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TOON VAN MEIJL
Radboud University Nijmegen

Maori–Pasifika relations: A problematic paradox?

ABSTRACT

Maori people maintain ambiguous relations with the rest of the Pacific. Genealogical relationships continue to be celebrated in ongoing connections across a wide range of domains and discourses, but the colonial history of New Zealand has also turned Maori into a community of indigenous people that has been eclipsed by European settlers over the past two centuries. As a corollary, Maori are embroiled in an intense struggle for recognition of their proprietary rights as the indigenous people of the islands of New Zealand. Over the past few decades, campaigns for a comprehensive settlement of their colonial grievances have gathered some momentum since the Treaty of Waitangi was gradually recognized again in the 1970s and 1980s. The negotiations between Maori and the government about historical and social justice for the indigenous population, however, may to some extent be counterbalanced by the increasing number of migrants arriving in New Zealand, from Asia and the Pacific Islands.

In the current competition for scarce resources, Maori have consistently argued that within the New Zealand nation state the establishment of biculturalism should precede the development of multiculturalism, implying also that indigenous rights should prevail over those of settlers and migrants. The political dichotomy between Maori and Pacific Islanders raises the question to what extent it distorts historical and contemporary connections. This article explores the multiple histories and manifold relations between Maori and Pacific Islanders in the past and present in order to examine whether the paradox of historical connections and contemporary competition can be resolved.

KEYWORDS

Maori
Pacific Islanders
Maori–Pasifika relations
biculturalism
multiculturalism

New Zealand is located in the South Pacific, but for a long time it was questionable whether it is also a Pacific country. From the early days of colonial settlement, the government and the majority of the country's population was oriented primarily towards its 'mother' England, as the home country of the European settlers and their descendants was often described. Over the years, many visitors have commented on the dominance of English mores and customs that were deeply embedded in the national ethos of New Zealand until rather recently. Needless to say, both the country's indigenous population and other migrant groups from non-European countries, including Pacific Islanders, were not included in this national imagery.

In 1973, the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community (later called the European Union), which reduced drastically the export market of New Zealand. In subsequent years, this led to a severe economic recession, which also caused a national re-orientation. In the 1980s, politicians even began to state that New Zealand was a country of the Pacific, but these claims have since been refuted by a range of noted New Zealand historians. In an essay published in the *Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand* (1990), for example, Mary Boyd discussed the place of New Zealand in its geographic region and argued that it still had to come to terms with the realities of being a Pacific country. Some ten years later, the *éminence grise* of New Zealand history, Kerry Howe (2003b: 50), argued in his keynote address to the New Zealand Historical Association that 'Pakeha New Zealanders never regarded themselves as "Islanders" or as *of* the region, but as members of a self-constructed, advanced nation-state whose origins and subsequent external images lay well beyond the Pacific Ocean. New Zealand was thus only incidentally in the Pacific'.

In 2009, the debate about the need to re-situate the New Zealand nation state in its geographic context was followed up by Damon Salesa, in a compelling essay published in the authoritative *New Oxford History of New Zealand* (2009). He argued that historians have largely failed to take into account the colonial relations between New Zealand and the Pacific Islands and peoples, both in the Pacific and in New Zealand. Only very recently was the first full-length book about the shared history of New Zealand and the people of the Pacific published: *Tangata o le Moana*, edited by Sean Mallon, Kolokesa Māhina-Tuai and Damon Salesa (2012). It is a beautiful record of New Zealand as a Pacific place, with a central view elaborated in fifteen essays touching on every aspect of this history, from migration to tourism, economics to politics, sport to the arts. Then, in 2013, the conference of the New Zealand Studies Association held at Nijmegen, the Netherlands, also focused on *New Zealand and the South Pacific*. Indeed, it might indicate that at long last the received history of New Zealand is being reconfigured radically.

Interestingly, the ambiguous identity of New Zealand as a country in the Pacific with its heart in Europe is paralleled by ambiguity in the relations between the first inhabitants of New Zealand, the Maori, and the *Tagata Pasifika*, those Pacific Islanders who are not indigenous to New Zealand, but for whom New Zealand is now home. Maori and Pacific Islanders share similar origins, migration histories, physical, linguistic and cultural characteristics, political positions and predicaments and even similar aspirations for the future, yet their cognatic relations are deeply inflected by their various and specific experiences of colonialism. Since the 1980s, Maori have been arguing consistently that their dispossession in the nineteenth century should be redressed before the needs and desires of migrants, including

Pacific Islanders, can be addressed in contemporary New Zealand. The priority that is given to the protection of Maori proprietary rights implies that a policy of biculturalism prevails over an ideology of multiculturalism in New Zealand, in spite of the genealogical, historical and cultural connections between the tangata whenua (people of the land, i.e. Maori people) and tagata pasifika (peoples of the Pacific). A creative character in Chantal Spitz's novel *L'Île des rêves écrasés* (1991; *Island of Shattered Dreams*) expressed this ambiguity very well by stating that Maori and Pacific Islanders are very 'similar in body and soul, yet made different by various foreign governments that have been squatting on their land' (cited in Somerville 2012: 81). In this article, I would like to explore changing Maori–Pasifika relations over time. What happened in the past, with a specific emphasis on the last couple of decades? And what can be expected of the future in New Zealand?

