischen-Bureaus; H. Handruck (1932) Rigas natürliche Bevölkerungsbewegung 1911-1930, Riga: Veröffentlichungen des statistischen Amtes der Stadt Riga; Die Bewegung der Bevölkerung in den Jahren 1914 bis 1921, Vienna: Beiträge zur Statistik der Republik Österreich, 8. Heft, 1923 (Vienna data); Statistisches Handbuch für die Republik Österreich, various years (Vienna figures).

Data on residential segregation, educational segregation, and anti-Semitic voting are from the statistical yearbooks mentioned above. Additional data on residential segregation were found in: J. Vijgen (1983) Joden in Amsterdam, Amsterdam: Master's thesis in social geography, Universiteit van Amsterdam (data for Amsterdam 1906); Bureau voor Statistiek der Gemeente Amsterdam (1924) De resultaten der volks- en beroepstelling van 31 december 1920, Amsterdam: Müller; Bureau voor Statistiek der Gemeente Amsterdam (1934) De bevulling van Amsterdam Deel II: De uitkomsten der tienjaarlijksche Volkstellingen van 1830 tot 1930, Amsterdam: Meulenhoff; Berlin in Zahlen, Taschenbuch 1945 (figures for 1939); Die fünfzigjährige Entwicklung Budapests 1873-1923. Budapest: Publicationen des Statistischen Amtes der Haupt- und Residenzstadt Budapest; W. Gley (1936) 'Grundriss und Wachstum der Stadt Frankfurt am Main', S. 55-100 in: W. Hartke (Ed.),
Festschrift zur Hundertjahrfeier des Vereins für Geographie und Statistik, Frankfurt: Ravenstein (figures for Frankfurt).

NOTES

1. With this question, we go beyond Goldscheider & Zuckerman (1984: 92). It downplays an increase in Jewish-Gentile intermarriage with the observation that even in the 1930s, most European Jews married Jews.

2. Gerhardt (1996) points out that Hitler’s authority (in Weber’s sense) was not simply rational-legal, but mainly charismatic, and thus not characteristic of modern societies, but of pre-modern ones.

3. Sources on the constitutions are the Jüdisches Lexikon and the Encyclopaedia Judaica. Details on laws authorizing marriages between Gentiles and Jews have been taken from Ruppin (1934: 316-317), dates of 20th-century anti-Jewish legislation from the Encyclopedia of the Holocaust.

4. Since we lack the data to test them, we do not derive three current hypotheses: (1) occupational segregation makes for less mixed marriage, (2) if Jews speak Yiddish at home, they are less likely to intermarry, and (3) the longer ago a Jewish person’s family migrated to the city, the more likely this person is to marry a Gentile.

5. Given the preponderance of historians in the literature on Gentile-Jewish relations, the opportunities have received less attention than the motivations.

6. This is rational choice sociology.

7. Integration and assimilation are different phenomena. Integration involves the creation of ties between groups. Assimilation takes place when one group disappears into another. Assimilation is not only a phase after integration, sometimes – if laws forbid intermarriage – it is also one before it.

8. In addition, this argument adds an opportunity explanation to one of our wish hypotheses and thus elaborates our theoretical framework instead of the argument rejecting this approach.

9. In the 1920s, Riga with 350,000, Amsterdam with 700,000, and Vienna with 2,000,000 inhabitants all had a 10% Jewish population. The 4,000,000 population of Berlin was 4%, the 500,000 population of Frankfurt was 6%, and the 1,000,000 population of Budapest was 20% Jewish.

10. Mixed marriages do not indicate assimilation, but conversions do. They do so less if they occur to surmount legal barriers to mixed marriages, and more so if people convert for other reasons. Honigmann (1989) shows that intermarriage figures are far more stable than conversion figures.

11. If a city’s districts were subdivided (as was the case in Budapest and Riga), we merged the new into the old ones; if a city’s area increased at the end of the period considered (Frankfurt, Vienna), we deleted the new districts. We corrected the 1906 Amsterdam figures by including the area annexed in 1920.

12. Riga’s 1920 figure is an unimportant exception. As a consequence of the evacuations during World War I, Riga’s population in 1920 was half of what it was in 1913.

13. Our findings in section 7 will not change if Amsterdam is one place higher or lower.

14. The advantage of odds ratios above percentages is that odds ratios are not affected by the relative size of a religion, whereas percentages are.

15. It is not wise to present correlations.

16. The auxiliary assumption is that the later intermarriage becomes permitted, the more this option is perceived as real.
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Campbell, D.T. (1975) "Degrees of Freedom" and the Case Study Comparative Political Studies, 8, 178-193.