Soul and Body in the Middle Ages

A study of the transformations of the scientia de anima,
c. 1260 - c. 1360

Sander W. de Boer
SOUL AND BODY IN THE MIDDLE AGES

A study of the transformations of the *scientia de anima*, c. 1260–c. 1360

Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de Filosofie

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. mr. S.C.J.J. Kortmann,
volgens besluit van het college van decanen
in het openbaar te verdedigen op woensdag 13 april 2011
om 13.30 uur precies

door

Sander Wopke de Boer

geboren op 7 december 1976
te Andijk
Acknowledgments

I had fortune of being able to write my dissertation at the Center for the History of Philosophy and Science, a place that offers everything a scholar could wish for. I will probably miss our many champagne parties the most. I want to thank the many members, past and present, I had the pleasure of meeting and working with: Hans Thijssen, Paul Bakker, Cees Leijenhorst, Christoph Lüthy, Carla Rita Palmerino, Femke Kok, Michiel Streijger, Davide Cellemare, Sanne Stuur, Adam Takahashi, Alexis Smets, Hiro Hirai, Mihnea Dobre, Delphine Bellis and Michiel Seevinck. This list must be supplemented by the two additional members of the History of Philosophy department, Thomas Baumeister and Harm Boukema.

To my supervisor, Paul Bakker, I owe a great deal. Two things in particular continue to impress me about him. First the precision with which he always reads scholarly texts. His seemingly never ending series of critical, and accurate comments not only improved this dissertation greatly, but also transformed me into a better scholar than I thought I would be able to become. The second is his continuous efforts in trying to provide other people, including myself, the opportunities for obtaining grants, giving lectures, finding positions, and so forth. I consider it a privilege to have worked with him. Although I spent less time discussing this dissertation with my second promotor, Hans Thijssen, his comments were invariably valuable and to the point.

I also benefited greatly from the insightful and critical comments of scholars from outside the Radboud University. I especially want to thank Prof. Robert Pasnau for his comments on a draft of chapter four, Prof. Edith Sylla for her comments on a draft of chapter five, and Prof. Jack Zupko for his detailed comments on both of these chapters. Their efforts saved me from several embarrassing mistakes.

In 2008 I spent a fruitful three-month period of research at the University of Notre Dame. I want to thank the Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale and the University of Notre Dame for awarding me the SIEPM/Notre Dame grant that made this visit possible. The many members
of the Medieval Institute at Notre Dame I want to thank for their warm hospitality. I want to mention especially Prof. Kent Emery, for making my visit possible in the first place and for the pleasant walks on Sunday afternoons; Roberta Baranowski, for all her help with so many practical details; Cristina Maria Cervone for our many talks and the occasional ice-cream; and Steve Molvarec for inviting me into his home for my very first traditional Easter party.

The ten years that I have spent at the Radboud University Nijmegen were made all the more pleasant because of the friends I have made there. Ad Ven-nix I have known the longest. He was my *magister primus metaphysicae*, and I spent many hours reading philosophical texts in one of his many reading groups. His classes on the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas have been one of the main reasons that I started working on medieval philosophy, although I must admit that I was never able to match his insight into the Thomistic tradition. Gert-Jan van der Heiden has become a close friend over the years. It was good to have someone to discuss the pros and cons of university life with. I also enjoyed the reading groups we participated in together. Lastly, with Simon Broek and René Gulikers, who usually were the other participants of these reading groups, I spent many happy hours in the best pub of Nijmegen University, the Cultuurcafé.

I have always enjoyed teaching as much if not more than doing research. So my final thanks go out to the many students I have had the pleasure of teaching over the years, for their enthusiasm, effort, and critical questions.
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### Abbreviations

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>J. Hamesse, Auctoritates Aristotelis</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHDLMA</td>
<td>Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge</td>
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<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>Aristoteles Latinus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCSL</td>
<td>Corpus Christianorum Series Latina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHLMP</td>
<td>Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHMP</td>
<td>Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMAGL</td>
<td>Cahiers de l'institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSEL</td>
<td>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUP</td>
<td>Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis</td>
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<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Patrologia Latina</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIEPM</td>
<td>Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale</td>
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1 Introduction

A<ugustine>. Behold, I have prayed to God.
R<eason>. What then wouldst thou know?
A. All these things which I have prayed for.
R. Sum them up in brief.
A. God and the soul, that is what I desire to know.
R. Nothing more?
A. Nothing whatever.


I cannot think of a more fitting way to begin this book than by quoting this passage from Augustine. With the support of an authority of such stature, devoting a study in the history of philosophy to the soul seems to need little justification. Augustine's words are, indeed, apt to describe the situation in the period under discussion in this book, the late-thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. After studying the commentary tradition on Aristotle's *De anima* — the most obvious place to look for philosophical discussions on the soul in that period —, Augustine's remark no longer seems to be the exaggeration it seemed to me to be when I first read the passage. The soul is one of the most important philosophical subjects in the later Middle Ages. I am not refer-

1The writing of this dissertation was made possible through financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), grant nr. 276-20-004. This grant was awarded to the VIDI project 'Form of the Body or Ghost in the Machine? The Study of Soul, Mind, and Body (1250–1700)', directed by Paul Bakker. I also benefited greatly from a three-month period of research conducted at the University of Notre Dame on a SIEPM–Notre Dame grant.

2Although the most obvious source, the commentaries on the *De anima* are not the only source for philosophical discussions on the soul. The commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* in particular contain many interesting discussions on the topic. A recent SIEPM colloquium, organized by P. J. J. M. Bakker, M. B. Calma and R. L. Friedman, was devoted entirely to the material in these commentaries: "Philosophy and Psychology in Late-Medieval Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences", Nijmegen, 28–30 October, 2009.
ring here to the idea that the soul is one of the most important things to gain knowledge about, although it certainly was perceived as such by all the commentators on the De anima. Rather, I mean that for a study of the soul in the later Middle Ages one had to draw upon, and combine, so many disciplines and discussions, that it became a focal point for some of the most important philosophical controversies. With the immortal, and somehow immaterial, human intellective soul as the noblest among its objects, the scientia de anima became much more than just another part of natural philosophy. The unity or plurality of substantial form, the correct description of the processes of generation and corruption, the structure of the soul in terms of its essence and powers, the possibility of self-knowledge in this life and perhaps the next, all these topics and many more were discussed in the commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima.

1.1 Subject matter

The subject matter of this book is, in short, the history of psychology in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. But although this description is convenient because of its brevity, it should immediately be qualified in two respects. First, because it contains an anachronism. The word ‘psychology’, although derived from the Greek, does not occur in any ancient Greek text. Aristotle’s famous treatise on the soul is simply entitled Περὶ ψυχῆς, On soul, and he never combines the terms ‘ψυχή’ and ‘λόγος’. The same applies to the Latin commentary tradition, in which the science that studies the soul is simply referred to as the scientia de anima. In fact, it is only in the sixteenth century that the term seems to have been used for the first time.3

The earliest use of the word ‘psychology’ is found in a catalog reference to a work by Marko Marulić (1450–1524) entitled Psychologia de ratione animae humanae liber I, supposedly written c. 1520. The work itself, however, has not been found. The first available work in which the word occurs is Johannes Thomas Freigius’s Catalogus Locorum Communium, a text that is prefixed to his Ciceromanus (1575).4 But these are still only isolated occurrences. The term only becomes widespread in the eighteenth century when Christian Wolff (1679–1754) uses it in the title of two of his works: Psychologia empirica

4Lapointe, ‘Who Originated the Term ‘Psychology’?’, 332.
(1732) and *Psychologia rationalis* (1734). Taking psychology in its current meaning, as an experimental discipline, we move to the end of the nineteenth century; its beginning is usually dated to 1879, when Wilhelm Wundt opened the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig. Still, the anachronistic terminology is not that important here; the lack of a word does not imply the lack of the corresponding concept. The tradition of the *scientia de anima* will still count as the precursor of psychology if the topics that are discussed in it are the same as, or closely related to, those we would now label psychological.

This brings us to the second, more important qualification, which concerns the scope and the place of the science of the soul. In the Aristotelian tradition, at least up until the late fourteenth century, the *scientia de anima* was considered to be a part of natural philosophy; it was therefore subordinated to physics, as one of its special branches. Now physics as whole deals with beings in so far as these are subject to motion and change. The *scientia de anima*, in turn, studies these mobile, changing things in so far as they are alive. This subordination of the study of the soul to physics implies that there is a fundamental difference between the place of contemporary psychology in the system of the sciences and that of the *scientia de anima*. But it also implies that there is an important difference in the scope of their respective subject matters. Whereas psychology studies cognitive being, the *scientia de anima* studies living being. As a result a number of topics that were discussed extensively as a part of medieval "psychology" would nowadays be considered to be a part of biology or even physiology. This difference should not be neglected. The *scientia de anima* is as much about animals and even plants as it is about human beings. One of things I aim to show in this book is the importance of always keeping this difference in scope in mind when interpreting the commentaries on Aristotle's work.

In spite of these major differences between contemporary psychology and the ancient and medieval *scientia de anima*, there is a lot to be said for consid-

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7By the time the term psychology becomes commonplace, the *scientia de anima* is no longer considered to be a branch of natural philosophy, but a special branch of metaphysics. Or more precisely, the most speculative and difficult part of it is assigned to metaphysics (the *psychologia rationalis*). A large part of this transformation from a natural philosophical to a metaphysical discipline took place in the Renaissance, but we will see that the seeds for this transformation are already sown in the medieval commentaries.
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

ering the latter as one of the most important historical roots of modern-day psychology. For although the term ‘soul’ as Aristotle uses it applies to all living things, there is a strong emphasis in the De anima on the human soul. Aristotle’s treatise deals with the nature of perception, the acquisition of knowledge, the workings of all the senses, and above all — connecting all these themes — the ontological status of the soul and its relation to the body. It is just that we should never forget that the study of these themes is embedded within the same framework that also includes the study of plants and animals.

1.2 Status quaestionis

In the past ten years, a substantial body of scholarly literature has been devoted to the study of Aristotelian psychology and its reception. Some of these studies employ the term ‘transformations’ when referring to the De anima tradition. The term is well chosen, which is why I also use it in the title of this study on the scientia de anima. It is much more accurate to say that the scientia de anima transformed over time than simply to say that it changed. The important difference is that transformation implies both change and continuity. More often than not, the views of predecessors were neither simply discarded, nor uncritically taken over. Instead, they were often adapted in subtle ways. This book is devoted to describing some of the most important transformations in the period from the later thirteenth to the end of the fourteenth century.

The increasing attention to the tradition of the scientia de anima notwithstanding, our knowledge of it is still sketchy. There are several reasons for this. First, many of the commentaries remain unedited. Second, the vast majority of the studies that are available tend to focus so much on the human soul that the broader context of the De anima, as a science that studies all souls, becomes lost. When it comes to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, our knowledge is sketchier still, because the available material from that period has never been studied as a coherent whole. Whereas there are several synthetic studies about the period from the introduction of Aristotle’s De anima into the Latin West up to Thomas Aquinas — even if these studies focus almost exclusively on the human soul —, the same cannot be said for the later

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8See for example D. DES CHÈNE, Life’s Form Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul, Ithaca [etc]: Cornell University Press, 2000, vii and even more clearly D. PERLER (ed.), Transformations of the Soul Aristotelian Psychology 1250–1650, Leiden [etc]: Brill, 2009, where the term is used in the title of the volume. Both volumes aim to describe the complex routes in which Aristotelian psychology was transmitted and transformed without making reference to the traditional, and misleading manner of dividing the history of philosophy into a Medieval, Renaissance and (Early) Modern period.
When it comes to the period from Thomas Aquinas to, let us say, Pierre d'Ailly, which is the period I will focus on in this book, there are a few good monographs on some individual commentators. But what is lacking is a more detailed narrative that connects the late thirteenth and fourteenth-century traditions. As a consequence, we know very little about the developments in the De anima tradition in that period, let alone about their causes or impact. An important first step, however, in describing the transformations of the scientia de anima in this period has already been made by Jack Zupko.

Zupko has argued for a rehabilitation of Ernest Moody's description of the fourteenth century as a time of growing empiricism. He has tried to show that Moody's description is applicable to the developments in the scientia de anima, in the period starting from Thomas Aquinas and ending with Nicole Oresme, by studying the different views on the subject matter of the scientia de anima. One of his main conclusions is that there is a clearly noticeable shift in the commentaries on the De anima, namely a shift from trying to determine the essence of the soul to focusing instead on its perceptible powers. This shift can then be characterized as a growing empiricism because there is (1) an increasing emphasis on the perceptible aspects of the soul and (2) a declining interest in metaphysical speculations about the soul's essence.

Zupko's argument deserves careful examination. There can be no doubt that there is a change of interest in the fourteenth century. But there are, at least at first sight, also several counterexamples to Zupko's claims, especially in the commentaries by Buridan and Oresme. For example, when Oresme argues for the inclusion of the study of the intellect in the scientia de anima, he mentions its indivisibility, its being abstracted from the body and its perpetu-

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ity as conclusions belonging to the *scientia de anima*,\(^\text{12}\) which seems ad odds with a growing emphasis on the empirical study of the soul’s powers. And how to interpret the debate found in both Buridan and Oresme on the question of whether or not a horse would be able to see with its foot, once God has created an eye there, in terms of a growing empiricism?\(^\text{13}\) On the other hand, there are several examples that seem to support Zupko’s claim. For instance, later fourteenth-century commentators often argue that the immortality and indivisibility of the human intellective soul cannot, strictly speaking, be demonstrated in the *scientia de anima*, whereas the late thirteenth-century commentators were convinced that this was possible.

In order to assess how and to what extent the *scientia de anima* transforms in the period c. 1260–c. 1360, two related areas need to be studied. First, we need to look at what the commentators say about the methodology of the science of the soul in their commentaries on the *De anima*. What kind of science are we dealing with? What exactly do we study in it? And what kind(s) of method(s) do we need to follow in order to proceed in this science? This is what I will do in chapter 3. This part will pay attention to topics such as the subject matter of this science, its particular difficulty, and the certainty of its conclusions.

Second, we need to see how the methodological standpoints are being put into practice. Do the commentators adhere to any particular method when studying the soul, and if so, in what sense? Is a difference in their discussions about the methodological aspects of the *scientia de anima* always accompanied by a difference in doctrinal positions? And if not, then what is the exact function of the methodological questions in the first book of the commentaries on *De anima*? In order to be able to answer these and related questions, I will present two case studies.

First, in chapter 4, I will look at how the commentators interpreted Aristotle’s famous definition of the soul as ‘the first act of a physical organic body that is potentially alive’.\(^\text{14}\) I will show what elements were being singled out as needing discussion, and how the discussion of this definition is closely related to the views that commentators held about what happens in generation and

\(^{12}\)Nicole Oresme, *Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima*, in: B. Patar, *Expositio et quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima*, études doctrinales en collaboration avec C. Gagnon, Louvain [etc.]: Peeters, 1995, III.1, 309: “Tertio est dicendum quod scientia hic accipitur pro aggregatione ex multis conclusionibus; modo de intellectu multae sunt conclusiones, sicut quod est abstractus, quod est perperus, et quod est indivisibilis, etc., quorum quaedam sunt de primo, et aliae non de primo qua preaeedictum non convertitur cum subjecto.”

\(^{13}\)See below, 5.1.

corruption. Second, in chapter 5, I will discuss how the commentators described the soul in terms of its essence, powers, and acts. The two case studies combined give what we might call the metaphysics of the soul, that is, they describe the soul–body relation on a general ontological level. This is usually followed in the commentaries by more detailed questions on the different senses individually and then by questions on the intellective powers, but these I will not discuss.

I should make it clear from the start that in chapters 3–5, I am not trying to determine which of the commentators gave the correct interpretation of Aristotle. In those cases where I do write about what Aristotle’s views were, the reader should always supplement this with the qualification ‘according to the common interpretation’. Aristotle’s De anima is a remarkably complex work, and, on top of that, the transmitted text suffers from much corruption. As a result, there is still no complete consensus on even the basic questions of whether or not Aristotle thought that soul and body constitute one thing rather than two, or on whether or not the active intellect is a part of the human soul.15

I have chosen not to focus on what is often considered to be the most interesting topic in the De anima, the intellective soul, but rather to focus on the soul in general and treat the intellect only insofar as it helps to understand this general framework. I have two main reasons for this choice. First, since this study is about the relations between methodology and doctrinal position, I want to take the aim that the medieval philosophers themselves put forward in the beginning of their commentaries seriously. In the footsteps of Aristotle, all of them make it clear that they intend to discuss the soul in general and not merely the intellective soul. To put this more strongly, they often felt the need to argue explicitly for the legitimacy of including a study of the intellective soul within the scientia de anima, whereas they took it for granted that the vegetative and sensitive souls are part of the proper subject matter of this science. I would argue that the fact that the human mind proves to be the most resistant to a natural philosophical treatment does not imply that it is necessarily the most important (or even controversial) topic within the scientia de anima. The second reason for my focus on the soul in general rather than on the intellect is that I have become more and more convinced that the body was often as difficult to understand philosophically as, if not more than, the soul in the later Middle Ages.16

15The interested reader can find information about some of the debates on what Aristotle could have meant in the footnotes.
16I agree with Caroline Walker Bynum in her study on medieval debates on the resurrection of the body when she says that “Yet, for medieval thinkers, body far more than soul raised technical philosophical questions about identity and personhood.”, although I would place the
As a consequence, my approach will focus on the soul as the principle of life more than as the principle of understanding. The implications of the soul as principle of life are then drawn out in two chapters discussing the Aristotelian definition of the soul, its division into various powers, and its mode of presence in the body. I am convinced that this perspective on the material is much more than just a valuable addition to the approaches that focused on the intellect. By discussing the intellect in separation from the rest of the De anima tradition, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to see why certain aspects of the intellective soul were being singled out as problematic. For this we also need to know which problems already arise on the levels of the vegetative and sensitive souls. By looking at the De anima tradition from the perspective that the commentators argued for explicitly, namely, as a science that studies the vegetative, sensitive and intellective soul both separately and in relation to one another, what they write about the human soul and the problems connected to it will take on a new meaning. This broader perspective is therefore not only necessary in order to show how the scientia de anima as a whole transformed, but also crucial to appreciating the problems connected with the human soul.

1.3 Periodisation and sources

In this study I will often, mostly for the sake of convenience, distinguish between three phases in the period under discussion. As the first phase I take the period from the 1260s to 1280s, for which I mainly focus on the commentary by Thomas Aquinas and several commentaries by anonymous masters of arts. For the second phase, the late 1290s to the early 1320s, I concentrate on the commentaries by Radulphus Brito and John of Jandun. Brito's commentary turned out to be so interesting that I decided to edit a substantial part of it. I have included this edition of book I and the first half of book II in the appendices.


Dennis Des Chene has studied the later tradition of the science of the soul (1550–1650) along similar lines in his impressive study Des Chene, Life's Form.

The third book had already been edited: Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones De anima, libri tertius, in: F. Fauser, Der Kommentar des Radulphus Brito zu Buch III De anima, kritische Edition und philosophisch-historische Einleitung, Munster: Aschendorff, 1974

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For the third phase, around the middle of the fourteenth century, I focus on the commentaries of John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, and the anonymous commentary published by Benoît Patar under the name of Buridan. I have good reasons to doubt that the ascription to Buridan is correct, which is why I will refer to the third commentary as the anonymus Patar. I cannot overemphasize that this periodisation is primarily for the sake of convenience, and does not imply any radical discontinuities that would enable us to talk about a typical commentary from any one of these periods. As I already indicated, it is better to speak of a gradual transformation of the De anima tradition than of radical discontinuities.

Since the subject matter of this book is the transformation of the scientia de anima, I only discuss those authors who wrote a commentary on this text. Also, I have made no systematic effort to compare the views that someone defends in his commentary on the De anima to his views in other texts. I had, however, to make two exceptions to this rule. The first exception is found in my discussion of Thomas Aquinas. Although Aquinas wrote a commentary on Aristotle's De anima, his commentary is not structured as a series of questions on topics related to the text (per modum quaestionis), but instead as an interpretation of each individual passage (per modum expositionis). As a result, it is not always equally clear whether we are dealing with Aquinas's own view or with his interpretation of what Aristotle meant to say. Given the enormous influence that Aquinas exerted over the later tradition, I have used several of his other works, especially his Quaestiones disputae de anima and his Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis, to supplement what he says in his commentary on the De anima.

The second exception is William Ockham. Ockham never wrote a commentary on the De anima. It turns out, however, that much of what goes on in Parisian commentaries from the middle of the fourteenth century is strongly influenced by Ockham. So strongly, in fact, that a discussion of Ockham's views on the soul is simply necessary to understand this phase of the De anima tradition.

Finally, I will not discuss John Duns Scotus, which is, perhaps, surprising, since he did write a commentary on the De anima. The reason for this is that Scotus's commentary only discusses a part of Aristotle's text. It includes no questions on either the methodology of the scientia de anima or on the definition of the soul and its structure in terms of essence and powers. In short,

19 For discussion, see the appendices.
20 The authenticity of this commentary has been conclusively established by the editors of the critical edition. See John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super secundum et tertium de anima, edited by C. Bazan, K. Emery Jr., R. Green [e.a.], Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press [etc.], 2006 (Opera philosophica, 5), 121*-137*.
none of the topics I discuss in this study can be found in Scotus’s commentary.

1.3.1 A chronological list of consulted commentaries

My claims about the transformations that take place in the scientia de anima from the 1260s to c. 1360 are mostly based on the following commentaries:

Anonymus Vennebusch (fl. c. 1260)

This anonymous commentary per modum quaestionis has been edited by Joachim Vennebusch. Vennebusch dates it c. 1260. The commentary on book III seems to be incomplete, ending after III.5. It is difficult to establish the number of questions, because often two or three questions are discussed at the same time and are determined together.

Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274)

Thomas Aquinas’s Sentencia libri De anima, his commentary on the De anima per modum expositionis, has been edited by René-Antoine Gauthier. Gauthier dates it between December 1267 and September 1268.

Anonymus Giele (fl. c. 1270)

This anonymous commentary per modum quaestionis, written by a master of arts, has been edited by Maurice Giele. Giele dates it between 1270 and 1275. It contains 21 questions on book I and 25 questions on book II.

Anonymus Bazán (fl. c. 1275)

This anonymous commentary per modum quaestionis, written by a master of arts, has been edited by Bernardo Carlos Bazán. He dates the commentary

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22 Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri De anima, edited by R.-A. Gauthier, Roma: Commissio Leonina [etc.], 1984 (Opera omnia, 45:1). For the dating, see pp. 283*-287*.

23 Anonymus Giele, Questiones in Aristotelis libros I et II De anima, in: M. Giele, F. van Steenbergen and B. Bazán, Trois commentaires anonymes sur le Traité de l’âme d’Aristote, Louvain: Publications universitaires[etc.], 1971, 11–120. For the dating, see pp. 15–16. The terminus post quem is established by its dependence on Aquinas’s De unitate intellectus (1270) and the terminus ante quem is fixed by its use by Giles of Rome in De plurificatione intellectus possibilis (written before 1275).
A CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF CONSULTED COMMENTARIES

between 1272 and 1277. It contains 7 questions on Book I, 40 on book II, and 22 on book III.

**Anonymus Van Steenberghen (fl. c. 1275)**

This anonymous commentary *per modum quaestionis*, written by a master of arts, has been edited by Fernand van Steenberghen. Van Steenberghen dates the commentary between 1273 and 1277. It contains questions on all three books of the *De anima*, but stops abruptly in the middle of question 22 of book III. The commentary contains 21 questions on book I, 45 on book II, and 22 on book III.

**Radulphus Brito (c. 1270—c. 1320)**

The third book of Radulphus Brito's commentary on the *De anima per modum quaestionis* has been edited by Winfried Fauser. My own edition of book I and the first half of book II can be found in the appendices. The commentary contains 10 questions on Book I, 44 on book II, and 28 on book III.

**Walter Burley (c. 1275–1344)**

Parts of Walter Burley's commentary on the *De anima*, an *expositio* with *quaestiones* inserted in those place he wanted to elaborate on, have been edited by Paul Bakker. The edited questions will be published as part of a broader study on the *De anima* tradition. Zdzislaw Kuksewicz has dated the commentary to 1316.

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27 See below, Appendix A.


CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

John of Jandun (c. 1285–1328)

There exist two redactions of Jandun’s commentary on the *De anima per modum quaestionis*, both of which are not available in any modern edition.\(^{30}\) The second redaction (composed 1317–1319), is available, however, in a Renaissance edition.\(^{31}\) For this study I rely solely on this second redaction. It contains 13 questions on Book I, 37 on book II, and 42 on book III.

John Buridan (c. 1300–c. 1360)

Buridan has lectured on Aristotle’s *De anima* several times.\(^ {32}\) The final redaction of his *quaestiones* commentary on *De anima* is designated in some of the manuscripts as the *ultima sive tercia lectura*. The second book of this redaction has been edited by Peter Sobol.\(^ {33}\) The third book has been edited by Jack Zupko.\(^ {34}\) All quotations from book I are from my own, unpublished edition.\(^ {35}\) A group of scholars, including Bakker, Sobol, Zupko, and myself, have joined forces in order to publish a new edition of the entire commentary.\(^ {36}\) The *ultima lectura* was probably written after 1347 and before 1357/58.\(^ {37}\) There also exists another version of Buridan’s lectures on the *De anima*, edited by Georg Lokert (1485–1547) and published in Paris in 1518.\(^ {38}\) This edition has been


\(^{35}\) *JOHN BURIDAN, Questiones de anima (secundum ultimam lecturam), liber primus, ms Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Reg. Lat. 1959."

\(^{36}\) For more information about this project and the complete list of participating scholars, see http://buridanica.org.

\(^{37}\) For the dating, see MICHAEL, *Johannes Buridan: Studien*, 708. The dating is based on the reference contained in the text to the condemnation of Mirecourt that took place in 1347. See also *JOHN BURIDAN, QdA*, xxiii.

transcribed by Benoît Patar as an appendix to his edition of the Anonymus Patar (see below).

Nicole Oresme (c. 1320–1382)

Oresme's commentary on the *De anima per modum quaestionis* was first edited by Peter Marshall in 1980. In 1995 Benoît Patar published an updated edition of these *quaestiones* using an extra manuscript. This updated edition also includes Oresme's *Expositio* on the *De anima*. The commentary contains 4 questions on Book I, 21 on book II, and 19 on book III.

Anonymus Patar (fl. c. 1340–1350)

Benoît Patar has also edited an anonymous set of *quaestiones* and an anonymous *expositio* commentary on the *De anima*. The two commentaries have been published as Buridan's first lecture on the *De anima*. For reasons that can be found in the Appendices, however, I strongly doubt that the ascription is correct. I consider these texts to be a set of anonymous commentaries from the middle of the fourteenth century. The commentary contains 6 questions on Book I, 22 on book II, and 16 on book III.

1.4 Orthography, punctuation and translations

I will utilize a variety of early prints, modern editions, and medieval manuscripts, which raises some questions about how to deal with the orthography of the Latin and the punctuation of the texts. Throughout this book I will adhere to the orthography as used in a particular edition. When citing from the manuscripts, I will use the medieval orthography, but with some exceptions as noted in the preface to my edition of Radulphus Brito's commentary found in the appendices. These exceptions are mostly the introduction of a u/v and c/t distinction that are not (consistently) found in the sources. I will change the punctuation of any existing edition (both renaissance and modern) silently when necessary. Given that the punctuation

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in medieval manuscripts is inconsistent at best, and absent at worst, treating all punctuation in an edition with suspicion is always the best approach when trying to understand a text. In some instances I have either corrected an edition or chosen a variant reading. In these instances the reading of the editor is also given as <original reading ed.>.

All translations from the Latin are my own, unless stated otherwise. All English translations of Aristotle are taken from The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes.
To describe what the soul actually is would require a very long account, altogether a task for a god in every way; but to say what it is like is humanly possible and takes less time.

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In this chapter I will provide an overview of a few of the more important discussions that can be found in the commentaries on the *De anima*. This will help to prepare for the more detailed discussions in the coming chapters. At the same time, it will give me the opportunity to introduce a selection of the most important literature. My aim is not to give a complete account of either the secondary literature or the controversies found in the commentaries, which would be impossible, but rather to identify some key topics, most of which will be treated in much more detail in the following chapters.

There is an intimate relation between the methodological questions taken up in book I of the commentaries on the *De anima* and the philosophical positions defended in books II and III of these same commentaries. Even a brief glance at the methodological questions shows that these are settled by arguments taken from a variety of often hotly debated topics in the other books, such as the ontological status of the human intellect, the relation between the soul and its powers, and the unicity or plurality of substantial form. In fact, these arguments are so important for understanding the methodological questions raised in book I, that it is next to impossible to give an analysis of book I without also discussing several topics that are debated in the other two books. I have chosen, therefore, to introduce the debates in this chapter, and to present a more detailed analysis in the later chapters.

Before going into the philosophical discussions found in the later medieval commentaries on the *De anima*, however, I will first, briefly, describe how Aristotle’s treatise on the soul entered the Latin philosophical tradition.
2.1 The introduction of the *De anima* into the Latin West

During most of the Middle Ages, Aristotle's *De anima* was unavailable in the Latin West. In fact, the only works that were available prior to the twelfth century were a few of Aristotle's logical treatises. The first Latin translation of the *De anima* was made, directly from the Greek, by James of Venice around the middle of the twelfth century and has been labeled the *translatio vetus*. Around 1230 a second translation (the *translatio nova*) was made from the Arabic, which also included Averroes's long commentary on the text. Although its translator is usually claimed to be Michael Scot, only one out of the remaining fifty-seven manuscripts of Averroes's *Long Commentary on the De anima* seems to identify him as such. The most influential translation, however, is the so-called *recensio nova*, which was made by William of Moerbeke and finished around 1266–7. This *recensio nova* is a revision of the *translatio vetus*.

Although the *De anima* was available at the time of the rise of the universities in the late twelfth century, the first official reactions to the use of the text were far from positive. There is an extant letter from a provincial synod held in 1210, presided over by the archbishop of Sens, at which the writings of David of Dinant were condemned. It contains a passage that states that Aristotle's works in natural philosophy are not to be read — that is, used in teaching — at the University of Paris, neither publicly nor in secret, under the

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1These works are the *Categoriae* and *De interpretatione*. Together with an introduction by Porphyry, the *Isagoge*, they were translated by Boethius at the beginning of the sixth century. These three translations and a small set of commentaries and treatises by Boethius are jointly known as the *logica vetus*. For a list of Boethius's commentaries and treatises, see *CHMP*, 129.

2The editor of the *Long Commentary*, F. S. Crawford, expressed his doubts about the claims of Renan and Grabmann, who (between the both of them) claimed that four more manuscripts ascribe the translation to Michael Scot. He was unable to find any such ascriptions in those manuscripts. See AVERROES, *Commentariorum magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*, edited by F. Stuart Crawford, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953, xi. The lack of evidence for the ascription of the translation to Michael Scot was also more recently pointed out by D. N. HASSE, *Avicenna's De anima in the Latin West. The Formitation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300*, London [etc.]: The Warburg Institute [etc.], 2000, 9.

3This translation survives in approximately 250 MSS. It is described in great detail by R.-A. Gauthier in his introduction to THOMAS AQUINAS, *SentdeA*, 129*-199*. For the composition date, see p. 283* of Gauthier's introduction.

4This brief overview relies mostly on F. VAN STEENBERGHEN, *Aristotle in the West. The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism*, Translated by Leonard Johnston, Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1955, esp. 59–88. His detailed description of the early phases of the reception of the *De anima* in the Latin West is still accurate.
penalty of excommunication.  

However, less than twenty-five years later, the attitude of the church authorities was already much more positive. In April 1231, Pope Gregory IX wrote a letter in which he assigned the task of purging the works of Aristotle of any errors to a committee of three members. As Augustine had done before him with Plato, Gregory IX invoked the analogy of the Jews taking the spoils of Egypt to point out that Aristotle's philosophical works contain much that is valuable and useful. The appointed committee seems to have never completed its task, however, and by 1252 the reading of Aristotle's *De anima*, in its uncensored form, had been added to the list of requirements for obtaining a bachelor's degree in the arts faculty at Paris.

In an influential article, Daniel Callus divided the introduction of the *De anima* in the thirteenth century and the assimilation of its contents into three stages: the early reception in which the commentators wrote treatises under the influence of Avicenna (until about 1240), the writing of exposition type commentaries under the influence of Averroes (until about 1265), and the appearance of commentaries in the question form. This division has recently
been criticized, rightly, by Olga Weijers, mainly because the literary forms of
the commentaries, especially in the first two periods, turn out to be much
more varied than Callus's classification suggests.\textsuperscript{10} This means that the influ-
ence of Avicenna and Averroes on the form of the commentaries was limited.
Callus was right, however, about their influence on the contents of the com-
mentaries. The early reception of the \textit{De anima}, especially, was strongly in-
fluenced by Avicenna.\textsuperscript{11} Avicenna's treatise on the soul is not a commentary
on Aristotle's \textit{De anima}, but it was perceived as such in the Middle Ages.\textsuperscript{12}
His influence on the commentators in the first half of the thirteenth century
becomes clearly visible when we turn to Aristotle's views on what the soul is.

\section{2.2 The soul as \textit{perfectio}}

In Aristotelian philosophy, 'soul' has a very different meaning than the one
associated with it nowadays. Many of us tend to associate the term 'soul' with
some ghostlike spiritual core of human beings, something that is distinct from
their material composition. 'Soul' is associated with personality, emotions,
feelings, and, for some, even with immortality. We may be willing to ascribe
a soul to (some) animals when they exhibit behavior somehow similar to our
own, but we would certainly not be willing to ascribe a soul to insects or plants.
To many of us, the soul is at best something elusive, more a matter of faith
than something the existence of which can be scientifically demonstrated.

Although several of the elements associated by us with 'soul' are also men-
tioned in Aristotle's \textit{De anima}, the basic notion of 'soul' that Aristotle em-
loys is fundamentally different from ours. 'Soul' in any philosophy based

\textit{British Academy}, 29 (1943), 229–281, 264–65. For an overview of the reception of the \textit{De anima}
in the thirteenth century up until Thomas Aquinas, see DALES, \textit{The Problem of the Rational Soul}.
But note that this study only focuses on one aspect of the reception, namely the discussions
about the intellective soul.

\textsuperscript{10}See O. WEIJERS, 'The Literary Forms of the Reception of Aristotle. Between Exposition
and Philosophical Treatise', in: LUDGER HONNEFELDER et al (eds.), \textit{Albertus Magnus and the
Beginnings of the Medieval Reception of Aristotle in the Latin West From Richard Rufus to Fran-

\textsuperscript{11}See WEIJERS, 'The Literary Forms', 578 and HASSE, \textit{Avicenna’s De anima}, 13–79. D. N.
HASSE, 'The Early Albertus Magnus and his Arabic Sources on the Theory of the Soul', \textit{Vivar-
rium}, 46 (2008), 232–252, esp. 239–244, shows how even Albert the Great, writing in the 1240s,
was still strongly influenced by Avicenna in his discussions on the soul. Although Albert was
also familiar with Averroes, this commentator was "not yet perceived as a philosopher of the
same rank as Aristotle or Avicenna" (p 249)

\textsuperscript{12}The Middle Ages were not the only period in which the text was perceived as a com-
mentary on Aristotle. According to HASSE, \textit{Avicenna’s De anima}, 1: "It is a common mistake
among Western medievalists to call Avicenna’s \textit{De anima} a commentary on, or a paraphrase of
Aristotle’s \textit{Peri psychês}.

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The soul as perfectio

on Aristotle is first and foremost that by which the living differs from the non-living. An argument for the existence of soul is, therefore, completely unnecessary; simple observation and common sense will suffice. This is very well put by Avicenna in the opening lines of his own treatise on soul:

Dicemus igitur quia, quod primum debemus considerare de his, hoc est scilicet affirmare esse huinis quod vocatur anima, et deinde loquemur de eo quod sequitur hoc. Et dicemus quod nos videmus corpora quae sunt quae non nutriuntur nec augmentantur nec generant; et videmus alia corpora quae nutriuntur et augmentantur et generant sibi similia, sed non habent hoc ex sua corporeitate; restat ergo ut sit in essentia eorum principium huinis praeter corporeitatem. Et id a quo emanant istae affectiones dictur anima, et omnino quicquid est principium emandandi a se affectiones quae non sunt unus modi et sunt voluntarie, imponimus ei nomen ‘anima’.

Let us therefore say that we should first consider these things, that is, affirm the existence of that which is called soul, and subsequently speak of that which follows this. And let us say that we see some bodies that neither feed, nor grow, nor produce offspring, and we see other bodies that do feed and grow and produce things similar to themselves, but they do not have these <operations> on account of their corporeality, it remains, therefore, that in their essence, there exists besides corporeality a principle of these <affections>. And that from which these affections flow is called soul. And on altogether whatsoever is the principle of the flowing forth out of itself of affections that are not limited to one mode and that are voluntary, we impose the name ‘soul’.

But things are more complicated than they might appear from these opening lines of Avicenna’s treatise. It is true that from the earliest commentaries

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13 Were it not for the extensive commentary tradition on Aristotle’s work that renders ψυχή as anima, which we can only sensibly translate as soul, I would prefer the title of the English translation made by Charles Collier in the middle of the nineteenth century, which does not have the misleading connotations of ‘soul’, ARISTOTLE, On the Vital Principle, translated from the original text with notes by Charles Collier, Cambridge Macmillan and Co, 1855.

14 AVICENNA, Liber De anima seu sextus De naturalibus, édition critique de la traduction latine médiévale par S van Riet Introduction sur la doctrine psychologique d’Avicenne par G Verbeke, Louvain Peeters [etc ], 1968–72 (2 vols ), vol 1, I 1, 14–15. Although the text is not a commentary on Aristotle’s text, it follows the structure of Aristotle’s text closely and elaborates on it.

15 ‘Voluntary’ should be taken in a very broad sense here. One of the manuscripts on which the edition is based supplies some explanation in the form of a gloss (see the apparatus criticus on p 16 of the edition) “Quattuor sunt hic species actionum quoniam aliae sunt unius modi et voluntariae ut superiorum corporum, aliae sunt unus modi et non voluntariae ut elementorum, aliae sunt diverso modo et non voluntariae ut vegetabilium, aliae diverso modo et voluntariae sicut omnium sensibilium.”
on the *De anima* onward, the general term ‘soul’ has been used in the meaning of a constitutive principle of the living body. But it has also been used to refer to a (at least in some sense) self-sufficient and immortal entity.\(^{16}\) The resulting ambiguity of the term ‘soul’ is not, however, the result of a confused interpretation of Aristotle. Quite the opposite. The ambiguous status of the intellective soul forms the core of Aristotle’s *De anima*.

The emphasis in Aristotle’s treatise is undeniably on soul as a constitutive principle of the living body, and this very fact alone makes the *De anima* one of the greatest advancements in philosophical thought about the relationship between soul and body. Whereas Plato had a tendency to equate the human being with his or her soul, at times even describing the body in terms of a prison, Aristotle repeatedly insists on the unity of the living substance and dismisses every question regarding the cause of this unity of soul and body.\(^{17}\) There are no two fundamentally different entities — a soul and a body — that are subsequently joined by some unifying cause, whatever that cause may be.\(^{18}\) There is always only one entity, the living, functioning, ensouled organism. Yet each time Aristotle repeats this claim, it is quickly followed by some

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\(^{16}\)It could be objected that the second meaning is usually assigned to the compound term ‘intellective soul’ and that ‘soul’ is used as a general term covering all forms of life. Although this is true, it does not change the fact the vast majority of philosophers employing these terms would also say that the intellective soul is unequivocally a soul. Hence, the intellective soul is thought of as both the principle of life of the living substance and an immortal entity in its own right.

\(^{17}\)Plato’s view that man is identical with his soul can be found in PLATO, *Alcibiades*, translated by D. S. Hutchinson, in: Plato, *Complete Works*, edited, with introduction and notes by J. M. Cooper, Indianapolis [etc.]: Hackett, 1997, 130c1–6, 589: “Since a man is neither his body, nor his body and his soul together, what remains, I think, is either that he’s nothing, or else, if he is something, he’s nothing other than his soul.” The authenticity of the *Alcibiades* is debated, however (for some discussion see PLATO, *Alcibiades*, edited by N. Denyer, Cambridge[etc.]: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 14–26) But there are other references in Plato’s works to the identity of man with his soul, a list of which can be found in L. P. GERSON, ‘Platonic Dualism’, *The Monist*, 69:3 (1986), 352–369, 367, note 13.

\(^{18}\)At least according to the standard reading of Aristotle. But in a number of publications Abraham Bos has argued that Aristotle has been misread by almost all commentators from Alexander of Aphrodisias onward. According to Bos, the soul is not the form of an organic body (as is commonly held), but of a body that serves as an instrument for the soul, the pneumatic body, which is the means through which the soul moves our physical body. The most detailed discussion can be found in A. P. Bos, *The Soul and its Instrumental Body: A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Living Nature*, Leiden [etc.]: Brill, 2003. His interpretation of Aristotle has also led him to reconsider the status of the *De spiritu*, included in Bekker’s edition of the *opera omnia* but generally regarded as spurious. Since the *De spiritu* is consistent with Bos’s interpretation of Aristotle’s *De anima*, he considers the text to be authentic. See A. P. Bos and R. FERWERDA, *Aristotle, On the Life-Bearing Spirit (De spiritu) A Discussion with Plato and his Predecessors on Pneuma as the Instrumental Body of the Soul*. Introduction, Translation and Commentary, Leiden [etc.]: Brill, 2008, esp. 23–5.
qualification or doubt. Take, for example, the following famous passage from the beginning of book II of the *De anima*:

If, then, we have to give a general formula applicable to all kinds of soul, we must describe it as an actuality of the first kind of a natural organized body. That is why we can dismiss as unnecessary the question of whether the soul and the body are one: it is as though we were to ask whether the wax and its shape are one, or generally the matter of a thing and that of which it is the matter.\(^{19}\)

One can hardly ask for a stronger formulation of the fundamental unity of soul and body. Not only do they have the strongest unity possible, that of form and matter, but it also seems that even the question of whether or not soul and body are *one* loses its meaning.\(^{20}\) It seems clear that the soul is taken here as the principle of life, and not as something having its own existence apart from the body. Remarkably, however, merely about 25 lines further in the text, this statement seems to be contradicted when Aristotle compares the soul–body relationship to that of the relation between a sailor and his ship:

From this it is clear that the soul is inseparable from its body, or at any rate that certain parts of it are (if it has parts) — for the actuality of some of them is the actuality of the parts themselves. Yet some may be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all. Further, we have no light on the problem whether the soul may not be the actuality of its body in the sense in which the sailor is the actuality of the ship.\(^{21}\)

This is not an isolated occurrence; the contrast reoccurs again and again in the *De anima*. Each time that the soul is put forward as the vital principle, a tentative qualifying remark will quickly follow, in which the intellect seems to be put forward as some separate or at least separable entity.\(^{22}\) In the

\(^{19}\) *Aristotle, De anima*, II, 412b5–8.

\(^{20}\) But see C. Shields, "The Priority of Soul in Aristotle's *De anima*: Mistaking Categories?" in: D. Frede and B. Reis (eds.), *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy*, Berlin [etc.]: Walter de Gruyter, 2009, 267–290, for a detailed analysis of this passage, in which he argues, against the common interpretation, that according to Aristotle the soul is prior to the body. According to Shields, Aristotle does not mean that asking the question of the unity of soul and body is asking the wrong question, since form and matter are principles, not things. Instead, he means that the question need not be asked anymore, because the fact that the soul is the first actuality already makes it clear in what sense the soul–body composite is a unity. The body is an instrument of the soul, and gets its unity from the soul.

\(^{21}\) *Aristotle, De anima*, II, 413a4–9.

commentary tradition and texts related to it, this contrast has been dealt with in various ways. It was Avicenna’s *De anima* that provided the commentators with an important tool to do justice to the contrasting passages in the *De anima* while still providing a unified theory of soul. According to Avicenna, the soul can be defined from two perspectives. It can be defined as it is in itself, and as such the soul is defined as a spiritual immortal substance. But the soul can also be defined in its relation to the body. As such it is defined as the body’s *perfection*. Notice that (the Latin) Avicenna uses the term ‘perfection’ (*perfectio*) rather than the term ‘form’ (*forma*) when defining the soul in its relation to the body. Defining the soul as ‘the perfection of the natural organic body’ makes the definition compatible with his other definition of the soul, in abstraction from the body, as a spiritual immortal substance. For there seems to be no reason why one thing cannot be perfected by another.

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24 Avicenna’s intriguing proof for the possibility of defining the soul apart from its relation to the body has become known as the ‘flying man’ argument. Avicenna, *De anima*, I.1, 36–7. “Dicemus igitur quod aliquis ex nobis putare debet quasi subito creatus esset et perfectus, sed velato visu suo ne externora videret, et creatus esset sic quasi moveretur in aere aut in inani, ita ut eum non tangeret spissitudo aeris quam ipse sentire posset, et quasi essent disuncta membra eius ut non concurrerent sibi nec contingent sese. Deinde videat si affirmât esse suae essentiae. non enim dubitabit affirmare se esse, nec tamen affirmabit exteriora suorum membrorum, nec occulta suorum interiorum nec animum nec cerebrum, nec aliquid alud extrinsecus, sed affirmabit se esse, cuius non affirmabit longitudinem nec latitudinem nec spissitudinem. Si autem, in illa hora, possibile esset ei imaginari manum aut aliud membrum, non tamen imaginaretur illud esse partem sui nec necessarium suae essentiae. Tu autem scis quod id quod affirmatur, alud est ab eo quod non affirmatur, et concessum alud est ab eo quod non conceditur. Et, quoniam essentia quam affirmat esse est propria illi, eo quod illa est ipsem, et est praeter corpus eius et membra eius quae non affirmat, ideo exerpefactus habet viam evigilandi ad scendendum quod esse animae alud est quam esse corporis; immo non eget corpore ad hoc ut sciat animam et perzipiat eam; si autem fuit stupidus, opus habet converti ad viam.” For a detailed discussion of the argument, see Hassé, Avicenna’s *De anima*, 80–92, for the context see M. Marmura, ‘Avicenna’s “Flying Man” in Context’, *The Monist*, 69.3 (1986), 383–395. The claim that the flying man argument was frequently discussed in Latin writings, as is found for example in Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*, 8, is an exaggeration. Although the argument was occasionally discussed, the references are few, especially compared to the number of commentaries on the *De anima*. It is not even discussed by Albertus Magnus, who otherwise takes over many elements of Avicenna’s discussion of the soul. See Hassé, ‘The Early Albertus Magnus’, 241.

2.2.1 Avicenna's influence

Avicenna's two definitions of the soul and his use of 'perfection' instead of 'form' shaped the commentary tradition in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century. The distinction between two ways of defining the soul is found in many of the philosophers of the first half of the thirteenth century, for example in, John Blund, Peter of Spain, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure. And in his use of the term 'perfection', Avicenna was followed by virtually all commentators, starting with Dominicus Gundissalinus, the translator of Avicenna's treatise on the soul. Also in his own treatise on the soul, Gundissalinus rendered Aristotle's definition by using the term 'perfection': "Anima est prima perfectio corporis naturalis, instrumentalis, viventis potentialiter." And practically all philosophers who discussed the soul in Aristotelian terms followed Gundissalinus's practice when they discussed the soul's relation to its body.
The common element in all early thirteenth-century attempts to capture the soul–body relationship in Aristotelian terms is that the soul is presented as a substance in its own right. The technical term used to describe the soul’s ontological status is ‘hoc aliquid’, literally a ‘this something’.

A *hoc aliquid* is an entity in its own right, which in itself has a complete essence. The difficulty with this description of the soul is that it seems to turn the soul and the body into two different things again, which then occasions the question of how they can be related in such a way as to constitute one single living being. But during this phase of the reception of the *De anima*, the commentators were not so much worried about the details of how the soul relates to the body. Rather they were concerned about how the soul, as a substance in its own right, was internally structured. No created substance, everyone of them agreed, could be completely simple, since that would imply that such a substance could not be distinguished from God. So there must be some ontological complexity within the soul itself. This required complexity was fleshed out in one of two ways. Several commentators argued that the soul is composed of form and matter, just as every corporeal substance is. The only difference is that the soul is composed of form and spiritual matter, whereas bodies are composed of form and corporeal matter. This view that everything, except God, is composed of matter and form is called universal hylomorphism.

Other commentators turned to Boethius in saying that the soul is composed of *quod est* and *quo est* (also called esse). But what precisely is meant by this distinction seems to differ from one commentator to another.

When the soul is itself composed of matter and form, the result is that the living human being as a whole has a plurality of substantial forms, consisting

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of, at least, the form of the soul and the form of the body. This consequence was accepted by many of the commentators in the first half of the thirteenth century. The resulting popularity of the plurality of forms position has been singled out as a very important element in the reception of the *De anima*. But, as Bazán has rightly argued, when it comes to the writings on the soul prior to Aquinas, it is the element of a soul–body dualism that is fundamental and not the element of universal hylomorphism. The defense of the commentators of a plurality of forms in any given substance is subordinated to their intuition that the soul is a complete substance in its own right. From this perspective, those who defend universal hylomorphism and those who opt for the Boethian distinction between *quod est* and *quo est* have much more in common than is apparent at first sight.

### 2.3 The soul as *forma*

Ultimately, a solution in terms of different definitions did not satisfy the commentators, especially as they became increasingly aware of the implications of the whole Aristotelian philosophical framework in which the study of the soul was embedded. For no matter in how many ways you define the soul, it must still be the case that the soul is either the form of the body in a strict sense, in which case it seems to perish with the body, or a separate substance, in which case the unity with the body is left unexplained and some medium must be introduced. From the 1260s onward, referring to two different definitions was perceived as more of a way of avoiding the choice between these two alternatives than as an actual solution of the problem. The most important factor in this realization was the continuously improving precision of the terminology that was used in the commentaries.

The commentators from the second half of the thirteenth century began to notice that the term ‘perfection’ did not fully capture Aristotle’s description of the relation between soul and body, and substituted ‘perfection’ with the more precise terms ‘(first) act’ and ‘(substantial) form’. Once this new terminology had been introduced, they began to realize that the Avicennian solution was ultimately untenable. How could the soul be a spiritual substance in its own right and a substantial form at the same time? The very formulation of two definitions of the soul now made it clear that these descriptions were, at least

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38 This is also noted by Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*, 3.
at first sight, incompatible. If the soul is the substantial form, or first act, of the living body, it seems that it cannot be a substance in its own right. If, on the other hand, the (human) soul is an immortal substance, it seems that it cannot be the substantial form of the body. This insight meant the beginning of new phase in the commentary tradition on the *De anima*. In the later thirteenth century three solutions were put forward: (1) A denial that the soul in so far as it is immortal and subsistent informs the living body, defended by Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia and John of Jandun among others.\(^{39}\) This position is now known under the name ‘radical Aristotelianism’;\(^{40}\) (2) A new view of what accounts for subsistence, which allowed the soul to be the only form of the body and subsistent in its own right, without turning the soul into a substance. This was defended by Aquinas; and (3) The position that the human soul is both a substance and a form, which was favored by many Franciscans. These three solutions will be briefly introduced here.

### 2.3.1 Immortal but not personal: radical Aristotelianism

Already in the twelfth century, Averroes had given an interpretation of the *De anima* that did justice to the intimate relation between soul and body as well as to Aristotle’s remarks on the subsistence and immortality of the intellect. Averroes clearly stated that the soul is the form of the body. But he was also fully aware that when the soul is a form of a body, this implies that the soul is mortal and is corrupted when the body corrupts. To solve this tension, Averroes stated that if the intellect truly is immortal, it cannot be a form of the body in the same sense in which the vegetative and sensitive souls are forms of the body. On the contrary, the intellect has to be a separate form, which is somehow conjoined to the body in its operations only. Aristotle’s definition of the soul, Averroes said, is equivocal.\(^{41}\) Only the vegetative and sensitive souls are forms of the body in the regular Aristotelian sense; they give the body its being, and they corrupt when the body corrupts. The intellect, on the

\(^{39}\)Or, more precisely, they denied that the mortal intellect inheres in the human body, although we can still call it a substantial form of the body on account of the relation with the body that it acquires during cognition. In the terms of John of Jandun, the separate intellect can be called our substantial form in the sense of ‘operans intrinsecum appropriatum corporis’ For discussion, see BRENÉT, *Transferts du sujet*, 52–59.

\(^{40}\)It is also referred to as ‘heterodox Aristotelianism’, but since this description seems to imply the existence of such a thing as an orthodox Aristotelianism, I will not use it. A final label that is used to refer to this group is ‘Latin Averroism’, which points to the strong influence of Averroes’s long commentary on the *De anima*.

\(^{41}\)AVERROES, *Commentarium magnum in DA*, II.7, 138\(^{15}\) 20. “Et induxit hunc sermonem in forma dubitationis, cum dixit. Si igitur dicendum est, excusando se a dubitatione accidente in partibus istius definitionis. Perfectio enim in anima rationali et in alius virtutibus anime fere dicitur pura equivocatione, ut declarabitur post.”
IMMORTAL BUT NOT PERSONAL: RADICAL ARISTOTELIANISM

other hand, is a unique, immortal, divine substance existing separately from all bodies, although it relates to these bodies in the process of thinking. This doctrine that all human beings share one unique immortal intellect has been labeled mono-psychism.

From the 1270s onward, a small number of commentators tried to develop Averroes's interpretation as a solution for the difficulties inherent in Aristotle's description of the soul as form of the body. This group includes Siger of Brabant, Anonymus Giele, and John of Jandun. Sometimes Walter Burley is also linked to this group. They are often referred to as either radical (or heterodox) Aristotelians or Latin Averroists. Although these philosophers have often been presented as an homogeneous group, Van Steenberghen pointed out already in the 1960s that they are not.

The label 'radical Aristotelian' has many connotations, all of which are explored in an article by Bazán, but the most important doctrinal aspect included under it is the thesis that there is only one, immortal intellect, which

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42 Strange as this may seem, there are good philological as well as philosophical arguments in favor of this reading of Aristotle's De anima. One of the philological arguments is a parallel between the terminology Aristotle employs when he discusses the intellect in De anima III.5 (430a10–25) and that in Metaphysica XII 7–9, where he discusses the divine intellect. For discussion see V. Caston, 'Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal', Phronesis, 44:3 (1999), 199–227, who proposes to read Aristotle's description in the De anima as referring to a divine intellect. The philosophical reasons include, but are not limited to, the immateriality of thought and the fact that two persons can share the same thought. For a discussion of some philosophical reasons see especially D. L. Black, 'Consciousness and Self-Knowledge in Aquinas's Critique of Averroes's Psychology', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 31.3 (1993), 349–385 and D. L. Black, 'Models of the Mind: Metaphysical Presuppositions of the Averroist and Thomistic Accounts of Intellection', Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 15 (2004), 319–352.


44 The possibility that the Anonymus Giele is in fact Boethius of Dacia has been tentatively suggested by Giele in his introduction to the edition. But because apart from the doctrinal parallels he could find no other evidence for the ascription of the commentary to Boethius of Dacia, Giele preferred to publish the commentary as anonymous.

45 John of Jandun's views are analyzed in detail in Brenet, Transferts du sujet.

46 For example in A. Maier, 'Ein unbeachteter "Averroist" des XIV. Jahrhunderts: Walter Burley', in: Ausgehendes Mittelalter Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14 Jahrhunderts, vol. 1, Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1964, 101–121. The reason that Burley is not always included in this group is that his thought developed from a more anti-Averroist to an Averroist standpoint, even within his commentary on the De anima. For this development see Kuksewicz, 'The Problem of Walter Burley's Averroism'. Kuksewicz also notes that we find a similar development in Thomas Wilton (p. 375).

47 F. Van Steenberghen, La philosophie au XIIIe siècle, Louvain [etc.]. Publications Universitaires [etc.], 1966, esp. 391–400.
Averroes's reading of Aristotle was controversial for theological reasons, in particular because it seemed to deny the personal immortality of the soul which is required for the personal accountability after death for our sins. But his reading was just as controversial on philosophical grounds. Those who followed his interpretation claimed that the only coherent philosophical account of an immortal intellect that has the power to know all things is a unique and separate intellect. From this starting point they then proceeded to provide an account of individual human cognition in terms of a connection or conjunction with this shared intellect. Their opponents, in contrast, tended to deny the possibility of an impersonal shared intellect from the start on account of its incompatibility with our everyday experience of the first-personal aspect inherent in cognition. Starting from the premise that any intellect must be a personal intellect, they then proceeded to give an account of the relation of this individuated intellect to a material substance. But there was at least one philosopher who refused to adhere to the terms of this debate.

In a question entitled ‘Whether the intellective soul is, according to its substance, joined to the body as its substantial perfection’, the anonymous author of the commentary on the *De anima* edited by Giele remarks that although the debate is complicated, and the arguments against the Averroistic position seem difficult to solve, there is, in fact, an easy solution. The whole difficulty, he remarks, seems to come from the premise that it is an individual human being who knows something. But this premise is not itself proven by those who refer to it in their argumentation. So a denial of this premise would be enough to counter their arguments, which is precisely what he proceeds to do: ‘Whence I do not concede that properly speaking man understands.’ He certainly has a point, but it is doubtful that many people would have been persuaded by this solution.

The occurrence of this radical solution to the prob-
lem again shows that referring to radical Aristotelianism as a unified body of doctrine is something one should try to avoid.

Although at first sight it may seem obvious why any interpretation following Averroistic lines met with much resistance, things are more complicated than they may appear. It is of particular importance to realize why the claim of the unicity of the intellect was so controversial. For there is at least one sense in which the claim that there is but one intellect for all of mankind is perfectly acceptable although not agreed upon by all philosophers. Aristotle had made a distinction between two intellects. The first one, the so-called potential intellect (*intellectus possibilis*), is the intellect that is in potentiality to knowledge, that is, it is capable of receiving knowledge. The second one, the agent intellect (*intellectus agens*), plays an active role in the acquisition of knowledge by transforming sensible images into universal concepts. Had these radical Aristotelians only been talking about a unique agent intellect, they would never have been labeled radical. The claim that the agent intellect is unique and common to all men need not amount to anything more than the claim that there must be some external causal influence (other than sense perception) that enables understanding to take place, a thesis that does not only seem (mostly) harmless, but also had already been defended in one variant or another by distinguished philosophers, Avicenna included, and even by Church Fathers.

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52 Aristotle makes the distinction in *De anima* 111.5.

53 The position that claims that for true and certain knowledge some form of divine illumination is required — as was defended by Augustine and Bonaventure, for instance — makes many claims that are similar to the position that a separate and agent intellect fulfills a causal role in cognition. In fact, the two positions are easily combined as is the case in John Pecham. John Pecham; G. Melani (ed.), *Tractatus de anima*, edited by G. Melani, Firenze: Studi Francescani, 1948, 19–20. “Similiter dico esse in anima intellectiva. Habet enim quasi perspicuitatem mentis possibilitatem, qua in omnium formarum similitudines vel differentias est transmutabilis, et haec vis, sicut credo, dictur intellectus possibilis. Habet etsi vim activam, naturalem claritatem vel celeritatem ipsam possibilitatem in omnium formarum similitudines vel differentias impellentem Habet lucem superius radiantem, in qua omnia videt, et tamen ipsam non videt; ipsam attingit ut rationem videndi et non in ratione objecti... Duplicem enim ponit intelligentiam agentem, increatam et creatam, ut iam patet.” When Robert Pasnau describes the positions of Roger Marston and William of Auvergne, both of whom claim that the agent intellect is separate and divine, he puts this more strongly; R. Pasnau, ‘Divine Illumination’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/illumination/> (accessed on 11 July 2010). “Such cases illustrate how the various medieval disputes over whether human beings
Averroes, however, claimed that not only the agent intellect, but also the potential intellect is numerically one for all of mankind. And it was this claim that seemed to imply that it is strictly speaking not this or that particular human being that understands, but instead only this single intellect. Not to mention that it threatens the personal immortality of the human soul. To be fair, Averroes thought that the implication that individual knowledge would be impossible did not follow, and defended the claim that knowledge should still be ascribed to particular human beings even when they shared this intellect. But most philosophers remained unconvinced and regarded his claims with great suspicion and even hostility.

2.3.2 Formality and subsistence combined: Thomas Aquinas

One of the philosophers who were strongly opposed to the interpretation of Aristotle by Averroes and the so-called radical Aristotelians was Thomas Aquinas. At roughly the same time as the revival of Averroes's interpretation, he developed a different, although no less radical solution, which is embedded in a comprehensive metaphysical view. Every substance, he says, can only have one substantial form, which in the case of living beings is their soul. This single substantial form gives a substance its being, its unity, and its definition. In the most interesting case, that of a human being, this substantial form is the intellective soul. This intellective soul is called the substantial form of man without any ambiguity; just as any other substantial form it is the formal cause of all the perfections of the substance, including the corporeal perfections and even corporeality itself. Aquinas, therefore, wholeheartedly accepts Aristotle's definition of the soul as the substantial form of the organic body.

The problem is that this view seems to rule out that the intellective soul is also a substance in its own right. If the soul truly is the substantial form of the human body, in the same sense as other substantial forms are the substantial forms of other substances, it is merely a metaphysical part of a substance, but not a substance in its own right. To put this more precisely, the intellective soul is not a substance in the sense that it is something that belongs to the
category of substance; it is not a *hoc aliquid*. And if this is so, then it seems that the intellective soul cannot survive the death of the body, since the continued existence of a substantial form depends on the continued existence of the substance of which it is the form.

Aquinas accepts the implication that the intellective soul is not a substance in the strict sense. But he denies that the consequence of this is that the intellective soul perishes with the body. His solution lies in a reformulation of what accounts for the subsistence of something. The reason that something subsists, he explains, is not that it is a substance, but that it can perform some operation on its own. The fact that in almost all cases only substances have their own proper operations should not mislead us. For there is at least one exception, and that is our intellective soul. When we consider all the operations exercised by a human being, we find that at least one of these, our understanding, transcends matter in the sense that it is not exercised in any corporeal organ. And if understanding is not exercised in any bodily organ, it must be an operation for which the intellective soul does not depend on the body, at least not essentially. This means that this operation must belong to the intellective soul on its own. And having at least one transcendent operation is enough to guarantee the continued existence of the soul after the death

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57 The soul can still be called a substance in a broader sense. For Aristotle also uses the term ‘substance’ to refer to the metaphysical principles of primary substances. In that broader sense both the matter and substantial form that constitute the substance can also be called substances. **Aristotle, De anima, II 1, 412a5-9:** “We say that substance is one kind of what is, and that in several senses: in the sense of matter or that which in itself is not a this, and in the sense of form or essence, which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called a this, and thirdly in the sense of that which is compounded of both.”

58 Crucial to the project of incorporating Aristotle’s theories of the soul in the later Middle Ages was the possibility of accounting for the immortality of the soul. The various arguments that were used to demonstrate this immortality in the first half of the thirteenth century are discussed in Oguejiofor, *The Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul.*


60 Aquinas’s arguments for this are complex, and I cannot discuss these here. In short, the most important premise he uses in his argument is that the universality of our concepts is only possible when they are received in something immaterial. For a critique of how Aquinas makes use of this premise, see J. A. Novak, ‘Aquinas and the Incorruptibility of the Soul’, *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 4:4 (1987), 405–421. For a more favorable interpretation, see G. Klima, ‘Aquinas on the Materiality of the Human Soul and the Immateriality of the Human Intellect’, *Philosophical Investigations*, 32:2 (2009), 163–181, 172–179. Incidentally, the same premise was used by Averroes. But he drew the conclusion that the immateriality of our intellect implies that it is a unique immortal substance that is shared by all humans.
of the body. For if the operation can be performed without the need for a bodily organ in this life, there seems to be no reason why the intellective soul cannot continue to perform it after the death of the body.\textsuperscript{61}

Aquinas's view of the soul–body relation is now so familiar that it may be hard to realize how radical this view actually was when Aquinas put it forward.\textsuperscript{62} In fact, at the time, it was thought by many to be just as much of a threat to the personal immortality of the soul as Averroes’s view of a unique potential intellect. The common opinion was still that the only way the soul can survive the death of the body was when it is a substance in its own right. Although Aquinas argued that the transcendent operation of the intellect was enough for a continued subsistence of the soul, many philosophers remained unconvinced. If the soul is not a substance, but truly a substantial form, it seems to be so closely intertwined with the body that it has to corrupt at the corruption of the body, the immateriality of our understanding notwithstanding.

\subsection*{2.3.3 A substance, but also a form}

The third solution, which was often presented as the traditional view, was especially popular among Franciscans.\textsuperscript{63} This solution was to hold simultaneously that the rational soul is the form of the body and that it is a substance in its own right. To this end, many of these commentators adopted the po-

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{61}There is an important proviso here that is often neglected in the secondary literature. Being embodied belongs to the essence of the human soul, which means that in its unembodied state it only has an incomplete essence. For Aquinas, this implication carries much more weight than is usually noted. It means, namely, that the unembodied soul is in an unnatural state and as such this state can only be temporal. Aquinas argues for the necessity of a bodily resurrection on the basis of the unembodied soul's unnatural condition. THOMAS AQUINAS, \textit{Summa contra gentiles}, Roma. Commissio Leonina [etc.], 1918–1930 (Opera omnia, 13–15), IV, c. 79, 248–249: “Ad ostendendum etiam resurrectionem carnis futuram evidens ratio suffragatur, supponens quae quae in superioribus sunt ostensa. Ostensum est enim in secundo animas hominum immortales esse. Remanent igitur post corpora a corporibus absolutae. Manifestum est etiam ex his quae in secundo dicta sunt, quod anima corpori naturaliter unitur: est enim secundum suam essentiam corporis forma. Est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpore esse. Nihil autem quod est contra naturam, potest esse perpetuum. Non igitur perpetuo erit anima absque corpore. Cum igitur perpetuo maneat, oportet esse perpetuum. Quod est resurgere Immortalitas igitur animarum exigere videtur resurrectionem corporum futuram.”


\footnotesize\textsuperscript{62}For a detailed analysis of Aquinas's critique on his predecessors, who treated the soul as both a substance (\textit{hoc aliquid}) and a substantial form, see Bazan, ‘The Human Soul’.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{63}But similar to the ‘radical Aristotelians’, this ‘traditional’ group is also heterogeneous. See Dales, \textit{The Problem of the Rational Soul}, 197.

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sition that there is a plurality of substantial forms in a substance, including a plurality of souls in living beings. On the surface, this view has much in common with the views of the earlier commentators who followed Avicenna, and those who defended it were eager to point out that theirs was the traditional view. But in reality it differs from the early thirteenth-century views in several important respects.\textsuperscript{64} The soul is now called a substantial form, whereas the earlier commentators had used the term 'perfection'. Also, the vegetative, sensitive and intellective soul are now seen as three distinct forms, whereas most earlier commentators had held the view that these are parts of one soul.\textsuperscript{65} And though Augustine is invoked in support of the traditionality of their views, as he often is, the position that is ascribed to him has more in common with Avicebron and Avicenna than with Augustine.

This view that the soul is both form and substance was simultaneously directed against Averroes's position that all human beings share one unique immortal intellect and Aquinas's position that the intellect is the only substantial form of the human being. Some of its more famous proponents are John Peckham, Matthew of Aquasparta and William de la Mare. Unfortunately, none of the proponents of this view seems to have written a commentary on Aristotle's \textit{De anima}, which is why we must turn to other texts.\textsuperscript{66}

To see the contrast with Aquinas's solution, William de la Mare's treatise entitled \textit{Correctorium fratris Thomae} is the best starting point. This treatise was composed with the explicit aim to correct several philosophical mistakes made by Thomas Aquinas, and it quickly became an obligatory companion to the study of Aquinas's works in the Franciscan studia.\textsuperscript{67} Two of the errors

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{DALES}, \textit{The Problem of the Rational Soul}, 182: "In the second place, the self-styled defenders of tradition were themselves simply an alternative version of the novelties of which they complained. They adopted Aristotle as the 'Philosopher'. They derived the doctrines of plurality of forms and universal hylomorphism from Avicebron, even while attributing them to Augustine. And much of their thought was more indebted to Avicebron than to the tradition of the church."

\textsuperscript{65} Daniel Callus established conclusively that the Franciscan appeal to tradition to support their critique of Aquinas's view that man has but one soul has little basis in the textual tradition. See especially D. A. \textit{CALLUS}, 'Two early Oxford Masters on the Problem of Plurality of Forms Adam of Buckfield — Richard Rufus of Cornwall', \textit{Revue neoscolastique de philosophie}, 42 (1939), 411-445 (which is partly based on a groundbreaking study by O. \textit{LOTTIN}, 'La pluralité des formes substantielles avant Saint Thomas d'Aquin. Quelques documents nouveaux', \textit{Revue Neoscolastique de Philosophie}, 34 (1932), 449-467) and D. A. \textit{CALLUS}, 'The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form', \textit{The Thomist}, 24 (1961), 257-285.


\textsuperscript{67} William de la Mare's treatise and its influence are discussed in section 4.4.
that William singles out are that (1) the soul is not composed of matter and form, and that (2) there is only one substantial form in a human being.\(^6\) The two are closely related, the link being that the human soul is considered to be a substance in its own right. Because of its substantiality, the soul must have the metaphysical structure of a substance, which, according to William, is its composition out of matter and form.\(^6\) But even though the human soul has the metaphysical structure of a substance, it also functions as the highest substantial form of a human being.\(^6\)

The substantiality of the soul also implies that the body must have an actuality of its own. That is, the body must also be composed of matter and another form. Or, more precisely, of matter and a series of hierarchically ordered forms. The human soul is the final perfection of the human body. But it is not the body's only substantial form. Many of William's arguments that attempt to demonstrate that the body must have an actuality of its own apart from the soul focus on the actuality of the corpse. Clearly, a corpse is still something, even though the intellective soul is no longer present.\(^7\) Hence, the living body must have had other substantial forms besides the intellective soul.

Substantially the same position is found in Matthew of Aquasparta, who

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\(^6\)The composition of the human soul is discussed thrice, in articles 10, 91 and 113, in relation to Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, Quaestiones disputatae de anima, and *In quattuor libros Sententiarum* respectively. The unicity of substantial form is discussed in many articles. The most explicit discussions can be found in articles 31, 48, 90, 98, and 102.

\(^6\)The substantiality of the soul and its composition out of matter and form is also defended by John Pecham; JOHN PECHAM, *Tractatus de anima*, 46: "Anima enim, sicut supra probatum est, est substantia incorporea, in potenta omnium cognitiva, habens substantiam in omnium similitudinem transformabilem, sicut cera ex sui aptitudine transformabilis est in omnium similitudinem figurarum."; JOHN PECHAM, *Tractatus de anima*, 47: "Igitur anima neque est corpus neque forma corporalis, sed est substantia spiritualis, ex materia et forma propria constituita."

\(^7\)William de la Mare, unfortunately, is not very clear on the exact details, although he briefly discusses the possible objection that being a form of the body and being a substance composed of matter and form are incompatible. WILLIAM DE LA MARE, *Correctorium fratris Thomae*, in: P. Glorieux, *Correctorium corruptorii 'Quare*', Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1927, a. 31, 131–132: "Sed contra hoc videtur esse quod dixit in quaestione 75, articulo 5, in responsione quaestionis: si anima est composita ex materia et forma, nullo modo potest dici forma corporis, cum materia nullius sit forma. Responsio: sicut ponimus virtutes animae sensitivae perficere materiam grossiorem corporis mediante corpore subtili quod est spiritus qui est delativus huiusmodi virium, sicut vult Augustinus, *De differentia spiritus et animae*, ita ponimus formam animae intellectivae primo perficere materiam suam spiritualem et, hac mediante, materiam corporalem. Ulterius ergo dico quod materia animae non est forma corporis, sed mediante ipsa forma animae corporis informat corporum."

\(^7\)For example, WILLIAM DE LA MARE, *Correctorium*, a. 87, 362: "Ergo in homine in quo utrumque componentium habet esse per se, sicut corpus et anima, ut patet post separationem animae a corpore, potest vere dici quod hoc corpus est."
composed a set of disputed questions on the soul between 1275 and 1277.72

The human soul is a spiritual substance that is composed of matter and form, substances have a plurality of substantial forms, and the human soul functions as the highest substantial form of a human being. What makes Matthew an interesting and important supplement to William de la Mare here is that he devotes an entire question to the substantiality of the soul, entitled ‘whether the intellective soul is a *hoc aliqutd*’, to which he gives a nuanced answer. The notion ‘*hoc aliqutd*’, he argues, has four connotations.73 It connotes (1) a fixed and determinate being; (2) which does not inhere in something else; (3) which does not depend on something else for its existence, but is subsistent on its own; and (4) which has an absolute and complete existence, in the sense that it has a complete essence (*est completum in specie*). The human soul satisfies the first three of these criteria, but it fails to meet the fourth. It has no complete essence on its own.74 The reason for this is that the human soul is naturally inclined to the body, without which it has no complete nature. But this notwithstanding, we can, according to Matthew, still call the soul a *hoc aliqutd*.75

It is curious to see how close Matthew’s position actually is to that of

72 *Matthew of Aquasparta, QdA.*

73 *Matthew of Aquasparta, QdA, 154:* “Et in hac parte puta via media procedendum esse, distinguendo de hoc aliquid. Importat enim hoc aliquid quattuor, ita quod tria tollit et unum ponit. Tollit enim indifferentiam et inhaerentiam et dependentiam, sed ponit perfectam et absolutam existentiam.”

74 Matthew supports his position that the soul on its own has no complete essence by reference to book XII of Augustine’s *Super Genesim ad litteram* Interestingly, the same passage is also cited by William de la Mare *William de la Mare, Correctorium*, a. 113, 420: “Ad argumentum tamen alter dicimus quod cum dicit animam habere esse perfectum antiquam coniungatur corpori, hoc est falsum; quia enim anima apta nata est esse perfectio corporis non habet perfectum naturae suae modum nisi quando habet corpus sibiconiunctum, corpus inquam, non animale sed spirituale, id est tanta sibi facilitate obediens ut sit sibi gloriae quod prius fuit sarcinae, ut habetur XII *Super Genesim* in finit. Ita etiam modo non haberet esse perfectum naturae suae nisi esset unita corpori animali, id est quod facit animale.” See *Augustine, De Genes ad litteram libri VIII-XII*, traduction, introduction et notes par P. Agaesse et A. Solognac, Paris. Desclée de Brouwer, 1972 (Bibliothèque Augustinienne, 49), XII, cap. XXXV 68, 452: “Prouinde, cum hoc corpus iam non animale, sed per futuram commutacionem spirituale receperit angelis adaequata, perfectum habebit naturae suae modum oboediens et inperans, vivificata et vivificans tam ineffabili facilitate, ut sit ei gloriae, quod sarcinae fuit.”

75 *Matthew of Aquasparta, QdA, 157:* “In quantum ergo anima intellectiva non habet perfectam naturam speciei, quia pars speciei est, tamquam forma specifica, nec est in specie nisi per reductionem, deficit a perfecta ratione eius quod est hoc aliquid. In quantum vero est natura per se subsistens, non dependens a materia, sed est a materia separabilis, tamen est hoc aliquid, utpote composita ex propriis principiis ex quibus habet esse, et ex quibus individuatur.” Compare also *Matthew of Aquasparta, QdA, 157:* “Sic ergo dico quod anima intellectiva et forma est corporis, et tamen hoc aliquid et per se subsistens.”
Aquinas. Aquinas would approve of all four connotations, although he tends to include the first two under the ‘subsistence’ requirement, and he would also, strongly, agree that the human soul fails to meet the fourth. This close correspondence suggests that their disagreement runs deeper than the correct description of the soul. That this is indeed the case can be seen in the next section.

2.4 Unicity versus plurality of substantial form

Although the fiercest criticism of Aquinas came from the Franciscans, there was opposition to his solution from within the Dominican order as well. In particular Robert Kilwardby, the Archbishop of Canterbury, strongly resisted Aquinas’s interpretation of the soul–body relationship. On 18 March 1277 he prohibited the teaching of a number of theses in natural philosophy (16), logic (10) and grammar (4). A very large part of the theses in natural philosophy targeted precisely the position that there is only one substantial form in every substance, which in the case of a human being is the intellective soul. These controversies regarding the unicity or plurality of substantial form constitute one of the most important backgrounds to the reception of the De anima in the period under discussion in this book, from c. 1260–c. 1360. This is why I will go into the philosophical intuitions that underly these controversies in some detail.

In Aristotelian philosophy in general, substance is analyzed at its most basic level into the principles of matter and form. Form is the active principle of determination; it is what makes a thing be what it is, for example a horse, or a rock, or a human being. Matter, on the other hand, is the passive principle of reception and limitation; it is what makes a thing be this particular thing, for example, John instead of Joe. Each substance, that is, each particular self-subsisting thing, is structured according to these two principles. When these two principles are interpreted in the strictest possible sense, the result is the unicity of substantial form; if they are interpreted in a looser sense, the result is some variant of a plurality of substantial forms. The difference between the strict and a looser interpretation has been formulated by Daniel Callus in what I consider to be the clearest possible manner:

If with Aristotle one holds (i) that prime matter is a completely passive

\[^{76}\text{CUP I, 474, 558–60.}\]

\[^{77}\text{At least this seems to be the case in Aristotle. But in the Middle Ages it was hotly debated whether spiritual substances, the angels, are composed of matter and form.}\]

\[^{78}\text{For a philosophical analysis of the debate on the unicity and plurality of form Zavalloni, Richard de Medivilla is still one of the best starting points.}\]
potency without any actuality of its own whatever; (ii) that privation is the disappearance of the previous form, and, consequently, has no part at all in the composition of the substance; and (iii) that substantial form is absolutely the first determining principle, which makes the thing to be what it is, the only root of actuality, unity and perfection of the thing; then, consistent with his stated principles, the conclusion forced upon us is that in one and the same individual there can be but one single substantial form... On the other hand, if one contends (i) that primary matter is not absolutely passive and potential, but possesses in itself some actuality, no matter how incomplete or imperfect it may be: an incohatio formae, or any active power; (ii) that privation does not mean the complete disappearance of the previous form, so that matter is not stripped of all precedent forms in the process of becoming; or (iii) that substantial form either meets with some actuality in prime matter or does not determine the composite wholly and entirely, but only partially; from all this it will necessarily follow that there are in one and the same individual plurality [sic] of forms.79

The reason why I favor Callus's description is that it makes it clear that the underlying philosophical controversy in the debate on unicity or plurality of forms was about the meaning of the term 'matter', and especially 'prime matter'. Looking at the articles that Kilwardby prohibited with this description in mind, there can be no doubt that they target the unicity of substantial form in all its presuppositions and consequences. Take for example articles 3, 'that there is no active power in matter' (quod nulla potentia activa est in materia), and 4, 'that privation is nothing real, and that it is present in both celestial bodies and in these lower bodies' (quod privatio est pure nichil et quod est in corporibus supra celestibus et hiis inferioribus'). It is the same disagreement over the meaning of the term 'matter' that is the source of the debate whether every substance — including the spiritual substances — is composed of matter and form.80 This, I would say, is why the descriptions that Matthew of Aquasparta and Thomas Aquinas give of the soul in terms of hoc aliquid can be almost similar, whereas they disagree fundamentally on the question of whether the soul is composed of matter and form: it is because their fundamental disagreement is about what matter is.

79 Callus, 'The Origins of the Problem', 258.
80 The combination of the doctrines of universal hylomorphism and of the plurality of substantial form has often been called the binarium famosissimum. But this expression is a twentieth-century invention and was not used in the Middle Ages. For discussion see P. V. Spade, 'Binarium Famosissimum', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/binarium/> (accessed on 11 July 2010).
Unicity or plurality: a psychological or a metaphysical question?

There is something else to keep in mind when discussing the unicity and plurality of substantial form. Although the debate on unicity and plurality of forms is closely connected with the question of whether a human being has one soul or several souls (vegetative, sensitive and intellective), these are in fact two different debates. For although any philosopher who claims that there is more than one soul in man will hold some variant of the plurality of forms position, the converse does not hold. One can be convinced that each man has only one soul, and even claim that this soul is his substantial form, while still maintaining that there are other substantial forms in such a man as well, for example, the form of corporeality. 81 The positions that (1) there are multiple substantial forms in complex living beings but that (2) there is only one soul are logically compatible, and this combination has in fact been defended by many philosophers, especially in the early thirteenth century.

The question on unicity and plurality of substantial forms began as a psychological question about the soul. Are the vegetative, sensitive and intellective soul three distinct souls, or is there but one soul in man responsible for all the vital functions such as nutrition, sensation and understanding? 82 The answer that man has but one soul was by far the more popular view in the early thirteenth century, and was maintained by John Blund, 83 William of

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81 Cf. CALLUS, 'The Origins of the Problem', 259

82 The unicity position can be traced back to Avicenna's De anima, which entered the Latin West both through its translation by Dominicus Gundissalinus and through the inclusion of this opinion in Gundissalinus's own treatise De anima. See CALLUS, 'The Origins of the Problem', 263–8. Gundissalinus's text has also been read by several scholars as defending the plurality thesis instead. For discussion and conclusive proof that this reading is incorrect, see D A CALLUS, 'Gundissalinus' De anima and the Problem of Substantial Form', The New Scolasticism, 13 (1939), 338–355. The plurality position can be traced back to Avicebron's Fons Vitae and also reached the Latin west both though its translation by Gundissalinus and through the inclusion of this opinion in some of Gundissalinus's own works. It is found in De processione mundi and De umtate. Cf CALLUS, 'The Origins of the Problem', 271. Vennebusch argues against the thesis that Gundissalinus is an important source for the plurality thesis, a thesis which is, in his words, omnipresent in the secondary literature. His argument is that ascribing a plurality position to Gundissalinus is based on a misreading of parts of his De anima (ANONYMUS VENNEBUSCH, QdA, 55) Vennebusch's reading of the De anima is correct, as is his assessment of the literature. However, some years later, Callus traced the plurality formulation not to Gundissalinus's De anima, but to other works (see the previous note). Roensch agrees with Callus on the source for the plurality doctrine in F. J ROENSCHE, Early Thomistic School, Dubuque, Iowa. The Priory Press, 1964, 4 I see no reason, therefore, to deny Gundissalinus's influence, although I agree that it is the unicity position that is defended in Gundissalinus's De anima. Incidentally, Vennebusch mentions Themistius as an alternative source for the doctrine.

Auvergne, John de la Rochelle, and Alexander of Hales, among others. This led Callus to his claim that the plurality of substantial form is not the traditional position, as was claimed by those who defended the position that the human soul is both substance and form against Aquinas. Still, although Callus is right that the substantial unity of the soul is, in fact, the more traditional opinion, there is an important aspect to the debate that he fails to bring to the fore in his writings. Aquinas’s radical innovation was precisely to transform the unity of the soul into a general metaphysical framework. When he refers to the substantial unity of our soul, it is often not as a conclusion drawn from this framework, but rather as one of the most illustrative examples to support it. And the unicity of substantial form is definitely not the traditional opinion, especially not if it is applied to all substances. What Callus fails to take into account is that Aquinas is the first who truly considers the soul to be a substantial form, rather than a perfection, which has an ambiguous ontological status.

As long as the question of the unicity or plurality was only treated as a psychological question that was limited to the soul, neither the unicity nor the plurality position met with great resistance. But once the question was also treated as a metaphysical question with all its implications, which Aquinas was the first to do, it became precisely its application to the soul that provoked the strongest opposition. In a way, Aquinas made it impossible to settle the psychological question of whether we have one or three souls in abstraction from the metaphysical question of whether a substance can have more than one form. Now, in other words, the psychological question had been turned into the most pressing formulation of the metaphysical one. If the two questions could be separated in Aquinas, his thesis that man has but one soul would probably never have evoked such strong reactions. And once the psychological and metaphysical questions have become the same question, it matters little whether the view that man has but one soul was defended before. For the earlier view was still radically different from the one defended by Aquinas.

At first, the formulation of the unicity of substantial form as a general metaphysical framework rather than a primarily psychological question met

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vegetatio, sensus et ratio. Et anima sensibilis est genus subalternum, quia anima sensibilis est genus animae rationalis et species animae vegetabilis”; cf Callus, ‘Introduction of Aristotelian Learning’, 252

84 For a (partial) list of defenders of the substantial unity of the soul during the early phases on the debate on unicity and plurality of form, see Callus, ‘Two early Oxford Masters’, esp. 411–413.

85 That Aquinas is to first to do so is clearly shown in Bazan, ‘The Human Soul’, esp. 106–113
CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW

with much resistance. But in the 1290s the strongest resistance had mostly disappeared, although Aquinas’s position was still being debated.\(^{86}\) The final turning point in the discussion occurred during the General Church Council of Vienne held in 1311-12. This council took position in the discussions on the relation between our human intellective soul and our body by decreeing that it was heretical to deny that the intellective soul is *per se* and essentially the form of the human body.\(^{87}\) Strictly speaking the Council’s decree takes no position in the debate on the unicity or plurality of substantial form. It merely requires that the intellective soul is considered to be a substantial form, not that it is the *only* substantial form. But somewhat surprisingly the vast majority of the medieval commentators did interpret the Council’s decree in such a way, that is, that it demanded that there is but one substantial form in man.\(^{88}\)

This brings us to the question of why Aquinas so strongly defended the position that there is but one single substantial form in each substance, and, more importantly, of how it could become so popular. The problems it gives rise to in the context of generation and corruption as well as in various theological contexts (the Eucharist, the actuality of the body of Christ during the *triduum*, the status of relics) seem so substantial that it is hard to see how it could have become popular. Although Aquinas constantly insists that only his position can explain the fundamental unity of a substance, the plurality position seems to be able to account for that unity as well.\(^{89}\) Take, for exam-

\(^{86}\) For details, see section 4.4.

\(^{87}\) H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionem et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, quoq emendavit, auct. in lingua germanicam transtulit et aduviante Helmuto Hoping edidit Petrus Hunermann, Freiburg [etc.]: Herder, 1999 (38\(^{th}\) updated edition), 902, p. 391 (De anima ut forma corporis). “Porro doctrinam omnem seu positionem temere asserentem, aut vertentem in dubium, quod substantia animae rationalis seu intellectivae vere ac per se humani corporis non sit forma, velut erroneam ac veritati catholicae inimicam fidei, praedicto sacro approbante Concilio repromamus. definientes, ut cunctis nota sit fidei inereta veritas ac praecelatur universis erroribus aditus, ne subintrent, quod quisquis denceps asserere, defendere seu tenere pertinaciter praesumpserit, quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter, tamquam haereticus sit censendus.”

\(^{88}\) A notable exception is the Franciscan Gerard of Odo, who here, as well as in most matters of natural philosophy, takes the minority position, and claims that the council’s degree demands that the body has its own form apart from the intellective soul. This was shown by Russell Friedman in the paper he presented at the conference *Psychology and the other Disciplines, A Case of Cross-disciplinary Interaction (1250-1750)*, Nijmegen, 31 May - 2 June, 2007, organized by P. J. J. M. Bakker and C. H. Leijenhorst. For two other examples of Odo’s unique natural philosophical standpoints, see S. W. de Boer, ‘The Importance of Atomism in the Philosophy of Gerard of Odo (O.F.M)’, in C. Grellard and A. Robert (eds.), *Atomism in Late Medieval Philosophy and Theology*, Leiden [etc.]. Brill, 2009, 85-106 and P. J. J. M. Bakker and S. W. de Boer, ‘Locus est spatium. On Gerald Odonis’ *Quaestio de loco*, Vivarium, 47:2-3 (2009), 295-330.

\(^{89}\) For a detailed and precise analysis of Aquinas’s position on the unicity of substantial form,
ple, William de la Mare’s response. The basic intuition is that every substance is a unity per se, which, according to Thomas, is the result of its having one substantial form. If there were, per impossibile, a second substantial form in a given substance, it would not be a unity per se anymore. It would be two things, not one. Although William agrees that a substance is per se a unity, he denies that such a unity implies having only one substantial form:

Ad secundum dicendum quod quaelibet istarum formarum dat aliquod esse; sed sicut prima forma est in potentia ad secundam completivam ipsius, ita esse quod dat prima forma est incompletum et in potentia ad esse completum. Pluralitas ergo formarum non est contra unitatem compositi essentiale nisi sint tales quae non se habent secundum esse completum et incompletum ita quod non possint convenire ad aliquam unitatem essentialem.\(^9\)

To the second argument we should say that each of these forms gives some being; but just as the first form is in potency towards the second that completes it, so the being which the first form gives is incomplete and in potency to complete being. Hence the plurality of forms is not contrary to the essential unity of composite, unless these forms are of such a kind that they are not related according to complete and incomplete being, so that they cannot converge to an essential unity.

The unity of the substance is guaranteed even with a plurality of substantial forms, because the different substantial forms are themselves in potency to each other. Each substance is informed by its various substantial forms in an ordered manner, where the last substantial form is also the highest, and most specific form. At any point in time during the generation of a substance, that substance is an essential unity, even though it is still in potency toward a more perfect substantial form. Each new, more perfect form, actualizes a potency of the previous form. The implication is that until the point that the final substantial form is introduced, the substance has only an incomplete being. But even though incomplete, it is still an essential unity.

An important advantage of the unicity position seems to be that it can more easily account for the difference between generation (substantial change) and accidental change. Accidental change presupposes an actual subject (that is, something that has a substantial form), whereas generation presupposes a purely potential subject, prime matter. If one holds to a plurality of substantial forms, the difference between accidental change and generation cannot be formulated in this manner. However, on closer

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\(^9\) William de la Mare, *Correctorum*, a. 31, 133.
inspection, it turns out that it is actually the unicity position that has a difficult time explaining what goes on during the generation of a substance. The description of generation in terms a purely potential subject implies the complete corruption of the previous subject including all its accidents, something that gives rise to many counter-intuitive consequences.\footnote{For several of these difficulties, see below, section 4.3.}

Perhaps the greatest advantage of the unicity position is that it can account for the fact that whereas certain capacities are found in a large variety of animals, they are found in them in very different manners. Take for example the power of perception, which is found in all types of animals, including human beings. The underlying physiology and the extent of the power is different in the case of, say, humans, dogs and fish. An unsophisticated version of the plurality of forms position will have to say that all these animals have a certain set of forms in common, from the form of corporeity up to the form of the sensitive soul. The real cause of diversification is the final forms in these animals, respectively the form of being-human, being-a-dog, and being-a-fish. The difficulty then is to explain why the perceptive powers of these animals differ, whereas these are all grounded in the sensitive soul, which is similar in each of the animals. Or, to put it differently, if all the previous forms remain in a substance, how can a higher form so radically alter the operations and powers of the lower forms?

The discussion about the unicity and plurality of substantial form and the relative merits and demerits of these positions influences the De anima tradition greatly. Once Aquinas had turned the unity of the soul into the paradigm case for the unicity of substantial form, the De anima becomes one of the focal points for this metaphysical discussion. And, especially in the fourteenth-century commentaries, we will see that the discussion is indeed to a large extent about what matter is, as Callus already indicated. But at the same time, Callus’s strict definition of what constitutes the unicity position turns out to be ill-suited for describing later fourteenth-century positions.\footnote{See below, section 4.3.4, esp. p. 189.}
Methodological discussions

Theologus habet inquirere qua via contingat animam mereri et
demeri, et quid sit ad salutem, quid ad penam. Quid autem anima sit,
et in quo predicamento sit, et qualiter infundatur corpore, non habet
ipse inquirere. Ex quo ista scire magis pertinent ad alium artificem. Ex
quo ergo theologus solum habet docere qualiter sit merendum et
demerendum, non habet ipse proprie docere quid sit anima nec quid sit
eius essentia.

JOHN BLUND, Tractatus de anima, written in the first decade of the
thirteenth century (D. A. Callus and R. W. Hunt (eds.), London: The
British Library, 1970, 715-21)

In order to understand how medieval philosophers looked at the scientia de
anima, we should first examine the questions which they explicitly devoted to
its status. Most commentaries on book I of the De anima contain a number of
questions that discuss methodological aspects, the most important of which
are:

1. Is the scientia de anima really a science? And if so, what is its place in the
general framework of the sciences? More precisely, does it fall under natural
philosophy or is it a part of metaphysics?

1A forthcoming collection of essays edited by Paul Bakker and Carla Di Martino will be
devoted entirely to this question. P. J. J. M. BAKKER and C. DI MARTINO (eds.), L'étude de
l'âme entre physique et métaphysique, Perspectives grecques, arabes et latines, de l'Antiquité à la
Renaissance, in preparation. The discussion on the place of the scientia de anima within the
libri naturales, which becomes important from the fifteenth century onwards, is not yet found
in the commentaries of the late-thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. For the later discussions,
see, for example, FRANCESCO PICCOLOMINI, Expositio in tres libros De anima, Venezia, 1602, I,
f. 1: "Cum scientiae de natura libri sunt vari, quem locum inter eos sibi vendicient libri De
anima non consentiunt expositores. Et quatuor eorum sunt opiniones. Pro quorum notitia
considerandum est scientiarn de natura præsertim in duas partes dividi. In quorum prima
declarantur ea quae sunt communia corpori physico et attinentia ad naturam infra animam
collocatam(!). In altera vero attinentia ad naturam ad animam extensam et de anima dictam.
Pars prima absolvtur in libris Physicorum, De caelo, De ortu et interitu et Meteorologicorum,
2. What is its subject matter? More specifically, is it the soul or the ensouled body?²

3. Is it the most difficult of the sciences? And how does its difficulty relate to the supposed certainty of its conclusions?

In addition, many commentaries also discuss two other methodological issues. The first is the question of whether science considers good and honorable things. This tends to be a question about science in general and not about the scientia de anima in particular. In any case, there is usually little of interest to be found in that question.³ The second is whether knowledge of accidents contributes to our knowledge of substance.⁴

Before discussing the above-mentioned questions in detail, I should first briefly say something about how to read and interpret such methodological
questions in late medieval commentaries. Anyone turning to the medieval questions on the status and method of the science of the soul will be disappointed if he or she expects to find a well-thought-out methodology, presented in an orderly fashion, and then followed strictly in the rest of the text. Such a thing will not be found in medieval commentaries on Aristotle.\(^5\) Commentaries in the question format especially tend to have only a very limited overall systematic organization. And because of this, a single incidental remark in Aristotle can be the sole occasion for the inclusion of a particular question in the commentary. The ad-hoc element inherent in such commentaries is clearly visible in the methodological questions found in book I. To make matters worse, at least from a modern viewpoint, methodology and doctrine are not formally distinguished, which results in methodological questions being guided, and often decided, by doctrinal positions. As a consequence, trying to separate the methodological part of the questions in book I from the doctrinal part is artificial at best, anachronistic at worst. There are better ways to study these questions.

The most fruitful way, in my view, is to look at these methodological discussions as occasions for discussing underlying and often elusive doctrinal difficulties. It is not the method per se that is at stake for the commentators, but the method as a means of solving tensions in the scientia de anima that Aristotle left unresolved, or was unclear about. They took Aristotle’s comments on the status and method of the science of the soul as indicators of both the possibility and the unity of the science of the soul. And in their questions related to these comments, their main concern was always to show that it is possible to have a single unified science in which not only the sensitive and vegetative, but also the intellective soul form part of its proper subject-matter.

This approach makes it possible to explain an intriguing phenomenon in the tradition of commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, namely that problems sometimes migrate from one question to another. A particularly instructive example of this is the discussion on the certainty and difficulty of the scientia de anima that I will analyze in detail.\(^6\) As will become clear in the course of this chapter, almost all of these methodological questions revolve, in the final analysis, around the ontological status of the human intellect. The peculiar character of the methodological questions in the commentaries on book I bear witness to what I will call the ‘fragile unity’ of the scientia de anima. That is to say, the discussions in (most of) the late-medieval methodological questions are ways of trying to ensure that the scientia de anima remains a single unified science, in which both the vegetative and sensitive parts of the soul and the

\(^5\) Arguably, it also not found in Aristotle himself.
\(^6\) See section 3.3.
somewhat immaterial intellect form part of its proper subject matter. Or, in other words, we can read the methodological questions as ways of addressing the unity underlying the otherwise fragmented commentaries in the *quaestio* format.

### 3.1 The scientific status of the *scientia de anima*

At the beginning of their *De anima* commentaries, commentators often raised one or more questions concerning the scientific status of the *scientia de anima*. These questions usually were, or amounted to: (1) can there be a science of the soul (at all)? and (2) can there be a natural science of the soul?\(^7\) I will first present a classification of the most important arguments. Many of the difficulties that are introduced in this classification will be discussed at greater length in subsequent sections. After having presented this classification, for which I will rely mostly on some anonymous commentaries from the early 1270s, I will offer a more detailed discussion of two of the later commentators, Radulphus Brito and John of Jandun, whose viewpoints on these questions are particularly interesting.

As is often the case in commentaries that use the question format, not all of the arguments introduced for or against a position are equally interesting. Some of the arguments merely rely on rather obvious ambiguities or on certain rhetorical tricks, and as such, are easily countered by the commentators who introduce them. As a consequence, these arguments reveal little or nothing of the commentator's own views. Other arguments, however, target certain inherent difficulties of a position, and these can be quite revealing of the details of a commentator's own view. In the discussions on the scientific status of the *scientia de anima*, three general types of such arguments can be

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\(^7\)These questions are not present, however, in several of the mid-fourteenth-century commentaries on the *De anima*, for instance, in those by Buridan, Oresme and Anonymus Patar. For some discussion of the role these methodological questions played in the later, sixteenth-century scholastics, see T. Aho, 'The Status of Psychology as Understood by Sixteenth-Century Scholastics', in: S. Heinamaa and M. Reuter (eds), *Psychology and Philosophy Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Thought*, Berlin [etc.]: Springer, 2009, 47–66. The article should be read with some care, however, since some of the claims that the author makes in passing about the thirteenth and fourteenth century are incorrect. For example, he states that the question of whether a science of the soul is possible at all is a 'somewhat non-standard question' that was omitted by most earlier commentators, John of Jandun being an exception (p. 51). But in fact it was a standard question that can be found in many commentaries, including those by Brito, Anonymus van Steenbergen, Anonymus Bazán and Anonymus Giele. It is only in the period of Buridan and Oresme that it begins to disappear from the commentaries. And that 'classical scholastics were unanimous in that the subject <of the *scientia de anima* SdB> must be the soul' (p. 52) is also certainly not true.
found, linked to three properties that were attributed to the human soul: imperceptibility, simplicity and potentiality. This typology is interesting in itself, since all three properties are clearly connected to the intellective part of the human soul.