BECOMING MAORI IN NEW ZEALAND

In 1982, soon after my introduction to the Maori community in which I had settled to conduct ethnographic field research, one of the elders walked into my flat and asked what was my home country. Since I had presented myself as a student from the Netherlands, I did not fully understand the gist of his question so I asked what he meant. 'Well', he said, 'we live in Aotearoa, but we come from Hawaiki. I understand you live in Holland, but where do you come from?' I had great difficulties explaining to him that I had no knowledge of a migration history of my own ancestors. This anecdote illustrates that even today most Maori are very conscious of the location of their homeland in eastern Polynesia. At the same time, it is not less significant that in ceremonial speeches delivered at tangihanga or funeral wakes, the spirits of the dead are still often said to leap off the headland in the north of New Zealand, Cape Reinga, or, in Maori, Te Rerenga Wairua (the leaping-off place of spirits), to return to their land of origin. Thus, Maori mythology reflects that Maori are part of the Pacific, not only historically, but also linguistically and culturally. Genealogical relationships between Maori and their Polynesian family members continue to be celebrated in ongoing connections across a wide range of domains and discourses. This raises the question when and why the tension emerged in the process of adjustment to and by immigrant groups and their descendants in New Zealand. In order to address this question, a brief excursion into the past is inevitable.

The first settlers of New Zealand, who are now called Maori, travelled across the ocean and settled the largest islands in the South Pacific approximately one thousand years ago (Sutton 1994; Howe 2003a). Questions about precisely whence the Maori people came have never been unambiguously resolved. Strictly speaking, however, the Maori did not come from anywhere: they only *became* Maori after settlement in the southern corner of the Polynesian triangle (see Davidson 1984: 20). However, among linguists and archaeologists there is no doubt about the eastern Polynesian origin of the Maori. Archaeologists and linguists also agree on the fact that the society opened up for the Old World by James Cook in the second half of the eighteenth century was markedly different from the one in the making shortly after the arrival of the Maori in New Zealand. Indeed, Maori prehistory is the study of the adaptation of eastern Polynesian migrants to a new land, where they lived in isolation for at least six centuries but probably more.

First contacts between Maori and Europeans were characterized by barter. The Maori showed a particular interest in iron tools, blankets, soap and fish hooks, while they, in turn, provided food and craft goods to Cook and his crew. A corollary of the coastal trade was a change in settlement patterns and an associated tightening of the tribal organization. Settlement became more concentrated in villages, with an influence on the bonds within and between tribal groupings. At the national level, colonial interaction brought about the abstraction: the Maori. Around 1800, the word maaori was first recorded as an adjective of taangata, meaning 'usual', 'ordinary' or 'normal' 'people'. It was contrasted with taangata tupua, 'strange' or 'foreign people', but, according to Sorrenson (1979: 59), with supernatural connotations. Only since the 1830s has the word Maori been used as a noun. From then on Europeans were referred to as Pakeha, derived from the adjective paakehaa, meaning 'foreign' (Williams [1844] 1971: 252).

From the outset, Maori people responded to the arrival of European voyagers, travellers, traders and settlers with enthusiasm. They appeared receptive to most things that Europeans were bringing to New Zealand. As a consequence, a flourishing trade between Maori and Europeans emerged on the 'frontier' of the British Empire. The booming economy made New Zealand an attractive country for settlement among the victims of the Industrial Revolution in Britain. The increasing number of British arriving in New Zealand with the intention to settle there permanently, however, soon created enormous problems (Owens 1981).

Following the intensification of contact between Maori and European colonists a governor was assigned to secure sovereignty for Britain, preferably by means of a treaty with the Maori people. On 6 February 1840, a pact was signed at Waitangi between the first governor representing the British Crown and a number of Maori chiefs. In what became known as the Treaty of Waitangi the Maori ceded sovereignty in exchange for the possession of their lands, forests and fisheries (Orange 1987). The debate about the Treaty of Waitangi is complicated since there are significant differences between the English version and the Maori translation that was signed by most Maori chiefs. There can be no doubt that both signing parties had different understandings of key aspects.

For the British, the signing of the Treaty marks the formal notification of the first steps towards comprehensive European control of the Maori and New Zealand society. It opened up the avenue for the arrival of growing numbers of European settlers, which soon made Maori people more reluctant to share their country with others. Ultimately, the tension between Maori and Europeans degenerated into a war in 1860. Following a series of battles, one-and-a-quarter million acres of land were confiscated in 1864. Outside the confiscated areas, New Zealand was brought under colonial control through the individualization of customary land titles (Kawharu 1977). As a corollary, many Maori people lost recognition of their interests and were dispossessed of their tribal lands. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Maori had lost 94.1 per cent of all their lands (Kawharu 1977: 35). At the same time, approximately 60 per cent of the Maori population had been destroyed in the course of the nineteenth-century. In 1896, only 40,000 Maori remained (Pool 1991: 76).

INCLUSION AND BICULTURALISM

In the beginning of the twentieth century, a new era began. Maori people were becoming less concerned with political autonomy as it was increasingly recognized that the social welfare of the Maori population could only

be improved by obtaining equal rights within European society. At the same time, however, anxiety emerged about the cultural identity of Maori people. Recognition of European power was not supposed to entail a complete assimilation into New Zealand society at the expense of a distinct Maori way of life. Thus, Maoritanga (Maoriness or Maori culture), as it was phrased in those days, came to serve the two different objectives of 'inclusion' into European society and 'biculturalism'.

Inclusion was advocated, first and foremost, as a plea for socio-economic equality. It involved a demand for equal rights, not only in such areas as agriculture, but also in the political sector and in education. However, within the boundaries of the society in which Maori and Europeans were to hold an equivalent status, the Maori people aspired to retaining a distinctive culture and identity. Hence they simultaneously pleaded the right to be excluded from some dimensions of New Zealand society in order to maintain their own norms and customs. The latter aim has been described as the policy of biculturalism (Schwimmer 1968), although the term itself was not used until the 1980s (see below).

At the beginning of the century, the dual policy of inclusion and biculturalism was most effectively advocated by the members of the students' association of a Maori Anglican Boys College in Hawke's Bay, the Te Aute College Students' Association. The organization is commonly referred to as the Young Maori Party, although it never formed a political party. It was more a group of educated individuals who operated politically, and of whom some took up parliamentary seats (Fitzgerald 1977: 32).

Members of the Young Maori Party campaigned for the Maori people to embrace European technology in order to develop the land still held in Maori ownership. Several tribes attempted to overcome the fragmentation and multiplicity of ownership in blocks of Maori freehold land by forming incorporations. These campaigns and actions of the Young Maori Party were at a peak when Parliament passed a number of liberal acts granting limited self-government to the Maori. At the same time, the Maori population started to grow again until in 1921 it regained the level of the 1850s (Pool 1991). Hence the beginning of the century has been thought of as the dawn of a Maori renaissance.

The introduction of land development schemes, however, coincided with the great depression of the 1930s. Where established, development schemes helped mitigate the effects of the depression, but elsewhere many Maori people were forced back to subsistence agriculture and bartering produce for clothes. Another alternative was simply to migrate from the rural areas to the cities. The proportion of Maori people living in cities and boroughs increased from 9 per cent in 1936 to 15 per cent in 1945 (Metge 1964). This was partly the result of a deliberate government policy to create a cheap labour market. Many Maori people were persuaded to move to cities and enter new occupations in industries.

At present, approximately 85 per cent of the Maori population lives in urban environments, but they do not seem to have integrated well. Instead, many are locked into a vicious circle of underdevelopment. Statistics unequivocally reveal the poor conditions of the Maori population, with disproportionally low educational achievements, lower skilled jobs, high unemployment rates, low incomes, high crime rates as well as a deprived status, low self-esteem and poor health conditions (Ministry of Social Development 2010). But Maori share their socio-economic predicament with the *tagata pasifika* who migrated to New Zealand post-World War II.

FROM MULTICULTURALISM TO BICULTURALISM

In the mid-1940s, only 2,000 Pasifika residents were living in New Zealand. The number of Pacific Islanders settling in New Zealand quickly multiplied during the decades after World War II, although the number of Pacific migrants remained relatively low in relation to the rapidly urbanizing Maori. It was not until the 1960s that a massive wave of Pacific peoples moved to New Zealand, resulting in some 60,000 Pasifika by the mid-1970s (Hill 2010: 294). This inflow foreshadowed an even further increase in numbers over the next two decades, resulting in a figure of 265,974 people of Pacific ethnicity living in New Zealand at the time of the 2006 Census. This was an increase of 59 per cent since the 1991 Census (Statistics New Zealand 2006). At present, Pasifika constitute 7 per cent of the population, while Maori form around 15 per cent (Ministry of Social Development 2010: 16).