3.1.1 Imperceptibility

The first and most important of the three types of argumentation targets the fact that the soul cannot be perceived by our senses. Already in the early commentary by the Anonymus Vennebusch (probably written around 1260), both of the arguments that the author introduces against the possibility of a science of the soul are derived from the soul’s imperceptibility.\(^8\) The first is based on the principle that all our knowledge is derived from the senses. Since the soul cannot be perceived, we can acquire no knowledge of it.\(^9\) The second argument claims that any universal notion of the soul must be gained from multiple sense perceptions (ex pluribus sensibus). But given that the soul is imperceptible, this is impossible.\(^10\) And without a universal notion, there can be no science.

Within the Aristotelian tradition, there was an almost complete consensus on the idea that our senses are the principal source of all our knowledge. Its clearest expression is found in the famous medieval adage that ‘nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses’ (nihil est in intellectu, quin prius fuerit in sensu).\(^11\) This strong emphasis on our senses as the principal source of all knowledge makes the imperceptibility of the soul very problematic. So it is not surprising that all commentaries on the De anima include at least one argument that is based on the soul’s imperceptibility to argue against the possibility of a science of the soul. The most popular counterargument to such arguments was to make the soul’s perceptible operations the starting point of

\(^8\)For the composition date, see the introduction to the edition, esp. pp. 85–86.

\(^9\)ANONYMUS VENNEBUSCH, QdA, I.1, 924–5: “Omne nostrum intelligere est a sensu, ut habetur tertio huius. De illo ergo quod non cadit sub sensu, non est scientia; anima est huiusmodi; ergo etc.”

\(^10\)ANONYMUS VENNEBUSCH, QdA, I.1, 927–12: “Item omnis scientia rei habetur per universale manens in sui disposicione, ut scribitur primo Phisicorum et fine Posteriorum; sed ipsam animam non contingit habere universale; ergo etc. Minor declaratur: quoniam universale, quod est principium scientiae, sumitur ex pluribus sensibus, ut habetur principio Methaphisice; anima autem non cadit sub sensu; ergo ex pluribus sensibus non potest summ universalis ipsum anime.”

\(^11\)Although the adage expresses an Aristotelian view on the acquisition of knowledge and was regularly attributed to Aristotle in medieval texts, it does not occur as such in the works of Aristotle. For its history see P. F. CRANEFIELD, ‘On the Origin of the Phrase Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu’, Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 25:1 (1970), 77–80.
the *scientia de anima* rather than the soul’s invisible essence. Anonymus Giele can serve as an example of this strategy, and all the more so since the imperceptibility arguments form the core of his discussion on the possibility of a science that studies the soul, and the perceptibility of the soul’s operations the core of his solution. In fact, he claims that the only reason why a science of the soul is possible at all is precisely that we have cognitive access to these operations, which in turn refer to an underlying essence that explains their presence. Were it not for our knowledge of these operations, we would know nothing about the soul. And if there were a soul whose operations did not appear to our senses, it would be inherently hidden (*naturaliter occulta*), as the author puts it.

Although perceptible operations of the soul might provide enough grounds for a scientific study of its essence, the strategy of securing the possibility of a scientific study of the soul by appealing to these operations is not without its own difficulties. For it is precisely this perceptibility that is often denied to the soul’s very operations, particularly the operations of the intellective soul, namely thinking and willing. That this is a legitimate concern is admitted by Anonymus Giele, but he remarks that although the act of understanding cannot be perceived by the senses, the lower operations of the soul can, and then argues that these lower operations already refer to an underlying substance, the soul, in which they inhere. It is unclear whether or not he is thinking of some form of self-perception. In any case, the argument does not need to rely on self-perception, since the growth of plants and the movements of animals would already count as perceivable operations of the soul from the perception of which we can infer the presence of a soul that accounts for these operations.

In addition to referring to the vegetative and sensitive functions, Anony-

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12This is also in line with Aristotle’s suggestion that in the *scientia de anima* we should proceed from objects, to acts, to powers. See Aristotle, *De anima*, II 4, 415a14–22: “It is necessary for the student of these forms of soul first to find a definition of each, expressive of what it is, and then to investigate its derivative properties, etc. But if we are to express what each is, viz. what the thinking power is, or the perceptive, or the nutritive, we must go farther back and first give an account of thinking or perceiving; for activities and actions are prior in definition to potentialities. If so, and if, still prior to them, we should have reflected on their correlative objects, then for the same reason we must first determine about them, i.e. about food and the objects of perception and thought.”

13Anonymous Vennebusch uses a similar strategy: Anonymous Vennebusch, *QdA*, 9479 82. “Dicendum ergo quod anima non cadit sub sensu tanquam illud quod habet cognosci a sensu per sui speciem; cadit tamen sub sensu secundum suas operationes sensibles, quibus delatis ad intellectum mediantibus operationibus sensibles deventur in cognitionem ipsius animae.”

mus Giele also offers an interesting argument that is aimed specifically at the human intellective soul. It is clear, he argues, that the operations of the practical intellect can be perceived by the senses even if the operations of the theoretical intellect cannot; and our perception of the operations of the practical intellect is enough evidence for the inference to the presence of an intellective soul. This is actually a clever argument. What Anonymus Giele is thinking of here are the operations that pertain to the various arts and crafts. Building a house, making a sculpture, and practicing medicine would be examples of such operations. The difference between these operations of the practical intellect and the operations of the theoretical intellect is that the former are transitive, that is, their effect is realized outside of the intellect itself. The products of the theoretical intellect, by contrast, are immanent, that is, they remain within the intellect. To give some examples of products of the theoretical intellect, we can take the various concepts we form and conclusions we draw. Now, since the effects of the practical intellect, which are realized outside of it, are perfectly visible, this opens up the possibility to infer the existence of the cause of this effect. When we realize that this cause must be an intellect (which is not that difficult), we have solid grounds for including this intellect within a scientific study of the soul. To include the intellect within a philosophical study of the soul does not amount to the claim that philosophy can tell us everything about it, not even when the operations of the practical intellect are indeed accessible to our senses. The main reason for this is that the intellect somehow transcends matter, and as a consequence transcends what is revealed of it through its perceptible, i.e., material operations.

Taking recourse to the perceptible operations of the soul is not the only strategy that allows for the possibility of a science of the soul. The alternative is to grant that the soul has a unique immediate cognitive access to itself, without any mediation by our sense organs. Since in the soul the cognitive power and the object of cognition coincide, it could be claimed that this unique situation enables a direct cognition of the soul without the need for perceptibility. Such a possibility of a direct insight into the soul would have the added benefit that it is supported by a venerable philosophical tradition. This solution, how-

15ANONYMUS GIELE, QdA, 24:45–47: “Et hoc est dicere quod, licet operationes speculativi non sunt sensibiles, tamen operationes practici sunt sensibiles; itaque operationes artis declarant substantiam animae esse.”

16Augustine, especially, had been a strong proponent of the soul’s capacity to contemplate itself apart from the body, referring to this possibility in various contexts. An important example is Augustine’s cogito argument against the skeptics of the Academy, which he formulates in De trinitate, XV, 12 (CCL 50A, 490–491): “Primo ipsa scientia de qua ueraciter cogitatio nostra formatur quando quae scimus loquimur, qualis aut quanta potest homini prouenire quamlibet peritissimo atque doctissimo? Exceptis enim quae in animum ueniant a sensibus corporis in quibus tam multa alter sunt quam uidentur ut eorum uerisimilitudine nimium
ever, was not accepted by the majority of commentators. Knowing something without the mediation of phantasms was considered to be a mode of cognition that is proper to angels, and at best it was conceded that our souls might know themselves in this manner in the afterlife once they had been separated from our bodies. But the soul as it informs the body has no direct knowledge of

constipatus sanus sibi uideatur esse qui insanit (unde academica philosophia sic inuult ut de omnibus dubitans multo misenus insaniret), his ergo exceptis quae a corporis sensibus in animum uestunt, quantum rerum remanet quod ita sciamus sic nos suuere scimus? In quo prorsus non metuimus ne aliquo uerssimulitudine forte fallamur quoniam certum est etiam eum qui fallitur suuere, nec in eius usiss habetor quoc adscicintur extrinsccus ut in eo sic fallatur oculus quemadmodum fallitur cum in aqua remus uideatur infractus et nauigantib us turris moueri et alia sexcenta quae aler sunt quam uidentur, quia nec per oculum carnis hoc cernitur. Intima scientia est qua nos suuere scimus ubi ne illud quidem academicus dicere potest: "Fortasse dormus et nescis et in somnis uideamus." Visa quippe somniaint simillima esse usiss uigilantium quis ignorant? Sed qui certus est de suae uitae scientia non in ea dicit: 'Scio me uigilare,' sed: 'Scio me suuere.' Sive ergo dormit ut uigueat, uuort. Nec in ea scientia per somnia fallit potest qua et dormire et in somnis udere uuentis est." Another version of this argument can be found in De civitate Dei, XI, 26 (CCL 48, 345-346). But the possibility of direct self-knowledge plays a much more important role in Augustine than merely refuting the sceptics; it is one of the cornerstones of his philosophy. For a partial list of passages on self-knowledge that clearly shows its importance to Augustine, see G O'DALY, Augustine's Philosophy of Mind, London: Duckworth, 1987, 207-211. P. CARY, Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist, Oxford [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 2000 has even gone as far calling Augustine the inventor of the self as a private inner space. Another influential defender of the soul's capacity to contemplate itself apart from the body is Avicenna, whose most famous argument for this possibility is known as the 'flying man' argument (see p. 22, footnote 24).

17See for example RADULPHUS BRITO, Questiones De anima, ms Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conventi Soppressi, E I 252, 1988-92: "Tamen illa operatio i.e. anime SdB> non est talis qualem habet in hac vita, qua anima in hac vita intelligit ex sensatis et uimaginis. Sed quando est separata a corpore non sic intelligit, sed per revelationem superiors intelligente, vel per species infusas, vel per habitus acquisitos hic, vel secundum aliquid alium modum." It is important to realize that even if the separated soul can understand without phantasms, in a manner somehow similar to that of angels, this does not imply that this new mode of cognition is superior to the embodied mode; THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, Roma: Commissio Leonina [etc.], 1888-1906 (Opera omnia, 4-12), I 89, a 1, 371: "Si iigatur anumae humanae sic essent institutae a Deo ut intelijienter per modum qui competit substantius separatb, non habebant cognitionem perfectam, sed confusam in communi. Ad hoc ergo quod perfectam et propriam cognitionem de rebus habere possent, sic naturaliter sunt institutae ut corporibus uniarit et sic ab ipsis rebus sensibilibus propriam de eis cognitionem accipiant; sicut homines rudes ad scientiam induci non possunt nisi per sensibilia exempla. Sic ergo patet quod propter melius anumae est ut corpori uniarit, et intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata; et tamen esse potest separata, et alium modum intelligendi habere." The idea that the separated soul employs a form of cognition without phantasms is not just found in those authors inclined to follow Thomas Aquinas; it is commonplace. It is also found, for instance, in ANONYMUS BAZAN, QdA, III.18, 504-505. For as soon as the possibility of a mode of cognition without phantasms is denied, the immortality of the soul becomes impossible as is shown conclusively by PIETRO POMPONAZZI, De immortalitate animae, in: Idem, Tractatus
itself. Even Anonymus Vennebusch, who stills refers to the soul as the act and perfection of the body rather than its form, denies the possibility of any direct self-knowledge in this life.\textsuperscript{18} The principle that all knowledge has its origin in the senses excludes the possibility of an immediate knowledge of our own immaterial soul.

### 3.1.2 Simplicity

The second type of argument against the possibility of a science of the soul focuses on the soul's simplicity. Such arguments claim that the soul can neither have attributes (\textit{passiones})\textsuperscript{19} nor parts, which rules out the possibility of

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\textsuperscript{18} Anonymus Vennebusch, \textit{QdA}, I.1a, 95\textsuperscript{93–98}: “Quod cognicio anime est nobis acquisita et non innata, et hoc mediente sensu et abstraccione facta a sensualibus fantasmatibus, et hoc loquendo de cognicione anime de qua loquitur in ista sciencia, immo ut conjunctum inquantum actus et perfeccio corporis; loquendo de eiusmod cognicione in statu sue separacionis naturaliter cognoscit se ipsam per presenciam.”

\textsuperscript{19} The term ‘\textit{passio}’ as it is used in this context is difficult to translate into English. What is important is that the translation should bring to the fore that (for the medieval commentators) the term is linked to two passages in the \textit{Analytica Posteriora}. The first is a passage on the unity of a science; Jacobus Venetus, \textit{Analytica Posteriora}, edited by L. Minio-Paluello and B. G. Dod, Paris [etc.]: Desclée De Brouwer, 1968 (Aristoteles Latinus IV.1), I.10, 76b11–15, 24\textsuperscript{6–10}: “Omnis enim demonstrativa scientia circa tria est, et quacumque esse ponuntur (hec autem sunt genus, cuius per se passionum speculativa est), et que communes dicuntur dignitates, ex quibus primis demonstrat, et tertium passiones, quorum quid significet unaqueque accipit.” In the English translation it is rendered as follows: Aristotle, \textit{Analytica posterioria}, translated by J. Barnes, in: J. Barnes (ed.), \textit{The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation}, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 124: “For every demonstrative science has to do with three things: what it posits to be (these form the genus of what it considers the attributes that belong to it in itself); and what are called the common axioms, the primitives from which it demonstrates; and thirdly the attributes, of which it assumes what each signifies.” The second passage is on demonstrations; Jacobus Venetus, \textit{Analytica Posteriora}, I.7, 75a43–b1, 19\textsuperscript{23–24}: “Tertium genus subiectum, cuius passiones et per se accidentia ostendit demonstratio.” In the English translation it is rendered as: “third, the underlying genus of which demonstration makes clear the attributes and what is accidental to it in itself.” To keep this link, I have consistently rendered the term ‘\textit{passio}’ as attribute.
any science that studies it.\textsuperscript{20} If something is perfectly simple, it is either known fully or not at all. Science, by contrast, proceeds by demonstrating that its subject matter has certain attributes or parts. The common strategy to respond to such arguments was to find some manner of introducing a structural complexity within the soul, without jeopardizing its unity. One way of doing so was by showing that, its simplicity notwithstanding, there are attributes or properties that we can ascribe to the soul.\textsuperscript{21}

There is, however, a difficulty in claiming that the soul has attributes or properties of its own, which is that properties are normally assigned to complete substances and not to matter and form themselves. Matter and form are two \textit{principles} that jointly constitute a substance, but they are not two separate \textit{things}. So strictly speaking, it seems, one should say that the whole living being has certain attributes on account of its having a certain form, namely, the soul. Anonymus Van Steenberghen, however, claims that when the soul is responsible for the existence of certain properties in the composite, these properties can be said to belong to the soul as their subject—presumably because being the principle of the existence of these properties, the soul is their ultimate source. But the author also draws a much stronger conclusion, namely that the soul can remain the subject of these properties even after it has been separated from the body.\textsuperscript{22} The argument as a whole is not very convincing and seems to rely on an ambiguity between ascribing properties to a subject on the basis of where they are exercised (in the composite) and on the basis of where they have their source (the soul).\textsuperscript{23} But Anonymus Van Steenberghen thinks

\textsuperscript{20}Anonymus Van Steenberghen, \textit{QdA}, 137–138\textsuperscript{6–11}. "Nam de eo non potest esse scientia, quod non potest esse subjectum aliquidus accidentis: scientia enim est aliquidus generis subjecti cuius sunt propriae passiones secundum Aristotelem libro \textit{Posteriorum}, sed anima non est subjectum aliquidus passionum, tum quia non habet rationem subjecti, cum sit forma, tum quia subjectum accidentum est compositum, secundum quod vult Boethius." Compare Anonymus Bazán, \textit{QdA}, I.1, 389–390\textsuperscript{18–27}; "Praeterea, de illo non est scientia quod non habet partes, proprietates et passiones; sed anima non habet partes, proprietates et passiones, ergo etc... Minor probatur, quod anima non habet partes, quia ipsa est indivisibilis; ergo etc. Etiam patet quod anima non habet proprietates, quia secundum Philosophum in quinto \textit{Metaphysice} materia subjecta formae substat proprietatibus et passionibus; sed anima non est huissmodi; ergo etc."

\textsuperscript{21}Sometimes a commentator mentions both attributes (\textit{passiones}) and properties (\textit{proprietates}) But the terms seem to be almost interchangeable.

\textsuperscript{22}Anonymus Van Steenberghen, \textit{QdA}, I.1, 139–140\textsuperscript{16–52}: "Et cum dicitur: forma simplex non est subjectum accidentium, dico quod falsum est; et verum est quod non est forma simplex subjectum accidentium quae consequuntur compositum per materiam, sed tamen est subjectum accidentium consequentium compositum per formam: si enim sint accidentia consequentia compositum per formam, si forma sit separata, potest esse subjectum illorum accidentium."

\textsuperscript{23}It is surprising that Anonymus Van Steenberghen does not notice this, for elsewhere he clearly states that the inference from being the source to being the proper subject is invalid.
that this argument is enough to qualify the soul as a subject of scientific study.

For another example of a simplicity argument, we can look at Anonymus Bazán. In contrast to Anonymus Van Steenberghen, he is not only concerned with the question of how the soul can have its own attributes and properties, but also with the question of how it can have parts.\textsuperscript{24} As far as its having properties is concerned, he counts the vital powers as properties of the soul, without considering whether or not they are properly speaking properties of the composite rather than of the soul. His argument that the soul has parts is more convincing. Although, he argues, the soul has no essential or integral parts, it does have parts if we take ‘parts’ in the sense of its various powers (\textit{partes potentiales}), namely, the vegetative, sensitive and intellective soul. The minor difference in approach notwithstanding, the argumentative strategies and the philosophical agendas of Anonymus Van Steenberghen and Anonymus Bazán are similar: establishing some form of structural complexity within the soul, in order to ensure that it can function as the subject matter of a science.

\subsection*{3.1.3 Potentiality}

The third type of argument against the possibility of a science that studies the soul focuses on the potentiality of the intellect. According to Aristotle, our intellect is in a state of pure potentiality prior to the acquisition of knowledge; it can be compared to a blank writing-table (\textit{tabula rasa}).\textsuperscript{25} Since something can only be known in so far as it is in act, it seems that the intellect itself is unknowable. And if it cannot be known, there can \textit{a fortiori} be no science that studies it. This argument is found, for instance, in Anonymous Bazán. In his

\begin{flushright}
\textit{ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, QdA, I.15, 186}\textsuperscript{47-49}: “Ad aliud dicendum quod passiones sunt animae ut principii; ex hoc autem non sequitur quod anima sit illud cuius primo sint istae operationes.”
\textit{ANONYMUS BAZÂN, QdA, I.1, 390}\textsuperscript{52-60}: “Ad tertium: de illo non est scientia quod non habet partes, proprietates et passiones, concedo. Sed cum dicitur: anima non habet huiusmodi partes, proprietates et passiones, ego nego. Et tu probas quia anima est indivisibilis. Verum est secundum partes essentiales et integrales, tamen anima est divisibilis in multas partes potentiales, utpote in intellectivam, sensitivam et vegetativam. Et tunc ad illud, scilicet quod anima non habeat proprietates, dico quod falsum est, imo anima habet proprietates, quae sunt sentire et intelligere, et substat proprietatibus suis; ergo etc.” In spite of the distinction in this argument between \textit{passiones} and \textit{proprietates}, the terms seem to be almost interchangeable in the question. The terminology of parts and wholes as applied to the soul is explored in detail in section 5.3.
\textit{ARISTOTLE, De anima, III.4, 429b30–430a2}: “Have we not already disposed of the difficulty about interaction involving a common element, when we said that thought is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable, though actually it is nothing until it has thought? What it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing-table on which as yet nothing actually stands written: this is exactly what happens with thought.”
\end{flushright}
(brief) reply, the author tries to establish the possibility of self-knowledge in order to circumvent this objection. For if the soul can know itself, then there can *ipso facto* be a science of the soul. Now, although it is not possible for the soul to have self-knowledge prior to knowing something else — since at that stage the soul is nothing but potentiality —, as soon as something else is known, the soul can begin to know itself.\(^{26}\) This implies that the possibility of some form of self-knowledge is fundamental for the possibility of a science of the soul.\(^{27}\)

The necessity of such self-knowledge for the possibility of a science of the soul is not as obvious as it might seem. This becomes immediately clear by comparing the *scientia de anima* to the other sciences. Only in the *scientia de anima* is the possibility of self-knowledge considered to be important. The implication can only be that the *scientia de anima* is considered — at least partly — to be a reflexive science, which receives its data from some form of inner perception. This becomes especially clear in the discussions on the certainty of this science.\(^{28}\)

### 3.1.4 The study of the soul within natural philosophy

These three types of argument, connected to imperceptibility, simplicity, and potentiality, give a good indication of the playing field when it came to discussing the status of the science that studies the soul. Combined, they were powerful enough to enable one to easily exclude the study of the soul from most areas of philosophy, with the possible exception of metaphysics. Its study could then be left to the theologians. It is interesting in itself that none of the philosophers who are being discussed here ever attempted to make this move. All of them wholeheartedly agreed with Aristotle in considering the *scientia de anima* a part of philosophy. The arguments described above indicate that they considered the soul to be a difficult object to study in a philosophical manner, but they would go no further than that conclusion. Moreover, all of them

\(^{26}\) ANONYMUS BAZÄN, *QdA*, I.1, 390\(^{30-34}\). "Et tunc arguo: de illo est scientia quod est ens intelligibile; sed anima est huusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet primo *Posteriorum*: de non ente non est scientia; ergo propter oppositum est scientia. Minor probatur, quia anima intelligendo alia intelligent se; ergo ipsa anima est intelligibilis, et ita patet quod anima est ens intelligibile." Compare RADULPHUS BRITO, *QdA*, I.1 46-60.


\(^{28}\) See below, section 3.3.
even agreed with Aristotle that the study of the soul belongs, at least to a large extent, to natural philosophy.

The Anonymi Giele, Bazán, and Van Steenberghen all devote a question to the place of the science that studies the soul, after having established that such a science is indeed possible. And all three agree that the scientia de anima forms a part of natural philosophy. Again it is the intellect that causes the most difficulties, given that the intellect is immaterial and that natural philosophy is concerned with matter and motion. But all three commentators are quick to point out that even though the intellect is immaterial, it is still related to matter in some way. They disagree strongly on the details of this relationship, but agree on the conclusion that this relationship is strong enough to include the study of the intellect within natural philosophy.29

This does not mean that there was no room for disagreement on the scientific status of the scientia de anima. But the disagreement did not concern the question of whether the soul could be studied in a scientific manner, or even whether it should be studied within natural philosophy. Instead, it concerned the question of whether apart from a natural philosophical study of the soul there could (or, should) also be another kind of study of the soul. To show this, I will compare the answers Radulphus Brito and John of Jandun give to the questions whether a science of the soul is possible, and if so, whether it forms a part of natural philosophy.

3.1.5 Radulphus Brito against John of Jandun

When Brito presents the initial objections against the possibility of a science that studies the soul, the bulk of their demonstrative force is carried by the im-

29 Anonymus Van Steenberghen emphasizes that in so far as the soul is considered to be a form that is the act of the body, its study belongs to natural philosophy. Anonymus Van Steenberghen, QdA, I.2, 143–42. "Unde, ex ratione posita de anima, patet quod Aristoteles considerat animam ut est forma corporis sensibilis, cum dicit quod est actus corporis, et huius corporis Et istud est verum de anima sensitiva et vegetativa; item de intellectiva, quia, quamvis intellectiva non communicat corpori per se, communicat tamen illi quod per se communicat vel conveniet corpori communicat enim phantasie vel imaginationi quae per se convenit corpori, ut patet." Anonymus Bazán uses a similar strategy. Anonymus Bazán, QdA, I.2, 392–39: "Ad secundum, cum arguitur de illa forma non est scientia naturalis, quae non est actus materiae, concedo. Et cum dicitur in minore: anima <intellectiva SdB> non est actus materiae, dico: quamvis non per se, tamen per accidens; unde anima est actus materiae." Anonymus Giele, by contrast, denies that the intellective soul is a form that is the act of the body. According to him, the intellective soul is a separate substance. Instead, he claims that it is because of the intellect’s relation to matter in its operations that it is included in natural philosophy Anonymus Giele, QdA, I.3, 268–9: "Et ideo potest esse scientia naturalis de anima <intellectiva SdB>, ratione suarum operationum quae communicant materiae sive corpori, ex quibus declaratur substantia animae, ita quod, sine materialibus et physicis, non probatur esse animae intellectivae."
perceptibility and simplicity of the soul. Like Anonymus Giele, Brito points to the operations of the sensible and vegetative souls to counter these objections. Since the operations of the sensible and vegetative souls appear to our senses, these can serve as a starting point for a study of the soul. But whereas Anonymus Giele also referred to the operations of the practical intellect to find an empirical foundation for the science of the soul, Brito does not see how the senses could get access to the intellect. So in order to safeguard the intelligibility of the intellect, he looks for an alternative explanation of how something can be intelligible without being accessible to our senses. This he accomplishes by making a distinction in the manner in which something can be intelligible. In the normal, direct manner (primo et principaliter), something is intelligible if and only if it is perceptible in itself or through its accidents. But in a secondary, indirect manner, things are also intelligible when they are known through something else which is itself perceptible. In other words, the intellect must first acquire knowledge of some external perceptible thing, before it becomes something actual and ipso facto intelligible itself.\(^{30}\)

But what about the soul’s simplicity? In particular, can it have any operations ascribed to it? Given Brito’s emphasis in these questions on the special status of the intellective soul, one might expect him to take a common way out of claiming that understanding is an operation that belongs to the soul alone, rather than to the soul–body composite.\(^{31}\) But not only does Brito not take this way out, he emphasizes over and over again that all operations of a living being — including understanding — belong to the composite of soul and body rather than to the soul alone!\(^{32}\) It is true to say that the soul has

\(^{30}\)Radulphus Brito, QdA, I.119–111, “Dico quod aliquid potest esse intelligibile dupliciter vel primo et principaliter, vel ex intellectione alterius. Modo illud quod est intelligibile primo est sensibile vel secundum se vel secundum alqua sui accidentia. Sed illud quod est intelligibile ex intellectione alterius non oportet quod sit sensibile, sed sufficit quod illud sit sensibile ex cuius intellectione intelligitur, sicut privationes intelliguntur per habitum. Et ideo non oportet quod privationes sint sensibles, sed earum cognitio dependet ex cognitione alciuis quod est sensibile. Sic est in proposito, quia intellectus ex hoc quod alia cognoscit vel intelligit est intelligibilis secundario. Ita cognitio eius dependet ex cognitione aliarum rerum quas intelligit. Et cognitio illarum rerum dependet ex sensu. Sed de operatione anime vegetative et sensitive non est tta, quia operationes iste dependant ex sensu et ex hoc intelligimus animam vegetativam et sensitivam.”

\(^{31}\)Many philosophers claim that understanding is an operation proper to the soul alone. See for example Thomas Aquinas, SentdeA, I 2, 1069–74: “Et ex hoc duo sequuntur. Unum est quod intelligere est propria operatio anime et non indiget corpore nisi ut objecto tantum, ut dictum est; videre autem et ahe operationes et passiones non sunt anime tantum, set conjuncti.”, Anonymus Giele, QdA, I.6, 3967–68. “Sed anima indiget in intelligere corpore sicut objecto, non sicut subiecto.”

\(^{32}\)Radulphus Brito, QdA, I 1125 126 “unde totius conjuncti est intelligere et sentire per animam tamen,” see also Radulphus Brito, QdA, I.1165–67; Radulphus Brito, QdA, II.1024 26.
operations, but only if we mean by that claim that the soul is what accounts for the presence of operations in the composite living being:

Et cum dicitur ‘anima non habet passiones’, falsum est. Licet enim anima separata non habeat passiones, ut consideretur hic totum compositum ex anima et corpore habeat passiones, per animam tamen.\(^{33}\)

And when it is said that the soul has no attributes, that is not true. For the separated soul may indeed have no attributes. But the whole composite of soul and body, as it is considered here, has attributes, yet through the soul.

Given his claim that all operations belong to the composite and none to the soul proper, it is not surprising that Brito considers the \textit{scientia de anima} to form a part of natural science. In fact, his question ‘whether there can be a natural science of the soul’ is very brief, probably because he found this to be so obvious that he saw no need to add any extra arguments for this claim. It is precisely because of the fact that all vital operations are exercised in the soul-body composite that the soul is studied within natural philosophy. Brito consistently counts understanding among the operations that belong strictly speaking to the composite, although he admits that understanding is exceptional in the sense that it is not exercised through a bodily organ.

But surprisingly, it is also Brito who seemingly without any occasion asks the question of whether there can also be another science that studies the soul as separated from the body.\(^{34}\) After maintaining that Averroes denies that the soul can exist apart from the body, whereas faith, truth and Aristotle agree that it can, Brito claims that there can very well be \textit{(bene potest)} a science of the soul as separated and in itself. But that science would be a divine science \textit{(scientia divina)}, that is, metaphysics, or, perhaps, theology.\(^{35}\) Given that Brito makes

\(^{33}\)Radulphus Brito, QdA, I.1\textsuperscript{120–122} (ad rationes).

\(^{34}\)Brito raises this issue in the middle of the question ‘whether there can be a science of the soul’, starting at line 73. From the context it is clear that Brito is referring here to the soul in its separated state after the death of the body, and not to a study of the soul taken in abstraction from the body.

\(^{35}\)The term ‘\textit{scientia divina}’ was regularly used to refer to metaphysics rather than to theology, because Aristotle had called metaphysics a divine science; Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysica}, translated by W D Ross, in: J. Barnes (ed.), \textit{The Complete Works of Aristotle The Revised Oxford Translation}, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, I 2, 983a4–8, p. 1555: “For the most divine science is also most honourable; and this science alone is, in two ways, most divine. For the science which it would be most meet for God to have is a divine science, and so is any science that deals with divine objects; and this science alone has both these qualities.” There is a third possible interpretation The expression ‘\textit{scientia divina}’ could also refer to God’s knowledge of our soul. In that case, God would be the only one who has knowledge of our soul once it is separated from our body.
this claim in the very same question in which he denies that the soul has its
own proper operation, it is unexpected, to say the least.

It is interesting to contrast Brito’s discussion of the question of whether
there can be a science of the soul with Jandun’s, whose philosophical back­
ground is considerably different from Brito’s. Whereas Brito’s interpreta­tion
of Aristotle has much in common with the interpretation given by Aquinas,
Jandun’s interpretation stands in the tradition of the commentaries of Aver­
roes and Anonymus Giele. Jandun interprets Aristotle’s theory of the soul in
such way that the intellective soul is considered to be a separate substance;
this applies to both the potential and the agent intellect. To be sure, when he
is pressed to answer the question of whether this theory of the separate intel­
lect is true, Jandun will say that according to truth and faith the position that
posits a separate intellect is wrong. But he consistently interprets Aristotle
from the perspective of a separate intellect. The question is how much im­
pact this has on his answer to the question of whether there can be a (natural
philosophical) science of the soul.

When answering the objection that the soul cannot be perceived, Jandun
begins by showing that at least the vegetative and sensitive souls are percepti­
ble. He is a bit more careful and precise in his formulation than Brito, claim­
ing only that these souls themselves are perceptible per accidens, whereas their
operations are perceptible per se. The intellective soul on the other hand is
(strictly speaking) neither perceptible per se nor per accidens. Also, Jandun
takes exactly the same approach to the intellective soul’s intelligibility as Brito:
although the soul is not intelligible directly on account of its imperceptibility,
it is intelligible in a derivative sense, since it can be understood through our
understanding of something else. This derived intelligibility is enough to in­
clude the soul among the objects that can be studied by science. But although
Jandun and Brito follow the same approach when it comes to the soul’s im­
perceptibility, they differ when it comes to the soul’s simplicity. Jandun does
not share Brito’s conviction that no operation is proper to the soul itself. In­
deed, Jandun’s interpretation of the agent and potential intellects as separate

\[36\text{JOHN OF JANDUN, } QdA, 11, 8: “Anima autem intellectiva nec per se nec per accidens videtur sensibilis esse, cum nec secundum se nec secundum operationes suas apprehendatur a sensu, nisi forte vellemus vocare sensibile per accidens quod habet habitudinem ad aliquid per se sensibile, sicut octavum coelum dicemus locari per accidens, quia habet habitudinem ad centrum, quod per se locatur, ut patet quarto Physicorum. Et isto modo anima intellectiva posset dici sensibilis, cum habeat habitudinem ad phantasmata, ut patet tertio huus.”}\n
\[37\text{JOHN OF JANDUN, } QdA, 11, 9: “Uno modo aliquid intelligitur primo, sicut quod habet proprium phantasma mediante quo potest phantasiari, et de tali procedunt omnes tres probatones. Alio modo aliquid intelligitur non primo, sed ex intellectione alterius quod primo intelligitur, et de tali non procedunt probatones. Modo anima non est intelligibilis primo modo, ad minus intellectiva, sed solum secundo modo.”}\n
58
substances presupposes that they have a proper operation, i.e., that they have
an operation that is not also the operation of the ensouled body. 38

Since the intellective soul has an operation that pertains properly to the
soul itself, it can, at least in principle, be studied on its own. So we might
expect Jandun to agree with Brito that it belongs to another, divine science to
study the intellective soul in itself. The expectation is partly correct. Jandun
indeed agrees that the soul can be studied in itself, apart from the body. But,
surprisingly, he still considers this study to be a part of natural philosophy. He
formulates his position in the context of a critique of some unnamed philoso­
phers, who claim that we can consider the soul in both a natural philosophical
and a metaphysical way:

Sed est intelligendum secundum aliquos quod anima intellectiva potest
accipi dupliciter. Uno modo secundum se et absolute. Et quia ut sic
est quaedam intelligentia, de ipsa ut sic non est scientia naturalis, sed
magis spectat ad metaphysicam. Alio modo potest considerari ut est
principium motuum et operationum in corpore humano. Et isto modo
de ipsa est scientia naturalis.39

But according to some people it should be understood that the intel­
lective soul can be considered in two ways. In one way in itself and
absolutely. And because so considered it is an intelligence, there is no
natural science of it, but rather it pertains to metaphysics. In another
way it can be considered as the principle of movements and operations
in the human body. And in this manner there is a natural science of it.

Although the ‘some people’ remain anonymous, the view itself can be
traced back to Avicenna. 40 Jandun, on the other hand, questions the validity
of this distinction immediately after formulating it, with the clever argument
that Aristotle counts all the existing separate intellects in his Metaphysica and

38JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, I.11, 57–58: “Omnis substantia quae non est unita corpori tan­
quam subiecto, cui dat esse, sed secundum esse est subsistens distincta a corpore, habet ope­
rationem immaterialis quae non dependet a corpore tanquam a subiecto. Hanc habeo pro
manifesta.” See also the overview given above in section 2.3.1.
39JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, I.2, 10.

40For a discussion of Avicenna’s two definitions of the soul and its influence, see section 2.2,
p. 22. It is found in many commentators of the first half of the thirteenth century, including
Albert the Great. For Albert the Great, see, for example, T. Bonin, ‘The Emanative Psychology
sophical study of the soul and a metaphysical study of it can also be found in the Philosophica
disciplina (written c. 1254); ANONYMUS, Philosophica disciplina, in: C. Lafleur, Quatre introduc­
tions à la philosophie au XIIIe siècle, textes critiques et étude historique, Paris: Vrin [etc.], 1988,
264, 139–141: “De anima absolute determinare in quantum est aliquid in se non est naturalis
philosophi, set potius metaphysici, cuius est considerare substantias spirituales separatas.”
does not include our intellects as separated from the body in that enumeration. In contrast to Brito, Jandun includes even the study of the intellect as it exists on its own, apart from the body (secundum se et absolute) within natural philosophy. Metaphysics is only concerned with those things that are entirely separate from matter, both for their being and for their first operations (operationes primas).

The difference between Jandun and Brito is not the result of their use of different criteria when deciding the question of whether something is studied within natural philosophy. Jandun formulated his criterion in terms of an object’s relation to matter: only those objects that have no relation to matter at all pertain to metaphysics, whereas everything that has some relation to matter pertains to natural philosophy. Since the intellect is related to matter in its operations, it can only be studied within natural philosophy. Brito is less explicit, but there is no indication that he would disagree. Their disagreement turns out to be doctrinal and not methodological. When Brito talks about the possibility of a study of the soul in itself apart from the body, he is referring to the soul as it exists after its separation from the body. But when Jandun is talking about the possibility of a study of the soul in itself apart from the body, he is talking about the study of the separate agent and potential intellects taken on their own. There is a crucial difference between these two perspectives, which is that according to Brito the soul is either related to the body (as its form) or exists in a separated state, whereas according to Jandun the intellective soul is always related to the body (in its operations) and always exists in a separate state. In Brito’s commentary the doctrinal and the methodological issues are strongly connected:

Modo aliquis dubitaret utrum de anima secundum se considerata posset esse scientia. Commentator diceret quod non, quia ipse ponit quod

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41 John of Jandun, QdA, I.2, 11: “Et ideo dico quod anima intellectiva secundum se et absolute et secundum quod est principium motuum et operationum in homine pertinet ad naturalem et non ad metaphysicam, qui solum considerat totaliter separata. Totaliter vero separata sunt illa, quae non indigent corpore, nec sibi appropriantur, nec quantum ad substantiam nec quantum ad operationes eorum primas.” Compare the position of Anonymus Giele, who also holds the view that the separate intellect is included in natural philosophy in so far as its operations are related to the body. Anonymus Giele, QdA, I.3, 2632-41: “Et est intelligendum adhuc, quamquam anima intellectiva sit separata sive separatum esse habens a corpore, sicut determinabitur inferius expresse, via physica, dico, et, quantum ad hoc, de anima non sit scientia naturalis, tamen, quantum ad operationes quas habet, non est separata, sed corpori communicat quantum ad suas operationes quas habet non nisi mediante corpore. Et ideo potest esse scientia naturalis de anima, ratione suarum operationum quae communicant materiae sive corpori, ex quibus declaratur substantiae animae, ita quod, sive materialibus et physicis, non probatur esse animae intellectiva.” But in contrast to Jandun, Anonymus Giele also claims that in so far as the intellect is ontologically independent from matter, it cannot fall under natural philosophy.
anima intellectiva non possit separari a corpore. Ymmo ipse vult quod semper sit coniuncta corpori quantum ad eius operationem. Et ideo secundum ipsum non possimus habere scientiam de ipsa anima in qua non determinetur de ipsa ut est coniuncta corpori.⁴²

Now, someone might doubt whether there could be a science of the soul as considered in itself. According to the Commentator there could not, because he posits that the intellective soul cannot be separated from the body. On the contrary, he wants that it is always conjoined to the body in its operations. And according to him, therefore, we cannot have a science of the soul in which it is not considered as conjoined as to the body.

Jandun does not defend the exact opinion that Brito ascribes to Averroes in this passage, because he argues that there can be a science that studies the soul in itself. It is just that even that science would belong to natural philosophy. But the reason why it would still belong to natural philosophy is precisely because the intellect is always conjoined to the body in its operations.

It is interesting to see what happens here. The answers Brito and Jandun give to the question of whether a science that studies the soul in itself would belong to natural philosophy or metaphysics is determined almost completely by their position with respect to the ontological status of the intellective soul. And from that viewpoint their answers are understandable. But from the viewpoint of how they ascribe operations to either the soul or the soul-body composite their answers are the opposite of what one would expect. Brito consistently ascribes all operations, including understanding, to the composite, but then wants to leave room for a divine science of the soul as existing apart from the composite. Jandun, on the other hand, ascribes proper operations to the separate soul, but then includes the study of this separate soul within natural philosophy.⁴³ It is not that these commentators never give criteria for answering the question, but these criteria function more as an afterthought than as guiding principles. Again this shows how the methodological questions are really ways of solving tensions in the scientia de anima that Aristotle left unresolved; in this case, that of how the intellect is related to the body.

⁴²RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, I.1.⁷³-⁷⁸.
⁴³The proper operation of the intellect is not normal human thought. Jandun makes it very clear that it really is this or that man that understands. See BRENET, Transferts du sujet, 340–362. But in addition to particular thoughts, there is also the eternal understanding of the agent intellect by the possible intellect that is independent of any relation to phantasms. See BRENET, Transferts du sujet, 380–394.
3.1.6 An increasing focus on the intellect

Although much of the focus in the question of whether or not a philosophical study of the soul is possible lies on the intellective soul, the question concerns the soul in general, including its vegetative and sensitive parts. Given the difficulties connected with the intellective soul, the amount of attention devoted to it in these questions is understandable, but it is important to keep in mind that the question had a broader focus. In the course of the fourteenth century, however, the question concerning the study of the soul in general as discussed in book I begins to disappear. Instead, some commentators include a question on the intellective soul in particular, which they take up in book III. This process apparently begins in the commentary of Jandun, who includes both the question on the soul in general in book I and the question on the intellective soul in particular in book III. And it continues with Anonymous Patar and Oresme, both of whom omit the issue in book I and include a question on the intellect in book III instead.\(^44\) As for Buridan, he neither raises the general question in book I, nor the more specific question in book III.\(^45\)

Is the appearance of this new question a sign that something important has changed in the commentary tradition? To answer this, we must look for an explanation of its appearance. A first attempt at an answer can be made by pointing to the first book of Aristotle's *De partibus animalium*, which contains an extensive section on the study of the soul. The most important passage in this context is the following:

> If now the form of the living being is the soul, or part of the soul, or something that without the soul cannot exist... if I say, this is so, then

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\(^{44}\) Similar to the normal order found in the questions on book I, the question of whether the intellect is studied in *natural philosophy* is the opening question of book III. According to Zupko, it seems that only four fourteenth-century philosophers included the question in their commentaries on the third book of the *De anima*. The first three are the commentators already mentioned: John of Jandun, Nicole Oresme, and Anonymous Patar (referred to as Buridan in the Zupko article). See J. Zupko, 'Natural Philosophers on the Nature of the Intellect', in: Maria C. Pacheco and José F. Meirinhos (eds.), *Intellect et imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale*, Actes du Xle congrès international de philosophie médiévale de la Société Internationale pour l'étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.), Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002, vol. 3, Turnhout: Brepols, 2006, 1797–1812, 1798. As the fourth, Zupko mentions Blasius of Parma, but I have been unable to locate the question. It is not included in the *tabulae quaestionum* of his *Conclusiones de anima* and his *Quaestiones de anima* found in G. Federici Vescovini, *Le quaestiones de anima di Biagio Pelacani da Parma*, Firenze: Olschki, 1974, 13–14 and 27–30. The closest match is question III.8 of the *Quaestiones*, which is entitled 'Utrum de intellectu sit scientia'. Nor is the question mentioned in P. Marshall, 'Parisian Psychology in the Mid-Fourteenth Century', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge*, 50 (1983), 101–193.

\(^{45}\) Both questions are also not raised in both Buridan’s second set of lectures on the *De anima* and the Lokert edition.
AN INCREASING FOCUS ON THE INTELLECT

it will come within the province of the natural scientist to inform himself concerning the soul, and to treat of it, either in its entirety, or, at any rate, of that part of it which constitutes the essential character of an animal; and it will be his duty to say what a soul or this part of a soul is; and to discuss the attributes that attach to this essential character, especially as nature is spoken of — and is — twofold, as matter and as substance; nature as substance including both the motor cause and the final cause. Now it is in the latter of these two senses that either the whole soul or some part of it constitutes the nature of an animal; and inasmuch as it is the presence of the soul that enables matter to constitute the animal nature, much more than it is the presence of matter which so enables the soul, the inquirer into nature is bound to treat of the soul rather than of the matter... What has been said suggests the question, whether it is the whole soul or only some part of it that constitutes the nature of an animal; and inasmuch as it is the presence of the soul that enables matter to constitute the animal nature, much more than it is the presence of matter which so enables the soul, the inquirer into nature is bound to treat of the soul rather than of the matter... What has been said suggests the question, whether it is the whole soul or only some part of it, the consideration of which comes within the province of natural science... But perhaps it is not the whole soul, nor all its parts collectively, that constitutes the source of motion... For other animals than man have the power of locomotion, but in none but him is there intellect. Thus then it is plain that it is not of the whole soul that we have to treat. For it is not the whole soul that constitutes animal nature, but only some part or parts of it.\(^{46}\)

This passage places the study of the soul unambiguously under natural philosophy, but also strongly (although not conclusively) suggests that a study of the intellect pertains to some other science, since the natural philosopher needs to discuss the soul only in so far as it ‘constitutes the essential character of an animal’. Given the immateriality and (at least according to many commentators) immortality of the intellective part of the soul, the science of metaphysics would be the obvious choice. But interesting as this passage from *De partibus animalium* is, it cannot be used to explain the emergence of a question on the study of intellect in book III in the fourteenth century. For in spite of the strong influence this passage was to have on Renaissance commentators, it played no role in the medieval commentaries.\(^{47}\)


\(^{47}\)For the influence of this passage on Renaissance commentators, which was probably due to its inclusion in the commentary on the *De anima* attributed to Simplicius, see P. J. J. M. Bakker, ‘Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics, or Something in Between? Agostino Nifo, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Marcantonio Genua on the Nature and Place of the Science of the Soul’, in: P. J. J. M. Bakker and J. M.M.H. Thijsen (eds.), *Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, 151–177, especially 152–154. A Latin translation of Simplicius’s commentary was not available during the Middle Ages. The first translation dates from the middle of the sixteenth century, see S. Salas-
commentators I discuss in this study as much as mentioned the passage, let alone discussed it.

A second possible reason for the emergence of a question on the intellect in book III is suggested by Zupko, who points out that there seems to be a relation with the Averroistic commentaries. For in commentaries that stay close to Averroes's interpretation it makes sense to ask the question about the inclusion of intellect within natural philosophy, given that the intellect is a separate substance, ontologically independent from the vegetative and sensitive parts of the soul. The continued interest in the question in other commentators can then be explained as follows:

A more likely explanation is that the question interested some non-Averroistic masters simply because they were reading the De anima commentaries of their predecessors, some of whom were Averroists. Buridan probably dropped the question by the time he delivered his third and final series of lectures on De anima because he had no reason to continue asking it, holding as he did that the human vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual powers form a per se unity, though one which the philosopher is in no position to demonstrate.48

This is a much more plausible answer than the first one, and I think that linking the emergence of this question to the Averroistic tenets in philosophical psychology can explain why Jandun takes up the question in book III after having already asked the more general question in book I.

If I am correct in assuming that the author I refer to as Anonymus Patar is not identical with Buridan,49 then Buridan did not drop the question at some point in his career; instead, he never took it up in the first place.50 So we have two out of three commentators with doctrinally closely related commentaries who take up the question in book III, whereas one completely ignores it. This reinforces Zupko's suggestion that the occurrence of the question in commentators who do not try to follow Averroes is incidental. Jandun has included it,

TOWSKY, De Anima die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16 und 17 Jahrhundert, Amsterdam [etc.]: Gruner, 2006, 76, footnote 169

48ZUPKO, 'Natural Philosophers on the Nature of the Intellect', 1811

49For the arguments, see the appendices.

50Buridan does devote a question to the apparent similarity between the potential intellect and prime matter. JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, III.7, 57–63: 'Utrum intellectus possibilis sit pura potentia ita quod non sit aliquis actus, sicut materia prima'. But even though this similarity between the potential intellect and prime matter formed the basis of one of the three strategies to argue against the possibility of a science of the soul (see above, section 3.1.3), Buridan's motive for raising the question is not that of discussing the potential difficulties of a natural philosophical study of the intellect. Instead he is concerned with distinguishing between the different meanings of 'potentia' 'Ista quaestio est formata ad exponendum alius auctoritates.' (p. 5849–50).
and so do these commentators. And indeed, as soon as we look more closely at how Jandun, Oresme and Anonymus Patara structure their discussions, it becomes clear that the later fourteenth-century commentators simply follow Jandun not only in their inclusion of the question, but even in the way they treat it. As a result their inclusion of the question has no impact on the tradition of the *scientia de anima*.

### On the natural philosophical study of the intellect

Jandun opens his commentary on book III with the question ‘Whether a natural philosopher should consider the intellect’. Before giving his final answer to the question, he distinguishes (following Averroes) between four different meanings of the term ‘intellect’. It can either mean the possible intellect, or the agent intellect, or the habitual intellect — which is defined as the intellect as informed by an intelligible species —, or, lastly, the imaginative (or cogitative) power. This last option is also the easiest to deal with. The imaginative power is by definition a material power, which belongs to the human sensitive soul.  

Since it has already been established in book I that (at the very least most of) the human soul is among the objects of study of the *scientia de anima*, any material powers that this soul has will also be studied there.

The inclusion of the possible intellect in natural philosophy is argued for by an appeal to the principle that every substance that is moved by something that exists in matter is itself an object of study for the natural philosopher. Given that the possible intellect is moved by the material phantasms, it *ipso facto* falls under the consideration of the natural philosopher. To argue for the inclusion of the habitual intellect Jandun chooses a different approach. This time the intellect is included, because a natural philosopher studies everything that is subject to generation and corruption. According to Jandun, the intelligible species that are the form of the habitual intellect are species that are subject to generation and corruption, since their presence or absence in the habitual intellect is dependent on the generation or corruption of what he calls the imaginative intentions. That is to say, the species will only be present in the habitual intellect when we have the corresponding phantasms at the sensitive level.  

If the corresponding phantasms are not present in the imaginative power, the intelligible species will not become the form of the habitual intellect.

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52 This limits what we can know to those things that are related to what we have experienced through our senses. Recall the adage *nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu.*
This leaves only the agent intellect. The study of this intellect is also assigned to natural philosophy, this time because it has already been argued that the other intellects as well as the operation of understanding are included, and, having included them, we should also include the cause of their operation. Since the agent intellect is an immediate principle of natural operations, which is dependent on something existing in matter for the exercise of these operations, it must also be included within natural philosophy. By this time, the link that connects the intellect to matter has become extremely weak. Just because the agent intellect is the proximate cause of the operation of understanding in the possible intellect, which itself is linked to matter only because of the relation to something existing in matter, namely the phantasms, it falls under the consideration of the natural philosopher. Jandun adds, in conclusion, that the intellect, in all its four meanings, is not just one object of study among many for the natural philosopher. Quite the contrary, the consideration of the intellect constitutes his highest and noblest task. It constitutes the summit of natural philosophy.

Jandun’s inclusion of a new question on the intellect in book III, next to the general question on the soul in book I, is understandable. The various meanings of the term ‘intellect’ alone merit a separate discussion. The focus in the questions in book I was on the difficulties pertaining to obtaining any knowledge of the intellective part of the soul, and to the question of whether or not the soul is complex enough to function as a subject matter of a science. The focus in book III, by contrast, is on the relationship between the intellect(s) and matter. Since Jandun writes his commentary in the tradition of Averroes, the relation between the intellect(s) and the body are much looser than those between a form and the substance of which it is a form. Because of this, the inclusion of the intellect within natural philosophy needs more careful argumentation. Moreover, Jandun had argued in book I that every study of the intellect pertains to natural philosophy, even the study of the intellect taken on its own.

With Jandun’s discussion in mind, a look at Oresme and Anonymus Patar makes it clear immediately that their discussions are indebted to his. Both authors begin their questions with a more general discussion about what constitutes a natural philosophical science, something that is not found in Jandun. But as soon as they turn to the intellect, they structure their discussions

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53 John of Jandun, QdA, 222. “Et ad hujus substantiae (et totae animae intellectivae humanae $SdB$) considerationem, tanquam ad ultimam, terminatur considerationis philosophorum naturalis de formis, quarum considerat quiditates, ita quod aliam formam nobis non considerat quantum ad quiditatem explicite, sed solum considerat alias formas abstractas quantum ad esse, secundum Commentator secundo Physicorum et partum in primo libro et ultimo commento eius.”

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around its same four meanings.\textsuperscript{54} There are only two minor differences with respect to Jandun's treatment. The first is that Jandun gives a bit more detail in his arguments. And the second is that Jandun seems concerned with relating the intellect to both matter and motion, whereas Oresme and Anonymus Patar focus almost exclusively on the aspect of motion.\textsuperscript{55} As a result of their following Jandun, their discussions are almost completely unrelated to the rest of their commentaries. For neither of them actually accepts Jandun's position that the intellect is a unique separate substance.

Summary

To sum up, there was a complete consensus on the question of whether the soul in its embodied state is studied within natural philosophy. All the arguments against this view were countered by constantly referring to the facts that (1) most of the soul's operations are exercised in the animated body, and (2) all our knowledge of the soul depends on our ability to sense these operations, which is possible precisely because they are exercised in the animated body. This consensus was not limited to the vegetative and sensitive souls. All commentators also agreed that the intellective soul belongs to natural philosophy in so far as it is related to the body. It is true that they disagreed on the mode and the extent of this relation, but no matter how it was perceived, they deemed it strong enough to maintain the unity of the \textit{scientia de anima}. Within an Aristotelian framework, the unanimity of the commentators in their assignment of the study of the soul to natural philosophy is understandable.

The only real debate revolved around the question of whether or not the human soul in itself, in so far as it exists separately from the body, is also part of the subject matter of the \textit{scientia de anima}. And, if the answer to this question is negative, by which other discipline it is studied. The different answers to these questions turned out to be strongly motivated by doctrinal concerns rather than by different views on method. True, the commentators do sometimes formulate criteria for the inclusion or exclusion of the intellect in metaphysics, but these criteria give the impression of being an \textit{ad hoc} justification for the position they already had in mind. The doctrinal concerns, however, influenced the answer to the question in sometimes surprising ways. Jandun claims that the intellect is a separate substance with its own proper operations,

\textsuperscript{54}There are some minor differences in terminology. Jandun's habitual intellect is called the intellect in act by Oresme. And whereas Jandun prefers the term 'imaginative power' (although he gives the synonym cogitative power in a gloss), Oresme only uses the term 'cogitative power'.

\textsuperscript{55}ZUPKO, 'Natural Philosophers on the Nature of the Intellect' discusses the positions of Oresme and Anonymus Patar in more detail.
but still holds that even the study of this unique immortal intellect *secundum se et absolute* forms a part of natural philosophy. Brito, by contrast, leaves room for a *scientia divina* of the intellective soul, even though he ascribes all the vital operations, including understanding, to the soul-body composite. Moreover, in spite of the link between the answers to these question and the views on the ontological status of the intellect — that finds it clearest expression in Brito —, there are other concerns at play also. Anonymus Giele, whose views on the ontological status of the intellect closely resemble Jandun’s, sides with Brito in leaving room for a metaphysical study of the intellect.

Setting aside the difficult case of the study of the soul in separation from the body, all commentators agree that the soul is studied by natural philosophy on account of its being the form of the body. But all this stress on embodiment also makes it difficult to distinguish the science of the soul from the sciences described in the *Parva naturalia*, a group of natural philosophical tracts in which ensouled bodies are the object of study. Does the required emphasis on embodiment necessitate making the animated body the subject matter of the *scientia de anima* instead of the soul? And if so, how is the *scientia de anima* different from the sciences described in the *Parva naturalia*? This is the question that is at stake in the second debate related to method: what is the proper subject matter of the science of the soul?

### 3.2 The subject matter of the *scientia de anima*

At first sight, it is somewhat surprising that there even was a discussion on the subject matter of the *scientia de anima*. Not only is Aristotle’s treatise called *On the Soul*, but the question of its subject matter is also raised and answered already in its first paragraph:

> The knowledge of the soul admittedly contributes greatly to the advance of truth in general, and, above all, to our understanding of Nature, for the soul is in some sense the principle of animal life. Our aim is to grasp and understand, first its essential nature, and secondly its properties; of these some are thought to be affections proper to the soul itself, while others are considered to attach to the animal owing to the presence of the soul.\(^{56}\)

The passage is strengthened by the opening passage of one of the *Parva naturalia* treatises, *De sensu et sensibilibus*, in which Aristotle states that the

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\(^{56}\) Aristotle, *De anima* I.1, 402a5–9.
soul in itself and its faculties have already been considered elsewhere, that is, in *De anima.*

Nevertheless, it was precisely Aristotle's tentative distinction between affections that are proper to the soul itself and affections that are proper to the living being that occasioned the debate on the subject matter of the *scientia de anima.* For if it is true that in this science we study the affections of the soul, and if it is also true that some of these affections — in fact, most of them — belong to the living being rather than just to the soul, should we not then conclude that we study the living being rather than the soul itself? Or should we perhaps take the middle position, and conclude that we study the whole living being, but only under the aspect of its being ensouled? What made these questions even more pressing is that Aristotle had classified the *scientia de anima* under the natural sciences. This implied — as we have seen — that whatever its subject matter might be, at the very least it needed to have some determinate relationship to material bodies; and indeed, this relationship was often emphasized in the commentaries.

In this respect, the later medieval commentaries discussed here differed greatly from their earlier counterparts, who tried to downplay the relation of the soul to the body by describing the soul as a perfection (*perfectio*) of the body rather than as its form (*forma*). The term 'perfection' has an ambiguity that the term 'substantial form' does not have, which is why it could be used by philosophers who wanted to stress the ontological self-sufficiency of the soul. For when it is said that the soul is the perfection of the body, this might mean that the soul is the form of the body; but it might also merely mean that the soul is a substance in its own right that enters into some relation with the body through which it perfects the body. It is perfectly consistent to say that the soul is the perfection of the body and that it is a substance in itself; but this

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57 Aristotle, *De sensu et sensibilibus*, translated by J. J. Beare, in J. Barnes (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 436a1–5, p. 693: "Having now considered the soul, by itself, and its several faculties, we must next make a survey of animals and all living things, in order to ascertain what functions are peculiar, and what functions are common to them. What has been already determined respecting the soul must be assumed throughout."

58 I call the distinction tentative, not only because it is introduced in the passage quoted above by the words 'are thought to be', but also because of what Aristotle says further on in the same chapter. Aristotle, *De anima*, 403a3–10: "A further problem presented by the affections of soul is this: are they all affections of the complex of body and soul, or is there any one among them peculiar to the soul by itself? To determine this is indispensable but difficult. If we consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence."
is certainly not the Aristotelian position.\textsuperscript{59}

As Theodor Kohler has shown in his study on philosophical anthropology in the thirteenth century, philosophers usually took one of three possible answers to the question concerning the subject matter of the \textit{scientia de anima}.\textsuperscript{60} Some claimed that the soul is the proper subject (the most popular option), some that the ensouled body under the aspect of the soul was its proper subject, and some claimed that both answers were equally defensible. There is a fourth possible position, namely that the ensouled body is unqualifiedly the subject of this science. This view can be found in at least one anonymous commentator from the thirteenth century, who argues as follows: according to Aristotle, any science that considers a form should also consider its matter; and the way in which the natural philosopher considers matter is in respect to form. From this uncontroversial standpoint, he draws the conclusion that the ensouled body taken absolutely is the proper subject matter of the \textit{scientia de anima}. But even according to this commentator, we are only interested in the animated body in so far as it is related to the soul as its matter. And in his replies to the counterarguments, he qualifies his position to the point where he says that both the soul and the ensouled body are part of the subject matter of the \textit{De anima}; the soul principally, and the ensouled body in so far as it has a relation to the soul.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{59} Bazán, 'The Human Soul', esp. 106–113 shows how the ambiguous ontological status of the soul was supported by this use of \textit{perfectio}, and how this forms the background of Thomas Aquinas's discussion \textit{Utrum anima possit esse forma et hoc aliquid}, the first question in the \textit{Quaestiones disputatae de anima}. He also argues elsewhere that the "weakening of the Aristotelian notion of form" which is implied in this use of 'perfection', especially when the soul is also considered to be a substance composed of matter and form, is "one of the breeding grounds of radical Aristotelianism"; Bazán, 'Radical Aristotelianism', 597–599

\textsuperscript{60} Köhler, \textit{Grundlagen des philosophisch-anthropologischen Diskurses}, 354–368

\textsuperscript{61} This anonymous question is found in MS Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 10135, f. 88\textsuperscript{a–b}, and is edited in J. Vennebusch, \textit{Ein anonymer Aristoteleskommentar des XIII Jahrhunderts} Questiones in tres libros de anima Textedition und philosophisch-historische Einleitung, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1963, 26: "Sic igitur naturalis considerat de anima secundum quod est perfectio corporis Manifestum est ergo, quod corpus animatum absolute sumptum est subjectum in hoc libro." The question is, of course, what exactly the author means when he uses the term '\textit{corpus animatum}'. The expression is often used to refer to the whole living being (the soul-body composite), but it can also be used to refer to a (metaphysical) constituent of the whole living being (the body part of the soul-body composite). I agree with Vennebusch that it is used in the second sense in this text "für ihn ist das '\textit{corpus animatum}' nicht das lebendige Wesen selbst, sondern ein Konstituents des lebendigen Wesens neben der Seele." (p. 27) At one point, the author even makes this explicit: "\textit{corpus autem secundum quod est perfectibile ab anima est corpus animatum}" (p. 26). But in spite of the strong formulation that the \textit{corpus animatum absolute sumptum} is the subject matter of the science of the soul, the author's position seems to be more nuanced. Firstly, the context in which he formulates his position is how the natural philosopher considers matter \textit{in addition to form} And moreover, in the replies to the counterarguments, we can find an
The disagreement about the subject matter of the *scientia de anima* certainly seems important. One would expect that a science that studies the soul and a science that studies the ensouled body — although, only *qua* ensouled — would differ greatly in emphasis at the very least. We might expect those philosophers who claim that the ensouled body forms the subject matter to pay more attention to the physiological aspects of the living being, whereas those who claim that the soul forms the subject matter might pay more attention to the soul in its disembodied state. To what extent this is actually the case will become clear in the remainder of this chapter.

### 3.2.1 The soul as subject

Philosophers as diverse as Thomas Aquinas, Anonymus Giele, John of Jandun, Anonymus Patar, and John Buridan insist that the soul is the proper subject matter of the *scientia de anima*. Aquinas simply takes the soul's status as subject in this science for granted. His acceptance occurs in an *expositio*, which stays close to Aristotle's text. Since Aristotle raises no explicit doubts on this matter, there was apparently little reason to gloss extensively on the passage. Fortunately, a passage in the *Summa theologiae* gives some indication of Aquinas's position.

> Naturam autem hominis considerare pertinet ad theologum ex parte animae, non autem ex parte corporis, nisi secundum habitudinem quam habet corpus ad animam. Et ideo prima consideratio circa animam versabitur.\(^{63}\)

To consider human nature belongs to the theologian from the aspect of soul, not, however, from the aspect of body, unless in so far as the body is related to the soul. And therefore the first consideration will be occupied with the soul.

If this passage is meant to distinguish a theological from a philosophical consideration of human nature, which seems plausible, then the fact that Aquinas accepts the soul as the proper subject matter of the *De anima* does important qualification. VENNEBUSCH, *QdA*, 26–27\(^{72-74}\): "Licet enim consideretur de anima et de corpore animato, tamen secundum quod attribucionem habet ad animam. Et ideo anima est primum subjectum in scientia hac, et corpus animatum per attributionem ad animam." So ultimately, the author seems to defend that we look at the ensouled body under the aspect of soul, a position defended by other commentators as well. See section 3.2.2.

\(^{62}\)Although Aquinas's *Quaestiones disputatae de anima* contains many topics related to those normally discussed in *De anima* commentaries, it is not a commentary on Aristotle's text and contains no methodological questions. According to BAZÁN, 'The Human Soul', 96, the text is probably modeled on John of la Rochelle's *Summa de anima*.

not imply that it is considered there without the body or merely according to
the relation (habitudo) it has to the body. For that is how the theologian con-
siders the soul. Presumably, then, the natural philosopher studies the soul
precisely as form of the body, whereas the theologian studies the soul as sub-
sistent in its own right. This is confirmed by the continuation of the passage
quoted above, in which Aquinas, quoting Ps. Dionysius, even refers to the soul
as a spiritual substance.

In the same passage, Aquinas announces the order that he will follow in
his investigation. First he will discuss the soul’s essence, then its powers, and
finally its operations. This seems, at first sight, to indicate that a theological
consideration of the soul also follows a different method than a natural philo-
sophical consideration, because this order is the inverse of that described in
De anima. There we are told that the proper method to proceed in natural
philosophy is to begin with the acts (or better, the objects to which these acts
are directed), then consider the powers, and end with the essence. But this
is not what Aquinas means. The different order in investigating the soul in

64 That there is a difference between a theological and philosophical approach to the soul in
Aquinas is argued for in M. J. Sweeney, “Thomas Aquinas’s “Quaestiones de anima” and the
Difference between a Philosophical and a Theological Approach to the Soul,’ in: J. A. Aert-
sen and A. Speer (eds.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kon-
gresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l’étude de la Philosophie
esp. 594. He compares the Quaestiones disputatae de anima and the Summa theologiae from this
perspective, which enables him to explain why the Quaestiones disputatae are written prior to
the Summa even though they seem to contain a more complete and sophisticated description of
the soul. The reason for this would be that in the Summa theologiae, I.75–89, Aquinas takes the
theological approach to the soul, whereas in the Quaestiones disputatae he takes a philosophical
approach. Note that this difference in method implies a difference in the starting point
of the investigation (soul as substance resp. soul as form), but not a difference in conclusions
reached about the soul. Given Aquinas’s insistence that the conclusions reached by theology
and by (properly conducted) philosophy must necessarily be in agreement, the latter would
be impossible. I find Sweeney’s analysis in terms of a distinction between philosophical and
theological approaches more convincing when comparing the Summa with the Sentencia libri
De anima than with the Quaestiones disputatae, given that Aquinas’s disputed questions belong
themselves to a mostly theological genre. But to be fair, Sweeney does not seem to want to take
the distinction between philosophical and theological too strict, since at one point he calls the
Quaestiones disputatae a “far more philosophical work than Summa cont. Gent., Quaestiones
de spiritualibus creaturis or Summa theologiae I pars. Among these, only Q. de anima does not
begin with a treatment of soul as spiritual substance prior to the discussion of soul as form.”
(page 591).

Angel. Hier., tria inveniuntur in substantibis spiritualibus, scilicet essentia, virtus et operatio,
primo considerabimus ea quae pertinent ad essentiam animae; secundo, ea quae pertinent ad
virtutem sive potentias eius; tertiao, ea quae pertinent ad operationem eius.”

66 Aristotle, De anima, II.4, 415a14–22.
the De anima and the Summa theologiae does not reflect a difference between theological and philosophical methods. Rather, it reflects a difference in the order of treatment of the subject. The De anima is a treatise in which a scientific investigation of the soul is conducted. The Summa theologiae on the other hand is a didactic treatise, concerned with ordering the material in such a way that a student can best follow and understand the subject. So the difference is that between the ordo inveniendi and the ordo docendi sive exponendi, between doing research and teaching.

To sum up, there is a difference between the manner in which the theologian looks at the soul (as a something that can subsist on its own) and the manner in which the natural philosopher looks at the soul (as form of the body). And this difference implies that the theologian hardly needs to take the body into account, whereas for the natural philosopher, understanding the body is an important part of the scientia de anima, even though the subject matter of this science is the soul. But it is better to understand this more as a difference in emphasis than as a difference between two incompatible approaches.

Aquinas did not offer any arguments for his position that the soul is the proper subject matter of the scientia de anima. Jandun, by contrast, gives two. His first argument enumerates the general requirements that any possible subject matter of a science must meet. Those requirements are that: (1) it should be the first thing that is known in that science, and (2) it should be the thing of which the parts (partes) and attributes (passiones) are considered in that science. Jandun claims that only the soul satisfies both these requirements.

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67 As is announced in the prologue of Thomas Aquinas, STh, 5: “Quia catholicae veritatis doctor non solum pro vectos debet instruere, sed ad eum pertinet etiam incipientes erudire, secundum illud apostoli I ad Corinth: III ‘tanquam parvulis in Christo, lac vobis potum dedi, non escam’, propositum nostrae intenti ons in hoc opere est, ea quae ad Christianam religionem pertinere, eo modo tradere, secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientium. Consideravit namque huic doctrinae novitios, in his quae a diversis conscripta sunt, plurimum impediri: partim quidem propter multiplicationem inutilium quaestionum, articulorum et argumentorum; partim etiam quia ea quae sunt necessaria talibus ad scindum, non traduntur secundum ordinem disciplinarum, sed secundum quod requiebat librorum expositio, vel secundum quod se praebebat occasio disputandi; partim quidem quia eorum frequens repetitio et fastidium et confusionem generabat in animis auditorum. Haec igitur et alia huissmodi evitare studentes, tentabimus, cum confidentia divini auxilii, ea quae ad sacram doctrinam pertinere, breviter ac dilucide prosequi, secundum quod materia patietur’ (my emphasis).

68 This is why R. Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of the Summa theologiae 1a 75–89, Cambridge [etc.]: Cambridge University Press, 2002 can use the Summa theologiae for a philosophical study of human nature, which would have been impossible if the theological consideration of the soul is completely different from the philosophical consideration.

69 John of Jandun, QdA, I 3, 14. The first criterion is taken from Aristotle, Analytica posteriora, I.1, 71a12–16: “It is necessary to be already aware of things in two ways: of some
in the case of the scien\textit{tia de an\textit{ima}}, although the only justification he gives is that this is clear when browsing through the \textit{De anima} \textit{(patet discurrendo per librum)}.

The argument that the subject matter of a science should be the first thing known in that science can be found in other commentators as well.\textsuperscript{70} Although this criterion has some plausibility, it is not always clear what kind of priority and what kind of knowledge is at stake here. It cannot be a complete knowledge of the soul that is the first thing that is acquired in this science, because then this science would be completed before it has even started. A complete knowledge of the soul would include knowledge of all its properties and powers. In addition, it is emphasized again and again in most commentaries, including Jandun’s, that the proper method of proceeding in the \textit{scien\textit{tia de anima}} is by studying the perceptible acts of the soul first and the essence of the soul last. Most likely, what Jandun had in mind is that the science of the soul begins with some rudimentary grasp of its subject. If we have absolutely no idea what we mean by the term ‘soul’, we will hardly be inclined to devote a science to its study, if only for the reason that we would have no clue where to begin. Jandun’s second argument is that the soul must be the subject in question, because it is the soul that we define and divide into its (structural) parts in this science, and not the ensouled body.

John Buridan also opts for the soul as the subject matter of the \textit{scien\textit{tia de anima}}. But the implications of that choice turn out to be quite different from those we find in Aquinas and Jandun. Buridan’s exact answer to the question about the subject matter is: “that the soul, that is the term ‘soul’, should be posited as the proper subject matter of that science.”\textsuperscript{71} And the small gloss in his answer that equates soul with the term ‘soul’ implies a completely different perception of science in general and of the science of the soul in particular.

\textsuperscript{70}Compare Anonymus Van Steenberghen, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{71}JOHN BURIDAN, \textit{QdA}, 1.1, f. 1\textsuperscript{rb}, “quod anima, id est istic terminus ‘anima’, ponendus est subiectum proprium in illa scientia”
The distinctive feature of his <i.e. Buridan's SdB</i> work in metaphysics is the use of the method now known as 'logical analysis', whereby philosophical problems are formulated as questions concerning the meaning and reference of terms and the truth conditions of sentences.\(^{74}\)
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSIONS

This method of logical analysis can be seen at work in Buridan's commentary on the *De anima*, where he applies a semantical analysis of terms such as 'whole' and 'part' when he discusses questions such as 'whether the whole soul is in the whole body'. On the other hand, claiming that it is not the aim of science to understand the essences of things — often accompanied by the claim that such essences do not exist in the first place — does not necessarily imply the further claim that it is impossible to assign essential predicates to subjects. The latter claim would make science a difficult, if not impossible exercise, a conclusion that not many medieval philosophers were willing to accept.\(^{75}\) John Buridan, for example, is a strong defender of the possibility of assigning essential predicates while at the same time denying the existence of essences.\(^{76}\) Indeed, Buridan's commentary on the *De anima* is full of essential ascriptions to the soul.

Buridan's position is subtle. According to him, the *scientia de anima* studies the quiddity (*quidditas*) of the soul, just as any natural philosophical science studies the essence or quiddity of its objects. The reason for this is simply that according to Buridan there is no ontological distinction between the essence

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\(^{75}\) A fourteenth-century exception may have been Nicolaus of Autrecourt. But his denial of the possibility of demonstrative science is not so much motivated by a denial of the existence of essences, but instead by his conviction that nothing about such essences (including their existence) can be inferred from our knowledge of the perceptible accidents. For instance in Nicholas of Autrecourt, *Second Letter to Bernard of Arezzo*, in: Idem, *His Correspondence with Master Giles & Bernard of Arezzo* A Critical Edition & English Translation by L. M. de Rijk, Leiden [etc.]: Brill, 1994, 74. "Et quod de aliqua substantia conjuncta materie alia ab anima nostra non habeamus certitudinem apparat quia: demonstrato ligno vel lapide, quod substantia sit ibi clarissime deducetur ex uno credito coaccepito. Sed hoc non potest inferri evidenter ex uno credito coaccepito, nam. cum omnibus apparentibus ante huusmodi discursum potest esse per aliquam potentiam, utputa dividam, quod ibi substantia non sit. Igitur in lumine naturali non inferitur evidenter ex istis apparentibus quod substantia sit ibi" Notice that Autrecourt seems to leave room for a non-discursive knowledge of the existence of our own soul. But if such knowledge can indeed be obtained, it is extremely limited. For in the same letter, Autrecourt denies that we can have certain knowledge of our own acts Nicholas of Autrecourt, *Second Letter to Bernard of Arezzo*, 53: "Sed quod gravius sustineri posset habetis dicere quod vos non estis certus de actibus vestris, utputa quod videatis, quod audiatis, ymo quod non estis certus quod aliquid apparent vobis vel apparuerit vobis".

\(^{76}\) This is convincingly argued for by Klima, who qualifies Buridan's position as follows: "One of the basic aims of his [i.e. Buridan's SdB] philosophy of language and metaphysics is to show that he can be a staunch nominalist in denying real essences to things in the way realists conceive of them, yet at the same time he can attribute scientifically knowable essential predicates to things ", G. Klima, 'The Essentialist Nominalism of John Buridan', *The Review of Metaphysics*, 58 (2005), 739–754, 741.
The second thesis: that the naturalphilosopher indeed considers the quiddities of all things (or at least of all things the quiddities, to avoid a logical objection), because physics considers men, and brutes, and stones, and also mobile things both in circular motion (as the heavenly bodies) and in linear motion (as the inferior bodies). And yet each one of those is nothing else but its quiddity, as I presently suppose. Hence the naturalphilosopher considers the quiddities of things. Indeed, it was said elsewhere that the naturalphilosopher considers all beings in the world; therefore he considers the very quiddities of things.

But the real point in question for Buridan is not whether the naturalphilosopher studies quiddities, but in what manner he studies them; and it is there that the metaphysician and the naturalphilosopher do differ. Only the metaphysician studies these quiddities \textit{qua} quiddities, or, in other words, according to their quidditative definition. For the naturalphilosopher such a study is ruled out from the start, because he always studies these quiddities in relation to matter and motion, with the consequence that this relation must always form an element of every definition that is made in naturalphilosophy.\footnote{78} We will, therefore, never be able to use a quidditative definition in naturalphilosophy.

\footnote{\textit{JOHN BURIDAN}, \textit{Questiones super duodecim libros Metaphysice}, Paris, 1518 (photomechanical reprint: Frankfurt. Minerva, 1964), VI.1, 'Utrum sola metaphysica considerat quiditates rerum', f. 33\textsuperscript{vb}.}

\footnote{\textit{JOHN BURIDAN}, \textit{QMetaph}, VI.1, f. 33\textsuperscript{b}: 'Ex quo sequitur quarta conclusio: quod nulla scientia considerat quiditates rerum. Differt enim dicere 'quiditates considerat' et 'considerat quiditates', quae dictum fuit alas quod talia verba 'scio', 'cognosco', 'considero', etc. faciunt predicatum a parte post positum appellare rationem a qua sumitur tale predicatum. Et ideo de virtute sermonis sequitur: considerat quiditates; igitur considerat eas secundum rationes secundum quas dicuntur quiditates. We will, therefore, never be able to use a quidditative definition in naturalphilosophy.}
The implications of the fact that the natural philosopher cannot use quidditative definitions are easily misunderstood, and should not be overstated. First of all, the difference between nominal and quidditative definitions does not imply that the natural philosopher is limited to an external, superficial knowledge of things, whereas the metaphysician is able to penetrate to the essences of things, something that is very well put by Jack Zupko:

Buridan’s use of the term ‘essential predicates’ in connection with quidditative definitions can obscure the fact that for him, the difference between nominal and quidditative definitions is formal, corresponding to different ways or modes we have of conceiving things, rather than to a difference between our names for things and their essences in any hypothetized, realist sense.\(^79\)

Moreover, in several places, Buridan claims that it is not the quidditative definition that gives the most complete knowledge of things. This status is reserved for the so-called causal definition. Such a causal definition not only indicates what a thing is (\textit{quid est}), but also why it is (\textit{propter quid est}).\(^80\) And these causal definitions play a large role in natural philosophy. The definition of the soul as ‘first act of the organic body having life in potency’, for instance, is a causal definition. So the fact that Buridan denies that the natural philosopher can use quidditative definitions has nothing to do with the difference between having knowledge of accidents only and having knowledge of the essences of things. It is simply another way of saying that everything that is studied in natural philosophy is studied there in so far as it has a relation to matter.

The new, semantical view on the subject matter of a science has an important consequence, which has to do with the unity of the \textit{scientia de anima}.\(^78\)


\(^{80}\)See Zupko, John Buridan, 111.
Once the new conception of science was introduced, a new question — which was not limited to philosophical psychology — presented itself and had to be answered: if the subject matter of science is the proposition, then what accounts for the unity of a particular science, given that it consists of a set of propositions? It is by no means evident why the set of propositions that is considered in, for example, the scientia de anima, would taken together constitute a single science. William Ockham, for instance, had denied that it did.\(^\text{81}\)

Buridan pays a lot of attention to the unity of the scientia de anima. In fact, he begins his reply to the first question in book I on the proper subject matter of the science of the soul by distancing himself from those 'modern' philosophers who refuse to assign a single subject to a single science, but instead claim that there are as many subjects in any given science as there are demonstrated conclusions in that science.\(^\text{82}\) He refers the reader to his commentary on the

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\(^{81}\)For example in William Ockham, \textit{Physica}, 7\textsuperscript{23}-\textsuperscript{29}: “Ideo dicendum est quod metaphysica non est una scientia numero, nec simulter philosophia naturalis, sed philosophia naturalis est collectio multorum habituum, sicut dictum est. Nec est alter una, nisi sicut civitas dictur una vel populus dictur unus vel exercitus comprehendens homines et equos et cetera necessaria dictur unus, vel sicut regnum dictur unus, vel sicut universitas dictur una, vel sicut mundus dictur unus.” For a brief discussion see I. Miralbell-Guerin, ‘Rational Science and Real Science in William of Ockham (An Introduction to Ockham's Philosophy of Science)’, in R. Tyorinoja and A. Inkeri Lehtinen [e.a.] (eds.), \textit{Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy}, Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S I.E.P M). Helsinki, 24–29 August 1987. Vol. 3, Helsinki: Finnish Society for Missiology and Ecumenics, 1990, 134–143, 137–139. A. A. Maurer, ‘The Unity of a Science: St. Thomas and the Nominalists’, in: A. A. Maurer (ed.), \textit{St Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974 Commemorative Studies}, vol 2, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974, 269–291, esp 271–275, gives a detailed analysis of the problem of the unity of knowledge. In brief, whereas for Aquinas the unity of science was rooted in the existence of a single \textit{habitus} for each science that provides it with a unique \textit{ratio} under which its objects are considered, later philosophers began to emphasize the extended meaning of \textit{habitus} — also found in Aquinas — in which it can be applied to all that which is produced by the \textit{habitus}, in this case the various demonstrations of a science. Although Maurer does not mention Buridan, he gives the following explanation of the fragmentation of science in Ockham: “Once the nominalists eliminated intelligible natures or essences from reality a new explanation of the unity of a science had to be found. For Ockham, the object of science is no longer the real world but the propositions we form about it. Corresponding to each demonstrated proposition there is a scientific habit in the intellect. These are ‘partial sciences’, which can be integrated into a ‘total science’, such as physics or metaphysics, by the logical interconnection of the terms of the scientific propositions” (Maurer, ‘The Unity of a Science’, 291).

\(^{82}\)John Buridan, \textit{QdA}, f. 1\textsuperscript{b}, ‘Utrum subiectum proprium in scientia libri \textit{De anima} sit anima, vel illa terminus ‘anima’, vel corpus animatum, vel quoddam alud, aut nihil’: “In ista questione dimitto opiniones multorum modernorum non volentium in una totalis scientia aggregata ex plunibus diversis conclusionibus et demonstrationibus assignare aliquod unum subiectum primum, sed tot quot sunt conclusiones demonstrare in illa ex diversis terminis constitute, verbi gratia in totali geometria et totali metaphysica.”
**Analytica posteriora** for his proofs,⁸³ but also summarizes his position here:

Nam in primo libro *<i.e. Posteriorum SdB></i*> debet videri quod oportet scientiam habere unitatem ex unitate aliusius unius considerati principaliter in illa scientia ad quod omnia alia prout in illa scientia considerantur habent attributionem. Et hoc vocamus in proposito subiectum proprium et adequatum huius scientie, [et illud dicitur proprium subiectum et adequatum illius scientie] non quia acceptum in qualibet conclusione determinata vel determinabili per illam scientiam, vel in illa scientia, vel etiam qua illa scientia illi subiecto inheret, sed quia in illa scientia nihil consideratur nisi ea ratione qua attribuitur ad ipsum, ut quia est pars, vel passio, vel principium, vel privatio, vel contrarium aliusius passionis, scilicet secundum attributionem propinquam vel remotam.⁸⁴

For in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics* one should see that a science needs to have its unity from the unity of some single thing that is considered principally in that science, and to which all other things

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⁸³The topic is discussed in question 31 of the first book: 'Utrum scientia congregata ex pluribus habitibus conclusionum et processuum sumat unitatem vel distinctionem a subiecto suo'. **John Buridan**, *Quaestiones in duos libros Aristotelis Posteriorum Analyticorum*, edited by H. Hubien, (unpublished), I 31: "Alia conclusio est quod talis scientia congregata, si debet dici una, habet unitatem ex unitate sui primi subiecti, non capiendo 'subiectum' pro illo cui scientia inhaeret, sed capiendo 'subiectum' correlatuum ad passionem uel passiones. Conclusio probatur per locum a divisione: qua non sunt plura considerata in scientia, nisi passiones, aut principia, aut conclusiones, aut media demonstrativa, aut subjecta passionum: ergo ab aliquo istorum oportet scientiam habere unitatem; sed hoc non est ab aliquo praedictorum enumeratorum; igitur relinquitur quod a subiecto. Quod etiam probatur sic: quia rationablie est congregationem capere unam subiectam ab eo quod est primum inter caetera; sed subjectum est huius modi; igitur et caetera. Maior de se nota est. Et minor apparat: quia incomplexa sunt priora complexibus, et inter incomplexa subjectum est prwius passione. Et non est dubium quin in aliqua scientia assignetur communiter primum genus subiectum. Nihil enim consideratur in illa scientia nisi quia pars eius subjecti, uel quia passio illius subjecti aut aliusius partis eius, aut forte passio passionis eius, uel quia oppositum illi subjecto aut alii partici eius uel passioni, aut aliquo tal modo attributo ad illius oppositum. Unde alter non posses scire quare magis ista conclusio 'triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis' sit de geometria quam ista 'contrariorum eadem est disciplina'. The edition made by Hubert Hubien can be found on Peter King's website. http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/resources/buridan/QQ_in_Post_An_txt (accessed 27 May 2008).

⁸⁴*John Buridan*, *QDA*, f. 1¹°; compare *John Buridan*, *QMetaph*, IV.4, ’utrum metaphysice sit assignandum unum subjectum primum et aggregationis multorum processuum et conclusionum debet assignari subjectum sic proprum et adequatum, quod in illa scientia nihil consideretur nisi ea ratione qua habet attributionem ad ipsum, scilicet vel scutum pars eius, vel scutum principium, vel scutum passio eius aut passio aliusius partis eius, vel etiam passio passionis, aut quia est contrarium vel oppositum illi subjecto aut alii partici eius vel passioni, et sic de alius diversis attributionibus." Notice that this description corresponds almost *verbatim* to the one given in the *Analytica Posteriora* cited in the previous footnote.
are attributed in as far as these are studied in that science. And this we call in the present context the proper and adequate subject matter of that science. And this is not called the proper and adequate subject matter of that science because it is part of every thesis that is proved or can be proved by that science, or in that science, or even because that science inheres in that subject, but because in that science nothing is considered except under the aspect under which it is attributed to this very subject, for instance, because it is a part, or an attribute, or a principle, or a privation, or the contrary of some attribute, that is to say according to a near or distant attribution.

Buridan’s central concept for explaining the unity of a science is that of ‘proper subject’ (‘proprium subtectum’), which refers to the highest, most general genus considered in a science. This most general genus is called the proper subject first because it is coextensive with what is studied in a science. Second, it is called the proper subject because it is related to all propositions that are included in that science. More precisely, for any given proposition to form a part of some science, it has to refer to this proper subject, whether as an attribute, or as a principle, or even as a privation. In metaphysics this proper subject is the term ‘being’, in physics it is the term ‘mobile being’, and in the scientia de anima the proper subject is the term ‘soul’.

Similar positions on the unity of a science are upheld by Nicole Oresme and Anonymus Patar, who also explain it in terms of its proper or adequate subject (subtectum proprium vel adequatum). Anonymus Patar gives only a brief description of what a proper subject is, and he does so in terms that are closely related to Buridan’s description: it is what is principally considered in a science, and to which all other things that are considered in that science are

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86JOHN BURIDAN, QMetaph, IV 5, ‘Utrum metaphysice proprium subiectum sit ens’, f 16r.

87JOHN BURIDAN, Physica, f 4r. “Secunda conclusio est quod iste terminus ‘ens mobile’ est subectum proprium in scientia naturali assignandum, quia est terminus communissimus inter considerata in scientia naturali et non transcendens limites scientie naturalis.”
attributed.\footnote{Anonymus Patar, QdA, 168-6. “De illo est ista scientia tamquam de subiecto primo et adaequato de quo principaliter determinatur in ista scientia, et de nullo ali o nisi secundum attributionem ad ipsam.”} For the \textit{scientia de anima}, he says, this is the soul.\footnote{Burdan’s insistence that the proper subject must be a term is lacking in the commentary by Anonymus Patar. His commentary is ambiguous on the question of whether the \textit{subiectum proprum} should be understood as a term, or as that which is signified by the term, or, perhaps, both.} Oresme’s description is slightly different. According to him, in order for something to qualify as the proper subject of a science, it has to have a relation to every principal conclusion of that science. But, strangely, Oresme explains that relation in terms of predication: the proper subject must be a term that is either directly or indirectly predicated of the subject term of all the principal conclusions in that science.\footnote{Nicole Oresme, QdA, I 1, 97-82. “Alto modo \textit{subiectum sDdB} capitur pro aliquo termino qui praedicatur de quocumque subiecto cuiuslibet conclusionis principalis in illa scientia, aut in recto aut in obliquo. Et illud convenienter respondetur quando quaeritur de quo tractatur in illa scientia.”} Unfortunately, Oresme gives no examples of how this is supposed to work.\footnote{Whereas Oresme only claims that it should be possible to use the proper subject as a predicate in all the \textit{principal conclusions} of a science, Buridan defends the position that the proper subject should be related to \textit{everything that is discussed} within a science. But because of Oresme’s brief discussion of the \textit{proprum subiectum} in his commentary on the \textit{De anima}, it is impossible to judge to what extent Buridan’s and Oresme’s positions differ.} Of course, in order to qualify as \textit{subiectum adequatum}, a term must not only be predicable of all the principal conclusions (criterion 1), but it must also be coextensive with the conclusions of that particular science and not be predicable of conclusions of other sciences (criterion 2).\footnote{The second criterion corresponds to what Buridan describes as being the most general genus.} Oresme’s own somewhat artificial example, which nevertheless makes it clear what he means, is a science that studies triangles. Its \textit{subiectum adequatum} is ‘triangle’ and not ‘figure’. For even though ‘figure’ satisfies the first requirement for being the \textit{subiectum adequatum}, because it is predicatable in some manner of all the conclusions of the science of the triangle, it fails to satisfy the second requirement, since it is also predicable of other sciences, for example, the science of squares.

\subsection*{3.2.2 \textbf{The ensouled body} \textit{sub ratione animae} as subject}

Among the defenders of the view that the ensouled body under the aspect of soul is the subject matter of the \textit{scientia de anima} we find Anonymus Vennebusch, Anonymus Bazán and Radulphus Brito. For Anonymus Vennebusch the issue is not very important. He pauses only briefly in his commentary to refute the opinion that it is the ensouled body unqualifiedly that is properly
speaking the subject matter of the \textit{scientia de anima}. As long as that is denied, he considers the options that it is the soul and that it is the ensouled body \textit{qua} ensouled to be more or less equivalent.\footnote{\textsc{Anonymus Vennebusch}, \textit{QdA}, I.3, 98--99\textsuperscript{50--53}: “\textit{Propter quod dicendum quod, licet posit dici de corpore animato, proprie tamen debet dici de anima sive de corpore animato ratione anime, sicut ex opposto scientia de plantis et de animalibus dicuntur principaliter de corpore sensibl}.”} But he hardly seems concerned about the question. Anonymus Bazán and Brito, however, are convinced that the subject must be the ensouled body \textit{qua} ensouled, and not the soul itself.\footnote{\textsc{Anonymus Bazán}, \textit{QdA}, I.3, 393\textsuperscript{29--30}: “\textit{Ad istam quaestionem est dicendum quod corpus animatum sub ratione animae est subiectum huus libri, ita tamen quod anima sit principalis.” \textsc{Radulphus Brito}, \textit{QdA}, I.3\textsuperscript{33--34}: “\textit{Ad illam questionem ego dico quod subiectum in hac scientia est corpus animatum sub ratione anime, vel sub ratione qua animatum}.”} They both use the same formal and persuasive argument to support their position: the relation between the subjects of two sciences should be the same as the relation between these two sciences themselves. Now, since the \textit{scientia de anima} is placed under (\textit{supponere}) the \textit{scientia naturalis philosophiae}, the subject matter of the \textit{scientia de anima} should also be placed under the subject matter of the \textit{scientia naturalis philosophiae}. And since the latter’s subject matter is the mobile body (\textit{corpus mobile}), the subject matter of the \textit{De anima} cannot be only the soul, but should be the animated body.\footnote{\textsc{Anonymus Bazán}, \textit{QdA}, I.3, 393\textsuperscript{21--28}: “\textit{In oppositum est Philosophus et omnes ali qui volunt quod corpus animatum sit subiectum huus libri, et non anima. Cuus ratio est ista: sic se habet scientia ad scientiam, sic se habet subiectum ad subiectum; sed scientia de anima supponitur scientiae naturalis philosophiae, ergo subiectum libri \textit{De anima} supponitur subiectum naturalis philosophiae, sed subiectum naturalis philosophiae est corpus mobile, ergo non solum anima est subiectum libri \textit{De anima}, sed magis corpus animatum.” \textsc{Radulphus Brito}, \textit{QdA}, I.3\textsuperscript{17--22}. Although Anonymus Bazán and Brito agree on the subject matter of the \textit{Physica}, their opinion that it is the \textit{corpus mobile} was not universally accepted. In fact, there was much more discussion going on about the subject matter of the \textit{Physica} than about the subject matter of the \textit{De anima}. See S. \textsc{Donati}, ‘Una questione controversa per i commentatori di Aristotele: il problema del soggetto della fisica’, in: A. \textsc{Zimmermann} (ed.), \textit{Die Kolner Universität im Mittelalter – geistige Wurzeln und soziale Wirklichkeit}, Berlin [etc.]: Walter de Gruyter, 1989, 111--127, for an analysis of these debates concerning the subject matter of the \textit{Physica}.}

But this position raises questions about the operations of the intellect. Are these not proper to the intellective soul? And does not the fact that these operations are discussed extensively by Aristotle in his \textit{De anima} imply, therefore, that the soul itself is the subject matter of this science? Although Anonymus Bazán does not raise these questions himself, it is quite clear that he considers all the properties that are studied in the \textit{scientia de anima} — including understanding — as belonging to the ensouled body as their subject and not to the soul alone.

\footnote{\textit{... quia in hoc libro determinatur de intelligere, gaudere et tristari, quae}}
omnia passiones sunt non animae solum, sed totius coniuncti.  

... for in this book understanding, rejoicing and grieving are discussed, all of which are not properties of the soul alone, but of the whole composite being.

This view that all operations of the soul must be ascribed to the ensouled body is also held by Brito.

In both Brito and Anonymus Bazán, there is a strong connection between their views on the subject matter of the *scientia de anima* and their view that all operations, including understanding, should be ascribed to the ensouled body. This can be seen clearly when they introduce the argument that the subject matter of a science is that of which we investigate the attributes. Both of them argue that all attributes and operations pertain to the ensouled body and that because of this the ensouled body is the proper subject matter. But although both Brito and Anonymus Bazán ascribe all operations of a living being to the soul–body composite, they also emphasize that in the *scientia de anima* we study this composite under the aspect of the soul, which is the principle of the vital operations.

3.2.3 Leaving the subject undecided

Among all the philosophers considered here, Nicole Oresme is unique in that he does not decide on the subject matter of the *scientia de anima*. Although

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96 Anonymus Bazán, *QdA*, I.3, 393–37. This is not a slip of the pen, since it is repeated in the same question (*ad rationes*). "Et cum dicitur quod intelligere et sentire hic declarantur, dico quod istae passiones non sunt passiones solius animae, sed totius coniuncti, et hoc sub ratione animae."

97 Radvulphus Brito, *QdA*, I.35–63: "Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'illud est hic subiectum cuius sunt passiones hic inquisset', concedo. Et cum dicitur quod iste sunt ipsius anime solum, falsum est. Imo sunt totus coniuncti sicut subjecti, et hoc per animam, ita quod anima non intelligit vel sentit, sed totum compositum per animam."

98 Radvulphus Brito, *QdA*, I.35–38. "Illud est hic subiectum cuius sunt operationes et passiones hic inquisset; sed passiones hic inquisset sunt totius coniuncti; unde intelligere est totius coniuncti. Et anima est illud quo principaliter ille operationes insunt toti coniuncto. Et ideo totum ratione anime est subiectum."

99 For Brito this also explains the title of Aristotle's treatise. The fact that the soul is the formal principle under the aspect of which the living being is studied is enough justification for the title *On the Soul*. Radvulphus Brito, *QdA*, I.35–60: "Iste liber intitulatur ab anima, qua anima est formale ratione cuius corpus animatum est hic subiectum."

100 Another exception is found in the commentary by Anonymus van Steenberghen, who simply omits the question of the subject matter of the *scientia de anima*.
he devotes a long question to the topic, and discusses both options ('soul' and 'ensouled body') with their respective merits and problems, he ultimately leaves the matter undecided, a strategy he favors in other difficult places in his commentary as well.\(^1\)

The subject matter of the *scientia de anima* is defined in terms of its proper subject (*propium subiectum*). In his discussion of what a proper subject is, Oresme formulates two criteria.\(^2\) The first criterion is that the term that functions as the proper subject must be predicable of all principal conclusions of that science. The second criterion is that it must be coextensive with the conclusions of that particular science and, therefore, must not be predicable of conclusions of other sciences. In his discussion of the two possible candidates for the proper subject, the soul and the ensouled body, Oresme investigates which of these terms is able to satisfy both criteria. But he does so by using a peculiar strategy. He discusses both possibilities, the soul and the ensouled body, without ever clearly choosing which of these is the real proper subject.

Oresme begins by arguing in favor of 'soul' as the proper subject on the grounds that 'ensouled body' would violate the second criterion. Since the ensouled body is also studied by the sciences called the *Parva naturalia*, the term is not coextensive with the *scientia de anima*. 'Soul', by contrast, not only satisfies the second criterion, but also the first. For in the *scientia de anima* we attempt to determine the attributes of the soul.\(^3\) This seems to settle the question, but Oresme continues by also arguing in favor of 'ensouled body' as subject. This time he states that the operations that are investigated in this science, such as sight and nutrition, belong to the composite rather than to the soul.\(^4\) This implies that taking 'soul' as the proper subject would violate the first criterion, since now it seems that all principal conclusions are about the ensouled body rather than about the soul. With respect to the second

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\(^1\)Especially in questions related to the unicity or plurality of forms. For example in his discussion of the meaning of 'first act' in Aristotle's definition of the soul. *Nicole Oresme*, *QdA*, II.2, 131\(^4\)–\(^8\): "Similiter quod sit primus patet quia: si in animato est solum una forma substantialis, patet statim quod illa est actus primus. Et si sint plures, adhuc anima, quae est ultima generatione, est prima perfectione et dat esse actualiter complete." By showing how his position is compatible with both the unicity and the plurality of substantial form, Oresme apparently thinks he can sidestep the entire debate.

\(^2\)See above, p. 81.

\(^3\)Nicole Oresme*, *QdA*, 98\(^1\)–\(^5\): "Secunda conclusio est quod anima est hic subiectum. Quod patet, quia de passionibus eius determinatur in hoc libro. Et competit animae primo, et mediante ipsa corpori <ipsi corpore ed.> animato. Et est subiectum adequatum, quia non alibi tractatur de ipsa anima. Et ideo convenienter dicitur quod iste liber est de anima."

\(^4\)Nicole Oresme*, *QdA*, 99\(^1\)–\(^7\): "Secunda conclusio est quod anima non est subiectum in hoc libro. Probatur quia: per conclusionem praecedentem proprietates et passiones non sibi competunt; et ideo anima neque videt neque tangit neque nutrit neque generat, sed homo vel animal."
criterion, there is a way, Oresme argues, in which we can maintain that the ensouled body is the proper subject, namely if we make the qualification that in the *scientia de anima* the ensouled body functions as the subject for more general attributes that are predicated of it on account of its having a soul. Other works that deal with living being, by contrast, predicate other, more specific attributes of the body. Oresme seems content to leave it at this, and never chooses between the two alternatives.

3.2.4 Summary

What is already becoming clear from these debates on the subject matter of the *scientia de anima* is that the three positions: soul, ensouled body, or both (depending on the perspective), seem to have relatively few implications for the manner of proceeding in this science. Although the alternatives, especially those of soul and ensouled body, seem to be strongly opposed to one another, there seem to be few if any consequences to opting for the one view or the other. The only possible exception is the connection Brito and Anonymus Bazán make between the proper subject matter, the ensouled body, and the proper subject of thought, also the ensouled body. The methodological discussions of the subject matter seem to be almost isolated from the doctrinal part of the commentaries.

105 Nicolle Oresme, QdA, 9941-46: "Et ideo est tertia conclusio quod corpus animatum est subjectum, dearticulando tamen quod hoc est verum quantum ad passiones communes quas habet ratione animae. Et hoc addito, patet quod est subjectum adaequatum, quia isto modo non determinatur de eo in libro *De animalibus*, immo quantum ad alias passiones et magis speciales."