The peak of Pasifika immigration in New Zealand coincided with the steep increase of Maori urbanization in the 1960s and 1970s. The latter have traditionally been concentrated in the northern half of the North Island and moved in large numbers to the city of Auckland, where the majority of Pasifika also settled. As a consequence, Auckland gradually transformed into a 'brown' metropolis (Anae 2004), sometimes also labelled the Polynesian capital. In the suburbs of Auckland and in other towns, Maori and Pasifika shared living experiences. Young urban Maori and New Zealand-born Pasifika people went to school together, played sports together, laughed together and worked together.

Maori–Pasifika relations were strengthened by an awareness of genealogical connections. Teresia Teaiwa and Sean Mallon (2005: 208) have argued that such kinship relations are ambivalent for many reasons relating to 'precedence, rights and equality', but they are still considered as ancestral ties. In this context, an old joke is usually cracked, saying that the only difference between the Maori and the rest of Pacific Islanders is that the Maori came on a waka (canoe) to New Zealand, but Pacific Islanders got smart by waiting another 200 years and flying over on a jet (Hill 2010: 297; Somerville 2012: 125).

During the early years of Pasifika migration, affinities between Maori and Pacific Islanders were not only based on their genealogical connections, but also on their shared predicament in New Zealand society. Indeed, a joint alliance between Maori and Pacific Islanders emerged against the socio-economic marginalization of both groupings in New Zealand society. Both urban Maori and Pasifika people expressed support for the need for solidarity among working-class people, including Maori, Pakeha and Pasifika (Hill 2010: 297). In the early 1970s, these views were primarily expressed by two activist groups that were largely founded on the same ideology of anti-capitalism. The Maori group Nga Tamatoa (young warriors) caught the headlines with its rhetoric of 'brown power' and 'Maori liberation' (Walker 1984: 276). There was a fundamental belief that New Zealand capitalism coupled with the parliamentary system should be liberated from racism. This political goal was shared by the Polynesian Panther Movement, which had a largely Pacific Islands membership and was explicitly based on the Black Panther Party in the United States that aimed at Black civil rights. The Panthers also located the causes of Maori and Pacific Islanders' oppression within the exploitative social relations of the capitalist system of production. Their call was for the overthrow of the capitalist system (Poata-Smith 1996: 103). This goal ensured that they collaborated with other groups such as Nga Tamatoa, which was basically concerned with the same struggle. Collectively these groups aimed at a global revolution.

Initially, the aspirations of these ethnic protest movements were sometimes also expressed in a discourse of equality that revolved around the concept of multiculturalism and which was grounded in equal citizenship (Hill 2010: 299). Since New Zealand was founded on the one people–one culture model, the recognition of multiculturalism was not obvious. After the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, the Governor of New Zealand, Captain William Hobson, had uttered the words 'He iwi tahi tatou' (we are all one people). Government policies of assimilation and integration had been modelled after this expression, until Maori began invoking the Treaty of Waitangi again to recognize their special rights as indigenous citizens of the New Zealand nation state. In the long and complicated debate about the Treaty, the emphasis had usually been placed on Article Two, which endorses Maori proprietary rights, but Article Three guarantees equality of treatment to all citizens to organize and act as they wish within the law. In the 1970s, this article was increasingly interpreted as offering different peoples the right to live lifestyles in accordance with their own culture. Thus, in the early to mid-1970s, Maori activists began again to emphasize the need to overturn the monocultural policies and practices that dominated New Zealand society. Pakeha people generally reacted defensively to the advocates of multiculturalism who were championing the right of Maori and other ethnic minorities to express and maintain their cultural identity. They often accused multiculturalists of creating divisions and disturbing national unity (Metge 1976 [1967]: 310). Indeed, New Zealanders were rather naive about the alleged ethnic harmony in their country. Even in 1983, during my first visit, someone still managed to say to me, when he heard that I was making a study of the Maori, that 'New Zealanders can show the world how to live with a brown race'. However, the new discourse of equality and multiculturalism that had emerged in the 1970s was irreversible.

Interestingly, Maori activists made no significant distinction between multiculturalism and biculturalism in their campaigns in the 1970s (Hill 2010: 300). At the beginning of the ethnic renaissance in New Zealand, the concept of biculturalism had not even passed into general currency, mainly because the term was considered to be 'unnecessarily restrictive' (Metge 1976 [1967]: 309). However, the influential publication of the Race Relations Conciliator, entitled *Race against Time*, from 1982, marks a turning point in the debate about the relation between multiculturalism and biculturalism. On the one hand, it stressed the need to acknowledge that all cultures have equal value and argued for the establishment of a multicultural society. On the other hand, it balanced its promotion of multiculturalism with a call for special rights for the tangata whenua by stating that biculturalism should precede multiculturalism (Tauroa 1982: 46). This change in focus was a response to Maori feelings that the government was simply promoting multiculturalism in order to avoid honouring its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi (Hill 2010: 301). In 1981, the Maori commentator Ranginui Walker (1987: 78–79), for example, argued in one of his influential columns in *The Listener* that New Zealanders 'pay homage to the in-word multiculturalism without even understanding the first steps towards biculturalism'. A few years later he added that 'the ideology of multiculturalism is resorted to as a mask for Pakeha hegemony and to maintain the monocultural dominance in New Zealand' (1987: 228).