106 Zupko offers an alternative interpretation of Oresme's position in: Zupko, ‘What is the Science of the Soul?’, 303: "In his own Questions on Aristotle’s *De anima*, he observes that some regard soul as the proper subject matter of psychology, others animate body. Without actually refuting it <i.e. that the soul is the proper subject>, however, Oresme adopts the second view..." The only evidence that Oresme actually adopts the second view seems to be the use of the construction si + the imperfect subjunctive, in the passage where Oresme returns to the first view (the soul as subject): "Ideo, si teneretur prima via, diceretur ad rationes principales." This I do not consider to be conclusive, since none of the usual indicators for an author's position, such as 'dico', 'sciendum', etc., can be found in his discussion of the second view. Be that as it may, the claim that Oresme adopts the second view (animated body), without actually refuting the first view, certainly underestimates how Oresme deals with the first view (the soul). For not only does Oresme not *refute* the first view, but he also *resolves*, one by one, all arguments formulated against this view.

107 The lack of consequences is nicely illustrated by the following passage. Anonymus Van Steenberghen, QdA, I.243-47: "Unde patet quod Aristoteles considerat de anima ut refertur ad materiam sensibilem, et omne tale est physicae considerationes. Propter hoc, si alquis velit dicere quod anima, ut refertur ad materiam sensibilem, sit corpus animatum, non est inconveniens dicere quod ista scientia sit de corpore animato. Tunc enim ista duo sunt idem."
One of the reasons why there were few consequences is that both sides were willing to admit much to the other side. The commentators who claim that the soul is the subject matter of this science certainly do not mean to deny that many, if not most of the operations that are studied in this science are exercised through the ensouled body. They merely intend to claim that these operations belong to the soul principally, since the soul is their formal cause. On the other hand, the commentators who claim that the ensouled body is the subject, certainly do not mean to deny that the soul is the principal formal cause of these operations. On the contrary, this is precisely why they add the clause ‘qua ensouled’ when they argue that the ensouled body should be taken as the subject. These concessions indicate that both positions do not differ fundamentally, indeed they cannot, because all commentators agree on the fact that the scientia de anima is a part of natural philosophy. The natural philosophical context prescribes that every study of the soul has to include the material component of its operations. Only once this agreement that the study of the soul is a natural philosophical study is abandoned, can there really be room for a debate on the subject matter of the scientia de anima.

Even the shift in subject matter from soul to the term ‘soul’ turns out to have few implications, apart from promoting the importance of semantical analysis as a tool in natural philosophy. When Buridan claims that the subject matter of the scientia de anima is the term ‘soul’ and not the soul itself, this reflects a changed conception of what science is primarily about, namely terms. But it reflects little else, and certainly not a changed conception of what we can know about the soul. When it comes to the latter question, even Aquinas and Buridan differ little. Both emphasize that within natural philosophy, the soul is studied in relation to matter. As a consequence, questions about the soul in its separated state after the corruption of the body do not belong to the scientia de anima. There seems to be only one important

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108 Hence, even if Oresme were to unambiguously argue that the living body is the subject matter of the scientia de anima, it would still not necessarily follow that there is a shift towards a more empirical approach. For Oresme’s hesitation on the proper subject matter, see section 3.2.3 For the description of the fourteenth-century De anima tradition as more empirical, see section 1.2.

109 This is one of the main reasons why the Renaissance debates on the method and subject matter of the scientia de anima have much more impact than the later medieval debates. There is no longer a consensus that the study of the intellective soul belongs to natural philosophy. See A. Paladini, La scienza animastica di Marco Antonio Genua, Galatina: Congedo, 2006.

110 For example, when Aquinas explains Aristotle’s remark that the separated soul does not understand, he merely says the following (Thomas Aquinas, Sentae, III.4, 223223–249): “Et ideo hic dicit quod non reminiscimur, sicut post mortem, eorum que in vita scivimus, quia hoc quidem inpassibile, id est 1sta pars anime intellective inpassibilis est, unde ipsa non est subjectum passionum anime, sicut sunt amor et odium et remissentia et huusmodi que cum aliqua passione corporali contingunt; passivus vero intellectus corruptibilis est, id est pars
difference between Buridan and Aquinas on this point, namely on the question of whether the continued existence of the soul after the corruption of the body is, strictly speaking, demonstrable. Aquinas answers affirmatively, whereas Buridan sides with William Ockham in saying that the conclusion, although probable, is not demonstrable.\textsuperscript{111}

Looking at the question of the subject matter of the \textit{scientia de anima} yielded some important and unexpected results. What has become clear is that there was a difference of opinion both on how to ascribe the vital operations to a subject and on what conclusions we can draw from this ascription about the kind of science the \textit{scientia de anima} was. The ascription of the operations studied in the \textit{scientia de anima} to their subject turned out to be controversial even without considering the soul in its disembodied state. On one side of the spectrum, we find commentators who claim that the ensouled body under the aspect of soul is the subject matter of the \textit{scientia de anima}. They choose to ignore Aristotle’s tentative distinction between operations that pertain to the composite as their subject and those that pertain to the (intellective) soul, and claim that all operations — including understanding — belong to the composite. On the other, more popular side, we find commentators who opt for the soul as the subject matter of this science, and who greatly stress Aristotle’s distinction between these operations.

### 3.3 The epistemic status of the \textit{scientia de anima}

The most important of the discussions on method — both from an historical and from a philosophical perspective — turns out to be the discussion on the certainty and the difficulty of the \textit{scientia de anima}.\textsuperscript{112} To demonstrate the

\textit{anime que est subjecta predictis passionibus est corruptibilis: pertinet enim ad partem sensiti-vam (tamen hec pars anime dicitur intellectus, scut et dicitur rationalis, in quantum alius al-quld sine fantasmate, ut infra dictur, et ideo destructo corpore non remanet in anima separata scientia rerum secundum modum quo modo intelligit. Set quomodo tunc intelligat, non est presentis intentionis discutere.”} It is true that Aquinas gives a bit more information about the separated soul in questions 15–21 of his \textit{Quaestiones disputae de anima}. But even though the general topic of this series of disputed questions is the soul, it is not a \textit{natural} philosophical work, nor does it pretend to be. So it cannot serve to demonstrate anything about Aquinas’s views on the limits of the natural philosophical approach.

\textsuperscript{111}For discussion, see section 5.5.1, p. 279.

\textsuperscript{112}Much of this section was originally presented at the conference ‘Soul and Mind: Ancient and Medieval Perspectives on the De anima, 14–17 February, 2007; the 50th anniversary celebration of the founding of the ‘De Wulf-Mansion Centre’ (Leuven) and the ‘Centre De Wulf-Mansion’ (Louvain-la-Neuve)’ and will be published in the proceedings under the title ‘Methodological Considerations in the Later Medieval \textit{Scientia de anima}’ (forthcoming).
importance of this debate, I will describe it from a retrospective angle first, by considering a sixteenth-century commentary on the *De anima*, written by the famous Paduan philosopher Jacopo Zabarella (1533–1589).113 Zabarella’s extensive discussion will provide a first outline of the development of the debate in the later Middle Ages. In contextus 1 of his commentary, Zabarella comments on the opening lines of Aristotle’s *De anima*, which in Moerbeke’s translation used by Zabarella are rendered thus:

Bonorum et honorabilium noticiam opinantes, magis autem alteram altera aut secundum certitudinem aut ex eo quod et meliorum quidem et mirabiliorum est, propter utraque hæc animæ ystonam rationabiliter utique in primis ponemus.114

Holding that knowledge concerns good and honorable things, one type however more than the other either because of certitude or because it concerns better and more marvelous things, on both these accounts we reasonably give this science of the soul the first place.

The point at issue in this passage is that the science of the soul occupies a special place in the hierarchy of the sciences. It has an excellence that puts it above other sciences on account of two properties, namely (1) the nobility of its subject matter and (2) its certainty. That its subject matter is very noble was accepted by all commentators and never occasioned any real debate.115 But that the *scientia de anima* also has a certitude that places it above other sciences is an entirely different matter, which interests Zabarella greatly. Once his commentary reaches the point where he explains what Aristotle means by this certitude, he begins his (long) discussion with the following words:

Hoc igitur coegit interpretes Aristotelis varia excogitare sensa, ita ut vix ullus sit apud Aristotelem locus magis dubius ac controversus.116

This therefore forced the interpreters of Aristotle to contrive various meanings, so that there is hardly any place in Aristotle that is more doubtful and controversial.

113 His commentary on the *De anima* was left unfinished when Zabarella died. It was later edited by his sons and published posthumously in 1605. See H. Mikkeli, *An Aristotelian Response to Renaissance Humanism: Jacopo Zabarella on the Nature of Arts and Sciences*, Helsinki, The Finnish Historical Society, 1992, 19.

114 William of Moerbeke’s translation as found in Thomas Aquinas, *SentDæa*, 3.


CHAPTER 3. Methodological discussions

This is quite a claim; and it is by no means evident why this passage in particular should have given rise to so much controversy. Still, Zabarella devotes a lot of space to his discussion of the controversy and describes and strongly criticizes a number of earlier interpretations, beginning with Walter Burley's.\footnote{117}

According to Zabarella, Burley denies that the excellence of the scientia de anima derives from the fact that it is the most certain science, because mathematics is more certain. Instead he claims that the excellence derives from the combination of the (slightly lesser) certainty and the (very high) nobility of its subject. Aristotle's criteria should not be taken separately, but jointly.\footnote{118} Zabarella, however, finds this interpretation unconvincing, and replies that in that case Aristotle would just have mentioned the nobility of the subject without the certainty, rather than mentioning both attributes. And indeed, it would be peculiar for Aristotle to use a phrase such as 'on both accounts' if he intended to claim that it is only the combination of certainty and nobility that sets the scientia de anima apart from the other sciences.

An alternative interpretation by Thomas Aquinas, whom Zabarella discusses next, is also quickly dismissed. In contrast to Burley, Aquinas claims that the scientia de anima possesses a special certainty, which results from the fact that everyone experiences in himself that he has a soul, and that it is thanks to this soul that he is alive. Its special certainty, therefore, lies in our unique acquaintance with its subject.\footnote{119} Zabarella objects to this view that this certainty regarding our soul is just the trivial certainty (levis certitudo) that the soul exists and not what it is. Moreover, Aquinas's view is simply not true.

\footnote{117}The whole discussion takes up 9 columns in the Venice edition (10-18)
\footnote{118}JACOPO ZABARELLA, De anima, 11. “Burleus concedendum putat scientiam de anima non magnam habere certitudinem et a multis certitudine cognitionis superari, ut a mathematicis omnibus, attamen tantum esse ipsius exessum in subjecti nobilitate, ut absolute illis omnibus praestansior esse dicatur, quia maior est eius exessus ratione nobilitatis subjecti quam defectus ratione certitudinis. Quare putat dictum Aristotelis esse intelligendum in sensu conjuncto, non in disjuncto, ut utrisque simul acceptis conditionibus antecellere alius dicatur, sed non in utralibet separatim.” Zabarella gives an accurate description of Burley's position. Compare WALTER BURLEY, Expositio libri De anima, MS Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 2151 [unpublished transcription by Paul Bakker], f. 1a b. “Intelligendum quod scientia de anima excedit omnes alias sciencias a scientia divina in his duobus conunctum, scilicet in certificazione demonstrationis et nobilitate subjecti. Set non excedit omnes alias in his duobus divisim, nam mathematica excedit illam scienciam in certitudine demonstrationis, set excéditur ab ista nobilitate subjecti. Unde si aliquam scientia alia a mathematica excédit istam in certitudine demonstrationis, illa excéditur ab ista in nobilitate subjecti, et si aliquam excédat istam in nobilitate subjecti, illa excéditur ab ista in certitudine demonstrationis, loquendo de demonstracione quia, que est ab effectu ad causam.”
\footnote{119}JACOPO ZABARELLA, De anima, 11 “Sanctus Thomas inquit scientiam de anima certam hic appellari, quia quilibet in seipso cognoscit se habere animam, et ab ea vivificari. Quare significare videtur nil aliud de anima esse notum, et certum, nisi quod anima existit.”
since there are many things of the existence of which we are much more certain, such as the natural bodies. This last remark may strike us as odd, since we are so used to the certainty of Descartes's cogito. But Zabarella has an interesting argument here: what we experience in ourselves is not the (immaterial) soul itself, but its operations. This implies that all our knowledge of the soul itself is mediated by our knowledge of these operations. Natural (material) bodies, on the other hand, we perceive directly, not just through their operations. And are we not the most certain of those things of which we are directly aware?

The opinions of others (quidam aliis), whose positions remain close to Aquinas's, are dismissed on more formal grounds. These philosophers also tie the certainty of the scientia de anima to the fact that we are aware of the operations of the soul that we experience in ourselves and therefore cannot doubt. But in addition, they emphasize that this certainty is retained in the conclusions we can reach about the soul in this science, because starting from these operations, we can easily reach conclusions (ex quibus facile duci possimus) about the essence of the soul through an a posteriori demonstration. Zabarella rejects this position on the grounds that whatever its premises are, an a posteriori demonstration is always less certain than an a priori demonstration.

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120 For Descartes, our certainty of the existence of natural bodies is ultimately secured by the indubitable certainty of the cogito, sum (combined with a proof of the existence of a non-deceiving God). There can be nothing, therefore, of which we can be more certain than of the existence of our own soul. For a discussion of the cogito argument, see, for example, E. Curley, 'The Cogito and the Foundations of Knowledge', in: S. Gaukroger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Descartes' Meditations, Malden, MA [etc.]: Blackwell, 2006, 30–47.

121 Jacopo Zabarella, De anima, 11: "Praeterea hac ratione scientia de anima non est excel-lens, cum ab omnibus fere alius superetur. Magis enim sensilla sunt omnia naturalia corpora, et eorum plurima accidentia, quam anima, quae non per se, sed per suas operationes sentitur. Quare omittis etiam alius scientius, excellitur scientia de anima ab omnibus ferme alius partibus philosophiae naturalis."

122 These quidam aliis are not identified in the edition.

123 Jacopo Zabarella, De anima, 11–12: "Alii quidam posteriores parum diversam a Sancti Thomae opinionem protulere, dicentes scientiam de anima excellere certitudine demonstrationum non quidem a priori et per causam, quoniam anima a priori declarari non potest, sed a posteriori et per effectus. Experimur enim in nobis ipsis operationes animae, ex quibus facile duci possimus ad essentiam animae cognoscendum, quare haec scientia nititur principii certissimis quoad nos et familiarsimis nobis." For this use of the notion 'a-posteriori demonstration', see p. 103. It is not to be confused with how Albert the Great, in line with Avicenna, speaks about a study of the soul a priori and a posteriori. For Albert an a-priori study of the soul means to study the soul as it is in itself, apart from its relations to the body, whereas an a posteriori study of the soul includes its relations to the body. See Park, 'Albert's Influence', 504.
It will not be necessary to describe the remainder of Zabarella's critique of his predecessors; instead it should suffice to give a list of the other philosophers he mentions. In the order in which Zabarella discusses them, they are: John Philoponus, Ludovicus Buccaferreus, Simplicius, Theonstius and Albert the Great. Each of these philosophers offered a different interpretation of the passage from the De anima cited above. So even if Zabarella's characterization of the debate — as concerned with one of the most controversial passages in Aristotle — is somewhat exaggerated, there is no denying that Aristotle's remarks on this topic were very diversely interpreted and that ancient, medieval and Renaissance commentators had great difficulty explaining the alleged certainty of the scientia de anima.

Much more important in this context is Zabarella's own solution. Not so much because he gives a new interpretation of the meaning of this certainty, but because he places the entire debate in a new, broader context. Perhaps surprisingly, Zabarella writes that Aristotle never meant to claim that the scientia de anima is the most certain science, and the fact that people were unaware of his real intention clouded most of the earlier discussions. In fact, according to Zabarella, the entire debate was occasioned by a linguistic confusion. The word certitudo was simply a wrong translation of the original Greek term ακρίβεια. A much better translation would have been exquisitudo, says Zabarella, since 'akribes' means 'exquisitum exactum'. And Zabarella is right; Moerbeke's translation as certitudo is misleading, to say the least. This insight ultimately leads Zabarella to conclude that Aristotle must have meant that the scientia de anima is not the most excellent science in general, but only within the libri de animalibus. For only within this context does it
satisfy both the criterion that it is concerned with the noblest subject matter
and the criterion that it is the most exact, or precise, science. As Zabarella
rightly points out, one of the main ways in which exactness is described in
the Analytica posteriora is in terms of being dependent on the fewest, highest
principles.\textsuperscript{127} Since the subject matter of the \textit{De anima} is the soul, and since
the soul is the ultimate principle of living beings, the \textit{scientia de anima} is the
most exact of all sciences that deal with living beings. All these other sciences
need to posit additional principles.

Irrespective of whether Zabarella's explanation of Aristotle's remark is
completely correct, his comments clearly testify to the great variety of inter­
pretations of the alleged certainty of the \textit{scientia de anima} and demonstrate
convincingly that the debate was occasioned by an imprecise translation of \textit{ακρίβεια}.\textsuperscript{128} This linguistic difficulty disappeared once philosophers also had
access to the Greek text or to the new translation of the \textit{De anima} by John
Argyropoulos, who translated \textit{ακρίβεια} by \textit{exactior}.\textsuperscript{129} But even though the
debate was occasioned by a wrong translation, it is concerned with important
philosophical issues. Otherwise, the passage on exactness would never have
become, in Zabarella's own words, the most controversial passage in the en-

\textit{hos enim excellet, et inter eos omnes in medio locata est tanquam rex et princeps a quo caeteri
pendent, cum declarat causam primam et summam omnium quae sunt in animalibus et in
plantis} \textsuperscript{\textit{a}}

\textsuperscript{127}Aristotle, \textit{Analytica posteriora}, I, 87a30–35. "One science is more \textit{precise} than another
and prior to it both if it is at the same time of the fact and of the reason why and not of the fact
separately from the science of the reason why; and if it is not said of an underlying subject and
the other is said of an underlying subject (e.g. arithmetic and harmonics); and if it depends on
fewer items and the other on an additional posit (e.g. arithmetic and geometry)"

\textsuperscript{128}For Zabarella's view of the status of the \textit{scientia de anima}, see P. Lautner, 'Status and
Method of Psychology according to the Late Neoplatonists and their Influence during the Six­
tenth Century', in: C. Leijenhorst, C. Luthy and J. M. M. H. Thijssen (eds.), \textit{The Dynamics
of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century}, Leiden [etc.]: Brill,

\textsuperscript{129}John Argyropoulos's translation of the \textit{De anima} gives the following rendition: "Cum
omnem scientiam rem esse bonam arbitremur ac honorabilem, et aliam alia magis ex eo talem
esse putemus, quia vel exactior est, vel rerum est earum quae magis praestabiles magisque
sunt admirabiles, scientiam animae nimirum ob haec utraque non inuria ponendum in primus
esse censemus." (in \textit{Aristotelis opera. Ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri edidit Academia Regia
translation was completed about 1460, revised about 1485 and first published in 1496. For
the details see F. E. Cranz, 'The Renaissance Reading of the \textit{De anima}', in: \textit{Platon et Aristote
new translations did not end the debates immediately, far from it. Moerbeke's translation of
the \textit{De anima} remained popular among the commentators for a long time, and was often used
together with the new translation by Argyropoulos. See K. Park and E. Kessler, 'The Con­
cept of Psychology', in: \textit{The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy}, Cambridge [etc.]:
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tire works of Aristotle. What these issues are, can be seen by looking more closely at the medieval commentaries.

As soon as we look at the actual context in which the debate took place in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, it becomes clear that it was not occasioned solely by the passage on certainty, but rather by the combination of this passage with a second passage found a few lines further, in which Aristotle claims that the scientia de anima is concerned with the most difficult of subjects:

Bonorum et honorabilium noticiam opinantes, magis autem alteram altera aut secundum certitudinem aut ex eo quod meliorum quidem et mirabiliorum est, propter utraque hce anime ystoriam rationabiliter utique in primit ponemus... Omnino autem et penitus difficillimorum est accipere aliquam fidem de ipsa.¹³¹

Holding that knowledge concerns good and honorable things, one type however more than the other either because of certitude or because it concerns better and more marvelous things, on both these accounts we reasonably give this science of the soul the first place... Gaining some knowledge about it, however, is altogether one of the most difficult things.

None of the authors I will discuss was aware that Aristotle was talking about exactness instead of certitude in this passage. Moerbeke's misleading translation resulted in a tension — which did not take long to be noticed — between certitude and difficulty. Although there was some discussion on the meaning of the certainty of the De anima in isolation from its difficulty, this tension is the philosophical origin of most of the debate.

3.3.1 Unproblematic beginnings: Thomas Aquinas

Aquinas still discusses Aristotle’s remark on the excellence of the scientia de anima on account of its certainty separately from the remark on its difficulty. He interprets the remark on the difficulty of the scientia de anima as referring to another part of the first section of the De anima, where Aristotle discusses the following two questions: how can we reach a definition of the soul, and what can our knowledge of the accidents of the soul contribute to our attempt to obtain such a definition?¹³² The manner in which Aquinas relates the passage on the difficulty of the scientia de anima to the definitional issue is by

¹³⁰ Zabarella obviously also has a hidden agenda here. Rhetorically, the extensive discussion serves to show what a good scholar Zabarella is in contrast to his predecessors.
¹³¹ William of Moerbeke's translation as found in Thomas Aquinas, SentdeA, 3.
¹³² Aristotle, De anima, 1.1, 402b12-22: "Again, which ought we to investigate first, these parts or their functions, mind or thinking, the faculty or the act of sensation, and so on? If
explaining that there is a difficulty not only in understanding and defining the
substance of the soul, but also in understanding and defining its accidents (ac-
cidenta seu proprias passiones). As a result, irrespectively of whether we begin
with the study of the accidents or of the substance it seems to be difficult to
obtain knowledge of the soul. 133

Aquinas argues that a perfect definition of a thing will reveal not only its
essential principles, but also its accidents. But at the same time, knowledge
of the accidents helps guide us towards knowledge of the essence. He has the
accidenta propria in mind, that is, those accidents that flow necessarily from
the essence of a thing and therefore give us an indication of the sort of essence
we are dealing with. 134 One of the defining characteristics of propria is that
they are not included in the definition of an essence, but at the same time they
always and necessarily accompany the essence. An example in mathematics
would be the property of a triangle that the sum of its angles is equal to the
sum of two right angles. In natural philosophy one of the most common
examples is the property of human beings of being able to laugh. But most

133 THOMAS AQUINAS, SentideA, 7260-268, “Et ideo difficile est, quia oportet nos cognoscere
quod quid est anime ad cognoscendum facilius accidencia anime, sicut in mathematicis valde
utile est preaccipere quod quid erat esse recti et curvi et plani ad cognoscendum quot rectis
trianguli anguli sint equales. E converso etiam accidencia si preaccipiantur, multum conferunt
ad cognoscendum quod quid erat esse, ut dictum est.”

134 A clear description of what accidentia propria are is given in: THOMAS AQUINAS, Quaes-
tiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis, edited by B.-C. Bazán, Roma: Commissio Leonina [etc.
], 1996 (Opera omnia, 24:1), q. 12, ad 7, 111265-277. “Ad septimum dicendum quod tria sunt genera ac-
cidentium. quedam enim causatur ex principis speciei, et dicuntur propria, sicut risibile homo-
ni; quedam vero causantur ex principiis individui, et hoc duplicer quia: vel habent causam
permanentem in subiecto, et hec sunt accidentia in separabilia, sicut masculinum et femininum
et alia huissmodi; quedam vero habent causam non semper permanentem in subiecto, et hec
sunt accidentia separabilia, ut sedere et ambulare. Est autem commune omní accidenti quod
non sit de essentia rei; et ita non cadit in definitione rei.”
importantly, Aquinas also considers the various potencies — or powers — of the soul, such as sight and hearing, to be propria.¹³⁵

Because our understanding of an essence, on the one hand, and of its proper accidents, on the other, are mutually dependent, there is a difficulty inherent in the process of defining any essence. As long as we do not clearly know what the proper accidents of the soul are, we have a hard time understanding its essence. And as long we do not grasp the essence of the soul, we have a hard time understanding its accidents. Now these are certainly sensible remarks. But they do not seem to apply solely to the definitions we search for in the scientia de anima. And indeed, Aquinas explicitly acknowledges this at the beginning of his discussion.¹³⁶ The scientia de anima is a difficult science indeed, but in this respect no more difficult than most of the other sciences; at least not in any strong sense of the word. And even this difficulty that the scientia de anima shares with many other sciences should not be overstated.

What makes the interdependence of our knowledge of an essence and our knowledge of its accidents manageable is that one thing is clear from the very outset, namely that there is a difference between the living and the non-living. And 'soul' is introduced as the name for the principle by which the living and non-living differ. Although the nature of the soul may be unknown and difficult to grasp, we already know that there are certain operations that can only pertain to living things.¹³⁷

¹³⁵THOMAS AQUINAS, STh, I, q. 77, a. 1, 237 (ad rationes): “Si vero accipiatur accidens secundum quod ponitur unum quinque universalium, sic aliquid est medium inter substantiam et accidens. Quia ad substantiam pertinet quidquid est essentiale rei: non autem quidquid est extra essentiam, potest sic dici accidens, sed solum id quod non causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei. Proprium enim non est de essentia rei, sed ex principiis essentialibus speciei causatur: unde medium est inter essentiam et accidens sic dictum. Et hoc modo potentiae animae possunt dici mediae inter substantiam et accidens, quasi proprietates animae naturales.”

¹³⁶THOMAS AQUINAS, QdSpir, q. II, ad 11, 103: “Dicit ergo quod, quamvis sit utilis scientia de anima, tarnen difficile est scire de anima quid est; et hec difficultas est in qualibet re, cum sit una communis questio multis aliis, circa substantiam eorum, et circa quid est.” Robert Pasnau also seems to interpret the passage in question as expressing a difficulty in knowing any essence; PASNAU, Thomas Aquinas, 165.

¹³⁷THOMAS AQUINAS, SentDeA, I, c. 1, 6:152–156: “Dicit ergo quod, quamvis sit utilis scientia de anima, tamen difficile est scire de anima quid est; et hec difficulatas est in qualibet re, cum sit una communis questio multis aliis, circa substantiam eorum, et circa quid est.” Robert Pasnau also seems to interpret the passage in question as expressing a difficulty in knowing any essence; PASNAU, Thomas Aquinas, 165.

Aquinas mentions sensation and movement, but omits the vegetative functions. THOMAS AQUINAS, SentDeA, I, c. 3, 14:35–37: “Nam animata videntur differre ab inanimatis maxime, et motu, ut scilicet moveant se ipsa, et sensu, seu cognitione.” Similarly, he only mentions intellecction and movement in THOMAS AQUINAS, STh, I, 75, a. 1, 194: “Respondeo dicendum quod ad inquirendum de natura animae, oportet praesupponere quod anima dicitur esse primum principium vitae in his quae apud nos vivunt. Animata enim viventia dicimus, res vero inanimatas vita carentes. Vita autem maxime manifestatur duplici opere, scilicet cognitionis et motus.” Doig makes some interesting comments on Aquinas’s lack of focus on the vegetative function in an article on the difference between Aquinas’s and Averroes’s definition of the soul. According to him Aquinas and Averroes have a different conception of the ratio vitae. For
Aquinas also mentions a second difficulty, which is related specifically to the *scientia de anima*. This time he connects Aristotle's remark on difficulty to the passage in which Aristotle states that all attributes of the soul seem to belong to the soul–body composite. Even understanding seems to belong to the composite rather than to the soul, because understanding is dependent on the presence of phantasms. Aquinas argues that Aristotle will resolve this difficulty in book III, but he already presents the most important element of the solution here. Understanding, Aquinas argues, has the soul as its proper subject, but it needs the body, i.e., the phantasms, as its object. This is why understanding seems, at first sight, to belong to the composite, whereas in truth its proper subject is the soul.

Given that the particular difficulty of the *scientia de anima* appears to be limited to the fact that on first sight all operations seem to belong to the composite, whereas this turns out to be untrue, what does Aquinas have to say about its certainty? On this topic he is very clear:

\[
\text{Hec autem scientia, scilicet de anima, utrumque habet \textit{i.e. nobilitatem et certitudinem SdB}, quia et certa est (hoc enim quilibet experitur in}
\]

Averroes it is to have the principle of plant life, whereas for Aquinas it is to have the principle of motion in a broad sense. Averroes's *ratio vitae* leads him to conclude that the term 'soul' is already equivocal when applied to the vegetative and sensitive functions, since the vegetative functions are always in act, that is, are always in second perfection. Although Aquinas agrees that the vegetative functions are always actually exercised, his focus on life as motion in a broad sense enables him to treat the definition as univocal. See J. C. Doig, 'Towards Understanding Aquinas' *Commentarium in de anima*: A Comparative Study of Aquinas and Averroes on the Definition of Soul (De Anima B, 1–2)', Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica, 66 (1974), 436–474, especially 455–457.

138 I would like to thank Jack Zupko for pointing this out to me.


140 THOMAS AQUINAS, *SentdeA*, 9–1058–69: "Aliqua autem operatio est que indiget corpore, non tamen sicut instrumento, set sicut objecto tantum. Intelligere enim non est per organum corporalæ, set indiget objecto corporali: sicut enim Philosophus dicet in III huus, hoc modo fantasmata se habent ad intellectum sicut colores ad visum. Colores autem se habent ad visum sicut objecta, fantasmata ergo se habent ad intellectum sicut objecta. Cum ergo fantasmata non sint sine corpore, inde est quod intelligere non est sine corpore, ita tamen quod sit sicut objectum, non sicut instrumentum." The passage continues with the claim that once we know that understanding inheres in the soul and not in the soul–body composite, we can conclude that the human soul is subsistent on account of its having this proper operation. Hence it not corrupt when the body corrupts, but is instead immortal (p. 1069–81).
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This science however, i.e., the science of the soul, has both (that is, nobility and certitude SdB), because it is both certain (for everyone experiences in himself that he has a soul and that the soul gives life) and because it is of the most noble things (for the soul is the noblest amongst the inferior creatures).

The scientia de anima is the most excellent of the natural philosophical disciplines not only because it studies the noblest thing, the soul, but also because it has a special kind of certainty. This certainty is the result of our intimate familiarity with its subject matter. We all experience that we have a soul, and know that it is this soul that makes us alive. Aquinas is not making the rather implausible claim here that our everyday inner experience gives us a scientific grasp of the soul that would enable us to define it as the first act of the body and enumerate its essential operations. His claim is much more modest. We have a pre-scientific grasp of the difference between living and non-living things, and we classify ourselves among the living things. As long as we understand the soul to be the principle of life, that by which the living differs from the non-living, the claim that everyone experiences that he has a soul is perfectly acceptable. Aquinas gives no indication whatsoever that he might be concerned about a possible incompatibility between the certainty and the difficulty of this science.

But although a pre-scientific grasp of the difference between living and non-living things can hardly be denied, it is debatable whether such a grasp of


142 The brevity of Aquinas’s remarks here is surprising. In his later commentary on the Metaphysica, composed c. 1271-1273, he gives a more elaborate analysis of the meaning of the term ‘certainty’ as applied to the science of metaphysics (THOMAS AQUINAS, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, edited by M.-R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi, Taurini [etc.], Marietti, 1950, I, lect 2, p. 14). There, he understands the certainty of metaphysics as stemming from the fact that it depends on the smallest amount of principles (ad sui subiecti considerationem pauciora actu consideranda requiruntur), which is indeed what Aristotle claimed; ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, I, 982a24-29. “And these things, the most universal, are on the whole the hardest for men to know; for they are furthest from the senses. And the most exact of the sciences are those which deal most with first principles; for those which involve fewer principles are more exact than those which involve additional principles, e.g. arithmetic than geometry.” Having few principles is one of the distinguishing marks of a certain (or better exact) science that Aristotle listed in his most extensive treatment of ακρίβεια in ARISTOTLE, Analytica posteriora, I, 87a30-37
our being alive and having a soul would help make the *scientia de anima* any more certain. For the only thing we are certain of in the sense used by Aquinas is the mere existence of soul. There is no reason so suppose that this certainty would extend to any of the scientific conclusions that are drawn in *De anima*. Strangely, Aquinas seems to fail to notice this in his commentary. And even in other texts, where he is much more precise in distinguishing scientific knowledge of the soul from our everyday experience that we are alive, he never — as far I know — connects Aristotle’s remarks on certainty and difficulty.

3.3.2 Certitude and nobility combined: Anonymus Van Steenberghen and Walter Burley

Another way of looking at the certainty of the *scientia de anima* takes its cue from Averroes’s commentary on the *De anima*. According to Averroes, at least as he was interpreted in the Middle Ages, it is the combination of an honorable object and the certainty of its conclusions that makes this science the most excellent of the natural sciences. Zabarella ascribed this view to Walter Burley, but it is also found in the Anonymus Van Steenberghen:

143 THOMAS AQUINAS, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, Roma: Commissio Leonina [etc.], 1972–1976 (Opera omnia, 22:1–3), 10.8, 321.107–108. “Ilia igitur cognitio quae communter de omni anima habetur, est qua cognoscitur animae natura; cognitio vero quam quis habet de anima quantum ad id quod est suum proprium, est cognitio de anima secundum quod esse habet in tali individuo. Unde per hanc cognitionem cognoscitur an est anima, sicut cum aliquis percipit se animam habere, per aliam vero cognitionem situr quod est anima et quae sunt per se accidentia eis.” See also THOMAS AQUINAS, StTh, I, 87, a. 1, 356: “Nam ad primam cognitionem de mente habendam, sufficit ipsa mentis praesentia, quae est principium actus ex quo mens percipit seipsam. Et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per suam praesentiam. Sed ad secundam cognitionem de mente habendam, non sufficit eum praesentiam, sed requiritur diligens et subtilis inquisitio. Unde et multi naturam animae ignorant, et multi etiam circa naturam animae erraverunt.” Interestingly, Cajetan, whose commentary is included in the edition of the Summa, does make the connection with Aristotle’s remark on the difficulty of the *scientia de anima* when he comments on this passage. “Tertio, pro declaratione quoque doctrinae Augustini, addit differentias inter has cognitiones, ad propositum quod ad primam sufficit anima praeens suo actus; ad secundam exiguitur valde diligens inquisitio, quoniam, ut in I De anima dicitur, omnino et penitus difficillimorum est aliquam de ea fidein accipere” (p. 359).

144 AVERROES, Commentarium magnum in DA, I, 1, 417–18. “Et quasi dicit: et qua nos opinamus quod cognitio est de rebus honorabilibus et delectabilibus, et quod superant se adinvocem aut propter confirmationem demonstrationis aut propter nobilitatem subjecti aut propter utrunque, sicut invenimus in scientia de anima, scilicet quia superat in his duobus alia scientiarum, preter scientiam Divinam, necessarium est opinari quod scientia anime antecedit alias scientias.” Although strictly speaking Averroes does not claim that the *scientia de anima* is more honorable only when the nobility of the subject and the certainty of its demonstrations are combined, the commentators probably got this impression because a few lines earlier Averroes compares geometry and astrology, claiming that each exceeds the other in terms of its certainty or the nobility of its subject respectively.
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSIONS

Nunc autem scientia habitus est, et ideo altero istorum modorum est nobilior una scienta alia, aut propter objectum, aut propter modum demonstrandi. Propter autem haec duo coniuncta, scientia de anima excellit omnes alias, praeter divinam.¹⁴⁵

Now, however, science is a disposition, and therefore one science will be nobler than another in one of these two manners: either on account of their object, or on account of their way of demonstrating. On account of both of these conjoined, however, the science of the soul excels all others besides the divine science.

This interpretation allows for an easy reply to most of the objections that refer to the excellence of one of the other sciences. For example, Anonymus Van Steenberghen grants that if we only consider the certainty of a science, then mathematics will be more excellent. And if we only look at the nobility of the subject matter, then perhaps ethics (morals) will be more excellent. But if we take the two characteristics jointly, then the scientia de anima is more excellent than both of these sciences. There is, however, one science that is even more excellent — as all commentators agree —, and this is the divine science. It needs no arguing that the latter science considers the noblest subject. But it also possesses the highest certainty, given that its demonstrations proceed from the first causes.¹⁴⁶ The interpretation of certitudo that Anonymus Van Steenberghen gives here agrees with Aristotle’s general explanation of ἀκρίβεια in the Analytica posteriora.¹⁴⁷ The problem with his strategy, however, as Zabarella also indicated, is that it fails to explain the exact formulation of the relevant passage in the De anima, that ‘on both accounts we should naturally be led to place in the front rank the study of the soul’ (402a4–5). Presumably, if Aristotle had meant that the nobility of the subject and the certainty of the demonstrations must be taken jointly, he would have phrased the passage differently.

Just like Aquinas, Anonymus Van Steenberghen makes no connection between the certainty and difficulty of the scientia de anima. He treats the difficulty in a separate question, in which he takes care to exclude one possible

¹⁴⁵ Anonymous Van Steenberghen, I 5, 150²²
¹⁴⁶ See Burley, see above, p 90, footnote 118
¹⁴⁷ An similar interpretation can also be found in NICOLE ORESME, Expositio in Aristotelis De anima, in B Patar, Expositio et quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima, etudes doctrinales en collaboration avec C Gagnon, Louvain [etc ] Peeters, 1995, 636–40. “Iterum sciemund quod forte aliqua pars scientiae naturalis est certior, sicut forte quae traditur in scientia physicorum, sed tamen nulla simul cum tanta certitudine habet subjectum ita nobile vel est de re ita nobili, et ideo praecedet alias propter utraque simul et non divisim” But in his Quaestiones on the De anima Oresme gives a completely different interpretation of the certainty See below, p. 114
¹⁴⁸ ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, QdA, I 5, 151²⁷–²⁸ “Sed scientia divina habet subjectum nobilissimum; item habet certissimas demonstrationes, quia procedit per causas primas.”
¹⁴⁹ ARISTOTLE, Analytica posteriora, I, 87a30–37

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source of difficulty. Some things are difficult to know on their own account, but the soul, given that it is a form and an \textit{ens per se}, is not one of them. Instead, the difficulty of this science is caused by the fact that the soul is the principle of many operations. And since these diverse operations are the starting point for our knowledge of the soul, it is very difficult to obtain an accurate knowledge of the soul.\footnote{ANONYMUS VAN STEELENBERGHEN, \textit{QdA}, I.7, 156\textsuperscript{34-38}: “Ex parte tamen nostra est difficil-\textit{tas, quia in cognitionem substantiae animae non devenimus nisi ex cognitione operationum et passionum; anima autem multarum operationum est principium, propter quam diversi-\textit{tatem accipit difficul\textit{tas.”} \ }} This explains why Aristotle’s predecessors were unable to obtain accurate knowledge of the soul: they neglected some of its operations in favor of others.

In contrast to Anonymus van Steenberghen, Burley does make the connection between the certitude of the \textit{scientia de anima} and its difficulty.\footnote{WALTER BURLEY, \textit{ExpdA} [unpublished transcription by Paul Bakker], 1\textsuperscript{9a-b}: “Dubitatur adhuc quia Philosophus dicit postea quod difficile est habere scienciam de anima — dicit enim quod penitus difficilibimorum est accipere aliquam fidem de ipsa anima; quod non esset, si hic essent aliqua certe demonstraciones. Dicendum quod duplex est modus procedendi in hac sciencia. Nam aliquando proceditur ab effectu ad causam, ut ab operationibus anime ad ipsam animam, et aliquando e converso a causa ad effectum. Quantum ad primum processum est ipsa sciencia facilis et certa, quia operationes anime sunt certe et manifeste. Set quantum ad secundum processum, in quo proceditur a causa ad effectum, est illa sciencia difficilis. Illa ergo sciencia est uno modo facilis et alio modo difficilis. Vel aliter dicitur quod hic inquiritur de substantia anime et eciam de operationibus anime. Quantum ad consideracionem de operationibus anime est ista sciencia facilis; set quantum ad consideracionem <de substantia> anime est difficilis.  }

The tension between having demonstrations that are certain and being concerned with very difficult things did not escape him. To solve this tension, he distinguished between two manners of proceeding in the science of the soul. In the first manner, we begin with the manifest operations of the soul and proceed from there to its essence. This manner is easy, because the soul’s operations are certain and manifest. In the second manner, we begin with the soul itself and proceed from there to its operations. This manner is difficult, because it is difficult to know the essence of the soul. So in one way the \textit{scientia de anima} is easy, in another it is difficult.\footnote{Interestingly, Anonymus Van Steenberghen also introduces the argument that the attributes (\textit{passiones}) and operations (\textit{operationes}) of the soul are manifest (\textit{manifestae}). His examples are sensing and understanding. But in contrast to Burley, he uses the argument to \textit{affirm} the difficulty of the \textit{scientia de anima}. For in his reply, he states that manifest operations only make their substance easy to understand when there are only few of these operations. But in the case of the soul, there are so many different operations that this will not apply. No matter how manifest these operations are, the sheer number of them makes it difficult to obtain knowledge about the soul. ANONYMUS VAN STEELENBERGHEN, \textit{QdA}, I.7, 156\textsuperscript{49-53}: “Ad aliud di-\textit{cendum est ut sic et ut non: illud enim ciusus operationes sunt manifestae, quia paucae sunt, illud non difficile est cognoscere: unde astrologia certior est quam geometria, ut dicitur primo  }
3.3.3 Increasing difficulties: Anonymus Bazán, Radulphus Brito and John of Jandun

The fact that Aquinas and Anonymus Van Steenberghen did not connect the certainty of the *De anima* with its difficulty makes them the exception in this narrative, as virtually all later authors tend to connect these two predicates. When Anonymus Bazán discusses the question ‘Whether the science of the soul concerns a category of difficult things’, he includes the argument that a science that proceeds by using a method that is certain cannot be difficult. Also, the argument that Aquinas introduced to support the certainty of this science, namely that it concerns things that we experience in ourselves, is now used to deny its difficulty. By doing so, the discussions about certainty and about difficulty become intertwined. The introduction of these arguments — also found in the later commentary by Walter Burley — have far-reaching consequences, as will become clear in the remainder of this chapter.

In his determination of the question Anonymous Bazán interprets the difficulty in two ways. First he relates the difficulty to the soul insofar as it is a possible object of science (*sit intellegibile*); as such, the difficulty points to the fact that the soul is a being in potency, whereas it must be a being in act in order to be understood. Second he relates the difficulty to the soul insofar as it is a knowing subject; as such, the difficulty points to the fact that all our cognition depends on our external senses and our imagination. Given that our intellective soul can be an object of neither sense nor of imagination, our intellective soul can be an object of neither sense nor of imagination,
the difficulty in understanding it is clear. This much has already been seen in the discussions about the possibility of a natural philosophical science of the soul. But Anonymus Bazán’s explanation of this second route also introduces a new theme, namely a twofold manner in which we can acquire knowledge. The explanation is similar to that of Walter Burley (given above).

We can either acquire knowledge of the soul in an a-priori or in an a-posteriori manner. The a-priori manner takes the soul itself as its starting point, and from there we begin to inquire into its potencies. Having inquired into its potencies we can subsequently proceed to inquire into the soul’s operations, and, finally, from these operations we begin to inquire into the objects of these operations. This manner of acquiring knowledge is called ‘difficult’. The alternative, a-posteriori manner of acquiring knowledge follows the exact opposite direction. Beginning with the objects to which the operations of the soul are directed, we then take a step back to consider these operations of the soul themselves, then the powers that are presupposed by the existence of these operations, until finally we are in a position to make some claims about the essence of the soul as the ultimate source of these powers and operations. This second manner is considered not difficult. At first sight this distinction between two methods might look confused. Should not the (deductive) method, where we start from the essence, be called ‘more certain’, and the (inductive) method, where we start from the operations, be called ‘less certain’? Because Anonymus Bazán does not elaborate on the details of these two methods, we can only try to reconstruct the argument. What he calls the certain method is the normal method of proceeding in natural philosophy, where we start with what is best known to us, namely the perceptible operations of the soul and the objects to which they are directed, and proceed from there to what is less known to us (the essence of the soul). This method gives as much certainty as is possible in natural philosophy. The other method, where we start from the essence and reason forwards to its operations, would

Estimation’. In addition, Klubertanz’s study on the vis cognitiva is still valuable. G. P. KLUBERTANZ, The Discursive Power Sources and Doctrine of the Vis Cogitativa According to St Thomas Aquinas, St. Louis, Missouri: The Modern Schoolman, 1952. C. Di MARTINO, Ratio particula thereof arabo-latine de la psychologie d'Aristote, Paris: Vrin, 2008 is the most recent comprehensive study of this topic.

Anonymus Bazán, QdA, 3989-49: “Ad evidentiam huius nota quod duplex est modus acquirendi scientiam. Unus a priore, ut quando volumus incipere ab anima inquirere potentias, et de potentiis operationes, et de operationibus objecta. Et ita inquirimus animae scientiam a priore, quae est de illis quae sunt experimenta in nobis. Et iste modus inquirendi scientiam animae satis non est facilis. Alius est inquirendi scientiam a posteriori, ut quando inquirendo scientiam de anima incipimus ab objectis, eundo ad operationes, et de operationibus ad potentias, et de potentius ad ipsam animam. Et iste modus procedendi sive inquirendi est a posteriori, et non est difficult.”
only produce more certain results if the essence were better known to us than these operations, to begin with, but this is not the case.\textsuperscript{156}

Given this twofold manner of proceeding, Anonymus Bazán replies to the arguments against his position as follows: that a science that has a certain method cannot be difficult is certainly true, but only one of the methods used in the \textit{scientia de anima} is certain. Therefore, when Aristotle referred to the certainty of this science, he was only speaking about the a-posteriori manner of proceeding. And when he referred to its difficulty, Aristotle was only talking about the a-priori manner of proceeding. This resolves the tension between the passage on certainty and the passage of difficulty. It is even possible to appeal to Aristotle’s remark on the difference between going from accident to substance and \textit{vice versa} to support this solution.\textsuperscript{157}

To another argument that claims that each science that concerns the things we experience in ourselves is certain, the author replies by saying that this is only true when these experiences are proportionate to our cognitive capacities, which they are in the case of the vegetative and sensitive operations of the soul, because we experience these through our senses (\textit{sensibiltet}).\textsuperscript{158} But the operations of the intellective soul, on the other hand, we only experience in an intellectual manner (\textit{intelligibiltet}), in which the connection with our senses is lacking. Here, we see for the first time in the discussions on the certainty of the \textit{scientia de anima} a distinction between our knowledge of our intellectual operations and our knowledge of the operations of our vegetative and sensitive souls. The discussion is now linked to that of the possibility of a science of the soul in which the imperceptibility of the intellect’s operations has always played an important role.\textsuperscript{159}

Beginning with the commentary by Anonymus Bazán, the question on the difficulty of the \textit{scientia de anima} begins to change its character. The purpose of this question now shifts from explaining a rather incidental comment by Aristotle to explaining how anything can be certain and difficult at the same time. This change can clearly be seen in Radulphus Brito’s commentary on

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{156}This reconstruction can be supported by looking at Walter Burley’s comments on the difficulty of the \textit{scientia de anima}, where he applies the same distinction as Anonymus Bazán. It is clear that Burley thinks that the certainty stems from the manifestness of the starting point of the method which proceeds from the perceptible operations of the soul and reasons toward to soul itself. See p. 101, footnote 149.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{157}Aristotle, \textit{De anima}, I 1, 402b17-22: “It seems not only useful for the discovery of the causes of the incidental properties of substances to be acquainted with the essential nature of those substances . but also conversely, for the knowledge of the essential nature of a substance is largely promoted by an acquaintance with its properties ”}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{158}Recall the adage that all our cognition has its ultimate origin in the senses. ‘nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuent in sensu’.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{159}See section 3.1 1.}
the *De anima*. Although at first glance he seems to stay close to Aquinas’s interpretation of the certainty of the *scientia de anima* in terms of our intimate familiarity with its subject, there is one crucial difference, which will set the agenda for the debates in the fourteenth century. Brito radicalizes the distinction that was introduced by Anonymus Bazán between our knowledge of the sensitive and vegetative souls, on the one hand, and our knowledge of the intellective soul, on the other:

> Ergo anima intellectiva difficilis est ad cognoscendum ex parte cognoscentis. Sed anima vegetativa et sensitiva non sunt ita difficiles ad cognoscendum, quia unusquisque experitur se nutriri et augmentari et sentire. Item: ad sensum apparent operationes earum, scilicet nutrire et sentire. 

Therefore the intellective soul is difficult to understand from the part of the knower. But the vegetative and sensitive souls are not that difficult to understand, because everyone experiences that he feeds and grows and perceives. Also, their operations appear to the senses, that is, feeding and perceiving.

The parallels between Anonymus Bazán’s question and Brito’s are striking. Both of them introduce the twofold method, a-priori and a-posteriori, as well as a distinction between the manner in which we experience the operations of our vegetative and sensitive souls as opposed to the manner in which we experience the operations of our intellective soul. In addition, both of them introduce a twofold manner of looking at the difficulty in question, by taking the soul either as subject or as object of understanding. But Brito pushes these distinctions further than Anonymus Bazán had done by making the following claim: whereas we are immediately aware of the operations of the vegetative and sensitive souls (which explains why our knowledge of these souls is certain), our knowledge of the intellective soul, by contrast, is always mediated.

The main reason why knowledge of our intellective soul is always mediated is that our intellect is in pure potentiality before it knows something. And

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160 Radulphus Brito, QdA, I.558-61.

161 The parallels are not limited to this particular question, but exist in other places also. Compare the similarities between the two commentaries in the question on the subject matter of the science of the soul discussed on p. 84.

162 Anonymus Bazán phrases the difference between our experience of the intellective and our experience of the other two souls as follows: Anonymus Bazán, QdA, I.5, 398-399:7-8: “Tunc ad tertium. Cum dicitur ‘illa scientia non est difficillima quae est de illis quae sunt experimentata nobis’, verum est secundum proportionem. Et cum dicis quod scientia de anima sit huiusmodi, verum est de anima vegetativa et sensitiva, sed de anima intellectiva non, quia illa non est experimentata sensibiliter, sed intelligibiliter.”
according to Aristotle, a thing can only be known insofar as it has actuality. This implies that, as long as the intellect remains in this pure potentiality, it cannot be known, at least not directly. Only once the intellect has been actualized by the knowledge of something other than itself, can it turn itself into an object of cognition. A peculiar consequence of this emphasis on the necessity of the actuality of any object of cognition is that our knowledge of the operations of the vegetative and sensitive souls is given an equal status. For the operations of the sensitive soul have the same degree of actuality as the operations of the vegetative soul, and both these sets of operations occur within us. Thus Brito claims that we experience both types of operations within ourselves. This idea is not just found in Brito, but also in many other late-thirteenth and fourteenth-century philosophers. But whereas it is certainly true that I am aware of many operations of my sensitive soul, I seem to be quite unaware of the operations of my vegetative soul, at least when awareness is understood as experiencing something within myself. But also the external senses provide little to no immediate experience when it comes to the typical vegetative operations of growth and nourishing. Of course we can measure and document these processes, but in that case our scientific knowledge of them is no more certain or privileged than any other type of knowledge obtained by similar scientific observation.

Having made a distinction between our mediated knowledge of the intellective soul and our immediate knowledge of the other souls, Brito consequently connects it to the difficulty of the scientia de anima. As a consequence of our direct knowledge of our vegetative and sensitive souls, it is impossible that we should encounter any real difficulties in trying to understand them. Accordingly, the difficulty that Aristotle mentioned only applies to our knowledge of the intellective soul (a restriction not found in Aristotle or Averroes).

The difficulty in understanding the intellective soul, Brito continues, has two different reasons. The first reason lies in the knower, the second in the thing known. To explain this distinction, Brito invokes the paradigmatic examples of such difficulties. Prime matter exemplifies a difficulty on the side of the thing known. Since prime matter considered in itself is just a pure

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164 The objection might have entered the medieval debates, were it not for the fact that the vegetative soul is hardly discussed in the commentaries on the *De anima*.

165 This distinction goes back to *Metaphysica* II where Aristotle discusses the investigation of truth in general; Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, II.1, 993b9–11: “Perhaps, as difficulties are of two kinds, the cause of the present difficulty is not in the facts but in us. For as the eyes of the bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all.”

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potentiality towards all substantial forms and has no actuality whatsoever, it is very difficult — if not impossible — to know. On the side of the knower, the standard example is the following: because humans are so dependent on their senses for the acquisition of knowledge, everything that cannot be sensed is very difficult for us to know, though in themselves these imperceptible things might be fully knowable when cognized by a subject that is not dependent on the senses, for example, by an angel or by God.

Applying this distinction between the two sources of difficulty to our knowledge of the intellective soul, Brito gives the following analysis: on the side of the thing known, the source of the difficulty is the ontological status of our intellect. Just as prime matter is in potency with respect to all substantial forms, our intellect considered in itself is also just in potency, namely in potency with respect to all knowledge. The more important source of difficulty, however, lies on the side of the one who knows, since we are dependent on our senses for the acquisition of knowledge, and the intellect cannot be sensed. Even worse, not only is the intellect itself not perceptible, neither are its operations, namely thinking and willing.

Brito is quick to point out that the difficulties inherent in trying to understand our intellect are even greater than in the case of trying to understand prime matter. Prime matter we can, at least, sense in some indirect way. For we can perceive substantial changes, which Brito calls the operations of prime matter, and the perception of these substantial changes leads us to knowledge of prime matter itself. But we do not, says Brito, sense thinking or willing. The ultimate explanation for these extreme difficulties within the science of the soul lies therefore in the unique ontological status of the intellective soul:

Modo anima intellectiva inter formas naturales remotior est a sensu, quia est quedam forma media inter substantias separatas et immateri­ales, et substantias sensibiles et materiales. 

Of all natural forms, the intellective soul is farthest removed from the senses, because it is a form that falls between the separate and immaterial substances and the perceptible and material substances.

The fact that, of all natural forms, the intellective soul is farthest removed from the senses, renders the science that studies it the most difficult of all natural sciences.

Recall that Aquinas thought that the scientia de anima had no special difficulties, but only a special certainty coming from our intimate acquaintance with its subject. Brito on the other hand is convinced that there is a special difficulty on account of the imperceptibility and potentiality of the intellectual soul. This, in turn, leads him to limit the certainty of this science to the vegetative and sensitive souls only.

Just like Anonymus Bazán had done before him, Brito suggests that there are two methods of proceeding in the scientia de anima: the certain a-posteriori method, where we begin with the operations of something, and from there reason to the subject that is the source of these operations, and the a-priori, uncertain method, where we begin with the subject (or essence) and from there reason to its operations. But Brito introduces a new element by implying that we only use one of these methods, namely the uncertain a-priori method, when studying the intellect, whereas in the case of the vegetative and sensitive souls, we can and do also use the certain a-posteriori method.

Why does Brito imply that we only use the a-priori method in the case of the intellect, given that he considers it to be such an uncertain method? The answer can, I think, be found in Brito’s emphasis on the imperceptibility of the operations of our intellect. For since we cannot perceive the intellect’s operations through our senses, the more certain method, which has these operations as its starting point, is simply unavailable for the study of the intellective soul. In other words, if we really have no sensory access to these operations, then the normal procedure of natural philosophy is barred, and as a consequence, we are limited to the uncertain method. Starting with operations that are better known than the essence is (unfortunately) not an option. The alternative that Brito seems to have in mind is that we have to start with an unclear and imprecise grasp of the intellect itself and do our best to continue from

\[167\] Radulphus Brito, QdA, I.566-72 (ad rationes): “Et cum dicitur ‘Philosophus dicit quod ista scientia est certissima’, dico quod duplex est modus procedendi in illa scientia. Unus est modus procedendi qui est a priori procedendo a subjecto ad eius operationes. Et alia investigatio est a posteriori ex operationibus investigando animam sive subjectum anime. Et quantum ad istum modum intelligit quod certo modo procedit, et sic non est difficillima. Sed quantum ad primum processum non est certa, et quantum ad illum est difficillima.”

\[168\] That only the uncertain method can be used in studying the intellect remains implicit in the passage where Brito explains the two methods. But it becomes evident when we look at Brito’s response to another argument in which he returns to the certain method that proceeds from effect to subject; Radulphus Brito, QdA, I.592-97: “Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘illa scientia non est difficillima que procedit ex eis que experimur in nobis,’ verum est quantum ad istud. Et cum dicitur ‘ista scientia est huiusmodi,’ verum est procedendo ex operationibus ad subjectum anime, et etiam quantum ad operationes anime vegetative et sensitive. Operationes enim istarum experimur in nobis. Sed quantum ad operationes anime intellective non est verum. Et ideo quantum ad hoc est difficillima.”
there. This procedure will be very uncertain, because we do not have a clear understanding of our starting point, but it is the best we can do under the circumstances.

It is worth pausing for a moment to look at the implications of Brito’s solution. Its advantage is that he has found a convincing way of combining the notions of certainty and difficulty in his description of the method of the *scientia de anima*. And armed with this combination he is now able to give a coherent interpretation of Aristotle’s text. But the disadvantage is that the result seems to be a split right through the middle of the subject matter of this science. Instead of one science, with one subject and method, we are left with two half subjects, each with partly different methods, and with one half being the most certain of all subjects in the natural sciences and the other half being the most difficult and uncertain. Can we really still speak of one *scientia de anima*?

In any case, from this moment onwards, the connection of the intellective soul with the notion of difficulty, and of the vegetative/sensitive souls with the notion of certainty, will become commonplace. It is implied by Nicole Oresme; and it is found explicitly, for example, in John of Jandun and John Buridan.

John of Jandun’s position closely parallels Brito’s. He also applies the predicate ‘not difficult’ to our knowledge of the vegetative and sensitive souls, and the predicate ‘difficult’ to our knowledge of the intellective soul.169 He even agrees with Brito that the difficulty of our knowledge of the intellective soul stems from both the knower and the thing known. In fact, he seems to disagree with Brito on only one point, and that is his distinction between the two methods of proceeding in the *scientia de anima*. Brito implied that when studying the intellect, we can only use an uncertain method by which we proceed from the essence to its operations. But according to Jandun, this uncertain method is in fact never used in the *scientia de anima*.170 And if a method is never used, it cannot be invoked to explain a difference in difficulty between our knowledge of the vegetative and sensitive soul, on the one hand,

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169 *John of Jandun, QdA*, I.6, 23 "Tunc dico duo ad quaestionem. primo quod scientia de anima vegetativa et sensitiva non est difficilima; secundo quod scientia de anima intellectiva est difficilima."

170 The terminology is slightly different from that of Brito’s question. Jandun speaks of a method *a priori in esse ad posteriorem* and a method *a posterioribus in esse ad priorem*; *John of Jandun, QdA*, I.6, 24–25. “Quodam dicunt quod duplex potest esse processus in scientia. Unus enim est a priorebus in esse ad posteriorem in esse, alius est a posterioribus ad priorem, ut dicit Commentator in isto proemio... Sed istud non valet, quia quantum ad illum modum procedendi qui non est usitatus in ista scientia, ista scientia non debet iudicari difficilima... Sed modus procedendi a prioribus ad postenora est huismojmodi. Quare etc."
and our knowledge of the intellective soul, on the other.\footnote{It would have been interesting to know why exactly Jandun rejects the division into two methods. Is it because he considers it impossible, even in principle, to use Brito’s uncertain method, or because he considers it simply not used by Aristotle? Unfortunately Jandun’s only argument, that the uncertain method is never used in the \textit{scientia de anima}, is that Aristotle and Averroes say so. \textsc{Aristotle}, \textit{De anima}, II.2, 413a11-13: “Since what is clear and more familiar in account emerges from what in itself is confused but more observable by us, we must reconsider our results from this point of view.” \textsc{Averroes}, \textit{Commentarium magnum in DA}, II, 12, 149: “Id est, et quia via naturalis in cognitione causarum propinquarum rebus est ire de latentibus apud Naturam apparentibus apud nos, et est ire de posterioribus in esse ad priora, ut dictum est in Posterioribus, oportet nos ire in cognitione diffinitionum propriarum unicuique partium anime per istam viam. Et nulla via est in cognitione talium diffinitionum, scilicet que componuntur ex propinquis causis propriis rei, cum fuerint ignote, nisi a posterioribus apud nos.”}

\subsection*{3.3.4 The final stages: John Buridan and Nicole Oresme}

The next important stage in the development of the discussion about the certainty and difficulty of the \textit{scientia de anima} is found in John Buridan, who proceeds in a somewhat different manner in the so-called \textit{ultima lectura} of his \textit{Quaestiones De anima}. Although he fully agrees with Brito and Jandun that a distinction between a difficulty on the side of the thing known and on the side of the knower is legitimate, he denies that the difficulty in knowing the soul stems from both sides. Instead, our difficulty in knowing the soul comes solely from the side of the knower, who (unfortunately) is dependent on the senses in acquiring knowledge. The core of his solution is contained in the following fragment:

\begin{quote}
Tunc ponuntur due conclusiones. Prima est quod scientia de anima est nobis difficillima et per consequens incertissima quantum ex parte cognoscentis inter cetera naturalia, scilicet circumscripitis Deo et intelligentiis, quia intellectus noster est insensibilis... Secunda conclusio est quod ex parte rei cognoscende et intelligende, scientia de anima est certissima et facillima, quia inter cetera naturalia anima est altioris entitatis et maioris cognoscibilitatis.\footnote{\textsc{John Buridan}, \textit{QdA}, I.4, f. 3r\textsuperscript{a}: ‘Utrum scientia de anima sit scientia de numero difficillimorum’.
}
\end{quote}

Then we posit two theses. The first is that the science of the soul is for us the most difficult and as a result the most uncertain from the side of the knower among the remaining natural things, namely leaving aside God and the intelligences, because our intellect is imperceptible... The second thesis is that from the side of the thing known and understood, the science of the soul is the most certain and the easiest, because among the remaining natural things the soul has higher being and greater knowability.
Here the connections between difficulty and uncertainty and between certainty and ease have become fully explicit: difficulty implies uncertainty, and certainty implies ease. The \textit{scientia de anima} is the most difficult of the natural sciences for us; but when we describe the object of this science in itself instead of in relation to our cognitive powers, it is the most certain and easy science there is. The result of this approach is that difficulty and certainty no longer need to be ascribed to different parts of the soul. For the difficulty now lies completely on the side of the knower, whereas the certainty now lies completely on the side of the thing known. There seems no longer to be any need for such a peculiar split between the vegetative and sensitive souls, on the one hand, and the intellective soul, on the other. This would give Buridan’s solution a large advantage over Brito’s and Jandun’s solutions. But surprisingly, this is not the final conclusion that is drawn in Buridan’s text.

In spite of the fact that the intellective soul itself is no longer described as the source of the difficulty of the \textit{scientia de anima}, we ultimately end up with a similar division within its subject matter. For Buridan returns to the difficulty of this science a second time. The first time he had attributed the certainty solely to the thing it itself. This time he tries to relate the certainty to the human knower as well, by using the following, surprising argument: not all knowledge acquired in this science is the most difficult compared to the other natural philosophical disciplines. On the contrary, some of the knowledge we can obtain in this science is amongst the easiest to obtain, and therefore amongst the most certain we can have:

\begin{quote}
Quod quantum ad aliqua scientia de anima est nobis facilior quam de alis formis naturalibus et certior, scilicet quantum ad ea que experimur in nobis de operationibus et potentiis anime et quantum ad ea que sunt faciliter ex illis deducibilia.\textsuperscript{173}
\end{quote}

With respect to some things, the science of the soul is easier for us than the sciences of the other natural forms, and more certain, namely with respect to those things that we experience in ourselves of the operations and powers of the soul and with respect to those things that are easily deducible from them.

We can easily obtain knowledge of the operations and powers of the soul that we experience in ourselves, which makes this knowledge certain; and this certainty also applies to the conclusions we can easily draw from these operations and powers. Unfortunately, Buridan gives no examples of such easily drawn conclusions, but his reference to our inner experience of operations as the starting point to explain this certainty should at this point no longer

\textsuperscript{173}John Buridan, \textit{QdA}, I.4, f. 3\textsuperscript{vb}. The manuscript gives \textit{cum} instead of \textit{ex}. 

surprise us. It is the same reference that was already so important in Thomas Aquinas.

Buridan is not willing to go as far as Aquinas, Brito and Jandun in his attribution of certainty and being easily knowable to our understanding of the vegetative and sensitive operations. For he also points out that the vegetative and especially the sensitive powers that we experience in ourselves need very complex material dispositions in their respective organs in order to function properly. And understanding these dispositions and their necessity is also a part of the scientia de anima. Therefore, our knowledge of the vegetative and sensitive souls can still be called difficult compared to knowledge obtained in the other natural sciences, where the material dispositions of the subject are less complex. Our knowledge is called easy, however, compared to the knowledge of the intellective soul.

As a consequence, Buridan ultimately arrives at a division similar to that found in Brito and Jandun: between the certain knowledge of the vegetative and the sensitive souls, on the one hand, and the difficult knowledge of the intellective soul, on the other. And in spite of the nuances that Buridan introduces concerning the certainty we have of the vegetative and sensitive souls, he ends up with much greater difficulties than his predecessors. If we accept Buridan’s position, then the difficulty in studying the intellective soul has now even increased to the point where we can no longer give an adequate explanation of the intellective soul in natural philosophy, as can be inferred from the remainder of the passage that was just described:

Sed illa <i.e. scientia de anima> est incertior et difficilior simpliciter quantum ad animam intellectivam: quomodo ists se habeat ad corpus et ad materiam, propter quod inextensa est et non educta de potentia materie, sed modo supernaturali adveniens et inherens corpori?\textsuperscript{174}

But this science <of the soul> is less certain and in an absolute sense more difficult as far as the intellective soul is concerned: how is it related to the body and to matter, as it is not extended and not educed from the potency of matter, but comes to the body, and inheres in it, in a supernatural manner?

Buridan’s description, in this question, of a supernatural inherence of the intellective soul is not an isolated remark. It can also be found, for example — and in an even stronger formulation — in his question on ‘whether sense

\textsuperscript{174} John Buridan, QdA, f 3\textsuperscript{vb} Zupko’s interpretation of the implications of this supernatural inherence of the intellective soul is very accurate: Zupko, John Buridan, 180 “Buridan is not suggesting here that the inherence of the human soul is utterly inexplicable, only that it cannot be explained naturalistically, i.e. with demonstrative or persuasive arguments based on premises whose truth is apparent to our senses.”
is a passive power'.

Although Buridan does not explicitly answer the question as to which other science, if any, could (partly) explain the inherence of the intellectual soul in the body, it is clear that this can only be theology.

For when Buridan in book III of his commentary discusses the question of whether the human intellect is a form that inheres in the human body, he resorts to theological examples such as the Eucharist in his explanation, something which he generally tries to avoid in his commentary on the De anima.

When Buridan spoke of the certainty related to the operations of the soul that we experience in ourselves, he only intended the operations of the vegetative and sensitive souls. Studying the human soul within natural philosophy is so difficult precisely because there we study the soul as embodied. The vegetative and sensitive operations seem to be relatively easy to understand, because their relations to the body seem relatively clear. Studying the unextended intellectual soul, by contrast, is exceptionally difficult because its relation to the body is such that we ultimately cannot even explain it in philosophy, for it inheres modo supernaturale. But as soon as we now consider the implications of this supernatural inherence of the intellective soul, Buridan’s adherence to the view that we are certain of the vegetative and the sensitive operations of our soul, because we experience them in ourselves, becomes baffling. For Buridan is convinced that each human being has only one single soul, and when it be-

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176 See Zupko, John Buridan, 181

177 John Buridan, QdA, III.4, ’Utrum intellectus humanus sit forma inhaerens corpori humano’: ”Et non est inconveniens idem esse non commensurabiliter in diversis locis ab invicem distantibus et secundum se totum, licet hoc sit modo supernaturali, ut corpus Christi simul est in paradiso et super altari (non enim corpus Christi in hostia super altari commensuratur magnitudine hostiae, sed est in qualibet parte hostiae, licet partes distent ab invicem, et non ob hoc distat a se). Et ita consumiliter quodammodo intellectus est in manu et pede, et in neutro commensurativa, cum non sit extensus in aliquo illorum membrorum.” Although Buridan usually avoids theological arguments, there are exceptions. E. Sylla, ’Ideo quasi mendicare oportet intellectum humanum: the Role of Theology in John Buridan’s Natural Philosophy’, in: J. M M H. Thijssen and J Zupko (eds.), The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan, Brill, 2001, 221-245 analyses some examples found in his commentary on the Physica in the questions on the eternity of the world and the possibility of a vacuum. For more examples, see Zupko, John Buridan, 144.
comes clear that in that case the vegetative and sensitive powers must inhere in the body in an unextended and supernatural mode as well, he just accepts this baffling consequence. All the vegetative and sensitive powers in a human being inhere in the body on account of an indivisible and unextended soul, which makes them radically different from similar powers found in plants in animals. In fact, in what Jack Zupko calls 'the most dramatic moment in the 25 questions of book II of his commentary', Buridan admits that the sensitive and vegetative operations in human beings are miraculous on account of their relation to an indivisible soul. But if that is the case, then what can this certainty of the operations we experience in ourselves still mean?

To round up this discussion, I will offer one final example. Nicole Oresme introduces even more nuances into the debate in his *Quaestiones De anima* than Buridan had done, and devotes a lot of space to discussing the various meanings of the terms 'difficulty' and 'certainty'. He also discusses more generally the conditions under which something can be called difficult. And when he goes as far as denying the opposition between certainty and difficulty by claiming that the certainty of knowledge need not imply that its acquisition is easy, it almost looks as if he had found a way out of the debate. But in the end, just as his predecessors, Oresme remains convinced that the certainty of the *scientia de anima* must be a special certainty. He denies, as Buridan had done, that there can be a difficulty on the side of the thing known. Neither can a difficulty lie in the capacities of our intellect. What remains is that whenever we have difficulties cognizing something, the problem must lie in our senses, more precisely in our internal senses. Oresme even approvingly cites Plato's *Phaedo* 'that the intellect is hindered because of the oppression of the flesh'. The remainder of Oresme's analysis of the certainty of the *scientia de anima* for the most part parallels Buridan's, with certain empirical principles (acquisita per experientiam) as a starting point and a certainty that is retained in those conclusions that are easily deduced from them (faciliter

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179 The same claim that a difficulty in acquisition can be compatible with the certainty of the acquired knowledge is also made in NICOLE ORESME, *ExpdA*, 788–90: "Respondetur quod non repugnat quod aliqua scientia sit difficilis et incerta ante eius notitiam et post acquisitionem sit certa, sicut scientiae mathematicae sunt difficiles et certissimae."

180 NICOLE ORESME, *QdA*, 1.3, 112 "Unde propter quandam indispositionem est quaedam resistentia et quaedam difficulitas in operationibus sensuum interiorum, maxime quae requiruntur ad intellectonem."

181 NICOLE ORESME, *QdA*, 11236–37; "Et ideo dicebat Plato in *Phaedone* quod intellectus impeditur propter oppressio nem carnis."
3.4 Conclusions

The common element in the three debates on method turns out to be the unique ontological status of the human intellect. In all three contexts, the commentators tried to find ways of maintaining the fragile unity of the *scientia de anima*, with varying success. When it came to the question of whether a science of the soul is possible, and if so, whether this science forms a part of natural philosophy, there was complete consensus. All commentators agreed that this science is possible and that it forms a part of natural philosophy. The most important arguments against the possibility of a science of the soul were related to the intellective part. They targeted its simplicity, imperceptibility, and potentiality. But, in different ways, all commentators were able to secure a natural philosophical study of intellect by arguing for a structural complexity within the soul, linking it to those things we can perceive, and arguing that the potential intellect becomes intelligible once it understands something else. In the period under discussion, the conclusion that we should include the study of the soul as a whole within natural philosophy was not reached after careful examination of the matter. It was a given. It is somewhat strange that these questions begin to disappear in the commentaries after Jandun. All the more so, since the fourteenth-century commentators become increasingly aware of how difficult it really is to include the intellective soul and the vegetative/sensitive soul in one single science.

The subject matter of the *scientia de anima* occasioned more debate. The majority of the commentators opted for the soul, but some, including Brito and Anonymus Bazán opted for the ensouled body, *qua* ensouled, instead. One of the main reasons for their choice turned out to be their ascription of all vital operations, including understanding, to the ensouled body rather than to the soul. Most other commentators argued that understanding is one of the very few operations that pertain to the soul alone and not to the ensouled body. But surprisingly, the choice for the one or the other option turned out to have few, if any, consequences. Again the explanation is that there was no real debate on the question of whether the soul, including the intellect, is studied in natural philosophy. Because the natural philosophical context prescribes that every study of the soul must include the material component of its operations, it matters little which of the two options for the subject mat-

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182 The two main differences are that Buridan's interesting remarks on the complexity of the material disposition of the organs are not found in Oresme and that the distinction in certainty between knowledge of the vegetative/sensitive and intellective souls is only implicit in Oresme.
Chapter 3. Methodological discussions

ter was chosen. Somewhat unexpectedly, even the fourteenth-century shift in what science is primarily about, from thing to terms, had few implications other than promoting semantical analysis as an important tool in natural philosophy. The methodological questions are isolated from the doctrinal part of the commentaries, in the sense that the answers to them have little or no impact on the what a commentator will defend in the doctrinal parts of his commentary. But at the same time, these methodological questions turn out to be a focal point for the problem of the unity of the scientia de anima. As such, they fulfill an important role in the commentaries as a whole.

The most important debates took place in the context of the alleged certainty and the difficulty of the scientia de anima. What would be an accurate characterization of the developments of this debate? One way of looking at it would be that the entire debate is just confused, and that this fact rules out any possible philosophical importance. It is clear that the proximate occasion of the debate was the misleading translation of ακρίβεια as certitudo. Had the translation been exactitudo, or something similar, it would probably never have started. And indeed, the debate is, in this respect, mainly a late thirteenth and fourteenth-century affair. Many Renaissance commentators lost interest in this discussion when they realized its origin, and the question of the place of the scientia de anima in the framework of the sciences becomes much more important than the question of the combination of certainty (or exactness) and difficulty. That the discussion had indeed more or less ended in the Renaissance is also evident in Zabarella. Even though he devotes several pages to the discussion, and refers to the solutions of a considerable number of philosophers, his motivation seems to be mainly historical curiosity and rhetorical effect.

Still, this description of the debate as occasioned by a peculiar translation and effectively concluded by a new and more accurate translation is only half of the story. For I hope to have shown that even if the debate was triggered by a linguistic issue, it quickly became a doctrinal controversy rooted in the difficult ontological status of the intellective soul as both embodied and at the same time somehow immaterial.

That we should regard it as a doctrinal controversy is also indirectly supported by the fact that none of the philosophers found the easy and obvious way out satisfactory, namely that of claiming that 'certainty' and 'difficulty' are not necessarily contradictory terms when applied to a science. A science may, for example, be very difficult to acquire, but once acquired its conclusions may be certain. Even when they mentioned this easy way out, as notably Oresme did, they were not satisfied with it. They keep explaining the term 'certainty' by reference to our intimate relation to the subject matter of the scientia de anima. As a result, they underestimate the difficulties in studying
the vegetative soul and overemphasize the difficulties in studying the intellectual soul.

What happened in this debate from a doctrinal viewpoint is the mutual reinforcement of two tendencies. On the one hand, there is an increasing emphasis on the role of the perceptibility of the soul's operations when it comes to acquiring certain knowledge of the soul, while on the other hand, there is a growing emphasis on the necessity of embodiment for the soul to exercise its functions. The combination of these two tendencies resulted in a double breach in the fragile unity of the *scientia de anima*. The more familiar breach took place when the study of the soul as immortal and disembodied was transferred to the domain of metaphysics and theology, and the *scientia de anima* ended up concerning itself exclusively with the soul as embodied. The other, and more unfamiliar breach goes straight through the *scientia de anima* itself and considers — again in terms of material and immaterial — one part of its subject the most certain, and one part the most difficult, of all that is studied in natural philosophy.

Maintaining the unity of the *scientia de anima* was not an easy task for the medieval commentators, as can be clearly seen in this debate on the difficulty and certainty of this science. To be sure, none of the authors I discussed explicitly acknowledges that the *scientia de anima* was now no longer strictly to be regarded as one science, but as a science with two formal objects to which the two incompatible predicates of certainty and difficulty applied. The connection between method and the pursuit of science was not that strong in the Middle Ages. But although no such explicit conclusions were drawn, the debate did have its effect; and it was just a matter of time before a conclusion along these lines was actually drawn, as becomes amply clear when we look at the Renaissance commentators struggling to place the study of the soul within the hierarchy of the sciences.\(^\text{183}\)

\(^{\text{183}}\)See Bakker, 'Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics, or Something in Between?'.

4 The Aristotelian definition of the soul

The first doctrinal aspect of Aristotle’s *De anima* that any commentator has to come to grips with is Aristotle’s famous definition of the soul: ‘the soul is the first act of a natural organic body having life in potency’, 1 which was rendered into Latin as ‘anima est actus primus corporis physici organici vitam habentis in potentia.’ 2 Most commentators devoted several questions to the discus-

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1ARISTOTLE, *De anima*, II.1, 412a27–28.

2The translators rendered the Aristotelian text as follows: Jacobus Venetus: “Unde anima est actus primus corporis phisici potentia vitam habentis. Huiusmodi autem est quodcumque organicum.”; William of Moerbeke: “Unde anima est primus actus corporis phisici potencia vitam habentis. Tale autem quodcumque organicum.”; Michael Scotus: “Et ideo anima est prima perfectio corporis naturalis habentis vitam in potentia. Et est secundum quod est organicum.” In the ANONYMUS, AA, 6:41 it is rendered as: “Anima est actus corporis organici physici vitam habentis in potentia, scilicet ad opera vitae.” In the late-twelfth and first half of the thirteenth century, several variants of the definition are employed. The most important of these substitute ‘perfectio’ for ‘actus’, similar to Michael Scotus’s translation. This use of the term ‘perfectio’ allowed body and soul to have a large degree of independence, even if they are intimately related. See section 2.2.1 for discussion. A convenient list of the variations of the
CHAPTER 4. THE ARISTOTELIAN DEFINITION OF THE SOUL

sion of this definition, beginning with its most general aspects and working towards the details. In Brito, for example, the discussion takes up the first five questions of his commentary on book II, beginning with the question of whether the soul is a substance and concluding with the question of whether the Aristotelian definition of the soul is correct.3

In order to understand better the medieval discussions of Aristotle's definition, however, it will be worth the effort to begin by looking at Aristotle's own words, with the help of some modern commentators. This will serve to introduce some of the difficulties that arose when the medieval commentators tried to explicate the definition.

4.1 Aristotle's definition of the soul

One of the first things that becomes clear when reading De anima II.1 is that, contrary to the impression given above, Aristotle does not give a single definition of the soul. Rather, he gives three variations. Although these variants were combined into one single definition in the Latin commentary tradition, it is useful to keep them separated for now:

1. The soul must, then, be substance, qua form of a natural body which has life potentially (412a18–19)

2. The soul is the first actuality of a natural body which has life potentially (412a27)

3. It is the first actuality of a natural body which has organs (412b4–5)

Apart from the occurrence of these three variants of the definition of the soul, a second aspect that quickly becomes clear when reading De anima II.1 is that their status is ambiguous. Aristotle introduces the final variant of his definition (412b4–5) with the conditional statement: “If then we are to speak of something common to every soul, it will be...,” which already may express some doubt about the adequacy of the definition,4 but more importantly, he

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3 [Callus, 'The Treatise of John Blund', 490–491

4 Walter Burley, for instance, refers to Aristotle's hesitant manner of speaking about the commonality of the definition again and again in his commentary, in order to argue that Averroes's interpretation of Aristotle is at least a consistent reading of Aristotle's text, regardless of whether the interpretation is correct or not. For example, [Walter Burley, ExpdA [unpublished transcription by Paul Bakker], 21]: "Pro primo sciendum quod Aristoteles non assere-
ends the first chapter of book II with the remark that: "This must suffice as our sketch or outline of the nature of the soul."

At this point in the *De anima*, the definition of soul is indeed sketchy at best. So sketchy, in fact, that Aristotle chooses to begin anew in book II.2 by taking the soul as the principle of life in its various manifestations, making it clear that life covers a broad range of phenomena. If any one of these is present we can call a thing 'alive'. Aristotle gives the following list: thinking, perception, local movement and rest, the movement involved in nutrition and, finally, decay and growth. The remainder of the *De anima* is largely devoted to an analysis and description of these various manifestations of life in order to flesh out the initial definitions of the soul. This procedure of beginning with a general, sketchy definition and working out its details in the rest of the treatise is not particular to the *De anima*, but common to many of Aristotle's works.

Returning to the three variants of the definition, we find two sets of terms that seem to be used interchangeably. The first is 'substance *qua* form' and 'first actuality', the second is 'a natural body which has life potentially' and 'a natural body which has organs'. Equating the terms of the first set is fairly easy, at least, as long as we hold that there is a single substantial form which gives the natural body its full actuality. For in that case, being a substance *qua* form already implies being the first actuality, since the substantial form is by definition that which gives the first actuality to a substance. Within the framework of a plurality of substantial forms, the equation of these terms is slightly more complicated. If we accept a plurality of substantial forms in a substance, the soul — being the final substantial form of a living being — would inform a subject that already has some actuality. Since in that case there are other substantial forms present in the living being prior to the advent of the soul (which also remain present after the advent of the soul), it must be

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5 Aristotle, *De anima*, II.2, 413a21-5. Presumably the list is not meant to be exhaustive, since the power to procreate is surprisingly absent.


7 For an introduction to the unicity of substantial form position, see section 2.3.2.

8 For an introduction to the plurality of substantial form position, see section 2.3.3.
explained how the soul can still be called the first actuality.9

Equating the second set of terms, however, turns out to be more difficult both within the unicity and the plurality frameworks. Given Aristotle’s insistence that we can only call something an organ as long as it is capable of exercising its proper function, being potentially alive and having organs seem to be contradictory descriptions.10 If something is merely potentially alive, how can it have organs, since it has no actual life functions that it can exercise? And if something has organs, it is by definition capable of exercising certain life functions. But then, how can it be anything but actually alive? One possible (and popular) manner of harmonizing these descriptions is to distinguish between a first and a second potency. A first potency is the potency to acquire a particular power, whereas a second potency is the potency to exercise that acquired power. Taking the term ‘potency’ in the definition of the soul as a second potency, having organs and being in potency to life seem perfectly compatible, at least, if the potencies in question are not continuously exercised.

Although it is relatively easy to combine Aristotle’s three variants of the definition, at least at first sight, the elements of the definition were debated in much detail in the medieval commentary tradition. One of the main reasons for these detailed discussions is that there is another difficulty in interpreting the definition of the soul, one which goes to the heart of Aristotelian metaphysics. Aristotle’s definition is formulated in terms of ‘act’ and ‘substance qua form’. Since both these terms are relative, referring to something in potency to this act or a substance qua matter respectively, what exactly would be the counterpart of the act and substantial form in question? In other words, if the soul is a substantial form, then what counts as the matter of which it is the form? Suppose we say that this matter is just the body with all its organs. In that case, the peculiar consequence arises that the form (having a soul) is already implied in the definition of the matter (a body with organs).

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9 One possible solution, which was quite popular, is shifting the interpretation of ‘first’ from a temporal sense to a hierarchical sense. The soul can then be called the first actuality in the sense that it is the most important and most determining actuality of the living being. It is what completes the living being. This solution is mentioned, for example, in Nicole Oresme, QdA, II.2, 13140–44: “Similiter quod sit primus patet quia: si in animato est solum una forma substantialis, patet statim quod illa est actus primus. Et si sint plures, adhuc anima, quae est ultima generatione, est prima perfectione et dat esse actualiter complete.” It is also mentioned as a possible solution in John of Jandun, QdA, II.3,82: “Vel potest dici aliter et satis rationabiler quod, quamvis aliqua alie forme substantiales precedunt animam via generationis, tamen anima est prior alii via perfectionis et nobilitatis. Et ideo dicitur actus primus simpliciter.”

10 Aristotle, De anima, II.1, 412b20–2: “When seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye, except in name — no more than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure.”
For according to Aristotle, unless something is actually alive (i.e., has a soul), it neither is a body nor has organs, except equivocally. But if the soul is already implied in the definition of its matter, then in what sense can this matter be in potency to the soul? If, however, we want to avoid the consequence that the soul is already implied in the definition of its matter, and take as the matter of the soul something which could be described as 'having life in potency but not actually', it is not very clear what would satisfy this criterion. And it is certainly not clear how whatever which might satisfy it, could also be described as a 'natural body which has organs'. On the other hand, if what functions as the matter of the soul cannot be described in either of these manners — as the organic body or as matter having life in potency but not actually — we seem to be left with an obscure definition of the soul that depends on the matter–form framework, but at the same time fails to provide the proper matter to which the soul is related as its substantial form.

That there is a difficulty in Aristotle's definition of describing the matter of which the soul is the form is well known and has been convincingly analyzed in a seminal article by John Ackrill. He rightly argues that it is not fully clear how the notions of matter and form are to be understood when considering the definition of the soul. Given that most of the things we might be willing to call a substance are in fact alive, if there really is a problem it is a fundamental one.

As Ackrill points out, the difficulty in understanding the meaning of 'form' and 'matter' in the definition of the soul arises because of a discrepancy in Aristotle's works between the kinds of things he uses as examples to show the meaning of the notions 'matter' and 'form' and the kinds of things he wants to apply these notions to. In Aristotle's examples we are normally able to single out the matter apart from its form, as we can, for instance, in a statue. The material out of which the statue is made, let's say bronze, is its matter, whereas its current shape, let's say its resemblance to the body of Socrates, is its form. The matter in question was already bronze before it was made into a statue, and it equally remains bronze while being a statue, albeit under another form. This example serves its purpose by demonstrating two important aspects of the matter–form relation. The first is that form

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12 ACKRILL, 'Aristotle's Definitions', 74.

13 For example in the elaborate discussion on the meaning of substance in ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, VII 3, 1029a3–6. Compare also ARISTOTLE, Physica, 1.7, 191a9–12, where the relation between substance and nature is explained by reference to a statue and a bed.
is always something realized in matter, which is an important step away from Plato's description of self-subsisting forms. The second, perhaps most important aspect is that matter is what functions as the underlying substrate (ὑποκείμενον) of change and endures even through generation and corruption. The bronze qualifies as the matter in this example, precisely because it is that which remains identical before, during and after the realization of the statue of Socrates.

However, as Ackrill rightly argues, we are unable to single out some matter which has a soul as its formal complement in a similar manner as we could in the case of the bronze statue. For "the body we are told to pick out as the material 'constituent' of the animal depends for its very identity on its being alive, in-formed by psuchê." In other words, it is impossible for a body to be potentially alive, without by that very fact being also actually alive. If this analysis is correct, as I think it is, it does not necessarily imply that the application of the terms 'form' and 'matter' to natural substances is mistaken or useless. It does imply, however, that we should at least be mindful of a shift in the meaning of the matter–form correlation when we move from artifacts to natural substances. One should be very careful when referring to the body of a living being in abstraction from that living being as a whole.

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14 The exact ontological status of Plato's forms has been, and still is, the subject of much scholarly debate. But that these forms are in some way ontologically independent of their material realizations is agreed upon by almost all scholars. For a summary of Plato's position and an introduction to the relevant literature, see for example: Allan Silverman, 'Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/plato-metaphysics/> (accessed on 8 February 2010): "To the extent that Plato recognizes the notion of existence, since being an essence seems, by Plato's lights, to be the superlative way to be, it is likely that Forms are both definitionally and existentially separate."

15 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, VIII.1, 1042a33–b4: "But clearly matter is also substance; for in all the opposite changes that occur there is something which underlies the changes, e.g. in respect of place that which is now here and again elsewhere... and similarly in respect of substance there is something that is now being generated and again being destroyed, and now underlies the process as a 'this' and again underlies it as the privation of positive character." That something endures even through generation and corruption is extremely important to Aristotle. It is the only way to avoid that generation is the coming into being of something out of nothing. The absurdity of such a generation was captured in the adage ex nihilo nihil fit (ARISTOTLE, Physica, 1.4, 187a27–29).

16 ACKRILL, 'Aristotle's Definitions', 70.

17 The seeming impossibility of taking the body as matter in the same way as the bronze is matter for the statue is often expressed by the phrase that the body is 'essentially ensouled matter', meaning that it is impossible to refer to a body apart from its being ensouled. Aristotle's alleged commitment to such essentially ensouled matter is also at the root of the recent controversy on whether or not Aristotle is a functionalist (for an introduction to this debate see especially the articles by M. Burnyeat, J. Whiting and M. C. Nussbaum & H. Putnam in the volume M. C. NUSBAUM and A. OKSENBERG RORTY (eds.), Essays on Aristotle's De anima, Oxford:
It could be the case that the difficulties described above are only apparent. There may very well be an interpretation of the relevant passages that will be able to pinpoint some matter for the soul that would meet all the requirements. In fact, Jennifer Whiting carefully argues for such an interpretation in an article entitled *Living Bodies*, claiming that “there are two distinct things Aristotle calls the ‘matter’ (ϋλή) of an animal: one (the organic body) is essentially ensouled, while the other (the mixture of elements constituting the organic body) is only accidentally ensouled.” Because Whiting’s interpretation tries to solve the problems pointed out by Ackrill, her solution is (necessarily) complex. It relies on a sophisticated distinction between functional and compositional matter that play different roles in Aristotle’s accounts. The functional matter is essentially ensouled, because it is defined by the life functions it can perform. The compositional matter, by contrast, is not defined in a functional manner, but in terms of the mixture of the four elements of which it is composed. This enables it to perform the role of enduring substrate in generation and corruption. In this second, compositional sense, the matter of the living body and that of the corpse can remain numerically identical, at least for some time. So when Aristotle says that a body is essentially

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19 The matter of the living body and that of the corpse as a whole will only remain identical for some time, since much of the corpse's matter will decompose. But those material parts that
ensouled, since being a body is defined in terms of being able to exercise vital operations, he is talking about body in the functional, but not in the compositional sense. I will return to Whiting’s interpretation later in this chapter, when I discuss Buridan.

The positions of Ackrill and Whiting clearly show some of the difficulties in interpreting Aristotle’s definition (which is one of the reasons why I presented their views before turning to late-medieval commentators). Given the difficulties that these modern commentators have in fully explaining Aristotle’s definition of the soul even when they are sympathetic to it, it should not come as a surprise that we find the late-medieval commentators trying to come to terms with similar difficulties. But there is also a second reason for discussing precisely these two interpretations here. The respective positions of Ackrill and Whiting, and the difficulties and solutions they point to, have to a large extent already been formulated by late-thirteenth- and fourteenth-century commentators. It will therefore be well worth the effort to look more closely at some of the later medieval interpretations, not only from an historical, but also from a philosophical standpoint.

4.1.1 Thomas Aquinas’s views on the matter of the soul

In the discussions on method presented in chapter 3, it became clear that one of the consequences of the fact that Aquinas only composed an exposition type commentary on the De anima was that he wrote very little on aspects related to the method of the scientia de anima. This may even have given the impression that his commentary is somewhat slavish, given that Aquinas seems not to have entered into these discussions precisely because he was explaining Aristotle, who did not raise much doubt on these issues. Should such an impression have arisen, however, it will become clear in this chapter that it needs correcting, for Aquinas has much to say about Aristotle’s definition of

remain are, in this compositional sense, numerically identical to the matter of the living being.

20Whiting, ‘Living Bodies’, 84: “We are now in a position to see how Aristotle can consistently claim both that the matter of an animal is essentially ensouled and that the matter of an animal is only accidentally ensouled. For Aristotle is talking about different things, each with different criteria of identity and persistence — one, the organic body and its functionally defined parts (including the homoiomerous ones); the other, the elements constituting homoiomerous parts.”

21In section 4.3 on the identity of accidents.

22Not surprisingly, this has (at least to my knowledge) not been noticed in the contemporary debates. Although Aristotle has become increasingly popular as an alternative to the Cartesian mind–body dualism, his medieval commentators are still almost completely ignored. A noteworthy exception is the excellent Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas.
the soul in his commentary on the *De anima*.\(^{23}\)

When Aquinas comments on Aristotle's definition of the soul in *De anima* II.1, he begins by making some remarks on definitions in general. The most important of these are his remarks on the difference between the definition of an accident and the definition of a substance, for which he refers to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*:

> Sciendum est autem quod, sicut docet Philosophus in VII *Methaphisise*, hec est difference inter diffinitionem substancie et accidentis quod in diffinitione substancie nichil ponitur quod sit extra substanciam diffiniti; diffinitur enim unaqueque substancia per sua principia materialia et formalia. In diffinitione autem accidentis ponitur aliquid quod est extra essenciam diffiniti, scilicet subiectum.\(^{24}\)

It must be known, however, as the Philosopher teaches in book VII of the *Metaphysics*, that there is the following difference between the definition of a substance and that of an accident: in the definition of a substance, nothing is included which falls outside of the essence of the defined thing; for each and every substance is defined by its material and formal principles. In the definition of an accident, however, something is included which falls outside of the essence of the defined thing, namely a subject.

Although Aquinas gives no example of a definition of a substance at this point, he does provide one definition of an accident: *snubness* (*simitas*) is a curvature of the nose.\(^{25}\)

It certainly seems clear that the accident in question (snubness) cannot be defined without reference to its subject (a nose) of which it is a certain shape. But it is not immediately obvious that the conclusions we can draw from this

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\(^{23}\) For several other examples of how Aquinas incorporated his own philosophical views in his commentary, see Bazán, '13th Century Commentaries on *De anima*', 176–177, footnotes 159 and 160.

\(^{24}\) Thomas Aquinas, *SentdeA*, II.1, 68^59^-67.

\(^{25}\) The example is taken straight out of Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, VII.5, 1030b14–34. Snubness is also introduced in Aristotle, *Physica*, II.2, where it is used as an example in the context of an argument designed to show that natural philosophers should not only consider matter, but also form, at least up to a certain point; Aristotle, *Physica*, II.2, 194a4–5: "Odd and even, straight and curved, and likewise number, line, and figure, do not involve motion; not so flesh and bone and man — these are defined like snub nose, not like curved." The argument ends in the well known distinction between the natural philosopher and the metaphysician that is so important for the methodology of the *scientia de anima*: Aristotle, *Physica*, II.2, 194b12–15: "And the student of nature is concerned only with things whose forms are separable indeed, but do not exist apart from matter. Man is begotten by man and by the sun as well. The mode of existence and essence of the separable it is the business of first philosophy to define."
example could be extended to the definitions of accidents in general. Snubness may just be a rather unique example, given that it can (by definition) only be found in a very specific type of subject, a nose, which is precisely the reason why it cannot be defined without reference to that particular subject.  

But what about an accident that is not restricted to such a particular type of subject? Take for example whiteness. Following Aristotle, we could roughly define this property as being a certain color, thus avoiding a reference to any subject.  

But then, what is a color? It seems impossible to answer this question without ultimately referring to some surface or volume of which color is a property, in which case the definition again involves a reference to a subject outside of the thing defined.  

Although Aquinas does not discuss another example than snubness in this context, he would certainly have defined the color white, or any other accident, along these lines; for he is convinced that no accident can ever be defined without reference to its subject. The fact that snubness can only be found in a very specific subject is ultimately irrelevant to the example.

The main reason why an accident cannot be defined without reference to a subject is that an accident cannot exist without a subject. Taken by itself, an accident does not have a complete being, as Aquinas calls it, which means that

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27 Aristotle, Topica, translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambndge, in: J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, IV.1, 121a5–8, p. 203 refers to white as a species of color: "To speak generally, the genus ought to fall under the same division as the species; for if the species is a substance, so too should be the genus, and if the species is a quality, so too the genus should be a quality, e.g. if white is a quality, so too should color be." Aristotle employs a different description of color in Aristotle, De anima, II.7, 418a28–b2: "Whatever is visible is color and color is what lies upon what is in itself visible; 'in itself' here means not that visibility is involved in the definition of what thus underlies color, but that that substratum contains in itself the cause of visibility. Every color has in it the power to set in movement what is actually transparent; that power constitutes its very nature. That is why it is not actually visible except with the help of light; it is only in light that the color of a thing is seen." That is, he defines color in terms of its effect on the surrounding medium.

28 At least on the traditional understanding of color as a property of the colored thing. But the precise nature of color makes little difference for its status as example. Either it will be a property of something, in which case it will refer to its subject in its definition, or it is something self-subsistent, in which case it would ipso facto be considered a substance within the substance-accident framework, and in which case it cannot be used as a counter-example to the required reference to a subject in the definition of any accident. Any exception to this could only be a miracle (and indeed, the discussions surrounding the Eucharist make liberal use of accidents not inhering in any substance while retaining their status as accidents).
it lacks something that is essential in order for it to exist.\textsuperscript{29} It is precisely because the subject is this essential element, that it forms a part of the definition of the accident.\textsuperscript{30} Such a definition of an accident was often called a \textit{definitio per additamentum} in contrast to a \textit{definitio essentialis} which only applies to substances.\textsuperscript{31} It is now also clear why the essential definition of a substance includes no elements outside of the substance itself. Because a substance can exist on its own, it can also be defined on its own.

Having established this distinction between the definition of a substance and the definition of an accident, Aquinas moves on to a discussion of the definition of a substantial form. The reason for discussing accidents is, first, to show that the definitions of substantial and accidental forms have something in common. Both accidental and substantial forms have no complete essence, since they exist only as part of a composite substance. In line with Aquinas's reasoning on the definitions of accidents described above, this lack of a complete essence implies that a substantial form can also not be defined without reference to something else that is essential for its existence, namely its proper subject or matter (\textit{proprium subiectum sive materia}).\textsuperscript{32} If, in fact, the soul is a substantial form, then its definition must necessarily include a reference to its matter or subject. This last conclusion raises the question of what precisely the matter or subject of the soul is, which will turn out to be a rather difficult question. This difficulty is caused by a difference in the kind of subject that is required for an accidental form and the kind of subject that is required for a substantial form.

\textsuperscript{29}THOMAS AQUINAS, \textit{SentdeA, II.1}, 68\textsuperscript{67-73}: “Oportet enim subiectum poni in diffinitione accidentis, sicut cum dicitur: ‘Simitas est curuitas nasi’; et hoc ideo est quia diffinitio significat quod quid est res. Substancia autem est quid completum in suo esse et in sua specie. Accidens autem non habet esse completum, set dependens a substantia.”

\textsuperscript{30}It should be noted that the existence of a subject is necessary only within the natural order. To be able to employ the notion of accident while discussing miracles, in particular the Eucharist, Aquinas has to redefine the relation between an accident and its subject. Given that, according to Aquinas, the accidents of the consecrated bread do not inhere in a substance, he redefines the notion ‘accident’ by reducing the actual inherence in a substance to a mode of being instead of the essence of an accident; for a detailed analysis of Aquinas’s position on the status of accidents in the Eucharist, see P. J. J. M. Bakker, \textit{La raison et le miracle. Les doctrines eucharistiques (c. 1250 – c. 1400)}, PhD Thesis, 2 vols, Nijmegen, 1999, esp. vol. 1, 294–302. See also E. Gilson, ‘Quasi Definitio Substantiae’, in: A. A. Maurer [E.A.] (ed.), \textit{St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974. Commemorative Studies}, vol. 1, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974, 111–129, esp. 121–125.

\textsuperscript{31}For the distinction between an essential definition and a definition by addition, see ARISTOTLE, \textit{Metaphysica}, VII.5, 1031a1–13. Compare AA 1:164 and 165.

\textsuperscript{32}THOMAS AQUINAS, \textit{SentdeA, II.1}, 69\textsuperscript{81-83}: “Unde, cum anima sit forma, oportet quod in diffinitione ipsius ponatur materia sive subiectum eius.”
Per animam enim intelligimus id quo habens vitam vivit. Unde oportet quod intelligatur sicut aliquid in subiecto existens (ut accipiatur hic large subiectum, non solum prout subiectum dicitur aliquid ens in actu, per quem modum accidens dicitur esse in subiecto, set etiam secundum quod materia prima, que est ens in potencia, dicitur subiectum). Corpus autem quod recipit vitam magis est sicut subiectum et materia quam sicut aliquid in subiecto existens.33

For by soul we understand that by which something having life lives. Therefore it is necessary that it be understood as something existing in a subject. ‘Subject’ here is taken in a broad sense, not only as a subject is said to be a being in act (in which manner we say an accident is in a subject), but also according to which we call prime matter (which is a being in potency) a subject. The body, however, that receives life is more like a subject and matter than like something existing in a subject.

In this passage we find the same similarity between accidents and substantial forms that Aquinas had introduced in the previous passage on definitions. Both accidents and substantial forms are not self-subsistent, but exist in some subject, which was the reason why they could not be defined without reference to this subject. This time, however, the difference between them is articulated more precisely. Although both accidents and substantial forms exist in a subject, accidents always exist in some actual subject — that is to say, some particular existing thing —, whereas substantial forms exist in a different kind of subject.34 This subject of a substantial form can be called a subject only in a broad sense.

Unfortunately, the passage quoted above is not fully clear on the details about this subject of a substantial form. Prime matter, which is a being in potency, is introduced as an example of a broader application of the notion ‘subject’. But is the implication of this passage that prime matter is in fact the subject of the soul? Or is the example of prime matter only invoked to draw attention to the necessary potentiality of whatever is the subject of the soul? To answer this question, it is necessary to look more closely at the manner in which Aquinas analyzes composite substances in general. Conveniently enough, Aquinas himself makes this digression — not found in Aristotle — immediately after this description of the subject of the soul.

As is well known, one of the central tenets of Aquinas’s thought is the strict distinction he maintains between accidental and substantial forms. Whereas accidental forms make something be in some qualified sense, for example

33 THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, II.1, 70-216.
34 For some alternative medieval attempts to formulate the difference between substantial and accidental forms, see R. PASNAU, ‘Form, Substance, and Mechanism’, The Philosophical Review, 113:1 (2004), 31-88, 32-33.
blue, or two meters tall, substantial forms make something be unqualifiedly and per se, for example a man, or a horse.\textsuperscript{35} The accidental form makes something be in a qualified manner, because it always qualifies some already existing subject. The term ‘already existing’ should be taken in the ontological and not in the strictly temporal sense. For it is, of course, impossible for a substance to come into existence without any accidents whatsoever. Aquinas’s point here is only that there is a strict \textit{ontological} dependence of accidents on their substance.\textsuperscript{36}

The substantial form, on the other hand, cannot be ontologically dependent on a prior existing subject, since it makes something to be in an unqualified manner. If a substantial form were ontologically dependent on a prior existing subject, this subject would only be modified in some qualified sense by the substantial form, in which case the strict distinction between substantial and accidental forms collapses. At the same time, the substantial form must inform something, since that is precisely the function of any form, be it substantial or accidental. Since this “something” that is informed by the substantial form cannot be something existing in actuality, it must be something existing in mere potentiality, that is, it must be prime matter.\textsuperscript{37} Prime matter is the ultimate substrate of change, and is that which is informed by substantial form. Here we encounter, once more, Aquinas’s famous position of the unicity of substantial form.

One of the main reasons for Aquinas to accept Aristotle’s definition of the soul is its ability to account for the fundamental unity of any living being in general, and of man in particular. The soul is not just any act of a living being, it is its first and substantial act, the very act that makes a thing to be what it is. By implication, the unity of soul and body is not just any (accidental) unity, but it is the most fundamental unity there is: the unity of a substance. Soul and body are not two different things, temporarily joined together. Rather they constitute one single substance. Even though this description becomes more complicated when the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body is accounted for, it is important to keep in mind that all these complications are consistently resolved by Aquinas within the framework of a fundamental substantial unity of man — and of any substance for that matter —, which is

\textsuperscript{35}THOMAS AQUINAS, \textit{SentdeA}, II.1, 71\textsuperscript{242–247}: “Sciendum est autem quod hec est differentia inter formam accidentalem et substantialem, quod forma accidentalis non facit ens actu simpliciter, set ens actu tale vel tantum, ut puta magnum vel album vel aliud aliud huiusmodi, forma autem substantialis facit esse actu simpliciter.”

\textsuperscript{36}That is, the existence of a particular accident implies the existence of the particular substance it is an accident of, but not vice versa.

\textsuperscript{37}THOMAS AQUINAS, \textit{SentdeA}, II.1, 71\textsuperscript{249–251}: “Forma autem substantialis non aduenit subiecto iam preexistenti in actu, set existenti in potencia tantum, scilicet materie prime.”
guaranteed by the fact that (1) every substantial form informs prime matter directly, and its counterpart that (2) every substance has one substantial form only.

But seen from this perspective, Aquinas’s remarks on definitions in his commentary on the *De anima* start to seem puzzling. Recall that he argued that when defining accidental as well as substantial forms, we need to posit their subject in their definition. But the subject posited in the definition of the soul is ‘a natural organic body having life in potency’, whereas he just argued that the subject of the soul is the same as the subject of any other substantial form, that is, prime matter. And it seems impossible to uphold both these positions at the same time. So either the subject of the soul is not prime matter, or the soul is a very peculiar substantial form in the sense that in its definition we need to posit something outside of it that is not its subject, but something else.

After explaining the difference between accidental and substantial forms in his lecture on *De anima* II.1, Aquinas claims that this distinction invalidates the hierarchical plurality of substantial forms in substances — where matter receives a succession of increasingly complex substantial forms — defended by Avicebron in his *Fons vitae*. When Aquinas gives his brief description of this position, he makes it very clear why he considers it false. The passage is worth quoting at length.

Oportet enim secundum premissa dicere quod una et eadem forma substantialis sit per quam hoc individuum est hoc aliquid sive substantia et per quam est corpus et animatum corpus et sic de aliis; forma enim perfectior dat materie et hoc quod dat forma minus perfecta et adhuc amplius. Unde anima non solum facit esse substantiam et corpus, quod etiam facit forma lapidis, set etiam facit esse animatum corpus. Non est ergo sic intelligendum quod anima sit actus corporis et quod corpus sit eius materia et subiectum, quasi corpus sit constitutum per unam formam que faciat eum esse corpus et superveniat ei anima faciens ipsum esse vivum corpus, set quia ab anima est et quod sit et quod corpus sit et quod sit corpus vivum. Set hoc quod est esse corpus, quod est imperfectius, est quasi materiale respectu vite.

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38 For Avicebron as the source for the theory of the plurality of forms (mediated by Dominicus Gundissalinus), see above, p. 38, footnote 82.  
For according to what was said previously, it is necessary to say that it is one and the same substantial form by which this individual thing is a particular or substance, and by which it is a body and an animated body, and so on. For the more perfect form gives to matter both that which the less perfect form gives and something more. Therefore the soul not only brings about being substance and being body — something which the form of a stone does as well — but also being animated body. It should not be understood, therefore, as if the soul were the act of a body and that body were its matter and subject, as if body were constituted by one form that makes it be a body and the soul supervenes on it, making it a living body. But rather it should be understood that it is by the soul that it exists, that it is a body, and that it is a living body. But being a body, which is less perfect, is as it were matter with respect to life.

This passage leaves no doubt that the soul informs prime matter just as any other substantial form does. In addition, the passage also shows one of Aquinas’s metaphysical principles — that the higher can do everything the lower can do and something more in addition —, as applied to substantial forms. Let us call this the hierarchy principle, as we will encounter it several times more. In the context of substantial forms it means that one single substantial form gives the whole range of perfections that are proper to a given substance; the soul not merely animates a living being, but it also gives it its corporeality, and, indeed, its substantiality. Most importantly for our present purposes, the final sentence of the passage provides a clue for the interpretation of Aquinas’s definition of the soul: being a body, although it is less perfect, is in a manner of speaking matter with respect to life. The body is not strictly speaking the matter of the soul, but functions in the definition as if it were the matter of soul.\footnote{Compare also the passage quoted on p. 129 where the body was referred to as being 'magis sicut subiectum et materia quam sicur aliquid in subiecto existens.'} It is clear, however, that the matter that is informed by the soul cannot in the strict sense be a part of the definition of the soul in the same manner as the subject of an accident is included in the definition of that accident, because the soul informs prime matter, which, taken in itself, has no properties whatsoever; it is just pure potency. Prime matter cannot be a part of the definition of the soul, because it cannot even be described in itself, apart from its relation to substantial form. However, it is still necessary to posit something outside of the soul in the definition of soul, since the soul (as a substantial form) is dependent on a subject for its very being. Aquinas’s solution then is to say that there is indeed something other than the soul posited in the soul’s definition, which in this definition functions semantically as its matter or subject, although it is not its matter or subject in the strict metaphysical sense.
But then, in exactly what sense does the natural organic body having life in potency function as a quasi subject in the definition of the soul? To answer this question, we should first determine the meaning of the potency in question, something which Aristotle himself had also done:

We must not understand by that which is potentially capable of living what has lost the soul it has, but only what still retains it; but seeds and fruits are bodies which are potentially of that sort. Consequently, while waking is actuality in a sense corresponding to the cutting and the seeing, the soul is actuality in the sense corresponding to sight and the power in the tool; the body corresponds to what is in potentiality; as the pupil plus the power of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul plus the body constitutes the animal.41

In his interpretation of this passage, Aquinas distinguishes between two senses of potency. In the first sense, being in potency to something means lacking the power to do that thing. In the second sense, being in potency to something means having the power to do that thing, while not doing it at the moment.42 This second sense is intended in the definition of the soul according to Aquinas. This means that the body having life in potency is not a body that lacks a soul, which would correspond to the first sense of being in potency, but rather a body that has a soul although it does not actually exercise all its powers. In a similar way, the eye is in potency to seeing not in the sense that it lacks sight, but in the sense that it has the power of sight even when it does not actually see something. This makes it clear that the body having life in potency is a body that already has a soul. I think it is accurate to summarize Aquinas's position as follows: the very notion of a 'natural organic body having life in potency' is unintelligible if we try to understand it without reference to the soul, since soul is precisely the formal principle which constitutes this 'natural organic body having life in potency.'43 Aquinas reads the passage in Aristotle quoted above carefully and points out that the seeds and fruits that Aristotle mentions are not themselves the bodies that are mentioned in the definition of the soul. Rather, they are capable of becoming such bodies. Fruits and seeds are in potency to becoming such 'natural organic bodies having life in potency'.44

41Aristotle, De anima, II.1, 412b25–413a3.
42Thomas Aquinas, SentdeA, II 2, 75108–112
43Recall that this was Ackrill's claim also. See above, section 4.1
44Thomas Aquinas, SentdeA, II.2, 75120–24, “Set verum est quod semen et fructus, in quo conservatur semen plante, est in potencia ad huismodi corpus vivum quod habet animam: nondum enim semen habet animam, set est in potencia ad animam.” In other places Aristotle hesitates when it comes to the question of whether we should say that seed is potentially a man;
Most of the elements of Aquinas's interpretation have now been discussed. But it might be useful to return one more time to the quasi material role the natural organic body having life in potency fulfills in the definition of the soul. The clearest expression of the precise meaning of quasi material is, however, not found in the Sentencia libri De anima, but in the Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis:

Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum forma perfectissima det omnia que dent forme imperfectiores et adhuc amplius, materia, prout ab ea per­ficitur eo modo perfectionis quo perficitur a formis imperfectioribus, consideratur ut materia propria respectu illius modi perfectionis quem addit perfectior forma super alias, ita tamen quod non intelligatur hec distinctio in formis secundum essentiam set solum secundum intelli­gibilem rationem. Sic ergo ipsa materia secundum quod intelligitur ut perfecta in esse corporeo susceptivo vite est proprium subjectum anime.45 (my emphasis SdB)

As to the second <objection>, it must be said that the most perfect form imparts everything that the more imperfect forms impart and some­thing more. Therefore matter, according as it is perfected by this form <i.e. the soul> in the same kind of perfection wherein it is perfected by more imperfect forms, is considered to be proper matter in relation to that kind of perfection which the more perfect form adds over and above the others. But it is so in such a way that this distinction among forms is not understood as something based on their essence, but only as something based on their intelligible concept. Thus, therefore, mat­ter itself according as it is understood to be perfect in corporeal being capable of receiving life, is the proper subject of the soul.

This passage confirms the interpretation of Aquinas as given so far. The body to which Aristotle refers in his definition is not really the matter for the soul (for this can only be prime matter), but is considered by us to be proper matter for the soul, insofar as it exemplifies the perfections that were imparted by the previous, less perfect substantial forms.46 But strictly speaking, even these perfections are in reality given by the soul, because it imparts all that the

45 Thomas Aquinas, QdSpr, a. 3, ad. 45.38-469.
46 'Previous' should be taken here in the temporal sense. Although at any one point in time a substance can have only one substantial form, in the order of generation there is a succession of substantial forms. In this succession, the next, more perfect substantial form corrupts the previous one, and imparts all the perfections of the previous form and something more to the substance.
lower forms imparted and something more. This passage thus finally makes clear the precise sense in which the natural body having life in potency is quasi material in the definition of the soul. For although it is true that every substantial form informs prime matter, and in a sense, therefore, all substantial forms inform the same (i.e. prime) matter, it is usually more informative to refer to matter as already having some form. When we speak about matter in this latter sense, we must say that only specific types of matter–form composites are capable of turning into specific types of substances. In the case of living beings, what serves as matter are semen, seeds and fruits. These are not living substances, but they are capable of becoming living substances. The reason that they are not living substances is that they lack an actual soul.\footnote{47} In Aquinas’s terms, this means that they are capable of turning into substances of such complexity that they become properly disposed to being alive.

To sum up, as Aquinas understands the definition of the soul, the ‘natural organic body having life in potency’ is not really the matter of the soul, although it functions in the definition as if it were the matter of the soul. Instead, when the soul informs prime matter, this natural organic body is the result, which has prime matter as its material principle, and soul as its formal principle. The quasi matter which is included in the definition of the soul does not exist as such before the body is actually ensouled.\footnote{48} As a result, the terms ‘having life in potency’ and ‘organic’ are interchangeable, since both point to the fact that a living body can perform a variety of operations even when it does not actually perform them, for instance, when it is asleep.\footnote{49}

Aquinas’s interpretation of the definition of the soul corresponds closely to the interpretation given by Ackrill.\footnote{50} Ackrill pointed out that in the definition of living beings in particular, but also in natural substances in general, we are not able to single out the matter apart from the form. For “the body we are told to pick out as the material ‘constituent’ of the animal depends

\footnote{47}Aristotle, De generatione animalium, translated by A. Platt, in: J Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton Princeton University Press, 1984, 737a17–18, p. 1144: “It has been settled, then, in what sense the embryo and the semen have soul, and in what sense they have not; they have it potentially but not actually.”

\footnote{48}Compare Thomas Aquinas, QdA, q. 1, 1245a36 (ad rationes): “Ad quinquantem dicendum quod in diffinitionibus formarum aliquando ponitur subiectum ut informe, sicut cum dicitur: ‘motus est actus existentis in potentia’. Aliquando autem ponitur subiectum formatum, ut cum dicitur ‘motus est actus mobilis’ et ‘lumen est actus lucidi’. Et hoc modo dicitur anima actus corporis organis organici physici, quia anima facit ipsum esse corpus organicum sicut lumen facit aliquid esse lucidum.”


\footnote{50}See above, p. 123
for its very identity on its being alive, in-formed by *psuchê*."\(^{51}\) This is what Aquinas claims as well. The body only functions *quasi* materially in the definition, but is not the soul’s matter in the sense in which the bronze is the matter of a statue. The important difference between Ackrill and Aquinas, however, lies in how they judge the impossibility of pointing out the matter of the soul. Ackrill thinks that the application of the matter–form correlation to natural substances is very problematic. Since the meaning of the matter–form distinction is grounded in the context of artifacts, the distinction is ill suited to be applied to natural substances and their powers. Aquinas, on the other hand, is not only untroubled by our inability to point out the matter of the soul, but even considers this to be fundamental for the matter–substantial form relation. Precisely because a living body is not an artifact it is impossible to single out its matter apart from its form.\(^{52}\) The consequence of this is that it is also impossible to define properly the form apart from its matter. Any adequate definition of the substantial form of a natural substance necessarily includes a description of the proper matter in which it is realized. Only in artifacts, where the form is accidental and not substantial, can we identify the matter apart from the form, which is precisely why we do not count artifacts as real substances.\(^{53}\)

### 4.1.2 The Anonymi

Aquinas’s discussion of the definition of the soul is exceptionally detailed. No such detailed exposition can be found in any of the anonymous commentaries of the 1270s. The treatment by Anonymus Bazán in particular is extremely brief. But even brief treatments can give us insight into what elements of

\(^{51}\) ACKRILL, ‘Aristotle’s Definitions’, 70.

\(^{52}\) THOMAS AQUINAS, *SentDæA*, II.1, 68–69\(^{76–83}\): "Unde substancia composita sic diffinitur quod in eius diffinitione non ponitur aliquid quod sit extra essenciam eius. In omni autem diffinitione forme ponitur aliquid quod est extra essenciam forme, scilicet proprium subiectum eius sive materia. Unde, cum anima sit forma, oportet quod in diffinitione ipsius ponatur materia sive subiectum eius."

\(^{53}\) Aquinas was fully aware of the difference between Aristotle’s examples of the matter–form relation (in which he keeps referring to artifacts) and the real relation between matter and substantial form (where matter cannot be pointed out apart from the form). But instead of thinking that the use of artifacts makes the real relation difficult (or even impossible) to interpret, he describes the use of such examples as a proper didactic tool. THOMAS AQUINAS, *SentDæA*, II.2, 74, 14–25: “Quia enim forme artificiales accidencia sunt que sunt magis nota quo ad nos quam forme substantiales, utpote sensui propinquiora, ideo convenienser rationem anime, que est forma substantialis, per comparisonem ad formas accidentales manifestat <i.e. Aristoteles SdB></i>. Similiter etiam partes anime sive potencie eius manifestiores sunt quo ad nos quam ipsa anima (procedimus enim in cognitioane anime ab objectis in actus, ab actibus in potentias, per quas anima ipsa nobis innotescit), unde convenienser etiam per partes ratio anime manifestatur.”
The definition were being singled out as standing in need of an explanation. The discussions by the Anonymi can be grouped into three themes, the first of which is the characterization of the soul as form with its connotation of actuality. This is followed by the discussions on the phrase 'having life in potency'. The final theme concerns the subject of the soul.

The soul: matter or form?

The problem with the characterization of the soul as form (as it appears in the anonymous commentaries) is that there are several similarities between the soul and matter; all of these seem to indicate that the soul is matter rather than form. Three properties in particular seem to point to such an identification of the soul with matter: its potentiality (est in potentia), its passivity (pattitur) and its receptivity (est receptivum). Since form was considered to be the active, determining principle of a substance, an explanation of the existence of these properties was needed. Anonymus Bazán and Anonymus Van Steenberghen both discuss this topic. It is clear, however, from the length and style of their treatment that it was not considered to be a serious philosophical problem; for that, the intuition that the soul is the active principle of the vital operations was much too strong. Their replies are almost identical, both of them pointing out that the soul's likeness to matter is only superficial, for although both matter and soul are receptive, passive and potential, they are so in respect of different things, and, more importantly, in different ways:

Sed intelligendum propter dissolutionem rationis, quod receptio animae et materiae primae non sunt unius rations receptiones, qua receptiones dfferent secundum diversitatem receptorum et secundum modum recipiendi.\(^{54}\)

But in order to dissolve the argument (according to which the soul is matter SdB), one should realize that the receptivity of the soul and of prime matter are different kinds of receptivity, because receptivities differ according to a difference of the received things and according to the manner of receiving.

Whereas matter is in potency to real forms (formas reales), the soul is in potency to intentional forms (formas intelligibiles et intentionales).\(^{55}\) To un-

\(^{54}\) Anonymus Van Steenberghen, QdA, II.2, 199–200\(^{30–33}\) See also Anonymus Bazan, QdA, II.1, 403–404\(^{35–41}\).

\(^{55}\) The difference between real and intentional forms is surprisingly difficult to formulate. A formulation solely in terms of cognitive capacities (or the lack thereof) is insufficient, since forms can also exist intentionally in a medium, such as air or water (the so-called species in medio). This difficulty in formulating what the difference consists in is one of the main reasons...
nderstand this argument, one must be aware of the outlines of medieval Aristotelian theories of cognition. Cognition (both intellectual and perceptual) was characterized as a certain kind of change in the living being, analogous to the various non-cognitive changes found in nature. Within this model, every change, whether cognitive or non-cognitive, is described as the reception of a particular form by a particular subject. Once a cognitive theory is phrased in terms of a reception of forms, some sort of difference is required between those forms taken on in cognition and those forms taken on in non-cognitive changes. For it must be possible to distinguish between taking on the form of blue by becoming blue, and taking on the form of blue by seeing or understanding blue; otherwise we would not have a theory of cognition. One of the ways of accomplishing such a separation is by distinguishing between two different kinds of forms, real forms (that make something blue) and intentional forms (that makes one cognizant of blue).

This difference between real and intentional forms corresponds to a difference in the manner in which these forms are received. Characteristic of the reception of a real form in matter is that the reception is always accompanied by a corruption of a contrary form, which is expressed in the adage 'the generation of one thing is the corruption of another' (generatio unius est...
**Corruption alterius**. For example, when the form of heat is received in water, the contrary form of cold that the water previously had will be corrupted. The reception of an intentional form, however, is not accompanied by the corruption of a contrary form, which is why such a reception is more properly described as a perfection than as a change. This difference was considered to give enough grounds to distinguish between the soul and prime matter.

**Having life in potency**

A more important (and more controversial) aspect of the definition, which is discussed in the commentaries of Anonymus Giele and Anonymus Van Steenberghen, is its final part, the 'having life in potency' of the organic body. The question of how this should be interpreted is closely linked to the question of what kind of body functions as the subject of the soul. The problem with this part of the definition — that Anonymus Giele focuses on and which also occupied much of Aquinas’s attention — is that it refers to life as potential whereas one would expect a reference to life as actual. For if the soul is the principle of life, then whatever has a soul must be actually living and not merely potentially. Aquinas had solved this problem by appealing to the distinction between first and second potencies. ‘Having life in potency’ refers to the fact that the vital operations of a living being are not continuously active (that is, they are always in second potency, but not always in second act). But even when they are not active, as, for example, sight is inactive during sleep, the living being is still alive. Hence the soul is the act of what has life in (second) potency, and the vital operations are the actualizations of that potency. The Anonymi take the same approach. For instance, in the words of Anonymus Van Steenberghen:

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58 Anonymus Bazán, QdA, II.1, 40443–48. “Dico quod duplex est passio. Quaedam est passio proprie dicta, quaedam improprie. Propria autem passio est illa quae fit cum abiectione alcius, ut quando homo est in bona dispositione et tunc, malo sibi adveniente, illa dispositio abicitur et iste patitur. Alia est passio improprie dicta, quae idem est quod salus et perfecto, et hoc cum additione, et non patitur propriamente.” Alternatively, one could also deny that the soul is, properly speaking, a being in potency. This approach was favored by John of Jandun, QdA, II.1, 68–69: “Et cum dictur quod anima non est ens in actu dico quod immo, licet istud communiter non dicatur. Et probo quia: sicut materia se habet ad potentia, sic forma ad actum, sed vere et proprie potest dici quod materia est ens in potentia, ergo vere et proprie potest dici quod forma substantialis est ens in actu.”

59 The problem is formulated explicitly in one of the arguments given in Anonymus Giele, QdA, II.3, 6627–29: “Videtur quod non, quia vita et anima sunt idem; ergo anima in actu, vita in actu; ergo habens animam in actu, vitam in actu est habens; ergo anima est actus habentis vitam in actu, non in potentia.”
Unde attendens Aristoteles ad huiusmodi operationes in actu dicit quod anima est actus corporis habentis vitam in potentia. Unde dicit Aristoteles quod haec potentia non abicit animam. Aliquid enim potest esse in potentia ad huiusmodi operationes et tamen habet principium huismodi operationum, ut animam.\(^60\)

Whence Aristotle — paying close attention to such operations (that is, sensing or understanding Spiele) in act — says that the soul is the act of a body having life in potency. Whence Aristotle says that this potency does not exclude the soul. For something can be in potency to such operations and nevertheless have the principle of such operations, as the soul.

Although the passage does not employ the terminology of first and second potencies, it is clear that the same distinction to which these terms are normally applied is also made here. The potency of which Aristotle speaks in his definition of the soul is the potency to actually exercising the various operations (second potency) and not the potency to being able to exercise these operations (first potency). In Anonymus van Steenberghen’s terms: the body potentially alive has the soul as the principle of the vital operations, whether it exercises these operations or not.

Anonymus Giele is even more clear on what kind of body the definition of the soul refers to:

Unde quoniam corpus est habens animam secundum modum, secundum quem non semper est in postremo actu, ideo dicitur actus viventis in potentia, ita quod corpus habens animam non est vitam habens in potentia sicut semen vel fructus, nec in postrema perfectione vitae, sed medio modo: ut sicut habens scientiam in habitu, non sicut penitus ignorans, nec tamen sicut actu considerans.\(^61\)

Hence because the body is something which has a soul in the second manner, according to which it is not always in the final act, (the soul) is called the act of what is alive in potency, in such a way that the body that has a soul is not something which has life in potency in the manner of seeds or fruit, nor which is in the final perfection of life, but in an intermediate way: as that which has knowledge habitually, not as that which is fully ignorant, nor as that which is actually considering the knowledge.

\(^{60}\) Anonymus Van Steenberghen, QdA, II,4, 202\(^{17-21}\). The proximate source for this was most likely Averroes who likewise interprets the part ‘having life in potency’ as meaning that the soul is a power that is the source of the various manifestations of life. Averroes, Comment. magnum in DA, II,4, 134\(^{44-48}\): “Et dixit ‘habens vitam in potentia’. Idest, et necesse est ut in anima sit substantia secundum quod est forma corporis naturalis habentis vitam secundum quod dicitur habere illam formam in potentia, ut agat actiones vite per illam formam.”

\(^{61}\) Anonymus Giele, QdA, II,3, 66-67\(^{35-40}\).
In close correspondence to Aquinas, Anonymus Giele is careful not only to distinguish the body having life in potency (in the definition of the soul) from a hypothetical body that would exercise all of its vital operations continuously, but also from bodies that are potentially alive, in the manner in which seeds and semen are. He compares the latter type of bodies to the state of being ignorant, that is, the state in which we simply lack knowledge. The living body, by contrast, he compares to the habitual state of having knowledge, that is, the state in which knowledge has been acquired but is not actively used at the moment. Yet in contrast to Aquinas and Aristotle who mention seeds and semen only briefly in the context of the De anima, and then only to exclude them from the definition of the soul, Anonymus Giele raises two questions (II.7–8) on whether the semen has a soul and if so in what manner, something which is very uncommon in commentaries on the De anima. Interestingly, the reason why he asks these questions in such detail is not so much the passage from the De anima where Aristotle calls seeds and semen potentially bodies of the kind that the definition of the soul refers to (De anima II.1, 412b25–27), but instead the following passage from De generatione animalium:

It is not only necessary to decide whether what is forming in the female receives anything material, or not, from that which has entered her, but also concerning the soul in virtue of which an animal is so called (and this is in virtue of the sensitive part of the soul)— does this exist originally in the semen and in the embryo or not, and if it does whence does it come? For nobody would put down the embryo as soulless or in every sense bereft of life (since both the semen and the embryo of an animal have every bit as much of life as a plant), and it is productive up to a certain point.

The use of this passage from Aristotle’s De generatione animalium is surprising, for it is not normally introduced in this context in medieval commentaries on De anima. But it is also fortunate, since Anonymus Giele’s description of the status of semen clearly shows how he perceives the exact difference between the organic body in potency to life, which occurs in the definition of soul, and the semen.

What makes semen and seeds and the like so interesting as a contrast to the body to which Aristotle’s definition of the soul refers is that, although they

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62 The comparison to knowledge is suggested in Aristotle, De anima, II 1, 412a9–11 “Now matter is potentiality, form actuality; and actuality is of two kinds, one as e.g. knowledge, the other as e.g. reflecting.”

63 Aristotle, De generatione animalium, II 3, 736a27–35 The answer is summarized in 737a17–18 “It has been settled, then, in what sense the embryo and the semen have soul, and in what sense they have not, they have it potentially but not actually.”
are not living bodies in the sense of having organs, they do seem to have a certain innate capacity to develop into such a body as the passage quoted above indicates. This is why Anonymus Giele wants to call semen and seeds 'ensouled' in some sense of the word, while at the same time he wants to uphold the fundamental difference between what has a capacity for becoming a living thing and what actually is a living thing. He tries to do justice to both these considerations by claiming that seeds and semen do not have a soul secundum substantiam but they do have a soul in virtute. The technical term 'in virtute' derives its meaning from the contrast with having something substantially. If something has a soul substantially, that soul is part of its essence and of its definition. If something has a soul only in virtute, it displays some of the powers that something substantially ensouled would display, without the soul actually being part of its essence and definition.64

Anonymus Giele's description of the presence of the soul according to its powers in seeds and semen gives rise to the further question concerning the cause of these powers. It cannot be the soul because the presence of the soul according to its powers was introduced in contrast to a real substantial presence of the soul. His reply is that the efficient cause of the existence of the soul in virtute in the semen is the father's soul. But this is easily misunderstood. It means much more than just that the father is the efficient cause of the semen. Rather, it means that the power that is present in the semen is an accident of the soul of the father even though its subject is the semen. Taken on its own, the semen has no formative power. All this power derives from the father's soul, even when the semen is no longer present in the father's body.65 This is counter-intuitive, to say the least. But it makes it very clear that Anonymus Giele wants to avoid at all costs turning the semen into something which can be called alive. The semen has no soul. And even though it has formative

64 This is why it is often better to translate the terms 'in virtute'/'virtualiter' and (in those cases where it is used as its synonym) 'in potentia'/'potentialiter' by 'according to its/their powers' (potentiae/virtutes) rather than the possibly misleading translations 'potentially/virtually'

65 Anonymus Giele, QdA, II.8, 8271-77 (ad rationes): "Tunc dico quod virtus animae effectiva sit a substantia animae patris Tamen est tale accident quod non est in substantia animae sicut in subjecto, sed recipitur istud accident in alio, ita quod dicatur esse virtus animae, non quia sit eius ut subjecti, sed quia effectiva est a substantia animae, ut dicit Commentator quod formas immateriales generant formas materales per virtutes quas dederunt generantia seminibus." Strange as this may sound, grounding the formative power of the semen in the soul of the father is in fact a very plausible interpretation of Aristotle's biology of generation, in spite of the philosophically peculiar situation that arises, according to this account, when the father dies after copulation but before conception. For in that case, according to this theory, the semen would have to lose its formative powers as soon as the father dies, making conception impossible. For a clear analysis of Aristotle's account of generation along these lines see H. J. Fosseheim, Nature and Habituation in Aristotle's Theory of Human Development, PhD Thesis, University of Oslo, 2003, esp 35–39.
powers, these powers are ontologically grounded in the father’s soul and not in the semen itself.

Returning to the interpretation of ‘having life in potency’ in Aristotle’s definition of the soul, we have seen that Aquinas and the Anonymi Van Steenberghe and Giele agree that the body having life in potency must be a body which is in first actuality to life, but not, or at least not constantly, in second actuality. But it turns out that there is a difficulty with their interpretation when we apply it to the vegetative soul. Aristotle had implied — and Averroes had emphasized — that the vegetative soul is continuously in second act to its nutritive operations. If this is truly the case, and it seems reasonable enough to suppose, then it means that the body is never in second potency to these operations of the vegetative soul. That, in turn, would imply that the definition of the soul is not applicable to the vegetative soul, since the required kind of second potency (one that is sometimes in second act and sometimes not) that the definition of soul (habentis vitam in potentia) requires is lacking there. The oversight is peculiar, for the difficulty that the interpretation of Aristotle’s definition in terms of first and second potency raised for the vegetative soul must have been known. Especially since Averroes himself had used precisely this continuous activity of the vegetative soul to point out that the term ‘perfection’ is already used equivocally when applied to the vegetative and sensitive souls, since one of them is always in its second perfection (the vegetative soul), whereas the other is always in its first but only sometimes in its second perfection (the sensitive soul). Averroes employs the resulting equivocity of the definition as applied to the vegetative and sensitive souls as an argument to downplay the importance of a universally applicable definition of soul. For if there cannot even be a univocal definition applicable to both the vegetative and sensitive souls, trying to find one that is applicable to all three souls is obviously a futile exercise.

It is particularly surprising that Anonymus Giele does not see the difficulty with the vegetative soul in this solution, since he explicitly introduces the continuous activity of the vegetative soul (citing Averroes) in the context

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66 Aristotle, *De anima*, II.4, 416b12–14; Averroes, *Commentarum magnum in DA*, II 5, 136'52: "Anima autem nutritiva nunquam inventitur in animalibus nisi secundum postremam perfectionem, nisi aliquis ponat quod sit quidam modus animalium qui non nutritur in aliquo tempore, scilicet in tempore in quo manet in lapidibus, ut rane magne, que nihil thesaunzant et manent tota hyeme in lapidibus, et similiter plurès serpentes "

67 Michael Scotus’s Latin translation of Averroes’s commentary uses the term perfectio instead of actus when rendering Aristotle’s definition. Averroes discusses the equivocation of the definition in *Averroes, Commentarum magnum in DA*, II.5.

68 See Doig, ‘Towards Understanding Aquinas’ *Commentarum in de anima*, 440–441
of the definition of the soul.\textsuperscript{69} In addition, he mentions that the presence of the principle of an operation will always result in the exercise of that operation unless there is some impediment.\textsuperscript{70} But in his reply to these arguments he ignores the vegetative soul completely and discusses the case of a sleeping man instead, thus switching to the sensitive soul where the problem of continuous activity does not exist. A man who sleeps does not perceive although he has a soul: this is something that can, indeed, be explained by distinguishing between first and second potencies. But such a reply does not address, let alone solve, the difficulty concerning the vegetative soul, since there the problem is that the soul is \textit{never} in second potency, but always in second actuality.

That their interpretation of Aristotle's definition would seem to exclude the vegetative soul from the definition seems to have escaped these commentators. In fact, most commentators either fail to see or ignore this problem. And even when the problem was noticed, as is the case in Brito's commentary, the solution is not very convincing.\textsuperscript{71} Almost all the focus in the commentaries on the \textit{De anima} is on the sensitive and intellective souls. Although the vegetative soul is mentioned often enough, it receives little discussion.

\textsuperscript{69}ANONYMUS GIELE, \textit{QdA}, II. 2, 66\textsuperscript{20-21} (rationes). "Praeterea, nutritiva semper est in postrema perfectione, ut dicit Commentator; ergo et sensitiva."

\textsuperscript{70}ANONYMUS GIELE, \textit{QdA}, II.2, 66\textsuperscript{14-19}. Walter Burley also refers to the continuous activity of the vegetative soul by quoting Averroes: \textsc{Walter Burley}, \textit{ExpdA} [unpublished transcription by Paul Bakker], II.3, f. 21\textsuperscript{a}. "Contra si diffinitio esset sic intelligenda, non conveniret omnini anime. Nam anima nutritiva nunquam est in potentia ad operationes vite, quia, per Commentatorem secundo \textit{huius}, anima nutritiva nunquam inventur cum animalibus nisi secundum postremam perfectionem." However, Burley does not follow Averroes in calling the definition of the soul equivocal on account of this. Instead, he claims that the term 'in potency' is used in a meaning that is common to the vegetative and other souls without specifying what sort of commonality this is. \textsc{Walter Burley}, \textit{ExpdA} [unpublished transcription by Paul Bakker], II.3, f. 23\textsuperscript{b}: "Ad alium dicendum quod 'potentia' accepta in diffinitione anime non accipitur precise pro potentia ante actum nec pro potentia in actu, sed accipitur secundum quod est communis ad potentiam cum actu et ad potentiam ante actu etc."

\textsuperscript{71}\textsc{Radulphus Brito}, \textit{QdA}, II.5\textsuperscript{106-116}. "Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod habet vitam in actu', verum est, non habet vitam in potentia remota ab actu, sed bene potest habere vitam in potentia coniuncta actu. Vel aliter, sicut dicitur est in postione: verum est quod non est in potentia ad actu primum vite, sed bene est in potentia ad actum secundum, qui es operari quantum ad animam sensitivam et intellectivam. Et quantum ad vegetativam est in potentia coniuncta actu ad actum secundum, quia illa numquam cessat a sua operatione." If we can stretch the meaning of the 'having life in potency' this far, then why should 'in potency' be included as a part of the definition? Especially since all living bodies have at least a vegetative soul and are therefore continuously in second actuality for at least part of their vital operations. Or, to put it another way, if 'having life in potency' merely refers to the fact that a living being is able to excersise its vital operations, the definition of every substantial form should include the phrase 'having \textit{P} in potency', where \textit{P} is some description referring to whatever activity is essential for that substance.
Substantial or accidental act?

Apart from the similarities between the soul and matter and the meaning of the phrase ‘having life in potency’ in the definition of the soul — with its connections to the question of the subject of the soul — there is a third theme that is clearly identifiable in these anonymous commentaries: the question of whether the soul can be a substantial act when the body it informs needs a variety of dispositions to make it suitable for the presence of life. Given that the soul does not inform random pieces of matter, but only those, such as an embryo, which already have a great variety of dispositions that enable them to function as matter for the soul, how can we explain that these dispositions must necessarily be present prior to the advent of the soul? This may seem like an odd question. Of course these dispositions must be present prior to the advent of the soul: how else could we explain that the generation of a living being is a process in which the body becomes gradually more complex until it is able to perform the full range of vital functions that are connected to the type of living being it is? But from the perspective of a matter–form metaphysics, which holds that each substance can have only one substantial form, the question is not easy to answer.

If one holds that there can be only one substantial form in any substance — which immediately informs prime matter — then either these dispositions seem to be unnecessary, or the soul seems to be an accidental form. Suppose these dispositions remain: then the soul informs a subject that already has some degree of actuality. But given the basic principles of the unicity position, every form that informs something having actuality, no matter how small the degree, is ipso facto an accidental form. As a matter of fact, those philosophers who were convinced of the existence of a plurality of substantial forms in a substance often referred to these necessary dispositions to support their position.72 This is sound philosophical strategy on their part, since the necessity of prior dispositions is a powerful natural-philosophical argument in favor of a plurality of substantial forms. If, on the other hand, these dispositions are all corrupted at the moment the soul is introduced, then the question arises why they were needed in the first place. This might not strike us as a pressing question, but one of the fundamental axioms in Aristotelian natural philosophy is

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72 For example William de la Mare, Correctorum, In primam partem Summæ, art. 32, 145: “Praeterea. Nunquam corrumpitur unum similium ad inducendum alia similum; hoc enim otiosum esset. Ergo natura non corrumpit accidents praecedentia infusionem ad inducendum alia penitus similum post infusionem. Restat ergo quod sunt eadem accidents permanentia. Sed praecedentia praecedebant animam rationalem in materia, ergo et illa quae constat ibi esse post infusionem. Et ideo media sunt inter animam et corpus, sive inter animam rationalem et materiam.”
that nature does nothing in vain (natura nihil facit frustra).\textsuperscript{73} So if a theory referred to an action on the part of nature, of which the relevance could not be explained, this was perceived as a sure sign that the theory was false.

Although all three Anonymi, and in fact practically all late medieval commentators, deny that the necessity of prior dispositions turns the soul into an accidental form, they vary greatly in both their ability to explain the situation and the extent to which they are aware of the potential problems. Anonymus Giele, for instance, understands that the necessity of a properly disposed body (or, strictly speaking, a properly disposed piece of \textit{matter}) prior to the soul could be a problem for the substantiality of the soul and tries to solve it. But his solution raises many more questions than it answers. Claiming that the consequence that the soul would be an \textit{accidental} form only arises when the soul informs something that is already informed by another \textit{substantial} form, he denies the presence of a substantial form in the disposed body in question. Since the dispositions are merely accidents, which according to his view are not grounded in an already present substantial form, their presence is perfectly consistent with the substantiality of the soul.\textsuperscript{74} What happens when the soul is introduced, is that this piece of matter with all its accidental dispositions finally receives a substantial form, something which it lacked before. But although this reply is logically coherent, it is difficult to be satisfied with the answer. For how can accidents be present without a substantial form being present simultaneously? And what substance do they inhere in prior to the advent of the soul, if any? Anonymus Giele neither raises nor answers these metaphysical questions.

Anonymus Van Steenberghen is more aware of the difficulties that can arise when we call dispositions necessary. Since he is equally strict as Aquinas in his views of what a substantial form is (namely that through which the substance receives all of its actuality), he denies that some other act exists in the animated body prior to the advent of the soul.

Et cum assumitur quod animae in corpore animato praeeexistit alius actus, dico quod falso est, quia nec praeeexistit corpus in actu, nec substantia in actu, nec corpus organicum: imo ista omnia rationem habent ex anima et causantur per animam.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{73}Aristotle, \textit{De anima}, III.9, 432b21–23; Anonymus, AA, 6:168.

\textsuperscript{74}Anonymus Giele, QdA, II.1, 65\textsuperscript{23–99} (ad rationes): “Item, cum dicis: est actus corporis sicut materiae et hoc est ens in actu, dico quod nihil prohibet formam substantialem esse actum alciuuis entis in actu, non per formam substantialem, sed per aliquod accident. Sed quod forma substantialis sit actus alciuuis entis in actu per formam substantialem prius dantem esse illi suae materiae, hoc est impossible; sed quod sint aliquae dispositiones bene est necessarium, ut organicum, physicum etc.”

\textsuperscript{75}Anonymus Van Steenberghen, QdA, II.3, 201\textsuperscript{15–39}. Compare also Anonymus Van
And when it is assumed that some other act preexists in the animated body prior to the soul, I say that this is false. For there neither preexists a body in act, nor a substance in act, nor an organic body in act. On the contrary, all these have their ratio from the soul and are caused by it.

While strongly endorsing the unicity of substantial form, with its implication that even the actuality of the body qua body must necessarily be the result of the soul, Anonymus Van Steenberghen denies the existence of an organic body prior to the soul. He ascribes the alternative position of the plurality of forms to the ancient philosophers (Antiqui). But the manner in which he tries to explain the status of the required dispositions is not completely satisfactory. For although it is true, within the unicity framework, that the substantial form is the formal cause of all perfections of the body, even of the body’s being a body, the soul is, as was said, not introduced into random bits of matter. Only certain things, such as seeds and semen, are capable of becoming living things through a gradual acquisition of the required dispositions. But the question why certain dispositions are necessary for an organic body to come into being — let alone what happens to them — is not raised by Anonymus Van Steenberghen.

Even when in one of the questions in his commentary (‘Whether the soul is immediately united to the body’) the necessary existence of such dispositions is introduced as an argument against an immediate unity of soul and body, Anonymus van Steenberghen merely replies by reiterating his position that no perfections, including dispositions, can precede the soul when the soul is the substantial form of the body. Although he is completely justified in saying this, given his conviction that there can only be one substantial form in a substance, the problematic questions of why these dispositions must be present and what happens to them during and after the advent of the soul still remain unanswered. Indeed, it almost seems as if Anonymus Van Steenberghen ignores their role by placing all emphasis on the soul as the formal cause of all perfections of the living body.

Anonymus Bazán, who incidentally has the shortest section on the definition of the soul of all these three authors, is the first commentator to formulate

**Steenberghen, QdA, II 5, 204**: “Nonne corpus est naturale et physicum? Dico quod omnia ista habet corpus ab anima secundum diversas rationes et operationes eius: unde considerando corpus praeter animam, non erit corpus in actu, sed solum in potentia; itern, nec substantia in actu sine anima, sed solum in potentia.”

**Anonymus Van Steenberghen, QdA, II.3, 202**: “Ad aliud dicendum quod actus primum immediate unitur materiae; et omnes dispositiones, sive sint ipsius formae vel materiae, omnes sequuntur unionem formae cum materia, sive ipsum aggregatum: unde anima non praexigit corpus organicum, sed per animam est corpus organicum.”

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the beginnings of a more satisfactory position. He tries to do justice to both aspects that are found in Anonymi Giele and Van Steenberghen: the necessity of properly disposed matter prior to the advent of the soul, on the one hand, and the soul as the formal cause of all the perfections of the body, including its being a body, on the other. His answer will turn out to be so important for the later tradition that is worth citing in full:

Per hoc ad argumenta. Ad primum, cum dicitur: 'quidquid advenit enti in actu est accidens et forma accidentalis', verum est si illud ens in actu manet ens in actu. Et dicis in minore quod anima advenit enti in actu. Dico quod, anima adveniente, dispositiones omnes quae sunt in materia destruuntur et reducuntur ad animam. Iuxta quod notandum quod quando puer est in utero matris non habet animam, sed ibi tantum sunt quaedam dispositiones; et quia, quando anima advenit, tunc illae dispositiones corrumpuntur et anima introducitur, et omnes dispositiones ad animam reducuntur, ergo illae dispositiones ad animam reducuntur; ergo illae dispositiones non manent ens in actu, sed corrumpuntur. Et ita in instanti anima introducitur. 78

By this I reply to the arguments. To the first, in which it is said 'whatever comes to a being in act is an accident and an accidental form', this is true if that being in act remains a being in act. And you say in the minor premise that the soul comes to a being in act. I say that when the soul arrives all dispositions that are in matter are destroyed and reduced to the soul. In this respect it should be understood that when a child is in the mother's womb it has no soul, but there are only certain dispositions there. And when the soul arrives, these dispositions are corrupted and the soul is introduced, and all dispositions are reduced to the soul. Therefore these dispositions are reduced to the soul. And therefore these dispositions do not remain a being in act, but are corrupted. And thus the soul is introduced in an instant.

In this passage, the unicity of substantial form — and the corresponding insight that no accidental perfection of a substance can be ontologically prior to the substantial form — is guaranteed by the corruption and regeneration of every disposition that existed prior to the advent of the soul. At the moment in which the soul is introduced, all previously existing dispositions of the body are corrupted. But the passage also acknowledges the factual existence of these dispositions prior to the advent of the soul. There is no attempt to claim that because the soul is the substantial form, it directly informs prime matter and therefore does not require any preceding dispositions. Anonymus Bazán's reply to the argument clearly presupposes that there are dispositions prior to the

78ANONYMUS BAZÁN, QdA, II.2, 40525-35.
soul, which is precisely why he attempts to explain what happens to them at
the arrival of the soul. His realization that the question what happens to dis­
positions at the moment the soul is introduced must be raised and answered
gives Anonymus Bazán an important place in the commentary tradition on
the De anima.

Anonymus Bazán's treatment is extremely brief and not fully clear, with
its still slightly hesitant terminology: ‘corrumpuntur’ is clear enough, but ‘re-
ducuntur’ is at the very least ambiguous on the question of whether these per­
fecions remain numerically identical throughout this change. Still, this is, as
far as I am aware, the first instance of a De anima commentary in which a
metaphysical perspective that insists on the strict unicity of substantial form
is combined with a natural-philosophical perspective which describes the gen­
eration of an organism as a process. It is characteristic of the De anima com­
mentaries from that moment on that this combination is made, and that, as
a result, some new problems are discussed with increasing intensity. I will re­
turn to these new discussions in detail in section 4.3. For now, suffice it to say
that the combined perspective as it is found in Anonymus Bazán raises new
questions. The fundamental question is whether the perfections before and
after the advent of the soul are numerically identical. This Anonymus Bazán
denies; according to him they have a specific, but not a numerical identity.79
In addition, given that the accidents before and after the advent of the soul
are numerically distinct, what is the cause of the corruption of the first set of
accidents? According to Anonymus Bazán this cause is the natural agent that
disposed the matter prior to the advent of the soul.80 Ultimately, the combi­
nation of the two perspectives (metaphysical and natural-philosophical) will
change the manner in which Aristotle's definition is discussed.

4.2 Fourteenth-century interpretations

From the late-thirteenth century onward, an alternative approach to explain­
ing Aristotle’s definition became popular. Several fourteenth-century philoso­
phers began to treat it as if the soul were placed in a semi-Porphyrian tree,
taking each element of the definition as analogous to a specific difference. Al­
though strictly speaking it is not the substantial form that can be described in
terms of genus and difference, but only the substance itself, the analogy is not

79 Anonymus Bazán, QdA, I.2, 40546-48: “Et dicis quod anima advenit enti in actu orga­nizado. Dico quod illae organizationes omnes, adveniente anima, in animam reducuntur et corrumpuntur numero, sed specie non.”
80 Anonymus Bazán, QdA, I.2, 40540-43: “Dico ad hoc quod illae dispositiones non cor­rumpuntur propter animam, sed propter agens naturale, quia agens naturale disponit mate­rium ad hoc quod, anima adveniente, dispositiones materiae corrumpuntur.”
far-fetched. The popularity of this approach surely had to do with the fact that it was so well suited for didactic purposes, but perhaps also with the fact that in much of the earlier discussions on the definition of the soul, the question what type of substance the soul is the form of was always such a central element. It seems just a small step from there to discussing the definition of the soul in a manner analogous to the definition of a substance. In this section I will first sketch the use of this new approach by the fourteenth-century commentators. Next, I will discuss how these same commentators also continued to discuss the problematic aspects of Aristotle's definition.

The 'Porphyrian' approach to Aristotle's definition can be found in John of Jandun, John Buridan, Anonymus Patar, and Pierre d'Ailly, all of whom give a very similar explanation, differing mostly in their explanation of the final part ('having life in potency'). Jandun and d'Ailly explain the definition in the following manner: by using the term 'act', Aristotle wants to exclude prime matter that is in pure potency. By adding the term 'first', he wants to exclude all second acts, which are identified as the various operations and motions of the living being. By adding the term 'of a body', he wants to exclude all acts of a living being that are also called first acts, but that do not belong to the body. These are the various intellectual dispositions, such as knowledge, virtue and mastery of an art. By adding the term 'natural' (or 'physical'), they continue, Aristotle wants to exclude all artifacts, leaving only the natural bodies of which, by adding the term 'organic', the simple homogeneous elements are also excluded. Finally, by adding 'having life in potency' he means to exclude the corpse that remains when the living being dies (Jandun) or the bodies that are seeds or semen (d'Ailly).

Buridan and Anonymus Patar offer a slightly different explanation, partly because they use a definition of the soul that differs subtly from the one used by Jandun and d'Ailly. The two variants of the definition are the following:

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81 What makes this step even smaller is that the immortality of the soul and its continued subsistence after death gives it many of the characteristics normally associated with a primary substance.

82 John of Jandun, QdA, II.3, John Buridan, QdA, II.3, 37–39, Anonymus Patar, QdA, II.4, 535–537, and Pierre d'Ailly, Tractatus de anima, in: O. Pluta, Die philosophische Psychologie des Peter von Ailly. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie des späten Mittelalters, Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner, 1987, c. 1, tertia pars: explanationis dearticulatio, 6. Although Nicole Oresme, QdA, II.1, 131–2 also discusses each part of the definition separately, I do not include him in this group. Instead of using the different parts of the definition to clearly distinguish the ensouled being from non-living things, Oresme has a completely different agenda. He offers two alternative interpretations for most of the parts of the definition. In this manner, he tries to show how Aristotle's definition is compatible with both the unicity and the plurality of substantial form frameworks. This clearly distinguishes his approach from the 'Porphyrian' approach.
- anima est actus primus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis (Jandun, d'Ailly)

- anima est actus primus *substantialis* corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis (Buridan, Anonymus Patar)

Buridan and Anonymus Patar side with d'Ailly on the function of 'having life in potency' and say that its function is to exclude seeds and semen. But they offer alternative interpretations for 'of a body' and 'physical'. According to them the function of 'of a body' is not to exclude anything, but to indicate the material cause of the soul. Similarly, the function of 'physical' is not to exclude anything, but to indicate the soul's relation to motion and natural operations (Buridan) or to designate that the soul's relation to the body is natural (*per naturam*) and not artificial (*per artem*) (Anonymus Patar). Buridan and Anonymus Patar do exclude knowledge and other habits, similar to how Jandun and d'Ailly interpreted 'of a body', but assign this role to the term 'substantial', which was lacking in the definition used by Jandun and d'Ailly.

Discussing Aristotle's definition as if it consisted of a semi-genus and semi-specific differences gives the definition a clarity that was often lost when it was discussed by looking at the potentially problematic parts in detail. Taking the definition as a whole, it accurately points to that class of beings that we would be willing to call alive. After expounding the meaning and function of the different elements of the definition, Jandun even exclaimed: "see how reasonably and beautifully Aristotle defines the soul, because no element is placed there superfluously, but all usefully and aptly!"

But no matter how beautiful and useful the elements of this definition may be, explaining them in this manner is a way of sidestepping and avoiding the various difficulties connected with it. This is why this explanation was not perceived as a replacement for a more detailed analysis of the various elements.

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83 This variant is also used in the Lokert edition of Buridan's commentary and in Oresme's commentary.

84 Olaf Pluta, the editor of d'Ailly's treatise, noted the similarities between d'Ailly's explanation of the elements of the definition and Buridan's (as it is found in the Lokert edition of his *De anima* commentary). See O. Pluta, *Die philosophische Psychologie des Peter von Ailly* *Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie des spaten Mittelalters*, Amsterdam. B. R. Gruner, 1987, 6, footnote 7. But given that d'Ailly sides with Jandun, both in the formulation of the definition (that is, without using the term 'substantial') and in the explanation of the terms 'of a body' and 'physical', Jandun's commentary is the more likely source.

85 JOHN OF JANDUN, *QdA*, II.3, 80: "Ecce quam rationabiliter et pulchre Aristoteles definit animam, quia nulla partcula superflue ponitur, sed utiliter et commode!"

86 Except in the case of Pierre d'Ailly. I will return to this in chapter 5.
For the most part, the arguments and themes found in the three anonymous commentators continue to be used in the later commentary tradition, but the discussions tend to become more elaborate. To show the developments in the discussions in the period after the Anonymi, I will group the arguments into two basic themes, proceeding from the less to the more controversial: the substantiality of the soul and the actuality of the body. The last of these themes leads fourteenth-century commentators into an elaborate discussion of the dispositions of the living body, which will be treated in a separate section.

4.2.1 The substantiality of the soul

Although none of the fourteenth-century commentators really doubted that the soul is a substantial form, the same objections against this position that were raised in the thirteenth century were still being discussed in the fourteenth.\(^87\) In particular the soul's likeness to matter in some respects and the reference to the body in the definition of the soul continued to be discussed.

Material characteristics

The potential character of the soul and the other characteristics it seems to share with matter were still discussed in a similar manner as before, but with more sophistication. When Jandun replies to the argument that the soul is passive and is therefore more like matter than like form, he is no longer satisfied with making the traditional distinction between being passive properly speaking (in which case the reception of a form implies the corruption of contrary forms) and being passive in a way which has to do more with perfection

\(^{87}\) That the description of the soul as a substantial form had become commonplace is also shown by the fact that the council of Vienne (16 October 1311–6 May 1312) adopted the description of even the intellective soul as form. See above, p. 40, footnote 87. This council's decision was made in the context of the condemnation of the teaching of Peter Olivi. See E. MüLLER, *Das Konzil von Vienne 1311–12. Seine Quellen und sein Geschichte*, Munster: Aschen­dorff, 1934, esp. 352–85 and T. SCHNEIDER, *Die Einheit des Menschen. Die anthropologische Formel 'anima forma corporis' im sogenannten Korrekturienstreit und bei Petrus Johannis Olivi. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte des Konzils von Vienne*, Münster: Aschendorff, 1973, esp. 247–257. Olivi's views on the soul–body relation are discussed in R. PASNAU, 'Olivi on the Metaphysics of Soul', *Medieval Philosophy and Theology*, 6 (1997), 109–132. What was at stake in the council's formulation was to guarantee the essential human nature of Christ. But an unexpected side effect of this decision turned out to be the promotion of the unicity of substantial form paradigm. Even though the council makes no decision on the question of whether there is one substantial form or whether there are many in any substance — its formula of the rational soul is compatible with both — most commentators seem to have interpreted it as endorsing the unicity paradigm.
(in which case the reception of a form does not imply the corruption of contrary forms). As he (rightly) points out, the soul is not only passive in the sense that has to do with perfection, but it is also passive in the proper sense. Almost everything connected to the sensitive and vegetative soul is, in fact, passive properly speaking. Instead of denying that the soul is passive in the strict sense, Jandun denies the principle underlying the argument that if something is passive in the strict sense, it must be matter. According to Jandun, if a substantial form is either essentially or operationally related to matter, it can and will be passive even if it is not matter. This solution is much more satisfactory than the previous attempts by the Anonymi. But again, the fact that the soul has something in common with matter, is not seen as a particularly pressing philosophical problem, neither in the late-thirteenth nor in the fourteenth century. All commentators were convinced that the soul is a substantial form, something they argued for in various ways.

Substantiality confirmed

Although each commentator had his own set of arguments to demonstrate the substantiality of the soul, two arguments in particular became popular in the period following the Anonymi and are found in almost all commentaries.

The first of these refers to the soul’s nobility. The argument goes as follows: the soul is nobler than any accident; therefore the soul is not an accident but a substance. This ‘nobility argument’ finds its origin in Averroes and had

88 See p. 139.
89 John of Jandun, Qda, II.2, 72: “Ad aliam, cum dicitur quod patitur etc., dicunt aliqui quod duplex est passio, ut patet per philosophum in isto secundo. Quaedam est passio propre dicta, et quod tali passione patitur non est forma substantialis et talis passio est ad dispositiones corruptivas. Alia est passio improprie dicta, que est salus et perfectio, et quod tali passione patitur bene est forma substantialis. Modo dicunt quod anima non patitur primo modo, sed secundo modo. Quare etc. Posset responderi quod intelligunt de pati subiective et non terminative. Sed istud non valet, quia anima vegetativa et sensitiva non patiunt solum secundo modo sed etiam primo modo.”
90 John of Jandun, Qda, II.2, 72: “Et ideo alter dico. Cum dicitur ‘illud quod patitur etc.’ dico quod duplex est forma. Quaedam est liberata omnino a materia, et talis forma non potest esse illud quod patitur, nec passione propre dicta nec passione improprie dicta. Alia est forma maternae coniuncta vel secundum esse vel secundum eius primum operationem, et talis forma bene potest esse illud quod patitur sive passione propre dicta sive passione improprie dicta. Modo talis forma est anima. Quare etc.” The difference between being essentially related to matter and operationally related to matter plays a large role in Jandun’s description of the human intellect. Being essentially related to matter means being the form of that matter in the strict sense. Being operationally related to matter, by contrast, means being the form of that matter in the sense of using the matter as an instrument for performing some operation. For the importance of these two meanings of substantial form in Jandun, see Brenet, Transferts du sujet, 52–59.
been reintroduced by Anonymus Giele. Although it is difficult to see how the argument could have persuaded anyone, it became quite popular and is found in Brito, Jandun, Anonymus Patar, Nicole Oresme and Buridan. On most readings, however, the argument seems to beg the question. For even if it is granted that the soul is nobler than whichever accident we compare it to, the inference to its substantiality would only be valid with the introduction of another premise. Otherwise, the most we could conclude from the argument is that the soul is at least the noblest accident, which is not sufficient. If, on the other hand, we read the premise as meaning that the soul is nobler than all accidents, then it can hardly be called an argument as it simply asserts the substantiality of the soul when the only two options available are that it is either an accident or a substance. To make matters worse, if one is convinced that the soul is not a substance, there seems to be little reason to accept its nobility.

The second argument, which I will call the ‘unity argument’, is more promising. This argument tries to prove that the variety of life functions must ultimately derive from some substantial form as their unifying principle, which, in turn, is equated with the soul. An elaborate formulation is found in Buridan’s commentary. If, he argues, the most important operations of a

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1. Anonymus Giele, QdA, II.2, 65: “Item, Commentator hic dicit quod est substantia et arguitur, nam nobilis in corpore animato, illud est substantia, non accidens; sed anima est huusmodi: unde dict hic Commentator quod omne nobilius aliquo, minus dignum est nobilitate quam anima. Et hoc concedimus.”; compare Averroes, Commentarium magnum in DA, II.2, 130, 16–19.

2. Radulphus Brito, QdA, II.123-26; John of Jandun, QdA, II.1, 68; Nicole Oresme, QdA, II.1, 124; John Buridan, QdA, II.1, 4; Anonymus Patar, QdA, II.1, 225–226.

3. The ‘nobility’ argument was treated with suspicion in later times as well. According to Zabarella, who comments on the argument as it is found in Averroes, some (unnamed) philosophers considered the argument to be a petitio principii; Jacopo Zabarella, De anima, II.2, 109: “Secundo, quia petit principium cum illo syllogismo: Omne quod est nobilius omni accidente est substantia. Anima est nobilior omni accidente. Ergo. Quisquis enim negat animam esse substantiam, negabit minorem.” Zabarella himself looks more favorably on the argument, thinking that it was never intended to be a demonstrative argument, but that it was rather used “ut syllogismum probabilem, quo ducantur homines tanquam per coniecturam ad cognoscendum quod anima non sit accidentis.” (II.2, 110).

4. It is found in Radulphus Brito, QdA, II.127-31; John of Jandun, QdA, II.1, 68; Anonymus Patar, QdA, II.1, 227–228; and John Buridan, QdA, II.1, 5–7.

5. John Buridan, QdA, II.1, 5–7: “Item operationes principales substantiarum non debent reduci in aliquod accidens tanquam in principale principium ipsarum, sed in substantiam; sed operationes principales animarum, ut nutritre, sentire, et intelligere reducuntur in animam tanquam in principale principium earum; ergo etc. Et confirmatur secundum Aristotelem quia: operationes vitales non reducuntur sufficienter in accidentia, quia non in gravitatem vel levitatem, quia tunc in animali omnia ossa fient deorsum et consequenter nervi et tota caro supra. Nec reducuntur sufficienter in qualitates quatuor primas, scilicet in calidum et frigidum etc., quia hoc maxime esset in calidum. Non potest dici, quia calidum ex se non habet naturam.
living being, such as those having to do with nutrition, sensing, understanding etc., are grounded in the soul as their principle, that would justify the conclusion that the soul is a substantial form. The premise that the principal operations of a substance cannot be reduced to a set of accidents hardly seems to need justification. Once we grant that the most important operations of a substance pertain to each individual of that species, any reduction to a set of accidents seems to be ruled out. For if these operations were grounded in some accident or set of accidents, there could, in principle, be individuals within the species that would lack these principal operations, which would be absurd. It might be objected that it is still required, in order for the argument to be valid, to provide some proof that the soul can be identified with the principle to which these most important operations of a living being can be reduced. For as it stands, the argument — even if it proves that the vital operations must be grounded in a substantial form — seems to beg the question when it equates the soul with this principle of vital operations. But that objection misunderstands the project Aristotle undertakes in his De anima. He proceeds from the empirically evident fact that there is a clear difference between the living and the non-living and simply defines 'soul' as the principle that accounts for that difference. It remains to be inquired what precisely this principle is (for example, a substance or an accident) and whether there is one such principle or many. But once 'soul' has been defined as the principle that accounts for the difference between the living and the non-living, no further proof needs to be given that the principle of life is indeed the soul.

That the principal operations of a substance cannot be ultimately grounded in some accident(s) seems to need little further argument, but Buridan does provide one. His argument proceeds by elimination: the operations cannot be reduced to the qualities of lightness and heaviness, for in that case the various parts of the organism could not grow in multiple directions. Every process of growth that is grounded in the quality of lightness would result in the organism growing in the direction of the sky; and if it were grounded in the quality of heaviness the organism would grow in the
direction of the center of the earth. But neither quality on its own could explain that, even in something as simple as a plant, the organism grows in multiple directions.98 Trying to explain growth by appealing to heaviness and lightness taken together will also fail; for as Aristotle rightly asks, what is it that keeps the organism together if its heavy parts tend downwards and its light parts upwards?99 Neither can the operations be explained by reference to the four primary qualities, if only for the reason that an organism has certain maximum limits to its growth. The primary qualities taken by themselves are insufficient to explain the existence of these limits.100 Surprisingly, Buridan does not find it necessary to discuss the possibility of any other, more complex (set of) accidents being the principle of the operations and ends the argument by concluding that the principle must be something substantial, which he then equates with the soul. If the validity of the 'unity argument' really depends on the elimination of all other options, then not discussing the possibility of more complex (sets of) accidents is an oversight. Anonymus Patar avoids this by stating that it is evident that the principle operations of a substance must ultimately be grounded in a substantial form.101 Still, as Buridan's argument stands, it is certainly effective in eliminating the possibility that the primary qualities or one of their derivatives such as lightness and heaviness can account for the presence of vital operations. But the elimination seems to have more of a didactic than a demonstrative function, given that the necessary presence of the vital operations in each and every member of a species is already enough to allow the conclusion that they are ultimately rooted in a substantial form.

98 This argument is also found in Averroes, Commentarium magnum in DA, c. 14, 153⁹-¹⁴. The passage is quoted by Jandun when he discusses the 'unity argument' (John of Jandun, QdA, II.1, 68).

99 Aristotle, De anima, II.4, 416a6–10: “Further we must ask what is the force that holds together the earth and the fire which tend to travel in contrary directions, if there is no counteracting force, they will be torn asunder; if there is, this must be the soul and the cause of nutrition and growth.”

100 This is particularly clear in the case of fire, Buridan's (and Aristotle's) favorite example. Fire will keep burning and expanding as long as it is supplied with suitable combustible materials John Buridan, QdA, II.1, 6: “... quia ignis in infinitum augmentaretur si apponetur combustibile, ut dicit Aristoteles” The body, on the other hand, has certain size limits even when it is continuously supplied with food. Compare Aristotle, De anima, II.4, 416a14–18.

101 Anonymus Patar, QdA, II.1, 227⁹–⁹⁹: “Maior est nota, nam non est verisimile quod principales operationes substantiæ animatae debant reduci in accidentem tamquam in principale principium, immo magis ad substantiam.”
CHAPTER 4. The Aristotelian Definition of the Soul

Definitional dependence on the body

An important difficulty that arose in the thirteenth-century commentaries was the soul’s definitional dependence on the body. Recall Aquinas’s lengthy discussion on this topic.\textsuperscript{102} This dependence on the body was discussed as if it were a threat to the substantiality of the soul: if the soul cannot even be defined without the body, then how could it exist without the body? Although the fourteenth-century commentators still mention this argument, they use it in a very different manner. Not only do they not consider the definitional dependence to be a potential threat to the soul’s character as substantial form, but they even use this dependence to establish and confirm the natural-philosophical character of the science that studies the soul. Brito is a good example of this practice. Already in his questions on book I, he connects Aristotle’s definition of the soul to the subject matter of the \textit{scientia de anima}, saying that it is precisely because the soul is defined by reference to the body that the subject matter is the animated body \textit{qua} animated:

> Et confirmatur ex alio quia: quod est principium essendi alicuius est principium intelligendi eius; modo anima est principium essendi totius coniuncti; ergo est principium intelligendi. Et ideo totum est hic subjectum ratione anime. Et propter hoc Philosophus in secundo huius diffiniens animam diffinit eam per corpus dicendo quod anima est actus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis.\textsuperscript{103}

This <namely that the composite of soul and body \textit{qua} animated is the subject of the science of the soul \textit{SdB}> is confirmed by another argument, namely the following: whatever is the principle of a thing’s being is also the principle of understanding it. Now, the soul is the principle of the being of the whole composite. Therefore it is the principle of understanding it. And therefore the whole is the subject here \textit{qua} animated. Because of this, when the Philosopher defines the soul in book II of \textit{De anima} he does so by mentioning the body, saying that the soul is the act of a physical, organic body having life in potency.

Another interesting example is Buridan. Of course he will not draw the conclusion that the ensouled body \textit{qua} ensouled is the subject of the \textit{scientia de anima} — recall that he considered the term ‘soul’ to be the subject matter of the \textit{scientia de anima} —, but he does relate the fact that the soul is defined by reference to the body to its inclusion in natural philosophy.

In his commentary on the \textit{De anima}, Buridan mentions three types of definition: a quidditative definition, a nominal definition (\textit{quid nominis}) and a

\textsuperscript{102}See above, p. 126 and onward.

\textsuperscript{103}\textit{Radulphus Brito, QdA, I.3\textsuperscript{45–50}}: "Ut rum subjectum in illo libro sit corpus animatum vel anima."
causal definition. The nominal definition merely explains the meaning of a term, whereas a quidditative definition expresses the essence of the thing defined. The latter type of definition is the exclusive domain of the metaphysician. Natural philosophy, by contrast, is mostly interested in the third type: the causal definition. Such a definition not only explains what a thing is, but also relates it to both matter and motion. Because of this relation, it is considered to be the most perfect definition within natural philosophy.

According to Buridan, Aristotle's definition of the soul in the De anima is an example of such a causal definition. In it, the body functions as the material cause of the soul and the vital operations function in some respects as its final cause. The formal cause is, of course, lacking, because the soul itself is a form. By understanding Aristotle's definition in these terms, the fact that the soul is defined by reference to the body is no longer an indication that the soul might lack substantiality, but instead a sure sign that the study of the soul pertains to natural philosophy.

A very similar approach is taken by Anonymus Patar, whose treatment of the definition resembles Buridan's. Most importantly, he also distinguishes between a quidditative definition that is the sole domain of the metaphysician and the causal type of definitions used in natural philosophy.

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104 *John Buridan,* *QdA,* II.3, 35. For a detailed analysis of their differences, see *Klima,* 'Buridan's Theory of Definitions'. His conclusions on the development in Buridan's theory of definitions should be read with some caution, since they rely on the authenticity of the so-called *Prima lectura* (i.e. the Anonymus Fatar) as Klima himself notes. For a brief discussion of the authenticity of the *prima lectura,* see the appendix.

105 *John Buridan,* *QdA,* II.3, 35: "Item quedam est diffinitio dicens quid nominis, alia pure quidditativa, alia causalis, explicans non solum quid res est, sed etiam propter quid est. Et talis est magis perfecta."; *John Buridan,* *QdA,* II.3, 34: "Nota quod naturalis non considerât substantias secundum rationes earum simpliciter quidditativas, sed solus metaphysicus. Physicus enim solum considerât substantias in ordine ad motum et operationes ipsarum. Et quia forme materiales ad operationes suas requirunt certam materiam et appropriatam per dispositiones qualitativas vel quantitativas, ideo oportet quod naturales diffiniant formas per suas proprias materiaes."

106 *John Buridan,* *QdA,* II.3, 35–36: "Et huiusmodi <i.e. definitio causalis SdB> est ista definitio <i.e. de anima SdBx Cum enim anima sit forma, non oportet quod habeat causam formalem... Et ad exprimendum causam eius materialem et subjectivam, dicitur 'corporis physici organici'. Et ad exprimendum quodammodo eius causam finalem, dicitur 'habentis vitam in potentia', sed per 'vitam' intelligimus hic operationem vitalem. Operatio enim est quodammodo finis operantis, ut felicitas hominis."

107 *Anonymus Patar,* *QdA,* II.3, 246<sup>89–99</sup> *(ad rationes):* "... est notandum quod philosophus naturalis illa quae considerât, ipse considerât in ordine et in habitudine ad motus et operationes naturales; sic autem non facit metaphysicus. Et ergo etiam philosophus naturalis solet definire per terminos mediantibus quibus designatur huiusmodi habitudino... Et quando dicebatur: 'terminus absolutus non debet definiri per terminum relativum', hoc conceditur definitione metaphysica <mediata ed.> et pure quidditativa. Nihilominus potest definiri per terminos relativos definitione naturali quae non est definitio pure quidditativa, sed est definitio..."
he agrees with Buridan that the body functions as the material cause in the
definition, and that the vital operations function as a quasi final cause. Nicole
Oresme stands in the same tradition, with the minor exception that in his
commentary we no longer find any reservations about the adequacy of the
comparison between the vital operations and the final cause of the soul. The
vital operations are not the quasi, but the real final cause.108

Buridan uses the causal character of the soul’s definition to explain other
peculiarities of it as well. For example, his reply to the objection that the soul’s
definition contains a transcendental term (‘act’) in the place of the genus in­
stead of the normally required generic term is that in a causal definition other
terms may take over the place and function of genus and specific difference.109
In a quidditative definition this would not be permitted. Because quidditative
definitions give the essence of the defined thing, they must necessarily give its
genus and specific difference in order to show where it fits in Porphyry’s tree.
But on this point the explanations of Buridan and Anonymus Patar diverge.
Anonymus Patar makes no reference to the possibility of using other terms
than the genus and specific difference in a causal definition, but instead ex­
plains the occurrence of the transcendental term ‘act’ by appealing to the ana­
logical nature of the definition, quoting Averroes approvingly on this point.110
If a definition is analogous, it can ipso facto not be composed of a genus and a
specific difference, since the combination of these two would place the thing
defined unambiguously in the Porphyrian tree. Nor is Buridan followed by
Oresme in his understanding of the use of ‘act’ in the definition. Oresme
excuses the use of a transcendental term in the definition by saying that Aris­
totle makes it clear that what he really means is that the soul is a ‘substantial

108NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II.2, 13175-77. “Et etiam exprimit causam finalem in hoc quod
dicit ‘potentia vivam habentis’, id est operationes vitales, quae sunt finis ipsius animae.”

109JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.3, 39-40. The necessity of using a genus as the first element of
a proper definition is explained in ARISTOTLE, Topica, V.3, 132a11-4 See also ARISTOTLE,
Topica, VI.3, 140a23-32.

110ANONYMUS PATAR, QdA, II.3, 24634 (ad rationes): “Nihilominus, si definitio est analoga,
tunc primus terminus potest esse analogus, sicut est iste terminus ‘actus’. Modo praedicto
definitio animae, sicut dicit Commentator, non convenit univoce omni animae. Secundum
alam enim rationem anima intellectiva est actus et similiter motor orbis, et secundum aliam
rationem anima vegetativa, sensitiva, etc. sunt actus.” This is the only place that I have found
in which Anonymus Patar treats the definition as analogical. Compare AVERROES, Commentar­
ium magnum in DA, II 5, 136b4-54: “Animae autem nutritiva nunquam inventur in animalibus
nisi secundum postremam perfectionem; nisi aliquis ponat quod sit quidam modus animali­
ium qui non nutritur in aliquo tempore, scilicet in tempore in quo manet in lapidibus, ut rane
magne, que nichil thesaurizant et manent tota hyeme in lapidibus, et similiter plures serpentem.
Et secundum hoc erit hoc commune animae sensibili et nutritive eadem intentione; et si non,
tunc perfectio accepta in eis erit secundum equivocationem.”

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act'. In other words, Oresme thinks that the seemingly transcendental term 'act' is used in conjunction with 'substantial' and as a result the transcendental meaning of the term 'act' is restricted to the non-transcendental meaning of 'substantial form'. From a methodological viewpoint, these differences in the explanation of the elements of Aristotle's definition — especially of the term 'act' — are quite extreme. For although Buridan and Anonymus Patar both consider 'act' to be a transcendental term in the definition of soul, the former relates this to the nature of causal definitions in general, whereas the latter sees it as confirmation for the analogical(!) nature of the definition of soul. Oresme, by contrast, is of the opinion that the term 'act' functions univocally in the definition, since it is only a shorthand for substantial form.

To be sure, the same definitional dependence of soul on the body that is used to explain why and how the soul should be studied within natural philosophy was also often introduced as an objection against the substantiality of the soul, mostly by claiming that only accidents are defined by something external to them. But, like the arguments on the similarities between the soul and matter, the definitional dependence is not really seen as a threat to the status of the soul as a substantial form. Often a simple qualification that only primary substances are defined without reference to an external subject sufficed. Secondary substances — i.e. the substantial forms — are defined by reference to a subject, just as all forms are, including accidental ones.

This is not to deny that the precise extent of the soul's dependence on the body was debated. But this debate was not in terms of definitional dependence, but in terms of the metaphysical and the operational dependence between the two. That is to say, the real debate focused on the questions in what sense the body is the matter of the soul and whether the body is required for all vital operations, but not on the question of whether soul can be defined without the body. The 'having life in potency' that Aristotle mentions in his definition of the soul was one of the most important starting points for this metaphysical debate.

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111 Nicole Oresme, QdA, II.2, 133, 30–2: "Ad quintam, cum dicitur quod actus... est nomen transcendens, verum est; sed statim restringitur in hoc quod dicitur substantialis. Et ideo ista duo nomina sunt loco unius."

112 E.g. Radulphus Brito, QdA, II.19–21: "Illud quod diffinitur per additamentum est accidentes; anima est huuiusmodi, quia in diffinitione anime ponitur corpus, quod est additum extra essentiam anime."

113 The second question: whether the body is required for all vital operations was often phrased as: whether the soul has a proper operation, and could be raised in the commentary on either book I or book III. See Radulphus Brito, QdA, I.9; John of Jandun, QdA, I.11, 56–59; Anonymus Bazán, QdA, III.4, 472–474; Anonymus Giele, QdA, I.6, 37–41.
4.2.2 The actuality of the body

There had always been arguments against the soul being a substantial form that revolved around the actuality of the body. Take, for example, the following argument from Brito:

Arguitur quod non quia: quod advenit enti in actu non est forma substantialis; sed anima advenit enti in actu; ideo etc. Maior patet per Commentatorem supra secundum huius. Minor patet, quia anima advenit enti in actu, scilicet corpori organizato. Modo organizatum est in actu, quia organizationes iste presupponunt formam substantialem.¹¹⁴

It is argued that it is not: what comes to a being in act is not a substantial form; the soul comes to a being in act; therefore, etc. The major premise is clear from what the Commentator says in book II. The minor premise is clear, because the soul comes to a being in act, namely the organized body. Now, what is organized is in act, because these organizations presuppose a substantial form.

Varieties of this argument can be found in almost every commentary on the De anima in the later Middle Ages. If the soul is the act of something that already has some actuality of its own, the soul can only be an accidental form. The actuality of the body is thus turned into a denial of the substantiality of the soul. Of course, this argument can only have some force within the framework of the unicity of substantial form, since every author who upheld a plurality of substantial forms could legitimately deny the major premise that ‘whatever comes to a being in act is not a substantial form’. But the position that each substance has but one substantial form had quickly become dominant in fourteenth-century Paris, certainly among those philosophers who commented on the De anima. And they made no exceptions, not even for the most difficult case: the rational soul of a human being.

Although the commentators were more than capable of dealing with ‘organized body’ arguments insofar as the substantiality of the soul was concerned, one problem remained that began to trouble them more and more. All the emphasis put on the actuality of the body prior to the advent of the soul, indeed even on the necessity of a properly disposed body, leads to an entirely new debate that becomes more and more important from Brito onward. The context of this new debate still is the set of questions commentators raise about Aristotle’s definition of the soul in the beginning of De anima II. The topic, however, is no longer linked with Aristotle’s De anima, but much more with his De generatione et corruptione: the (lack of) numerical identity of the

¹¹⁴Radulphus Brito, QdA, II.3²-6.
accidents of the body throughout generation and corruption. For example, is the whiteness of the corpse the same whiteness as the whiteness of the living body? One of the questions in that debate is whether or not we can perceive the numerical identity of accidents. Tracing the rise of this debate will reveal a fundamental transformation in the *scientia de anima*.

4.3 Can we perceive the identity of accidents?

The rational soul informs matter, thereby constituting a single rational substance, man; this much the fourteenth-century commentators agreed upon.\(^{115}\) But although this general position was accepted, there is considerable variation in the details, as will become clear. Most of these commentators tried to work within the framework of the unicity of substantial forms, but they did not always find this easy to do. The main reason for this is that one of the implications of the unicity position — as it was understood by these later medieval commentators — is that a substantial change always implies a *complete* concomitant corruption of the previous substance. Otherwise, the new substantial form would not inform prime matter directly, but would inform something that is already constituted by another substantial form, a situation which contradicts the unicity of substantial form. But at the same time, when one substance is corrupted and a new substance generated in its place, there is a clear and predictable connection between the two. For only certain substances can change into certain other substances, that is, only those substances that are properly disposed to receiving a certain substantial form can actually receive it, even if at the moment of reception the previous substance is completely corrupted, all the way down to prime matter. An obvious question here would be ‘why are these dispositions necessary, if every substantial form directly informs prime matter’? If all these pre-dispositions are fully corrupted at the moment that the new substantial form is introduced, then why are they necessary in the first place? If they are corrupted they seem to have been there for no reason, which violates the ‘nature does nothing in vain’ principle. If, on the other hand, they are not corrupted, but remain present in the new substance, the dispositions would temporally precede the new substantial form. From the late thirteenth century onward, philosophers begin to raise and discuss the question ‘what exactly happens to these dispositions?’ in increasing detail.

It can hardly be denied that when a substantial change occurs in some living being — in other words, when a living being dies —, we perceive no im-

\(^{115}\) Even Jandun agrees, although he radically alters the interpretation of how the intellective soul is the form of the body. See p. 26, footnote 39.
mediate change in its accidents. True, the corpse will no longer exercise any of the vital operations associated with the living body. But its length, color, complexity of organs, wounds and scars, etc. still look exactly the same as before (at least for some time). Yet in spite of this similarity, the paradigm of the unicity of substantial forms seems to dictate that all the dispositions of the living being have been corrupted and that similar ones have been newly generated. In order to show why this was perceived as a problem in the fourteenth century, I will return briefly to Aquinas.

4.3.1 Aquinas

In the previous section it has become clear that Aquinas consistently and constantly explains the unity of a living being by reference to the fact that it is composed metaphysically of one single substantial form, which directly informs prime matter. This became particularly clear in his interpretation of the phrase ‘a natural organic body having life in potency’ in Aristotle’s definition of the soul. The natural organic body, or the body having life in potency (these are synonymous for Aquinas), is not strictly speaking the matter or subject of the soul. It only fulfills a quasi material role in the definition; not, however, in the real constitution of the substance. In other words, we can consider the natural organic body as the matter or subject of the soul from a semantical viewpoint when we interpret the soul’s definition, but not from the viewpoint of metaphysics.

The difference between this metaphysical and semantical point of view immediately becomes clear when one tried to describe what the natural organic body is without taking the soul into account. As this body functions as a quasi subject for the soul in the definition, it is possible from the semantical point of view to consider it on its own. What would remain in the description is some body having the required complexity and dispositions to be informed by the soul, without actually being informed by it. But now consider what would remain if one tries to consider from the metaphysical point of view what the natural organic body is without its soul. What would remain in that case, is not some body with a certain complexity and certain dispositions. Instead, nothing at all would remain. For from a metaphysical standpoint, the natural organic body is what it is, something natural, organic and a body, precisely on account of its being ensouled. If we were to try and grasp what the organic body is while setting aside one of its metaphysical components, the soul, the only thing left to consider would be its other metaphysical component, that is, prime matter. But this, taken in itself, is nothing except a pure potentiality.

\[116\] This became clear in a passage from De spiritualibus creaturis, see above, p 135.
Taking the metaphysical point of view proves to be most difficult at the moments of generation and corruption, in which some separation involving the two most basic metaphysical principles, prime matter and substantial form, actually occurs. How does Aquinas deal with the unity of the living being at these borderline cases? How does he analyze the moment a living being comes into existence, and how will he analyze the moment of its death? Unfortunately, these questions are very difficult to answer by looking at Aquinas's commentary on the De anima, as he rarely pays attention to them in that context. The most important passage and the most obvious place to discuss such matters is the following:

Et inde est quod recedente anima, non remanet idem corpus specie; nam oculus et caro in mortuo non dicuntur nisi equivoco, ut patet per Philosophum in VII Methaphisice; recedente enim anima, succedit alia forma substantialis que dat alid esse specificum, cum corruptio unus non sit sine generatio alterius.117

Therefore, when the soul departs, the body is not left specifically the same; the eyes and flesh of a dead man, as is shown in Metaphysics, Book VII, are only equivocally called eyes and flesh. When the soul leaves the body another substantial form, which gives another specific being takes its place; for the corruption of something always involves the generation of something else.

If one takes the unicity of substantial form seriously in conjunction with the principle given in the passage above that each corruption involves a concomitant generation, there can be only one description of the change occurring in death.118 The soul departs, and a new substantial form, which came to

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117 Thomas Aquinas, SentdeA, II.1, 71.
118 There is an alternative solution, which is to deny that the corpse is a substance. But this possibility is not even mentioned, let alone endorsed, in any of the commentaries I looked at. Ludwig Hodl makes a very good case for such an alternative position in which the unicity of substantial form is maintained, but the principle that each corruption involves a concomitant generation is rejected. L. HÖDL, 'Anima forma corporis. Philosophisch-theologische Erhebungen zur Grundformel der scholastischen Anthropologie im Korrektenstreit (1277-1287)', Theologie und Philosophie, 41 (1966), 536-556, 550-1: "Kritiker und Verteidiger der thomasschen Formlehre wollten die Begriffe nova forma — nova natura — introductio für das Verstandnis des Todes nicht gelten lassen. Mit Recht! Denn alle genannten Begriffe sind Seins-Termini. Sie bedeuten von Haus aus die Bewegung des Seins in der Vollendung der Seinsform. Wie konnte das Seinsvokabular Todeterminologie werden? Dieses sprachlich-begriffliche Problem wurde bisweilen im Mittelalter zu wenig gesehen." I agree with Hodl that it makes little (if any) sense to describe the death of a living being as a generation, especially from the metaphysical viewpoint that there is only one substantial form. However, as soon as the viewpoint of the natural philosopher is seen as equally valid as that of the metaphysician, the option to describe the corpse merely in terms of a lack of form is no longer open. For from
be called the form of the corpse (*forma cadavens*), is introduced. And just as the soul informs prime matter directly, so also will the form of the corpse. Now although there may be, and in fact is, a similarity between the previous (living) substance and its parts and the new (dead) substance and its parts, it is just that: a *similarity*. Even if something still looks like an eye or like flesh, it is something different now, which is why we can only call these parts eye or flesh in an equivocal sense. The plausibility of this description within a strict unicity of substantial forms framework is closely related to the level on which the change is described. As long as we focus on the whole substance and those of its parts that can be functionally described, it seems plausible enough. But as soon as we shift the focus to the level of accidents, the corruption and regeneration of the size and color of the body seems counter-intuitive at the very least. Yet the accidents must be corrupted and regenerated, since they cannot migrate from one substance into the next.

Aquinas was the first to advocate the unicity of substantial form as a general metaphysical framework rather than as a mere psychological thesis. But in spite of the novelty of this view, he pays surprisingly little attention to questions about the (non-)endurance of accidents through generation and corruption. Although he discusses the metaphysical implications of the unicity of substantial form in great detail, questions about the generational aspects of the viewpoint of the natural philosopher the inquiry into the metaphysical principles of the corpse is equally valid as the inquiry into those of the living being. And as soon as the question is perceived to be valid, then the answer can never be that the corpse lacks a substantial form, for then the implication would be that it has prime matter (pure potency) as its sole principle, which is absurd. Yet this shift to a more natural philosophical perspective is what occurs in the fourteenth century, as can be seen in the remainder of this chapter.

119 As far as I know, Aquinas never uses the term *forma cadavens*. But it can be found, for example, in Nicole Oresme, QdA, II.5, 156–157: "Vel potest dici aliter quod forma quae dispomt ad aham corrumpitur in adventu alterius, sicut forma animalis disponit et est dispositiva ad formam cadaveris, quod patet statim, quia nunquam potest introduci forma cadaveris nisi post formam animalis." The term seems to have become more popular in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (for some examples see Des Chene, *Life's Form*, 91–92). But even when the term *forma cadaveris* was not used, the principle that the corruption of a living being implies the generation of some new dead thing, rather than the continuation of the same body minus its soul, is always clearly expressed. To give but one example, Anonymous van Steenberghen, QdA, II.3, 202: "Et dico quod resoluta anima, non manet corpus eiusdem speciei, secundum Aristotelem quarto Meteororum. corruptio enim unius est generatio alterius unde, corrupto corpore animato, corrumpitur et corpus sub ratione priore, et generans est corruptens primum."

120 Aristotle’s example in *Metaphysica* VII (1035b24–25) is a finger: "for it is not a finger in any state that is the finger of a living thing, but the dead finger is a finger only homonymously." The example of the eye is taken from Aristotle, *De anima*, 412b18–22.

121 The principle that accidents cannot transfer from one substance to the next, setting aside divine intervention, was accepted as an axiom by virtually all later medieval philosophers.
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a living being, especially the role of the dispositions, are hardly discussed, let alone answered. Now, it could be objected that such questions are not pertinent or even misguided from the viewpoint of Aquinas's philosophy. But whether this is true or not has little historical relevance. For there is ample evidence that many of Aquinas's contemporaries (and most of the philosophers in the fourteenth century) were convinced that such questions about the identity of accidents are decisive for the validity or non-validity of the framework of the unicity of substantial forms. Godfrey of Fontaines, for example, mentions the apparent identity of accidents throughout generation and corruption as one of the three most important arguments in favor of the plurality of substantial forms in his Quodlibet II, quaestio 7 (Easter 1286).122

Aquinas's most general description of what happens at the metaphysical level during the generation of a living being can be found in the relatively early Summa contra gentiles II.89,123 which also draws out some implications of the succession of substantial forms.124 When Aquinas comments on the corrup-

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122Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet II, in: M. de Wulf and A. Pelzer, Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines, Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université, 1904, q 7, 96. "Et arguebatur quod homo non habeat esse ab una forma substantiali tantum, quia ponere hominem habere tantum unam formam substantialem est contra sensum, item est contra rationem, item est contra fidem Contra sensum, quia in homine mortuo ad sensum apparent eadem accidentia esse quae erant in ipso vivente. Hoc autem non esset nisi alicquos formas substantialis quae erat in ipso vivente maneret in mortuo, quia accidentia non consequuntur materiae nisi mediante forma substantiali; sed forma substantialis quae est anima non est in mortuo homine, sed alia Et illa etiam erat in vivo simul cum anima; quare etc." For the Easter 1286 date of the Quodlibet, see J. F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy, Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981, xxvii, who agrees with the date Palémon Glorieux had proposed.

123The Summa contra gentiles was written between 1258 and 1265; most of it, including book II, was composed in the period 1261/2–5 See J.-P. Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas Volume 1 The Person and his Work, Revised edition; translated by Robert Royal, Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005 (originally published as. Initiation à Saint Thomas d’Aquin Sa personne et son oeuvre, Paris [etc.]: Editions du Cerf [etc.], 1993), 328

124Thomas Aquinas, ScG. II.89, 542: "Licet enim generatio simplicium corporum non procedat secundum ordinem, eo quod quodlibet eorum habet formam immediatam maternae pri-mae, in generatione tamen corporum aliorum oportet esse generationum ordinem, propter multas formas intermedias, inter primam formam elementi et ultimam formam ad quam generatio ordinatur. Et ideo sunt multae generationes et corruptiones sese consequentes. Nec est inconveniens si aliquid intermedium generatur et statum postmodum interrumpitur, quia intermedia non habent speciem completam, sed sunt ut in via ad speciem; et ideo non generatur ut permaneat, sed ut per ea ad ultimum generatum perveniat. Nec est mirum si tota generationis transmutatio non est continua, sed sunt multae generationes intermedias, quae hoc etiam accidit in alteratione et augmento. Non enim est tota alteratio continua, neque totum augmentum, sed solum motus localis est vere continuus, ut patet in VIII Physcorum Quanto igitur aliqua forma est nobilior et mags distans a forma elementi, tanto oportet esse plures formas intermedias, quibus gradatim ad formam ultimam veniatur, et per consequens
tion of the forms of semen, blood and even the vegetative and sensitive souls during the generation of man, he touches on the question of why these forms are necessary if they are always corrupted. His answer is interesting. Aquinas points out that the corruption of the intermediate forms of the semen and of the nutritive and sensitive souls are not exceptions to, but instances of the rule. Nature is organized in such a way that the more complex a substance is, the more intermediate forms are required for it to come into being. Nor is it unfitting (inconveniens) that these intermediate forms are corrupted, because these forms do not have a complete species but are steps on the way to becoming a complete species. This argument strongly suggests that the principal reason why Aquinas did not find the generations and corruptions involved in the coming-to-be of a complex substance problematic, or even surprising, is that he tried to understand generation from the perspective of the final cause rather than the efficient cause. All intermediate forms are understood solely from the perspective of the final form, which makes the substance be what it is. The various steps in this process are never understood as independent, but always as related to the final form. If this is correct, then one of the changes that take place in the century after Aquinas is a shift of attention from final causality toward efficient causality. This shift makes that questions about the status of dispositions and previous forms in generation can no longer be sidestepped as easily, since from the viewpoint of efficient causality the causes of their generation and corruption is one of the most pertinent questions one can ask. The first signs of this shift can be seen in Brito’s commentary.

4.3.2 Radulphus Brito

At first sight, Brito’s analysis of the change occurring at the death of a living being seems to be the same as Aquinas’s:

Et dicendum quod anima est forma substantialis corporis. Et hoc probatur tripliciter vel quadrupliciter. Primo sic quia: illa forma est forma substantialis corporis qua remota non remanet idem corpus numero
plures generationes medias. Et ideo in generatione animalis et hominis in quibus est forma perfectissima, sunt plurimae formae et generationes intermediae, et per consequens corrup tiones, quia generatio unius est corruptio alterius. Anima igitur vegetabilis, quae primo inest, cum embryo vivit vita plantae, corrumpitur, et succedit anima perfectior, quae est nutritiva et sensitiva simul, et tunc embryo vivit vita animalis; hac autem corrupta, succedit anima rationalis ab extrinseco immissa, licet praecedentes fuerint virtute seminis.” The same idea is expressed more briefly in Thomas Aquinas, QdSpir, q. 11, 102300-305 (ad rationes): “Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod generatio animalis non est tantum una generatio simplex, sed succedunt sibi invicem multe generationes et corruptiones: sicut dicitur quod primo habet formam seminis et secundo formam sanguinis, et sic deinceps quousque perficiatur generatio.”
quod prius nisi equivoce; sed remota anima a corpore, non remanet idem corpus numero quod prius; ideo etc.\textsuperscript{125}

And it should be said that the soul is the substantial form of the body, which is proved in three or four ways. First thus: that form is the substantial form of the body which, when it is removed, <makes that> the body does not remain numerically the same body as before, except equivocally; but when the soul is removed from the body, the body does not remain numerically the same as before; therefore, etc.

But in spite of the similarity of Brito’s and Aquinas’s positions, on closer inspection their treatments of the Aristotelian definition of the soul are quite different. In sharp contrast to Aquinas, Brito devotes most of his attention to what happens to the dispositions and accidents during the corruption and generation of the living being, a topic which had not occupied Aquinas’s thought. In fact, Brito’s treatment of this topic in his reply to the objections is more elaborate than several of his complete questions are as a whole. Exactly why Brito’s treatment focuses on the dispositions and accidents through generation and corruption and their efficient causes, whereas this was hardly a relevant question for Aquinas, is a question we must return to later.\textsuperscript{126}

The problem that occupies Brito’s attention can be made clear by a close reading of his question ‘Whether the soul is the substantial form of the body’. In this question Brito introduces five objections against the possibility that the soul is the substantial form of the body:

1. The soul comes to a being in act, because it comes to an organized body

2. No substance is defined by something added to it

3. The soul is such a form that when it departs the body still remains numerically the same

4. The soul comes to something already having a form that remains after the advent of the soul and therefore comes to a being in act

5. If the dispositions of the body to which the soul comes were subject to corruption, they would have been in vain

Three of these arguments target the moment of generation of the living being (1, 4 and 5), two of which (1 and 4) imply that it is not prime matter

\textsuperscript{125}RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, II.3\textsuperscript{38–42}.

\textsuperscript{126}Although Aquinas does not discuss the non-identity of dispositions as a problem, the related problem of the numerical identity of the body before and after the resurrection is a topic that he pays ample attention to in his biblical commentaries. Cf. WALKER BYNUM, The Resurrection of the Body, 234, esp. footnote 17.
that is informed by the soul, but rather a being that is already actual and properly organized or disposed. One argument targets the moment of corruption of the living being (3) and the final argument (2) — which Aquinas had also discussed extensively — is concerned with the reference to the body in the definition of the soul. All in all, four out of five arguments make some reference to the organized body existing apart from the soul. Although it is difficult to compare Aquinas's Expositio with Brito's Questiones, given that these are two different genres of commentary, the very occurrence of these objections already hints at a shift of interest.

By raising these objections, Brito has forced himself to explain the manner in which dispositions before and after the advent or departure of the soul are the same. And he draws what seems to be the only possible conclusion within the framework of the unicity of substantial form:


<Objection:> It is argued that the soul is not <the substantial form of the body SdB>. For what comes to a being in act is not a substantial form; but the soul comes to a being in act; therefore etc. The major premise is clear by what the Commentator says in book II of this work. The minor premise is clear: the soul comes to a being in act, namely an organized body; now, what is organized is a being in act, because these organizations presuppose a substantial form... <Reply:> When it is said 'what comes to a being in act', this is true, if it remains a being in act; but if its <i.e. the being in act’s SdB> actuality is corrupted, it is untrue. And when it is said 'the soul comes to a being in act', I say that this actuality is corrupted when the soul comes, and a similar form and similar dispositions are introduced.

All these dispositions are corrupted and then generated anew, with the consequence that they are not numerically identical. True, the dispositions before and after the advent of the soul are completely similar, which is to say that they are specifically identical, but numerically the dispositions before and

127 Radulphus Brito, QdA, II.3 6 & 68–72.
the dispositions after the advent of the soul are different.\textsuperscript{128} Although this may sound peculiar or at the very least counter-intuitive, this numerical dissimilarity is in fact a necessary consequence of two basic metaphysical principles that are at work here: (1) whatever gives something its specific being, also gives it its unity, and (2) accidents inhere in a substance and cannot migrate from one substance to another. If these principles are strictly applied by someone who holds that each substance has one single substantial form, the accidents cannot remain numerically identical throughout generation and corruption, since that would imply their transfer from one substance to the next.