The political estrangement between Maori and Pacific Islanders in the late 1970s and early 1980s was a mutual process. Although initially Pacific Islanders also cherished their genealogical affiliation with Maori, some seemed

to develop a sort of contempt for Maori in the course of the years. Many had little understanding of the colonial history of New Zealand and consequently had difficulties in understanding that Maori had lost their language and parts of their culture. Those who originated in a Pacific nation that had become independent felt they had fought colonization successfully. Furthermore, it was clear that Pacific Islanders had migrated to New Zealand because they believed that the country offered opportunities, but soon they found out that those came from *Palangi* (Polynesian word for foreigner, mainly used in reference to Europeans) rather than from Maori. Sefita Hao'uli, a New Zealand-based Tongan radio host, expressed this view by stating that 'Pacific Island people did not come here to hongi with Maori' (cited in McIntosh 2001: 149). Hao'uli described Pacific migrants as uninterested in Maori issues because they were not relevant to their day-to-day life. Their views of Maori were also biased because the education they had received had presented a negative image of the indigenous peoples of New Zealand. Finally, Pacific Islanders understood that sympathy for a Maori perspective on ethnic relations in New Zealand would have lined them up against Pakeha, who were considered to be offering the opportunities that were believed to be available in New Zealand (McIntosh 2001: 150).

The emerging tension between Maori and Pacific ambitions was magnified by Donna Awatere in her seminal series of articles on 'Maori sovereignty' in the feminist periodical *Broadsheet* (1982–83), which articulates Maori grievances and aspirations in the early 1980s. She acknowledged that immigrants from the Pacific Islands could be natural allies of the Maori, but in her view they were exclusively focused on the Pakeha value system that was both Christian and capitalistic. She launched scathing criticisms on Pacific Islanders for unscrupulously pursuing material wealth and a western status. As a corollary, she even argued that Pacific Island immigrants and their descendants 'form an uneasy alliance with the White Nation against Maori sovereignty' (Awatere 1982b: 25).

Although Awatere has later retracted these ideological views, her series of articles, also published as a book, on *Maori Sovereignty* (1984) is known as one of the most compelling statements that Maori seek 'the acknowledgement that New Zealand is Maori land, and further [seek] the return of that land' (Awatere 1982a: 38). It demonstrates that the acknowledgement of Maori rights as guaranteed in the Treaty of Waitangi became the main political goal of Maori again during the Maori renaissance.

TREATY OF WAITANGI SETTLEMENTS

As a result of the increasing politicization of the Maori people in the 1960s, the New Zealand government noted the rising tide of Maori anger and responded in 1975 with the Treaty of Waitangi Act, which established the Waitangi Tribunal. Section 6 of the Act allowed any Maori to submit a claim to the tribunal on grounds of being 'prejudicially affected' by any policy or practice of the Crown that was 'inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty'. The most important limitation of the act, however, was that '[a]nything done or omitted before the commencement of (the) Act' was excluded from the tribunal's jurisdiction. Maori could not therefore submit claims about their large-scale dispossession in the nineteenth century. In 1985, however, the newly-elected Labour government, led by David Lange, provided for the extension of the tribunal's jurisdiction back from 1975 to 6 February 1840 when the Treaty was signed (Orange 1987: 226–54). Needless to say, this clause opened up

an important avenue for Maori people to seek redress for past grievances, although the tribunal can only make recommendations to the Crown, which remains the only authority to make compensation for or redress grievances.

Towards the end of the 1980s, some 600 claims had been submitted to the Waitangi Tribunal, most of which had been sparked by the government policy of corporatization, which involved a gigantic transfer of lands and resources held in Crown ownership to semi-private State Owned Enterprises (Belgrave, Kawharu and Williams 2005). In response to a request from Maori tribes, however, the Court of Appeal ruled, on 29 June 1987, that the transfer of assets to State Owned Enterprises would be unlawful without establishing any system to consider whether the transfer of particular assets would be inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. It was the first time in New Zealand history that the legality of the Treaty was recognized.