In fact, Brito was not the first to raise these concerns in a \textit{De anima} commentary. As we have seen, Anonymus Bazán was the first commentator to write about the status of the dispositions in his question of whether the soul is a substantial or an accidental form, using a similar terminology and also claiming that all previous organizations are corrupted and regenerated at the moment of the introduction of the soul.\textsuperscript{129} He had even introduced the birth of a human being as an example, explaining that while a child is in the uterus it has no soul, but it does have certain dispositions. All these dispositions, however, are corrupted and regenerated at the moment of the advent of the soul.\textsuperscript{130} Although in Anonymus Bazán, the necessary corruption of the dispositions is noted but not yet discussed in any detail, in retrospect his comments

\textsuperscript{128}The lack of numerical identity is already difficult to explain in a strictly philosophical context. But certain theological constraints that I will not go into here made the problems even worse, especially the resurrection of the (same) body. For the problem of identity connected with the resurrection, see M. McCORD ADAMS, "The Resurrection of the Body According to Three Medieval Aristotelians: Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William Ockham", \textit{Philosophical Topics}, 20:2 (1992), 1-33, esp. 23-7 and H. A. G. BRAAKHUIS, "John Buridan and the "Parisian School" on the Possibility of Returning as Numerically the Same A Note on a Chapter in the History of the Relationship between Faith and Natural Science", in: S. CAROTI and P. SOUFFRIN (eds.), \textit{La nouvelle physique du XIV\textsuperscript{e} siècle}, Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1997, 111-140.

\textsuperscript{129}See above, 4.1 2 ANONYMUS BAZAN, \textit{QdA}, II.2, 405\textsuperscript{45-51} "Ad secundum, cum dicitur, forma substantialis advent enti in actu organizato, dico quod illae organizationes omnes, advenente anima, in animam reducuntur et corrumpuntur numero, sed specie non, qua anima dat organis esse; ergo patet quod illae dispositiones corrumpuntur, et anima introductur ut organa suum esse habeant, anima introducta."

\textsuperscript{130}Anonymus Van Steenberghen might have had something similar in mind when he claims that all dispositions of the organic body are consequent on the soul-matter union, and that the soul therefore needs no prior organic body. But contrary to Anonymus Bazán and Brito, he sidesteps the issue of the corruption and subsequent regeneration of accidents, although his claims occur in his answer to the objection that each specific soul needs its proper matter. This indicates that he is not yet fully aware of the potential problem in the same manner as Brito and Anonymus Bazán are. ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, \textit{QdA}, II 5, 204\textsuperscript{36-42}. "Ad alud dicendum quod actus primus immediate unitur materiae; et omnes dispositiones, sive sint ipsius formae vel materiae, omnes sequuntur unionem formae cum materia, sive ipsum aggregatum: unde anima non praeeexit corpus organismum, sed per animam est corpus organismum."
prove to be very important. Nevertheless, Brito is the first to discuss the topic in full detail and clarity.

The strange consequence of the view that all dispositions are corrupted at the advent of the soul seems to be that the substance that existed before the advent of the soul and the substance that exists after the advent of the soul seem to share absolutely nothing. They neither have (numerically or specifically) the same substantial form, nor (numerically) the same accidental forms. All that is left to connect the two substances is two sets of accidents with an uncanny similarity but without any real identity. Recall that this peculiar consequence where the living and the dead body share nothing except a similarity was the theme of the discussion between Ackrill and Whiting about Aristotle’s definition of the soul.

Brito’s solution that the accidents are merely similar and not numerically identical occasions an objection that is as obvious as powerful: given that all these accidents look precisely the same before and after the advent of the soul, as Brito admits, and that, moreover, we perceive no change in the accidents during this generation and corruption, should we not then simply conclude that the accidents are in fact numerically the same rather than merely similar? Why not take for granted, based on our sense experience, that numerically the same accidents somehow remain present throughout the generation and corruption and formulate our theories based on that assumption? Brito’s solution that the accidents are merely similar and not numerically identical occasions an objection that is as obvious as powerful: given that all these accidents look precisely the same before and after the advent of the soul, as Brito admits, and that, moreover, we perceive no change in the accidents during this generation and corruption, should we not then simply conclude that the accidents are in fact numerically the same rather than merely similar? Why not take for granted, based on our sense experience, that numerically the same accidents somehow remain present throughout the generation and corruption and formulate our theories based on that assumption?

131 Pointing to prime matter as something the two substances share does not help. Although it is in some sense true that they “share” prime matter, this only means that they have a similar metaphysical structure at the very basic level. More concretely, they are both material substances.

132 I take the term ‘uncanny similarity’ from WHITING, ‘Living Bodies’, 79 See above, section 41

133 According to my reading of the texts, Brito considers the corruption and regeneration of all accidents of fundamental importance. This reading is supported by Donati’s analysis of the use of dimensiones indeterminatae in unpublished commentaries on the Physica. Put briefly dimensiones (de)terminatae are definite and distinct dimensions, whereas dimensiones in(de)terminatae are indefinite and generic dimensions. The terminology is taken from Averroes’s De substantia orbis. In the Parisian commentaries Donati examined for the period ca 1270–1310, she found that no author explicitly rejects the analysis of substance in terms of indeterminate dimensions that ontologically precede substantial form, with one exception: Radulphus Brito. Brito rejects both roles that the indeterminate dimensions were supposed to fulfill, namely that (1) they are ontologically prior to substantial form and (2) they survive substantial change. The idea that any accident can precede substance or remain identical throughout substantial change is metaphysically unacceptable to Brito. See S DONATI, ‘The Notion of Dimensiones indeterminatae in the Commentary Tradition of the Physics in the Thirteenth and in the Early Fourteenth Century’, in C. LEIJENHORST, C. LUTHY and J. M. M. H. THIJSSSEN (eds), The Dynamics of Aristotelian Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century, Leiden [etc ]. Brill, 2002, 189–223, 218–9. For a historical analysis of the introduction of the dimensiones indeterminatae see S DONATI, ‘La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate in
answer to this objection that our senses perceive that the accidents remain identical throughout generation and corruption is blunt:

Et cum dicitur quod sensus hoc judicat, dico quod sensum non est credendum de ydemiptate accidentium, sed solum de similitudine, quia quidditas rei solum ab intellectu percipitur, et non a sensu.\footnote{RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, II.3, 81–4. Interestingly, Walter Burley’s commentary on the De anima includes Brito’s lengthy discussion almost verbatim. It can be found in WALTER BURLEY, ExpdA [unpublished transcription by Paul Bakker], II 1–2: ‘Utrum anima sit substantia, utrum anima sit forma substantialis corporis’, 20\textsuperscript{th}–20\textsuperscript{th}. Unfortunately it is unclear who copied whom, or, alternatively, which third source formed the basis of both texts.}

And when it said that the senses make this judgment, I say that the senses are not to be trusted when it comes to the identity of accidents, but only when it comes to their similitude, because the quiddity of a thing is perceived by the intellect only, and not by the senses.

Briefly put, the fact that we cannot perceive a change in the accidents proves absolutely nothing about their identity or their non-identity. This argument will turn out to be one of two key arguments in the debate on the status of the dispositions in subsequent commentaries.\footnote{In the Venice, 1587 edition of Jandun’s commentary, Averroes is mentioned in the margin, possibly as the source of the argument, but I have been unable to locate such a passage.} The second key argument is that it seems that there is no causal explanation possible of the generation of these new accidents. And nothing is generated without a cause. The discussion of this second argument takes up most of Brito’s text. I will not go into all the details of this discussion, but I will focus on what I consider to be the most interesting case: scars and wounds.\footnote{For other cases and their technical solutions, see the edition given in the appendix.} By examining how Brito explains the similarity between the scars and wounds of the living and of the dead body, the impact that the question about the identity of accidents had will become clearer.

The reason that scars and wounds are the most interesting example is that these became accidents of the living being by pure chance, which is literally what Brito calls them: accidentia casualia. Their existence can never be explained by mere reference to the substantial form and the particular balance of the four elements in the body, which might be a possibility in the case of skin color, size, weight etc.\footnote{At one point, Brito seems to include color in the list of accidentia casualia (lines 105–106), but the rest of the text makes clear that he normally reserves the term ‘casualia’ for the results of damage done to the body.} Indeed, Brito tries to explain the regeneration of most of the accidents by reference to either the cause that introduces the new substantial form of the corpse, or to the proportions of the four elements.
that are present in the corpse. But the very occurrence of scars and wounds is an abnormal state. Given that Brito is convinced that all accidents, including scars and wounds, are corrupted and regenerated at the moment of death of a living being, he feels obliged to come up with a reason why even these *accidenta casualia* are regenerated in the corpse. The text is unfortunately corrupt, so it is difficult to see the details of his solution. But his main approach is clear enough. The first thing that Brito does in the case of scars and wounds is to move most of the efficient causal explanation from the thing that caused the wound to the living body itself. True, there would have been no wound without something that wounded the body, but once this has happened, it is the body that either causes the scarring or causes the wound to stay open. By doing so, Brito avoids having to explain the presence of wounds and scars in the corpse by reference to the thing that originally caused the wound. The second thing that Brito does is to try and explain the wounds and scars in a manner similar to his explanation of the other accidents. That is, by reference to either the cause that introduces the new substantial form of the corpse, or to the proportions of the four elements that are present in the corpse. In preparation for this, Brito makes the unexpected claim that the form of the living body and the form of the corpse are quite similar forms. Although he does not explain this further, he is clearly thinking about the analogy he made earlier in the question between the forms of wine and vinegar.

Just as vinegar is a form that naturally follows the form of wine, so the form of the corpse naturally follows the form of the body. And as closely related forms, they share many of the dispositions that are required for their presence. Not numerically, as was demonstrated, but specifically. Since Brito has already explained the similarity of dispositions by reference to the proportion of the elements, he can now appeal to this almost similar proportion to explain why in the corpse the wounds also stay either open or have turned into scars, just as was the case in the living body. Whether or not this explanation is convincing — I would say not — is unimportant here. What is important is the sort of explanation Brito thought he had to provide to explain the sim-

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138 Radulphus Brito, *QdA*, II.3:135–136: “Cicatrix ergo que est facta per consolidationem partium est operata per naturam rei, quia natura intendit consolidare partem lesam.”

139 Radulphus Brito, *QdA*, II.3:116–127: “Unde non quecumque forma est in quacumque materia, sed determinata post determinatam, sicut appareat octavo *Metaphysice*, quia sicut ibi dicitur post formam vini non introductur forma quecumque, set forma aceti que similis est ei in gradu perfectionis, sicut forma ordinate sequens est similis forme vini; et forma non introductur nisi in materia disposita, ut appareat secundo *hunus*, quia actus activorum sunt in patiente disposito. Ideo dispositiones que sunt in materia cum forma sequenti sunt similes dispositionibus que sunt in materia cum forma precedenti. Et ideo cum color sequatur formam ratione commutacionis elementorum et consimilis commixtio sit in mortuo et vivo, consimilis color est in vivo et mortuo.”
imilarities between the living body and the corpse. There can be doubt that he is convinced that all accidents are literally corrupted and then regenerated in an instant. And that for each of the regenerated accidents it must be possible to assign an efficient cause that explains their presence in the corpse, which turned out to be a difficult project.

The difficulty in assigning a cause to these newly generated accidents is the weakest point of the position Brito defends. William Ockham, for instance, was convinced that it was not possible to assign a cause to the newly generated accidents. And he considered the impossibility of assigning such a cause to be the strongest argument against the view that the accidents are numerically diverse and, as a consequence, against the framework of the unicity of substantial form. Being convinced of their numerical identity, Ockham argued against the view that the soul directly informs the body and suggested instead that a form of corporeity is necessary. Otherwise the accidents would be transferred from one substance into the next. Similar arguments can also be found in commentaries on De generatione, where they are used to deny that some quality remains in the generated thing that was also present in the corrupted thing, more specifically, that the *symbola* — the qualities which two elements have in common — remain numerically identical through generation.

The discussion of the *symbola* in commentaries on the *De generatione* and the discussion on the identity of accidents in the commentaries on the *De anima* are closely connected in the fourteenth century. So close, in fact, that Buridan devotes a question to the soul in his commentary on the *De generatione*. And we even find Brito’s scars and wounds argument in the context of fourteenth-century commentaries on *De generatione et corruptione*, again

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141 See for example, Nicole Oresme, *Quaestiones super De generatione et corruptione*, edited by S. Caroti, München: Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1996, I.8, 67, 164–166: *“Octavo, queritur quomodo sive a quo corrumpantur tales dispositiones; non a generaente, quia non est contrarium, ymmo simile, ut patet de igne generante aerem.”*

in the questions about the *symbola*. This is not a coincidence; more and more of *De generatione* material will find its way into the discussions in the *De anima* during the fourteenth century, as we will see.

### 4.3.3 John of Jandun

Brito gave a very consistent interpretation of the unicity of substantial form, and he was prepared to accept all consequences that this position implies, even if this meant having to accept that our senses are not to be trusted when it comes to perceiving the identity of accidents; and also even if this meant accepting that all accidents are corrupted and regenerated at the instant of substantial change, including those accidents that seem completely unnecessary in the new substance of the corpse, such as scars and wounds. But no matter how consistent his interpretation was, the consequences were too strange to be convincing to all his contemporaries.

One of the first to respond was John of Jandun, who — although he does not mention Brito by name— seems to have Brito in mind when he discusses how certain philosophers speak of the dispositions of a body before and after the advent of the soul. The context of this discussion is still the same, namely the adequacy of the Aristotelian definition of the soul:

> Dicunt quod in adventu anime corrumpuntur omnes ille dispositiones et in eodem instanti similes introducuntur; quare etc. Sed istud non potest stare... Et ideo videtur mihi quod iste dispositiones et organizationes manent et non corrumpitur.

They say that with the advent of the soul, all these dispositions are corrupted and in the same moment similar ones are introduced; hence, etc. But this cannot stand... And therefore it seems to me that these dispositions and organizations remain and are not corrupted.

Before looking at Jandun’s own opinions, we should briefly look at the objections he introduces to structure his discussion of this topic, which takes

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143*Nicole Oresme, QdGen,* I.8: “Utrum aliqua qualitas maneat eadem in generato que prius fuit in corrupto”, 67.167. “Nono, quod cychates manent etc.” Judging from the heavily abbreviated form of the argument in Oresme’s commentary, it was well known.

144I consider the impact of Brito’s discussion on the identity of accidents and Ackrill’s article on essentially ensouled matter to be quite similar. Both argue from within the context of the *De anima*, and from the assumption of the unicity of substantial form, to a radical dissimilarity between the living body and the corpse. And, more importantly, both receive a variety of responses in the decades following their discussion, in which philosophers accept the legitimacy of their claims while trying to formulate an interpretation in which the consequences of these claims are avoided.

145*John of Jandun, QdA*, II 2, 73–74
place in the question ‘Whether the soul is a substance in the sense of a substantial form’. Of the complete set of nine objections against the thesis that the soul is substantial form, only three are concerned with the generation and corruption aspects that were so dominant in Brito’s commentary. One of these is the familiar argument that the soul comes to a being in act, namely the organized body. The other two focus on (1) the corruption of the living being and claim that the body remains numerically identical after death and (2) on the fact that the same whiteness that inheres in the body while it is alive continues to inhere in the corpse.

If we were to stop the analysis here, we might conclude that questions concerning the identity of accidents are not as important in Jandun’s commentary as they were Brito’s, given that only a third of the arguments address the issue. But once we look at the actual impact of these arguments on the whole question, a completely different picture arises. The largest part of Jandun’s replies to the initial arguments discuss precisely the identity of accidents. In fact, the discussion of these problems in Jandun’s replies is almost three times as long as his entire determination of the question! This confirms that it is justified to refer to the debate on dispositions as an embedded question in fourteenth-century De anima commentaries.146

Jandun’s primary concern when it comes to the sudden corruption of previous dispositions is not so much the brute fact that these dispositions are corrupted and regenerated, but rather that this alleged generation and corruption would imply many difficulties within Aristotelian physics. For instance, the preparatory process of gradual acquisition of the proper dispositions prior to the introduction of a new form is left unfinished if these dispositions are corrupted. For although the process would have a beginning, a first instant in which these dispositions begin to appear, it would have no end, that is to say, no last instant in which these dispositions are fully developed. In other words, the change has no end term (terminus ad quem).147 Jandun argues for his conclusion as follows: at every instant before the introduction of the soul these dispositions are not fully developed and the change is still going on. But the end term of the change cannot be the exact moment of the introduction of the soul, because at that moment all these dispositions are corrupted. Nor can the end term of the change be the fully developed dispositions that are found after the moment the body is informed by the soul, since these dispositions

146 By ‘embedded question’ I mean that even if there is no separate question on the identity of accidents in the fourteenth-century commentaries on the De anima, the passages in which the topic is discussed have the same complexity and length as a regular question.

147 John of Jandun, QdA, II.2, 73: “… si sic esset, sequeretur quod motus finitus esset sine termino ad quem, et moveri sine termino mutato esse; consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis patet per Philosophum sexto Physicorum.”
are not numerically identical with the dispositions that were there prior to the advent of the soul. The only possible conclusion seems to be that there is no definite moment at which the change has ended, even if there is a moment at which there is an ensouled body with fully developed dispositions. To Jandun, following Aristotle, this seems absurd. Arguing along similar lines, Jandun denies that the dispositions can be corrupted, because it is impossible to assign an exact moment or even a time frame to their corruption.

The second difficulty discussed by Jandun is that it is difficult (if not impossible) to see what can be the cause of the corruption of these dispositions. This is an interesting question, even more so because Brito had devoted almost all his attention to the related problem of assigning a cause to the regenerated dispositions, and very little to assigning a cause to the corruption of the dispositions. Normally any accident is corrupted by the introduction of a new and contrary accident. For example, if water is cold at first and later becomes warm, the accident of cold has been corrupted by the introduction of the new and contrary accident of warm. But during the corruption and generation of the dispositions needed for the advent of the soul, no contrary accidents are introduced; quite the opposite, the new dispositions are specifically the same as the old ones. The alternative of assigning the causal role of the corruption of these dispositions to the soul seems impossible, since it is this very soul that is the cause of the generation of (specifically) the same dispositions.

There is, however, another manner in which something can be corrupted without the introduction of a contrary form. For it can also be corrupted on account of the corruption of something else on which it depends for its existence. This is a called corruption per accidens, in contrast to the regular corruption per se. So it seems that someone holding Brito's view could simply claim that these dispositions corrupt per accidens on account of the corruption of the substance in which they inhere. Only the substance they inhere in is corrupted per se on account of the introduction of the soul. This possibility is denied by Jandun, who gives the following argument: dispositions cannot

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148 The problems concerning first and last instants in continuous change are discussed in ARISTOTLE, Physica, esp. VI.8. Although the introduction of the limit problem in Jandun's De anima commentary is striking, these problems do become more and more prevalent in fourteenth century philosophy and theology; their development and importance, especially in the context of what John Murdoch has called 'propositional analysis' as a way of doing (natural) philosophy in the fourteenth century, is described in detail in: Murdoch, 'Propositional Analysis in Fourteenth-Century Natural Philosophy' and J. E. Murdoch, 'Substitutes Anglicanae in Fourteenth-Century Paris: John of Mirecourt and Peter Ceuffens', in: M. Pelner Cosman and B. Chandler (eds.), Machaut's World: Science and Arts in the Fourteenth Century, New York: The New York Academy of Sciences, 1978, 51–86.

149 John of Jandun, QdA, II.2, 73: “Item, si corrumperentur aut hoc esset in instanti, aut in tempore; sed nullo modo; quare etc.”
be corrupted *per accidens*, since the generable and the corruptible belong to the category of substance.\(^{150}\) Although Jandun’s argument is elliptical, a plausible interpretation can be given. What he seems to be doing is denying the possibility of an accidental corruption on semantic grounds. The terms ‘generation’ and ‘corruption’ are only applicable to those things that belong to the category of substance. This means that no other thing than a substance can be called corruptible, so that talking about the accidental corruption of accidents is nonsensical. In short, Brito is making a category mistake.

For these reasons, and others, Jandun refuses to accept the consequence that all previous dispositions and organizations are corrupted at the advent of the soul.\(^{151}\) But then the question becomes how he can maintain that position, since the corruption of the dispositions, as was seen above, seems a necessary consequence of the intransferability of accidents from one subject to the next combined with the thesis that substantial form directly informs prime matter. It seems therefore that Jandun must either allow for a transfer of dispositions and organizations from one substance to the next, or else he must deny that the soul directly informs prime matter. Before answering this question, we must look more closely at the exact meaning of dispositions in this context. For Jandun immediately qualifies his statement that the dispositions remain, by distinguishing between two manners in which they can remain.

The first manner in which dispositions remain applies only to those dispositions that prepare matter for a new form of a compound substance (*mixtio*), whether this is an animate or an inanimate substance. In other words, this first manner considers only the dispositions of complex substances that prepare them to receive another substantial form. The dispositions in question are the four primary qualities, which exist in the matter of a substance on account of the presence of the four elements in it, since these qualities are the proper accidents of the elements. These elements are always present in complex substances, although they are present only according to what Jandun calls

\(^{150}\) *JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II.2, 73* “Sed istae dispositiones non sunt corruptibiles secundum accidens, cum corruptibile et generabile sint in substantia, ut dicit Philosophus in quarto *Metaphysice*.”

\(^{151}\) One of the other reasons is familiar: the dispositions seem to be introduced in vain if they are corrupted by the soul and regenerated. Why should not the soul itself directly introduce all the necessary dispositions, rather than first corrupting and then regenerating them? This argument was included in Brito’s list of arguments against the possibility that the soul is the substantial form of the body. See p. 169. E. Michael, ‘Averroes and the Plurality of Forms’, *Franciscan Studies*, 52 (1992), 155–182, 168–169 cites passages from Jandun’s commentary on the *Physica*, in which he also denies that scars and wounds are regenerated. His discussion is consistent with that in his commentary on the *De anima*
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...a diminished being.\textsuperscript{\textit{152}} And most importantly, they remain present even during generation and corruption.\textsuperscript{\textit{153}} Taking ‘dispositions’ in this manner, it is possible to counter the objection that all forms that come to a being in act are accidental forms, by replying that this is only true when the form comes to a being that is in a complete and perfect act. But when it comes to a being in an incomplete and diminished state — which is precisely the state of the elements in a mixed body — the form can still be a substantial form.\textsuperscript{\textit{154}} Therefore, according to Jandun, the new form can be a substantial form while at the same time the elements and their qualities remain numerically identical through the corruption and generation.

The second manner of speaking about dispositions applies not only to complex substances, but also to the elements. The dispositions in question are still the same (the four primary qualities), but now there can be no recourse to a diminished and incomplete being of these elements because an element taken in itself, apart from the complex substance, has full being. Jandun uses the example of the transformation of air (hot and moist) into fire (hot and dry). In this transformation it is clear that the moistness of the air is corrupted, because the resulting fire is not moist but dry. But what about the quality hotness that both elements share? Is this also corrupted and regenerated? According to Jandun it is not. Quite the opposite, the hotness of the air is perfected into the hotness of fire. It cannot be corrupted because the fire lacks any contrary quality, and all corruption is based on the introduction of a contrary form. Jandun has a persuasive argument for this thesis: it is precisely the fact that one quality remains that accounts for the ease of the transformation of one element into another with which it shares a quality.\textsuperscript{\textit{155}}


\textsuperscript{153}JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II.2, 75: “Et cum corrumpitur forma unus mixti in mixto, et introducitur forma alterius, elementa manent in materia utrusque, licet sub alio et alio esse.”

\textsuperscript{154}JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II.2, 75: “Tenentes autem istam iam possumus solvere rationes in oppositum Cum dicitur ‘id quod adventit etc’. dico quod verum est si adventit enti complete et perfecto. Si tamen adveniat imperfecto et remisso non oportet.”

\textsuperscript{155}The topic of transformation of elements into one another, especially of those elements that share a quality (the so-called \textit{symbola}) is discussed in virtually all commentaries on Aristotle’s De \textit{generatione et corruptione}. Jandun also seems to have commented on this C. H. Lohr, ‘Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors. Jacobus — Johannes JufP, Traditio, 26 (1970), 135–216, 212, n. 8 mentions an (unedited) question by Jandun entitled ‘Utrum elementa sub propriis formis maneant in mixto’, which, as A. Maiier, ‘Die Struktur der ma-
The key principle in this description of the transformation of one element into another seems to be that corruption only occurs at the introduction of a contrary form of the same metaphysical level as the corrupting form. When a new substantial form is introduced, only the previous substantial form is corrupted, but not the previous accidents. Jandun seems hesitant to speak of accidents as corrupting, but whether we talk about the corruption of accidents or simply about a change in accidents makes little difference for the following: an accident only corrupts (or: changes) at the introduction of a contrary accident, not at the introduction of new substantial form. So no substantial form on its own will ever corrupt the previous dispositions. This becomes even clearer when Jandun moves from the example of the transformation of elements to the example of the introduction of the soul:

Qualitates autem disponentes materiam ad introductionem anime non contrariantur sibi. Quare tales manent et non corrumpuntur in adventu anime, licet dispositiones contrarie, sicut dispositiones menstrui et spermatis corrumpantur, ut dicit Commentator primo Physicorum. Quare etc.\(^{156}\)

The qualities, however, that prepare matter for the introduction of the soul are not contrary to one another. Hence such qualities remain and are not corrupted at the advent of soul, although the contrary dispositions, such as the dispositions of the menstrual blood and the semen are corrupted, as the Commentator states in Physica I. Hence etc.

Within this second manner of speaking about dispositions, the reply to the objection that all forms that come to a being in act are accidental forms is more refined. Jandun now distinguishes between two manners of being in act (substantial or accidental) as well as two kinds of accidents (perfect and imperfect). If a form comes to a being that is either in substantial act or in perfect accidental act, it will be an accidental form. But if it comes to a being in an imperfect accidental act — which includes the primary qualities and indeterminate dimensions (\textit{dimensiones interminatae}) — it can be a substantial form.\(^{157}\)

The difference between this manner of discussing what happens when the soul informs a body and the manner in which Aquinas and the Anonymi discussed it cannot be overemphasized. What is occurring in Jandun (and Brito teriellen Substanz’, in: \textit{An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft}, vol. III, Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1952, 1–140, 42 suggested, might be a question from a lost commentary on the \textit{De generatione et corruptione}.

\(^{156}\)JOHN OF JANDUN, \textit{QdA}, II.2, 75.

\(^{157}\)For more information and literature about the \textit{dimensiones in(de)terminatae}, see p. 172, footnote 133. Briefly put, they are generic and indefinite dimensions that ontologically precede the specific and definite dimension of any material substance.
before him) is a shift of perspective combined with a shift in sources. Instead of referring to Aristotle's *Metaphysica* and using the ontological precedence of substantial over accidental form to explain the informing of the body by the soul, the most important source has now become Aristotle's *De generatione et corruptione* and its discussion of the transformation of elements into one another. The unity of soul and body is no longer the central problem; instead, the discussion has shifted to the status of the dispositions through the advent and departure, or corruption, of the soul. What is occurring here is not the rise of a new perspective, for both perspectives already existed. What does occur, is that the dominant perspective changes, and that this change gives rise to a new set of problems. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of this shift is that the theories developed in *De generatione* commentaries really do not help much in accounting for the numerical identity of most of the accidents that seem to remain identical through generation and corruption. At best they can account for the numerical identity of the primary qualities and perhaps of the indeterminate dimensions. But this does not seem to bother Jandun in the least. In a surprising change of strategy, Jandun denies the identity of higher level accidents, using the same argument as Brito: our senses simply cannot be trusted when it comes to the identity of accidents: \[158\]

\[... \text{sed non manet eadem qualitas secunda, quia non manet idem mixtum; cum eadem sit forma per quam corpus animatum est inanimatum et est mixtum; et cum dicitur: sensus hoc iudicat, dico quod non est credendum sensui de identitate accidentis, cum non se profundet usque ad quiddidatem, ut dicit Commentator in hoc secundo; quare etc.}\[159\]

\[... \text{but there does not remain the same second quality, because there does not remain the same mixtum, because the form by which the animated body is inanimate <i.e. merely organic> and a mixtum is one and the same form. And when it is said: the senses make this judgment, I say that our senses are not be trusted concerning the identity of accidents, because they do not penetrate to the essence, as the Commentator says in the second book <of the De anima>; hence etc.}\]

Jandun's discussion with those who hold the position Brito holds, turns out not to be about the strange consequence that accidents corrupt and regenerate, but instead about the question of whether the subject in which the primary qualities and the indeterminate dimensions inhere remains numerically identical through generation and corruption. The description he gave

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\[159\] John of Jandun, *QdA*, II.2, 77.
of the primary qualities as imperfect accidental acts was well as his analysis of corruption showed that this subject indeed remains numerically identical. The results of the analysis of the transitions of elements into one another is consequently applied to the question: what is the subject of the soul? Jandun’s final position in this question seems to be a variant of the plurality of substantial forms position, in which there are two substantial forms in a living being. One is the soul, the other the so-called form of the body (forma corporeitatis). This form of the body gives a minimum of actuality to bodily things, just enough to unify a mixture of elements into this or that particular lump of stuff. Since this form of the body remains present even after the advent of soul, all accidents up to this level of complexity, namely the primary accidents, also remain present. More complex qualities, however, are corrupted and regenerated, in support of which Jandun denies the ability of our senses to perceive the identity of accidents.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to establish more details of Jandun’s position on the questions whether a substance has one or more forms and which forms persist through generation based on his commentary on the De anima. For in most other contexts where Jandun deals with the subject of the soul, he responds to objections from both the point of view of a single substantial form as well as from the point of view of some pluralist position, often not making it fully clear which of those positions he actually holds. Take for example his question ‘whether the soul is the first act of the body’. When Jandun discusses the objection that the soul seems to come to a being in act and therefore cannot be the substantial form of the body, he first replies (rependetur hic) that all dispositions are corrupted and regenerated at the advent of the soul. But he ends this reply with the words ‘but at this moment I do not settle whether or not this is true’ (‘tamen utrum sit verum vel non, ad praesens non determino’). This is odd, to say the least, given his elaborate arguments in favor of the persistence of dispositions just three questions earlier. To make things even more confusing, he continues by formulating an alternative reply (‘si tamen volumus tenere aliam viam’), according to which not only the

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160 JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II.3, 81 (ad rationes): “Ad aliam cum dicitur ‘quod est actus materiae primae etc.’, potest dici quod verum est si sit actus materiae primae ommino immediate. Sed si mediante corporeitate, non est necesse quod sit actus primus. Sic autem est in proposito. Nam anima quae est forma dans esse non unitur materiae nisi mediante corporeitate, sicut et omnes aliae formae substantiales, ut docet Commentator in primo Physcorum et in tractatus De substantia orbis.”

161 The same strategy is also used in Nicole Oresme’s commentary.

162 JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, 90. “Tamen in adventu ipsius anime omnes actus substantiales et accidentales precedentes corrumpuntur. Et sit resolutio usque ad materiam primam. Et tunc in instanti educitur anima de potentia materie et similes dispositiones generantur simul cum anima, tamen perfectiores.”
dispositions but also the prior substantial forms, including at least the *forma corporeitas*, but perhaps more, remain identical.\footnote{The edition uses both ‘formae genera’ and ‘formas substantiales genera’. See JOHN OF JANDUN, QDA, II.5, 90–91. This second reply ends with the words “Et adhuc nullum video inconveniens sequi si bene et sane intelligantur dicta Commentatoris; de his autem amplius habetur in questione de gradibus et pluralitate formarum quam ordinavi.”} Jandun seems to prefer this alternative reply, but never states that it is his own position. And even if it were his view, it is not exactly the same position he defended when he discussed the identity of dispositions.\footnote{In question II.3 on the definition of the soul, when he replies to the objection: ‘the animated body has another act prior to the soul, therefore the soul is not the first act’, Jandun simply gives three responses without indicating that he prefers the one over the other: (1) (according to common opinion) although the body has many forms prior to the soul, these are all corrupted on the advent of the soul and there is a resolution to prime matter, (2) in another manner it can be said that the soul is the first act in its genus, namely the genus of those acts that are proper to living beings, which is also expressed by the part of the definition ‘having life in potency’; and (3) it can be said in yet another way and reasonably enough that although other forms are prior in the order of generation, the soul is prior in the order of perfection and nobility (p. 81–82). In question II.4 ‘An ex anima et corpore unum per se fiat’, Jandun seems to defend some type of plurality where the form of body or of substance remains in the body, but the text gives few details; JOHN OF JANDUN, QDA, II 4, 86: “Nihil enim prohibit illud quod est ens in actu quodammodo per unam formam esse in potentia ad aliam. Et sic intelligendum est dictum Commentatoris quod anima est forma in ente acu, id est subjectum animae est ens actu. Non quidem secundum quod subjectum, sed secundum formam corporis aut substantiae aut huissusmodi.” Also, “Et sic aliter se habet de compositione animalis ex corpore et anima et de compositione lapidis ex gravitate et materia prima.” But when it is time to give some details, Jandun merely refers to another work: “. . de hoc plenius habetur in questione De pluralitate formarum substantia.” This (unedited) question is found in two manuscripts MS Madrid, Biblioteca del Monasterio de El Escorial, lat. f.II.8, f. 52–78 and MS Reims, Bibliothèque municipale, 493, f. 151–166. A related, also unedited question is found in MS Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, vat. lat., 6768, f. 213–216 under the title Quaestio de diversitate et ordine formarum generis et species. Cf. WEIJERS, Le travail intellectuel, 99 and 102.} In the end, it seems that Jandun never reached a solution in his commentary on the *De anima* that he found satisfactory in all contexts. But although his solution is sketchy, it is possible to draw some conclusions. It is clear that Jandun, following Brito, was convinced that questions concerning the identity of accidents should be discussed in the *De anima*. He also accepts the principle that what our senses show us is irrelevant to this question. But in contrast to Brito, Jandun is also convinced that there must be some basic level on which the corrupted and the generated substance are numerically identical. True, the details of his account vary in different contexts, but there is always at least an identity up to the level of the form of the body, which includes the identity of the composing elements. The identity of more complex accidents remains connected to the identity of the ultimate substantial form, so that these are corrupted and regenerated. For a more definite answer to the identity prob-
lem, we need turn to John Buridan.

4.3.4 John Buridan

In Buridan’s commentary, the problem we found in Brito has become so important that the question of whether every soul is the first act of the organic body (Utrum omnis anima sit actus primus corporis organici), is now treated as a separate question that is discussed before the question of whether or not the Aristotelian definition of the soul is correct.

Buridan remarks that it is not obvious that the soul is the first act and he seriously considers the option of a plurality of substantial forms. In the end, however, he opts for the unicity of substantial form position. After this decision is made, we find the following remarks:

Et adhuc est una opinio quod sic omnis anima, ymmo et omnis forma substantialis est actus primus. Dicunt enim: licet in materia dispositiones prime requirantur ad hoc quod fiat et recipiatur in ista materia forma aliqua substantialis, tamen in adventu istius forme substantialis, omnes iste accidentales prime corrumpuntur.\(^\text{165}\)

And further there is one opinion that in this way every soul, yes even every substantial form is a first act. For the advocates of this opinion say: although in matter first dispositions are required so that some substantial form can become present and be received in this matter, nevertheless at the arrival of this substantial form, all these first accidental <forms> are corrupted.

Here, again, we find the view ('one opinion') that Brito had expressed. And Buridan, just like Jandun, thinks that is not, or at least not completely correct. But where Jandun’s extensive discussion had been an embedded question located in his replies to the initial objections, Buridan discusses it in his determination of the question.\(^\text{166}\) He gives a number of arguments in support of Brito’s solution, taking it very seriously. Yet in spite of all these arguments, Buridan ultimately disagrees with Brito, saying that "these <arguments> notwithstanding, I believe the opposite, of which the demonstration belongs to the book On generation and corruption."\(^\text{167}\)

Buridan refers the reader to his commentary on De generatione for the main arguments in support of his own conclusion that the dispositions are

\(^{165}\text{JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.2, 21.}\)

\(^{166}\text{In the edition the explanation and defense of Brito’s position takes up twenty percent of the entire question. This is without counting Buridan’s defense of his own position and replies to the arguments in favor of Brito’s view, which takes up close to another forty percent.}\)

\(^{167}\text{JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.2, 24: “Sed non obstantibus istis ego credo oppositum, quod demonstrare pertinet ad librum De generatione.”}\)
CHAPTER 4. THE ARISTOTELIAN DEFINITION OF THE SOUL

not corrupted at the advent of the soul.\textsuperscript{168} This should not come as a surprise, as we have already seen how much the discussion of the definition of the soul in the fourteenth century came under the influence of argumentation strategies from the \textit{De generatione} commentary tradition. In fact, by the time we reach Buridan’s commentary the impact of the arguments taken from \textit{De generatione} on the \textit{De anima} tradition has become so strong that Buridan’s commentary on \textit{De generatione} includes a question entitled ‘Whether in the living being there is another substantial form besides the soul.’\textsuperscript{169} Not only that, but several arguments and examples from the \textit{De anima} tradition are now also employed in his \textit{De generatione} commentary.\textsuperscript{170}

Although Buridan refers his readers to his commentary on the \textit{De generatione} for the full argumentation, he also discusses two arguments against the corruption and regeneration of dispositions in his \textit{De anima} commentary, of which I will discuss one.\textsuperscript{171} Buridan asks the reader to consider the case where a horse dies.\textsuperscript{172} In that case the soul, which is (among other things) respon-

\textsuperscript{168} The arguments are discussed in \textsc{John Buridan}, \textit{QdGen}, I.7–8, 74–89.

\textsuperscript{169} \textsc{John Buridan}, \textit{QdGen}, I.8, 80–89: \textit{Utrum in animato sit alia forma substantialis ab anima.}

\textsuperscript{170} For example in \textsc{John Buridan}, \textit{QdGen}, I.7, 156, 17–22: \textit{‘Utrum omnis generatio unius sit corruptio alterius’} we find the argument from \textit{De anima} that when certain species of living beings are cut in half, both parts continue to live: \textit{‘Quarto. Si dividatur anguilla in duas medietates, adhuc ura qua pars appareat vivere; et sic utraque pars est animal. Et tamen neutra illarum partium erat ante animal, nisi diceremus quod anguilla erat duo animalia; quod videtur falsum. Ideo videtur quia per divisionem quale libet pars facta est animal; et sic est ibi generatio animalis. Et non videtur ibi esse aliqua corruptio, quia sola divisio quantitativa non videtur esse corruptio substantialis. Igitur ibi est generatio sine corruptione.’} In his reply, Buridan explicitly refers to the discussion of living beings (158–159 and 70–81): \textit{‘Sed adhuc in substantiis est bene dubitatio propter viventia, quia ponentes quod anima sit addita alteri formae substantialis vel aliis formis substantialibus non oportet dicere quod ad generationem animalis per adventum animae aliquid corrumpatur... Sed si poneretur quod in nullo eodem supposito sunt simul plures formae substantialia, tunc universali esset dicendum quod omnem generationem unius substantiali concomitantur corruptio substantiali alterius.’} Interestingly, one of Buridan’s claims in this question, and one of his most important arguments, is that the adage \textit{‘generatio unius est corruptio alterius’} only has universal validity if each substance has but one substantial form. If the plurality of substantial forms position is true, then the adage only applies to the generation of the four elements.

\textsuperscript{171} The argument that I will not discuss, is typical of the \textit{De generatione} tradition; \textsc{John Buridan}, \textit{QdA}, II.1, 25: \textit{‘Item si ex aqua fiet ignis, aqua calefit. Constat quod, licet ista caliditas educatur naturaliter de potentia materie que naturaliter inclinatur ad formam ignis ad quam ista caliditas disponit, tamen non educetur ex forma substantiali aquae, quoniam ista est innaturally et disconveniens forme substantiali aquae. Sed potius forma substantialis aquae resistet generationi caliditatis quam quod concurret ad eius generationem. Ideo nullo modo oportet, si forma substantialis aquae corrumpatur, quod ista caliditas corrumpatur, ex quo materia manet <ex materia manente ed.> de cuius potentia educebatur.’}

\textsuperscript{172} \textsc{John Buridan}, \textit{QdA}, II.1, 24: \textit{‘Primum est, si equus interficiatur et ad corruptionem anime eius corrumpitur tota eius caliditas, adhuc ipso mortuo reperitur per aliquod tempus}
sible for the presence of heat in the horse’s body, is no longer there. Yet for a certain period of time, says Buridan, we can feel that heat remains present by touching the horse’s breast. Now what could be the cause of this heat? Not the soul, as it is no longer there and cannot therefore cause the supposedly numerically new heat. But what, then, could be the cause? The new substantial form of the corpse also cannot cause it, because the form of the corpse does not heat the body—or else all corpses would feel warm—, on the contrary, it makes the body cold. The only option left, which Buridan accepts, is that the initial assumption of a numerically new heat is wrong. The accidental form of heat must remain numerically the same. To be sure, the heat slowly disappears because the soul is no longer there to sustain it, but it is not corrupted and regenerated at the moment of the death of the horse. Buridan counters the familiar objection that accidents cannot remain numerically identical through generation and corruption by reference to an argument that he had already employed in his first question on book II:

Ad aliam dicitur quod, in generatione substantiali, remanent bene dispositiones accidentales sensibiles eodem in generato et corrupto. Sed non manet subiectum idem, capiendo ‘subiectum’ pro supposito per se subsistenti, quod dicitur ‘hoc aliquum’. Et non dixit Aristoteles in descriptione generationis quod simpliciter nullum sensibile remaneret idem, sed dixit, cum additione, ‘nullo sensibili remanente in subiecto eodem’, intelligendo per ‘subiectum’ sicud iam dictum fuit

To the other argument it is said that, in substantial generation, accidental perceptible dispositions indeed remain identical in what is generated and in what is corrupted. But the subject does not remain the same, taking ‘subject’ for a suppositum that is self-subsistent, which is called a ‘this something’. And when Aristotle described generation, he

magna caliditas in pectore. Quid ergo generaret istam caliditatem novam? Non interficiens, quia non habet naturam generandi caliditatem plus <quam frigiditatem>. Nec ista caliditas generatur per modum <om ed > sequale ad formam cadaveris, quia ista potius determinat sibi frigiditatem quam talem caliditatem.” The argument also occurs in John Buridan, QdGen, II 7, 262 11 “Utrum qualitas symbola maneat eadem in generato quae fuit in corrupto.” A similar argument can be found in Nicole Oresme, QdGen, I 8: “Utrum aliqua qualitas maneat eadem in generato que prius fuit in corrupto”, 66 141 “Tertio, si ita esset, sequitur quod frigiditas generaret novam caliditatem, quod videtur inconveniens. Patet consequentia, postito quod aliquod frigidum remittat calorem naturalem sic quod corruptam animal, tunc, si in cadavere esset novus calor, non videtur generari nisi ab illo frigidum corrumpente, quod est propositum.”

173 John Buridan, QdA, II 1, 16: The reference is to Aristotle, De generatione, I 4, 319b14–7 “But when nothing perceptible persists in its identity as a substratum, and the thing changes as a whole (when e.g. the seed as a whole is converted into blood, or water into air, or air as a whole into water, such an occurrence is a coming-to-be of one substance and a passing-away of the other”
did not say that unqualifiedly nothing perceptible remains the same, but he said, by way of an addition, ‘when nothing perceptible remains the same in a subject’, understanding ‘subject’ as we already said.

In effect, Buridan has reached a position similar to that of Whiting whom I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter.\textsuperscript{174} Whiting’s solution to the problem discussed by Ackrill — that we are unable to single out the matter apart from the form in living beings — is to distinguish between two conceptions of matter that play a role in Aristotle. She calls these two conceptions matter in the \textit{functionally} and in the \textit{compositionally} defined sense. Matter in the functionally defined sense does not remain after the death of the body, whereas matter in the compositionally defined sense does. So when Aristotle claims that the corpse is not a body except equivocally, he employs the functional definition of body. The body in this sense is called a body on account of the functions it has and the activities it can employ. This is why it is impossible to refer to this body in separation from the soul, because it is what it is, namely capable of all these vital functions and activities, on account of its soul. If this functional conception of matter is the only one we employ, then Ackrill’s problem is unavoidable. But, according to Whiting, Aristotle also employs the second, compositional conception of matter. Matter in this compositionally defined sense has a meaning that is much closer to our contemporary everyday use of the term matter: it is the particular piece of ‘stuff’ we can perceive, in so far as it is composed of the four elements in a certain proportion.

A similar distinction underlies Buridan’s position. For on the one hand, he affirms that generation should be described in terms of prime matter and one substantial form. In this sense the soul is the only form of the body. Yet on the other hand, generation does not imply that all accidents of the previous substance are corrupted. At some basic level, the accidents remain numerically identical since they inhere in matter itself rather than in the composite. It is, in fact, the common lack of understanding of the meanings of the term ‘matter’ that is one of the main causes of confusion in discussions of the status of accidents:

\textit{Ad ultimam rationem dicitur quod, per ignorantiam materie et notitiam substantie composite, omnia accidentia secundum communem locutionem attribuuntur substantie composite et non materie. Tamen non educuntur nisi de potentia materie, saltem ista que similia inveniuntur in compositis diversarum specierum.}\textsuperscript{175}

\textsuperscript{174}See above, p. 125.

\textsuperscript{175}JOHN BURIDAN, \textit{QdA}, II.2, 26–7. This is echoed in Marilius of Inghen’s commentary on the \textit{Sentences} when he discusses the relation of the Divine Word to the soul and the flesh during the three days between the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. After making the claim
In response to the final argument, it is said that because of our unfa-
miliarity with matter and our acquaintance with composite substance,
all accidents are attributed in common parlance to the composite sub-
stance and not to matter. They are, however, deduced from the potency
of matter alone, at least those that are found similarly in composite sub-
stances of diverse species.

According to Buridan, there is matter that is not defined in terms of its
function or powers, as it does not have a proper substantial form, but that
nevertheless has some actuality and is the bearer of basic qualities such as
heat. Although Buridan takes a different approach to the problem of es-
sentially ensouled matter, and employs a less clear terminology than Whit-
ing’s functionally and compositionally defined matter, a distinction similar to
the one she uses is certainly there and the sense of matter that was just de-
scribed corresponds to Whiting’s compositional matter. This is not to say
that Buridan is a functionalist, far from it. But it does mean that according to
Buridan it is both true to say that (1) the matter of the living being, including
some accidents, is numerically the same as that of the corpse and (2) the body
that is mentioned in Aristotle’s definition of the soul is what it is, a body, on
account of its being ensouled, and once the soul departs, it is no longer a body
except equivocally.

With their respective distinctions in hand, both Buridan and Whiting
refuse to accept the consequence that the accidents of the living body and the
corpse have only an uncanny similarity (Whiting’s term); and both think that

176 That matter without any substantial form still has some actuality according to Buridan
is confirmed in his commentary on the Physica, JOHN BURIDAN, Physica, I.20, f. 24b, “Tertia
conclusio: quod materia est actus et esset actus licet existeret sine forma sive substantiali sive
accidentali.” The idea that matter on its own has some actuality is also found in Duns Scotus
and William Ockham, see MCCORD ADAMS, William Ockham, 639–647. The examples of scars
and heat remaining in the body continue to be used in the sixteenth century as can be seen
in D DES CHENE, Physiologia Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought,
shows that Suarez defends a position similar to Buridan’s, in which certain accidents, among
which is quantity, persist through substantial change.

177 Whiting’s interpretation was discussed on p. 125.
Aristotle introduces matter in the functionally defined sense to clearly distinguish generation and corruption from alteration.\textsuperscript{178} And finally, Buridan, just as Whiting, considers the fact that commentators are not clear on the meaning and function of matter in Aristotle to be one of the main causes for the confusion about the status of the accidents of a living substance through generation and corruption.\textsuperscript{179}

It is important to note that the distinction between functionally and compositionally defined matter can only be made when the material in Aristotle’s works on living beings is discussed in close conjunction with his treatise on generation and corruption. It has been Aquinas’s great contribution to turn the unicity of substantial form from a psychological thesis (a living being has only one soul) into a general principle of metaphysics (each substance has but one substantial form). But it has been Buridan’s achievement to employ this metaphysical principle in such a manner that the result is a unified natural philosophy in which the \textit{De generatione} and the \textit{De anima} supplement each other and are consistent with each other, so that the soul can be discussed in the \textit{De generatione} context and the transitions of elements into one another in the \textit{De anima} context.

\subsection*{4.4 \textit{Excursus:} condemnations and polemics}

Why did the unity of the accidents become a problem and why did it become more and more important in the fourteenth century? On the one hand, when we look back to Aquinas, we find no indication that he saw the numerical unity of accidents as a pressing problem, and the same applies for example to the two anonymous commentaries from the 1270s edited by Giele and Van Steenenberghen. A third anonymous commentator, edited by Bazán, was the first to clearly raise the problem, but even there it seems of relatively little importance. On the other hand, if we look forward to Pietro Pomponazzi, we find a long question in the beginning of his commentary on book II of \textit{De anima} in the context of the definition of the soul entitled: ‘Whether some accident precedes the substantial form in matter’.\textsuperscript{180} I think the question of

\textsuperscript{178}Whiting, ‘Living Bodies’, 85: “I will argue that Aristotle introduces essentially ensouled matter as part of his solution to the problem of distinguishing generation and destruction \textit{simpliciter} from alteration and other sorts of accidental change.” Buridan argues a similar point, as can be seen in the quotation given above, p. 187.

\textsuperscript{179}John Buridan, \textit{QdA}, II.2, 27: “Ad ultimam rationem dicitur quod per ignorance materia et notitiam substantie composite omnia accidentia secundum communem locutionem attribuuntur substantie composite et non materie. Tamen non educuntur nisi de potentia materie, saltem ista que similia inveniuntur in compositis diversarum specierum.”

\textsuperscript{180}Paul Bakker brought this question to my attention.
why the unity of the accidents became such a problem can be answered by looking at the debates surrounding Aquinas’s position on substantial form in the decade following his death, in particular at the discussion now called the Correctoria debate.\textsuperscript{181} The most important phase of these debates occurs over a decade, beginning 1276 when the Parisian masters of theology rejected the unicity of substantial form position and ending 1286 when the masters claim that they can no longer recall ever having condemned Aquinas’s position on substantial form.\textsuperscript{182}

Already during Thomas Aquinas’s lifetime, his views on a number of subjects came under attack, particularly from the side of the Franciscans.\textsuperscript{183} Of special importance is a debate between John Peckham and Thomas Aquinas on the unicity or plurality of substantial form in 1270 before the masters of the University of Paris. Peckham even claimed at one point that this debate led Thomas to retract his views on the unicity of substantial form.\textsuperscript{184}

In 1277, seven years after this debate with Peckham on the permissibility of defending the unicity of substantial form, two sets of condemnations were issued, one in Paris and one in Oxford.\textsuperscript{185} The condemnations in Paris
were issued on March 7 by bishop Stephen Tempier and include a wide range of teachings, most of which are not directed against Aquinas.\textsuperscript{186} Those that may be directed against Aquinas are so only indirectly.\textsuperscript{187} It is important to note that the thesis that was most controversial in Oxford, the unicity of substantial form, is not included in the Parisian list. This is all the more surprising given that Tempier and the papal legate Simon de Brion had organized a meeting of the masters of theology one year prior to these condemnations, in which Aquinas’s position that the intellective soul is the only substantial form of the body had been almost unanimously rejected.\textsuperscript{188} The condemnations issued in Oxford on March 18, by contrast, are almost completely directed against Aquinas’s views, especially his position that every substance, including man, has but one substantial form. These condemnations were issued by the archbishop of Canterbury (1272–1278) and fellow Dominican, Robert Kilwardby.\textsuperscript{189}
Kilwardby's condemnations were reaffirmed by his successor to the See of Canterbury, the Franciscan John Peckham on October 29, 1284, who took this opportunity to launch a new attack on Aquinas's position on substantial form. It seems that the reaffirmation of Kilwardby's condemnation did not have the effect Peckham intended, because only two years later, Peckham once again condemned the unicity thesis and several related theses, this time in London. But the bishops of Canterbury were not the only ones who attacked the unicity of substantial form position.

Most important in this context is the so-called Correctorium debate. This debate takes its name from a tract written by the Franciscan William de la Mare, entitled the Correctorium fratris Thomae, which was composed sometime after 1277 but before the end of 1279. In this tract, De la Mare criticizes and, as he calls it, corrects 118 statements by Aquinas taken from a variety of works. By decision of the Franciscan general chapter held in 1282 in Strasburg, this Correctorium was turned into an obligatory companion to the study of the works of Aquinas in the Franciscan studia.

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190 Roensch, Early Thomistic School, 179. Several letters of Peckham in which he explains why he condemned the unicity thesis are extant. A summary of these can be found in D. A. Callus, 'The Problem of the Unity of Substantial Form and Richard Knapwell, O. P.' in Melanges offerts a Etienne Gilson, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1959, 123-160, 126-133. Interestingly, Peckham gradually shifts from denying that Aquinas even held the unicity position to claiming that he, Peckham, was the only person to try to defend Aquinas when he was attacked for his unicity position by the other masters, including his fellow Dominicans (Callus, 'The Problem of the Unity of Substantial Form', 128-129).

191 According to F. Pelster, 'Die Satze der Londoner Verurteilung von 1286 und die Schriften des Magister Richard von Knapwell O. P.' Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 16 (1946), 83-106, 89-90, there were two condemnations by Peckham in London. The first on 14 April 1286 and the second on 30 April 1286. In the first, Richard Knapwell is mentioned by name, whereas in the second no specific philosopher is mentioned.


193 The tract has been edited together with one of the Dominican replies to it in P. Glorieux, Les premieres polemiques thomistes 1 Le Correctorium corruptori 'Quare' edition critique, Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1927. It survives in two redactions. The first, edited and most important redaction, on which all the later replies are based, was written sometime between March 1277 and August 1279. For a summary of the argument used to date the work, see D. A. Callus, 'Review of: Muller, J.-P., O.S.B., Le correctorium corruptori "Quaestione".' Bulletin Thomiste, 9 (1954-1956), 643-655, 646. Three articles that only appear in the second redaction have been edited in R. Hissette, 'Trois articles de la seconde rédaction du 'Correctorium' de Guillaume de la Mare', Recherches de Théologie ancienne et medievale, 51 (1984), 230-241.

194 Item Generalis Minister imponit ministros provincialibus quod non permittant multipli-
Unsurprisingly, once this Correctonum became known outside the Franciscan studia, it provoked a strong rebuttal by several Dominicans; a total of four or five works were written in response to the Corruptorium fratris Thomae, as the Dominicans liked to call De la Mare’s tract. These responses have come to be known by the first word of the text as the Quare,195 Scien-
dum,196 Circa197 and Quaestione.198 Usually the Apologeticum veritatis contra corruptorium is also included in this list.199 Not all of these works respond to all of De la Mare’s articles, as the Circa stops after article 60 and the Quaes-
cari summam fratris Thome nisi apud lectores notabiliter intelligentes, et hoc nisi cum decla-
rationibus fratris Wilhelmi de Mara, non in marginibus positis, sed in quaternis; et huuismodi
declarationones non scribantur per aliosqu un seculares.”, cited according to GLORIEUX, Le Correc-
torum corruptorii ‘Quare’, ix.

195Richard Knapwell, Correctorium corruptorii ‘Quare’, edited by P. Glorieux, Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1927. The tract was written between 1278 and 1286, probably around 1282 or 1283, see HÖDL, ‘Geistesgeschichtlciche und literarkntische Erhebungen’, 93. The terminus post quem is the composition date of De la Mare’s work, and the terminus ante quem is fixed by internal references to the condemnation of Aquinas’s position on the unicity of substantial form by the Parisian masters of theology. Since in 1286 the masters of theology claimed that they could no longer recall any condemnation of Aquinas’s position, the Quare must have been written previously. That the Parisian masters had indeed condemned the position (in 1276) was shown in HÖDL, ‘Neue Nachrichten’. The various alternatives that have been proposed for the date of the tract are conveniently summarized in JORDAN, ‘The Controversy of the Correctorii’, 293, footnote 6. When Glorieux edited the Quare in 1927, the author of the tract was unknown. Later research conducted especially by Glorieux and Hödl points so strongly to Knapwell as the author, or at the very least the main author if it was a group effort (GLORIEUX, ‘Pro et contra Thomam’, 264 mentions the possibility that Knapwell and Thomas of Sutton have jointly composed the tract), that I see no compelling reason to continue to treat the Quare as an anonymous tract. For the arguments that Knapwell is the author of the Quare and a summary of the discussion concerning the authorship, see especially HÖDL, ‘Anima forma corporis’, 88–93. Just as the Correctorium itself, the Quare also survives in two redactions, see GLORIEUX, Le Correctorium corruptorii ‘Quare’, xxxviii–xlv

196Robert of Orford, Correctorium corruptorii ‘Scien
dum’, edited by P. Glorieux, Paris Vrin, 1956. The text was written in the same period as the Quare (between 1278 and 1286). There have been two serious candidates for the authorship: Robert of Orford and William of Macklesfield. The editor of the Scien
dum, Palémon Glorieux now takes Robert of Orford to be the more likely author (see GLORIEUX, ‘Pro et contra Thomam’, 264–265) In support of this, the arguments presented in HÖDL, ‘Anima forma corporis’, 94–99 also convincingly show that the author is Robert of Orford.


198Anonymus, Correctorium corruptorii ‘Quaestione’, in: J.-P. Muller, Le correctorium corruptorii ‘Quaestione’ texte anonyme du ms Merton 267, Roma: Herder, 1954. There is a good chance that it was written by William of Macklesfield, but the question of the authorship is still not settled. It is the shortest of the correctoria

199Ramberto de’ Primadizzi, Apologeticum veritatis contra corruptorium, edited by J.-P. Muller, Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1943. It was written c. 1287–88.
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Itone after article 30. The Scendum and the Quare, however, reply to all De la Mare’s articles. Of these the Quare, written by Richard Knapwell, was the most influential. Something to keep in mind when reading these correctoria is that all authors were young Dominican scholars who had not yet incepted as masters of theology. A second thing to note is that the first two were written in England, and the final three were written in France, which means that the impact of De la Mare’s Correctorium was felt in both Oxford and Paris.

One of the statements that De la Mare corrected was Aquinas’s position on the unicity of substantial form, especially in so far as it was applied to the rational soul in man. The correction is spread out over many articles, but I will discuss the two most important ones. The first is article 31 which attacks the statement that ‘In man there is only one substantial form’. The second is the article immediately following this, which attacks the statement that ‘no accidental disposition preexists in matter before the arrival (inductionem) of the soul’.

De la Mare’s strategy in his first article on the substantial form of man is the same strategy he favors in his entire tract, which is to draw as much attention as possible to every theological falsity that would result, were we to accept Aquinas’s statements. And he is quick to point out that because of these theological falsities, the unicity position has already been rejected or condemned (reprobatur). The most important falsities De la Mare mentions are that we could no longer explain the Eucharist, nor the transmission of original sin, and above all we could not explain the numerical identity of the body of Christ in the tomb with the living body of Christ. For, as the argument goes, if the only substantial form of the living body of Christ is his intellective soul, then what remains in the tomb after his death is either prime matter or a corpse with a new, different substantial form. Either way, the body of the living Christ and his corpse would not be numerically identical. Hence the corpse in tomb would not, strictly speaking, be his corpse. All of these arguments touch upon one of the fundamental problems that the proponents of a plurality of forms had with the unicity thesis, namely the apparent lack of numerical identity of both matter and accidents through generation and corruption. Although De la Mare briefly mentions some philosophical arguments, they hardly play

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200 The only possible exception is Knapwell, who incepted in 1284 which means that there is a small possibility that he incepted just before writing the Quare. See JORDAN, ‘The Controversy of the Correctoria’, 297.

201 Among these are articles 31, 32, 48, 52, 102, 107 and 114

202 For detailed analysis of this article, see ROENSCHE, Early Thomistic School, 201-12.

203 WILLIAM DE LA MARE, Correctorium, a. 31, 129: “Haec posito de unitate formae substantialis reprobatur a magistris, primo, quia ex ipsa plura sequuntur contraria fidei catholicae; secundo, quia contradicit philosophiae, tertio, quia repugnat Sacrae Scripturae.”

204 RICHARD KNAPEL, De unitate formae, 24.
a role in his discussion.\footnote{William de la Mare, \textit{Correctorium}, 130-131: “Secundo reprobatur quia contradicit philosophiae. Si enim anima sola intellectiva immediate est perfectio materiae primae, tunc non esse in homine forma elementi, nec forma mixti de quibus philosophia multa dicit. Cessabit etiam studium medicinae. Praeterea forma una et eadem numero dabit esse corporale et spirituale, et per consequens corporalis erit simul et spiritualis. Item sequitur quod materia prima sit gravis et levis, et quod habeat corpus ab anima quod sit grave et leve et non ab elemento dominante in corpore.” He does, however, devote a large part of the text to a philosophical explanation of how the unity of a living being can still be explained assuming a plurality of substantial forms.}

In the second article, on the accidental dispositions before the advent of the soul, there is again a strong emphasis on the body of Christ, this time at the moment of incarnation, supported by two references to the Parisian condemnation of the unicity position. But this time the theological arguments are accompanied by several philosophical arguments that quite cleverly focus on the temporal generation of man. Their main thrust is this: at some point the rational soul is introduced in a man, but before that there is already an actually living body; therefore there must be more than one substantial form. Of particular importance is that De la Mare makes use of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles: if two things are similar in every respect, they are (numerically) the same thing.\footnote{William de la Mare, \textit{Correctorium}, a. 32, 144-5: “Praeterea constat quod ante infusionem animae rationalis est in corpore forma mixti, et qualitatum remissarum ab actibus suis, et forma et figura membrorum organicorum. Item, post animae infusionem sunt haec omnia in corpore omnino similia prioribus. Et quod non sint alia quam prius, videtur per omnimodam similitudinem; quod enim per omnia simile est, idem est, ut dicit Damascenus, Libro III, capitulo 16.” (The reference is to the \textit{De fide orthodoxa}).} He can then use the similarity of the accidents that are present before and after the introduction of the (intellective) soul as an argument that there is more than one substantial form, for if there were but one substantial form, the accidents would be corrupted and regenerated and hence numerically diverse which is ruled out on account of their complete similarity.

Although De la Mare’s arguments are brief, the reaction in one of the Dominican \textit{Correctoria corruptorii fratis Thomae}, the \textit{Quare} written by Knapwell, is very long. One of the reasons for this, is that Knapwell does not limit himself to merely refuting De la Mare’s arguments about the generation of a living being. For after his refutations he unexpectedly introduces a second set of arguments against the unicity of substantial form, claiming that many people employ such arguments. These arguments include some that focus on the death of a human being (instead of the generation). Knapwell then proceeds to solve these as well. And when he responds to the argument about the similarity of accidents he takes the same approach as Brito later takes when it comes to sensory evidence for the identity of accidents: he denies that our
These direct, theologically inspired attacks made against Thomas Aquinas in Oxford by De la Mare do not stand on their own. As Jean-Luc Solère convincingly argued, several of the *quodlibetal* questions Aquinas had to answer in 1269–71 also try to attack him on the same theological grounds. Quodlibet II, q. 1, a. 2 (Advent 1269) is entitled ‘whether Christ was the same man during the three days before resurrection’, Quodlibet III, q. 2, a. 2 (Lent 1270) ‘whether the eye of Christ after his death was an eye equivocally’, and Quodlibet IV, q. 5, a. 1 (Lent 1271) ‘whether it is numerically one body of Christ that is hanging from the cross and lying in the grave’. That the explanation of these theological cases, in particular the status of the body of Christ, was one of the main reasons to defend a plurality of substantial forms can also be confirmed by looking at the lengthy *Quodlibet* on the unicity or plurality of substantial form in man held by Godfrey of Fontaines during the final stages of the debate (Easter 1286). Godfrey lists three principal reasons to choose the pluralist position: first, that we do not see the supposed corruption of accidents; second that the unicity position cannot explain how man is generated; and finally the theological cases: the Eucharist and the body of Christ. 

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207 RICHARD KNAPWELL, *Quare*, a. 32, 153: “Nec est illud contra sensum, quia sensus non est distinguere inter accidentia omnino similis quando subito inducuntur in eadem materia, puta quod humiditas vel dimensio sit alia in aceto de novo generato et vino praeexistente.” The proposition is argued for at some length in the passage immediately following this one.

208 SOLÈRE, ‘Was the Eye in the Tomb?’, especially 527–529.

209 SOLÈRE, ‘Was the Eye in the Tomb?’, 526. That these questions targeted hotly debated issues can be seen from the recurrence of similar questions in other authors. Solère gives a list in footnote 72 on page 531 of his article.

210 GODFREY OF FONTAINES, *Quodlibet II*, q. 7: ‘Utrum homo habeat esse ab una forma substantiali vel a pluribus’. For the date see footnote 122.

211 GODFREY OF FONTAINES, *Quodlibet II*, q. 7: ‘Et arguebatur quod homo non habeat esse ab una forma substantiali tantum, quia ponere hominem habere tantum unam formam substantiali est contra sensum, item est contra rationem, item est contra fidem. Contra sensum, quia in homine mortuo apparent eadem accidentia esse quae erant in ipso vivente. Hoc autem non esset nisi aliqua forma substantialis quae erat in ipso vivente maneret in mortuo, quia accidentia non consequuntur materiam nisi mediante forma substantiali. Sed forma substantialis quae est anima non est in mortuo homine, sed alia; et illa etiam erat in vivo simul cum anima. Quare etc. Hoc etiam est contra rationem, quia ratio iudicat quod unicuique agenti et actioni respondet suus terminus et effectus, quare duorum agentium quae agent diversis actionibus respondent diversi sive plures effectus et termini. Sed ad productionem hominis concurrunt duo agentia, scilicet agens naturale et agens supernaturale. Quare ad constitutionem eius concurrunt duae formae substantialiae, quarum una erit terminus agentis naturalis, alia erit terminus agentis supernaturalis. Hoc etiam videtur contra fidem, quoniam si in homine non sit nisi una forma, scilicet anima, tunc cum Christus fuit mortuos, non remansit idem corpus numero mortuum quod fuerat vivum; tunc etiam substantia panis converteretur in solam materiam quae non est corpus, nec caro, aut converteretur in compositum ex materia et anima quae...
and faith respectively. Two of the arguments, the impossibility of seeing the corruption of accidents and the generation (and corruption) of man begin to play an increasingly important role in the *De anima* commentaries from Brito onward.\textsuperscript{212}

How do these discussions relate to the commentary tradition on the *De anima*? I propose the following explanation. When Aquinas comments on the *De anima*, he is concerned with explaining the metaphysical composition and the functioning of the complete living being. In his commentary on the *De anima* he is not at all concerned with the temporal aspects of the generation of a living being. Precisely the opposite, it is the fully functioning living being with all its perfections and operations that is under consideration in the *De anima*. When De la Mare attacks Aquinas, however, using mainly theological arguments — especially arguments concerning the status of the body of Christ in the *triduum* — he takes another perspective. De la Mare focuses precisely on the moments of generation and corruption. The arguments concerning the body of Christ in particular introduce this (more) temporal perspective, and in their slipstream there follow some arguments on the generation of a man. The Dominicans, in their response, did not dismiss this changed perspective, or even comment on this change, but instead tried to reply to it by elaborating a theory of the identity of accidents hardly found in Thomas.\textsuperscript{213} The effect of this is that in the Dominican replies the viewpoint of the natural philosopher and that of the metaphysician are conflated, contrary to what Aquinas did.\textsuperscript{214}

Between about 1276 and 1286 the debate was held hostage by those who considered the unicity of substantial form position to be heretical. But although after this period, the question on the unicity or plurality of substantial forms is once again a question that can be discussed on philosophical grounds, without one of the options being prohibited, something has definitely changed in the discussions. If we look at the doctrinal question, Thomas posthumously won the debate. The unicity of substantial form becomes dominant in *De anima*

tamen non dictur ibi esse nisi per concomitantiam."

\textsuperscript{212}The final reason: the theological cases and in particular the status of the body of Christ, was not taken up in the *De anima* tradition. This is not surprising. The exact division of labour between the *artistae* and the theologians was often debated between the two groups, but it seems to have been a matter of general agreement that discussing the mysteries of faith in any detail should be left to the theologians.

\textsuperscript{213}Indeed, Aquinas had always tried to reply in his *Quodlibeta* without falling into this trap.

\textsuperscript{214}I fully agree with the description of the difference between a metaphysical and natural philosophical viewpoint given by Hohl, ‘*Anima forma corporis*, 553 “Der Naturphilosoph kann immer nur von der Pluralität der Formen sprechen, d.h., er betrachtet die Wirklichkeit in ihrer vielfältigen und gegliederten Erscheinung (species). Der Metaphysiker achtet auf die Seins-Form in ihrer Einheit, Wesentlichkeit und Wirklichkeit und integriert, ergänzt und vollendet die menschliche Betrachtung.”
commentaries. But looking at the formal and the methodological aspect, the Franciscan attacks changed the perspective in which Aquinas proposed his theory. And once this perspective had been introduced, along with the difficult questions it raised about the unity of accidents, it was there to stay and gave rise to these detailed discussions in the fourteenth century. It is an irony of history that the fourteenth century, in which so many philosophers switched from metaphysics to semantics to solve philosophical problems, is the same period in which these debates on accidental identity became so important.

4.5 Conclusions

The later medieval commentators turned out to be fully aware of the problem that Aristotle seems to rely on ‘essentially ensouled matter’, which was discussed by John Ackrill in the 1970s. They agreed that the body which is mentioned in Aristotle’s definition of the soul is not the soul’s matter in the sense that the bronze is the matter of a statue. A body can only be potentially alive if it is actually ensouled, which is why after death there no longer is a body unless we use the term body ‘equivocally’. Aquinas had explained in great detail why the body cannot be the matter of the soul, but other commentators were just as aware of the issue. For instance, the commentaries by Anonymi Giele and Bazán also discuss in some detail what sort of body qualifies as ‘having life in potency’. It is a body that is in first actuality to life, i.e. which has a soul, but is not, at least not continuously in second actuality to life. The term ‘potency’ in Aristotle’s definition of the soul refers to being capable of performing vital operations, not to being capable of becoming alive.

When the acceptance of essentially ensouled bodies is combined with a strict adherence to the unicity of substantial form position, it becomes difficult to describe what happens when the soul departs or is corrupted. On the one hand, the corpse looks remarkably similar to the living body. But on the other hand, the corpse is not a body, unless we use the term ‘body’ equivocally. Moreover, there can be no numerical identity on any level between the body and the corpse, not even on the level of accidents. In Aquinas we find little if any discussion of these counter-intuitive consequences. As I have argued, the reason for this seems to be that Aquinas looks at living beings from the perspective of the final cause rather than from the perspective of the efficient cause. But when his opponents argue against his position, the philosophical

arguments are often based on the perspective of efficient causality: what could possibly account for the regeneration of similar accidents?

The discussion about the identity of accidents throughout the generation and corruption of the living being became an increasingly important topic in the fourteenth-century commentaries on the *De anima*. Once Brito had formulated the precise consequences of a strict application of the unicity of substantial forms framework for the identity of accidents, fourteenth-century commentators tried to find ways to avoid these consequences while (for the most part) continuing to endorse the unicity of substantial form. As a result, even within the unicity of substantial forms framework, matter is given a gradually more independent status. Again, this is clearest in Buridan, who explicitly states that some accidents inhere directly in matter, and that it is only our ignorance of what matter is (combined with our acquaintance with composite substances) that makes us ascribe these dispositions to the composite substance. Buridan's solution turned out to have many similarities to that defended by several twentieth-century commentators of Aristotle, including Jennifer Whiting. These commentators distinguished between two senses of matter in Aristotle. A matter that is essentially ensouled and a matter that is only contingently ensouled, and which is numerically identical in the body and the corpse. Although many of the modern commentators who follow this line of interpretation have a functionalist agenda, which is, obviously, lacking in Buridan, they do share one concern. This is to find a way of defending both that the body is only a body on account of its being ensouled (hence the corpse is not a body) and that the body and the corpse share something, namely numerically the same matter and some basic accidents.

The driving force behind the introduction of the often detailed discussions on the (non-)identity of body and corpse on the level of accidents turned out to be to a large extent theological. The early attacks on Aquinas's position, in the *Quodlibeta* and the *Correctorium*, had a strong theological motivation. The arguments addressed the status of relics, the status of Christ's body in the *triduum*, etc. But these theological arguments were quickly supported by an appeal to (common) sense — we do not see the accidents being corrupted and regenerated — and by an appeal to the apparent lack of the proper efficient causality that could explain the regeneration, and the corruption of the accidents. When the philosophical arguments find their way into the commentaries on the *De anima*, there is no mention anymore of theological aspects that originally motivated the discussion. It was now simply accepted by all commentators, both those who agreed with the unicity of substantial form and those who opposed it, that the discussion of the validity of the unicity of substantial form position was a philosophical discussion. Either position could be upheld without being charged with heresy.
In a second phase, the arguments against the regeneration of accidents in the corpse were supplemented by material taken from commentaries on *De generatione et corruptione*. Slowly the discussion about accidents in the *De anima* tradition and the discussion on *symbola* in the *De generatione* tradition become intertwined. In the case of John Buridan, this even led to the inclusion of a separate question on the soul in his commentary on the *De generatione*. The surprising result is that the popularity in late-thirteenth and fourteenth-century commentaries on *De anima* of the position that man has but one soul and that this soul is his only substantial form hardly counts as a victory of Aquinas. Because of the new focus on efficient causality when explaining living being, which was lacking in Aquinas, there is an ever increasing awareness of the difficulties involved in accounting for the identity of the living being and the corpse. Ultimately, this leads to a new conception of matter, in which prime matter has a certain actuality of its own apart from any substantial form, as we saw in Buridan. And, ironically, it was precisely the question of what matter is that occasioned the debates on unicity and plurality of forms in the first place.\(^216\)

\(^{216}\)See section 2.4.
5 Substance, powers and acts

Those who see any difference between soul and body have neither.

Oscar Wilde, ‘Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of the Young’, Chameleon, 1894.

Aquinas approvingly paraphrases Aristotle when he writes that defining the soul — as Aristotle had done in the beginning of book II of the De anima — amounts to nothing more than to giving a sketchy, preliminary description of it:

Deinde epilogando colligit que dicta sunt et dicit quod secundum predicta determinatum est de anima et posita est anime descriptio figuraliter, quasi extrinsece et superficialiter et incomplete. Complebitur enim determinatio de anima quando pertinget usque ad intima ut determinetur natura uniuscuiusque partis ipsius anime.¹

Next, by way of conclusion, he <i.e. Aristotle SdB> sums up what has been said; and he says that in the foregoing a determination and description of the soul was given figuratively, as it were extrinsically and superficially and incompletely. The determination of the soul will be completed when he reaches its inner structure such that he determines the nature of each part of the soul.

To elucidate the soul’s definition, it is necessary to look more closely at the various ‘parts’ of the soul. Only then will the soul’s definition become something more than a mere extrinsic, superficial and incomplete description. Looking back, we can see that this approach was already indicated in the questions on the possibility of any science of the soul taken up in book I, in which what I called the simplicity arguments were countered by the introduction of

¹Thomas Aquinas, SentdeA, II.2, 76¹⁵⁸-¹⁶⁴.
some structural complexity within the soul, either in terms of attributes (*pas­siones*) or in terms of ‘parts’ (*partes*).\(^2\) For if the soul were completely simple, lacking ‘parts’ in every sense of the word, as the simplicity arguments claimed, it would be impossible to study it scientifically. The ‘parts’ in question are the soul’s powers, and their relation to each other and to the soul as a whole is one of the main subjects of this chapter.\(^3\)

All commentators included the soul’s having parts — I will omit the scare quotes from now on — as one of the necessary conditions for the possibility of a *scientia de anima*. But the methodological questions never made it fully clear how important these parts really are. The quote from Aquinas given above leaves no doubt as to their importance: defining the soul is not the ultimate goal of the *scientia de anima* but merely its beginning.\(^4\) Much more important — and this takes up most of Aristotle’s treatise — is fleshing out this definition by describing the various acts and powers of the soul, beginning with those that are the easiest to understand (the vegetative powers) and ending with those that are the most difficult to understand (the intellective powers). If the soul were so completely simple and undivided that it lacked

\(^{2}\)See above, 3.1.2.

\(^{3}\)For example *THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, 873-8*: “Non autem habet aliter anima partes nisi secundum quod eius potentie partes eius dicuntur, prout alicuius potentis multa, partes dici possunt potestates ad singula; unde determinare de partibus animae est determinare de singulis potentiis eius.” See also *ANONYMUS GIELE, QdA, II.5, 7715-19*: “Sensitivum siquidem et secundum locum motivum universaliter sunt partes animae in quibuscumque inveniantur, quia secundum locum etc., non est sine sensitivo, nec sensitivum sine vegetativo; ideo quodlibet istorum est semper pars animae et non tota anima.”

\(^{4}\)Aristotle’s approach in the *scientia de anima*, in which he first gives a definition of the soul, and then devotes the remainder of the treatise to discussing and elucidating the various parts of the definition (as well as those other topics that are either presupposed by or necessarily connected to the elements of the definition), is a method he also employs elsewhere. *LANG, ‘Aristotelian Physics’,* using the *Physica* as a case-study, gives an excellent analysis of the manners in which both Aristotle and Aquinas proceed in natural philosophy. Both philosophers take the definition of nature as their starting point and then explore the various elements related to this definition. Moreover, both philosophers employ teleological procedures, which are reflected in the structure of their texts. But whereas for Aristotle the teleological procedure consists in a gradual unfolding of the definition of nature, for Aquinas it consists in a progression from the general definition of nature to the proof of the ultimate cause of nature, God, in book VIII. So both authors employ a teleological procedure in their work, but the teleological order is reversed. Still, in both cases there is “… a radical unity of (1) the procedure by which arguments and conclusions are construed, and (2) the particular content, that is, the definition of problems within physics, and (3) the conception of physics as a science.” (p. 572). This conclusion even holds for Buridan’s commentary, which is Lang’s third and final example, in which the teleological procedure is absent and the treatment of topics is simply sequential. Although I would say that this has less to do with Buridan than with the fact that the *Quaestiones* genre is simply not suited for any teleological organization of the material discussed in the commentary.
parts in every sense of the word, then, after giving the definition of soul, there would be no possible way of proceeding. But precisely because the soul is ultimately responsible for a variety, even a broad variety, of powers and acts, it can be studied in a scientific manner. In the late-thirteenth and fourteenth centuries this meant, as we have seen, studying it within the natural philosophical framework.\(^5\)

It was considered to be one of the most important tasks of the *scientia de anima*, once the definition of soul had been given and explained, to describe the relation of the different vital acts to the different powers of the soul. And having made such a classification of powers and acts, the relation between the powers and the essence of the soul also had to be explained. Are the powers really the same thing as the soul itself and is any distinction between them merely a convenient way of discussing them, or is there a distinction independent of the way in which we think and speak about soul and powers? This final question on the relation between the soul and its powers continues to be debated throughout the fourteenth century, although after Ockham there are some important changes in the manner in which the question is understood and discussed. Interestingly, however, these changes cannot be captured in terms of either a growing empiricism or an increased application of logic and semantics.\(^6\)

### 5.1 A curious fourteenth-century thought experiment

Let's have a look at the following, curious thought experiment found in Buridan, Oresme, and the Anonymus Patar: it is clear that the power of vision is located in the eye, since it is only by using our eyes that we are able to see. But suppose that a part of an animal’s foot were to take on the same material dispositions as its eye; would this animal then also be able to see by using that foot?\(^7\) At first sight, the question may seem as bizarre as it is pointless. Given that the situation may be logically possible (let’s say, through divine interven-

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\(^5\)See section 3.1.4.

\(^6\)For the adjective ‘empirical’ as applied to the philosophers of the fourteenth century, see Moody, ‘Buridan and a Dilemma of Nominalism’, 299 and its revival in Zupko, ‘What is the Science of the Soul?’, esp. 297–299. See also Zupko, *John Buridan*, esp. 203–205. For the increasing importance of logic and semantics, see, for example, Murdoch, ‘The Involvement of Logic’.

\(^7\)To give some indication of the importance of the discussion, Oresme returns to it at least three times in his commentary on the *De anima*, in questions II.3: ‘Utrum potentie anime sint ipsa anima vel distinguantur ab ipsa et inter se’, II.4: ‘Utrum in qualibet parte corporis sit tota anima’, and II.5: ‘Utrum in eodem vivente, sicut in homine, sint plures animae, scilicet vegetativa, sensitiva, intellectiva’. Also, Buridan even returns to it in his commentary on the *Ethica* in question VI.3: ‘Utrum potentie anime sint ab anima realiter distincta.’
tion), but will never occur within the normal course of nature, why should a natural philosopher even be interested in the question? Yet the thought experiment is present in many of the commentaries from the mid-fourteenth century, and its discussion is taken very seriously.

What is even more surprising than the very occurrence of the question of whether or not an animal would be able to see with its foot, when it has acquired the dispositions of an eye, is that Oresme and Buridan seem to give the exact opposite answer. To begin with Buridan, his answer to the question introduced in the thought experiment is affirmative:

Sed tu rationabiliter queris utrum anima in pede equi sit visiva. Et ego dico quod sic, loquendo de potentia principali et remota, quia secundum se innata est videre, et videret in pede si Deus et natura formarent sibi oculum in pede. Tamen ipsa non est in pede potentia propinqua ad videndum, quia per potentiam propinquam debemus intelligere vel dispositiones requisitas cum principali agente vel ipsamet principalem potentiam habentem suas dispositiones.⁸

But you, reasonably, ask whether the soul in a horse’s foot is capable of vision. And I say that it is, speaking about a principal and remote power, because the soul is naturally capable to see, and it would see in the foot if God and nature were to form an eye for it in the foot. However, this power is not in the foot as a proximate power of seeing, because by a proximate power we must understand either the required dispositions together with the principal agent or the principal power itself that is in possession of its dispositions.

If God were to create an eye in the foot of an animal, the soul would then be able to see in the foot. Not only that, but the power of vision is in some sense ‘naturally present’ (innata) in that part of the soul that informs the foot. The only reason that the power of sight was not actually exercised in the foot prior to the formation of the eye there is that the foot lacked the required organ. I will return to the distinction between proximate and remote powers later.⁹

Oresme, by contrast, seems to disagree with all of the above:

Ex hoc sequitur corrolarie quod, si oculus esset in pede vel fieret ibi talis dispositio corporea, adhuc pes non videret, quia pars animae quae est ibi, non est nata videre.¹⁰

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⁸John Buridan, QdA, II.5, 66–67.
⁹For a more detailed analysis of the passage, see 5.4.4.
¹⁰Nicole Oresme, QdA, II.5, 151⁸⁷–⁸⁹.
From this it follows as a corollary that, if there were an eye in the foot or if such a bodily disposition were made there, the foot would still not see, because the part of the soul that is there is not naturally capable to see.

Even if God were to create an eye in the foot, the foot of that animal would still not be able to see. The reason for this is, apparently, that the soul has different parts, each of which can only cause a certain subset of the soul's powers. These "soul parts" are commensurate with the bodily organs, and the part of the soul that is present in the foot is simply not made for seeing. Oresme's position is similar to that taken up by Anonymus Patar, who also argues against the position of some philosophers (alqui) who claim that the part of the soul that is in the foot can somehow be the formal cause of vision once an eye is present in the foot. But he goes even further than Oresme by reversing the example used in the thought experiment. As Anonymus Patar claims, if the part of the soul that is in the foot were to be placed in the eye, then it would still not be able to see!11

The first thing that is important to note is that none of these three commentators show any sign of doubt or even hesitation when arguing for their respective positions. Yet the question seems speculative to the extreme. Not only does it seem that it cannot be settled by empirical observation (given that the situation never occurs in the normal course of nature), but it also seems that it cannot be settled by logical or semantical analysis. The latter option seems ruled out because the question is not whether God could make a living being with such a soul that its powers are present everywhere, needing only the required bodily dispositions to be exercised — that question could be settled by logical and semantical analysis.12 Instead the question is: given the factual metaphysical structure of living beings as found in the normal course of nature, how are the soul's powers distributed over the body? The appeal to divine intervention is merely a tool that enables us to have a thorough and clear discussion of this question by taking all logically possible scenarios into

11 Anonymus Patar, QdA, II.5, 27066-67: “Sexta conclusio: in eodem, sicut in bruto, sunt plures animae partiales. Patet ex dictis, nam alia est anima ossis et alia est anima carnis; istae autem animae sunt animae partiales. Sequitur corollarie quod, si illa pars animae quae est in pede equi esset in oculo equi, non videret patet, qua illa pars animae equi quae est in pede non est apta nata nec ordinata ad videndum. Sequitur etam hoc esse falsum quod alqui dicit de anima equi quod ista anima equi quae est in pede videret, si haberet organum sicut illa quae est in oculo.” Incidentally, this passage alone already counts as strong evidence against the identification of Anonymus Patar with John Buridan, since Buridan explicitly defends the position of the alqui that Anonymus Patar argues against.

12 The only thing that needs to be done to settle that question is to show whether or not it implies a logical contradiction. If so, even God cannot do it. If not, He can, at least in principle.
account. But what is really at stake here is not the question of what God could do, or even, the question of what could have been the relation between our soul and its powers, but the question of how the soul and its powers are actually related.

Clearly Buridan disagrees with Oresme and Anonymus Patar at some level when it comes to the answer we should give to the thought experiment. But the precise extent to which they disagree is still unknown at this point, since there are at least two reasons why a comparison between the passages is difficult. First, Buridan’s exact words are that ‘the soul would see in the foot’, whereas Oresme uses the words ‘the foot would still not see’. And second, since Buridan limits his claim to the soul taken as a principal and remote power, whereas neither Oresme nor Anonymus Pater makes such a distinction in the passages quoted above, there remains the possibility that they are talking about two different things. The first reason can be easily dismissed by pointing out that neither Buridan nor Oresme is very strict in his terminology when it comes to ascribing powers to a subject. They just as easily say that the eye sees, as they say that the soul sees or that the whole animal sees. Whether or not the second reason can be dismissed as easily is a question that can only be answered later in this chapter.

At this moment, there are two possible ways of interpreting the thought experiment. We can either assume that Buridan and Oresme are talking about the same thing, in which case they have a radically different conception of the soul and the way it relates to its powers and to the body. Or we can assume that when Buridan affirms the presence of the powers of sight in the foot and when Oresme denies it, they are talking about different senses of the term.

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14 For example, John Buridan, QdA, II.12, 182: “Et canis indicat quem videt vocare eum et per visum vadit ad eum, vel etiam indicat vocantem non esse istum quem videt, ideo non vadit ad istum quem videt, sed querit alium.” Also, John Buridan, *Questiones super decem libros Ethicorum*, Paris, 1513 (photomechanical reprint Frankfurt Minerva, 1968), VI.3, f. 119v. “Unde si oculus esset talis in pede quibus est in capite quantum ad qualitativas dispositiones utique nos oculo pedis videremus sicut oculo capitis”, Nicole Oresme, QdA, II 5, 15187–89. “Ex hoc sequitur corollariam quod, si oculus esset in pede vel fieret ibi talis dispositio corporea, adhuc pes non videret, quia pars anhiae quae est ibi, non est nata videre.” Additional evidence that the precise phrasing of the argument in Oresme and Buridan matters little can be found in Anonymus Patar, who phrases the argument in the same way as Burdan (that is, by saying that the soul in the foot would see), but reaches Oresme’s conclusions. See above, footnote 11.
‘power’, in which case their disagreement may be minor, perhaps merely a matter of emphasis. Whichever of these two interpretations turns out to be correct, these philosophers disagree at some level.

A detailed analysis of the debate found in Buridan, Oresme and Anonymous Patar in relation to its historical context will allow me to answer several important questions:

1. What causes this debate to arise and what is at stake for these philosophers?

2. What are the ramifications of their respective positions for the *scientia de anima* as a whole?

3. What is the difference (if any) between the *scientia de anima* as it is practiced in the later thirteenth century and as it it practiced in the fourteenth century? More specifically, can the difference be located in a shift from (a more) metaphysical to (a more) empirical approach as has been suggested in some studies?

The third question needs some introduction. Jack Zupko especially has argued in favor of qualifying the fourteenth-century *De anima* tradition as becoming more and more empirical. But it is easy to misunderstand his claim. It does not mean that the fourteenth-century commentators have something in common with either British or Logical Empiricism. Instead Zupko connects the term to what he calls a cluster of epistemic doctrines, including an emphasis on what is given in sense perception and on a-posteriori modes of reasoning. After applying his criteria to the *De anima* tradition from Thomas Aquinas to Nicole Oresme, Zupko concludes that there is indeed a shift in the fourteenth century as compared to the thirteenth:

What we are seeing here is the migration of the concept of the soul in Aristotelian psychology from a substance whose essence can be revealed by studying its motions in Thomas, to the imperceptible and undisclosable subject of those movements in Buridan, and finally, to something of which corporeal matter must itself be mentioned as an essential part in Oresme.

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15 Zupko, *John Buridan*, 204: “For if we understand empiricism in terms of a cluster of broadly epistemic doctrines concerned with the methodology of knowing, and emphasizing in particular (1) the evidentness of sensory appearances and judgments (as opposed to their intrinsic, formal content) as the primary criterion for their veridicality, (2) the reliability of a posteriori modes of reasoning, such as induction (as opposed to modes based on the notion that empirical truths are deductively demonstrable), and (3) the utility of naturalistic models of explanation, including their analogous application to non-physical phenomena (as opposed to their disuse, or limited application to specific natural phenomena), then much of what fourteenth-century philosophers did can count as empiricist, especially in contrast to the thirteenth century.”

Whereas Aquinas is still confident that we can demonstrate the real nature of the soul, Buridan and Oresme no longer share his optimism.\(^\text{17}\) The essence of the soul is not something we can say much about. I think that the description of the fourteenth-century *De anima* tradition as more empirical fails to capture the most significant changes. My analysis of the thought experiment will show the reasons for this.

In order to answer the three questions I raised above, there are several topics that need to be discussed first, most of which concern the metaphysical structure of the soul. The soul's structure was usually discussed by reference to four elements: object (*obiectum*), act (*actus*), power (*potentia*), and the (essence of the) soul itself (*anima*). Superficially, the relation between these four elements is a given. The soul has a variety of powers, which are exercised through a variety of acts, which in turn are directed to a variety of objects. But, unsurprisingly, the exact relations between these elements were debated. There seem to have been two main issues in these debates: (1) Is the relation between two elements one of identity or non-identity; e.g. is the soul really the same as its powers or not? and (2) By means of which principle can we decide on the number of a particular element; e.g. what would enable us to infer that there are two different powers rather than one more comprehensive power? Or three different souls rather than one soul in a human being? As can already be gathered from these questions, one of the driving forces in the discussion is the tension between unity and multiplicity that also drove the debate on the scientific status of the *De anima*. How can the unity of the living being be reconciled philosophically with its multitude of acts, of powers and, perhaps, even of souls?

In the remainder of this chapter I will look at the discussions about the structure of the soul on different levels, from the more general to the more detailed. First, I will briefly look at what the commentators say about the divisions on the level of the soul itself: do all living beings have but one soul, or do the more complex living beings have multiple souls? Second, I will look at their discussions of the difference between the soul and its powers. And third, I will look at the debates concerning the manner in which the soul is present in the body. All three themes will come together in the final part of the chapter, where I will return to the thought experiment of the eye in the foot and try to answer the questions raised above.\(^\text{18}\) Just as in the previous chapters, one of my aims is to show the transformations of the discussions in the period from, roughly, Aquinas to Oresme. But given that there is an almost complete consensus on several of the relevant topics up until Jandun,

\(^{17}\text{See Zupko, John Buridan, 225–226.}\)
\(^{18}\text{See p. 209.}\)
I will often not discuss each individual author in detail.

### 5.2 One soul or multiple souls?

'Vegetative', 'sensitive' and 'intellective soul' are the terms that are used to refer to plant souls, animal souls and human souls respectively. But the terms are also used in a slightly different sense in which they refer to something like clusters of powers. It is in this latter sense that we can say that a human being has all three souls, since in human beings we find vegetative, sensitive and intellective operations. As Aristotle's definition of the soul shows, when we use the term 'soul' in the first manner, it refers to the first act, or substantial form, of the organic body. But when we use the term in the second manner, it is not immediately clear whether or not we are still talking about substantial forms. When we say that a human being has all three souls, does this imply that he has three substantial forms? Or does it merely mean that the various powers of the one substantial form he has can be conveniently grouped into these three clusters of powers?19

For those philosophers who adhered to the position that there is a plurality of substantial forms in every substance, the question of whether there is one or whether there are multiple souls in a living being was easy to answer: since every essential perfection has to be accounted for by a different substantial form, the vegetative and sensitive souls in an animal must be distinct forms. And if the vegetative and sensitive souls are already distinct, there can be no doubt that the rational, immortal soul is a distinct form also. It might be debated whether the vegetative and sensitive forms should properly be called souls in a human being, but there can be no question that they are different substantial forms. But for those who advocated the unicity of substantial form, the question turned out to be more difficult, especially when it came to our intellective soul. It may be relatively unproblematic to say that the vegetative and sensitive functions can be accounted for by reference to one substantial form only. But can one and the same substantial form really be the source of both corporeal and incorporeal operations? Or is the intellective soul unique, in the sense that it cannot be accounted for by the unicity of substantial form paradigm?

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19There is a tendency among those who want to modernize Aristotle to avoid speaking about substantial forms, using expressions such as 'clusters of powers' exclusively instead. But since this leaves the ontological status of the vegetative, sensitive and intellective souls unspecified, I find it unsuccessful as an interpretation of Aristotle. For whatever their ontological status is, it is clear that for Aristotle the term 'soul' is not only a short-hand for a cluster of powers, but is also that which accounts for their unity and their being present in the first place.
The answers which the various thirteenth-century commentators gave to this question are well known for the most part, and I do not intend to discuss them here. Those inclined to follow Averroes, such as Anonymus Giele and Jandun, obviously thought that there is a real distinction between the intellect and the vegetative/sensitive soul. Aquinas, Anonymus van Steenberghen, Ananymus Bazán, and Brito, by contrast, all argued that we have but one soul. In order to understand the thought experiment of the eye in the foot, however, it is necessary to at least look at the way in which the question was discussed in the fourteenth century, from Ockham onwards, which is what I will do here.

One way of deciding the question of whether each living being has but one soul or multiple souls is by taking the operations of the soul as a starting point. This seems to be a sensible thing to do from a methodological standpoint, because the validity and even necessity of such an approach is continuously affirmed in the Aristotelian tradition with the adage 'the operation discloses the form' (operatio arguit formam). But it also seems to be simple common sense to use the operations as our starting point, since, after all, it is normally the perceptible operations that indicate what kind of substance we are dealing with. It is but a small step from this principle to saying that a difference between the various operations of a substance points to different substantial forms within that substance, provided that this difference in

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20 For the tradition prior to Aquinas, see Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla, 384–404, and Lottin, Psychologie et morale, vol. 1, 464–479.
21 Anonymus Van Steenberghen, QdA, II.7: Utrum vegetativum, sensitivum et intellectivum in eodem sint formae diversae: "Dicendum quod ista tria, secundum quod sunt in eodem, non sunt actus vel formae diversae." Anonymus Bazán, QdA, III.2: Utrum potentia vegetativa et potentia sensitiva, etiam intellectiva in homine pertineant ad unam essentiam: "Ad quaestionem dico quod hae potentiae pertinent ad unum essentiam et hoc confirmo tali ratione: si potentiae istae in homine essent diversae essentiae, sequeretur quod unum individuum esset plura individua; consequens est falsum; ergo et antecedens." Radulphus Brito, QdA, III.1, 96: "Sed obmissis istis opinionibus, quia erronea sunt, dico quod potentia intellectiva pertinet ad unam essentiam animae cum potentia vegetativa et sensitiva."
22 The most important epistemological access we have to a substantial form is through the operations it exhibits in the substance of which it is the form. Beginning with the operations, or perhaps even with the objects to which these operations are directed, is one of the basic methodological principles of natural philosophy (see Aristotle, De anima, II.4, 415a14–22). It is through the vital operations that we know that something has a soul. See for example Radulphus Brito, QdA, II.6: "Ideo dico quod in partibus animalis anulosi decisis et in partibus plantarum decisis est anima, quia propria operatio aliaius forme arguit illam formam." Compare Nicole Oresme, QdA, II.4, 143: "Tunc sunt conclusiones. Prima est quod in quibusdam animalibus anulosis et quibusdam plantis est totum homogeneum, et est in qualibet parte notabilis quantitatis tota potentialiter et essentialiter. Patet, quia post separationem partium apparent ibi opera vitae, et per consequens ibi est anima, quia operatio arguit formam."
operations is fundamental enough.\textsuperscript{23} And given that we can find vegetative operations combined with sensation and even thinking in some living beings, it is perhaps not so far-fetched to suppose that such a broad variety of operations cannot be accounted for by a single substantial form. This line of reasoning can be made more persuasive in a number of ways. Buridan, for example, mentions the following argument: if we assign (specifically) different sensitive souls to horses and donkeys on account of the differences in both organ and subject of vision, then so much the more should we assign different souls to the powers of vegetation and sensation in a single living being, since these powers differ even more from each other than the powers of vision in a horse and a donkey do.\textsuperscript{24}

Alternatively, the arguments could be taken from the evidence we can obtain through introspection. One clever psychological argument for a plurality of souls was given by William Ockham, who bases his argument on the empirical fact that we sometimes experience contrary desires.

Probo tamen quod distinguuntur <i.e. anima sensitiva et intellectiva in homine SdB> realiter, primo sic: impossibile est quod in eodem subiecto sint simul contraria; sed actus appetendi aliquid et actus renuendii idem in eodem subiecto sunt contraria; igitur si sint simul in re- nem natura, non sunt in eodem subiecto. Sed manifestum est quod sunt simul in homine, quia illud idem quod homo appetit per appetitum sensitivum, renuit per appetitum intellectivum.\textsuperscript{25}

I prove that the sensitive and intellective soul in man are really distinct. Firstly thus: it is impossible that contraries exist simultaneously in the same subject. But the act of desiring and the act of disapproving of the same thing are contraries. If, therefore, they exist simultaneously in nature, they do not exist in the same subject. But it is evident that they exist simultaneously in man, because the very same thing that a man desires through his sensitive appetite he disapproves of through his intellective appetite.

\textsuperscript{23} Clearly, the difference between seeing red and seeing blue, for example, will not count. But the difference between seeing red and thinking about it might.

\textsuperscript{24} John Buridan, QdA, II.4, 42–43: “Item operationes magis differentes debent provenire a formis et principiis magis differentibus. Sed constat quod videre et nutrire in isto equo sunt operationes magis differentes quam videre in equo et asino. Quod appetit, quia et organa et subiecta habet magis differentiam. Ergo si videre in asino et videre in equo proveniunt ab animabus diversis secundum speciem, sequitur quod magis in equo videre et nutrire proveniunt ab animabus specifice differentibus.”

\textsuperscript{25} William Ockham, Quodlibeta, II.10, 157\textsuperscript{13–19}. Ockham gives two more arguments in this Quodlibet: (1) that sensation has the sensitive soul as its subject and not the intellective soul and (2) that the same form cannot be both extended (as the sensitive soul is) and unextended (as the intellective soul is).
I may have the strong (intellectual) desire to study all night, but at the same time also have a strong (sensitive) desire to set aside the books and go to sleep instead. Since the principle of non-contradiction dictates that contraries cannot belong to a single subject in the same respect at the same time, Ockham can argue that in order to account for such contrary desires we need to posit a different subject for each of them. Hence the desires must be caused by different souls. Ockham ends up with the position that man is unique in the sense that he has two souls, in contrast to plants and animals, all of which have only one soul.26 Over and above our sensitive soul, which includes all thevegetative powers, we also have a rational soul.

I have chosen Buridan and Ockham as examples for a reason. Both philosophers are well known for their attempts at ontological parsimony. If there is one thing that a non-specialist knows about fourteenth-century philosophy, there is a good chance that this will be some formulation of Ockham’s razor: the principle that in any (scientific) theory we should employ the barest ontology possible that still leaves us with full explanatory force.27 So when these philosophers take the existence of multiple souls seriously, or in Ockham’s case even as the truth, it is clear that there must be some really compelling reasons to assume such a plurality.28

Ockham unfortunately never wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s *De anima*, although, as we will see, the discussions he devoted to the soul in other places exerted a tremendous influence on later fourteenth-century commentators. Buridan, by contrast, wrote several commentaries and discussed the question of whether we have one soul or multiple souls extensively. He takes the question very seriously, emphasizing its difficulty.29

And after giving a fair account of the plurality of souls position, which he equates with the plurality of forms position in general, and showing how

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26 For a discussion of Ockham’s position in the context of the general controversy on the unicity or plurality of substantial forms, see McCORD ADAMS, William Ockham, vol. 2, 633–669.
27 The principle is usually quoted as *entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem,* but that formulation is not found in Ockham’s texts. For Ockham’s own different formulations of the principle and their context, see McCORD ADAMS, William Ockham, vol. 1, 156–161. See also A. A. MAURER, ‘Method in Ockham’s Nominalism’, The Monist, 61 (1978), 426–443 for the broader methodological context of the razor.
28 This becomes even more clear when we see that Ockham denied that there is a real distinction in two other psychological cases: (1) between intellect and will and (2) between the agent and potential intellect. See William Ockham, *Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum (Reportatio),* edited by G. Gal and R. Wood, St. Bonaventure, New York: St Bonaventure University, 1981 (Opera theologica, 5), II, q 20, 425–447.
29 John Buridan, QdA, II.4, 45: “Ista questio bene est difficilis quia difficile est demonstrare aliquam partem.”
from a plurality viewpoint one could reply to possible counterarguments, he gives his own position. This is introduced by one of his favorite phrases 'these arguments not withstanding, I believe the opposite' (non obstantibus istis ego credo oppositum), namely, that there is only one soul in each living being.

5.2.1 Buridan's arguments against a plurality of souls

A first sign of Ockham’s influence may already be found in how Buridan structures his discussion of the question of whether we have one or more souls. The question is divided in two parts. In question II.4, Buridan raises the question of whether the vegetative and sensitive soul are one, to which he gives an affirmative answer. The question of whether the intellective soul is also identical with the vegetative/sensitive part is postponed until III.17. The same strategy was followed by Ockham in his Quodlibeta.

Buridan's first argument, in the question from book II, against the pluralist position would only have been effective against an extreme variant of that position. To paraphrase the argument: if the sensitive and vegetative soul are really distinct, God could take away one while leaving the other intact. This would either, for example, turn a horse into a plant when its sensitive soul is taken away, or, equally strange, leave a horse without any vegetative functions at all if its vegetative soul is taken away. I find it doubtful whether there is anyone in the pluralist camp who would accept such a loose connection between the substantial forms that, at least in principle, whichever one of these forms could be removed, while the substance as a whole remains somehow intact. And they would almost certainly deny that one of the lower forms

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30 John Buridan, QdA, II.4, 45–48.
31 For his general argumentation against a plurality of forms Buridan refers the reader to his commentary on the Metaphysica. The topic is discussed in John Buridan, QMetaph, VII, q 14, ff 49r–50r. In his commentary on the De anima Buridan argues specifically for the unicity of the soul.
32 Both questions are discussed in Zupko, 'Horse Sense and Human Sense'.
33 William Ockham, Quodlibeta, II, q 10: ‘Utrum anima sensitiva et intellectiva in homine distinguantur realiter’. The relation between the vegetative and sensitive soul is discussed as a dubium within William Ockham, Quodlibeta, II, q 11: ‘Utrum anima sensitiva et forma corporeitatis distinguantur tam in brutis quam in hominibus’. Ockham’s position there is that the sensitive soul is identical to the vegetative soul, but is really distinct from the form of corporeity.
34 John Buridan, QdA, II.4, 49 "Prima ratio est si in equo ab anima sensitiva circumscriptur anima vegetativa vel everso. Deus enim sic eas posset auferri ad invicem si essent diverse anime. Remota igitur sensitiva, remanente vegetativa, quod remaneret esset planta Omne enim animatum habens animam vegetativam sine anima sensitiva est planta. Everso autem, remota vegetativa et remanente sensitiva, quod remaneret esset animal. Et ex utrisque est nunc equus compositus. Ergo ipse est compositus ex animali et planta, quod est absurdum."
could be taken away while the higher remains. But the argument does succeed in showing one thing. Any pluralist owes us an account of how the different substantial forms are connected within a given substance. And whatever this connection is, if it is too loose, the counterintuitive conclusions of Buridan’s argument cannot be avoided.

More convincing is the approach Buridan takes in two of his other arguments. The plurality of forms position, he argues, is committed to an introduction of forms from the most general to the most specific. First, something would have to receive the form of corporeality, then that of being alive, then that of being an animal, etc. The most specific form, for instance being a donkey, would always be added last. Buridan takes this to imply that all forms prior to the specific and last form are general, in the sense that, for example, the sensitive soul in a horse and a donkey would be exactly the same. It is only when the specific forms of being a horse and being a donkey are introduced that they begin to differ. But that implies, so goes the argument, that a horse and a donkey should form the exact same organs and have the exact same vegetative and sensitive operations, since these result from the general souls that they have in common. This is obviously not the case.

In spite of these difficulties, the pluralist still has one powerful argument left, and that is the appeal to the methodological principle that a difference in operations indicates a difference in forms. To this, Buridan replies that the principle itself is valid, but only when applied to the operations that belong to different substances.

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35 John Buridan, QdA, II.4, 50: “Item difficilius arguitur quia isti ponunt quod, secundum animam sensitivam, equus et canis sunt eiusdem rationis substantialis et quod tantum dierunt secundum rationes substantiales specificas, hoc est, per diversas formas substantiales specificas additas anime sensitive vel animabur sensitis.” Buridan makes a good point here. The forms are taken from the logico-semantic divisions that are made within Porphyry’s tree, which already points to their generality. But also, if the previous forms are not general, then the forms of corporeity as are introduced, for instance, in a human being and a horse respectively, must be generically different. Horse corporeality would be something other than human corporeality even before the most specific forms of horiness and humanness are introduced. But it is difficult to imagine how these forms of corporeality can be determined to one species or another in the absence of all specific differences.

36 John Buridan, QdA, II.4, 52: “Item isti ponunt animam vegetativam esse eiusdem rationis in homine, equo, pisce, et hoc est valde inconveniens, quia tunc consimiliter deberet facere nutritionem et consimilem carnem facere et consimilia membra formare, quod est manifeste falsum.”

37 John Buridan, QdA, II.4, 54–55: “Ad primam dicitur quod non possimus arguere diversitates specificas formarum substantialium in istis materialibus, nisi ex diversitate operationum. Hoc conceditur, sed tamen non quecumque diversitas specifica operationum arguit diversitatem formarum substantialium. Hoc enim non arguit in uno supposito propter hoc quod forma superioris gradus est maioris actualitatis, potest in plures et nobiliores operationes, et continet potentialiter formas inferiores, sicud mixtum continet et retinet de elementis al-
laughing and a substance that only shows vegetative functions and nothing else, I can, and should, infer that the two substances are specifically distinct and thus have different substantial forms. But when I see both laughter and vegetative functions in one and the same substance, I cannot infer that this substance has two different substantial forms.

The reason that Buridan does not admit the validity of the inference from different operations to different forms within one and the same substance is a metaphysical principle. Buridan is convinced that there is a hierarchy of substantial forms, in which the higher form can do all that the lower form can and more. Given this hierarchy, the only thing that can be concluded from the great variety of operations in a single substance is that they must be grounded in a form that occupies a higher place in this hierarchy than forms that can only account for a subset of these operations. The example he gives is that of the qualities of the elements. These qualities remain present in a compound substance (mixtum), let's say a human being, although the substantial forms of the elements are no longer present. The human body is a unity in which the elements are not present according to their substantial forms — otherwise the human body would be a mere aggregate of these elements. But nevertheless, the body is still heavy and tends downward when it falls on account of its heaviness, which is an elemental quality. We cannot, Buridan argues, infer the presence of the forms of the elements from the fact that the body displays heaviness; instead we should say that the body has retained some of the qualities of the dominant element.

Buridan's final position is that each living being, including human beings, has but one soul, which is at the same time its only substantial form. As such, he defends the same viewpoint as Aquinas. The ontological status of the human soul, however, will turn out to be very different from that defended by Aquinas.

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38 See Zupko, John Buridan, 168–169.
39 The terminology for such a presence of qualities of lower forms within a higher form is not completely fixed in the Middle Ages. Buridan uses the terms 'potentialiter' and 'virtualiter' interchangeably to describe such a presence. The term 'virtualiter' was also preferred by Aquinas.
40 It is not only the ontological status of the soul that is different. As became clear in section 4.3.4, p. 189, Buridan and Aquinas also assign a different status to the matter that is informed by the soul. Whereas for Aquinas matter is pure potentiality, for Buridan matter has some degree of actuality on its own, enough to be the subject of several accidents.
5.2.2 Nicole Oresme’s hesitation

Oresme and Anonymus Patar are peculiar cases when it comes to the discussion of the unicity or plurality of forms. Throughout his commentary on the *De anima* Oresme especially went to considerable trouble to avoid taking sides in this debate. There are numerous passages where the question is discussed in the conditional sense: if there are multiple forms, then... ① I know of no other commentator who is so careful to avoid taking a stand on this issue in his *De anima* commentary. And although Anonymus Patar is perhaps less extreme, he also leaves both options open in the most important questions related to the unicity or plurality of the soul in his commentary. ②

Oresme’s most important question on the topic, the fifth question of book two (‘whether in the same living being, as in man, there are multiple souls, namely a vegetative, sensitive and intellective soul’) is no exception. But it at least gives some indication of which option he seems to prefer. The question contains an elaborate argument to reject the principle that contrary operations cannot proceed from one and the same form, which had led Ockham to conclude that there are two souls in man, a sensitive and intellective soul. According to Oresme (and to Anonymus Patar also), there are no fewer than eight possible causes that can explain the existence of diverse, or even contrary acts that proceed from the same form, and he discusses each of these. ③ This

① For example, NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II 4, 142: "Iterum, si in homine non sit aliqua alia anima, tunc absolute dicendum est quod in qualibet parte hominis est tota anima hominis et omnes potentiae... Et si in homine sit alia anima et forma, scilicet sensitiva, tunc dicendum est de ipsa sicut de animabus brutorum." See also NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II 3, ad 4, 139: "Ad quartam, cum dictur quod sensus repugnat intellectui, potest dici quod sunt diversas animae. Et si sit eadem, tunc non est prope repugnantia, sed solum hoc est propter inclinationem ex dispositione corporali." And in NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II.1, 131: "Quantum ad secundum notandum est quod conclusiones quas intendo ponerere, volo intelligere saltem aliam specialiter de anima extensa ad extensionem corporis, scit est anima equi vel anima asini vel huinammodi, et etiam de anima sensitiva hominis, si ponatur distincta ab anima intellectiva"

② ANONYMUS FATAR, QdA, II.5: ‘Utrum in eodem vivente sint plures formae substantiales, verbi gratia, sicut in homine vel in equo’, ends with the words “Et sic patet qualiter secundum duplicem opinionem potest solvi quaestio.” The two opinions in question are the position that a human being has but one soul and Ockham’s position that a human being has two souls. He also keeps his options open in other questions, such as ANONYMUS FATAR, QdA, II 4, 252–253: "Quantum ad secundum notandum est quod conclusiones quas intendo ponere, volo intelligere saltem aliam specialiter de anima extensa ad extensionem corporis, scit est anima equi vel anima asini vel huinammodi, et etiam de anima sensitiva hominis, si ponatur distincta ab anima intellectiva"

③ NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II.5, 149–50. These possible causes are. (1) propter passa aliter et aliter disposita, (2) propter coagentia, agentia et concurrentia, (3) propter agentia particularia et determinantia, (4) propter quialitates aut virtutes aut dispositiones diversas, (5) propter instrumenta extrinseca, (6) propter diversas partes heterogeneas talis formae agents, (7) propter libertatem, and (8) quia agens est causa unus per se et alterius per accidens. Compare ANONYMUS
discussion is enough to lead Oresme to the conclusion that any inference from
the existence of diverse and even contrary operations to a plurality of forms
is invalid. Using the principle of parsimony in scientific explanation he then
draws the conclusion that the vegetative and sensitive souls, at least, are not
distinct. These are one and the same soul.

An identification of the intellective soul with the vegetative/sensitive soul,
however, is more difficult. The fact that the intellective soul and the sensi­
tive soul can have contrary operations simultaneously is not enough to con­
clude that the two souls are distinct, as we have seen. But Oresme seems to
be persuaded by another of Ockham’s three arguments in favor of a distinc­
tion between the intellective and vegetative–sensitive soul in man, namely the
following:44

Eadem forma numero non est extena et non-extensa, materialis et
immaterialis; sed anima sensitiva in homine est extensa et materialis,
anima intellectiva non, quia est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte;
igitur etc.45

Numerically the same form is not extended and non-extended, material
and immaterial; but the sensitive soul in man is extended and material,
the intellective soul is not, because it is wholly in the whole and wholly
in whichever part; hence etc.

Apart from having operations that are contrary to those of the sensitive
soul, the intellect also has properties that are contrary to those of the sensitive
soul. In particular, the intellective soul is unextended, whereas the sensitive
soul is extended. Also, the intellective soul is immortal, whereas the sensitive
soul is not.46 Since contrary properties cannot belong to the same substance
simultaneously, it seems that the intellective soul is distinct from the sensitive
soul. After considering this argument, Oresme hesitantly adopts the same posi­
tion that Ockham defended: in a human being, the sensitive soul (including
the vegetative operations) is distinct from the intellective soul. I say hesitantly,
because Oresme says that this position appears, for now, to be the more likely
position (ista via apparat pro nunc verior). Moreover, he also leaves open the

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44 See above, p. 213, footnote 25.
46 Nicole Oresme, QdA, II.5, 15341–44: "Et ideo in homine cum hoc est anima intellectiva
quaest omnino alterius rationis a forma materiali; et ideo potest esse suppositum per se, et
separati a corpore ipsa manente."
possibility that the intellective soul is identical to the sensitive soul, by showing in detail how anyone who wants to adhere to the unicity position should proceed to counter all arguments put forward against this position.\footnote{Nicole Oresme, \textit{QdA}, II.5, 155\textsuperscript{12-14}: "Nunc ergo, si quis vellet tenere aliam viam, discurrendum est per rationes quae sunt contra non scindae sed evadendae, ut videatur etiam propter quas opertet hoc ponere et propter quas non."}

It is difficult to determine how we should interpret Oresme's answer to the question. Although he does take Ockham's side in this question, he does so with the qualification that it only appears to him, for now, to be the more likely position. And in all other contexts in his commentary on the \textit{De anima} he leaves both the unicity and plurality option open.\footnote{Oresme's commentary has a bit of encyclopedic feel to it, which does not always make it the most interesting text to read. Another noticeable feature is the very large number of (often vague) internal references, as was also noted by E. Grant, \textit{The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages. Their Religious, Institutional, and Intellectual Contexts}, Cambridge [etc.]: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 130.} But what is clear, at least, is that the position that distinguishes between the sensitive and intellective soul was not the default position, not even after Ockham.

5.2.3 Summary

The few commentators who were inclined to follow Averroes, for instance, Jandun and Anonymus Giele, argued that the intellect is really distinct from the vegetative/sensitive soul and that it is a separate, unique substance. Ockham, by contrast, also argued that the intellect is really distinct from the vegetative/sensitive soul, but considered both souls to be a form of the body. Man, he claimed, has two souls. The vegetative/sensitive soul on the one hand, and the intellective soul on the other. Oresme and Anonymus Patar tried to avoid taking a stance on the issue, but when pressed to do so, Oresme, at least, seems more inclined to side with Ockham in this respect. The option that man has three souls, which had been defended in the second half of the thirteenth century, is not defended by any of the commentators I discussed. All the remaining commentators I discuss in this study argued for the substantial unity of the soul.

The answers to the question of whether in man the intellective soul is distinct from the sensitive soul seem to be irrelevant to the question of how the thought experiment of the eye in the foot should be interpreted. Apparently, the thought experiment can be formulated and answered irrespective of whether the distinction between the two souls is accepted or not. Both Oresme and the Anonymus Patar, who, at the very least, avoid committing to the position that there is but one soul in man, also agree that the sensitive soul has different parts, each of which has its own functions. This is why the part of
the soul in a horse's foot is unable to be the cause of vision. Buridan, by con- 
trast, who is fully committed to the position that there is but one soul in each 
living being, also holds that the sensitive soul has different parts, all of which 
are equally capable of causing vision. The difference between them seems to 
stem from a disagreement on how we should analyze the soul in terms of its 
powers, not from how we should analyze the soul in terms of its substantial 
unity.

Saying that the soul is a substantial unity leaves unspecified how that unity 
is internally structured in terms of powers, but also how it relates to the body 
as a whole. Is the soul an indivisible whole which is present as such in each 
part of the body? Or does the soul have some internal structure? And if so, 
does this mean that the soul's structural parts are in some sense located in 
different parts of the body? These questions will be discussed in the next part.

5.3 The relation between the soul and its powers

Prior to Ockham, there is a remarkable unanimity when it comes to the ques- 
tion of whether there is a difference between the soul and its powers. Virtually 
all commentators accepted both Albert the Great's position and his terminol- 
gy.49 That is, they all argued that there must be a real distinction between the 
soul and its powers. And they all claimed that the way in which the relation 
between the soul and its powers should be specified is that the soul's powers

49 Albert the Great not only made an influential attempt to describe the overall structure of 
the various powers of soul, but he also supplied what became the most popular way of speaking 
about the relation between soul and powers, namely that the powers flow forth from the soul. 
See Park, 'Albert's Influence', 507. The background and sources for Albert's terminology are 
discussed in Bonin, 'The Emanative Psychology'. But although Albert's terminology and position 
were accepted, there is still a great difference between Albert and those who take over his 
terminology. Bonin shows that the term 'fluxus', as well as other terms related to emanation, 
has a very rich meaning in Albert's theory of the soul, something which is already no longer 
the case in Aquinas (p. 53). For Albert, the flowing forth of the powers is closely related to his 
idea that the rational soul is a substance in its own right, essentially separate from the body. For 
Aquinas, by contrast, the soul is not a substance, but merely subsistent. Bonin, 'The Emanative 
Psychology' puts it very well when she says that "Thomas agrees with Albert that the soul is the 
principle of the powers, and he too can call it the font of the powers; after all, the composite 
causes its powers insofar as it is actual, and the soul is what actualizes it. Nonetheless, talk of 
fonts no longer fits quite as well when the font stands in need of something else in order to 
flow." (p. 53). What she says of Aquinas is also applicable to all other commentators I discuss. 
Although all of them, at least up until Ockham, use Albert's terminology, the connotations of 
an essentially separate soul are no longer present. Saying that the powers flow forth from the 
soul has simply become a slightly awkward metaphor; it amounts to nothing more than a way 
of saying that the powers are ontologically distinct from the soul's essence, while at the same 
time they are intimately related to it. This explains why they just as easily say that the soul's 
powers are proper accidents (propria) of the soul.
flow forth from its essence (fluunt ab essentia animae).\textsuperscript{50} Moreover, they even introduce mostly the same arguments, both for and against a real distinction between the soul and its powers. This means that there is little to be gained by discussing the different commentators one by one. Instead I will focus on the general argumentative strategies they employ. But before looking at the arguments for and against a real distinction, we should first establish what it means to say that the powers are really identical or really distinct from the soul.\textsuperscript{51}

A good starting point is Anonymus Van Steenberghen’s discussion of the question, in which he gives a precise definition of power:

Potentia enim nihil aliud est quam primum principium operationis: activa enim potentia est principium operandi in aliud secundum quod alud; passiva est principium transmutationis ab alio secundum quod alud. Et dico 'primum principium', non sicut subjectum, sed quo subjectum agit vel patitur, sicut caliditas est primum principium quo ignis calefacit.\textsuperscript{52}

For a power is nothing else than the first principle of an operation: that is to say an active power is a principle of operation with respect to something else in so far as it is something else; a passive power is a principle of transmutation <caused> by something else in so far as it is something else. And I say 'first principle', not in the meaning of a subject, but in the meaning of that through which a subject acts or undergoes, just as heat is the first principle through which fire heats.

Saying that the soul is really identical to its powers, therefore, is saying that the soul is the first and immediate principle of the vital operations.\textsuperscript{53} And saying that the soul is really distinct from its powers, is saying that the soul

\textsuperscript{50}See, for instance, ANONYMUS BAZAN, QÎM, 409\textsuperscript{24–25}: "In oppositum sunt omnes doctores, dicentes quod potentiae animae fluant ab essentia animae."

\textsuperscript{51}A real distinction is opposed here to a merely conceptual distinction. John Duns Scotus’s formal distinction is not accepted by any of the authors I discuss in this book.

\textsuperscript{52}ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, QdA, II 9, 210\textsuperscript{30–34}: "Qui igitur dixerunt quod anima est suae potentiae, dixerunt quod anima est principium suarum operationum, scilicet sentienti et vivendi et intelligendi; sed secundum quod principium intelligendi, dicitur intellectivum; secundum quod principium sentiendi, dicitur sensitivum, et sic in alius."

\textsuperscript{53}ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, QdA, II 9, 210\textsuperscript{30–34}: "Ponentes igitur quod anima est suae potentiae, dixerunt quod anima est principium suarum operationum, scilicet sentienti et vivendi et intelligendi; sed secundum quod principium intelligendi, dicitur intellectivum; secundum quod principium sentiendi, dicitur sensitivum, et sic in alius."

"Ponentes igitur quod anima sit sue potentiae, hoc intelligunt, quod ipsa essentia animae sit principium immediatum omnium operationum animae, dicentes quod homo per essentiam anime intelligit, sentit et alia huusmodi operatur, et quod secundum diversitatem operationum diversis nominibus nominatur: sensus quidem in quantum est principium sentiendi, intellectus autem in quantum est intelligendi principium, et sic de alius; utpote si calorem ignis nominemus potentiam liquefactivam, calefactivam et desiccativam, quia hac omnia operatur. Sed nec opimmo stare non potest."
is merely the mediate, but not immediate principle of the vital operations. It is true that the term 'power' is used in other senses also. Jandun and Brito mention power as taken for the subject that is able to do something — in this sense, they say, the soul is identical to its powers — and power as a relation (\textit{respectus}) to an act. But although the term 'power' also has these other meanings, the one that is really at stake here is power in the sense of being the \textit{immediate} principle of operations.

\textbf{5.3.1 Arguments against a real distinction}

There were three popular ways of arguing against a real distinction between the soul and its powers that can be found in almost all commentaries. Looking at these arguments and their counters is a good way to obtain a detailed picture of the commentator's views on the relation between the soul and its powers.

\textbf{The powers as essential parts of the soul}

The first of the arguments against the real distinction between the soul and its powers compares the soul to matter. Just as the potency (\textit{potentia}) of matter to become all forms belongs to its 'essence', it is said, so also must the powers (\textit{potentiae}) of the soul belong to its essence. This argument is almost always related by the commentators to a passage from Averroes's \textit{De substantia orbis},

\begin{quote}
\footnotesize
\textit{JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II.9, 104–105} gives the following list of the meanings of the term 'potentia'. It is sometimes (1) taken for the subject that is able to do something (\textit{pro subiecto potente, sive quod potest}), sometimes (2) for the immediate principle (\textit{immediate principio}) of an active or passive operation, and sometimes (3) for a relation (\textit{respectus}) and a being ordered (\textit{ordo}) to an act. Taken in the first sense, the soul is essentially the same as its powers, since the soul is the basic principle of its acts, the composite receives the acts only on account of the soul. Taken in the second sense, soul and powers differ essentially. The third sense has to do with how a power can lead us to knowledge of the soul. "Et ex hoc sic patet tertia conclusio quaestionis, scilicet quod per ipsam potentiam alqualiter notificatur substantia animae, cum per ipsam potentiam referitur ad actionem. Et agere facit scire formam, sicut pati materiam. Quare etc" (p. 106). The same threefold distinction is found in \textit{RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA}, II 9\textsuperscript{2–61}, who criticizes some anonymous commentators for focusing on the third meaning, and saying that the powers, taken as \textit{respectus}, are really distinct from the soul. A power of the soul, Brito argues, is not a relation. This critique is probably directed against Henry of Ghent, who seems to have defended this view in \textit{Quodlibet} III.14 (Paris, 1518) Henry of Ghent is identified as the defender of this view by the editors of \textit{WILLIAM OCKHAM, Quodlibeta}, II, q. 20, 431.

\textit{JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II.9, 103:} "Sicut se habet potentia materiae ad materiam, sic potentia animae ad animam, per convenientem similitudinem. Sed potentia materiae est idem essentia ter cum materia, ut videtur velle Commentator in tractatus \textit{De substantia orbis}, ubi dicit quod materia prima substantiatur per posse. Quare etc" See also \textit{ANONYMUS BAZÁN, QdA}, II 3, 406\textsuperscript{5–11}; \textit{ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, QdA}, II.8, 209\textsuperscript{3–7}, \textit{RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA}, II 9\textsuperscript{3–13}.
\end{quote}
in which it is said that matter is characterized by potency (*materia substantiatur per posse*). There are two possible strategies to counter this argument. The first is to deny the validity of the comparison between the soul and matter, the second is to deny the real identity between the 'essence' of matter and the potency to become all forms. Both strategies are used. The main result, however, is the same. The powers of the soul are not identical to the essence of the soul.

The replies to this argument show that the soul's powers should be conceived as accidents, more precisely, as proper accidents (*propria*). As proper accidents, they neither belong to the soul's essence, nor are they separable from it. Rather, they follow, or 'flow forth' as it was often called, from the essence. A mathematical example should make it clear what the term 'follow' means here. Let us take, for example, Euclid's definition of a triangle as 'a plane figure which is contained by three straight lines'. The essence of a triangle is what is expressed in that definition. But now take the property of having the sum of all angles equal 180 degrees. This is neither something that forms part of the essence of a triangle — since the definition mentions nothing about this property — nor is it an accidental property that some triangles have and some not. The presence of the property is a direct consequence of the essence even though it is not, strictly speaking, part of it. This shows what proper accidents are; accidents that are necessarily present whenever the essence is present, because their presence is implied in the essence.

Yet, there is something very peculiar about the solution that the soul's powers are proper accidents. If it is true that the powers are not part of the essence of the soul, but are related to it as its *propria*, then what is the essence of the soul? And, if we cannot give an answer to that question, then what can we hope to accomplish in the *scientia de anima*? The problem did not escape the commentators as can be gathered from their answers to a second popular argument against the distinction between the soul and its powers.

**The powers as specific differences**

The second argument claims that the vegetative, sensitive and intellective powers of the soul are its specific differences, and, as such, are part of the

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56 Cf. AA 10:5. Anonymus Van Steenberghen is the only commentator I found who does not connect the argument to Averroes's text.
57 This strategy is used, for example, by Radulphus Brito, *QdA*, II.9, 91-93.
58 This strategy is used, for example, by John of Jandun, *QdA*, II.9, 106: "... quod posse, quo substantiatur hoc subiectum, non est de natura ipsius subiecti."
Arguments against a real distinction

soul's essence. This argument is more sophisticated than the first one, and, at least at first sight, more convincing. When we examine Porphyry's tree, we can see that at some point body is contracted into living being, living being into animal, and, lastly, animal into man. Each of these contractions is the result of the addition of a specific difference to a genus. The most obvious answer to the question of what these specific differences are, is that they are having vegetative powers, having sensitive powers, and having intellectual powers respectively. This is especially clear in the classical definition of a human being as a rational animal. What else can 'rational' mean other than having the power to think? But if that is the case, having vegetative powers, having sensitive powers, and having intellectual powers are all specific differences. And any specific difference by definition belongs to the essence. Given that every essence is a unity, the powers of the soul cannot be really distinct from the essence of the soul.

There is only one possible way to counter this argument, and that is to deny that the vegetative, sensitive and intellectual powers constitute the soul’s essential differences. That strategy, however, has serious consequences. It means that we lose the possibility of saying anything concrete about the soul’s essence. Not every commentator seems to be fully aware of this, but Aquinas certainly is, as Robert Pasnau has shown. When Aquinas, in his *Summa theologiae*, replies to the objection that the powers of the soul cannot be accidents, because they constitute the soul’s essential differences, he not only denies the claim that the powers are *differentiae*, but he also states that we can never know substantial forms directly. The only cognitive access we have to substantial forms is through their accidents. Hence, accidents can sometimes

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61 See, for example, in Anonymus Bazan, *QdA*, II.3, 40864-86: “Ad tertium, cum dicitur: istud est de essentia animae per quod animatum differt ab inanimato, concedo. Et dicis quod per potentiam animatum differt ab inanimato, nego. Et tu probas quia homo differt a lapide per potentias, scilicet intelligere, sentire, dico quod homo differt per suam essentiam a lapide et non per potentias”; Anonymus Van Steenberghen, *QdA*, II.8, 21158-72: “Ad aliud dicendum quod huissumodi differentiae non sumuntur a potentibus animae, sed ab ipsa anima secundum enim quod sunt in diversis, sunt animae diversae; secundum autem quod sunt in eodem, sumuntur illae differentiae a re una, secundum diversa apparentia de re.”

take the place of the essential differences in the description of a substance.\footnote{Thomas Aquinas, \textit{STh}, I, q. 77, a. 1, ad 7, 237: "Ad septimum dicendum quod rationale et sensibile, prout sunt differentiae, non sumuntur a potentiis sensus et rationis, sed ab ipsa anima sensitiva et rationali. Quia tamen formae substantiales, quae secundum se sunt nobis ignotae, innotescunt per accidentia, nihil prohibet interdum accidentia loco differentiarum substantialium ponit."}

Aquinas’s reply in the \textit{Summa theologiae} puts his discussion of the relation between our cognition of accidents and our cognition of substance in his commentary on the \textit{De anima} in a new light. When discussing the possibility of having a science of the soul, Aquinas had argued as follows:

Consequenter etiam cum dicit: ‘videtur autem non solum quod quid est’ ponit difficultates que emergunt quantum ad illa quae sunt in adiutorium diffinitionis anime, quia in diffinitione oportet non solum cognoscere principia essentialia, set etiam accidentalia. Si enim recte diffinirentur et possent cognosci principia essencialia, diffinitio non indigeret accidentibus; set quia principia essencialia rerum sunt nobis ignota, ideo oportet quod utamur differenciis accidentalibus in designatione essencialium (bipes enim non est essenciale, set ponitur in designatione essencialis), et ut per ea, scilicet per differencias accidentales, perveniamus in cognitionem essencialium.\footnote{Thomas Aquinas, \textit{SentdeA}, I.1, 7247-260. The passage continues as follows: "Et ideo difficile est, quia oportet nos cognoscere quod quid est anime ad cognoscendum facilius accidencia anime, sicut in mathematicis valde utile est preaccipere quod quid erat esse recti et curvi et plani ad cognoscendum quod rectis trianguli anguli sint equales; e converso etiam accidentia, si preaccipiantur, multum conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid erat esse, ut dictum est. Si quis ergo assignet diffinitionem per quam non deveniatur in cognitionem accidencium rei diffinitae, illa diffinitio non est realis, set remotae et dyalectica. Set illa diffinitio per quam deveniatur in cognitionem accidencium est realis et ex propriis et essencialibus rei." (p. 726-273).}

Next, when he \(<i.e.\) Aristotle SdB\> says ‘it seems, however’, he posits difficulties, which emerge in relation to the things that support the definition of the soul. For in a definition, we ought not only to know the essential principles, but also the accidental ones. Indeed, if essential principles were rightly defined and could be known, a definition would not require accidents. But because the essential principles of things are unknown to us, we ought to use accidental differences when designating the essential ones (for being two-footed is not essential, but it is placed in the designation of the essential). And through these, namely the accidental differences, we come to a knowledge of the essential differences.

Clearly, for Aquinas at least, there was far more at stake than just discussing Aristotle’s somewhat incidental comment that “it seems not only useful for the discovery of the causes of the incidental properties of substances to
be acquainted with the essential nature of those substances... but also con-
versely, for the knowledge of the essential nature of a substance is largely pro-
moted by an acquaintance with its properties.\textsuperscript{65} Our intellect is too weak to
penetrate into the essences of things. By using proper accidents as our starting
point, we can conduct a scientific investigation, but the result can never be
proper knowledge of the essences of things, since that knowledge would have
to include knowing exactly how the proper accidents and the essence are re-
lated. But this relation is something that we will never be able to grasp.\textsuperscript{66} This
does not mean that real scientific knowledge is impossible. It simply means
that there are limits to what we are able understand.

**Infinite regress**

The final argument against a real distinction between the soul and its powers
tries to show that such a distinction would lead to an infinite regress.\textsuperscript{67} I will
discuss the argument in the formulation in which it is found in Brito’s com-
mentary. Let us assume that a power (potentia) of the soul adds something
over and above the soul’s essence. In that case, the soul, taken on its own,
must be in potency (in potentia) to that power.\textsuperscript{68} And then we can ask of that
potency, whether it is the same as the soul’s essence or something added to it.
Neither reply will do. For if it said that this potency is the same as the soul’s
essence, then for the same reason we could have said that the original power
of the soul is identical to its essence. If, on the other hand, the soul’s potency
to its powers is itself something added over and above the soul, the soul must
be in potency to that potency, and we can repeat the question \textit{ad infinitum }.\textsuperscript{69}

When it is said that the soul must be in potency to its powers, this is
granted by Brito as long as we are clear on the type of potency in question,

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\textsuperscript{65} Aristotle, \textit{De anima}, I.1, 402b17–22.

\textsuperscript{66} See Pasnau, \textit{Thomas Aquinas}, 167.

\textsuperscript{67} See Radulphus Brito, \textit{QdA}, II.9.14–24; Anonymus Bazán, \textit{QdA}, 406–407.\textsuperscript{12–26}; John of
Jandun, \textit{QdA}, II.9, 103–104; John Buridan, \textit{QdA}, II.5, 61. The formulation of the argument in Anonymus Bazán is somewhat confusing, possibly because of an omission in the first three sentences: “Praeterea, hoc idem secundo arguitur sic: si potentia esset quoddam accidens adveniens animae, \textit{omission SdB}; modo quando anima haberet actu illam potentiam, ipsa esset in potentia ad aliam potentiam; tunc quaero de illia potentia: vel est de essentia animae, vel est accidens adveniens animae.”

\textsuperscript{68} This works better in Latin: “per suam essentiam est in potentia ad suas potentias”.

\textsuperscript{69} The argument assumes that the soul must be in potency to its powers when those powers
are distinct from it. Perhaps it relies on the following presupposition: if the powers of the soul
are distinct from the soul, they are either accidents or substances. It is clear that they are not
substances, so they must be accidents. Now the relation between any substance (or essence)
and its accidents is that between potency and act. Therefore the soul must be in potency to its
powers if these powers are really distinct from the soul.
namely a potency that does not disappear as potency when it is actualized (potentia coniuncta actui). As for the question of whether this potency is distinct from the soul's essence or not, it should be said that having these powers belongs to the soul essentially. The solution of the argument thus closely parallels the interpretation which the commentators gave to Aristotle's definition of the soul as actus primus corporis physici organici habentis vitam in potentia. The soul's potency to life was interpreted as a potency that is not lost when it is actualized, but, on the contrary, as a potency that, although perfected through its act, itself remains present. A potency in that sense is always an inborn or acquired power instead of merely a condition. It is, in more technical terms, a potency that belongs to the second species of the category of quality.  

5.3.2 Arguments in favor of a real distinction

What the discussion of the arguments against a real distinction showed is that the powers were conceived of as proper accidents. More precisely, the powers are located in the second species of the category of quality. The fact that the powers are proper accidents explains why the soul and its powers are ontologically distinct, whereas the fact that they are proper accidents explains why we never encounter a soul that has no powers. Now that the most common arguments against the position that the soul is distinct from its powers are discussed, we can turn to the arguments that were introduced to defend this position to see why the distinction was so important for the commentators.

Belonging to different categories

The first argument is that soul and powers belong to two different categories, which means that these are two different kinds of entities. The soul belongs to the category of substance, whereas its powers belong to the category of quality. Hence the soul is distinct from its powers. When the powers of the soul are conceived of as accidents, the question of whether the soul is ontologically distinct from its powers becomes the same question as that of whether a substance is ontologically distinct from its accidents. The answer to the latter

70 The description 'second species of quality' refers to the discussion of quality in Aristotle, Categorias, translated by J. L. Ackrill, in: J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 8, 9a14—19, p. 14: “Another kind of quality is that in virtue of which we call people boxers or runners or healthy or sickly — anything, in short, which they are called in virtue of a natural capacity or incapacity. For it is not because one is in some condition that one is called anything of this sort, but because one has a natural capacity for doing something easily or for being affected.”

71 Radulphus Brito, QdA, II.950–61; Anonymus Bazán, QdA, 40732–34, John of Jandun, QdA, II.9, 104.
question is obvious within the Aristotelian tradition; every accident is ontologically distinct from its substance. It is not surprising that the answer is obvious, since the argument now begs the question. To say that the powers are accidents presupposes that they are ontologically different from the soul. What needs to be done is to show why the powers of the soul must be conceived of as accidents, which is what the commentators in fact do in the second and third argument.

We also find a closely related argument that phrases the difference between the soul and its powers in terms of actuality and potentiality instead of in terms of substance and accident. The advantage of this argument is that it is able to stand on its own. Since this argument is the dominant strategy in Aquinas, I will use his formulation.\(^2\)

Nam anima secundum suam essentiam est actus. Si ergo ipsa essentia animae esset immediatum operandi principium, semper habens animam actu haberet opera vitae, sicut semper habens animam actu est vivum. Non enim, inquantum est forma, est actus ordinatus ad ulteriorem actum, sed est ultimus terminus generationis. Unde quod sit in potentia adhuc ad alium actum, hoc non competit ei secundum suam essentiam, inquantum est forma, sed secundum suam potentiam. Et sic ipsa anima, secundum quod subest suae potentiae, dicitur actus primus, ordinatus ad actum secundum. Inventur autem habens animam non semper esse in actu operum vitae. Unde etiam in definitione animae dicitur quod est actus corporis potentia vitam habentis, quae tamen potentia non abscit animam. Relinquitur ergo quod essentia animae non est eius potentia. Nihil enim est in potentia secundum actum, inquantum est actus.\(^3\)

The soul is essentially an act. If, therefore, the very essence of the soul were to be the immediate principle of its operations, then what has a soul would always actually have the vital operations, just as what has a soul is always actually alive. For it is not, in so far as it is a form, an act that is ordered to a further act, but it is the end term of generation. Hence that it is still in potency to another act does not belong to it according to its essence, in so far as it is a form, but according to its powers. And so, the soul, as it underlies its powers, is called the first act, which is ordered to a second act. But we find that what has a soul is not always in act with respect to the vital operations. Whence it is said in the soul's definition that it is the act of the body having life in potency, a

\(^2\) For a detailed analysis — that is still worth reading — of all the texts in which Aquinas discusses the relation between the soul and its powers, see P. Künzle, Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen von Augustin bis und mit Thomas von Aquin, Freiburg, Schweiz, Universitätsverlag, 1956, 171–218.

\(^3\) Thomas Aquinas, StTh, I, q 77, a 1, 236–237 Utrum essentia animae sit eius potentia
potency, however, that does not exclude the soul. It remains, therefore, that the essence of the soul is not its power. For nothing is in potency according to act, insofar as it is act.

The soul is always the act of the body. Being the actuality of the body is what constitutes its essence. The soul’s powers, by contrast, are sometimes in act and sometimes merely present in potency. This suggests that the soul and its powers are ontologically distinct. The soul is in first act, whereas the powers are in second act. And since nothing can be in potency in so far as it is in act, the soul’s powers must be ontologically distinct from its essence. The argument also aims to show something else. The crucial passage is ‘quae tamen potentia non abiicit animam’: the soul’s potency to the vital operations as it is expressed in the soul’s definition is a potency that is never removed from the soul. Even if the vital operations are actually exercised, the soul is still in potency to these vital operations, for otherwise the soul’s definition would no longer apply to it.\(^{74}\)

### The differences between the powers themselves

The second argument in favor of a distinction between soul and powers focuses on the differences between the powers among themselves. If we suppose that the powers are really identical to the soul, it follows that they must also be really identical to each other.\(^{75}\) But that gives rise to several counter-intuitive consequences. If the powers are really identical to one another, then, since identity is a transitive relation, whatever we can predicate of one power, we should also be able to predicate of another. Take, for example, intellect and will. Intellect is a power capable of acquiring knowledge (*potentia cognoscitiva*). But on the assumption that the powers are identical to the soul, whatever applies to the intellect will apply to the will also. So we should admit that the will is also capable of acquiring knowledge, with the result that the original distinction between knowing and willing collapses. Similar problems arise on the level of the sensitive functions. If sight and hearing are both identical to the soul, then wherever we find the one, it seems we should also find the other. But this runs counter to the empirical observation that the two powers are located in two different places of the body.

\(^{74}\)The argument also aims to show that the ontological distinction between the soul and its powers is already implied in Aristotle’s definition of the soul.

\(^{75}\)Radulphus Brito, QdA, I.1-9274; John of Jandun, QdA, 105.
From simplicity to multiplicity

The final argument is simple. In its briefest formulation it goes as follows: given that there is only one soul and a multitude of powers, the powers must be distinct from the soul. Since the powers can be multiplied while the soul remains one, the powers and the soul cannot be identical. The problem with this brief formulation, however, is that it does not make clear why this conclusion follows. Why should it be impossible for one soul to have multiple powers when the powers are not distinct from the soul? Moreover, the argument seems to beg the question. Only if the powers are multiplied in the sense that they are different entities does the conclusion follow. But if powers are thought of more in terms of the soul being related to different acts, there is no compelling reason to accept the conclusion.

A more promising variant of the argument is found in Jandun. Nature, he says, does not proceed from one thing to another very dissimilar thing unless through a medium. But the soul and its operations are very dissimilar. Whereas the soul is a substance, the operations are accidents. And whereas there will no longer be an animal if the soul is separated from its operations — with the soul no longer remaining part of the animal —, there will still be an animal if the operations are separated from the soul — with the soul remaining part of the animal. This formulation combines the intuition underlying the argument that the multitude of powers implies their ontological distinction from the soul with the previous argument that soul and powers belong to different categories.

Interestingly, at this point Jandun pauses to discuss an objection (sed dubitaret uenitis). The objection is the following: if accidents are capable of being the immediate principle of operations, then, given that a substance is more perfect and more noble, a substance should be even more capable of being the immediate principle of operations. If this objection is valid, then there is no reason to assume an ontological distinction between the soul and its powers. Recall that the whole debate is about the question of whether the soul

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76 RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, II.9, 38-41. ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, QdA, II.8, 21016-18.
77 JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, 105: "Item. Natura non procedit a multum dissimili et diverso ad multum diversum nisi per medium, quod quodammodo<do> convenit cum utroque extremorum. Huusmodi enim est ordo naturae, ut manifestum est; modo ipsa anima et eius operatio, seu actus, sunt multum diversa entia. Nam anima est substantia et est inseparabilis ab ipso [in] animato manente. Operatio vero est accidentes eius et est separabiles ab ipso animato manente; et ideo est rationabile sta uniri per medium, quod alquum modo sit conveniens utrique, et hoc est ipsa potestas naturalis animae. Ipsi enim est conveniens cum anima in hoc quod permanet in animato quandi vivit et convenit cum operatione in hoc quod est accidens quondam. Et ideo ex ordine naturae rationabile est concedere potentiam naturalem differentem esse a substantia animae mediante qua operatur."
78 JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, 105.
is identical to its powers, where ‘powers’ is taken as the immediate principles of its operations. So if the soul can be the immediate principle of its operations, there is no need for any additional powers that are ontologically distinct from the soul itself. A substantial part of Jandun’s response to the question on the relation between the soul and its powers is devoted to this more general question of whether it is the substantial or the accidental form that is the immediate cause of operations. And from his reply, we can gather that for Jandun the question about the relation between the soul and its powers is primarily an instance of the more general question of how created substances cause their operations, just as it was for Aquinas.

Being the immediate principle of operations in the material, sublunary realm (in istis inferioribus) is, according to Jandun, a form of instrumental, or organic, causality. He invokes the analogy with arts and crafts, where the instrument is a proximate principle of operation and the art itself a remote principle. Remote principles are not a form of instrumental causality, but a form of principal causality. It is being the principal cause that belongs to more noble things, but not necessarily being the immediate cause. Jandun approvingly cites Aristotle’s De sensu where it said that fire does not act in so far as it is fire, but in so far as it is hot.\(^79\) That is, fire acts in so far as it has certain accidents that are the immediate principles of its operations. Jandun also briefly mentions the separated substances, but says that the discussion of how they are related to their operations is another question. The important point is that in material substances the principal and the immediate causes of operations are two ontologically distinct entities.

### 5.3.3 Some preliminary conclusions

The questions on the distinction between the soul and its powers often give the impression of a more general discussion of the relation between any substance and its powers that just happens to be held in the context of the De anima. This already becomes apparent when we look at how Jandun structures his discussion: we find a long dubium which is concerned with the more general thesis that not substantial, but accidental forms are the immediate principles of operation. It is even more visible in Aquinas, for whom the arguments for a real distinction between the soul and its powers often appear to be an afterthought. Aquinas views the question from a much broader perspective, namely that of the distinction between God and creature. The real distinction between essence and power is a mark of creation, since only in

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God are essence and powers identical.\textsuperscript{80} From this perspective, the question of whether the soul is identical with its powers is settled long before it can even arise. This broader perspective can, undoubtedly, be at least partially explained by reference to the fact that most of Aquinas’s discussions on the soul take place in more theological genres. But even so, this perspective is so important in Aquinas that it is almost inconceivable that he would ever identity the soul with its powers.

The different arguments for and against the distinction between the soul and its powers show that the underlying discussion is the question of whether the soul’s powers are accidents or part of its essence. If they are accidents, then they are \textit{ipso facto} distinct from the soul. If they are not, they are \textit{ipso facto} identical to it. Given that all commentators agreed that the powers are, and must be, accidents, the only thing that remained to be done is to spell out the exact relation between these accidents and the soul. This is where they relied on Albert the Great. The powers are proper accidents of the soul, and they proceed from the soul by way of a \textit{fluxus}, a flowing forth.

\subsection*{5.3.4 The identification of the soul with its powers}

In the tradition after Ockham — who denied that there is any real distinction between the soul and its powers — the question of whether the soul and its powers are really distinct or not is discussed differently. This difference is reflected in both the terminology and in the arguments that are being used. The \textit{fluxus} terminology is abandoned, new arguments are introduced, and the real distinction between the soul and its powers is no longer the \textit{communs opinio}.

Buridan mentions no fewer than twelve arguments in favor of a real distinction between the soul and its powers. The ‘simplicity to multiplicity’ argument is still used by Buridan. Interestingly, the second stock argument against a real distinction, that of the similarity between the soul and its powers, is now in-
introduced as an argument both for and against a real distinction. The final argument, that the soul and its powers belong to different categories, is not mentioned anymore. By far the dominant strategy used by Buridan, however, is concerned with the necessary distinction of the powers among themselves. Eight of the twelve arguments aim to show that the different powers must be distinct from each other, from which a real distinction between the soul and its powers is supposed to follow. One of these is the following argument, which is closely related to the thought experiment of the eye in the foot:

Third: where one <power> is not, another is, as the power of sight is in the eye and not in the foot or the ear. For if the power of sight were in the foot or the ear, it would be there in vain, because it would not be able to exercise its operation. And nature does nothing in vain. Therefore.

Buridan introduces the observation that powers are exercised in specific organs as an argument in favor of a real distinction between the soul and its powers. The power of vision is exercised in the eye but not in the foot, whereas the soul is present in the whole body. Supposing that the powers are not distinct from the soul, all powers must be in the whole body although they are only exercised in particular parts of it. But this situation would seem to conflict with the Aristotelian adage that nature does nothing in vain (natura nihil facit frustra).

In spite of the impressive list of arguments in favor of a real distinction, the question seems to have already been decided in the opening lines of Buridan’s reply, which are the following:

Dicendum est breviter quod omnis anima est potentia, quia omne principium activum vel passivum alicuius motus vel operationis est potentia activa vel passiva, activa si sit principium activum et passiva si sit passivum operationis et passionum.

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81 JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.5, 59–60: “Item ad principale. Sicud se habet potentia materie ad materiam, ita potentia anime ad animam. Sed potentia materie non est de essentia materie, ut dicit Commentator primo Physicorum.” Notice that although the argument is still based on a passage from Averroes, the source is no longer De substantia orbis, but the commentary on Physica I. The same argument is also to argue against the distinction, only this time by reference to Aristotle. JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.5, 60–61: “Oppositum arguitur quia: sicud se habet potentia materie ad materiam, ita potentia anime ad animam. Sed Aristoteles in principio istius secundi dicit materiam esse potentiam.”

82 JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.5, 58.

83 JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.5, 61.
It should be said briefly that every soul is a power, since every active or passive principle of some motion or operation is an active or a passive power; an active power if it is an active principle and a passive power if it is a passive principle of an operation and of passions.

That every soul is a power is clear, Buridan claims, since everyone concedes that the soul is the principle of its operations, whether these are active or passive. This is a somewhat puzzling reply in light of the distinctions that the previous generations of commentators made between the different senses of the term ‘power’. In the earlier discussions, the relevant sense of ‘power’ was being the immediate principle of operations. But there is no mention anymore of this qualification. The meaning of the term ‘power’ in the passage cited above seems to be closer to power in the sense of the subject that is able to do something, an interpretation under which the earlier commentators also claimed that the soul is identical to its powers.

Obviously, Buridan’s first reply, taken on its own, cannot settle the question of whether the soul is identical to its powers. It either seems to sidestep the question completely by denying that there are two things we are talking about, a soul and a set of powers, or else it fails to reply to the controversial question: is the soul (even granted that we may call it a power) really the same as its different powers? Buridan is clearly aware of this, for he quickly moves on to discuss a more controversial question, namely whether the soul of a human being has a plurality of powers. This he answers in the negative: when we mean principal powers, and also, when we take the question in its proper sense (loquendo de proprietate sermonis), there is no plurality of powers. Only in an improper sense can we say that a man’s soul has multiple powers, namely in the sense that his soul can exercise diverse operations. At this point, the question seems to be answered fully. There is no real distinction between the soul and its powers, nor between the powers amongst themselves. There are only different descriptions of the soul in relation to its different operations.

But unexpectedly, immediately after Buridan establishes the identity of the soul with its powers, he goes on to deny that very same identity. The
fact that this conclusion seems to blatantly contradict the first part of his solu-
tion did not escape him, so he carefully explains the relation between both
answers. When identifying the soul with its powers, he was discussing the
powers of the soul insofar as we can refer to the powers while excluding the
necessary bodily dispositions required for their exercise. Buridan reserves the
expression ‘principal powers’ (potentiae principales) for this usage. But when
denying the identity of soul and powers, Buridan uses the term ‘power’ in a
second, derivative sense, for which he reserves the expression ‘instrumental
powers’ (potentiae instrumentales). In this second sense, the powers refer to
whatever is required for the exercise of their operation, in particular to the
various bodily dispositions that are necessary for the exercise of the powers
in the first, principal sense. For example, we can call the dispositions needed
for seeing (the eye and the sensible species it receives) a sensitive instru-
mental power. In contrast to the principal powers, these instrumental powers are
both distinct from the soul and from each other. This distinction, Buridan
claims, is all that is needed to solve the question of the relation between the
soul and its powers.

Although Buridan gives a few initial arguments against a distinction be-
tween the soul and its powers, including the infinite regress argument, it never
really becomes clear what his main grounds to oppose this distinction are.
Luckily, there is another text in which Buridan also discusses the difference
between instrumental and principal powers where this becomes clearer. His
commentary on Aristotle’s Ethica also includes a question on the relation be-
tween the soul and its powers. In contrast to his discussion of the question
in his commentary on the De anima, he devotes ample attention to the logico-
semantical aspects of the question. ‘Power’, Buridan says, has more than one
meaning, but in all its meanings it is a relative term.

88 Buridan also uses the term ‘potentia remota’ as a synonym for ‘potentiae
principales’, and ‘potentia propinqua’, and sometimes ‘potentia dispositiva’, as a synonym for ‘potentiae instru-
mentales’, see for example John Buridan, QdA, II.5, 66–7.

89 John Buridan, QdA, II.5, 65: “Et sic dispositiones ad sentiendum sunt potentie sensitive
instrumentales et different ab anima sensitiva.”

90 John Buridan, QdA, II.5, 66: “Totum ergo solvitur distinguendo inter potentiam prin-
cipalem et instrumentalem sive dispositivam.”

91 John Buridan, Ethica, VI, q. 3. ‘Utrum potentie anime sint ab anima realiter distincte’,
ff. 118r–119v.

92 John Buridan, Ethica, VI, q. 3, f. 118ra. “Potentia enum quolibet dictorum modorum
est principium aut activum aut passivum aut principale aut dispositivum. Principium autem,
secundum suam propriam rationem, respectivum est, nec potest nisi ad alium intelligi.”
becomes how propositions in which a relative term is predicated of a subject should be analyzed. Buridan gives several examples of such propositions, which include ‘God is His powers’, and ‘form is nature’. The truth conditions of these propositions are the same as in propositions in which the predicate is a non-relative term. The proposition is true if and only if the subject and predicate terms stand for (supponunt) the same thing. Where opinions differ, however, is whether in propositions such as ‘form is nature’, the predicate signifies something over and above what the subject signifies, and if so, what?

Buridan discusses three views on the signification of relative terms, one of which is that relative terms signify something that has its own reality, over and above what the subject signifies. According to that view, ‘power’ not only signifies something over and above the subject of that power, but what it signifies has the same ontological status as, for example, a quality has. This interpretation of ‘power’ neatly corresponds to the earlier tradition that denied the identity of the soul with its powers: the powers are accidents that are really distinct from the soul. To refute this view, Buridan gives one single argument. There is at least one case, Buridan argues, in which we know for sure that a subject and its powers are really identical, namely God. On account of the divine simplicity, there can be no ontological distinction between God and His powers. So when we talk about God’s powers, the term ‘powers’ signifies nothing other than God Himself. And if we can account for the proposition that God is his powers without introducing something over and above God Himself, then there is no reason why we cannot do the same in all other cases, such as when we talk about the soul and its powers, or about the power of matter. Why posit additional entities if we can explain everything without these?

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93 In the proposition ‘form is nature’, nature is the relative term, according to Buridan, since nature is defined as a principle, and principles are relative terms.
94 For a discussion of the way in which Buridan analyses propositions in terms of supposition and signification, see Zupko, John Buridan, esp. 61. In short, supposition has to do with a term’s reference, and, as such, is a property of terms only in so far as they form part of a proposition. Signification, by contrast, has to do with a term’s meaning, which is a property that terms have on their own account.
95 John Buridan, Ethica, VI, q. 3, f. 118: “Saltem enim cum dicimus Deum esse principium aliorum, non potest dici quod primum significet in Deo rem aliam ab ipso Deo, cum Deus sit omnino ex orat. simplex et nihil sit in eo quod non sit ipse Deus. Ideo saltem in Deo necesse est redire ad primam opinionem vel ad tertiam. Et si talis predicatio potest de Deo salvari sine re sibi addita, poterit etiam in aliis. Propter quod ociosum erit in materia vel in anima vel in quocumque alio principio ponere relationem preter animam superadditam fundamento. Frustra enim ponuntur plura ubi totum potest salvari per pauciora.”
96 Interestingly, this is the mirror image of the general argument that Aquinas used to establish the distinction between essence and powers in all created substances. As Aquinas argued,
Now that Buridan has established the identity of the soul with its powers in this way, he proceeds in the same way as in his commentary on the *De anima*. He introduces a distinction between proximate (or, instrumental) and remote (or, principal) powers. But it is made in slightly different terms than in the question from his commentary on the *De anima*. A proximate power is now one that can act — or be acted upon, in the case of a passive power — without needing a mediating quality to dispose it to acting. A remote power, by contrast, is dependent on such a mediate quality to dispose it to acting. Buridan gives prime matter as an example to clarify this distinction. Prime matter is in potency to receiving all forms. But is not in proximate potency to receiving all forms, but only to those it can receive immediately, without needing to be predisposed by the reception of other forms first.

This distinction between proximate and remote powers as a distinction between powers that can be exercised without requiring anything else, and powers that can only be exercised once the proper material dispositions are in place, seems, at first sight, to be different from the distinction Buridan introduced in his commentary on the *De anima*. There the distinction was between powers as identical with the soul and powers as the bodily dispositions required for the exercise of powers in the first sense. Although there is, indeed, a difference, the two uses are closely related, which can be gathered from the following passage:

> Ignis autem secundum eius substantiam precise acceptus non est in potentia propinqua ad calefaciendum, sed mediante caliditate<corr ex qualiditate(!)>. Propter hoc igitur substantiae active et passive, licet principaliter agant vel patiuntur, tamen non solum ipse dicuntur potentiae active vel passive, sed etiam qualitates disponentes ipsas ad agendum vel patiendum dicuntur potentiae. Et sic potentiae est de secunda specie qualitatis. 

Fire, however, when taken precisely according to its substance, is not in proximate potency to heating something, but only as mediated by heat. Because of this, even though active and passive substances are what act or undergo principally, not only they are called active or passive powers, but also the qualities that dispose them to acting or undergoing are called powers. And in this sense, power belongs to the second species of quality.

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*only God acts according to His essence. All created substances can only act through their powers, since they lack the divine simplicity*

97JOHN BURIDAN, *Ethica*, f 118v-ab “Dicitur autem propinqua <i.e.> potentia SdB> quia sine qualitate media disponente ipsam ad agendum vel patiendum agit vel patitur Dicitur autem remota quando non agit vel patitur nisi mediante qualitate aliqua dispostente ipsam ad agendum vel patiendum”

98JOHN BURIDAN, *Ethica*, f 118vb
Here we have a distinction between senses of ‘power’ that resembles the one found in Buridan’s commentary on the *De anima*. On the one hand, we can talk about powers as the required dispositions. On the other hand, we can talk about powers as belonging to that which acts principally. The remainder of the *Ethics* question relies on this distinction. Buridan makes a distinction between the powers of the intellective soul that are not exercised in any bodily organ and the other powers that are, but then argues that all these powers should be analyzed in a similar way. If by ‘power’ we refer to the required qualitative dispositions, then the powers are distinct from the soul and from one another. If, on the other hand, we refer to power in the sense that the dispositions are not included, then all powers, including the vegetative and sensitives ones, are identical to the soul. Even though the terms ‘proximate power’ and ‘remote power’ are defined differently, what Buridan tries to accomplish with the distinction is the same as in his commentary on the *De anima*. And just as in the *De anima*, Buridan considers the thought experiment of the eye in the foot, to which he gives the same answer.\(^9\) If there were an eye in the foot, we would be able to see through that eye.

The distinction between two meanings of the term ‘power’ allows Buridan to simultaneously maintain that the powers are distinct from the soul (as instrumental powers) and that they are identical to the soul (as principal powers) — for simplicity’s sake, I will stick to the meanings of instrumental and proximate power as they are defined in the commentary on the *De anima* in the remainder of this book. In terms of parsimony, Buridan seems to be successful. Having denied any real distinction within the soul, he did even better than Ockham himself who still had to allow for a real distinction between the sensitive and the intellective soul in man. And by accepting the instrumental meaning of ‘power’, he can grant his opponents that the powers are, of course, different from each other. We only need to keep in mind that we are talking about a difference between instrumental powers.

Turning to Oresme and the Anonymus Patar, it becomes clear that what Buridan is defending became a mainstream view. The distinction between the two senses of the term ‘power’ that Buridan employed in order to solve the question of the identity or diversity between the soul and its powers is also found in their commentaries. Although they do not use the terminology of principal and instrumental powers, the distinction they make is exactly the same. In one sense, they argue, ‘power’ is used to refer to the active or passive agent itself, i.e. the soul, (corresponding to Buridan’s principal powers) and in

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\(^9\) *John Buridan, Ethica*, f. 119r: “Unde si oculus esset talis in pede qualis est in capite quantum ad qualitativas dispositiones, utique nos oculo pedis videremus sicut oculo capitis. Ubique enim per totum corpus est anime substantia que innata est omnem suam operationem exercere ubi fuerint organice dispositiones ad hoc requisite.”
CHAPTER 5. SUBSTANCE, POWERS AND ACTS

another sense ‘power’ is used to refer to the bodily dispositions and accidents that are necessary for the exercise of the power (corresponding to Buridan’s instrumental powers).\(^\text{100}\) When the term ‘power’ is used in the first sense, to refer to an acting or undergoing substance, it is used in its proper sense. And in that sense it is identical to the soul. When used in the second sense, the powers are distinct from the soul and from one another. There is no need, therefore, to posit any accidents in the soul that are distinct from the soul itself.\(^\text{101}\)

The question is, however, to what extent this new view of the relation between the soul and its powers differs from the earlier view that the powers are distinct from the soul. If we take the criterion for the affirmative answer proposed by most earlier commentators, namely that the soul has to be the \textit{immediate} principle of its operations, it seems that the position defended by Buridan, Oresme and Anonymus Patar is not that different from theirs. Even according to the new view, the soul is not the immediate principle of its operations, at least not of its vegetative and sensitive operations, but merely the principal principle. And taking powers as principal principle, Brito and Jandun, for instance, had already identified the soul with its powers. Because of the difference in terminology between the tradition prior to and posterior to Ockham, the important similarities between the old and the new view are easily overlooked. But these similarities notwithstanding, there is one crucial difference between the new instrumental powers and the earlier commentators’s powers that flow forth from the soul. That difference is that the instrumental powers are no longer described as accidents of the soul, let alone its proper accidents. Instead, the instrumental powers are described as dispositions, or accidents, of the body.

\textbf{Intermezzo: William Ockham}

I have mentioned William Ockham several times in the previous section and for good reason. The discussion as it is found in Buridan, Oresme, and Anony-

\(^\text{100}\) \textit{Nicole Oresme, QdA, II.3, 136: “Secunda distinctio est quod potentia activa dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo capitur pro substantia agent vel activa; alia modo pro dispositionibus et accidentibus mediantibus quibus faciliter potest agere, et sunt quasi agentia instrumentalia.”}

\(^\text{101}\) \textit{Nicole Oresme, QdA, II.3, 138: “Quarta conclusio est quod non oportet in ipsa sola anima ponere aliqua accidentia praeter istas potentias, sed sufficient ista corporalia.”}

\textit{Compare Anonymous Patar, QdA, II.4, 252: “Secunda distinctio: potentia activa dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo potentia activa accipitur pro substantia quae est principalis agent; alio modo accipitur pro accidentibus mediantibus quibus tamquam mediantibus substantia agit.” The same distinction applies to the passive powers.}

\textit{Nicole Oresme, QdA, II.3, 138: “Quarta conclusio est quod non oportet in ipsa sola anima ponere aliqua accidentia praeter istas potentias, sed sufficient ista corporalia.”}

\textit{Compare Anonymous Patar, QdA, II.4, 256: “Octava conclusio: non oportet ponere in ipsa anima aliqua accidentia praeter istas potentias quae sunt huiusmodi accidentia corporalia, sed sufficient ista.”}
mus Patar can be almost completely traced back to Ockham’s discussion of the relation between the soul and its powers, something which, as far as I know, has never been noted in the secondary literature.\(^{102}\) In the second book of his commentary on Peter Lombard’s *Sententiae*, Ockham discusses the question of whether memory, understanding, and will are really distinct powers.\(^{103}\) It is a long question, partly because Ockham discusses and refutes the opinions of Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus in turn, all of whom posit some form of distinction between the soul and its powers.\(^{104}\) Ockham’s own position, by contrast, is that both intellect and will are really identical to the intellectual soul itself. To support his position, Ockham, among other arguments, invokes the analogy with God’s relation to His powers.\(^{105}\) These different powers add nothing to God’s essence, but merely point to the different effects God can accomplish. Ockham leaves it to the reader to conclude that, since there is no need to posit a real distinction between God and His powers, there is also no need to posit a real distinction between the human soul and its powers.

More details on Ockham’s views of the relation between the soul and its powers can be found in another question, in book III of his commentary: whether the sensitive powers are really distinct from the soul itself and from

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103 William Ockham, *Reportatio*, II, q. 20, 425–447: ‘Utrum memoria intellectus et voluntas sint potentiae realiter distinctae’ Notice that these are all powers of the intellectual part of the soul; the relation between the soul and its sensitive powers is discussed elsewhere, in question III.4.

104 Aquinas’s position has already been described. According to Henry, the powers only add to the soul a certain relation (respectus) to different objects. According to Scotus, the powers are not really, but formally distinct from the soul itself.

one another.106 This is the question that is the most important for understanding the fourteenth-century Parisian tradition. The answer to it, Ockham states, depends on what sense of ‘power’ we are talking about:

Ad istam quaestionem dico quod potentia animae potest dupliciter accipi: uno modo pro omni necessario requisito ad quemcumque actum vitalem tanquam causa partialis; alio modo pro illo praecise quod se tenet a parte animae elicientis tanquam principium partiale.107

To this question I reply that ‘power of the soul’ can be taken in two ways: in one way for the necessary conditions for whichever vital act, as partial causes; in another way for precisely that which holds from the part of the soul eliciting that act, as a partial principle.

In the first way, ‘power’ refers to all that is required for a vital act, and most importantly, to the necessary bodily dispositions. In that sense, the powers are distinct from both one another and the soul itself. In the second way, ‘power’ refers only to the soul. In that sense, the soul is identical to its powers. The distinction does not correspond completely to Buridan’s distinction between power as a proximate and as a remote principle, but it is a very close match. The only difference is that Buridan’s proximate power (as defined in his commentary on De anima) refers to the bodily dispositions only, whereas Ockham’s refers to the bodily dispositions plus the soul. Because of this difference, Ockham is forced to make a qualification when he argues that powers in Buridan’s proximate sense of ‘power’ are subject to corruption; they can be corrupted according to at least part of what is signified by the term, namely according to the bodily dispositions.108 But in all other respects, the distinction functions on the same level as the distinction made later by Buridan, Oresme, and Anonymus Patar. When Peter King writes that only a few philosophers followed Ockham in his identification of the soul and its power, since even Buridan opted to endorse Aquinas’s view, he misinterprets Buridan on this

106 William Ockham, Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum (Reportatio), edited by F. E. Kelley and G. I. Etzkorn, St. Bonaventure, New York: St. Bonaventure University, 1982 (Opera theologica, 6), III, q. 4, 130–148: ‘Utrum potentiae sensitivae different realiter ab ipsa anima sensitiva et inter se’.
107 William Ockham, Reportatio, III, q. 4, 1351–6.
108 William Ockham, Reportatio, III, q. 4, 13519–1363: “Et ideo, accipiendo potentiam visivam pro forma sensitiva quae nata est elicere actum visendi, et pro accidentibus necessario requisitis tanquam causae partiales, sic potest concedi quod potentia visiva corrupitur, saltem quantum ad significatum partiale, puta quantum ad dispositiones accidentales.”

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issue. Buridan, Oresme and the Anonymus Patar (as well as Pierre d’Ailly) all side with Ockham in this respect.

Conclusions

To sum up, the question of whether the soul and its powers are really distinct or not was considered to be, at least until Ockham, mostly a particular instance of the more general question of whether a substantial form can be the immediate principle of its operations. Since this was denied on theological (for instance, in Aquinas) and natural-philosophical (for instance, in Jandun) grounds, the real distinction between the soul and its powers could be established easily. Since an adequate terminology to describe the relation between the soul and its powers was already developed by Albert the Great, virtually all commentators simply adopted that way of speaking about the soul and its powers, even though the term *fluxus* can never be more than a slightly awkward metaphor within an Aristotelian view of the soul–body relationship.

All this changes after Ockham, and under the influence of Ockham, as can be seen in the commentaries by Buridan, Oresme and the Anonymus Patar. All commentators now begin to link the discussion of the relation between the soul and its powers to a related discussion about the manner in which the soul is present in the body. They do this by establishing an identity between soul and powers in the principal sense, while insisting on a difference between soul and powers in the instrumental sense. Since powers in the instrumental sense are accidents of the body and not of the soul, there is no distinction between essence and (proper) accidents within the soul itself.

Interestingly, the discussion of the relation between the soul and its powers was considered to be just the first step in describing the way the soul and

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109 KING, 'The Inner Cathedral', 271: “Ockham’s radical rejection of the mainstream view <that the soul is really distinct from its powers *SdB*> seems to have had some currency at Oxford in the 1320s... Even the arch-nominalist Jean Buridan, when he discussed the relation of the soul to its act, opted to endorse Aquinas’s view rather than Ockham’s in his *Quaestiones in De anima* 3.20 <sic *SdB*>.” In support of this, King cites a passage from question III.11, in which Buridan argues that the intellect cannot be identified with either its act of knowing (*intellectio*) or its knowledge (*scientia*), and then continues to say “As for intellect and act of cognition, so too for the soul and any of its faculties in general. Ockham’s opposition was strident but it did not even become an entrenched dogma of nominalism.” I am puzzled by this argument. For not only is there a difference between asking whether the soul and its powers are distinct and asking whether the soul and its acts are distinct, but also, even Ockham never identified the soul with its acts.

110 PIERRE D’AILLY, TdA, 10–11: “Loquendo igitur de potentia principali et essentiali anima est unica potentia, nec est verum de virtute sermonis, quod in homine sint plures potentiae... Loquendo vero de potentia instrumentalii et accidentalii anima a suis potentiis distinguetur, et sunt ipsius plures potentiae.”
the body are related. For the further question of how the soul is present in
the body in terms of its powers arose regardless of whether a commentator ac­
cepted the identity between the soul and its powers or not. Is the soul present
in each part according to all its powers, they all asked, or are the powers them­selves spatially distributed over the body? The question becomes even more
pertinent, and difficult, when it comes to the intellective soul, since it was
thought to be immaterial, and, as a result, to be in some sense unextended.
Most commentaries on the *De anima* devote at least one question to the man­ner in which the soul is present in the body, particularly whether the soul is
present in each part, and if so, in what manner.

The discussion of these questions is crucial to understanding the thought
experiment of the eye in the foot. Buridan, Oresme, and Anonymus Patar
have established that the soul is identical to its powers when we take ‘powers’
in its proper sense, that is, as principal powers. This allows us to say that in the
proper sense powers can be present even in those places where they are never
exercised. For as long as the soul is present in a place, all its principal powers
are present there too. But this distinction alone, it turns out, cannot settle
the thought experiment. For even though Buridan, Oresme, and Anonymus
Patar agree on the distinction between two meanings of ‘power’, and also agree
that in the sense in which ‘power’ refers to the soul as a principal agent, the
powers are identical to the soul, they still disagree about the right answer to
the thought experiment. Even when it is admitted that the power of vision
is identical with the soul itself, it is, apparently, still possible to deny that the
power of vision is present in the foot even when there is an eye there.

In order to solve this final puzzle, there are two more questions that need
to be answered. The first is whether the soul is indeed present in each and
every part of the body. And the second is whether the soul is present in each
part of the body in the same way, or, as the commentators put it, whether
the soul is a homogeneous or heterogeneous form. These questions will be
answered in the next section.

### 5.4 The soul’s presence in the body

Almost all commentators on the *De anima* devoted at least one question to the
presence of the soul in the body. Often, the question was phrased as follows:
whether the whole soul is present in each and every part of the body. This
formulation is indebted to Augustine, who had described the (human) soul as
something that is wholly in the whole body and wholly in each of its parts.\(^{111}\)

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\(^{111}\) The presence of the soul in the body is discussed in *Augustine, De immortalitate animae*, traduction, introduction et notes par P. de Labriolle, Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 1939
Given that Augustine thought of the soul as a substance in its own right, his description makes sense at least, whether we agree with it or not. But it is not immediately clear what this formula means in the context of the *De anima* when the soul is thought of as a substantial form. Nevertheless, the description of the soul as something that is wholly present in the whole body and also wholly present in each and every part of the body was very influential. It became the standard answer to the question of the soul's presence in the body in the commentary tradition on the *De anima*.¹¹²

If the soul really is a substantial form, it cannot, strictly speaking, have parts in the quantitative sense of the word.¹¹³ So then what does being wholly (or partially) in each part of the body mean? A similar question can be asked about the closely related discussion of the question of whether the soul is an extended or an unextended form. If the soul really is a substantial form, that is, a metaphysical constituent of the living organism rather than a thing in its own right, then what exactly can it mean that it is either extended or unextended? Is it not just the living substance itself that is extended rather than its substantial form? In order to make the meaning of these two questions about the presence of the soul in the body as clear as possible, it is helpful to begin by looking at the context in which they arose.

Both questions can be traced back to the same textual source, namely Aristotle's observation in *De anima* II that most plants as well as a certain class of animals, the so-called annulose animals, share an interesting property. When we sever a part of the plant, or the animal, both the severed part and the substance it was severed from continue to live, at least for some time.¹¹⁴ This then

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¹¹²But, as will become clear in this chapter, the answer could be interpreted in very different ways.

¹¹³That the soul has parts in a derivative sense, that is, various powers, was acknowledged and defended by all commentators, since the existence of these 'parts' was seen as a necessary condition for the very possibility of a science of the soul. See above, sections 31 and 5.

¹¹⁴Aristotle, *De anima*, II 2, 413b17–24 "Just as in the case of plants which when divided are observed to continue to live though separated from one another (thus showing that in their case the soul of each individual plant was actually one, potentially many), so we notice..."
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raises the question of whether the whole soul was present in both parts to begin with, and if so, in what manner. This brief passage in Aristotle became enormously important in the fourteenth-century debates on the manner in which the soul is present in the living being, from Radulphus Brito onward. In fact, as we will see, the discussions about the souls of annulose animals were used to establish the general framework for all subsequent discussion of the souls of more complex animals. In the fourteenth century, the discussion about the soul-body relationship is no longer structured in terms of the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective soul, but instead in terms of the souls of plants and annulose animals, the souls of perfect animals, and the intellective souls of human beings.

5.4.1 From annulose to perfect animals

The annulose animals are mentioned in commentaries on the *De anima* prior to Brito, but they play only a minor role. Two of the three anonymous commentators from the 1270s mention the annulose animals when they discuss whether or not the soul is located in some specific part of the body. But their mention of the annulose animals is simply one more argument in favor of a negative answer to this question. The same goes for Aquinas. When he discusses Aristotle's passage on annulose animals in his commentary on the *De anima*, he does little more than accept Aristotle's conclusions that the

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a similar result in other varieties of soul, i.e. in insects which have been cut in two; each of the segments possesses both sensation and local movement; and if sensation, necessarily also imagination and appetite; for, where there is sensation, there is also pleasure and pain, and, where these, necessarily also desire.” See also ARISTOTLE, *De anima*, 1.5, 411b19–22: “It is a fact of observation that plants and certain insects go on living when divided into segments; this means that each of the segments has a soul in it identical in species, though not numerically; for both of the segments for a time possess the power of sensation and local movement.” According to M. DUNNE, ‘Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-Century Commentaries on the *De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae*, Early Science and Medicine, 8:4 (2003), 320–335, 327, the term ’anulosa’ is probably taken from Michael Scot’s translation of the *De anima*, which accompanied the Latin translation of Averroes’s commentary. These animals are also sometimes called *entoma* (in Moerbeke’s transliteration), or *incisa*.

115 ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, QdA, II.6, 20553–39: “Item, plantae decisae vivunt, et in qualibet parte decisa inventur omnis pars animae et nutritiva et generativa et augmentativa; hoc autem non esset si essent distinctae loco et subiecto. Item, partes animalium inveniuntur vivere, et etiam in partibus animalium decisis inveniuntur diversas partes, quia in illis est virtus motiva et virtus sensitiva et per consequens virtus appetitiva quae est indicativa aliius convenientis vel nocivi.” ANONYMUS GIELE, QdA, II 6, 79–80. 59–65. “Virtutes animae in corpore non sunt distinctae loco et subiecto, ut probat Aristoteles de vegetativa, sensitiva et appetitiva in animalibus annulosis; virtus autem visiva et auditiva etc. distincta sunt in animali. Tamen, si dictae virtutes accipiantur secundum illud secundum quod maxime operantur, sunt in loco et subiecto distinctae, nam vegetativum in instrumentis huius operationis, ut hepate etc., appetitiva autem in anteriore parte cerebri.”
principles of motion, sensation and imagination are not located in any specific
part of the body, even though many other powers are.\textsuperscript{116}

Starting with Brito, however, Aristotle’s remarks on annulose animals be­
come increasingly important for the discussions of the soul–body relation in
general. Instead of being an interesting exception to what normally happens
when a living being is divided into two parts, the annulose animals become the
paradigmatic example of the manner in which the soul is present in the body.
They begin to constitute the general framework within which the presence of
the soul in more complex animals must be explained. This is especially clear
in Brito, who devotes three questions of his commentary on the De anima
(II.6–8) to a discussion of the manner in which the soul is present throughout
the body. Beginning by answering the question for annulose animals (Utrum
in partibus animalis anulosi decisis sit anima), he moves on to discuss the
presence of the soul in all animals (Utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis
animati), and ends his discussion by taking a closer look at what the presence
of the soul in the body implies for its being extended or not (Utrum animae
brutorum sunt extense per accidens quantum ad essentiam extensione corporis).
A similar division, but without the final question, is found in Jandun.\textsuperscript{117}

The example that Brito uses to establish his conclusions about the manner
in which the soul is present in the body is that of cutting an eel (anguilla)
in two parts. When we do so, Brito says, both halves continue to exercise
vital operations, which can only mean that both halves are still ensouled. For
not only do both parts continue to move, but also, when we prick a part, it
will retract from us. This shows that both parts still have a sensitive soul. At
least, that is Brito’s final conclusion. But before drawing that conclusion he

\textsuperscript{116} Aquinas does make one interesting qualification concerning imagination that is not
found in Aristotle. THOMAS AQUINAS, SentDeA, I, 4, 84.90–100: “Set quod dicit, quod fantasia
est in parte decisa, videtur esse dubium. Nam a quibusdam fantasia attribuitur determinatum
organum in corpore. Set scendum est quod fantasia inventur indeterminate in animalibus
imperfectis, in animalibus vero perfectis determinate, sicut infra in III dicetur, organum ergo
aliquid determinatum fantasia attribuitur ad maiorem perfectionem et determinationem sui
actus, non sine quo fantasia actus nullo modo esse posset sicut actus visus nullo modo potest
esse sine oculo.” The animalia anulosa are also mentioned in both his disputed questions about
whether the whole soul is in each part of the body: THOMAS AQUINAS, QdA, q. 10 “Ad quin­
tum decimum dicendum quod animalia anulosa decisa uiuunt non solum quia anima est in
qualibet parte corporis, set quia anima eorum, cum sit imperfecta et paucarum actionum, re­
quirit paucam diuersitatem in partibus, que etiam inuentur in parte decisa uiuente. Vnde,
cum retineat dispositionem per quam totum corpus est perfectibile ab anima, remanet in ea
anima. Secus autem est in animalibus perfectis.” See also THOMAS AQUINAS, QdSpir, a. 4, ad
19, 55.389–394: “Ad undevicesimum dicendum quod in illis animalibus que decisa vivunt est una
anima in actu et multe in potentia, per decisionem autem inducuntur in actum multitudinis,
sicut contingit in omnibus formis que habent extensionem in materia.”

\textsuperscript{117} John of Jandun, QdA, II 6: ‘An in partibus dicisis animals anulosi anima remaneat’;
John of Jandun, QdA, II 7: ‘An tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis animati.’
consider an alternative explanation. The continued motion of the severed part could simply be due to the presence of a remainder of the vital heat and spirits, which are unable to escape because of the stickiness of the humors (viscositas humoris). And as long as this vital heat and spirits are present, the parts of the eel will continue to exhibit signs of life, without actually being alive.\textsuperscript{118}

Brito discards this solution on two grounds. The first is that vital heat and spirits are instrumental agents, not principal agents. And an instrumental agent only functions on account of the presence of a principal agent, which in this case is the soul. When the soul is no longer present, the vital heat and spirits can no longer perform the causal role they performed earlier. The situation can be compared to trying to explain the sculpting of a statue by an appeal to only the marble and the chisel. Although no one would deny that the chisel is instrumental in sculpting the statue, it only functions on account of the presence of the principal agent, the sculptor. In the same way, vital heat and spirits are merely instruments of the soul.\textsuperscript{119}

The second, more important ground on which Brito discards the solution has to do with an important methodological principle.\textsuperscript{120} Brito reminds his readers that the perceptible presence of operations establishes (arguit) the presence of the form to which these operations are related. The mere presence of the vital operations, therefore, is enough to establish the presence of a soul. And he has a good point. Although the implications of abandoning this principle are not spelled out, it would mean that we can never establish the presence of any substantial form with certainty.\textsuperscript{121}

Whatever its exact mode of presence in the body, the experiment with eels at least shows that the soul is present in each part after the eel has been cut in two.\textsuperscript{122} But to avoid any misunderstanding we have to keep the following

\textsuperscript{118}\textit{Radulphus Brito, QdA, II.6\textsuperscript{24}}\textsuperscript{29}.
\textsuperscript{119}\textit{Radulphus Brito, QdA, II.6\textsuperscript{30-35}}.
\textsuperscript{120}\textit{Radulphus Brito, QdA, II.6\textsuperscript{36-37}}.
\textsuperscript{121}Nicholas of Autrecourt was one of the very few willing to accept this consequence. \textit{Nicholas of Autrecourt, Second Letter to Bernard of Arezzo, 72}: "Ex ista regula sic declarata cuicumque habenti intellectum infero quod numquam Aristotelis habuit notitiam evidenter de aliqua substantia alia ab anima sua, intelligendo 'substantiam' quandum rem aliam ab obiectis quinque sensuum et a formalibus experientius nostris. Et ita est, qua de tali re habuisset notitiam ante omnem discursum; quo non est verum, cum non appareant intuitive et etiam rustici scirent tales res esse. Nec sciantur ex discursu, qua ex una re non potest inferri quod aliqua res sit, ut dicit conclusio supraposita. Et si de coniunctis non habuit, multo minus de abstractis habuit notitiam evidenter."
\textsuperscript{122}There is little chance that Brito actually conducted the experiment. The experimental examples in medieval texts often have more in common with thought experiments than with experiments in our modern sense. For the role of experiments in medieval texts see E. \textit{Grant}, 'Medieval Natural Philosophy: Empiricism without Observation', in. C. \textit{Leijenhorst},
three points in mind. (1) The experiment only works if the severed part is not too small, and if we make the cut in the right place. For if we make the cut along the length of the eel's body, the result will be two lifeless parts. Brito's explanation of this is important. For the reason why both parts are dead is that in annulose animals (and also plants) the marrow, or spine, or what functions as such, corresponds to the heart in more complex animals. If we cut along the length of the body, this 'heart' is destroyed and both parts will be dead.\(^{123}\) (2) Although the severed part of a plant can continue to live for a long time, the severed part of annulose animals will often live only briefly. The reason for this is that annulose animals are more complex than plants, and therefore their soul needs more complex dispositions in matter in order to continue to function. (3) The perfect animals require an even more complexly organized matter. This is the reason that their soul will not remain present in the severed part even for a short time. Instead, once a part is cut off, it no longer lives.

I discussed Brito's question of the soul of annulose animals in detail, because his argumentative strategy is important. The annulose animals are taken as the paradigmatic example for the soul's presence in the body. An analysis of what happens when these these animals are cut in two halves shows that their soul must be present throughout the whole body. Then, assuming the same presence of the soul in perfect animals, the fact that the severed parts of perfect animals display no signs of life, not even for a short period, is explained by reference to the more complex material dispositions that need for their vital operations. The annulose animals are not the exception, but the rule when it comes to the presence of the soul in the body.

### On different types of wholes

Now that it has been established that the soul is present in each part of the body, Brito asks the follow-up question of whether that also implies that the whole soul is present in each part of the body. But before discussing that question, it is necessary to pause briefly in order to look at the terminology that he

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\(^{123}\) The same remark is found in *Anonymous Vennebusch, QdA*, q 27, 15563–73. "Huiusmodi organum in unoquoque animali est cor vel simile cordi, quod in animalibus anulosis extenditur secundum longitudinem animalis sub rotunditate extensa existens sub toto; que quidem rotunditas manet in qualibet parte decisa. De parte autem anime que fuit in ipsa, fit una anima tota in actu propter conformitatem organi, que prius fuit in toto et que manet in parte. Et propter hoc in alius animalibus non anulos, in quibus est radicale organum ut cor sub figura rotunda, orbiculare vel piramidali, et hoc in parte determinata corporis ut quod non in qualibet divisa a parte in qua manet tale organum, non manet anima post decisionem. Et secundum hoc contingit quod, si anguilla decindatur in transversum, manet anima in partibus; si autem dividatur secundum tensionem spine dorsi, partes post decisionem non habent vitam."
and other commentators use when they speak about the presence of the soul as a whole. Much of it can be traced back to Boethius’s influential *Liber de divisione*, in which we find a distinction between the following four types of division:

- that of a genus into its species;
- that of a whole into its proper parts;
- that of a spoken sound into its proper significations (for those that have more than one proper significance);
- a division *secundum accidens.*

Boethius’s discussion of the second type is the most relevant for the later debates on the relation between the soul and its powers, because it contains an analysis of the various meanings of the term ‘whole’. As Boethius shows, there are several types of wholes that can be divided into their proper parts, one of which is a whole consisting of different powers. The soul is introduced as the paradigmatic example of this type of whole, which later became called a *totum potestative* (or also: *totum virtuale / totum potentielle*). It played

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125 Boethius, *De divisione*, 6: “Nunc divisionis ipsius nomen dividendum est et secundum unumquodque divisionem vocabulum uniuscuiusque propositi proprie partes tractandae sunt, divisio namque multis dicitur modis. Est enim divisionis generis in species, est rursus divisionis cum totum in proprias distribuitur partes, est alia cum vox multa significans in significacione proprie recipit sectionem. Praeter has autem tres est alia divisionis quae secundum accidens fieri dicitur. Huius tres modus est: unus cum subjectum in accidentia separamus, alius cum accidens in subjecta dividimus, tertius cum accidens in accidentia secamus (hoc ita fit si utraque eidem subjecto messe videantur).”

126 Boethius, *De divisione*, 38: “Dicitur quoque totum quod ex quibusdam virtutibus constat, ut animae alia potestia est sapiendi, alia sentiendi, alia vegetandi.” The other types of wholes Boethius mentions are a continuous whole (such as a body), a non-continuous whole (such as an army), and a universal whole (such as man).

127 The division of such a whole, says Boethius, has to be distinguished from the division of another type of whole, namely that of a genus into its species. Boethius, *De divisione*, 40: “Eius quoque totus quod ex virtutibus constat hoc modo facienda est divisione: ‘animae alia pars est in virgultis, alia in animalibus’ et rursus ‘eius quae est in animalibus alia rationalis, alia sensiblis est’ et rursus haec alius sub divisionibus dissipantur. Sed non est anima horum genus sed totum, partes enim hae animae sunt, sed non ut in quantitate, sed ut in alqua potestate atque virtute, ex his enim potestis substantia animae iungitur. Unde sit ut quiddam simile habeat huismodi divisionis et generis et totius divisionis, nam quod quaelibet eius pars fuerit animae praedicatio eam sequitur, ad generis divisionem refertur, cuus ubicunque fuerit species ipsum mox consequitur genus, quod autem non omnis anima omnibus partibus iungitur sed alia alius, hoc ad totius naturam referri necesse est.”
an important role in later discussions about the presence of the soul in the body.  

Boethius's potestative whole is not the only type of whole that is relevant to the question of whether the whole soul is present in each and every part of the body. Jandun mentions three different ways in which the question of whether the whole soul is present in each part of the body is normally understood:

Ad istam questionem dicitur communiter quod anima est tota triplici totalitate, scilicet totalitate essentiali, totalitate quantitativa et totalitate virtuali seu potestativa. Et secundum hoc respondetur ad questionem tria. Primo: quod anima totalitate essentiali est in qualibet parte corporis animati. Secundo: quod non est ibi tota totalitate quantitativa. Terto: quod nec totalitate potestativa sive virtuali.

It is generally responded to this question that the soul is a whole by a threefold totality, namely an essential totality, a quantitative totality and a totality according to its powers. And accordingly, three answers will be given to the question. First: that the soul is in whichever part of the animated body by an an essential totality. Second: that it is not there by a quantitative totality. Third: neither by a totality according to its powers.

So the question of whether the soul as a whole is present in each part of the body can be understood in three ways, one of which is Boethius's potestative whole. We can either interpret the expression 'the whole soul' as a quantitative whole, or as an essential whole, or as a whole consisting of powers. This threefold meaning of totality is found in many of the earlier commentators, such as Thomas Aquinas, Radulphus Brito, and Anonymus Bazán. It is

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128 See, for example, PARK, 'Albert's Influence', 506–507, who shows that this type of whole is taken over by Albert the Great.
129 JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II.7, 97.
130 See, for example THOMAS AQUINAS, QdA, q. 10, 91-209; "Potest autem attribui totalitas aliqui forme tripliciter, secundum quod tribus modis conuenit aliquid habere partes. Vno enim modo aliquid habet partes secundum divisionem quantitatis... Alio modo dicitur aliquid totum per comparisonem ad partes essentiales specier. Terto modo dicitur aliquid totum per comparisonem ad partes virtutis seu potestatis"; compare also THOMAS AQUINAS, QdSpir, a. 4, 52-53; ANONYMUS BAZAN, QdA, I.1, 390; "Ad tertium: de illo non est scientia quod non habet partes, proprietates et passiones, concedo. Sed cum dicitur: anima non habet huusmodi partes, proprietates et passiones, ego nego. Et tu probas quia anima est indissolubis. Verum est secundum partes essentiales et integrales, tamen anima est divisibilis in multas partes potentiales, utpote in intellectivam, sensitivam et vegetativam." — but notice the use of the expression integral parts instead of quantitative parts. For Brito, see q. II.7. The debates on the divisibility of the soul in the sixteenth and seventeenth century continue to use this framework of three types of divisibility. See DES CHENE, Life's Form, 173–189.
also found in Albert the Great, who may have been the first to use it in this context.\textsuperscript{131}

**Whether the whole soul is present in each part of the body**

The first option that the soul is in the whole body and each of its parts according to a *quantitative* totality seems to have been a non starter, for being present in something according to a quantitative totality normally means being present as, for example, a volume of water is present in a barrel. The water is present in the barrel according to a quantitative totality, if and only if all of the water is contained in the barrel. In the case of the soul we are speaking about the quantitative presence of a substantial form. This means that the situation is altogether different, since a form, strictly speaking, has no quantity. But we might still say that the soul is quantitatively present in the body in a manner that is analogous to how we can say that whiteness is quantitatively present in a white surface. That is, in each quantitative part of the extended white substance, the form of whiteness is clearly present. Likewise, we could say that the soul is present in each quantitative part of the body, since each of these parts is alive.

But even when we are allowed to speak of the 'quantitative' parts of the soul by reference to the quantitative parts of the body, it is immediately obvious that these 'quantitative' parts of the soul must be different from each other. The part of the soul that is in my left hand, is clearly different from the part in my right hand. And if that is so, then the soul is not present as a quantitative *whole* in each and every part. So any interpretation of the term ‘whole’ in the quantitative sense is clearly impossible in this context. Even if we allow that the soul has ‘quantity’ in a derivative sense, if it is quantitatively totally present in one part, then there is nothing left to be present in any other part. Not even things that have extension, such as the water used in the example above, can be quantitatively present as a whole in each and every part of something. For even supposing, for simplicity’s sake, that the barrel has just two parts, the bottom half and the top half, once the total volume of water is present in the bottom half of the barrel, there is obviously nothing left to

\textsuperscript{131}ALBERT THE GREAT, *De anima*, edited by C. Stroick, Münster: Aschendorff, 1968 (Opera omnia, 7:1), II.1, cap. 11, 79\textsuperscript{80}–80\textsuperscript{7}: “Oportet autem scire, quod partes eius quod est spirituale, et eius quod est corporale, differunt, quoniam partes corporae rei componunt aut suam essentiam aut suam quantitatem. Et si componunt suam essentiam, tunc sicut materia et forma aut sicut mixta in eo quod mixtum vocamus. Si autem componunt suam quantitatem, tunc sunt tertiae vel mediae vel quartae, et sic de alis quantitativis partibus. Et has vocare consuevimus integrales, primas autem essentiales. In spiritualibus autem dicimus, quoniam ipsa spiritualia potentiae quaedam sunt et habent suas partes naturales potestates, ex quibus constituitur quoddam universum suae potestatis, sicut apparat in urbanitatibus.”
fill the top half of the barrel. In short, taking the total presence in each and every part in the quantitative sense, neither the soul nor anything else for that matter is present in this way.

The essential presence of the soul in each part of the body seems more to the point. But the manner in which an essential presence is argued for by Brito makes it clear that in this sense the answer to the question of whether or not the soul is wholly present in each part is obvious. The examples that are invoked make it clear that the essential presence of the whole form in each part of a substance means little more than that each part of that substance is a part of that substance. Take for instance Brito's argument that we can observe signs of life in each part of a living being. From this observation, he immediately concludes that the soul is essentially present in all parts: since the soul is one single essence (i.e. without parts in the relevant sense), if it is present, it must be present according to its total essence.\textsuperscript{132} We can find a similar argument in Aquinas, who says that there can be no doubt that the soul is present wholly in each part of the body.\textsuperscript{133} Nor is this a unique property of the soul; on the contrary, the claim that it is present in each part of the substance it informs according to its whole essence holds true of every substantial form.\textsuperscript{134} Even Jandun agrees with Brito and Thomas on this point; the statement that the form is present in each part according to its total essence is true of every material substance.\textsuperscript{135} Nevertheless, Jandun also argues that strictly speaking we should deny that the soul is present as an essential whole, since in the strict sense the term 'whole' applies only to what has parts.\textsuperscript{136} But this is mostly

\textsuperscript{132}\textit{Radulphus Brito}, QdA, II.758-63.
\textsuperscript{133}This is discussed, for example in \textit{Thomas Aquinas}, \textit{STh}, I\textsuperscript{a}, q. 76, a. 8: "Sed quia anima unitur corpori ut forma, necesse est quod sit in toto et in qualibet parte corporis. Non enim est forma corporis accidentalis, sed substantialis. Substantialis autem forma non solum est perfectio totius, sed cuiuslibet partis." And later in the same question: "Sed totalitas secunda, quae attenditur secundum rationis et essentiae perfectionis, proprie et per se convenit formis." (p. 232).
\textsuperscript{134}The general principle that each substantial form is wholly in each part of the substance it informs can be found in \textit{Thomas Aquinas}, ScG, II, 72: 'Quod anima sit tota in corpore et tota in qualibet parte', 457: "De hac igitur totalitate loquendo \langle i.e. secundum essentiae perfectionem SdB\rangle, quae per se formis competit, in qualibet forma apparat quod est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte eiusmod." For a discussion of this passage, see \textit{Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas}, 93-94.
\textsuperscript{135}\textit{John of Jandun}, QdA, II.7, 97: "Modo essentia animae est in qualibet parte corporis animatum, sicut essentia cuiuslibet formae materialis est in qualibet parte corporis materiae."
\textsuperscript{136}\textit{John of Jandun}, QdA, II.7, 97: "Ergo relinquitur primum, scilicet quod essentia animae tota totalitate essentialis est in qualibet parte corporis. Sed antequam procedam ulterius, mihi videtur, salva reverentia sic dicentium, quod illusion non est omnino verum. Quod illusion quod non habet partes essentiales non est totum totalitate essentialis, haec est manifesta cuiuslibet intelligenti... Si quis autem vellet salvare illusion commune dictum quod tota anima totalitate essentiali etc., forte posset dicere quod illusion intelligitur quasi privative non positive. Et est sen-
a semantic disagreement. In all other respects he remains close to the traditional answer: in terms of essence, if the soul is present in a part, it must be completely present in that part.

The only alternative that could be controversial turns out to be the total presence of the soul in each part of the body according to its powers (totalitate virtuali seu potestativa). If the soul is not present in each part of the body in this manner, it simply means that the various powers are spatially distributed throughout the body, in the sense that the power of vision is present in only one place, and that of hearing in another. If, on the other hand, the soul is present in each part in a potestative manner, then all of the soul’s powers will somehow be present in each part, even if most of these are obviously not exercised in each part. This second alternative is certainly the most intriguing. It is also the one that is the most relevant for the thought experiment of the eye in the foot. But at the same time, it is also the most difficult to understand. Even more difficult than determining the exact meaning of such a totality — for what can it mean to say that a power is present while at the same time it cannot ever be exercised in the normal course of nature? — is understanding how the question of whether or not the soul is present in each part in this manner could ever be conclusively answered.

Assuming that the proposition that the soul is present in each part of the body according to all its powers is meaningful, and that the answer is not evident, by what method can we determine whether the proposition is true or not? There is no natural philosophical observation that could settle the question. Whether or not the soul is present according to all its powers, the observable phenomena will be identical. This is why the thought experiment of the eye in the foot is such a powerful tool in the discussion.