The recognition of the Treaty made it legally and politically inevitable to redress violations of the Treaty that had occurred in the past. Initially, the government took a long time to develop a policy for the settlement of Treaty of Waitangi grievances in New Zealand, but in recent years a great deal of significant progress has been made. Since 1990, 62 settlements have been completed, amounting to NZ$1.4 billion of compensation that has been offered to Maori to settle grievances about their dispossession in the nineteenth century (*New Zealand Herald*, 4 June 2013). Treaty settlements are not only made up of financial and commercial redress, including a mix of cash and Crown-owned property, but in most cases they begin with an apology from the Crown for its actions or omissions in the past. In many cases, they also include some sort of cultural redress relating to ownership of Crown land, rights and access to customary food gathering sources or, for example, recognition of traditional place-names by facilitating name changes to sites, such as Mount Cook which is now called Aoraki.

Although some 60 claims are still outstanding, the Crown is involved in negotiations with tribes in every geographical area left to settle. In fact, the Crown aims to have all outstanding grievances settled by its own target of 2014, but most believe it will undoubtedly take longer. Nevertheless, the settlement of Maori grievances that has been taking place over the past two decades is changing the New Zealand nation state fundamentally. Today, it is too early for a comprehensive review of the impact of the settlement process on the socio-economic development of the Maori population, which is also beyond the scope of this paper (but see Wheen and Hayward 2012). At the same time, it is tempting to consider and reflect on the implications of Treaty settlements for a range of economic, political and sociocultural issues on the long term, including relations between Maori and Pasifika.

CONTEMPORARY RELATIONS

I have been visiting New Zealand for more than 30 years and can personally confirm that it has become a radically different country. Relations between Maori and Pacific Islanders have also improved substantially. During my first visit, a Maori man asked me two questions, just like many other New Zealanders: How long have you been in the country? and, What do you think of New Zealand? The answer that most New Zealanders would like to hear was that, even after one or two days, a visitor would be thoroughly impressed with New Zealand and put into perspective the national inferiority complex by stating that it was a very beautiful country. Stephen Turner (2000)

has related these polite phrases to the long survival of a colonial desire to return to 'mother' England that was mediated by a metropolitan gaze. He has also argued that New Zealanders' sense of self is a function of the forces that shape the production of a national image for others in the context of the tourist industry. For that reason, knowledge of self for those living in the export zone is received – that is, received from others for whom it is produced in the first place (Turner 2000: 222).

Interestingly, however, my Maori host was not expecting me to confirm the stereotype that New Zealand is stunningly beautiful. While I was still stuttering, he quickly gave me the answer he wanted to hear: '… too many Coconuts, hey …'. These words were uttered during the days when the competition for scarce resources between disadvantaged minorities on the labour market was still fierce. Today, it would be difficult to argue that the situation for Maori and Pacific Islanders in New Zealand is rosy, but significant progress has been made and I think that the tension between various minorities in New Zealand has been somewhat relieved. Although socio-economic indicators of the living standards of Maori and Pacific Islanders still tend to be relatively disadvantaged in relation to those of the total population, both groupings have, since the 1980s, experienced gains in well-being that have been significantly greater that those for the total New Zealand population, including life expectancy, participation in tertiary education, employment and median hourly earnings (Ministry of Social Development 2010). In 2008, 82 per cent of all Maori adults and 80 per cent of all Pacific adults were satisfied with their life overall (Ministry of Social Development 2010: 133–6; see also Sibley and Ward 2013).

Another important indicator for the fact that the political tension that was characteristic for Maori–Pasifika relations in the early 1980s has been overtaken by time is the increasing rate of intermarriage. Historically, intermarriage between Maori and Europeans has always been high, but in more recent years ethnic combinations in New Zealand have become more complex. Marriage between Pacific peoples and Maori is becoming more common, as is marriage between Asians and Europeans. The census data from 2006 show that approximately 70 per cent of Pacific adults had a partner who recorded a Pacific ethnicity, but 25 per cent of Pacific men and 21 per cent of Pacific women had a European partner. In terms of partnerships with Maori, 16 per cent of Pacific men and 10 per cent of Pacific women had a Maori partner (Callister and Didham 2008).

Even more significant, however, is that intermarriage is more common among young people than among older people. Among the 45+ age group, for example, 77 per cent of Pacific men had a Pacific partner, while for women this was 75 per cent. But in the age group 15–24 years, within-group marriage rates are just under half for men and 64 per cent for women. This suggests that Pacific men are out-marrying at a faster rate than Pacific women. The rates of marriage between Pacific people and Maori increase especially among younger age groups, particularly for men. Finally, it is also significant that in the age group 15–24 years, the proportion of Pacific women with a Maori partner (22 per cent) is not much different from the proportion with a European partner (25 per cent) (Callister and Didham 2008).