With the later fourteenth-century approach to the question in mind, Brito’s answer may come as a surprise. He thinks that the option of the potestative presence of the soul merits little discussion, because it is easy to see that the soul is not present in this way. It certainly does not need a thought experiment to be discussed.

*Secundo dico quod anima tota totalitate potestativa non est tota in qualibet parte corporis. Et intelligo per totalitem potestativam animam totam cum eius potentii. Modo illo modo non est tota in qualibet parte corporis. Cuius ratio est quia: si anima tota esset in qualibet parte corporis isto modo, tunc secundum quamlibet partem corporis posset operari omnes suas operationes, sicut videre, audire, odorare, et sic de aliis; sed hoc est falsum, quia secundum partem determinatam aliam et

sus quod essentia animae non est in una parte corporis sine alia parte essentiae. Hoc est verum propter hoc quod anima huiusmodi partes non habet, sed impropri diceretur.*
Second, I say that the whole soul, taken as a potestative whole, is not wholly in whichever part of the body. And I understand by 'potestative whole' the whole soul with all its powers. Now, in this way it is not wholly in whichever part of the body. The reason for this is the following: if the whole soul were in whichever part of the body in this way, then it could exercise all its operations with each part of the body, such seeing, hearing, smelling, and so forth. But this is false, because it exercises different powers with determinate parts, since it sees with the eye and hears with the ear and so forth. Hence etc. The major premise is clear, because in whichever place there is a principle of operations the operations can be present; therefore, if the whole soul were in whichever part of the body according to all its powers, which are the principles of operation, then the soul could operate with whichever part <of the body SdB>, which is unfitting. Hence etc.

For Brito, the answer is simple, and the question can be settled empirically. Saying that a power is present amounts to saying that the operations corresponding to that power can be exercised. Saying, therefore, that the soul is present according to all its powers in each part of the body, is saying that all its powers can be exercised in each part of the body, which is clearly not true. A similar response is given by Aquinas. Given that Brito has established

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137 Radulphus Brito, QdA, II.746-57.
138 Interestingly, Aquinas included the thought experiment of the eye in the foot among his many arguments. Thomas Aquinas, QdSpir, a. 4, 5082-89: "Preterea. Si in quacumque parte corporis est operatio anime, ibi est ipsa anima; pari racione in quacumque parte corporis est operatio visive potentie, ibi est visiva potentia. Set operatio visive potentie esset in pede, si ibi esset organum visive potentie; unde quod desit operatio visiva erit propter defectum organi tantum. Erit igitur ibi potentia visiva, si ibi sit anima." The argument is countered with just a brief reply. If there were an eye in the foot, then the visual power would also be there, since the visual power is precisely the act of such an organ. But if we take away the organ, the soul remains, but not the visual power. Thomas Aquinas, QdSpir, a. 4, 54336-338: "Ad undecimum dicendum quod, si esset oculus in pede, esset ibi potentia visiva, quia hec potentia est actus talis organi animati; remoto autem organo, remanet ibi anima, non tamen potentia visiva." Although the example of vision in relation to the foot is not found in the parallel question in the disputed questions on the soul, the text does contain a closely related argument (also found in De spiritualibus creaturis as argument three): Thomas Aquinas, QdA, q. 10, 8996-101: "Preterea. Omnes potentie anime radicantur in essentia anime. Si igitur essentia anime sit in qualibet parte corporis, oportet quod quilibet potentia anime sit in qualibet parte corporis; quod patet esse falsum, nam auditus non est in oculo set in aure tantum, et sic de aliis." Aquinas
that the powers are distinct from the soul, what reason could there ever be for him to accept that all powers are present everywhere in the body?

Actually there could be one reason. When arguing for the distinction between the soul and its powers, Brito, and many others had claimed that the powers flow forth from the essence of the soul. That is to say, whenever the soul is present, so will its powers be. But since the soul is present according to its entire essence in every part of the body, as Brito has just proven, it would seem that all the powers must necessarily flow forth from it into every part.\footnote{This is one of the arguments that Brito introduced to argue against the soul's presence as an (essential) whole in each and every part.}

In his reply to this argument, Brito gives a few more details on how this \textit{fluxus} works. The powers do not flow forth from the soul immediately, but mediated by the various organs. Only when a properly disposed organ is present will the power that is exercised through that organ flow forth from the soul. The essential presence of the whole soul in each and every part does not, therefore, lead to the actual presence of all of the soul's powers in each and every part, on the assumption that the powers are distinct from the soul. This is why all commentators up until Brito insist, when they ask whether the soul is identical to its powers, that the relevant sense of ‘power’ is that of the \textit{immediate} principle of operations. Recall Anonymus Van Steenberghen's definition of power (see p. 222), where this aspect was emphasized.

The only philosopher who entertains some doubt as to whether the answer to the question of the presence of the soul in the body as a potestative whole really is that obvious is Jandun. He was already critical when it came to the soul's presence as an essential whole, pointing out that the term ‘whole’ is used improperly when we apply it to something that has no parts in the relevant sense. But he is even more critical when discussing the soul's presence as a potestative whole. The opinion that the soul is also present in each part of the body as a potestative whole only looks false and absurd on first sight, he says, because the alternative is so famous that we have become accustomed to it. And that to which we have become accustomed, we deem to be the best thing to say. So if that is what someone wants (\textit{si placet}), it may be said (as is the common opinion) that the soul is not present throughout the body as a potestative whole. Jandun, however, does not commit himself fully to the one

\footnote{\textit{Ad tertium decimum dicendum quod licet omnes potentie anime radicentur in essentia anime, tamen quelibet pars corporis recipit animam secundum suum modum; et ideo in duersis partibus est secundum duersas potentias, neque oportet quod in una secundum omnes.” (pp. 93\textsuperscript{365}–94\textsuperscript{370}) Again, the reply can be so brief, because for Aquinas, the existence of a power implies the existence of the subject of that power, that is to say, of the organ in which the power is exercised. There can be no question of the existence of a power in the absence of its subject.}
5.4.2 Is the soul extended or not?

The final part of Brito's discussion of the manner in which the soul is present in the body is carried out in a question entitled 'whether the souls of brute animals are extended per accidens according to their essence by the extension of the body.' The per accidens qualification is clearly important here. Substantial forms, as such, are neither extended nor unextended, since they are principles and not things in their own right. But even with the qualification per accidens it remains a strange question to ask. The notion of a per accidens extension came up in the discussion of whether the soul is present in each part of the body as a quantitative whole. In that context, it was only invoked to establish the meaning of quantitative when the predicate is applied to something that has no extension on its own. No commentator took the option that the soul was present as a quantitative whole in each part of the body seriously, and rightly so. So why devote a separate question to the possible extension per accidens of the animal soul?

In order to understand why Brito includes this question in his commentary, and the answer he gives to it, we must return to Aquinas. Not, however, to his commentary on the De anima, but to either his Quaestiones disputatae de anima or his Quaestiones de spiritualibus creaturis, both of which discuss the same question: "whether the whole soul is in whichever part of the body", and both of which give the same answer. Here I will use the latter text, since it contains the most elaborate set of arguments. In it, Aquinas discusses twenty(!) objections against the affirmative answer. And what is most important here, is that, in the course of this discussion, he makes it clear what being extended in a body means when applied to the soul.

Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod <triplex SdB> totalitas venietur. Prima quidem et manifestior secundum quantitatem, propterea quod

140 JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II.7, 99: "Huic autem opinioni <i.e. quod anima est tota in qualibet parte corporis totalitate potestativa SdB> non video aliquid inconveniens sequi nisi quod non est famosa et consuetudinum. Et ideo primo aspectu videtur falsa et absurda, quae enim consuevimus dici secundo Metaphysicae. Et propter hoc si placet dicatur alio modo quod non omnes virtutes animae sunt in qualibet parte corporis animati, sed diversae virtutes aliquae sunt in diversis partibus corporis, ut visus et auditus et huiusmodi. Et sic non tota anima totalitate potestativa, vel potestativa, ent in qualibet parte animalis sive corporis animati."

141 I think that this is also what Pasnau is pointing to when he discusses Aquinas’s critique of those who consider the soul to be some sort of body: "What soul is, in fact, is the actuality of a living body, and to be an actuality is to be incorporeal." PASNAU, Thomas Aquinas, 29

142 THOMAS AQUINAS, QdA, q. 10· 'Utrum anima sit in toto corpore et qualibet parte eius', THOMAS AQUINAS, QdSpir, a. 4· 'Utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis'.
totum quantum dicitur quod natum est dividi in partes quantitatis: et hec totalitas non potest attribui formis nisi per accidens, in quantum scilicet per accidens dividuntur divisione quantitatis, sicut albedo divisione superfici. Set hoc est illarum tantum formarum que coextenduntur quantitati, quod ex hoc competit aliquibus formis, quia habent materiam similem aut fere similem et in toto et in parte. Unde forme que requirunt magnam dissimilitudinem in partibus non habent huiusmodi extensionem et totalitatem sicuti anime, precipue animalium perfectorum. 143

In order to make this evident <namely that the soul is wholly in the whole body and wholly in each of its parts>, we should consider that we find a threefold totality. The first and more noticeable totality is according to quantity, as we call a quantitative whole that which is suited to be divided into quantitative parts. And this totality cannot be attributed to forms, except per accidens, namely in so much as they are divided per accidens by the division of a quantity, just as whiteness is divided by the division of the surface. But this belongs only to those forms that are coextensive with quantity, something that is applicable to some forms because they have matter that is similar, or almost similar, in the whole <substance> and in a part of it. Whence the forms that require greatly dissimilar parts, do not have such extension and totality in this manner, such as souls, especially that of perfect animals.

The first, and most important thing is that strictly speaking (per se) no form is a quantitative whole, because no form can be divided on its own into quantitative parts. Only material things can be divided in this way. There is an extended sense, however, in which we might say that a form is a quantitative whole, namely, when it can be divided per accidens through the division of the subject it inheres in. It is in this same way that we say that the whiteness of a surface is divided per accidens when the surface it inheres in is divided. 144 But, secondly, the passage makes it clear that according to Aquinas there is not one but two criteria that need to be met before we can call a form extended even per accidens. (1) The subject it inheres in must be material, that is, must have

143 THOMAS AQUINAS, QdSpir, a. 4, 52213–53227. Aquinas’s answer became controversial even among later Thomists. For the sixteenth-century debates on the question of whether or not the souls of perfect animals are extended, see DES CHENE, Life’s Form, 171–189.

144 The qualification per accidens as it is applied to the division of the whiteness does not mean that the original whiteness is still essentially one whiteness, even though accidentally there are now two whitenesses. There really are two new whitenesses after the division. Instead, the qualification is introduced to point out that the division of the original whiteness was indirect. It is the (white) surface that is divided per se. That the whiteness is also divided is a consequence of this per se division. Hence the qualification per accidens only indicates that the whiteness has been divided on account of something else (that has quantity) having been divided.
extension. But also (2) the different quantitative parts of that subject must be similar (or next to similar) to each other, so that after the division, we end up with two things, both of which are similar in all respects but their quantity to the original thing.

To stick with the example of a white surface, imagine a white sheet of paper being cut in half. The resulting parts will be very similar, both to each other and to the original sheet of paper. In fact, there is only one difference between the parts and the original sheet, and that is that the parts are only half the size of the original. Only when both criteria are met, are we allowed to say that a form has been divided per accidens. In all other cases, the form has not been divided per accidens, but destroyed per accidens. In other words, instead of there now being two forms whereas there used to be one, there is now no longer a form whereas there used to be one. Imagine doing the same with an animal as with the sheet of paper. Clearly the result will be different. Instead of ending up with, let us us say, two cats, identical in all respects but size to the original cat, we now have two parts of a dead cat. There was no division of the substantial form (or soul) per accidens, since the form is no longer present. The conclusion can only be that the cat’s soul was destroyed per accidens.

This gives a reasonably clear criterion when it comes to answering the question of whether the soul is extended per accidens through the body. We can answer the question in the affirmative, when, after we sever a part from a living being, both what is left of the original substance and the severed part continue to live.145 The criterion can only be specified in terms of the presence of vital operations, because only these indicate the presence of the corresponding vital powers. This explains why Aquinas qualifies his example of soul by saying ‘especially that of perfect animals’. The forms of plants and annulose animals, by contrast, require only slightly dissimilar material parts as compared to perfect animals, which is precisely what makes them the ex-

145 Compare Thomas Aquinas, QdSpir, a 4, ad 9, 54322 329. “Unde in animalibus in quibus figura partis fere est conformis figure totius, pars recipit animam ut quoddam totum: quare de­csa vivit In animalibus tamen perfectis, in quibus figura partis multum differt a figura totius, pars non recipit animam sicut totum et primum perfectibile, ut decisa vivat; recipit tarnem an­imam in ordine ad totum, ut conjuncta vivat.” Compare also Thomas Aquinas, ScG, II, 72, 457: Quod anima sit tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte. “Totum autem et pars secundum quantitatem dicta formis non conveniunt nisi per accidens, scilicet inquantum dividuntur di­visione subjectis quantitatem habentis. Totum autem vel pars secundum perfectionem essentiae inventur in formis per se. De hac igitur totalitate loquendo, quae per se formis competit, in qualibet forma appareat quod est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte eius: nam albedo, sicut se­cundum totam rationem albedinis est in toto corpore, ita et in qualibet parte eius. Secus autem est de totalitate quaer per accidens attributur formis: sic enim non possimus dicere quod tota albedo sit in qualibet parte. Si igitur est aliqua forma quae non dividatur divisione subjectis, sicut sunt animae animalium perfectorum, non ent opus distinctione, cum eis non competat nisi una totalitas: sed absolute dicendum est eam totam esse in qualibet parte corporis”
ception. As it turns out, the question of whether the soul is extended \textit{per accidens} throughout the body is for Aquinas exactly the same question as that of whether the soul is present in each part of the body according to all its powers! Notice that Aquinas's criterion is applicable to all souls including the human intellective soul. This will be important in the discussion of the later tradition.

**Ambiguous criteria**

With Aquinas's criterion in mind, we are ready to return to Brito's discussion of the extension of the animal soul. His discussion reflects an important shift which remains present in the whole fourteenth century. The shift is located in the criteria Brito uses to answer the question. Instead of appealing to Aquinas's criterion of the presence of vital operations after division to settle the question for all souls including human soul, Brito begins to use different criteria for different souls. In addition to appealing to the presence of vital operations, he introduces a second unrelated criterion, which is that of being educed from the potency of matter. In his discussion, Brito distinguishes between three types of soul. I will follow Brito in first turning to the human soul, then to that of the annulose animals, and lastly to that of perfect animals.

In the opening lines of his reply, Brito denies the extension, even \textit{per accidens}, of the intellective soul with the following argument: if a form is not educed from the potency of matter, as is the case with the intellective soul, it cannot be extended, even \textit{per accidens}, by the extension of the subject to which it belongs. There is no need to appeal to the criterion of the presence

\footnote{Thomas Aquinas, \textit{QdSpir}, a 4, 53\textsuperscript{34–244}, “Si igitur loqueremur de aliqua forma habente extensionem in materia, puta de albedine, possemus dicere quod est tota in qualibet parte totalitate esse et virtus, non autem totalitate prima, que est ei per accidens, sicut tota ratio speciei albedinis inventur in qualibet parte superficie, non autem tota quantitas quam habet per accidens, set pars in parte. Anima autem, et precipue humana, non habet extensionem in materia; unde in ea prima totalitas locum non habet.” Notice again the qualification Aquinas makes especially the human soul. As we descend in the hierarchy of living beings, the question of whether the soul is present in each part according to all its powers becomes more difficult to answer, since the material parts of the living being become increasingly similar to each other. At which point exactly all powers are present in each part is a difficult question to answer. Is it already the case in the annulose animals, even if they only live for a short time after the division? And even if both parts only continue to live when we do not make the cut along the length of the body? Or is it only in plants, the parts of which can live for a long time after the division? Although even there, the cut can only be made in some places. Cutting off a leaf and expecting it to develop into a whole plant again is bound to end in disappointment.}

of vital operations. Not being educed from the potency of matter immediately implies that quantitative predicates can never be applied. This limits the discussion to those souls that are educed from the potency of matter, that is, to every non-human soul.

For the souls of the annulose animals (and plants), the question is settled in the same way as it was settled by Aquinas. From the fact that both halves of these animals continue to exercise their vital operations, at least for some time, we may conclude that their soul is extended *per accidens* according to the extension of the body.148

Having settled the issue for human souls and for the souls of the annulose animals, Brito now turns to the souls of perfect animals. And here he seems to hesitate. Although he argues, *pace* Aquinas, that they are extended *per accidens*, he also suggests that they are not extended in the same way as the souls of the annulose animals are.149 For in the annulose animals the soul’s powers are also extended through the body, whereas in the case of perfect animals

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148 Augustine also discussed the division of annulose animals in his *De quantitate animae* (xxx, 61–xxxii, 68) and uses the presence of all powers in both parts as an argument to prove in what way the animal’s soul is present in its whole body. There is an important difference in emphasis though. Whereas Brito uses the example to argue for the *per accidens* extension of the soul, Augustine uses it to argue for the *per se* lack of quantity of the soul.

149 Radulphus Brito, *QdA*, II.853–59. “Set notandum quod non eodem modo iste forme <i.e. brutorum perfectorum SdB> sunt extense per accidens sicut animae animalium annulosorum, qua essentia illius est extensa per accidens et secundum essentiam et secundum virtutes saltas in aliquis. Et in alius animalibus anulus alique virtutes sunt extense, scut virtus motiva in anguillus et consimilibus animalibus. Sed in istis, licet essentia per accidens sit extensa per totum, tamen quilibet eius virtus non est extensa per totum, quia non in qualibet parte asinus vel equus videt vel audit ”
the powers are not extended through the body, but located in specific places. Touch, as Brito himself notices, is the exception here.

Given his approach to the question, it is not surprising that Brito hesitates when it comes to the souls of perfect animals. Contrary to Aquinas, Brito no longer has a clear criterion on which to decide the issue. The limit cases were decided by an appeal to two different principles: (1) not being educed from matter implies not being extended and (2) when both parts of a plant or an animal continue to live after division, this implies that the soul is extended. Because of these two different principles, Brito has created a problem he cannot solve. Taking principle (1), he is inclined to argue that since the souls of perfect animals are educed from matter, they are also extended. But taking principle (2) he should argue that since perfect animals cannot survive division, their soul is not extended. His solution that the souls of perfect animals are extended, albeit in a different way than those of annulose animals, is the ambiguous result of ambiguous criteria.

Because Brito is unclear on his criteria, it also becomes unclear what he thought was at stake in this question. What is clear, however, is the result: a distinction between the manner in which the human soul is present in the body and the manner in which all other souls are present in their bodies. The human soul is not educed from the potency of matter and hence has a completely different manner of inhering in the body than all souls that are educed from the potency of matter. The difference is not simply that the human soul will survive the death of the body, although, as all commentators admitted, it will. Rather, it is that the presence of the soul in the human and in the animal body are fundamentally different, the one being extended \( \text{per accidens} \), and the other not being extended even \( \text{per accidens} \). The connection that Brito makes in this question between the concepts of being, or not being, educed from the potency of matter and being, or not being, extended will play a large and important role in the subsequent debates on the soul’s presence in the body.

5.4.3 The discussion of the soul’s presence after Ockham

There is again a difference between the manner in which the question is handled by the philosophers prior to Ockham, and those after Ockham, which can be explained as follows. The question of whether the whole soul, taken

\[150\text{ Granted, logically speaking the inference is invalid. From the proposition 'forms that are not educed from matter are not extended' the proposition 'forms that are educed from matter are extended' cannot be inferred. But as will become clear later in this chapter, fourteenth-century commentators accept both these principles almost as axioms.} \]

\[151\text{ Brito gives no further account of the difference between the different modes of inherence of the souls of annulose animals and those of perfect animals.} \]
as a potestative whole, is present in whichever part of the body is closely related to the question of whether the soul is distinct from its powers. When the powers are distinct from the soul, it becomes possible to say that the soul is essentially present everywhere in the body, even though its powers are located in specific parts. But when a distinction between soul and powers is denied, this becomes much more difficult. This is why the distinction between proximate and remote powers began to play such an important role. The proximate powers, at least, are located in specific parts of the body. But the distinction also opened up the possibility of asking whether or not the remote, or principal, powers are present in each and every part of the body. And the meaning of that question is now clear: it amounts to asking whether the soul is a homogeneous or heterogeneous form. Although all of this makes sense from the fourteenth-century perspective, it is difficult even to translate the question to the thirteenth-century perspective.

Buridan, Oresme, and the Anonymus Patar all argue for the same position as Brito when it comes to the extension of the plant and animal souls. That is to say, they all argue that the vegetative as well as sensitive souls are extended according to the extension of the body.  

Jack Zupko has aptly called this the 'extensionality principle'. As he puts it: “According to the extensionality principle, when an animating principle has been derived from an extended subject, it must inhere commensurably in that subject.” An important part of this definition is the connection between the soul's extension and its being educed from the potency of matter. But it is even more important to note that what began as an incidental comment in Aquinas, namely that some forms, including the souls of the annulose animals can be called extended per accidens, is now, rightly I think, considered by Zupko to be one of the four most important principles of the soul–body relation in Buridan. As will be illustrated below, the principle is equally important in Oresme and the Anonymus Patar. In fact, it has become so important that no one bothers to use the qual-

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152 NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II.3, 137-138: “Quarto, supponendum est quod anima sensitiva est extensa habens partes quantitativas secundum extensionem subjecti in brutis... Et eodem modo de vegetativa.”; JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.7, 89: “Aristoteles autem contra hoc ponit duas contradictiones quas etiam ponimus. Prima est quod anima vegetativa et anima sensitiva in e quo non sunt distincte secundum diversas partes corporis, sed per totum corpus animalis ex tensa est vegetativa et sensitiva et appetitiva.” The same position is also defended by MARSILIUS OF INGHEN, Questiones Sententiarum, II, q. 11, f. 248v: “Secundo est notandum quod omnes anime brutorum et plantarum sunt extense extensione corporis.”

153 ZUPKO, John Buridan, 165.

154 The other three principles Zupko mentions are the 'subject identity principle' (every living being has but one soul), the 'definitional distinction principle' (the terms 'vegetative soul', 'sensitive soul' and 'intellective soul' are not synonymous), and the 'homogeneity principle' (each part of the soul is of the same nature). See ZUPKO, John Buridan, 165–175.
ification *per accidens* any more when discussing the soul’s extension. Again, recall that although Brito also adheres to this extensionality principle, Aquinas does not.\(^{155}\) And in Brito, it is nowhere near as important as is it in the later fourteenth-century commentators.

Adherence to this principle of extensionality is still compatible with a variety of philosophical positions. Not only is it compatible with both the unicity and the plurality of substantial forms and even of souls, but it also leaves the manner in which the soul is present in each of the bodily parts in terms of its powers undetermined. I will not specify this principle further at this point, so that it can serve as a common ground for comparing Buridan, Oresme, and the Anonymus Patar.\(^{156}\) Since all three philosophers agree that there is no distinction between the vegetative and sensitive soul, the complete animal soul must be extended according to the extension of the body, and hence be present in the whole body and each of its parts. The final question that needs to be answered now is ‘how is the soul present?’ Is it present wholly in each part or not, and if it is, in what sense is it wholly present in these parts? The distinction used by the thirteenth and early fourteenth-century philosophers between a presence in a quantitative manner, an essential manner, and according to powers, will be useful here, even though it no longer occupies a central place in the later fourteenth-century commentaries.\(^{157}\)

Buridan discusses the manner in which the soul is present in the body in great detail. After giving the arguments for and against the thesis that the whole soul is present in each and every part of the body, he begins by giving a list of six difficulties (*dubitationes*) connected to it, each of which, he says, is worthy of having a separate long and difficult question devoted to it.\(^{158}\)

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\(^{155}\) For anyone adhering to this ‘extensionality’ principle, the question of whether a form is extended according to the extension of the subject it inheres in is the same question as whether the form is educed from the potency of matter. To put it briefly, the human intellective soul is the only exception there is, on account of its immortality.

\(^{156}\) Since Zupko formulated the extensionality principle in the context of his study of Buridan, he was able to give it a very precise meaning: “Buridan’s extensionality principle as applied to the soul, then, is a claim about capacities of the soul conceived as remote potentialities.” This more precise formulation makes it inapplicable to anyone but Buridan, which is why I will stick to the more general formulation for now.

\(^{157}\) It is still mentioned, however, in *Nicole Oresme, QdA, II.4, 144*-13.

\(^{158}\) *John Buridan, QdA, II 7: ‘Utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis’, 87: ‘Et quelibet istarum dubitationum posset esse una magna questio et difficilis.’ These difficulties are. (1) how are we to understand Aristotle’s comment that the parts of the soul are not spatially distinct? (2) if the human soul is unextended and indivisible, how does it inform the whole body and each of its parts? (3) whether each part of a plant is itself a plant, and each part of an animal itself an animal? (4) whether each part of a man is itself a man? (5) whether the same plant, or animal, or man remains when parts are cut off, or added (through the intake of food)? And finally, (6) how should we reply to the original question on the presence of the soul in the
On account of the difficulties connected to the human soul, Buridan postpones the discussion of it to the third book of his commentary. In the question at hand, he only concerns himself with plant and animal souls. Since his views on the inherence of plant and animals souls in the body have already been described in detail by Jack Zupko, I will simply summarize his findings here.\[159\] The animal soul is wholly present in the whole body and each of its parts. We can capture precisely what Buridan means by this presence if we use the distinction made by the earlier commentators between three kinds of presence. The animal soul is present as an essential whole, as a potestative whole, but not as a quantitative whole. In Buridan’s own terminology this means that the animal soul is a homogeneous form that is extended according to the extension of the body:

\[\text{Item non ponimus quod anima sensitiva equi sit composita ex partibus, scilicet ex substantiis diversarum rationum, sed ex partibus eiusdem rationis, sicud erat forma aeris. Sed propter homogenitatem in talibus homogeniis, partes recipiunt predicationes totius quantum ad predicationem quidditativa.}\[160\]

Also we do not posit that the sensitive soul of a horse is composed of parts, namely of substances of different kinds, but of parts of the same kind, just as the form of air is. But on account of the homogeneity in these homogeneous substances, the parts receive the same predications as the whole in so far as the quidditative predications are concerned.

Although Buridan’s view of the inherence of the soul is well known, the views of Oresme and Anonymus Patar are not known all. And as it turns out, they defend the exact opposite view. Both of them do accept that the animal soul is extended according to the extension of the body, since this is a property, they argue, of all material forms. But the animal soul, at least the soul of perfect animals, is a heterogeneous form, not a homogeneous form. Each part of the soul itself is different. To quote Oresme:

\[\text{Tunc de sensitiva in aliis animalibus perfectis, sicut est bos, etc., prima conclusio est quod talis anima est totum heterogeneum. Probatur quia totum est totum heterogeneum; igitur anima. Antecedens est notum. Et patet consequentia per Commentatorem in primo huius, ubi dicit quod diversitas in partibus corporis est secundum exigentiam ipsius animae, quia corpus ordinatur ad animam tamquam finem, non e converso.}\[161\]
Now for the sensitive soul in other perfect animals, such as an ox etc, the first thesis is that such a soul is a heterogeneous whole. This is shown to be true, because the whole is a heterogeneous whole; hence the soul is a heterogeneous whole. The antecedent is known. And the consequence is clear from what the Commentator says in book I of the De anima that a diversity in bodily parts exists according to the need of the soul, because the body is ordered to the soul as its goal, not the other way around.

Oresme’s view is difficult to understand. It is because the soul is a heterogeneous form, he argues, that the body is a heterogeneous body. But does it really make sense to talk about the heterogeneity of the soul as a property that it has on its own account? The only possible interpretation seems to be that “behind” each different bodily part lies a different soul part, not just in a quantitative sense, but also in a qualitative sense! Oresme is not the only one to defend this peculiar position. Anonymus Patar gives the exact same analysis. On this issue, there really are two positions in Paris in the fourteenth century.

Again, Ockham turns out to have influenced the discussion greatly, as he also did with the distinction between two senses of ‘power’ and the subsequent identification of the soul with its powers. In the same question where Ockham identified the soul with even its sensitive powers, immediately after establishing this identity, he moves on to discuss a question which he thinks is related, namely that of the extension of the animal soul. The animal soul, Ockham says, is extended according to the extension of the body and is divisible into homogeneous parts (partibus eiusdem rationis). So notwithstanding that the animal soul is one single form, its powers are distinct from one another, although not from the soul itself, in a quantitative sense. If, for instance, an

162 ANONYMUS PATAR, QdA, II.5, 26959–27059: “Quinta conclusio: anima equi vel alterius bruti, et similar anima sensitiva hominis si ponitur distincta ab anima intellectiva, est forma heterogenea, hoc est habens partes distinctas specie. Patet, nam illa pars animae quae est in carne distinguitur specie ab illa parte animae quae est in osse. Probatur sic: os et caro distinguuntur specie et habent diversa nomina substantialia et similitur diversas definitiones; ergo illa distinctio specifica est ab aliquo. Vel igitur a materia vel a forma. Non a materia, quia illa est eiusdem rationis in osse et in carne; relinquitur ergo quod a forma. Et per consequens forma ossis distinguitur specie a forma carnis et istae formae partiales sunt partes formae totalis ipsius equi; ergo ipsa est heterogenea.” Again this shows that there are substantial doctrinal differences between Buridan and Anonymus Patar.

163 WILLIAM OCKHAM, Reportatio, III, q. 4, 13622–13728: “Intelligendum tamen quod licet in animali sit tantum una forma sensitiva quae elicit omnes istas operationes, tamen ipsa forma non est indivisibilis sed divisibilis in partes eiusdem rationis, quia forma sensitiva in quolibet animali — sicut pono — extenditur ad extensionem quantitatis in materia ita quod sicut una pars quantitatis est in una parte materiae et alia pars in alia parte, ita una pars animae sensitiae perficit unam partem materiae et alia pars eiusdem rationis per omniam perficit aliam partem.”
animal’s eye is destroyed, then that part of the soul that informed the eye is 
destroyed including its powers, whereas the powers of the other parts of the 
soul remain intact. 164

Having made the distinction between two senses of ‘power’ and having 
argued for the extension of the soul, Ockham raises the same question as the 
one discussed in the thought experiment of the eye in the foot: are all the 
powers present in every (quantitative) soul part? And it is not just the same 
question he raises. Ockham actually discusses the same thought experiment:

Et ideo dico quod si pars illa formae sensitivae quae perficit organum 
auditus vel gustus vel quae est in pede perficeret organum visus, et pars 
quae perficit organum visus perficeret organum auditus, tunc illa pars 
formae quae prius eliciebat actum videndi nunc eliceret actum audiendi 
vel gustandi et e converso. Et si dispositio illa accidentalis quae est in 
organo visus esset in pede, illa pars sensitivae quae nunc est in pede ita 
eliceret actum videndi sicut nunc elicit oculus, quia materia est eiusdem 
rationis in oculo et in pede, et forma similiter. 165

And hence I say that if the part of the sensitive form that perfects the 
organ of hearing or taste or that which is in the foot were to perfect 
the organ of sight, and the part that perfects the organ of sight were 
to perfect the organ of hearing, then that part of the form that first 
elicited the act of sight would then elicit the act of hearing or tasting 
and conversely. And if that accidental disposition that is in the organ of 
sight were to be in the foot, the part of the sensitive form that is now in 
the foot would elicit the act of sight just as the eye elicits it now, because 
the matter in the eye and the foot is the same, and the form also.

Here we have the position that Buridan will defend later, using the same 
distinction, for all practical purposes, between two senses of the term ‘power’. 
Not only does Buridan’s view of the relation between the soul and its powers 
correspond generally to Ockham’s, but it seems to correspond to it in de­ 
tail. The positions of Oresme and Anonymus Patar, by contrast, agree with 
Ockham’s in the general sense that they also identify the soul with its pow­ 
ers. But on a more detailed level, their views differ from both Ockham’s and 
Buridan’s, since they do not accept the conclusion that the animal soul is a ho­ 
mogeneous whole. Instead, they say, the animal soul is heterogeneous, with 
different parts, each of which is capable of only a subset of the total of func­ 
tions the soul as a whole is able to perform.

164 William Ockham, Reportatio, III, q. 4, 13717–19; “Sicut si ervatur oculus, tunc illa pars 
formae quae perficiebat pupillam oculi corrumpitur, et adhuc remanet illa pars formae sensi­
tivae quae perficit organum auditus.”
165 William Ockham, Reportatio, III, q. 4, 13812–1392.
5.4.4 Is the power of sight really present in the foot?

We are now finally in the position to give an accurate interpretation of the thought experiment of the eye in the foot from the beginning of this chapter. Buridan’s affirmation that the power of vision is indeed present in the foot should be understood as follows. As Buridan already indicated, ‘power’ must be taken here in the principal sense, that is to say, in the sense in which the powers are identical to the soul. This soul is, in every animal, no matter how simple or complex, a perfectly homogeneous form. In this respect, the soul is no different from the forms of the elements. It is present in its (essential) totality in each part of the animal in exactly the same way. This is why the empirical fact that most of the vital powers are localized should be explained by reference to the instrumental powers only, that is, to the fact that the animal body is structured differently in different places. The soul’s powers are only ‘activated’ in those places where the structure of the body is suited for the exercise of that power. This explains why Buridan is so confident in his answer to the thought experiment. The answer he gives is the only logical conclusion within his metaphysics of the soul. To question the answer is to question the entire framework he developed so carefully. Since the soul is proven to be a homogeneous whole, there can be no reason why the power of sight would not be exercised in the foot if this foot were to take on the material dispositions of an eye.

For Oresme, matters are more complex. And the reason for this is his conclusion that although the animal soul is extended according to the extension of the body, it is not homogeneous but heterogeneous, at least in the case of perfect animals. The question we must answer now is whether he specifies heterogeneity in terms of principal powers. If he does, his metaphysics of the soul is fundamentally different from Buridan’s. There are several places in his commentary where Oresme specifies what it means that the soul is heteroge-

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166Marsilius of Inghen’s commentary on the De anima unfortunately remains unedited, a few questions excepted. But some trace of the debate is clearly present in his commentary on the Sentences, where he defends the same position as Buridan. Marsilius of Inghen, Questions Sententiarum, II, q. 11, f. 250ª: “Quartum correlarium: si pars anime ossis equi per potentiam Dei mutaretur ad organum oculi, et anima organi oculi in os, ita bene videretur equus post sicut ante. Patet ex quo forme sunt omnimode similis essentialiter. Quicquid una facit eodem instrumento hoc alia equalis, si esset illo instrumento, equaliter faceret. Quintum correlarium: quod pes non videt vel os, hoc non est ex impotentia anime, sed ex defectu organi et dispositionis organice.” And just as Buridan, Marsilius connects these conclusions to the homogeneity of the soul of all plants and animals; Marsilius of Inghen, Questions Sententiarum, II, q. 11, f. 249ª: “His premissis est conclusio responsalis hic: omnes partes eiusdem anime extense asini vel equi vel alterius vivi sunt essentialiter specialissime similis.” For another example of the relation between Marsilius of Inghen’s commentary on the Sentences and the discussion in the De anima tradition in the fourteenth century, see p. 188, footnote 175.
neous to which we can now turn.

In some of the passages, Oresme’s formulation is ambiguous between powers in the principal and in the instrumental sense. For example, when Oresme discusses a by now familiar argument against the position that the whole soul is in whichever part of the body; as the argument goes, in that case the visual power would be located in the foot as well as in the eye, which would violate the adage that nature does nothing in vain. The souls of perfect animals, Oresme replies, are heterogeneous in the sense that they are not wholly present in whichever part of the body, neither quantitatively (*integraliter*), nor according to their powers (*potentialiter*), nor according to their essence (*essentialiter*). And if the powers are only located in the parts in which they are exercised, the argument fails.

The ambiguity is contained in the term *potentialiter*, for as we have seen, this can refer to either the principal or the instrumental powers. Although Oresme certainly seems to be talking about powers in the principal sense, he does not say so explicitly. But once we take all of the passages in which he discusses the heterogeneity of the souls of perfect animals into account, there can be absolutely no doubt that he is indeed talking about the heterogeneity of the soul in terms of its principal powers. Take, for example, in the following passage

\[
\text{Et ideo qui non habet oculos non dicitur habere potentiam visivam: et causa huius est quia ex supposito patet quod talis anima habet diversas partes heterogeneas et habentes diversa officia in diversis organis. Et ideo pars quae est in pede non potest illud quod potest illa quae est in oculo.}^{168}
\]

And so, someone who has no eyes is not said to have the power of sight: and the reason for this is that it is clear from what has been assumed that such a soul has different, heterogeneous parts, that also exercise different functions in different organs. And therefore the part that is in the foot cannot do that which the part that is in the eye can do.

Moreover, in retrospect, the proof that Oresme is indeed talking about powers in the principal sense is already contained in his answer to the thought experiment that was quoted in the beginning of this chapter.

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\(^{167}\) Nicole Oresme, *QdA*, II.4, 144^8-13: “Tunc est secunda conclusio quod talis anima *sensitiva in animalibus perfectis SdB* in qualibet parte non est tota, nec integraliter nec potentialiter nec essentialiter. Quod non integraliter, notum est, quia pars quae est in pede non est in manu; nec potentialiter, quia non omnes potentiae sunt in qualibet parte; nec essentialiter exponendo ut prius, quia pars quae est in manu non est anima, sed aliquid animae.”

\(^{168}\) Nicole Oresme, *QdA*, II.3, 137^16-20.
Ex hoc sequitur corollarie quod, si oculus esset in pede vel fieret ibi talis dispositio corporea, adhuc pes non videret, quia pars animae quae est ibi, non est nata videre.  

From this it follows as a corollary that, if there were an eye in the foot or if such a bodily disposition were made there, the foot would still not see, because the part of the soul that is there is not naturally capable to see.

The many doctrinal similarities in their commentaries on the *De anima* notwithstanding, Oresme and Buridan disagree about the structure of the animal soul at its most basic level. According to Buridan there is no difference between the form of an element, such as air, and the form of a complex animal. In both cases, the form is extended according to the extension of matter, and in both cases the form is perfectly homogeneous. It is present in each part in the exact same way. According to Oresme and Anonymus Patar, by contrast, there is a fundamental difference between the forms of the elements and the form of a complex animal. Although both forms are extended according to the extension of matter, the former is homogeneous, whereas the latter is heterogeneous. This leaves only the following important question: how is this fundamental disagreement between Buridan and Oresme (and Anonymus Patar) possible? How can they agree that there is no distinction between the sensitive and vegetative souls; agree that these are extended according to the extension of the body; introduce the same distinction between a principal and an instrumental power; identify the soul with its powers; and yet arrive at the exact opposite description of the soul: homogeneous versus heterogeneous? If we are to give a qualification of the sort of transformations that took place in the *scientia de anima* in the fourteenth century, this is a question that must be addressed.

### 5.4.5 From annulose animals to perfect animals

In the discussion of Brito’s position about the manner in which the soul is present in the body, it became clear that for him the annulose animals are paradigmatic for the soul–body relation. The soul’s extension in the bodies of the annulose animals can be proven, and that conclusion can be transferred

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169 Nicole Oresme, *QdA*, II.5, 151.

170 In case there is any remaining doubt what Oresme’s heterogeneous soul means, the following passage, I am sure, will take it away. Nicole Oresme, *QdA*, II.4, 1448–13: “Tunc est secunda conclusio quod talis anima in qualibet parte non est tota, nec integraliter, nec potentialiter, nec essentialiter. Quod non integraliter, notum est, quia pars quae est in pede non est in manu; nec potentialiter, quia non omnes potentiae sunt in qualibet parte; nec essentialiter exponendo ut prius, quia pars quae est in manu non est anima, sed aliquid animae.”
to the souls of perfect animals. But the criteria for this transfer were not fully clear. Even though Brito concluded that the souls of perfect animals are also extended, he added that they are so in a different way than the souls of annulose animals. On the level of the soul, it turned out to be possible to conclude that the souls of perfect animals are extended on the basis of the extension of the souls of the annulose animals. But on the level of the soul's powers, Brito thought that the annulose animals tell us little about the souls of perfect animals. For in the case of annulose animals, all powers are present in each and every part of the body, whereas in the case of perfect animals the powers are located in specific parts of the body. As it turns out, the same implicit question of what criteria we should use when transferring our conclusion about the annulose animals to perfect animals is central in the debate in the period of Oresme, Buridan, and the Anonymus Patar. Although their position on the relation between the soul and its powers is indebted to Ockham, their treatment of the question of how the soul is present in the body of different kinds of living beings is indebted to the tradition exemplified by Brito and Jandun.

So let us return, once last time, to the most simple forms of life, to those plants and animals that survive being cut in two halves. Let's take plants, where both halves — if they continue to live — continue to live for a long time, and are capable of performing all the life functions of the original plant. The part that has no roots will begin to sprout them if it is well taken care of, and the other part will grow into a fully developed plant as well. Buridan, Oresme, and Anonymus Patar draw the same two conclusions from this observation:

1. The souls of such simple life forms are extended according to the extension of the body, that is, one part of the body is informed by one part of the soul and another part by another.

2. The souls are homogeneous, that is, they are present essentially and according to all their powers in each part.\(^{171}\)

Their radical difference, however, stems from an implicit disagreement about the principles by which a conclusion about the soul of these simple life forms can be extended to more complex life forms. Buridan's main justification for the extension of the conclusions drawn from the observation of plants and annulose animals to more complex animals is difficult to accept for any

\(^{171}\) Aristotle had already pointed out that the souls of plants and annulose animals are homogeneous in Aristotle, *De anima*, I.5, 24–27: "But, all the same, in each of the parts there are present all the parts of soul, and the souls so present are homogeneous with one another and with the whole — the several parts of the soul being inseparable from one another, although the whole soul is divisible."
modern reader.\textsuperscript{172} It is an appeal to the 'hierarchy principle', the same principle he had used to deny the plurality of souls in animals.\textsuperscript{173} Whatever perfection may be found in some being, that same perfection will also be present in a more perfect manner in a more perfect being:

\begin{quote}
Ergo non solum in capite vel in parte que est proportionalis capiti est potentia sensitiva, sed per totum corpus; et similiter appetitiva et secundum locum motiva... Et si hec sunt concessa de illis animalibus imperfectis, ita debet hoc concedi de perfectis, licet non sic possint vivere divisa, quia anima, propter eius maiorem perfectionem, requirit in sua permanentia nobiliorem et perfectiorem organizationem.\textsuperscript{174}
\end{quote}

Therefore, the sensitive power of the annulose animals \textit{SdB} is not solely in the head, or in the part that corresponds to the head, but in the whole body; and the same goes for the appetitive power and the power of local motion... And if these things are conceded for those imperfect animals, it should also be conceded for the perfect animals, although they are incapable of surviving in this way after division, because their soul, on account of its greater perfection, requires a more noble and perfect organization in order to endure.

The argument works because the presence of all powers throughout the whole body is seen as a perfection. The annulose animals show us something very important about the perfections found in living beings, namely that all vital powers are present everywhere in the body. Now, if something as simple as the soul of a plant or of an annulose animal is already homogeneous, then so much the more so are the souls of more perfect and more complex animals. That more complex animals do not stay alive when cut in half, let alone that both parts develop all vital functions again, is explained by reference to the complex body required for the exercise of these vital functions. Since it is not the case that both parts of a complex animal have the required complexity to perform all vital functions, indeed, at best only one does, they will not both continue to live. But this is not an indication of the lack of presence of the full range of powers in the principal sense, but only an indication of the

\textsuperscript{172}Buridan supplies one other justification, and that is that a horse will show signs of pain when it is pricked, regardless of the part of its body in which it is pricked. From this Buridan concludes that the sensitive soul must be in each part of the body. Although the argument is closely related to that of the division of the annulose animals, it is much less powerful. Even if this argument is successful in showing that the sensitive soul is present in each and every part of the animal, it can never demonstrate that this soul is present as a homogeneous whole.

\textsuperscript{173}For Buridan's appeal to the hierarchy principle in his denial that a diversity of operations in any given substances can be used to establish a plurality of substantial forms in that substance, see p. 217.

\textsuperscript{174}John Buridan, \textit{QdA}, II.7, 90.
complexity of the powers in the instrumental sense. And since powers in the instrumental sense are defined in bodily terms, we can also phrase this differently: it is an indication of the complexity of the living body that is required for the exercise of the vital operations.

Oresme, by contrast, argues in the opposite direction. That the soul of simple life forms is homogeneous is not only apparent from the fact that the two parts continue to live, but also, and perhaps more so, from the lack of diversity of bodily parts. This is particularly clear in annulose animals, where all parts look more or less alike. But once we examine the more complex animals, we notice a great variety of bodily dispositions. Clearly there is an important difference between the two types of living beings. And this difference, Oresme concludes, can only be explained in terms of the structure of the soul. So when the annulose animals have a homogeneous soul, the perfect animals must have a heterogeneous soul. For Oresme, the conclusion that a complex animal would have a homogeneous form must have seemed almost absurd. For it is precisely from the fact that one part looks the same as the other part that we normally call something homogeneous, as we do for instance with water or air.

The inference from heterogeneous bodily parts to a heterogeneous soul is an important methodological principle in Oresme. This can be seen, for instance, in his question on the unicity or plurality of souls. Oresme begins by denying that a diversity or even contrariety of operations must necessarily be caused by a diversity of forms. He then applies the principle of parsimony by claiming that we do not need to posit a diversity of souls to explain the diversity of life functions. Since the diversity of dispositions of the body is one of the most important reasons that the soul can have such diverse operations, and since the soul is the formal cause of that diversity, Oresme concludes that the soul is a heterogeneous form. This move from the heterogeneity of bodily parts to the heterogeneity of the substantial form is especially clear in the following passage:

Quinta conclusio est quod anima bruti est forma heterogenea, et prius fuit probatum. Et probatur adhuc quia: dat aliud esse ossi et aliud esse carni. Unde caro et os differunt specie et habent diversa nomina substantialia et definitiones; et aliud est esse carnem et esse os; igitur habent formas diversarum rationum; et illae sunt partes unius totalis animae; igitur ipsa est totum heterogeneum.

175 Nicole Oresme, QdA, II.4, 14393-95. "Tunc de sensitiva in aliis animalis perfectis, sicut est bos, etc., prima conclusio est quod talis anima est totum heterogeneum. Probatur, quia totum est totum heterogeneum; igitur anima."

176 Nicole Oresme, QdA, II.5, 15174-79.
The fifth conclusion is that the soul of a brute animal is a heterogeneous form, and this was proved previously. And besides it is proved as follows: it gives different being to bone and to flesh. Hence flesh and bone differ in species and have diverse substantial names and definitions; and the being of flesh and bone differs; therefore they have forms of a different nature; and these are the parts of one complete soul; therefore this soul is a heterogeneous whole.

This heterogeneity of the soul is subsequently specified in the following way: in any complex living being there exists a variety of partial forms (formae partiales), of which Oresme gives one example, namely the power of sight. These partial forms are localized in specific places in the body. Oresme then draws two final conclusions. The first is that because of the localization of these partial forms, the power of sight is not in any place other than the eye. The second conclusion is that something can be composed of a body and a part of the soul without thereby being an animal. The requirement for being an animal is having a complete soul. 177

So when Oresme describes the soul as a ‘heterogeneous form’, the basic meaning of this expression is that the soul’s various powers are located in specific parts of the body; not only in the sense that not all powers can be actually exercised everywhere because of a lack of the proper organ — this much Buridan would agree with — but in the much stronger sense that the powers are distributed spatially over the body, somehow independently of the placement of organs. In the normal course of nature there is a harmony, to be sure, between the spatial distribution of the soul’s powers and the location of the organs required for the exercise of those powers. But this harmony ultimately turns out to be a contingent fact. It is possible, through divine intervention, that two bodily parts change places with the result that the soul part and the

177 This final conclusion is introduced as an explanation of the generation and corruption of living beings. By assuming that the soul can be gradually introduced or gradually corrupted, Oresme is able to explain how the complexity of bodily dispositions (that is the result of the generation of an animal) can develop. But this relies on a peculiar interpretation of the succession of forms in generation. The two standard positions were that either each successive form corrupts the previous form or that each successive form perfects the previous form. Both these extremes had in common that the forms perfecting a substance were unqualifiedly called substantial forms. In Oresme’s interpretation, there is a succession of partial forms that are not really substantial forms. The implication is that one can be more or less informed by a soul, meaning that more or fewer parts of the soul can be introduced. The difficulty with this solution is that we either have to accept the consequence (contra Aristotle) that something can be more or less an animal, or we have to specify how many and which parts of the form are required for something to be an animal. Both options are problematic at least, and the only way out, that all the parts must present before something can be called an animal, leads to the absurdity that a man who has lost a limb has lost part of his soul and can therefore no longer be called a man.
bodily part no longer match. And, at least according to Anonymus Patar, the same can be done with soul parts, with the same result. The combination of the presence of an organ that has all the required material characteristics (e.g. an undamaged eye) and the presence of a soul in the body to which the organ belongs does not guarantee that the power corresponding to the organ (i.e. vision) can be exercised. For this, a third condition must be met, namely that the spatial positions of the power and of the organ coincide.

This debate on the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the soul also explains an interesting, but puzzling passage in Buridan’s commentary. One of the arguments that was often introduced against the presence of the whole soul in every part of the body is that this would mean that every part of animal is itself an animal. For every part of animal would consist of a (whole) soul and an organic (part of the) body. It is discussed at great lengths by Buridan, whose approach to this argument is for the most part semantical. Put briefly, he distinguishes between two interpretations of the term ‘animal’. In the first interpretation we take the term to be a truly substantial term, that is, a term that does not connote anything apart from the substance for which it stands. In this particular case, that means especially that it does not connote the totality of the animal’s bodily parts. In this sense, Buridan concludes, we should indeed say that every part of an animal is animal, nor is there anything strange about this conclusion. In a second sense, and this is the sense most often used, the term is not truly substantial, but connotes the totality of the bodily parts. And in this sense, clearly, the parts of an animal are not them-

178 Anonymus Patar, QdA, II.5, 270: "Sexta conclusio: in eodem, sicut in bruto, sunt plures animae partiales. Patet ex dictis, nam alia est anima ossis et alia est anima carnis, istae autem animae sunt animae partiales. Sequitur corollarie quod, si illa pars animae quae est in pede equi esset in oculo equi, non videret patet, quia illa pars animae equi quae est in pede non est apta nata nec ordinata ad videndum. Sequitur etiam hoc esse falsum quod aliqui dicunt de anima equi quod ista anima equi quae est in pede videret, si haberet organum sicut illa quae est in oculo."

179 Although Oresme makes an interesting case for the heterogeneity of the soul of perfect animals, his position is also not without difficulties, for we can easily turn his argument against him. Although the parts of, let’s say a worm may be similar in the sense that is required for homogeneity, most plants have a more complex structure comprising at least roots, a stem, and leaves. If the heterogeneity of bodily parts must lead to the conclusion that soul is heterogeneous as well, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the souls of the plants must be heterogeneous even if the plant structure is not very complex. Indeed, at some point, Oresme himself uses plants as an example of diverse operations in diverse parts in the context of the question of how one form can be responsible for diverse operations; Nicole Oresme, QdA, II.5, 150: "Sexto, propter diversas partes heterogeneas talis formae agents, sicut forma ovi alud facit per partem quae est in vitello et alud per albumen. Et similiter de herbis. quaedam habent aliam virtutem in radice et aliam in folis."

180 John Buridan, QdA, II.7, 97: "Secundam conclusionem ego pono quod si hac nomina 'animal', 'equus', 'asinus' etc. non sint nomina vere substantialia, sed connotativa, scilicet con-
selves an animal. This part of his answer is clear enough. The puzzling part comes next, when he says that the answer he just gave solves one of the difficulties (dubitatio) connected to the presence of the whole soul in each part of the body:

Et hoc sit dictum de ista tertia dubitatione, nisi quod adhuc addi potest rationabiliter causa quare magis consuevimus dicere quod quelibet pars aëris est aer et quelibet pars aque est aqua quam quod quelibet pars equi est equus vel capre capra. Videtur enim mihi quod causa in hoc est quia vulgus et multi philosophorum putant membra animalis esse substantialiter diversarum rationum, non solum quantum ad accidentia, et quod hoc nomen 'animal' sit appropriate impositum ad supponendum pro composito ex partibus sic dissimilium rationum, sicud esset de domo. Et si ita esset, tunc non quelibet pars animalis esset animal, sicud nec quelibet pars domus esset domus. Sed si hoc non est ita, tunc debet dici sicud ante dictum est.\textsuperscript{181}

And this concludes the reply to this third difficulty, except that <this> can be added reasonably: the reason why we are more accustomed to say that each part of air is air and each part of water is water than that each part of a horse is a horse or of a she-goat is a she-goat. It seems to me that the cause in this matter is that both the general public and many philosophers believe that the limbs and organs of an animal have a substantially different nature, not only in respect of accidents, and that the name 'animal' is appropriately imposed to supposit for the composite of the parts that have different natures in this way, as is the case with a house. And if this were so, then it would not be the case that each part of an animal is an animal, just as neither each part of a house is a house. But if this is not so, then it should be said what was said previously.

Indeed, many philosophers make this assumption, Oresme and Anonymous Patar being two of them.

5.5 From animal to human soul

We have seen how from Brito onward the analysis of plants and annulose animals provided the basic metaphysical framework for the discussion of the manner in which the soul is present in the body. In addition it has been shown how the commentators used different criteria when transferring their conclusions about the souls of annulose animals to their discussion of the souls of

\textsuperscript{181}JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.7, 99–100.
perfect animals. Because of these different criteria, they reached different conclusions about the structure of the souls of perfect animals. What remains to be investigated is how they make the final step. What conclusions can we draw about the way in which the human soul is present in the body? Are we allowed to transfer the conclusions reached in the discussion of either the annulose or the perfect animals to the human soul? And if so, how?

5.5.1 The intellective soul: material or immaterial?

The main reason that the discussion of the human soul differs from the discussion of the soul of perfect animals is that the aspect of immateriality comes into play. Aristotle had argued that the power of thinking is unique, in the sense that it is not exercised in any organ. And although he had been less clear on the ontological status of the human soul, he had hinted in several places that it contains at the very least a divine element, and might be capable of continued existence after the death of the body. And for his medieval commentators, there could be no doubt about the truth of the immortality of the intellective soul, although whether or not this truth is demonstrable is another matter.

The immateriality of the human soul, or part of it, alone, makes it an exceptional subject to study within natural philosophy. When the commentators discussed the possibility of a scientia de anima, it was the inclusion of the intellective soul that resulted in what I called the fragile unity of this science. But also when it came to the discussion of the metaphysical structure of the human soul, it was not always evident if and how the conclusions about the souls of perfect animals could be extended to the human soul, even if both types of soul fall under the same definition of ‘first act of the natural organic body having life in potency’.

In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the difference between the immaterial human soul and the material souls of perfect animals was usually clarified in one of two ways. One could either, following Averroes, place the divine immaterial element outside of the individual and postulate a unique, single, immortal intellect, or, one could say that the human intellect is immaterial in the sense that it has some operations, thinking and willing, that are not exercised in any bodily organ. The existence of these immaterial operations could then function as a premise in the proofs of the immortality

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183 Aristotle, *De generatione animalium*, 736b27–28: “It remains, then for the reason alone so to enter <i.e. from without SdB> and alone to be divine, for no bodily activity has any connection with the activity of reason.”
of the soul.\textsuperscript{184}

The few commentators who tried to defend Averroes's position excepted, almost all commentators thought that the human soul could be discussed in the same way as the plant and animal souls. The human soul did come with some unique operations and properties, in particular the immateriality of thought and the immortality of the soul itself, but these operations and properties could be demonstrated within the \textit{scientia de anima}. In so far as the human soul is embodied, it could be studied in the same way as animal souls, and the conclusions concerning it have the same degree of certainty as those concerning the animal soul. Granted, there are things about the human soul that cannot be discussed with certainty. Especially in so far as the human soul can continue to exist in an unembodied state, only this possibility could be demonstrated. All the details of the soul's unembodied existence, for instance, its mode of cognition, fall outside of the natural philosophical range. But since the \textit{scientia de anima} studies the soul as form of the body, this was not seen as a problem. More detailed discussions on the human soul after the death of the body could be left to the theologians.\textsuperscript{185}

When we compare the period from Aquinas and the Anonymi with the period starting from Ockham, several things have changed. First, the overall structure of the discussion of the ontological status of the intellect is now a discussion of the relative merits and demerits of three famous positions: that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, that of Averroes, and that of faith. This same structure is found Oresme, in Buridan and in the Anonymus Patar.\textsuperscript{186} Each of these positions is then characterized by reference to the list of properties of the human soul given in table 5.1.\textsuperscript{187} These properties, as well as their opposites, were considered to be mutually implicative, that is, if we set aside what we

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{184}Later thirteenth-century discussions of the immortality of the intellect were very much structured by the question of whether and in what sense an immaterial operation can be ascribed to a material individual.
\item \textsuperscript{185}See, for example, \textsc{Radulphus Brito, QdA, I,} 987-94. "Quando ergo dicitur \textit{‘anima est separabilis’}, verum est, \textit{‘ergo habet operationem propriam’}, verum est. Tamen illa operatione non est talis qualam habet in hac vita, quia anima in hac vita intelligit ex sensatis et imaginatis. Sed quando est separat a corpore non sic intelligit, sed per revelationem superius intelligentie, vel per species insusas, vel per habitus acquisitos hic, vel secundum aliquem alium modum"
\item \textsuperscript{186}The same strategy is also followed by Marsilius of Inghen. \textsc{Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones in tres libro Aristotelis De anima, III} 3 \textit{‘Utrum cum perpetuum intellectum esse formam inhaeren tem corpore humano’}, in: O. Pluta, \textit{‘Die Diskussion der Unsterblichkeitfrage bei Marsilius von Inghen’}, in: S. Wielgus, \textit{Marsilius von Inghen Werk und Wirkung}, Lublin. Redakcja Wydawnictw Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1993, 119-164, 151-127, 129; "Quantum ad primum (articulum) est sciendum, quod tres sunt opiniones de ista quaestione: prima est Alexandri, secunda est Commentatoris, tertia est fidei catholicae."
\item \textsuperscript{187}For example: \textsc{Nicole Oresme, QdA, III,4,} 338-60; \textsc{John Buridan, QdA, III,4,} 120-136; and \textsc{Anonymus Patar, QdA, III,4,} 423-69.
\end{itemize}
know through faith.\textsuperscript{188}

**Table 5.1: The three famous opinions on the intellect**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claim</th>
<th>Alexander</th>
<th>Averroes</th>
<th>Faith and Truth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>inheres in matter</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is educed from the potency of matter</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is extended</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is multiplied</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is begotten</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Supernaturally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is corruptible</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in this table, Alexander’s position is characterized as follows: the human intellect is a material form, educed from the potency of matter, which is extended according to the extension of matter, is multiplied according to the number of humans, is begotten, and is corruptible.\textsuperscript{189} The second position, that of Averroes is characterized as the exact inverse of that of Alexander.\textsuperscript{190} But ultimately, all these mid-fourteenth-century commentators accept the position held by faith, which states that the human soul is truly a form inhering in the body, although it is not extended according to the extension of the body, nor educed from the potency of matter.\textsuperscript{191}

A second change is that the conclusions about the manner in which the human soul inheres in the body are no longer considered to be demonstrable,

\textsuperscript{188}This conclusion is drawn by Buridan in several places, e.g. in John Buridan, *QdA*, III.6, 50\textsuperscript{97–99}: “Quinta conclusio: quod haec sex se mutuo consequuntur: intellectum esse perpetuum, non esse genitum nec corruptibilem, non esse eductum de potentia materiae, non inhaerere materiae, non esse extensum extensione materiae, et non esse multiplicatum. Et similiter sex opposita illorum consequuntur se mutuo.”

\textsuperscript{189}John Buridan, *QdA*, III.3, 22\textsuperscript{58–62}: “Dicebat Alexander quod intellectus humanus est forma materialis generabilis et corruptibilis, educta de potentia materiae, et extensa extensione materiae, sicut anima bovis aut anima canis, et non est manens post mortem.”

\textsuperscript{190}John Buridan, *QdA*, III.3, 22\textsuperscript{63–69}: “Alia fuit opinio Averrois quod intellectus humanus est forma immaterialis, et ingenita et incorruptibilis, et sic non est educta de potentia materiae, nec extensa, immo nec multiplicata multiplicacione hominum, sed quod est unicus intellectus omnibus hominibus, scilicet quo ego intelligo, quo tu intelligis, et sic de aliis. Ideo non est forma inhaerens corpori.”

but merely probable.\(^{192}\) Here again, the later fourteenth-century commentators seem to echo Ockham.\(^{193}\) Strictly speaking, the *scientia de anima* is only able to demonstrate the manner in which the souls of plants/annulose animals and those of perfect animals inhere in their bodies. As a result of this, theological arguments are now being introduced into the discussion of the human soul. When Buridan discusses the question of whether the sensitive soul and intellective soul are the same or different in humans beings, for example, he begins in his normal manner by referring the reader to all his arguments in favor of the identity of the vegetative and sensitive souls that also apply to the identity of the sensitive and intellectual soul. But instead of then elaborating on the reasons for his identification of the sensitive and intellective soul — the usual thing to do after presenting the arguments for and against —, he proceeds to give three “theological arguments that produce in me a great faith” that a human being has but one soul. There is no determination of the question besides these three arguments. One of these runs as follows:

> Et possum addere rationes theologicas quae mihi in hoc faciunt magnam fidem. Quorum una est quod filius Dei assumpsit sibi totam humanitatem et integram. Ideo cum anima sensitiva sit de integritate hominis, illam assumpsit. Et nihil dimissit quod assumpsit. Ergo illam in morte non dimisit, et sic in morte non corrupmepatur. Et tamen dicentes eam esse substantialiter distinctam ab intellective dicunt eam corrumpi in morte; ergo etc.\(^{194}\)

And I can add theological arguments that produce in me a great faith in this matter. One of which is that the son of God took up the whole and complete human nature. Hence, since the sensitive soul belongs to the completeness of man, he took it up. And he abandoned nothing which


\(^{193}\)William Ockham, *Quodlibeta*, I.10, 63\(^{39}-64\(^{47}\): “Dico quod intelligendo per ‘animam intellectivam’ formam immaterialem, incorruptibilem quae tota est in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte, nec potest evidenter sciri per rationem vel per experientiam quod talis forma sit in nobis, nec quod intelligere tali substantiae proprium sit in nobis, nec quod talis anima sit forma corporis, — quidquid de hoc sensuerit Philosophus non curo ad praesens, quia ubique dubitative videtur loqui —, sed ista tria solum credimus.”

\(^{194}\)John Buridan, *QdA*, III.17, 19\(^2\(^{42-49}\).
he took up. Hence he did not abandon the sensitive soul in death, and
so it was not corrupted in death. And yet those who say that this soul
is substantially distinct from the intellective soul say that it is corrupted
in death; hence etc.

So, apparently, that Christ took up human nature as a whole makes it
more plausible that the human soul is a unity, even though the consequence of
this unity turns out to be that the human soul always inheres in a supernatural
manner, in such a way that even the vegetative and sensitive operations are
immaterial and hence incomparable to those in plants and animals. Strange
as this may seem, Buridan is not the only one to introduce the incarnation as
an argument in favor of the unity of the human soul. Marsilius of Inghen
does the same in his commentary on the *De anima*. And the argument is
also discussed by Ockham when he asks the question of whether or not the
sensitive and intellective souls are distinct in man. But Ockham, at least,
introduced this argument in the theological context of the *Sententiae*.

The mere fact that theological considerations play a role in the determi­
nation of questions from the *De anima* is not surprising. We have already
seen how similar considerations played a substantial role when it came to dis­
cussing the unicity or plurality of substantial form and the related question of
whether or not the accidents of the living body and of the corpse are numer­
ically identical. The crucial difference, however, is that these theological
considerations are now explicitly introduced in the context of the *De anima*
rather than merely playing their important role in the background without be­
ing mentioned. This reflects the methodological change that occurred in the
later fourteenth-century commentaries, namely that the natural philosophical

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195 The other two arguments that produce “great faith” are: (1) a reference to Psalm 16:10
“For thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see cor­
rupion.” (King James version), which would be false if Christ’s sensitive soul were corrupted.
And (2) an analogy between the manner in which God is present in the world (*culshet partis
prinapalitans and sine distanta*) and the manner in which the soul is present in the body.
Although Buridan emphasizes that whereas the soul is a form that inheres in the body, God is
not form that inheres in the world.
196 The argument is that Christ took up the whole human nature including the sensitive
soul. And what Christ has taken up he will not abandon. From this Marsilius draws the con­
cclusion that the sensitive and intellective soul cannot be two separate souls, since otherwise
either Christ’s death is not truly a death (when his sensitive soul survives) or he abandons part
of what he took up (if the sensitive soul corrupts). See Plutus, *Utrum intellectus utitur organo
corporeo*, 175.
197 William Ockham, *Quodlibeta*, II, q. 10, 159–74. It is countered with the following
reply “Dico quod illa sensitiva Christi remansit ubi Deo placuit; tamen semper fuit unita
detatis. Sed utrum remansit cum corpore vel cum anima intellectiva, solus Deus novit. Sed
utrumque potest dix.” (p. 16091–95).
198 See above, section 4.4.
paradigm is no longer deemed adequate to demonstrate the manner in which the human soul inheres in the body. We can demonstrate how the souls of annulose animals inhers in their bodies, and, based on these demonstrations, move on to show the manner in which the souls of perfect animals inheres. But at that point the natural philosophical approach has reached its limits. If we want to discuss the human soul also, we have to resort to theological arguments in order to give a convincing (but not demonstrative!) description of how the human soul inheres in the body.

The limits of natural philosophy

Buridan makes it very clear that when it comes to the human intellect, philosophy has reached its limits. Since his views on the difference between the human soul and other souls have been analyzed in detail by other scholars, I can be brief here. The presence of the human soul in the body is described in the terminology of the Eucharist, and is explicitly called a super-natural mode of inhering. Because of the fact that the human soul is not educed from the potency of matter, every human vegetative and sensitive power must be immaterial! By maintaining the unity of the soul, Buridan has, in the end, broken the fragile unity of the science that studies it. Almost nothing about the human soul can be proven, or even adequately understood in the scientia de anima. As it turns out, even the vegetative and sensitive aspects of human beings inheres in this supernatural manner, and are fundamentally different from similar processes in plants and animals. The human soul has now become the limit of natural philosophy; not in the sense of the place where

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199 See Zupko, John Buridan, 180-182.


201 John Buridan, QdA, III.4, 36178–187; “Et non est inconveniens idem esse non commensurabiler in diversis locis ab invicem distantibus et secundum se totum, licet hoc sit modo supernaturali, ut corpus Christi simul est in paradiso et super altari (non enim corpus Christi in hostia super altari commensuratur magnitudine hostiae, sed est in qualibet parte hostiae, licet partes distent ab invicem, et non ob hoc distat a se). Et ideo consimiliter quodammodo intellectus est in manu et in pede, et in neutro commensurative, cum non sit extensus in aliquo illorum membrorum.”
natural philosophy and metaphysics touch, but in the sense of that place that natural philosophy can never reach. All that remains is faith.

Buridan's description of the inherence of the intellective soul as supernatural has been noted in the secondary literature. But there has been little or no discussion about the position of Oresme and Anonymus Patar on this issue. At first sight, it may look as if they have fewer difficulties than Buridan when describing the inherence of the human. They certainly do not resort to theological arguments to establish the relation between the sensitive and intellectual parts of the human soul, and there is no mention of any supernatural inherence. Nor do they feel the need to introduce theological arguments into the discussions on the inherence of the human soul, as Buridan and Marsilius do. But once we consider the matter more carefully, we can see that they are really little better off than Buridan. They are simply less clear about the difficulties connected to the human soul. Now that the soul has been identified with its powers, they have only two options. Either, following Ockham, they can say that a human being has two souls, or, following Buridan, they can say that a human being has one soul which inheres in the body in a supernatural manner. If they follow Ockham, they can, at least, maintain that the vegetative and sensitive operations in humans and animals function in a similar manner. In that way, part of the human being can be studied in the scientia de anima in the same way, and according to the same principles, as other living things are studied there. They only have to admit that we have reached the limits of natural philosophy when it comes to the intellective part of the human soul. If, on the other hand, they follow Buridan, they have to say that all vital operations of a human being are radically different from those found other living things, since all these operations come from a soul that inheres in the body in a radically different manner than the souls of animals do. And then the whole human soul becomes mysterious to the natural philosopher.

The reason that Anonymus Patar and Oresme cannot offer a better alternative to the description of the inherence of the human soul given by Buridan is that they refuse to (fully) commit themselves to either option. Because

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202 Although Anonymus Patar does compare the inherence of the human soul to the presence of God in the universe, just like Buridan did. See ANONYMUS PATAR, QdA, II 6, 283–284

203 And they have to hope that no one asks too many question about the interaction between the sensitive and intellective functions. LAGERLUND, 'John Buridan and the Problems of Dualism', 386–387, is right to point out that several problems in Ockham's epistemology are the result of the real distinction between sensitive and intellective soul.

204 More precisely, Anonymus Patar never commits himself to either alternative. Oresme does commit himself to Ockham's position in one passage from his commentary, but only hesitantly. Moreover, he consistently leaves both options open in almost every other place in his commentary.
both solutions, that of Ockham and that of Buridan, are possible, they are also unable to account for the human soul within the normal framework of the *scientia de anima*. For if we really are unable to establish whether a human being has but one soul or two within the *scientia de anima*, this means that, at least in principle, none of the conclusions we reached when discussing the souls of annulose and of perfect animals can be extended to the human soul. If there is but one soul, then this soul cannot be heterogeneous as the souls of perfect animals are. In that case, the whole human soul inheres in the body in a radically different manner from that of perfect animals. This implies that the basic principle that the heterogeneity or homogeneity of the soul is established on the basis of the heterogeneity or homogeneity of the body has to be abandoned. The inherence of the human soul is so exceptional that it cannot be established or explained by the principles they developed in the *scientia de anima*. That they do not use the term 'supernaturaliter' matters little.

Although the earlier commentators considered the intellective soul to be a very difficult subject to study, they remained convinced that the science of the soul can establish the following three points conclusively: (1) that the immaterial intellective soul is the form of the body, (2) in what sense it is the form of the body, and (3) that it can survive the death of the body. This changes radically with Buridan, Oresme and the Anonymus Patar. The science of the soul cannot establish conclusively that the immaterial intellective soul is the form of the body. It might buttress the conclusion with probable arguments, but it can never demonstrate it. Also, strictly from the viewpoint of natural philosophy, Alexander of Aphrodisias’s position of a mortal soul that is educed from the potency of matter and extended according to the extension of matter is the more plausible position. As a result, very few conclusions

205 *Anonymus Patar, QdA, II.4, 255*: "Sed notandum est hic quod, si in homine ponimus sensitivam non esse distinctam ab intellectiva, et quod in homine est solum una anima, puta intellectiva indivisibilis et inextensa, nos debemus dicere de homine quod in homine eadem est potentia visiva, auditiva, et sic de alius; et potentia visiva est in pede et in manu et ubique in corpore, quamvis non in qualibet parte corporis ipsius hominis sed in parte determinata exerceat illam operationem quae est videre, et mediante una alia parte corporis ipsius hominis aliam operationem quae est audire, et sic de alius. Sed si in homine ponamus animam sensitivam esse distinctam ab anima intellectiva, tunc debemus loqui de anima sensitiva hominis sicut iam dictum est de anima equi vel asini, scilicet quod illa pars animae sensitivae quae est in oculo dicitur potentia visiva et illa quae est in organo auditus, auditiva, et sic de alius."  

206 *Nicole Oresme, QdA, III.4, 336*: "Et ideo, post opimonem ventatis et fidei, opimo..."
that we can draw about the souls of perfect animals can be translated to the soul of humans. According to Buridan, the inheritance of the human soul can only be described in terms that are taken from the theological context of the Eucharist. And even for Oresme and the Anonymus Patar, the human soul is structured completely differently from that of perfect animals. Whereas the souls of the latter are heterogeneous, with powers that are located in specific parts of the body, the human soul is homogeneous, without any such structure, whereas, at the same time, this homogeneous soul is responsible for all the heterogeneous bodily parts of a human being.

5.6 Epilogue and conclusions

With the discussions between Buridan, Oresme and Anonymus Patar in mind, one can hardly blame Pierre d'Ailly for becoming bored with the detailed expositions of the relations between powers and essences. In the opening words of his *Tractatus de anima*, written sometime between 1377 and 1385, d'Ailly writes the following:

Quidditatem animae umbratice somniantes philosophi de ea diversa et adversa senserunt, quae omnia disserere longum esset. Sed quia Aristoteles inter eos obtinens principatum animam probabilius definivit dicens quod ipsa est 'actus primus substantialis corporis physici, organicii habentis vitam in potentia', ideo huius definitionis explanationem prosequamur.

Considering the essence of the soul obscurely as if in a dream, philosophers have thought diverse and opposite things about it, the discussion of which would take a long time. But because Aristotle, who holds the first place among them, defined the soul rather probably by saying that it is 'the first substantial act of the physical, organic body having life in potency', let us give an explanation of this definition.

D'Ailly devotes six pages in the edition to a “discussion” of the definition of the soul, the relation to its powers and the manner in which it is present in the body. The remainder of the tract is devoted to a discussion of the various powers of the soul. It is clear that d'Ailly was familiar with the type of commentaries written by Buridan and Oresme. On several points, his brief

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Alexandri inter omnes alias est bene probabilis et multum magis quam opinio Commentatoris." See also, **ANONYMUS PATAR, QdA, III.4, 423 46-49** and **JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, III.4, 3278-82**. Marsilius of Inghen agrees, see Plut, 'Utrum intellectus utitur organo corporeo', 157 327-331.


208 Pierre d'Ailly, *TdA*, 5.
discussion of the structure of the soul is indebted to this tradition. The editor of the treatise, Olaf Pluta, has pointed out that d’Ailly seems to borrow from Buridan’s commentary in his discussion of Aristotle’s definition of the soul. In all likelihood he was indeed familiar with Buridan’s commentary, since he takes over many important elements, such as beginning with the annulose animals when discussing the soul, the distinction between principal and instrumental powers, and the thought experiment of the presence of the principal power of sight in the foot (to which he gives the same answer as Buridan had done). The one element that d’Ailly does not take over uncritically is Buridan’s indivisible human soul, in which the sensitive powers are also unextended. After a very brief discussion of this topic, d’Ailly claims that the question of whether in man the sensitive and intellective soul are distinct is a undecided question (problema neutrum), to which both answers are probable, so if someone wants to claim that they are identical, that is fine also.

In stark contrast to the commentators from whom takes his material, however, d’Ailly is not at all interested in discussing the arguments for and against a position; he is content to simply state, or better, copy what he considers to be the more probable opinion. There is not even any discussion of the difference between the souls of plants and animals on the one hand, and those of men, on the other, let alone any mention of the finer points on which Buridan, Oresme and the Anonymus Patar disagreed. The detailed discussions about the essence of the soul, its mode of presence in the body and its relation to its powers have come to an end here, at least temporarily. But not because the fourteenth-century Parisian commentators had moved from trying to determine the essential structure of the soul to a more empirical approach that focuses on the soul’s operations. On the contrary, the discussions have ended, at least temporarily, with d’Ailly, because the speculative approach had been taken to its limits. The detailed discussions on the continuity of the living body with the corpse, as well as the thought experiment that was supposed to show the precise relations between the essence and the powers of the soul, as well as their mode of inherence in the body, had taken the scientia de anima to its breaking point. It was no longer possible to return to the way in which Aquinas had approached the unity of the soul and its relation to the body as its substantial form, in which these problems could not even arise. Nor was

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209 Pierre d’Ailly, TdA, especially 39–41. The definition turns out to be a bad example, since the structure corresponds to that found in Jandun and not to that found in Buridan.

210 Pierre d’Ailly, TdA, 10: “Ideo propter ista principaliter quidam dixerunt quod non est in homine eadem anima sensitiva et intellectiva. Sed cum hoc sit problema neutrum, cuius utraque pars est probabilis, cui placet tenere oppositum, potest dicere quod anima sensitiva hominis est indivisibilis nec ipsa est eiusdem rationis in hominibus et brutis.”

211 See above 4.3.
it possible to solve all the technical problems that had arisen in the course of
the final two decades of the thirteenth and in the first half of the fourteenth
century. Why not then just ignore the technical difficulties, and simply write
a treatise on the soul's powers without entering into details about the onto-
logical structure of the soul? Maybe this is not a strategy that is convincing in
the long run — indeed, later commentators will return to these difficulties in
ever increasing detail, with the result that once again a philosopher, Descartes
this time, will try to put an end to the discussion by simply ignoring all the
detailed speculations —, but it is a strategy that is understandable.

5.6.1 Conclusions

Was there a shift from metaphysical speculation about the essential structure
of the soul — combined with an optimism about our ability to know the soul's
essence — in the thirteenth century to a more empirical approach — com-
bined with a pessimism about our ability to know the soul's essence — in
the fourteenth? Looking at the case studies I discussed, I would say no. The
thought experiment of the eye in the foot shows that the fourteenth century
was in this sense as metaphysical, if not more so, as the late thirteenth century.
This is consistent with the findings in the previous chapter, where it became
clear that the discussions on the relation between soul and body became in-
creasingly metaphysical and detailed in the fourteenth century, leading to var-
ious problems concerning the identity of the living body and the corpse. At
the same time, it cannot be denied that the later fourteenth-century commen-
taries have a very different feel from their earlier counterparts. Especially the
conclusions related to the intellective soul are much more tentative in these
later commentaries than before; they are often qualified by saying that they
are merely probable, but not demonstrable.

I propose the following alternative interpretation. The always fragile unity
of the scientia de anima has reached its breaking point in the commentaries by
Oresme, Buridan and the Anonymus Patar. On the one hand, the discussions
about the ontological structure of the vegetative and sensitive soul have be-
come increasingly detailed. Granted, semantical analysis had become a much
more important tool than in the thirteenth century, and the commentators
used this tool as much as possible when discussing questions such as the re-
lation between the soul and its powers. But once this tool had done its job,
for example, by distinguishing between proximate and remote potentialities,
or between the different senses of the term 'animal', there was still room for
controversy on the manner in which the soul is present in the body. So much
room even, that Buridan and Oresme (and Anonymus Patar also) reached op-
posite conclusions about the structure of the souls of perfect animals. Where
these are homogeneous according to Buridan, they are heterogeneous according to Oresme and Anonymus Patar. At the same time, however, almost none of the results of these detailed discussions were considered to be transferable to the intellective soul.

The fundamental division in the commentaries on the *De anima* from Brito onward is not that between the vegetative, sensitive and intellective soul. Instead it is the division between that souls of plants and annulose animals, the souls of perfect animals, and the intellective soul. As we have seen, all commentators agreed on the properties of the lowest level of souls. These are extended according to extension of matter, homogeneous and divisible. But they disagreed on how we can use these conclusions in our discussion of the souls of perfect animals and humans. Is the homogeneity a perfection (Buridan) or an imperfection (Oresme, Anonymus Patar)? Is the extension a result of the fact that the soul is educed from the potency of matter (Brito, Oresme, Anonymus Patar, Buridan) or of the fact that the bodily parts are (almost) similar to each other (Aquinas)? This disagreement on how to proceed from annulose to perfect animals is a disagreement on the principles that allow us to make inferences within the science of the soul. Although opinions differed on what principles we should use, there was a consensus that such inferences are possible. But when it comes to the human soul, something changes with Ockham. After Ockham, the commentators no longer considered it merely difficult to go from perfect animals to human beings in the *scientia de anima*, they considered it impossible! Not in the sense that they had nothing to say about the human soul, far from it, but in the sense that the structure of plant and animal souls and their modes of inherence in the body tells us little or nothing about that of the human soul. It is not just that the human soul has some unique properties that we have to account for, such as the power of understanding and its immortality, but the entire human soul should be analyzed in a completely different way from all the other souls. Also, as a consequence of this, none of the conclusions we reach about the human soul can be demonstrable within natural philosophy, even though they can still be probable.

This consensus that almost none of the results from the discussion of plant and animal souls are applicable to the human soul is, I would argue, by far the most important difference between the period up to Ockham and the later-fourteenth century. The human soul turned out to be completely different in almost all its properties from the souls of perfect animals, not just in the properties that it also has immaterial operations and is immortal. It matters little whether the intellect is said to inhere *supernaturaliter* in such a way that even the vegetative and sensitive operations are immaterial, and hence completely incomparable to those of plants and animals (Buridan), or that the
human soul is said to be an indivisible whole of which all powers are present in every place — if it turns out not to be distinct from the sensitive soul — in contrast to the souls of perfect animals that are completely heterogeneous and composed of various formae partiales (Oresme and Anonymus Patar). For in both cases, the scientia de anima, as a science that studies all souls, seems to be reduced to a mere nominal unity. What I have called the fragile unity of this science is now lost, even though this conclusion is not (yet) drawn by the commentators themselves. The project of giving a natural philosophical account of soul that is able to incorporate the intellect as well has failed. It is not that the whole scientia de anima has changed its method; it is not that it became more empirical; it is simply that the intellective soul no longer fits within the basic natural philosophical framework. In that respect the later fourteenth-century tradition is more radical than even someone like Jandun, who, at least, was still able to incorporate the study of the separate intellect within natural philosophy.

After the middle of the fourteenth century, it had become very difficult to maintain simultaneously that (1) the scientia de anima is a unity in which both the non-intellective and intellective souls are studied and (2) that it forms a part of natural philosophy. It becomes more and more appealing to assign this science to another domain. But it would take the next century before philosophers take this final step.212

212 Bakker, 'Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics, or Something in Between?', discusses the positions of three Renaissance authors: Agostino Nifo, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Marcantonio Genua. Of the three, only Pomponazzi considers the scientia de anima to be a part of natural philosophy.
Final conclusions

In the introduction, I claimed that it is better to say that *scientia de anima* transforms than to say that it changes. In this concluding chapter I want to bring together what I think are some of the most important transformations in the period c. 1260–c. 1360. In doing so, I will also take up the question of the relation between the methodological and the doctrinal parts of the commentaries.

Radulphus Brito and William Ockham

In the fourteenth century, two commentators in particular influenced the *De anima* tradition in ways that have not been noted before, namely Radulphus Brito and William Ockham. Brito made several important contributions. He was the first to discuss the topic of the numerical identity of accidents through generation and corruption in detail, in which he was followed by all later commentators. But he was also the first to structure the discussion about the manner in which the soul inheres in the body by first discussing the souls of annulose animals, then those of perfect animals, and finally those of human beings. This method of beginning with the annulose animals and then moving to more complex animals became the standard manner in which the later commentators discuss the structure of the soul and its relation to the body.

Unfortunately Brito was unclear about the criteria by means of which we can move from one level of complexity to the next. This became apparent in his discussion of the question whether the soul is extended throughout the body. Whereas Aquinas formulated one criterion that could be applied to all souls, namely that the soul is extended if and only if the living being can be divided in such a way that both parts continue to exercise all vital operations, Brito formulated two different criteria. The first is that souls that are not deduced from the potency of matter are not extended throughout the body. The second is that in those cases where both parts of a divided living being continue to exercise all vital operations, their soul is extended. This led to difficulties in describing how the souls of perfect animals inhere in the body.
The mid-fourteenth-century commentators who took over Brito’s approach to discussing the inherence of the soul disagreed about the criteria by which to move from the souls of the annulose animals to those of perfect animals. Because of their (implicit) disagreement about these criteria, they reached opposite conclusions about the innermost structure of the souls of perfect animals. Whereas these are heterogeneous according Oresme and Anonymus Patar, these are homogeneous according to Buridan and Marsilius.

William Ockham is the second philosopher who greatly influenced the De anima tradition, in spite of the fact that he has never written his own commentary on Aristotle’s treatise. All commentators from Aquinas to Jandun were practically unanimous in their description of the relation between the soul and its powers. The same applies to their description of the presence of the vegetative and sensitive souls in the body. All of them claimed, following Albert the Great, that the soul is really distinct from its powers, and that the relation between the powers and the soul should be described in terms of a flowing forth (fluxus). Ockham, by contrast, identifies the soul with its powers. In doing so, he introduces a distinction between two senses of the term ‘power’, one of which applies to the soul itself and the other to the dispositions of the body. The soul is identical with its powers in the first sense, whereas in the second sense the powers are distinct from the soul. The distinction enabled him to discuss the question whether the soul is present everywhere in the body according to all its powers by means of the thought experiment of the eye in the foot. In all of this, he is followed by Buridan, Oresme, Anonymus Patar, and Marsilius of Inghen. Even Pierre d’Ailly places himself in this tradition by including this new solution in his brief discussion of the soul’s structure. There remained, however, two topics on which these philosophers could not agree even with the new distinction between senses of ‘power’ and the thought experiment in hand. The first is the structure of the souls of perfect animals. The second is the question whether a human being has one soul or two. Even Pierre d’Ailly called this second topic an undecidable question (problema neutrum).

Methodology and doctrine

The disagreement between the later fourteenth-century commentators can be traced back to a disagreement about the methodological aspects of the science of the soul. But this latter disagreement is, contrary to what one might expect, not voiced in the methodological questions they take up in their commentaries on the first book of the De anima. The methodological questions from book I turn out to be almost completely isolated from the remainder
of the commentaries. Their impact on how a commentator proceeds in his
discussion of the controversial questions is negligible. Yet the methodological
questions do have a crucial function, namely that of maintaining the fragile
unity of the *scientia de anima*. All the methodological questions turn out to
be, first of all, and most importantly, ways of including the human intellective
soul within the same discipline that studies the other souls. It does not matter
whether a commentator is closer to Aquinas, or Ockham, or even Averroes;
they all agreed that the *scientia de anima* both belongs to natural philosophy
and includes the study of the human soul. This is why it hardly mattered
what stand a commentator took on the subject matter of the *De anima*. The
constraint that this science belongs to natural philosophy precluded any real
discussion of what is studied and how it is studied in terms of subject matter.
Whether we opt for the soul or for the ensouled body, *qua ensouled*, the end
result is the same.

There are important methodological discussions that have a large impact
on what views a commentators will defend. But these are not found in the
methodological questions from book I. They are, instead, found, often im-
plicitly, in the questions from books II and III. The questions that seem, on
the surface, to be methodological are not. But several questions that seem,
on the surface, to have nothing to do with methodology are. Some important
examples that I discussed in this book are, for instance:

- How can we decide whether or not two accidents are numerically identical?
  And what does this imply for the question whether a human being has but one
  substantial form or multiple?

- What allows us to decide whether a human being has but one soul or two?

- By means of what criteria can we transfer our conclusions from the souls of
  annulose animals to those of perfect animals, and, finally, to those of humans?

Sometimes the methodological aspect is discussed explicitly, as is the case
in the second example given above. But more often this aspect is not thema-
tized explicitly, even though it plays a decisive role in the various answers to
the question. The third example mentioned above shows this clearly. The rea-
son why it was so difficult to see to what extent Buridan, Oresme, and Anony-
mus Patar differ in their views of the manner in which souls inhere in bodies
is precisely because of the underlying disagreement about methodology.

Natural philosophy, metaphysics and theology

The examples of methodological disagreement given above go beyond the *De
anima* tradition strictly speaking. The discussion about the identity of ac-
cidents is closely related to the *De generatione* tradition, and the discussion about the number of souls in a human being is closely linked to that of the *Metaphysica*. Because the *De anima* tradition became a focal point for these important philosophical controversies, it was influenced by several other contexts. Perhaps the most important influence came from theology. The discussions about the unicity and plurality of substantial form are heavily impacted by the *Correctoria* debates and the related *Quodlibeta* literature. Interestingly we find no direct references to the discussions from these theological genres in the commentaries on the *De anima*. But in the background the influence is there. One of the most important transformations that took place under the influence of the *Correctoria* literature and the related genre of *Quodlibeta* was a shift in emphasis from explaining the soul–body relation in terms of final causality to explaining it in terms of efficient causality. It was this shift that occasioned some new debates. The best example is the discussion of whether or not the dispositions of a substance that is complex enough to become alive and those of the actually living substance — as well as the accidents of the living body and those of the corpse — are numerically identical. In order to answer this new question, commentators increasingly turned to Aristotle’s *De generatione et corruptione* in their discussions about the soul. The result is that discussions about generation and corruption in general and those about how the soul is related to the body become intertwined. In the case of Buridan, this even led to the inclusion of two questions on the soul in his commentary on *De generatione et corruptione*.

Here too there is an important difference between the period up until Jan-dun and the period from Ockham onward. At first, the theological concerns that drive the discussion in the *De anima* function almost exclusively in the background. But in the period from Ockham onward, their influence becomes much more explicit, especially in the context of the discussions about the human soul. To put this more precisely, the theological concerns become explicit at the same time that the fragile unity of the *De anima* can no longer be maintained. This unity is disrupted once we are no longer allowed to transfer our conclusions about the souls of perfect animals to those of human beings. Theology fills this now open space. For even if we can demonstrate virtually nothing about the inherence of the human soul, we can, at least, introduce arguments that produce great faith, as we have seen in Ockham, Buridan, and Marsilius.

It seemed, at first, that Oresme and Anonymus Patar were able to maintain the unity of the *scientia de anima*. In contrast to the commentators mentioned above, they do not resort to theological arguments in the context of their discussion of the human soul. Nor do they describe the inherence of the soul as supernatural. But, on closer inspection, Oresme and Anonymus Patar are
also the ones who are the least clear about how the human soul inheres in the body. In (almost) all places where they need to mention the human soul, they try to avoid taking a stand on the question whether human beings have but one soul, or two. From this perspective, that they did not resort to theological arguments, or to a description of the inherence of the human soul as supernatural, hardly counts as an accomplishment. A more plausible interpretation is that they were not yet fully aware of the extent of the difficulties connected to the human soul, or, more precisely, of the impact that the description of the inherence of the human soul necessarily has on other parts of the *De anima*.

**The disruption of the fragile unity of the scientia de anima**

The increasing emphasis on the difference between the human soul and all other souls has a counterpart in the increasing emphasis on the difficulty of the *scientia de anima*. By the middle of the fourteenth century the discussion about Aristotle's comments on the difficulty and the certainty (ακρίβεια) of the science that studies the soul had led to the following position: the difficulty lies completely on the side of the intellective soul, which is enormously difficult to study on account the fact that neither the intellect nor its operations can be perceived. The certainty, on the other hand, was placed completely on the side of the vegetative and sensitive soul. Once the inherence of the intellective soul is thought to be completely different from that of the sensitive soul, the already existing tendency to consider the intellective soul a very difficult subject to study is reinforced to the point that the intellective soul becomes so elusive that we could even begin to question whether it can be studied by a natural philosopher at all.

Even if we maintain that it should still be studied in natural philosophy, we now have to admit that there is very little that we can demonstrate about it, whereas we certainly can demonstrate how the vegetative and sensitive soul relate to the bodies of plants/annelose animals and perfect animals. This does not mean that the later fourteenth-century philosophers were skeptical about what we, *qua human beings*, can know about the human soul. The evidence given by faith is a perfectly acceptable, and reliable basis for drawing inferences about the manner in which our soul inheres in our body. But it does mean that we, *qua natural philosophers*, are unable to develop a *scientia de anima* in which the vegetative, sensitive and intellective souls are studied according to the same paradigm and according to the same principles. It is in this precise sense that the fourteenth century bears witness to the gradual disruption of the fragile unity of the *scientia de anima*.

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1See above, section 3.3.4.
The philosophers of the mid-fourteenth century are convinced that they are able to determine what the innermost structure of the souls of annulose and perfect animals is like. There is no hesitation in their answer to the thought experiment of the eye in the foot, even though they did disagree about what the right answer is. Their hesitation only starts at the level of the human soul. Once we take into account that the *scientia de anima* is meant to study all souls, we can see that there is no increasing empiricism in the fourteenth-century *De anima* tradition. The fact that these commentators were convinced that we cannot demonstratively proceed from the operations of the human soul to its essential structure must be explained differently. For the very same philosophers were also convinced that proceeding from the operations to the essential structure is not only perfectly possible in the case of all other souls, but even that it is the proper way of proceeding in the *De anima*. Their discussion of the essential structure of the soul, its mode of inherence in the body, and the implications of all of this for, for instance, the identity of accidents between the living body and the corpse, become more and more detailed. I would say that these discussion became so detailed that these were taken to their limits, to the point where Pierre d'Ailly did not even bother to mention the discussions any more. He simply gave Buridan's conclusions. At the same time, commentators increasingly doubted (under the influence of Ockham) the possibility of actually demonstrating anything about the human soul.

The result of these developments is a gap between our detailed demonstrative knowledge of the structure of the souls of perfect animals and our lack of such knowledge about the structure of the human soul. If we consider what the commentators claim about the human soul from the perspective of their whole project in the *scientia de anima*, giving an account of all souls, their discussions no longer appear to be more empirical than those from the thirteenth century. Instead, they begin to appear as a final attempt to continue to discuss the human soul within the natural philosophical framework of the *De anima*, even though the unity of the *scientia de anima* is now almost impossible to maintain. An attempt that was bound to fail.
A Radulphi Britonis Questiones super librum de anima

I have chosen to retain the orthography of the manuscripts, with some exceptions. I have introduced a c/t distinction and a u/v distinction that are not (consistently) found in the manuscripts. Paragraphing and punctuation are my own. Inversions and meaningless variants such as ille – iste and ergo – ideo – igitur have not been included in the critical apparatus.

The edition is not critical, nor is it meant to be. I have based the edition on ms F (Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conventi Soppressi, E. I. 252), following the editor of the third book of Brito's De anima commentary. But although F is a good manuscript in terms of legibility and relatively few homoioteleuta, it also has a tendency to omit small, often important qualifications. In those cases where relevant qualifications are omitted, as well as in those cases where a word makes no grammatical or philosophical sense, I have not hesitated to take the reading from the second ms V (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 1059). In all other cases, I have tried to follow the reading of F as much as possible, which means that I have often retained readings that are stylistically awkward, and only in rare cases have I attempted to correct the sloppy use of the indicative and conjunctive.

There are a few places where neither F nor V gives a reading that makes sense, usually because of a shared omission. In those rare cases, I have tried to remedy this by consulting a third manuscript, ms P (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, Lat. 14.705). This is the oldest known manuscript, which seems to contain a slightly different redaction.

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1For the stemma, see RADULPHUS BRITO, Quaestiones De anima, liber tertius, in: F. Fauser, Der Kommentar des Radulphus Brito zu Buch III De anima, kritische Edition und philosophisch-historische Einleitung, Munster: Aschendorff, 1974, 80.

2See RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, 64–66
Abbreviations:3

add. : addidit
coni. : conicio
corr. : correpit
del. : delevit
f. : folium
in marg. : in margine
inv. : invertit
lin. : linea
om. : omisit
scrips. : scripsit
sup. : supra
suppl. : supplavit
† : locus corruptus esse videtur
(?) : lectio incerta
(!) : sic
[...] : deleted by the editor
<...> : inserted by the editor

3I have followed the system of abbreviations suggested by the S.I.E.P.M. as described in A. Dondaine, 'Abréviations latines et signes recommandés pour l'apparat critique des éditions de textes médiévaux', Bulletin de la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 2 (1960), 142–149.
I.1 Utrum de anima possit esse scientia

Circa librum De anima primo in generali queratur utrum de anima possit esse scientia.

Arguitur quod non quia: omne illud de quo est scientia est intelligibile; sed anima non est intelligibilis; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; et ideo illud de quo est scientia est intelligibile. Minor probatur saltem de anima intellectiva et hoc dupliciter. Primo sic quia: nichil est intelligibile nisi prius fuerit sensibile, quia, sicut patet tertio De anima, intelligentem necesse est fantasmata speculari; modo anima intellectiva non cadit sub sensu, nec per se nec secundum aliquam sui operationem; ergo non est intelligibilis.

Secundo probatur hoc idem quia: si anima intellectiva esset intelligibilis, tunc esset idem in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem; hoc autem est inconvenientis; quare etc. Probatio maior<is> quia: intelligibile ut sic est in actu respectu intelligentis, ut patet tertio De anima, quia objectum est in actu respectu potentie; intellectus autem est in potentia respectu intelligibilis; ergo, si intellectus intelligeret seipsum, idem esset in actu et in potentia. Falsitas consequentis patet, quia actus et potentia sunt differentie maxime opposite, ut patet per Philosophum in prohemio huius.

Item ad principale: illud de quo est scientia oportet habere partes et passions; sed anima non potest habere partes et passions; ideo etc. Maior patet primo Posteriorum, quia scientia est unius generis subiecti partes et passions eius considerans. Minor patet per Philosophum in prohemio huius, qui dicit quod anime nulla est propria operatio, sed omnes sunt totius coniuncti. Etiam quod habet passions substant respectu earum; modo anima non potest substrare respectu passionis cum sit forma simplex, quia, ut patet nono Metas...
physice, forma non est, nec materia, sed totum compositum est; et ideo cum anima intellectiva sit quedam forma, non est id quod est, sed id quo alicquid habet esse.

Item Philosophus primo huius: dicere animam irasci simile est ac si dicitur texere vel edificare; set iste sunt false 'anima texit' et 'edificat'; ergo et illa 'anima irascitur vel intelligit', et sic de aliis. Sed non sunt alie passiones anime. Ideo etc.

Item quod habet passiones substat respectu earum; sed anima non substat, quia omne quod substat, substat ratione materie, que est primum substanis; sed anima non habet materiam; ideo etc.

Item anima non habet partes cum sit forma simplex.

In oppositum est Philosophus, qui dicit quod ystoriam de anima, id est scien-
tiam de anima, in primis ponemus. Ergo intentio sua est quod de anima est scientia. Hoc etiam apparret per omnes commentatores. Unde Themistius di-
cit quod si anima de seipsa decepta sit, quomodo de alis fida putabitur? — quasi diceret: nullo modo. Etiam Philosophus dicit quod illa scientia prodest ad omnem veritatem; ideo nulla potest haberi sine ista.

Ad illam questionem dico quod de anima potest esse scientia, quia de illo potest esse scientia quod est ens, intelligibile et habet partes et proprietates que de ipso possunt probari, Modo anima est huiusmodi.

Est enim ens, quia est actus corporis, ut dicit Philosophus secundo huius.