In the post-contact history of New Zealand, the rate of intermarriages between Maori and Europeans has always been relatively high, which has probably helped to reconcile tensions (Harré 1966). Accordingly, it might be speculated that increasing rates of intermarriage and partnerships between

these groups and Pasifika might also have a reconciliatory effect (Hill 2010: 312). Cross-cultural relationships make it necessary to engage in dialogue between ethnicities and across cultural differences, not only between partners, but to some extent also between their families and friends. This assumption has been confirmed in two recent studies of cross-cultural friendships in New Zealand (Schäfer 2007; Brandt 2014). In cross-cultural relationships, the multicultural ideal of friendly social interaction across difference is actively pursued. Cross-cultural relationships, because of their relatively informal and voluntary characteristics allow for a relatively high degree of flexibility in the construction of difference and similarity. For that reason, too, cross-cultural relationships provide important in-between spaces in which people from different ethnicities can re-imagine themselves and others in and through mutual interaction.

An increase in cross-cultural relationships between Maori and Pasifika undoubtedly reflects shared experiences and often physical proximity in the predominantly urban spaces in New Zealand. Indeed, Maori and Pasifika connections are being established in many spaces, ranging from schools and workplaces to community organizations and sports teams. In terms of sports, the co-operation between Maori and Pasifika in the national rugby team is interesting since rugby is New Zealand's national sport. In fact, when New Zealand won the Rugby World Cup for the second time in 2011 there was no real debate about the contribution made by Maori *and* Pasifika (Mallon, Māhina-Tuai and Salesa 2012: 15). Ethnic diversity 'on the pitch' is regularly cited as evidence of racial harmony in New Zealand. In contrast, however, some also discuss the so-called 'browning' of New Zealand rugby as part of a broader 'discourse of Anglo decline' in the South Seas (Grainger, Falcous and Newman 2012: 270).

The ambiguity in the representation of New Zealand's national sport demonstrates that people from all walks of life can identify with rugby in multiple ways. Rugby brings a diversity of people together in New Zealand's cultural life in a way which is not rivalled by any other activity. Internationally, the All Blacks represent this coming together of people as Pakeha, Maori, Samoans, Fijians and Tongans compete as one against the rest of the world. The multi-ethnic composition of the All Blacks suggests a form of kinship that unites players and fans across the boundaries of ethnic allegiances, even though some obviously regret the Polynesianization of the sport and the simple fact that 'white men can't jump' (see Teaiwa and Mallon 2005: 212).

That political debates about Maori indigeneity may be misleading to the extent that they do not adequately reflect the rapprochement that is taking place between Maori and Pasifika at schools and on rugby fields is also visible in representations of genealogical connections in the arts. Artistic realms of representation function as mirrors of sociocultural practices and show that there is more interaction between Maori and Pasifika than political bigots would like us to believe. A recent review of the history of Maori articulations of the Pacific dimension of their identity calls attention to the critical intersections of indigenous and Pacific identifications in New Zealand. Alice Te Punga Somerville (2012) considers the ways in which Maori 'once were' and still are Pacific by drawing attention to the many unspoken disjunctures and surprising connections between what is understood as 'Maori' and what is regarded as 'Pacific', ultimately presenting an exquisite view of the discourses surrounding indigeneity, migration and diaspora in the contemporary Pacific. In the first part of her book she analyzes representations of those who have

articulated what it means to be Maori living in the diaspora, while in the second she focuses on the many ways that articulations of Maori and Pacific identities diverge *and* converge in New Zealand.

Somerville (2012) sets off from the viewpoint that Maori distinctiveness developed over the centuries of no contact with the rest of the Pacific, and the emphasis in recent decades on indigenous and non-indigenous opposition implies that Maori and the Pacific are not as consistently linked as one might hope or expect on the basis of observations in contemporary New Zealand. Her analyses of a range of historical and contemporary case-studies lead her to decentre the relationship between colonizer and colonized in favour of local constructions of the region as a space that has been overwritten by multiple criss-crossings and navigational histories. From the work of Somerville, the conclusion may be drawn that Maori literary analysis offers Maori the opportunity to reconnect with the Pacific and to engage with a vast regional comparative context that has the capacity to reaffirm genealogies and historical links between the Maori community and their Pacific relatives.

Obviously, some people will dismiss a sketch of a new horizon for Maori–Pasifika relations, but any focus on Maori as Pacific people should not be deconstructed as undermining the political imperatives and possibilities of Maori as indigenous people. It is to be acknowledged that a discourse of shared immigrantness has been foregrounded in the colonial history of New Zealand in order to assimilate Maori into the nation state of settlers. The difference between Maori and non-Maori migration to the islands of New Zealand has frequently been articulated as temporal rather than as a difference of kind, but at the beginning of this article I explained that Maori only became Maori in New Zealand. For that reason, too, Maori have no other place to which they can return except for a family visit in Hawaiki. The real question is then how the simultaneous designations of migrant and indigenous can be reconciled. Does being Pacific, being migrants from across Te Moananui-a-Kiwa (the Pacific Ocean), foreclose the possibility of identifications as indigenous? And does identifying strongly as indigenous exclude modes of understanding Maori as Pacific? My answer to these questions would be that Maori are *both* Pacific and indigenous. Maori have migrated from the Pacific to New Zealand where they have lived in relative isolation for six centuries or more. Over the past two centuries, their identity has been influenced by a humiliating history of dispossession and marginalization. As a consequence, Maori have multiple identities, both as a Pacific people and as the indigenous population of New Zealand, just as Hawaiki is a multiplicity rather than a singular site for various Pacific peoples. Indeed, each of the sites around Polynesia is a Hawaiki of sorts (Somerville 2012: 210).

CONCLUSION

In their seminal essay about space and colonial politics of difference, Gupta and Ferguson (1992) contest the assumption that nations and societies may be regarded as distinct spaces or natural places, which has long fostered an understanding of indigenous travel, foreign imperialism and postcolonial migration as disruptions of spatial separation. They argue that space must not be conceived of as naturally disconnected, but instead as 'hierarchically interconnected' (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 8). They do so in order to understand sociocultural change not as a matter of cultural contact and articulation

of distinct identities, but rather as a matter of 'rethinking difference *through* connection' (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 8).

The Pacific is probably a perfect illustration of space as hierarchically connected, a space which Epeli Hau'ofa (1994) has described as 'a sea of islands'. In his vision, Pacific Islanders are not divided by the great ocean, but instead consider the sea as connecting. This conceptualization of Oceania has significant implications for the position of New Zealand, which suddenly becomes a Pacific place rather than a white metropolis to which Pacific peoples have been migrating. It also has deep, complex and politically explosive implications for the ways in which New Zealand might be approached. It shifts the focus from separation to connection.

As mentioned before, the connection with the Pacific has always been obvious for Maori. In the early 1850s, the famous Te Arawa writer Wiremu Maihi Te Rangikaheke met a man from elsewhere in the Pacific, who identified himself as having come from Hawaiki. Te Rangikaheke instantly expressed a desire to engage in a personal way with 'the place from which our ancestors came in former times' (Somerville 2012: 196). In a letter that he intended to send 'home' to Hawaiki, he expressed his concern that Maori may have forgotten aspects of cultural practice and philosophy since their migration from Polynesia, and especially since the range of interactions with Europeans during the nineteenth century (Somerville 2012: 195). It is not necessary to reiterate that European colonization of the Maori only intensified after 1850, which has complicated Maori–Pasifika relations in recent decades. Over the past twenty years, however, great strides have been made in settling Maori grievances about violations of the Treaty of Waitangi and their subsequent dispossession and marginalization. As a consequence, there may be room again to explore Maori connections with the Pacific and to reassess, perhaps even reinforce, Maori–Pasifika relations.

In May 2013, the *New Zealand Herald* (18 May 2013) featured a report about two traditional double-hulled canoes that arrived with their crew in Northland after an historic voyage of 10 months across the Pacific Ocean. The crew left Auckland's Waitemata Harbour in August 2012 and travelled to Rapanui before returning to New Zealand using only the stars, moon, sun, ocean currents, birds and marine life to guide their 10,000-nautical-mile journey. It was heralded as a true testament to the traditions and skills of tangata whenua, but it might also be interpreted as an interesting attempt to re-explore Pacific connections. After all, expeditions like this were hardly popular until recently. Indeed, such a trip is also a signal of changing relationships between Maori and Pasifika. It represents an attempt to weave a fine new mat (see Anae 2003), so to speak, made up of the strands of Maori and Pacific cultures, which reflects both historic and contemporary interactions between Maori and Pasifika, granting New Zealand its unique identity.

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CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS

Toon van Meijl studied social anthropology and philosophy at the University of Nijmegen and at the Australian National University in Canberra, where he completed his Ph.D. in 1991. Since 1982 he has conducted thirty-three months of ethnographic fieldwork among the Tainui Maori in New Zealand. Currently he is Professor of Anthropology and head of the Department of Anthropology and Development Studies at Radboud University Nijmegen, in the Netherlands. He is also director of the interdisciplinary Centre for Pacific and Asian Studies at Nijmegen, and chair of the European Society for Oceanists. He has published widely on issues of cultural identity and the self and on sociopolitical questions emerging from the debate about property rights of indigenous peoples.

Contact: Dept. of Anthropology and Development Studies, Centre for Pacific and Asian Studies, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
E-mail: t.vanmeijl@ru.nl