Est etiam intelligibilis quantum ad vegetativam et sensitivam, quia opera-
rationes anime vegetative et sensitive apparent ad sensum, ex quibus opera-
tionibus possunt intelligi. Etiam quantum ad animam intellectivam ipsa est intelligibilis sicut et alia, ut dicit Philosophus tertio huius. Et circa hoc est
difficultas de modo secundum quem anima intellectiva est intelligibilis. Et de hoc sunt due vie. Una est quod postquam intelligit alia, intelligit seipsam. Unde intellectus factus in actu per cognitionem rei intelligitur a se, sicut per cognitionem hominis vel lapidis intellectus est factus in actu et tunc, cum ipse sit factus in actu, intelligitur a se sicut et alia. Sed se intelligit ut est possibi-

25 nec materia | et materia non est V est | om. V 26 id | illud V id | illud V 28 huius |
APPENDIX A. Radulphi Britonis Questiones super librum de anima

55 lis. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus in tertio huius: 'Cum autem sic singula fiat', vult quod intelligit se sicut et alia. Sed hic est difficultas utrum simul et semel intelligat se et alia, vel successive, ita quod primo intelligat alia et po-stea seipsum. Oppinio communis est, quousque de hoc sit discussum, quod primo intelligit alia a se et postea seipsum intelligit inquantum est informatus cognitione aliorum. Alia opinio est quod simul intelligit se et alia, quia idem est actus quo intellectus intelligit alia et intelligit se, quia substantia in-tellec-tus possibilis non cognoscitur nisi per habitudinem | ad cognitionem aliorum. Que autem istarum oppinionum sit verior inferius apparebit.

Item habet partes subiectivas ut est in diversis speciebus et partes potesta-tivas prout est in uno, sicut in bove anima habet plures potentias, et similiter de aliis.

Item habet passiones, sic scilicet quod ratione sui subiecti passiones insunt toti coniuncto.

Item habet operationes, saltem ut est in corpore, que insunt toti coniuncto per naturam anime, sicut intelligere, vivere, sentire et augmentare et generare et moveri et sic de aliis. Et sic de anima est scientia illa prout est forma cor-poris. Etiam scientia illa est valde necessaria, quia secundum Philosophum in prohemio huius: ista scientia de anima proicit ad omnem veritatem, id est ad omnem scientiam, quia subiecti cognitio valet ad cognitionem accidentium; modo anima subiectum est omnium scientiarum; ideo etc.

Sed est hic notandum quod ista scientia de anima est ut est perfectio cor-poris. Modo aliquis dubitaret utrum de anima secundum se considerata pos-set esse scientia. Commentator diceret quod non, quia ipse ponit quod anima intellectiva non possit separari a corpore. Ymmo ipse vult quod semper sit coniuncta corpori quantum ad eius operationem. Et ideo secundum ipsum non possimus habere scientiam de ipsa anima in qua non determinetur de ipsa ut est coniuncta corpori. Tamen secundum veritatem et fide nostram et etiam secundum Philosophum intellectus est separabilis a corpore, quia, ut patet in secundo huius, separatur ab aliis potentiiis sicut perpetuum a corrup-

55 Aristoteles, De anima III.4, 429b5 73 Aristoteles, De anima I.1, 402a5–6; cf. AA 6:3 84 AA 6:52; Aristoteles, De anima II.2, 413b26–27
tibili. Et ideo bene potest esse scientia de anima ut separabilis est secundum se et absolute. Sed ista scientia erit divina. Unde est intelligendum quod dictum est quod intellectus intelligit se ut est informatus cognitione alcuuius rei.

Aliquis dubitaret quomodo intellectus habet cognitionem sui ipsius ut est possibilis. Unde ut habet cognitionem rei visum est quomodo est intelligibilis. Sed ut est possibilis antequam sit informatus cognitione rei dubium est quomodo intelligitur.

Et dico, sicut Philosophus dicit primo Physicorum, quod materia, cum sit ens in potentia, per analogiam ad formam habet intelligi. Et intellectus possibilis, cum sit in potentia ad intentiones universales, sicut materia ad formas sensibles, ut dicit Commentator tertio hiius, habet intelligi per analogiam ad cognitionem que est informativa sui, ita quod primo cognoscit se ut est informatus cognitione rei, et quia aliud est illud per quod est ens actu et alia est substantia ipsius intellectus possibilis que est in potentia ad illum actu, ideo per habitudinem ad talem cognitionem intellectus possibilis poterit cognosci.

Tunc ad rationes.

Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'illud de quo est scientia est intelligibile', concedatur. Et cum dicitur 'anima intellectiva non est intelligibilis', falsum est. Et cum probatur quia: 'omne illud quod est intelligibile oportet quod sit sensibile', dico quod aliquid potest esse intelligibile dupliciter: vel primo et principaliter, vel ex intelllectione alterius. Modo illud quod est intelligibile primo est sensibile vel secundum se vel secundum aliqua sui accidentia. Sed illud quod est intelligibile ex intelllectione alterius non oportet quod sit sensibile, sed sufficient quod illud sit sensibile ex cuius intelllectione intelligitur, sicut privationes intelliguntur per habitum. Et ideo non oportet quod privationes sint sensibles, sed earum cognition dependet ex cognitione alcuuius quod est sensibile. Sic est in proposito, quia intelllection ex hoc quod alia cognoscit vel intelligit est intelligibilis secundario. Ita cognition eius dependet ex cognitione aliarum rerum quas intelligit. Et cognition illiarum rerum dependet ex sensu. Sed de operatione animae vegetativa et sensitive non est ita, quia operationes iste dependent ex sensu et ex hoc intelligimus animam vegetativam et sensitivam.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'si intellectus esset intelligibilis, idem esset in actu et in potentia', dico quod idem esse in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem  

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92 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica I.7, 191a8–11; AA 1:29 95 Locus non inventus

86 est | om. V quod | quia V 87 informatus | informatum F 92 Et | om. V sit | dicit V 96 que est informativa | sine est informata F 97 ala | aliiud V est | om. V 98 que | qui V 105 ex | om. V 111 vel intelligit | et sic V 112 aliarum | aliorum F 114 et | vel V 114–115 dependent ex sensu | apparent ad sensum V 115 intelligimus | intelligitur V animam vegetativam et sensitivam | anima vegetativa et sensitiva V

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et eodem modo est inconveniens, sed alio et alio modo non est inconveniens. Et cum dicitur ‘anima ut intelligens esset in potentia, secundum quod intellecta esset in actu’, dico quod intellectus ut est possibilis sic est intelligens, sed ut est informatus per cognitionem rei, ut sic est intelligibilis, sicut et alia intelligibilia. Et sic est intelligibilis et intelligens diversimode et in actu et in potentia.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘de quo est scientia habet passiones’, concedatur vel saltem alterum per ipsum. Et cum dicitur ‘anima non habet passiones’, falsum est. Licet enim anima separata non habeat passiones, ut consideratur hic totum compositum ex anima et corpore habet passiones, per animam tamen.


Ad aliud dicendum quod non omne substantia respectu accidentium habet materiam. Et quando dicitur ‘materia est primum substantia’, verum est respectu formarum substantialium, non respectu accidentium, quia subjectum accidentium est ens actu. Sed contra: dicitur quod quaedam accidentia consequuntur subjectum ratione materie, ut quantitas, et quaedam ratione forme, ut propria accidentia. Dicendum quod omnia sunt ratione forme ut est in materia. Sed quia forma perfectior habet formas imperfectiones in virtute, et aliqua accidentia consequuntur ad eam habet illas formas in virtute, sic anima rationalis habet in virtute sensitivum et vegetativum et eodem modo forma mixti et forma que dat esse corporeum ut corpus est de genere substantiae. Et aliqua insunt in homine ratione eius ut est rationalis, et aliqua ut habet vim sensitivam et vegetativam, et sic de aliis. Ideo accidentia que insunt composito ratione qua hec forma habet in virtute formas imperfectiones, que sunt magis immerse materie, dicuntur esse ex parte materie.

Ad aliud patet.

I.2 Utrum de anima possit esse scientia naturalis


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Conseuenter queritur utrum de anima possit esse naturalis.

Arguitur quod non quia: illa que sunt moventia non mota non sunt physice considerationis, ut dicitur secundo Physicorum; sed anima est movens non mota; ergo etc. Maior patet. Minor patet, quia anima est principium motus et non mota, quia omne quod movetur est ens actu; sed anima non est ens actu sed actus, quia quod est ens actu est aggregatum ex materia et forma; modo anima non est aggregatum ex materia et forma, immo actus simplex; ergo anima non movetur; quare etc.

Item forma que non est perfectio materie non est de consideratione naturalis; sed anima, saltem intellectiva, non est perfectio materie; ideo etc. Maior patet. Minor patet per Philosophum tertio huius: anima nullius corporis est actus.

In oppositum est Philosophus, qui ponit scientiam de anima inter scientias naturales. Et Avicenna ponit librum suum esse sextum de naturalibus.

Dicendum quod scientia de anima est naturalis, quia illa scientia est naturalis que considerat formam perficientem materiam; sed ista scientia est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet secundo Physicorum. Minor <patet> per Philosophum secundo huius, qui difficinit sic animam, dicens quod sit actus corporis etc. Et postea dicit quod illa diffinitio est communis. Ergo omnis anima est actus corporis sive materie.

Item illud quo vivimus, sentimus et intelligimus principaliter non subjective est forma perficiens materiam; modo anima est illud quo principaliter vivimus, sentimus et intelligimus per Philosophum secundo huius; ideo etc. Maior patet per Philosophum ibidem, quia illud quo aliiquid operatur est duplex: vel ‘quo’ sicut materiale, vel ‘quo’ sicut forma quod est illud quo ali­quid operatur principaliter. Minor patet per Philosophum ut dictum est, quia anima vegetativa est illud quo vivimus principaliter, sensitiva quo sentimus, intellectiva quo intelligimus.


Tunc ad rationes.

Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'illa que sunt moventia non mota' etc., verum est vel non habentia attributionem ad motum. Et cum dicitur 'anima est mo-vens non mota', dupliciter potest dici: primo quod anima est mota saltem per accidens, quia moto corpore moventur omnia que sunt in corpore, vel quod habet attributionem ad motum, quia est principium motus. Et cum dicitur quod anima non movetur, verum est per se. Tamen per accidens bene movetur et habet attributionem ad motum.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'anima intellectiva non est perfectio materie', falsum est secundum fidem et veritatem. Et cum dicitur quod Philosophus dicit quod anima intellectiva nullius corporis est actus, dicendum quod Philosophus sic intelligit quod nullius corporis sit actus, quia non est perficiens organum, quia non exercet suam operationem mediante organo corporali sicut anima sensitiva, ut visus et auditus perficiunt organum corporale. Et propter hoc dicit quod anima | intellectiva nullius partis corporis est actus. Vel autem sicut communiter dicitur quod ipse intelligit quod nullius partis corporis est actus, quia non est actus deductus de potentia materie ab ipso generante. Sed Commentator aliter responderet. Diceret enim quod illud quod non est perfectio materie nec habens habitudinem ad materiam, tale non pertinet ad scientiam naturalem. Modo anima intellectiva, licet non sit perfectio corporis, dependet tamen ex ipso corpore in sua operatione.

I.3 Utrum subiectum in illo libro sit corpus animatum vel anima

Consequenter queritur utrum subiectum in illo libro sit corpus animatum vel anima.

Arguitur primo quod anima sit hic subiectum per Philosophum, qui dicit quod propter utraque hic istoriam de anima in primis ponemus. Vult ergo quod anima sit hic subiectum.

Item in principio libri De sensu et sensato continuans istum librum cum illo dicit sic 'quoniam determinatum est de anima' etc. Et ita vult quod anima sit hic subiectum.

3 Aristoteles, De anima I.1, 402a4–5 6 Aristoteles, De sensu et sensato I.1, 436a1–2

APPENDIX A. RADULPHI BRITONIS *Questiones super librum de anima*

Item <illud est ibi subiectum a quo intitulatur liber; sed> ille liber intitulatur ab anima. Maior patet, quia intitulatio libri debet fieri a digniori in scientia. Illud autem est subiectum. Minor patet, quia ille liber dicitur *De anima*.

Item illud est subiectum cuius passiones sunt inquisite; sed anime passiones sunt inquisite, sicut sentire, intelligere etc.

Item illud est subiectum sub cuius ratione omnia considerantur hic; sed anima est huiusmodi; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia hoc est de ratione subjecti. Minor patet, quia de corpore non determinatur nisi ut est subiectum anime; ideo etc.

Oppositum arguitur quia: sicut se habet scientia ad scientiam, sic se habet subiectum ad subiectum; modo ista scientia est pars subjectiva subjecti scientiae naturalis; ergo subiectum istius libri est pars subjectiva subjecti scientiae naturalis. Modo subiectum scientiae naturalis est corpus mobile. Et anima non est pars subjectiva corporis mobilis, ymmo magis corpus animatum; igitur anima non est hic subiectum ymmo magis corpus animatum.

Item illud est subiectum in hac scientia cuius operationes et passiones sunt inquisite in hac scientia; modo operationes et passiones inquisite in hac scientia sunt totius coniuncti et non ipsius anime; ergo totum coniunctum sive corpus animatum est hic subiectum. Maior istius rationis satis patet ex hoc quod subiectum est illud cuius passiones inquiruntur in scientia. Minor patet, quia iste operationes que sunt gaudere et tristari etc. non sunt operationes anime, ymmo totius coniuncti, ut dicit Philosophus primo huius in capitolo de erroribus. Etiam dicit quod similis est dicere animam gaudere vel tristare et dicere eam texere vel edificare. Modo dicere eam texere est inconveniens. Ergo et intelligere est inconveniens.

Ad illam questionem ego dico quod subiectum in hac scientia est corpus animatum sub ratione anime, vel sub ratione qua animatum. Et ratio huius potest esse duplex. Prima est illa quia: illud est hic subiectum cuius sunt


operationes et passiones hic inquisite; sed passiones hic inquisite sunt totius coniuncti; unde intelligere est totius coniuncti. Et anima est illud quo principaliter ille operationes insunt toti coniuncto. Et ideo totum ratione anime est subiectum. Item Philosophus dicit secundo Physicorum quod quicumque habet considerare formam habet considerare materiam usque ad quid ut est subiectum forme, sicut qui considerat sanitatem considerat nervum ut subiectum est sanitatis; modo anima est forma perficiens corpus; ergo considerantem de anima oportet considerare de corpore ut est subjectum anime; ideo aggregatum ex corpore et anima est hic subjectum ratione anime.

Et confirmatur ex alio quia: quod est principium essendi alicuius est principium intelligendi eius; modo anima est principium essendi totius coniuncti; ergo est principium intelligenti. Et ideo totum est hic subjectum ratione anime. Et propter hoc Philosophus in secundo huius diffiniens animam diffinit eam per corpus dicendo quod anima est actus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis.

Tunc ad rationes.

Ad primam. Cum dicitur quod Philosophus dicit ystoriam de anima etc., verum est. Pro tanto dicit hoc, quia principale sub cuius ratione consideratur totum coniunctum est anima. Per idem potest solvi dictum Philosophi in principio libri De sensu.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'illud est hic subjectum a quo iste liber intitulatur', dico quod non oportet, quia aliquando liber intitulatur ab efficiente, aliquando a subiecto, et aliquando ab eo quod est formale in subiecto, sicut est in proposito. Iste liber intitulatur ab anima, quia anima est formale ratione cuius corpus animatum est hic subjectum.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'illud est hic subjectum cuius sunt passiones hic inquisite', concedo. Et cum dicitur quod iste sunt ipsius anime solum, falsum est. Imo sunt totius coniuncti sicut subjecti, et hoc per animam, ita quod anima non intelligit vel sentit, sed totum compositum per animam.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘illud sub cuius ratione omnia determinata hic considerantur est hic subjectum’, dico quod li ‘sub cuius ratione’ potest dupli-
citer intelligi. Vel 'sub cuius ratione' sicut sub ratione subiecti quod consideratur in scientia, vel sub ratione eius quod est formale in subiecto. Maior vera est in primo sensu et non in secundo. Et ad minorem dicendum quod anima est illud sub cuius ratione consideratur omnia hic, sicut sub ratione eius quod formale est in subiecto, <quia anima est illud> quo corpus animatum hic consideratur. Et non est illud quod consideratur sicut subiectum.

I.4 Utrum omnis scientia speculativa sit de numero bonorum honorabilium

Consequenter queritur utrum omnis scientia speculativa sit de numero bonorum honorabilium.

Arguitur quod non quia: sicut dicit Philosophus sexto Metaphysice versus finem 'bonum et malum sunt in rebus, verum et falsum sunt in anima'; modo scientia est in anima; ergo non debet dici de numero bonorum, immo de numero verorum.

Item quod ordinatur ad malum non est de numero bonorum honorabilium; modo aliqua scientia speculativa ordinatur ad malum, ut scientia sophistica ordinatur ad deceptionem; ergo etc.

Item quedam sunt scientie prohibite sicut nigromantia; ergo non omnis scientia speculativa est de numero bonorum honorabilium.

Item quod ordinat hominem ad malum non est est bonum; modo scientia est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Minor patet, quia sicut dicit Philosophus primo Politice 'sevissima est iniustitia habens arma', id est habens scientiam vel sapientiam deducendo malitiam suam. Vult ergo quod scientia potest ordinari ad malum. Etiam videmus quod isti qui habent scientiam lucrativam, sicut qui sciant leges, plura et maiora mala faciunt per scientiam suam quam illi qui sunt ignari et ignorantes; quare etc.

Item probatio quod non omnis scientia sit de numero bonorum honorabilium quia: bonum utile non est bonum honorabile, quia illa ex opposito distinguuntur, ut patet primo Ethicorum; modo scientia est bonum utile, et


69 intelligi accepit V 70 vel sub cuius ratione sicut add V subiecto modo add V vera | om V 71 est in | sub F dicendum dico V 72 consideratur | om F omnia alia F eius | om V 73 quia anima est illud | suppl P 74 illud om F quod consideratur sicut subiectum | om V 8 ut sicut V scientia scientia om V 9 deceptionem decipiendum V 10 omnis est F 11 scientia om V 12 modo om. V 14 iniustitia iustitia V 17 leges loges(?) F 18 et sive V
maxime ista scientia, ut dicit Philosophus in littera, est bonum utile — dicit enim quod scientia de anima utilis est ad omnem veritatem et maxime ad naturam; ergo scientia speculativa non est bonum honorabile.

Item illud bonum quod est ordinatum ad aliud non est bonum honorabile; modo omnes scientie speculative alie a mathematica ordinantur ad metaphysicam; ergo nulla scientia speculative alia a metaphysica est honorabilis, sed magis laudabilis.

In oppositum est Philosophus, qui dicit 'bonorum honorabilium notitiam oppinantes' etc.

Ad istam questionem ego dico duo. Primo quod omnis scientia est de numero bonorum. Secundo dico quod omnes scientie speculative sunt de numero bonorum honorabilium.

Primum declaratur sic quia: illud quod omnes homines naturaliter appetunt est bonum; modo omnes homines naturaliter appetunt scire; ergo omnis scientia est bona. Maior patet primo Ethicorum et terto Topicorum. Minor patet primo Metaphysice, ubi dicitur quod omnes homines natura scire desiderant. Item hoc probatur specialiter de scientiis speculativis quia: perfectio uniuscuiusque est summum bonum; modo scientie speculative sunt perfectio intellectus; ergo sunt eius bonum.

Secundum declaratur, scilicet quod scientie speculative sint bonum honorabile, quia: quod queritur propter se et non propter alius est bonum honorabile; modo scientie speculative queruntur propter se, non propter alium; quare etc. Maior patet per diffinitionem boni honorabilis et boni laudabilis. Unde bonum laudabile est quod queritur propter alius, sicut scientie lucrativa ut scientia medicinalis et consimiles, bonum autem honorabile est quod queritur propter se, sicut satis potest haberi ex primo Ethicorum; modo scientie speculative queruntur propter se, quia queruntur propter fugam ignorantiae; ergo sunt de numero bonorum honorabilium.

| Et tu dices: quare tunc philosophi non honorantur? Dico quod secundum rei veritatem ipsi debent honorari. Unde Tullius dicit libello De senectute |

22 Aristoteles, De anima I.1, 402a5–7; cf. AA 6:3 29 Aristoteles, De anima I.1, 402a1–2 36 AA 12:1; Aristoteles, Ethica, I.1, 1094a1–3 AA 36:38; Aristoteles, Topica III.1, 116a19–20 37 AA 1:1, Aristoteles, Metaphysica I.1, 980a21 47 Aristoteles, Ethica I.6, 1096b13–16 51 Cf. Cicero, De senectute, I.2

philosophie [non] est honor condignus: 'numquam satis laudari poterit no-
men philosophye'. Et Seneca dicit 'philosophus apud pessimos est honoran-
dus'. Sed forte causa est quare non honorantur, quia homines non addiscunt
 nisi ad divitias et bona extrinseca, non tamen addiscunt ad bona anime.

Tunc ad rationes.

Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'bonum et malum sunt in rebus', causa istius
propositionis est quia bonum et malum dicuntur ut terminant appetitum;
modo appetitus non movetur ad illud quod habet in se, sed ad illud quod est
extra se, sicut ad emptionem rei extra; et ideo dicitur quod bonum et malum,
que sunt termini appetitus, sunt in re. Sed verum et falsum sunt | in anima,
quia sunt in conformitate intellectus ad rem vel disconformitate. Et quia illa
conformitas vel disconformitas est in intellectu, ideo dicitur quod verum et
falsum sunt in intellectu. Quando ergo dicitur quod bonum et malum sunt
in rebus, concedatur. Et cum dicitur 'scientia est in anima', dico quod anima
potest considerari dupliciter, vel ut est cognoscens et conformis rei, vel ut est
quedam forma naturalis nata perfici scientiis. Modo verum et falsum sunt in
anima ut est potentia cogitativa. Sed ut est quedam res et quedam forma natu-
ralis, scientia est bonum anime ut est perfectio eius. Et ignorantia est malum
similiter eius.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod ordinatur ad malum' etc., verum est si per se
ordinetur ad malum. Et cum dicitur 'quedam scientie sunt huiusmodi, sicut
sophistica ad decipiendum', dico quod non ordinatur per se ad decipiendum,
ymmo ad hoc ordinatur ut aliquid si in deceptione. Si autem aliquid
decipiat alterum per sophistacm, hoc est per accidens. Et cum dicitur 'ni-
gromantie sunt prohibite', credo quod ille non sunt scientie, quia non habent
aliquem certum modum procedendi, ut apparent illis qui viderunt. Vel potest
dici sicut Albertus dicit in quodam tractatu quod, licet iste scientie possint or-
dinari ad malum, tamen cognitio ipsarum non est mala se qui non applicaret
ipsas ad malum opus.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod ordinat hominem ad malum' etc., verum
est si per se hoc faciat. Et cum dicitur 'scientia est huiusmodi', dico quod
non est verum per se. Sed si ita sit, hoc est per accidens. Et cum dicitur

53 Cf Seneca, Epistulae morales ad Lucilium, hb. II, ep. XIV 11 78 Locus non inventus
APPENDIX A. RADULPHI BRITONIS Questiones super librum de anima

'sevissima est iniustitia habens arma', dico quod hoc est per accidens, nam habens appetitum perversum regulat et ordinat scientiam suam ad malum. Scientia tamen per se ordinatur ad bonum.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'bonum utile non est honorabile', dico quod bonum utile potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quod est solum ad alterum ordinatum, ita quod numquam propter se queretur sicut dieta, vel sicut potio amara. Et tale bonum utile non est bonum honorabile, ymmo ex opposto distinguuntur. Aliud est bonum utile quod, cum hoc quod queritur propter aliud, queritur etiam propter se. Et tale bene potest esse honorabile. Modo scientia de anima est huiusmodi, quia cum hoc quod est utilis ad alias scientias, etiam propter se queritur.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'bonum quod est ordinatum ad aliud non est honorabile', verum est si sit ordinatum ad aliud tamquam propter operationem, ymmo illud est laudabile. Sed quod est ordinatum ad alterum tamquam ad scire et quod etiam propter se acquiritur, tale est bonum honorabile. Modo tales sunt scientiae speculative aliae a metaphysica.

I.5 Utrum scientia de anima sit de numero difficillimorum.

Consequentem est questio utrum scientia de anima sit de numero difficillimorum.

Arguitur quod non quia: illa scientia que certiori modo procedit non est de numero difficillimorum; modo scientia de anima certiori modo procedit aliis scientiis, ut dicit Philosophus in littera; quare etc.

Item: illa scientia est facillima, non difficillima, in qua cognoscibile est coniunctum cognoscenti; sed in illa scientia de anima cognoscibile est coniunctum cognoscenti; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia facile est cognoscere coniunctum quod est sibi propinquum vel coniunctum. Minor patet, quia cognoscens ibi est ipsa anima, etiam cognoscibile ibi est ipsa anima; modo idem est sibi ipsi maxime coniunctum; quare etc.

Item: illa scientia non est difficillima que procedit ex eis que experimur in nobis; sed scientia de anima ex talibus procedit; quare etc. Maior de se

5 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima 1.1, 402a1–5

patet. Minor etiam patet, quia in scientia de anima procedimus ex operationibus anime. Illas autem operationes anime quilibet experitur, sicut quod augmentatur, nutritur et sentit.

Item: metaphysica, saltem quantum ad duodecimum librum, est longe difficillior quam ista scientia de anima, quia considerat totaliter abstracta a materia, illa autem considerat coniuncta in esse cum sensibilibus; modo illa scientia que considerat omnino abstracta a sensibilibus est difficillior illa que considerat coniuncta cum sensibilibus; ergo illa scientia de anima non est difficillima.

In oppositum est Philosophus, qui dicit quod illa scientia est de numero difficillimorum.

Dicendum quod illa scientia de anima inter alias omnes scientias naturales est de numero difficillimorum, quia illa scientia est de numero difficillimorum que habet difficultatem magnum tam ex parte cognoscentis quam ex parte cognoscibilis; modo anima habet difficultatem tam ex parte cognoscentis quam ex parte cognoscibilis; ergo scientia de anima inter scientias naturales est de numero difficillimorum. Maior patet, quia omnis difficilatas scientie procedit ex parte intelligibilis vel ex parte intelligentis. Minor declaratur. Primo quod sit difficillima ex parte intelligibilis, saltem quantum ad animam intellectivam, quia: illa est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia et 'ante suum intelligere nichil est actu eorum que sunt, sed solum possibilibis est vocatus', ut dicitur tertio hius; modo omne quod intelligit, intelligit ut ens actu; cum ergo intellectus non sit ens actu, immo sola potentia, ergo ex parte intelligibilis, quod est ipse intellectus, est difficultas in illa scientia.

Et si dicas quod eque difficile est intelligere materiam primam, de qua determinatur in libro Physicorum, sicut intellectum possibilem, quia sicut intellectus potentialis(!) est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, ita etiam materia prima est in potentia ad omnes formas naturales, et sic saltem primus liber Physicorum, in quo determinatur de materia prima, sit eque difficilis sicut liber De anima, ideo ad istud dico quod non est verum, quia, licet materia prima sit

23 Aristoteles, De anima, I.1, 402a10–11 35 Aristoteles, De anima III.4, 429a21–24 39 Eg Aristoteles, Physica, I.9, 192a25–34
ens in potentia ad omnes formas naturales, potest cognoscì ex transmutatione
formarum naturalium circa ipsam materiam. Et quia, sicut dicit Commenta-
tor primo *Physicorum*, transmutatio apparat ad sensum immediate, ideo ex
ipsa transmutatione potest cognoscì materia prima. Sed operationes intellec-
tus possibilis et cognitiones que sunt circa ipsum non apparent ad sensum,
neque eius substantia. Et ideo difficilior est cognitio de intellectu possibili
quam de materia prima.

Etiam in illa scientia est difficultas ex parte cognoscentis, quia omne quod
cognoscimus, cognoscimus ex sensatis et imaginatis, sicut apparet ex secundo
*huìus* et tertio; modo anima intellectiva non cadit sub sensu vel imaginatione;
ergo anima ex parte cognoscentis est difficilis ad cognoscendum.

Et confirmatur et in idem redit quia: illud quod inter omnes res natura-
les remotius est a sensu, difficillimum est ad cognoscendum ex parte cognos-
centis; modo anima intellectiva inter formas naturales remotior est a sensu,
quia est quedam forma media inter substantias separatas et immateriales et
substantias sensibles et materiales — est enim ultima forma ad quam con-
sideratio naturalis se extendit; ergo anima intellectiva difficilis est ad cogno-
scedendum ex parte cognoscentis. Sed anima vegetativa et sensitiva non sunt ita
difficiles ad cognoscendum, quia unusquisque experitur se nutriri et augment-
tari et sentire. Item ad sensum apparent operationes earum, scilicet nutrire et
sentire.

Tunc ad rationes.

Cum dicitur ‘illa scientia que certiori modo procedit’ etc., potest nega-
ri, quia alia scientia potest esse | difficilis quantum ad eius acquisitionem et
tamen illa acquisita potest esse certus modus procedendi in ea. Vel potest
concedi: eo modo quo est certissima non est difficillima. Et cum dicitur ‘Phi-
losophus dicit quod ista scientia est certissima’, dico quod duplex est modus
procedendi | in illa scientia. Unus est modus procedendi qui est a priori pro-
cedendo a subiecto ad eius operationes. Et alia investigatio est a posteriori
ex operationibus investigando animam sive subiectum anime. Et quantum
ad istum modum intelligi quod certo modo procedit, et sic non est difficilli-

44 ex | parte temporis mutatìone ex *add* F 46 transmutatio | temporis mutatio *scrips* F
47 ipsa | *ista* V transmutatìone | temporis mutatione *scrips* F 48 ipsum | *ipsam(*)) F
50 quam | *quod* V 51 etiam | *et* V scientia | *om* V cognoscentis | quae omne quod
cognoscentis *add* F 53 et | *ex add* V 56 difficilìllum | *difficìlius* V 59–60 consideratio |
cosèr* *scrips* F 61 cognoscentis | *cognoscentis scrips* F | *ita* | *ista* V 63 et sentire | *om* F
64 sentire | etc. *add* V 66 cum dicitur | *om* F 66–67 negari | *ista* *add* V 67 quia |
alis quae *add* V scientia | *om* F 68 acquisita | acquisìtio V 70 est | *om* V 72 subiecto |
substantia anime V 73 subiectum | substantiam V 74 modum | processum V

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46 *Locus non inventus* 52–53 Aristoteles, *De anima* III.8, 432a8–9
ma. Sed quantum ad primum processum non est certa, et quantum ad illum est difficillima. Vel potest dici quod scientia de anima certiori modo procedit, quia ex eis que experimur in nobis procedit, et sic est facilis. Et quantum ad hoc quod inquirimus et investigamus modum secundum quem illa que experimur in nobis fiunt ab anima, scientia de anima est difficilis.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'illa scientia est facillima in qua cognoscibile est coniunctum cognoscente', dico quod cognoscibile esse coniunctum cognoscenti potest dupliciter intelligi: vel secundum proportionem que requiritur ad hoc quod aliquid cognoscatur, vel quia est coniunctum sibi secundum esse, non tamen secundum talem proportionem que requiritur ad hoc quod aliquid intelligatur. Modo si cognoscibile cognoscenti primo modo sit coniunctum, scilicet secundum proportionem requisitam ad hoc quod intelligatur, tunc verum est quod tale sit facillum ad cognoscendum. Tamen si sit coniunctum sibi secundum esse, et non secundum talem proportionem, non oportet. Et cum dicitur quod cognoscibile in illa scientia est coniunctum cognoscenti, verum est secundum esse. Tamen secundum proportionem que requiritur ad hoc quod cognoscatur non est sibi coniunctum, quia est in potentia quantum ad intellectum possibilem et omne quod intelligitur oportet esse in actu. Et ideo non est ibi proportio que requiritur ad intelligibile et intelligens, quia illa proportio debet esse talis quod intelligibile sit in actu tale quale intelligens est in potentia.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'illa scientia non est difficillima que procedit ex eis que experimur in nobis', verum est quantum ad istud. Et cum dicitur 'ista scientia est huiusmodi', verum est procedendo ex operationibus ad subjectum anime et etiam quantum ad operationes anime vegetative et sensitive. Operationes enim istarum experimur in nobis. Sed quantum ad operationes anime intellective non est verum. Et ideo quantum ad hoc est difficillima.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur quod scientia de duodecimo Metaphysice est difficilior, verum est. Neque Philosophus dicit quod illa scientia est difficillima, sed dicit quod est de numero difficiliorum. Etiam intelligit quod est de numero difficiliorum inter scientias naturales.

I.6 Utrum universale fiat ab intellectu vel sit preter operationem intellectus
Consequenter, quia Commentator dicit super illum par tem ‘universale aut nichil est aut posterius est’ quod intellectus est qui facit universalitatem in rebus, ideo queritur utrum universale fiat ab intellectu vel sit preter operationem intellectus.

Arguitur quod sit preter operationem intellectus quia: difficinibile est universale; sed aliquid est difficinibile preter operationem intellectus; ergo etc. Major patet, quia singularium non est difficultio, ut dicitur septimo Metaphysice. Minor declaratur quia: aliquid est difficinibile per ea que insunt sibi essentialiter et non secundum accidentia; sed esse intellectum est esse accidentalre et esse verum extra animam est essentiale; ergo preter esse intellectum est res difficibilis.

Item objectum cuiuslibet potentie precedit potentiam cuius est objectum; sed universale est objectum intellectus; ergo precedit intellectum et eius operationem. Major patet, quia objecta prima sunt potentiis, ut patet secundo De anima. Minor patet, quia quod quid est <est> objectum intellectus; sed quod quid est universale; ergo etc.

Item si universale esset per operationem intellectus, hoc esset per operationem intellectus agentis vel possibilis. Non per operationem possibilis, quia intellectus possibilis secundum quod huiusmodi est in potentia passiva ad omnia intelligibili; sed tale non est actu, quia omne agens agit secundum quod ens actu; ergo etc. Item non habet esse per operationem agentis, quia universale | est secunda intentionem, que presupponit primam intellectionem sive intentionem; sed intellectus agens non agit nisi quantum ad primam intellectionem abstrahendo a fantasmatibus. Et postquam intellectio prima est in intellectu, super illum non se extendit ultra operatio intellectus agentis ad hoc quod fiat secunda intellectio sive secunda intentionem; ergo per operationem intellectus agentis non habet esse universale.

Item universale est quod natum est esse in pluribus; sed res reperibilis est in pluribus sine intellectu, sicut asinus vel equus; ideo etc.

\[7\] AA 1:182; Aristoteles, Metaphysica VII.15, 1039b27–1040a5  14–15 Forsan Aristoteles, De anima II.4, 415a18–22
In oppositum est Commentator, qui dicit quod intellectus facit universalitatem in rebus.

Ad solutionem istius questionis primo videndum est quid significetur nomine prime intentionis et secunde, quia universale potest accipi et pro prima intentione et pro secunda. Et primo ad hoc videndum est quid significetur nomine intentionis in communi.

Unde notandum est quod intentio est illud quo intellectus tendit ad aliud, et hoc est cognition in ipso intellectu existens. Et hoc est manifestum secundum interpretationem, quia intention est in aliud tentio. Sed prima intellectio rei qua intelligitur primo ex proprio suo fantasmate est prima intentio in abstracto, et res sic intellecta dicitur prima intentio in concreto, sicut cognitio hominis vel asini que sumitur ex proprio suo fantasmate dicitur prima intentio in abstracto, et res iste sic intellecte dicuntur intentio prima in concreto.

Secunda intentio est secunda rei cognitione quae non sumitur a modo essendi proprio vel fantasmate proprio rei, sed est quedam secunda cognitione rei respectu alterius et sumitur ex aliquo modo essendi communi corespectivo, sicut esse universale vel universalitas. Unde universalitas est cognitione vel ratio cognoscenti rem ut nata est esse in pluribus, et universale in concreto est esse cognitione rei ut est in pluribus.

Et similiter in complexis, sicut 'homo currit' est quoddam complexum secundum intellectum. Hoc autem complexum potest intelligi vel ratione unionis subjecti et predicati secundum esse intellectum primum quod fit. Et hoc cognition est ut prima intentio in abstracto, et hoc sic cognitum est prima intentio in concreto. Sed hoc idem cognitum, vel ut dubitatur de inherentia predicati cum subjecto, vel ut ponitur pro alio et sic de alii, dicitur 'questio' vel 'propositio', que sunt nomina secundarum intentionum concretarum. Set ille cognitiones quibus cognoscitur tale complexum ut pro alio positum dicitur secundae intentiones in abstractum in talibus. Et simili modo est in consimilibus. Sed de hoc alibi super logicam plenius est discursum.

Tunc ad questionem est dicendum quod quia universale est nomen intentionis concrete, ideo potest accipi vel pro prima intentione concreta vel

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30 Averroes, Commentarum Magnum in Anstotels De Anima Libros, 1225-6
secunda. Si sumatur primo modo, tunc dicendum quod quantum ad illud quod materiale est in significato suo non est ab intellectu, quia res sive quod quid est rei que intelligitur non est ab intellectu; sed illud quod est materiale in significato concreti universalis primo modo sumpti est quod quid est rei sive natura, quia intellectio quecumque denominative predicatur de objecto suo et ipsum concernit in concreto, sicut album concernit suum subjectum et ipsum denominat; ergo quod materiale est in significato universalis primo modo dicti non est ab intellectu aliquo. Si autem sumatur quantum ad illud quod est formale ibi, quod est ipsa prima intellectio rei qua res dicitur intellectu et intellectus intelligens, tunc dicendum quod non fit effective ab intellectu possibili sed agente. Quod non a possibili probatur quia: intellectus possibilis est in pura potentia respectu intellectiois saltem quantum ad intellectionem primam; sed quod est in pura potentia respectu alterius non est causa effectiva eius, sed solum potest esse causa susceptiva; ideo etc. Sed tamen effective est ab intellectu agente vel ab anima mediante intellectu agente, quia Philosophus dicit quod sicut intellectus possibilis est in potentia fieri omnia intelligibilia, scilicet quantum ad cognitionem rerum intelligibilium, sic intellectus agens est potens omnia intelligibilia potentia intellecta facere actu intellecta. Et sic omnis prima intellectio que recipitur in intellectu possibilis effective fit ab intellectu agente una cum fantasmatisibus. Sed per quem modum hoc fit inferius patebit.

Si autem sumatur ‘universale’ pro secunda intentione in concreto, eodem modo dicendum quod quantum ad illud quod est ibi materiale non est ab intellectu, quia sicut prima intellectio denominat rem que intelligitur primo intellectu, sic secunda intellectio sive secunda intentione denominat rem ipsam secundum quod secundario intelligitur. Sicut enim hec est vera ‘homo absolute intelligitur’, sic hec est vera: ‘homo est aliquid intellectum in pluribus’. Sed tale esse intellectum ut in pluribus est quod significatur nomine universalis; sed res illa que est sic intellecta potest esse sine operatione intellectus; ergo universale <sumptum> pro re que significatur materialiter nomine universalis potest esse sine operatione intellectus.

Tamen notandum est quod intentio universalis potest attribui rei que habet esse solum in intellectu et potest illam rem concernere et de illa concretive predicari. Et tunc objectum suum, quod materialiter importatur nomine un-
versalis, vel posset importari, non esset sine operatione intellectus. Sed tale obiectum non est quod primo concernit intentio universalis, quia esse in pluribus, quod est modus essendi ex quo sumitur universale, non est reperibile primo in eis que sunt in intellectu, sed in eis que sunt extra animam, licet unitas rei in pluribus sit secundum intellectum.

Sed diceret aliquis quod obiectum quod concernit intentio secunda universalis est res primo intellecta et non res secundum se; sed res primo intellecta non est sine operatione intellectus; ergo quod materiale est in significato universalis ut est secunda intentio non est sine intellectu.

Ad hoc dicendum quod rem primo intellectam esse obiectum secunde intentionis potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quod aggregatum ex re et prima intellectione rei sit obiectum eius. Et hoc non est verum, quia tunc ista non esset vera 'homo est species' vel 'animal est genus', quia homo ut significatur et animal non significant hominem intellectum et animal intellectum, sed significant veram naturam hominis et animalis. Sed species et genus si respicerent aggregatum ex re et intentione prima pro objecto, de tali aggregato denotive predicarentur <et> verificarentur. Ergo tunc de homine et animali et sic de consimilibus, que talia congregata non significant, sed naturam rei secundum se non possent intentiones iste concrete predicari. Item tunc essent eiusdem rei due intellectiones simul in intellectu, quia res primo intellecta intelligeretur secunda intellectione et sic simul esset intellectio prima rei in actu in intellectu et secunda intellectio eiusdem rei.

Alio modo potest intelligi rem primo intellectam esse obiectum secunde intentionis, quia res que primo secundum se intelligitur et absolute postea intelligitur intellectu respectivo, sicut primo intelligitur homo vel animal secundum se et postea intelligitur sive intelligibilis est ut est in pluribus; modo intellectus rei secundum se est prior quam intellectus eius ut est in pluribus, qui est respectivus intellectus. Et sic concedo quod obiectum secunde intentionis est res intellecta primo intellectu, id est res que prius secundum se intelligitur et postea intelligitur secunda intellectione respectiva. Et sic prima intentio non est obiectum neque pars objecti respectu intentionis secunde, licet presupponat rem esse prius intellectam secundum se, sicut respectivum presupponit absolutum. Sed res ratione alicuius modi essendi communis et respectivi existentis in ea est obiectum eius.
Si autem sumatur intentio universalis concreta ratione formalis quod est in significato suo, tunc adhuc dico quod non fit ab intellectu possibili, sed ab agente et obiecto ratione modi essendi ex quo sumitur talis intentio. Cuius ratio est quia: intellectus possibilis est in potentia passiva respectu intellectionis secunde sicut respectu prime; sed quod est in potentia passiva respectu alicuius non est effectivum eius, ut prius declaratum est; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia omne intelligere est pati ab intelligibili quod est obiectum illius intellectionis, ut patet in tertio De anima. Minor patet de se. Sequitur ergo quod intellectus possibilis non est effectivus secunde intellectionis rei. Sed talis intellectio est secunda intentio, ut prius visum est. Ideo etc. Sed quod intentio universalis in abstracto vel ratione eius quod formale est in significato intentionis universalis in concreto causaretur ab intellectu agente et obiecto ratione modi essendi correspondentis illi intentioni in re sive in obiecto probatur quia: universale quantum ad rationem formalem suam est intellectio rei ut est in pluribus; sed omnis intellectio que est in intellectu possibili sive in anima mediante possibili effective est ab obiecto et intellectu agente; ergo etc. Maior patet ex dictis, quia universale significat aliquid intellectum ut in pluribus. Minor similiter patet, quia omnis intellectio est ab obiecto effective, quia ab obiecto sumit determinatam speciem. Item effective est ab intellectu agente saltem respectu eorum que primo intelliguntur, quia ab eo habet esse abstractum; sed intellectio eorum que secundario intelliguntur ex intellectione aliorum habet esse ab intellectu agente mediate, scilicet mediante intellectione illorum ex quorum intellectione intelliguntur.

Item si ponatur quod intentio universalis sit quantum ad suum formale intellectio rei cum respectu ad plura superaddito, ita quod intentio prima et secunda non sunt due intellectiones sed una intellectio sumpta secundum se et in respectu ad plura, sicut aliqui dicunt, adhuc magis patet quod fit ab intellectu agente et obiecto, quia non est dubium quin prima intentio rei fit ab intellectu agente et obiecto; ergo cum secunda intentio non differat a prima nisi per respectum superadditum, erit similiter ab intellectu agente.

Item si ponatur quod intentio universalis sit prima intellectio secundum quod ad rem primo intellectam sequitur aptitudo essendi in pluribus, adhuc patet quod est ab intellectu agente et obiecto, quia, ut dictum est, prima intellectio est effective ab obiecto et intellectu agente.
Si autem sumatur universale sicut solet aliquando accipi, vel pro quiditate et natura rei secundum se, quod est universale in potentia, vel pro quiditate ut sibi applicari sive attribui potest intentio universalis, sic non habet esse ab intellectu, quia intellectus non est causa rei existentis extra animam. Sed quiditas et natura rei cui attribuibilis est intentio universalis primo est res vera extra animam, quia, ut dictum est, non attribuitur rei ut intellecta est, sed rei existenti extra, quia res extra animam habet modum essendi sibi correspondentem, scilicet esse in pluribus suppositis. Dato enim quod intellectus non esset, asinus esset plurificatus per diversa supposita. Ergo si sumatur illo modo, universale non est ab intellectu.

Sed adhuc circa dicta notandum est quod intentiones, cum sint quedam intellectiones, vel quedam intellecta in concreto sumpta, predicantur de re obiecta denominative, non quia sint in obiectis sicut in subiecto, sicut dicitur homo albus ab albedine in ipso existente formaliter, sed quia sunt in eis sicut in obiecto et hoc est esse in aliquo movente vel efficiente respectu earum. Et ideo sicut dicitur ‘Sortes est percutiens’ percussione que est in passo, et similiter ‘color videtur’ visione que est in oculo (quia color efficit visionem in oculo), et similiter ‘scibile scitur’ scientia que est in anima, sic intentiones concrete que quantum ad suum esse formale quod est intellectio sunt in anima, denominative predicantur de obiectis earum, quamvis non sint in eis sicut in subiecto. Unde sicut ista est vera | ‘lapis intelligitur’ intellectione que est in anima, sic illa ‘homo est species’ et sic de aliis, quia esse genus et species et sic de aliis intentionibus secundis sunt quedam intellectiones, vel quedam esse intellecta. Et ideo predicantur denominative de obiectis suis.

Ad rationes.

Ad primam. Cum dicitur ‘diffinibile est universale’, verum est accipiendo ‘universale’ pro quiditate rei cui potest attribui ratio universalis. Sed accipiendo ‘universale’ pro intentione secunda non est verum quod omne diffinibile sit universale isto modo. Item licet diffinibile sit universale sumptum pro re primo intellecta, tamen diffinitio non debetur sibi neque datur ei pro illo esse intellecto, sed pro esse suo quiditativo et per sua principia essentialia, que sunt extra animam. Et quando dicitur in minori ‘aliquid est diffinibile prêter operationem intellectus’ etc., dicendum quod diffinitio non esset rei nisi esset intellectus diffiniens, neque res est diffinibilis nisi in habitudine ad intellectum

\[\begin{align*}
165 & \text{sive} \mid \text{om F} \hspace{1em} 167 & \text{intention} \mid \text{intellectus V universals} \mid \text{vel V est} \mid \text{cum F} \hspace{1em} 168 & \text{quia} \mid \\
170 & \text{om F} \hspace{1em} 174 & \text{sumpta} \mid \text{sumpte V} \hspace{1em} 175 & \text{objectis} \mid \text{objecto F} \hspace{1em} 176 & \text{homo} \mid \text{est add V} \hspace{1em} 177 & \text{efficiente} \mid \text{effective F} \hspace{1em} 179-180 & \text{quia color efficit visionem in oculo} \mid \text{om (hom) F} \hspace{1em} 180 & \text{sic} \mid \text{sicut V} \hspace{1em} 181 & \text{est} \mid \text{om V sunt} \mid \text{sive V} \hspace{1em} 183 & \text{intelligitur} \mid \text{intellectus F} \hspace{1em} 184 & \text{sic} \mid \text{sicut V genus et} \mid \text{om V species} \mid \text{esse add V} \hspace{1em} 188 & \text{cum} \mid \text{quando V} \hspace{1em} 189 & \text{potest} \mid \text{ponit F ratio} \mid \text{ideo V} \hspace{1em} 191 & \text{sit universale} \mid \text{sit universale add V} \hspace{1em} 195 & \text{intellectus} \mid \text{intelligendi V} \hspace{1em} 196 & \text{diffiniens} \mid \text{diffinitions V est} \mid \text{esset V}
\end{align*}\]
diffinientem. Sed tamen non propter hoc datur ab intellectu diffinitio rei pro esse intellecto, sed pro esse vero quod habet extra. Unde differt dicere rem diffiniri vel esse diffinibilem sub aliqua ratione intelligendi acceptam, vel sub aliquo esse intellecto, et rem diffiniri vel esse diffinibilem pro esse intellecto, quia primum dictum est verum, sed secundum falsum est. Et ideo diffinitio que datur de re accepta sub aliqua ratione intelligendi non est sine intellectu. Tamen non datur diffinitio ab intellectu rei pro illo esse intellecto, sed pro suo esse quiditativo et essentiali pro sua realia principia.

Ad aliam. Quando dicitur 'obiectum potentie precedit potentiam' etc., verum est secundum se et absolute acceptum. Sed obiectum ut actu obicitur sive ut actu immutat potentiam simul est cum potentia, quia agens in actu et passum simul sunt. Et quando dicitur in minori quod universale est obiectum intellectus, verum est accipiendo 'universale' pro quod quid est rei cui potest ratio universalis sive intentio attribui. Et istud precedit operationem intellectus, ut dictum est, et est sine operatione intellectus.

Ad aliam. Quando dicitur 'aut esset per operationem intellectus possibilis, aut agentis', dicendum est quod est per operationem agentis accipiendo 'universale' pro ipsa cognitione vel intentione in abstracto, vel pro eo quod est formale in significato universalis in concreto sumpti. Et quando dicitur quod intellectus agens non agit super illud quod est in intellectu, sed super fantasmatum, verum est primo et immediate. Sed per abstractionem quiditatis a fantasmatibus fit apta nata intelligi ut una in pluribus. Et per consequens fit apta nata quod sic ab intellectu possibilis intelligatur. Et sic mediate sive ex consequenti intellectus agens agit ad secundam intellecutionem sive intentionem secundum universalis. Vel potest dici quod intellectus agens immediate agit in intentionem secundam universalis, quia eo quod res est fantasiiate esse in pluribus per actionem intellectus agentis, potest intelligi ut in pluribus, et hoc sic intellectum est universale. Quod autem fantasya possit cognoscere rem ut in pluribus patet quia: numerus et pluralitas est quid sensibile, licet sit commune sensibile. Et ideo fantasy que percipit omnia sensibilia communia potest plurificationem suppositorum cognoscere, sicut cognoscit supposita alicuius nature secundum se. Sed bene verum est quod supposita ratione nature sive quiditatis non cognoscit, sed ratione accidentium sensibilium illorum suppositorum.
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘universale est quod est in pluribus’, dicendum quod hoc est universale in potentia, scilicet res cui intentio universalis potest attribui. Sed universale in actu est res intellecta ut una in pluribus. Et hoc non est sine operatione intellectus agentis.

I.7 Utrum natura specifica sit una.

Consequenter quia Themistius dicit ibi ‘animal autem universale’ etc. quod genus est conceptus sine ypostasi, ex thenei similitudine singularium collectus et subdit ‘species autem natura quedam vult esse et forma’, queratur utrum natura specifica sit una, dato quod intellectus non esset, sicut natura asini vel equi et sic de aliis.

Arguitur quod sic quia: omne quod est ens reale circumscripto intellectu est unum circumscripto intellectu; sed natura speciei circumscripto intellectu est ens reale; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia ens et unum convertuntur. Minor patet, quia dato quod non esset intellectus, adhuc esset extra animam quiditas asini vel equi et sic de aliis entibus realibus.

Item per illud per quod aliqua non differunt, in illo conveniunt; sed diversa supposita eiusdem speciei circumscripto intellectu non differunt in natura speciei; ergo circumscripto intellectu conveniunt in natura speciei, et sic natura speciei in eis est una. Maior et minor satis videntur esse probabililes.

Item uni intellectui per se correspondet aliqua quod in re, alter esset fictus intellectus; sed species habet unum intellectum per se, quia natura specifica videtur primo intelligibilis; ergo in re est unitas natura correspondens isti intellectui, et sic natura speciei in re est una.

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1 Themistius, In de anima 1, 8–9; cf. AA 6:34
Item septimo *Metaphysica* dicit Aristoteles quod generans generat alium propter materiam, et secundum formam est idem generans et generatum, quia forma non dividitur; ergo vult quod forma specifica in generante et genito sit secundum se una et quod solum est ibi multiplicatio per materiam; ergo natura specifica secundum formam est una, dato quod non esset intellectus.

Item hoc videtur esse de intentione Themistii, ut patet in auctoritate preallegata.

Item octavo *Metaphysica* vult Philosophus quod forma secundum se est una. Et dicit similiter ibidem quod non habent <materiam> sensibilem vel intelligibilem sunt statim unum. Ex hoc arguitur: quod secundum se non dividitur nisi per materiam, secundum se est unum; sed natura speciei non dividitur numeraliter nisi per materiam et non secundum formam; ergo natura specifica secundum se est una in diversis individuis circumscripto intellectu.

Item diversitas inter aliqua duo presupponit unitatem cuiuslibet illorum in se, quia omnis multitudo presupponit unitatem cuiuslibet sue partis in se; sed quiditas asini realiter, dato quod non esset intellectus, et quiditas equi sunt diverse; ergo quelibet in se est una, dato quod intellectus non esset.

Item nisi natura speciei esset una in diversis individuis, non plus conveniret duo individua unius speciei quam duo individua diversarum specierum; hoc est falsum; ideo etc. Probatio consequentie quia: sicut diversa individua diversarum specierum differunt per essentiam, ita individua eiusdem speciei, quia non habent convenientiam in aliqua | essentia vel natura; sed consequens est falsum; ergo etc.

Item si natura specifica non esset res alia preter singularia, nec haberet aliquid unitatem realem secundum se, tunc non esset ordo realis inter species, sed solum inter individua; sed consequens est falsum et contra Philosophum octavo *Metaphysica*, qui vult quod species et forme substantiales sint sicut numeri. Et ideo sicut in numeris est ordo prioris et posterioris, sic in speciebus est ordo perfectioris et imperfectionis, et similiter prioris et posterioris. Probatio consequentie quia: in re extra natura specifica non haberet unitatem et per consequens neque entitatem; et si non haberet entitatem, non haberet ordinem ad aliam speciem, sed solum individua habent ordinem, que habent esse extra animam.
In oppositum arguitur per Philosophum septimo *Metaphysice*, qui dicit quod universalia non habent esse preter esse quod habent in singularibus; sed natura speciei est universalis; ergo non habet esse nisi inesse quod habet in singularibus; sed in duobus singularibus non est natura una, quia Sortes et Plato non sunt unus homo, sed plures; ideo etc.

Item Commentator in duodecimo *Metaphysice* vult quod universalia sunt unum secundum rationem et intentionem; sed species est universale; ergo unitas speciei est unitas secundum rationem et intentionem, et per consequens non est unitas realis.

Item omne existens extra animam est unum numero secundum Boethium *De unitate et uno*, qui dicit quod omne quod est, ideo est, quia unum numero est; sed quod unum numero est non est commune secundum speciem neque natura specifica ut specifica est; ideo etc.

Ad istam questionem aliquis posset dicere quod unitas secundum speciem est aliquia unitas realis et quod non solum unitas numeralis est unitas realis, sed etiam unitas secundum formam, quia sicut argutum fuit forma secundum se non dividitur. Et ideo secundum se est indivisa et per consequens una. Item duo asini maiorem convenientiam realiter videntur habere quam asinus et bos. Et hoc non esset nisi natura in qua conveniunt esset una secundum se.

Verumptamen credo aliter esse dicendum ad questionem quod natura specifica potest considerari dupliciter: vel sigillatim ut est in quolibet supposito et divisim, sicut in Sorte salvatur natura hominis secundum se, dato quod non esset alius. Alio modo potest accipi natura speciei ut natura speciei simul est in duobus suppositis vel pluribus suis.

Si sumatur primo modo, dico quod natura speciei est una unitate essentiali et reali preter unitatem numeralem qua est una per principium individuationis per quod numeraliter distinguitur a quocumque alio supposito sue speciei. Et hoc probatur dupliciter. Primo sic quia: forma specifica de se non est una numero neque plures numero secundum quod diversa individua eiusdem speciei differunt numeraliter. Sed hoc habet per principia individuantia que sunt quedam accidentia superaddita, ut alibi fuit declaratum. Ex hoc arguitur sic: natura specifica ut est in aliquo uno supposto est aliquae ens per formam suam preter esse quod habet per principium individuans quod est

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60 *AA* I.174; cf. *Aristoteles, Categoriae*, 5, 2a19–27
70 Boethius, *De unitate et uno* (PL, 63, 1075A)
65 duodecimo | secundo V sunt | sint V 67 et intentionem | om V 69 secundum |
sed V 70 unum | uno V 72 est | om V 74 unitas | una natura F quod | om V 77 realiter | realim V 78 qua | quam F 79 Verumptamen | tamen V 81 salvatur natura hominis secundum se | secundum se salvatur natura hominis V 83 vel | in add V 85–86 individuationis | individuans V 86 quocumque | est add V 91 sic | om V
superadditum sue essentie. Sed per illud per quod aliquest quid est ens, per illud est
unum, quia ens et unum convertuntur. Et illa unitas est alia ab unitate quam
habet per principium individuans, sicut et entitas quam habet per formam
substantialem est alia ab entitate quam habet per principia individuantia. Ha­
bet esse indivisum secundum quantitatem determinatam et divisum ab alio individuo eiusdem rationis. Sed per formam suam habet esse
indivisum secundum essentiam suam et a qualibet alio divisum secundum es­
sentiam. Ergo natura specifica ut est in aliquo individuo est una unitate reali
sive essentiali que est a forma sua substantiali, que est alia unitas ab unitate
qua est unum numeraliter per principium individuans. Assumpta propositio
probatur quia: si forma specifica de se vel de sua ratione esset una numero,
nunquam posset in diversis reperiri numeraliter. Et similiter, si de se esset
plures, nunquam tota salvaretur in aliquo uno supposito. Ergo cum possit
esse in uno et in pluribus, de se neque est una numero neque plures. Et sic
patet assumpta propositio. Sed maior probatur quia: quodlibet individuum
includit formam suam substantialem per quam habet esse; et per eandem est
habens naturam speciei, quia ut suppono eadem est forma per quam Sortes
habet esse substantiale, et per quam est homo et animal, et per quam est Sor­
tes; sed per principia individuantia sive per principium individuans habet esse
divisum numeraliter ab aliis individuis eiusdem speciei que sunt eiusdem ra­tionis cum ipso; et in se sic est indivisum numeraliter indivisione opposita
divisioni in diversa supposita numeraliter differentia; ergo per formam suam
substantialem habet esse preter esse quod habet per principia individuantia.
Minor patet ex dictis. Ideo etc.

Item secundo hoc probatur: natura specifica potest intelligi preter prin­
cipia individuantia; sed non habet esse separatum a singularibus suis; ergo cum
iste intellectus non sit fictus, ipsa quiditas in quolibet supposito habet esse
reale preter esse quod habet per principia individuantia que sibi accidunt. Sed
sicut aliquest habet esse, sic habet esse unum, ut prius dictum est. Et Aristote­
les declarat quarto Metaphysice quod ens et unum convertuntur. Ergo natura
specifica ut in uno supposito est, sive ut est in quolibet supposito divisim et
sigillatim, habet unitatem reale preter unitatem quam habet per principia
individuantia. Nam natura speciei si sumatur ut est in diversis suppositis si­
mul, sic non est aliquest unum realiter in duobus suppositis simul, sed solum

122 AA 1:90; Aristoteles, Metaphysica IV.2, 1003b22–3
secundum rationem. Cuius ratio est quia: nichil quod pertinet ad essentiam unius individui est in altero individuo, quia neque materia eadem est diversorum individuorum, neque forma; sed nichil pertinet ad essentiam individui substantie composite nisi materia vel forma; ideo etc. Et idem iudicium est de individuis accidentium, quia sunt individua individuatione subiecti. Sed de individuis quantitatis aliter est, quia quantitas est illud quo aliquid est formaliter divum in partes eiusdem rationis, et in se individum individuum opposita divisioni, quia illa individua se ipsis sunt formaliter individua in se et divisa numeraliter ab alii. Si autem dicatur quod quantitas secundum se non est divisibilis, sed quantum ad hoc quod dicit subiectum habens quantitatem, tunc subiectum illud erit individum in se et divisi in ab alio per quantitatem formaliter.

Item si in duobus individuis esset una natura communis realiter preter quod est in Sorte et in Platone et sic de aliis individuis, tunc illa esset tertia natura a natura aliorum, et sic universalia secundum esse separat a singularibus; hoc est falso et contra Philosophum septimo Metaphysice; ideo etc. Unde notandum quod licet materia Sortis et Platonis sint diverse numeraliter, et similiter alia est forma substantialis Sortis et Platonis, tamen illa distinctio istorum formarum non est per formas substancialia, sed per distinctionem materie. Et distinctio materie est per distinctionem quantitatis, ut alibi fuit declaratum.

Ad rationes. Quando dicitur: 'omne quod est ens reale est unum', verum est unitate que convertitur cum ente. Et cum dicitur 'natura speciei, sicut hominis vel asini, est ens reale', verum est ut est in quolibet suo supposito divisim et sigillatim. Tamen ut simul in duobus vel pluribus suppositis est non est una natura neque est ens, sed entia, sicut Sortes et Plato non sunt ens neque unum, sed entia.

Ad aliud. Cum dicitur 'per illud per quod aliquid est distinctum ab aliis et in se indistinctum est unum', concedatur modo quo est indistinctum in se et dis[inctum ab alio, modo illo est unum. Et cum dicitur 'natura equi et

142 AA I 174; cf Anstoteles, Categoriae, 5, 2a19–27
128 in altero individuo individuo alio V 128–129 diversorum duorum V
131 individua individua V 132 de om V alter est om V 133 divisione indivisione V
individualione V 133–134 opposita dicte V 134 divisioni est alqua ratio add V
illa ipsa V 136 sed secundum V 139 si aliquid add V realiter preter nichil V
per(?) illud F 141 ahorum individuorum V 142–143 ideo etc om V 144 similiter
alia est similiter(?) alia est(?) F 146 distinctionem divisionem V 148 quando dicitur om F 149 cum V 150 ens om F supposto supponendo F 151 ut est add V est om V 152 sed neque V sortes om V 153 unum ens add V 154 alid alam V cum dicitur om F 155 in se indistinctum est unum est unum in se indistinctum F concedatur conceditur V 156 et vel V illo illud F

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asini sunt distincte realiter, dato quod intellectus non esset', dicendum quod ut sunt in suis suppositis sigillatim acceptis sunt ab invicem distincte per suas formas substantiales; et quelibet in se per eandem formam est indistincta, et sic quelibet est una. Sed ut sunt simul in diversis suppositis natura asini et equi et sic de aliis speciebus non est in se indistincta et distincta ab aliis, sed sunt plures nature asini vel equi et sic de aliis, quarum quelibet est indistincta in se et distincta ab alia natura alterius speciei. Et sic non sequitur quod natura specifica in pluribus individuis simul sit una realiter, sed est plura una, ut ita loquatur, sive est plurificata in pluribus quorum quelibet est in se una.

Ad aliam. Quando dicitur 'in illo in quo aliqua non differunt, conveniunt', verum est secundum quod huiusmodi. Et cum dicitur quod duo individua conveniunt in natura speciei realiter, dico quod falsum est, quia nichil reale quod est in uno est in alio. Unde neque materia neque forma est eadem realiter in utroque, sed solum secundum intellectum. †Licet enim unum individuum non differat ab alio per formam, que forma unius est alia realiter a forma alterius. Etiam forma alterius que pertinet ad speciem, quia per eandem formam realiter participant naturam speciei et suppositi illius speciei. †

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'uni intellectui per se' etc., concedatur vel in natura intellecta in aliquo modo essendi ex quo sumitur talis intellectus. Et quando dicitur 'species habet unum intellectum' etc., verum est. Et ideo in re, scilicet in quolibet supposito sigillatim sumpto sibi correspondet una natura. Sed in diversis simul non est una natura sibi correspondens. Unde ex fantasmate cuiuslibet individui potest intellectus cognoscere naturam secundum se speciei et abstracte preter singularia et ut apta nata est esse in pluribus singularibus.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur quod generans generat alius propter materiam etc., dicendum quod sunt idem secundum formam ydemptitate speciei, que ydemptitas non est realiter in duobus suppositis. Et sic forma non secundum speciem et intellectum, sed realiter est forma indivisa in diversis individuis. Vel aliter dicendum quod pro tanto dicit Philosophus quod idem sunt secundum formam, et quod forma non dividitur in eis, quia, licet habeant diversas formas, tamen non differunt per formas. Unde differt dicere quod duo indi-

157 sunt | invicem add V realiter dato quod intellectus non esset | om V 158 ab | ad V 160 et | vel V 161 et distincta | om F 161-162 sed sunt... de alius | om (hom ) F 162 quorum | quorum F 164 est | om F 166 aliam | alius V quando dicitur | om F 167 cum | quando V 168 dico | dicendum V 172 alterius | om V 173 participant | participant V naturam | natura V 174 cum | quando V dicitur | om V concedatur | concedatur V 177 supposito | individuo V 179-180 secundum se speciei | speciei secundum se V 182 aliam | alius V cum | quando V propter | preter F 184 ydemptitas non est | non est ydemptitas V realiter | realis V 185 indivisa | divisa V 186 idem | ydee F 187 quod | quia V dividitur | dicitur V 188 differt | differunt V
vidua habent diversas formas substantiales et quod differunt per formas suas substantiales, quia primum dictum est verum, sed secundum est falsum.

Ad aliud. Quando dicitur quod Themistius dicit quod species vult esse natura una quedam etc., dicendum quod Philosophus ibi loquitur de formis separatis a materia totaliter, sicut sunt intelligentie. Et in eis forma sua est per quam sunt ens et unum, neque ibi sunt individua differentia solo numero sub una specie, quia per idem est indivisa quilibet in se et divisa ab alio secundum speciem et secundum individuum. Vel potest dici quod forma specifica secundum se est una ut est in quolibet individuo sigillatim et secundum se accepto. Et similiter ut est simul in pluribus non est divisa per se, sed per accidentia et pro tanto dicitur una, quia secundum se per se non est divisa, sed tamen per principia individuantia est divisa. Et alia est forma unius a forma alterius individui.

Ad aliam. Quando dicitur secundum Aristotelem octavo *Metaphysica* forma secundum se est una et non dividitur etc., dicendum quod Philosophus ibi loquitur de formis separatis a materia totaliter, sicut sunt intelligentie. Et in eis forma sua est per quam sunt ens et unum, neque ibi sunt individua differentia solo numero sub una specie, quia per idem est indivisa quilibet in se et divisa ab alio secundum speciem et secundum individuum. Vel potest dici quod forma specifica secundum se est una ut est in quolibet individuo sigillatim et secundum se accepto. Et similiter ut est simul in pluribus non est divisa per se, sed per accidentia et pro tanto dicitur una, quia secundum se per se non est divisa, sed tamen per principia individuantia est divisa. Et alia est forma unius a forma alterius individui.

Ad aliud. Cum dicitur ‘diversitas aliquorum presupponit unitatem cuiuslibet in se’, verum est. Et quando dicitur ‘quiditas asini realiter est diversa a quiditate hominis circumscripse intellectu’ etc., dicendum quod Philosophus ibi loquitur de formis separatis a materia totaliter, sicut sunt intelligentie. Et in eis forma sua est per quam sunt ens et unum, neque ibi sunt individua differentia solo numero sub una specie, quia per idem est indivisa quilibet in se et divisa ab alio secundum speciem et secundum individuum. Vel potest dici quod forma specifica secundum se est una ut est in quolibet individuo sigillatim et secundum se accepto. Et similiter ut est simul in pluribus non est divisa per se, sed per accidentia et pro tanto dicitur una, quia secundum se per se non est divisa, sed tamen per principia individuantia est divisa. Et alia est forma unius a forma alterius individui.
multiplicatio nature specificae in eis non est per essentiam et formam, sicut in diversis individuis diversarum specierum. Et ideo magis conveniunt duo individua unius speciei quam individua diversarum specierum.

Ad aliud dicendum quod esset ordo realis inter naturam specificam ut est in unoquoque individuo secundum se et sigillatim sumpto et naturam alterius speciei in aliis individuis. Et sic natura specifica est una extra animam, ut visum est. Item inter naturam multiplicatam in pluribus individuis unius speciei et naturam alterius multiplicatam in aliis individuis esset ordo perfectionis et imperfectioris.

Ad rationes in oppositum patet solutio, quia bene probant quod natura speciei ut est simul in duobus suppositis non est una realiter, sed solum est una secundum rationem. Sed ut est in quolibet supposito divisim accepto bene est una, sicut natura specifica hominis in Sorte secundum se accepto est una et similiter in Platone et sic de aliis. Neque contra hoc procedunt rationes adducte ad oppositum, sicut patet inspicienti.

I.8 Utrum accidentia ducant in cognitionem substantiarum.

Consequenter queritur utrum accidentia ducant in cognitionem substantiarum.

Arguitur quod non quia: secundum quod dicit Plato 'nichil agit ultra suam speciem'; sed cognitio substantie est ultra cognitionem accidentis; ergo cognitionis accidentis non ducit in cognitionem substantie ipsius. Maior est evidens per Platonem. Et potest probari per Philosophum primo De generatione capitulo 'de activis et passivis', ubi dicit quod agens assimilatur passo in fine licet sint contraria in principio. Istud idem dicit Philosophus secundo De anima in illo capitulo 'determinatis autem hiis'. Minor de se est evidens, videlicet quod predicte cognitiones sunt distincte, quia objecta sunt distincta.

Secundo arguitur quia: esset circulatio, quia si accidentia ducerent in cognitionem substantie, cum ipsum quod quid est ducat in cognitionem accidentium, ergo a primo ad ultimum cognitione accidentium duceret in cognitionem substantie et e converso.

Item eadem sunt principia essendi et cognoscendi, ut dicit Philosophus secundo Metaphysice; sed accidentia non sunt principia essendi ipsius sub-

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APPENDIX A. RADULPHI BRITONIS Questiones super librum de anima

stantie, sed magis e converso, sicut de se patet; ergo sequitur quod accidentia non sunt principia cognoscendi ipsam substantiam.

Quarto sic arguitur quia: vel primo cognoscitur substantia vel accidens. Si substantia, tunc accidens non ducit in cognitionem ipsius primo. Si tu dicas quod accidens, hoc non potest esse, quia tunc sequeatur quod ipsa substantia non esset primum objectum intellectus, quod esset contra Philosophum tertio De anima. Item tunc accidens primo significaretur nomine entis, quia quod primo per aliquid intelligitur primo significatur. Ergo sequitur de necessitate quod ipsum accidens non primo cognoscitur.

Quinto arguitur sic: illa que a diversis potentiis cognoscuntur, cognition unius non ducit in cognitionem alterius; sed ipsum accidens et substantia a diversis potentiis cognoscuntur; ergo cognition unius non ducit in cognitionem alterius. Et sub illa ratione sub qua fuerit aliquid objectum unius non apprehenditur ab alia potentia diversa nisi solum secundum accidens. Maior patet, quia cum color et sonus cognoscuntur a virtute auditiva et visiva, que sunt diverse potentie, cognition unius non ducit in cognitionem alterius. Minor est evidens, quia accidens est objectum sensus, substantia autem est objectum intellectus, secundum quod apparent tertio De anima, que sunt diverse potentie.

In oppositum est Philosophus in littera, qui dicit quod non solum quod quid est valet ad cognoscendum causas accidentium inherentium substantiis, sed accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est.

Ad istam questionem, de qua sunt diverse vie de modo per quem cognition accidentis confert ad cognitionem substantie, dicendum est primo ponendo unam viam et deinde enumerando alias, distinguendo tamen primo de accidentibus, quia quedam sunt communia, quedam | propria. Unde de accidentibus communibus non est verum, sed magis de accidentibus propriis, secundum quod dicit Themistius super prohemium. De accidentibus communibus probatio quod nichil faciant quia: illa que indifferenter habent reperiri in divers speciebus non magis ducunt in cognitionem unius determinate quam alterius, sicut de se manifestum est; sed accidentia communia sunt huiusmodi; quare etc. De accidentibus propriis satis patet per Philosophum tertio De

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17 patet | om V 22 esset | erat V 23 tunc | omne F 27-29 sed ipsum .cognitionem alterius | om (hom) F 30 nisi | non F 33 autem | om V 39 cognitio | cognitionem F 42 quedam | sunt add V

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anima, qui dicit quod intelligentem in actu necesse est fantasmata speculari; sed ipsa fantasmata possunt esse accidentia propria substantiarum.

De modo ponendi secundum quem illa accidentia faciunt ad cognitionem substantie prima via talis est. Primo distinguendo de substantiis, quia quedam sunt substantie coniuncte qualitatibus sensibilibus; que habent cognosci ex fantasmatibus suorum suppositorum, que existunt sub quibusdam accidentibus et sub determinata quantitate. Sed alie sunt substantie que sunt separate a qualitatibus sensibilibus et a materia fantasiata. Modus autem secundum quem talia accidentia propria faciunt ad cognitionem substantie talis est, quia illud quod movet fantasiam non est solum accidentes neque subjectum, sed subjectum accidentis sub ratione accidentis, quia forma non agit neque materia, sed totum compositum ratione forme. Et tale compositum sive concretum existens in fantasia sub esse materiali — ex eo quod talis virtus est materialis, quia non profundat se usque ad quiditatem rei — in virtute luminis intellectus agentis irradiantis super fantasmata immutat intellectum possibilem quantum ad cognitionem quiditatis secundum se, preter hoc quod cognoscat accidentia sub quorum ratione quiditas erat fantasiata. Et isto modo accidentia propria valent ad cognoscendum quod quid est, non quia accidens primo cognoscatur ab intellectu possibili, sed quia ipse intellectus dependet ex sensatis et imaginatis. Sed substantie secundo modo dicte cognoscuntur per sua accidentia communia vel propria ipsarum vel suorum effectuum. Et ex accidentibus propriis devenimus in cognitionem ipsarum, et ille cognoscuntur per cognitionem effectuum suorum qui ad sensum apparent et ab negationem condicionem et proprietatum multarum que sunt in istis substantiis materialibus, sicut quod sunt immateriales, incorporales etc. Sed substantie sensibiles cognoscuntur ex fantasmatibus propriis a fantasia cognitis, et cognoscuntur ab intellectu prius naturaliter quam sua accidentia per que sunt a fantasia cognitete. Et quia videmus aliquod corpus, scilicet superceleste, moveri circulariter et regulariter et eternaliter, possumus devenire ad cognoscendum quod sit alia substantia immaterialis movens et non mota et eterna. Et tales substantie non primo a nobis cognoscuntur, sed magis accidentia.

Aliqui autem dicunt sic: quod primo intelligitur accidens et postea substantia,
quia accidens causatum est ab ipso quod quid est, et causa est in suo effectu
virtute; ideo ex cognitione accidentium devenitur in cognitionem ipsius quod
quid est, sicut ex cognitione effectus devenimus in cognitionem cause.

Sed illud non valet propter duo, quia si prius intelligeretur accidentis quam
quod quid est, tunc, cum illud quod prius intelligitur prius per nomen si-
gnificetur, tunc significaretur accidentis per quodcumque nomen significans
utrumque prius quam substantia sive ipsum quod quid est. Et ita nomine
entis prius significaretur accidentis quam substantia, quod nullus diceret. Item
illud est proprium et primum objectum intellectus quod primo cognoscitur ab
intellectu; modo ipsum quod quid est est primum objectum intellectus, sicut
apparet in tertio huius, et non accidentis; ergo ipsum quod quid est prius intel-
ligitur quam accidentis. Item de hoc quod dicunt quod accidentia — quia sunt
causata ab ipso quod quid est — ducunt in cognitionem ipsius quod quid est,
sicut effectus ducit in cognitionem cause, istud non valet, quia cognitio sub-
stantie ut est causa non est cognitio essentiae substantie sive secundum se et
absolute; ergo si ipsum quod quid est cognoscetur per accidentia ut causa
per effectum, tunc non habemus cognitionem essentiae substantiae; modo
hoc est inconveniens; quare etc. Et ideo oportet dare alium modum per quem
accidentia valeant ad cognitionem quod quid est.

Et ideo alii aliter dicunt quod accidentia illo modo valent ad cognoscendum
quod quid est, quia primo accidentia fantasiamur et cognoscuntur ab intel-
lectu et postea intellectus statim devenit in cognitionem entis, quia ratio entis
est in quolibet ente. Et inde devenit in cognitionem substantiae, quia per prius
‘ens’ dicitur de substantia quam de accidente. Et sic ipsa accidentia valent ad
cognitionem substantiae sive ipsius quod quid est.

Sed illud non valet propter rationes immediate tactas, quia isti ponunt,
sicut alii, quod prius intelligitur accidentis quam substantiae, quod est fals
sum. Etiam volunt ipsi quod illud quod prius intelligitur est ens; et ‘ens’
per prius dicitur de substantia; ergo illud quod prius intelligitur substantia.
Et tamen volunt quod accidentis primo cognoscatur quam substantia; ergo
implicat contradictoria in dictis suis.

Aliter dici potest et probatur quod primo intelligitur ens ex hoc quod fantas
solum fantasiamur accidentis substantiae, et in quolibet ente includitur ratio entis
in communi. Et ideo ex hoc quod fantasiamur est in actu fantasiesi aliquod ac-
cidentis, per virtutem intellectus agentis poterit intelligi ens in communi, quod
est primum obiectum intellectus secundum Avicennam, et postmodum deveniet intellectus in cognitionem substantiae, quia ens per prius est in substantia quam in accidente. Et secundum istam viam intellectus non cognoscit prius accidens quam substantiam.

Aliter dicitur a quibusdam, et istam viam alias tenui, supponendo primo quod, quando virtutes alique sunt connexe et ordinate ad invicem, una illarum, scilicet inferiori, existente in sua operatione, ex hoc statim superior virtus potest cognoscere aliquid quod non est cognitionum a virtute inferiori. Et hoc potest declarari in sensibus disparatis, sicut aliquo leso in digito, oculus advertit ad locum lesionis, quamvis oculus non cognoscat illud quod ledit. Eodem modo est in virtute extimativa et visiva, que sunt virtutes ordinate. Unde ovis oculus quando videt colorem lupi, quamvis virtus visiva non apprehendat speciem inimici, tamen virtus extimativa, que est virtus superior ad virtutem visivam, statim percipit speciem inimici virtute visiva existente in sua operatione. Modo virtus intellectiva superior est ad virtutem fantasticam; et ideo, quando virtus fantastica est in fantasiando aliquod proprium accidens, tunc in virtute intellectus agentis abstrahentis aliquam rationem intelligendi a fantasmatis, tunc intellectus possibilis intelligit ipsum quod quid est sine hoc quod intelligat ipsum accidens prius. Et hoc est quod Philosophus dicit in littera. Dicit enim sic: 'cum enim habeamus tradere secundum fantasiam de accidentibus, aut omnibus aut pluribus, et tunc de substantia habebimus optime aliquid dicere'. Unde non vult quod fantasia cognoscat ipsum quod quid est, neque quod intellectus cognoscat ipsum accidens, sed quando fantasia fantasiatur ipsa fantasmata, tunc intellectus fertur in ipsum quod quid est virtute intellectus agentis abstrahentis aliquam rationem intelligendi ab ipsis fantasmatis.

Etiam alia via est per quam potest dici quod accidentia valet ad cognoscendum quod quid est, quia quod intelligitur ab intellectu, hoc est sub aliqua ratione intelligendi, que ratio intelligendi non est illud quod intelligitur, sed illud sub quo aliquid intelligitur; modo iste rationes intelligendi sumuntur ex modis essendi, qui modi essendi sunt fantastati; modo cum fantasia fantastatur aliquid fantasma vel modum essendi rei, tunc virtute intellectus agentis abstrahitur ab illo modo essendi aliqua ratio intelligendi per quam intelligitur talis res. Unde illud quod intellectus agens abstrahit non est ipsum quod

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135 Aristoteles, *De anima* I 1, 402b22–25
quid est, sicut communiter dicitur, sed est ratio intelligendi. Sed illud quod intelligitur est quod quid est et substantia.

Contra istas duas vias arguitur quia: ipse supponunt unum dubium, sicut quod substantia non intelligatur per propriam speciem, sed per speciem sive rationem sumptam ab accidentibus. Item secundum istas vias substantia vel quod quid est nullo modo esset in fantasie, sed solum accidentia sua; sed hoc videtur inconveniens, quia sola forma accidentalis non agit in sensum vel fantasiam, sed compositum ex subjecto et forma; ideo etc. Item Philosophus dicit quod nihil intellectus possibilis intelligit nisi sit fantasiatum, quia dicit quod sicut se habent sensibilia ad sensum, sic fantasmatum ad intellectum; sed secundum istos quiditas non esset fantasiata aliquo modo, sed solum accidentia; ideo etc.

Est una alia via communis quod quid est est in fantasmatibus sicut causa in effectu. Et ideo virtute intellectus agentis abstrahitur ipsum quod quid est a fantasmatibus. Et tunc intellectus possibilis ipsum quod quid est intelligit.

Tamen istud non valet quia: cognitio substantie ut causa non est cognitionis eius secundum se et essentialis, sed accidentalis, et sic de substantia non habetur cognition prima secundum quod substantia est, quod falso est.

Primam viam magis credo esse veram.

Tunc ad rationes.

Ad primam. Cum dicitur ‘nichil agit ultra suam speciem’, concedatur quod nichil agat ultra suam speciem virtute propria. Sed si agat virtute aliterius bene potest, ut patet de caliditate ignis, que non agit neque generat ignem virtute propria, sed magis virtute ignis. Et quando dicitur in minori ‘cognitionis substantie extra cognitionem accidentis et e converso’, certe verum est, et tamen cognitionis accidentalis non agit cognitionem substantiae virtute propria, sed virtute intellectus agentis et virtute substantie in qua habet esse, secundum quod visum est in positione. Vel potest dici quod sola cognitione fantasiata accidentalis non facit cognitionem substantie, sed fantasia totius aggregati ex subjecto et accidente, quod includit substantiam (licet materialiter et sub ratione accidentalis), formaliter in virtute intellectus agentis facit cognitionem substantie secundum se in intellectu possibili propter hoc quod intellectus cognoscat accidentiam.
Ad secundam rationem. Cum dicitur quod esset circulatio, dico quod non est verum. Et cum dicitur ‘ipsum quod quid est facit ad cognitionem accidentis et e converso’, dico quod non est verum eodem modo, quia ipsum quod quid est facit ad cognitionem accidentis cognitione perfecta et completa; sed e converso est cognitione incompleta.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘eadem sunt principia essendi et cognoscendi’, verum est sic quod illa que sunt principia essendi sunt principia cognoscendi, non tamen e converso. Et cum dicitur in minori ‘accidentia non sunt principia essendi’ etc., verum est. Et quando tu dicis ulterior ‘ergo non sunt principia cognoscendi’, dico quod tu facis fallaciam consequentis a destructione antecedentis, quia quecumque sunt principia essendi sunt principia cognoscendi, non tamen e converso.


Ad ultimam rationem. Cum dicitur ‘illa que a diversis potentii cognoscuntur’ etc., bene volo in potentii que non sunt ordinate, sicut potentia gustativa et auditiva, sed in potentii ordinatis non est verum. Et quando dicitur in minori ‘accidens et substantia a diversi potentii cognoscuntur’, verum est, sed ille potentie sunt ordinate. Et sic dicendum est ad istam questionem.

I.9 Utrum anima habeat propriam operationem.

Consequenter queritur utrum anima habeat propriam operationem.

Arguitur quod sic quia: cuiuslibet potentie abstracte est operatio abstracta; modo anima intellectiva est potentia abstracta; ergo habet operationem abstractam. Maior patet, quia operatio proportionatur virtuti cuius est operatio, et ideo virtus abstracta habet operationem abstractam. Minor patet per Philosophum in principio secundi huius. Dicit enim quod anima quantum ad aliquam partem eius, scilicet intellectivam, nullius corporis est actus. Ergo est

6 Cf Aristoteles, De anima II.1, 413a4–7
potentia abstracta a corpore et per consequens habet operationem abstractam a corpore. Et si habet operationem abstractam a corpore, illa est sibi propria, quia ex quo est abstracta non communicat corpori in illa operatione.

Item Philosophus dicit quod si anima haberet proprias operationes, continget eam separari a corpore, et si non haberet proprias operationes non continget eam separari. Tunc arguo: illud quod potest separari a corpore habet proprias operationes in qua non communicat corpori; sed anima intellectiva potest separari a corpore; ergo etc. Maior patet per Philosophum, ut dictum est, et per Themistium ibidem. Dicit enim Themistius quod dignitas in natura est quod nil fit otiosum; modo si anima intellectiva possit separari a corpore et non haberet proprias operationes, tunc esset otiosa, quod est inconveniens. Minor patet per Philosophum secundo huius, ubi dicit quod anima intellectiva separatur ab aliis partibus animate, sicut perpetuum a corruptibili.

Tertio sic arguitur: illa operatio est propria anime que non exercetur per organum corporale; modo intelligere non exercetur per organum corporale; ergo videtur quod sit solius anime. Minor patet de se.

In oppositum videtur esse Philosophus in isto prohemio.

Et arguitur ratione quia: si aliqua esset operatio propria anime, maxime videretur intelligere; sed intelligere non est operatio propria anime; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia in ista operatione minus indiget anima corpore quam in aliis. Minor patet, quia intelligere vel est fantasiam vel non est sine fantasiam, ut dicit Philosophus; modo fantasiam est virtus corporalis; ergo intelligere non est sine corpore.

Ad istam questionem dico quod ‘aliaquam operationem esse propria anime’ potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quia non communicat corpori in illa operatione sicut instrumento (quia non est talis operatio exercita per organum corporale), vel quia non communicat corpori in illa operatione sicut objecto vel subiecto. Modo quando queritur utrum sit aliqua operatio propria anime, dico quod sic primo modo, scilicet in qua non communicat corpori sicut instrumento vel organo corporali. Sed secundo dico quod non habet alii-
quam propriam operationem in qua non communicat corpori sicut objecto vel subjecto.

Primum declaratur sic quia: illa operatio est propria anime isto modo in qua anima non operatur mediate aliquo organo corporali; modo aliquo est operatio talis anime ad quam exercendam non indiget aliquo organo, sicut est intelligere; ergo talis operatio est propria ipsius anime isto modo, scilicet in qua non communicat corpori sicut instrumento vel organo.

Secundum declaratur. Et primo quod non habeat operationem propriam in qua non indigeat corpore sicut objecto, et hoc in hac vita quia: intelligere est quedam operatio que indiget fantasmate vel re fantasiata sicut objecto; modo res fantasiata est res corporalis et fantasia est virtus corporea; ergo ad hoc quod anima intelligat, indiget corpore sicut objecto vel sicut aliquo requisito propter representationem sui objecti, ita quod ad hoc quod apprehendat suum objectum indiget corpore. Modo operatio que videtur maxime propria anime est intelligere. Ergo si non potest exercere istam quin indigeat corpore sicut objecto vel sicut aliquo requisito propter representationem sui objecti, nullam operationem habet <in> qua non indiget corpore ad hoc ut ipsam exerceat.

Sed utrum anima indigeat corpore sicut subjecto ad exercendum suam operationem, Commentator diceret quod non, quia secundum ipsum substantia anime intellective non est perfectio corporis, et ideo intelligere, quod est operatio anime intellective, non est in corpore sicut in subjecto. Et rationes istius operationis in tertio huius apparebunt. Sed quia ista opinio est erronea et contra fidem et veritatem, quia vile esset nature humane quod non haberet intellectum perfectionem sui. Et per consequens intelligere dependet ex corpore quodam modo sicut ex subjecto, quia operatio non est magis abstracta quam suum subjectum; modo anima intellectiva est forma substantialis corporis, ut apparebit inferius, et perfectio corporis; ergo oportet quod intelligere sit in corpore sicut in subjecto. Hoc tamen est per accidens, quia potentia anime intellectiva fundatur in essentia anime immediate et secundum quod separabilis est, non mediante organo corporali. Et | quia ipsa essentia anime intellectiva est in corpore et perfectio corporis, idee per accidens isto modo est in corpore, quia est operatio anime dum existit in corpore. Unde accidit anime intellectiva quod sit actu perficiens materiam secundum quod in ea fundatur potentia intellectiva. Cuius ratio est: si ipsa separat a corpore, remaneret potentia intellectiva, et ideo, cum intelligere sit operatio anime

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mediante potentia intellectiva accidentaliter, per accidens est quod intelligere nostrum in hac vita dependet ex corpore sicut ex subiecto.

Alie autem operationes anime, sicut sentire etc., dependent ex corpore sicut ex subiecto, quia non fundantur in essentia anime immediate, sed mediente corporali organo.

Tunc ad rationes.

Ad primam. Cum dicitur ‘potentie abstracte est operatio abstracta’, verum est: sicut est abstracta, sic habet operationem abstractam. Et cum dicitur ‘anima intellectiva est potentia abstracta’, verum est isto modo: quod non habet organum corporale. Et sic bene volo quod habet propriam operationem ad quam exercendam non indiget corpore sicut organo. Sed non est potentia sic abstracta ita quod sit solum separata a corpore.

Ad secundam. Cum dicitur ‘si anima habet operationem propriam’ etc., concedatur. Et cum dicitur ‘anima est separabilis a corpore’, Commentator diceret quod non esset separabilis a corpore secundum operationem, quia, licet non intelligat in illo corpore, intelligit tamen in alio, licet secundum substantiam esset separabilis. Sed de hoc non curo. Quando ergo dicitur ‘anima est separabilis’, verum est, ‘ergo habet operationem propriam’, verum est. Tamen illa operatio non est talis qualem habet in hac vita, quia anima in hac vita intelliget ex sensatis et imaginatis. Sed quando est separata a corpore non sic intelligit, sed per revelationem superioris intelligentie, vel per species infusas, vel per habitus acquisitos hic, vel secundum alium mode. Et propter hoc dicit Philosophus in tertio huius quod nos non reminiscimus post mortem eorum que fecimus in hac vita.

Ad tertiam rationem. Cum dicitur ‘illa operatio est propria anime que non exercetur per organum corporale’, verum est, quia non dependet ex corpore sicut ex organo. Non est tamen sic propria quin dependeat ex corpore sicut ex subiecto vel obiecto modo quo dictum est prius.

I.10 Utrum naturalis diffinit per materiam, logicus vero per formam

Consequenter queritur circa illam partem ubi Philosophus dicit quod naturalis diffinit per materiam, logicus vero per formam, utrum hoc sit verum.

97 Aristoteles, De anima III.5, 430a24–26

76 nostrum | nostram F | 77 sicut | sunt F | 78 fundantur | fantasiatur F | 85 corpore | corporalis V | 86 solum | seorsum V | 87 secundam | rationem est add. V | 88 concedatur | conceditur V | 89 non | nisi F | esset | est V | 91 curo | curo(?) V | ergo | om. V | 93 vita | om. V | 97 in | om. V | non | nisi F | 101 sicut | sicut add. V | 102 prius | primo V
Arguitur primo quod naturalis non diffinit per materiam, quia illud quod est principium diffiniendi rem est principium cognoscendi eam; sed materia non est principium cognoscendi; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia diffinitio datur causa innotescendi ut habetur sexto Topicorum. Minor patet, quia materia est de se ignota ut appareat primo Physicorum; tale autem non est principium cognoscendi aliud.

Secundo sic arguitur: si diffinitio naturalis haberet dari per materiam sensibilem, aut ibi poneretur materia sensibilis ut sensibilis est, aut materia que est sensibilis non ut sensibilis est. Si dicatur quod ponatur ibi materia sensibilis ut sensibilis est, ergo in diffinitione substantiarum materialium oportet ponere qualitates sensibiles, et per consequens accidentia, quia sensibilitas inest sibi per accidentia. Et tunc diffinitiones substantiarum darentur per additamentum. Neque datur per materiam que sensibilis est non ut sensibilis est, quia tunc diffinitio naturalis non differret a mathematica, quia mathematica diffiniuntur per materiam que sensibilis est non ut sensibilis est, quia coniuncta sunt in esse cum sensibilibus.

Item tertio ostenditur quod logicus non diffiniat per formam quia: qui diffinit per totum aggregatum ex materia et forma non diffinit per formam magis quam per materiam; modo logicus diffinit per totum aggregatum ex materia et forma, quia per genus et differentias; modo genus et differentia, sicut animal et rationale, dicunt totum aggregatum ex materia et forma; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia in aggregato non magis est forma quam materia.

Oppositum utriusque vult Philosophus

Ad istam questionem dico quod naturalis diffinit per materiam sensibilem, logicus vero per formam.

Ad declarationem prymi est intelligendum quod materia sensibilis que pointitur in diffinitione rerum naturalium potest considerari triplicter: uno modo secundum se et absolute ut est indifferens ad quamlibet formam, non considerando eam ut sensibilis est, neque ut habet ordinem ad formam determinatam. Et sic non debet poni in diffinitione naturalium, quia materia isto

6 Aristoteles, Topica VI.1, 139b14–15 7 Cf. AA 2.29, Aristoteles, Physica I.7, 191a8–11
modo non est principium intelligendi aliquid, quia ignota est ut sic, et tale non est principium cognoscendi aliquid.

Alio modo potest considerari materia secundum quod sensibilis, id est, ut est sub dispositionibus sub quibus sentitur. Et adhuc illo modo materia non ponitur in diffinitione naturalium, quia iste dispositiones sunt accidentia; modo accidentia non ponuntur in diffinitione substantiae; ergo materia ut est sensibilis illo modo non ponitur in diffinitione naturalium, quia illud per quod est sensibilis sunt accidentia.

Tertio modo potest considerari materia ut habet ordinem et respectum ad formam determinatum, ex quo respectu quem habet ad talem formam determinat sibi complexionem determinatam qualitatum sensibilium ad hoc ut talis forma in tali materia introductur, ita quod qualitates sensibiles non includuntur in sua essentia, sed requirit talem dispositionem vel talem complexionem qualitatum sensibilium in respectu quem habet ad formam determinatum. Et propter hoc dicitur materia sensibilis, et non quia qualitates sensibiles in sua essentia includuntur. Modo materia illo modo ponitur in diffinitione naturalium, quia diffinitio realis, cuiusmodi est diffinitio naturalis, debet habere partes diffiniti sub ratione sub qua sunt partes eius sub propriis rationibus. Et hoc habetur in primo Physicorum, ubi dicitur quod diffinitio dividit in singularia, id est, dicit partes diffiniti sub propriis rationibus acceptas. Modo materia que est principium rerum naturalium est principium earum secundum ordinem quem habet ad determinatam formam, sicut carnes et os sa sunt materia secundum respectum quem habent ad formam humanam vel asinam. Ergo talis materia ponitur in diffinitione naturalium. Unde notandum quod carnes et ossa in sua ratione nullum accidentem includunt, sed solum dicunt materiam. Dicunt tamen eam in ordine ad formam determinatam, et ex hoc requirit quod sit disposita sic vel sic. Sed illas dispositiones in sua ratione non includunt.

Notandum tamen est quod ille ordo materie ad determinatam formam non attendit ex parte materie absolute (quia de se est indifferentes ad omnem formam), sed attenditur in materia ex ordine formarum, que sibi invicem succedunt in materia, et etiam agentium. Unde octavo Metaphysice habetur quod ex vino fit acetum immediate, set ex aceto non fit immediate vinum, sed per multas alterationes. Et similiter ex vivo fit mortuum immediate, sed ex mortuo non fit vivum immediate.
Secundum declaratur, scilicet quod logicus diffiniat per formam. Iuxta quod est intelligendum quod duplex est diffinittio logica: una que datur in terminis logicalibus, sicut est diffinittio syllogismi, vel inductionis, vel alicuius entis logicalis, et de tali diffinittione logica non loquitur Philosophus. Alia est diffinittio logica que datur per genus et differentias. Modo genus et differentia dicunt totum aggregatum sub aliqua ratione que sumitur ab aliquo modo essendi consequente formam, sicut ratio animalis sumitur ab hoc quod est sentire et moveri secundum locum, que consequuntur animal ratione forme. Et ratio huius quod est rationale sumitur ab hoc quod est ratiocinari, quod consequitur formam humanam. Et propter hoc dicitur quod diffinittio logica datur per formam, id est, per aliquid quod significat totum aggregatum sub aliqua ratione intelligendi que sumitur a modo essendi consequente formam.

Vel potest dici quod, quia logicus diffinitt per genus et differentiam, que significant aggregatum ex forma et materia, et forma est illud quod est ibi principaliter et sub cuius ratione totum intelligitur, quia omne quod intelligitur, intelligitur per formam per quam est ens actu, ideo dicitur quod diffinittio logica datur per formam. Item propter hoc aliud, scilicet quia non accipit materia sub propria ratione materie sicut fit in diffinittione | naturali, ideo per oppositum ad modum diffinitionis naturalis dicitur diffinire per formam.

Sed secundum Commentatorem diceretur aliter. Commentator enim vult septimo Metaphysice et secundo huius quod in eis que significant aggregatum ex materia et forma, sicut 'homo', nomen per prius dicitur de forma, secundo de aggregato, tertio de materia. Modo tenendo istam viam diceretur quod diffinittio logica datur per formam pro tanto, quia nomine generis et differentie, per quas datur diffinittio logica, primo importaretur forma. Et propter hoc diceretur quod diffinittio logica datur per formam. Tamen istud non videtur valere quia: in istis substantialibus aggregatis ubi partes non habent esse, sed totum aggregatum (quia forma non est, sed est illud quo aliquid est), neque materia habet esse, sed aggregatum ex materia et forma habet esse, non videtur istud esse verum, quia illud quod habet esse est illud quo significatur. Et ideo, cum aggregatum sit illud quod habet esse, ideo aggregatum per nomen habet significari et non partes. Et ideo prima via tenenda est.

Tunc ad rationes.

88 Locus non inventus

69 una | est add. V 70 sicut | sic V 71 logica | logicaI V 74 ab | ad V 75 animal | animam V 76 quod | quia V 77 consequitur | sequitur V 80 differentiam | differentias V 82 principaliter | principalius V 84 accipit | accipitur V 89 homo | hoc V 90 tertio | dicitur add. V | diceretur quod | diceret quid F 94 non | sup. lin. F 97 quia | quod V quod significatur | om. F
Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'ille est principium diffiniendi rem' etc., illa ratio est soluta ex dictis, quia materia prima secundum se et absolute non habet poniti in diffinitione, quia ut sic non est principium cognoscendi aliquid cum de se sit ignota. Sed materia considerata in ordine vel respectu ad formam determinatam, ut sic potest bene poniti in diffinitione, quia isto modo habet intelligi et cognosci per analogiam ad formam, ut habetur primo *Physicorum*.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'si daretur per materiam, aut poneretur ibi materia ut sensibilis est' etc., dico quod ibi ponitur materia sensibilis ut sensibilis est et non ut sensibilis est, id est, sub dispositionibus sub quibus sentitur, sed ut habet ordinem ad formam determinatam naturalem, ex quo ordine exigit determinatam complexionem qualitatum sensibilium. Et cum dicitur 'tunc ergo in diffinitione rerum naturalium poneretur accidens', dico quod non, quia materia isto modo non includit aliquid accidens.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'qui diffinit per totum aggregatum' etc., ista ratio soluta est, quia totum aggregatum per quod datur diffinitione logica significatur sub ratione forme, id est, sub aliquam rationem intelligendi que sumitur ab aliqua modo essendi consequente formam. Et ideo diffinitione logica dicitur dari per formam et non per materiam, et etiam propter alias dictas causas in positione.

II.1 Utrum anima sit substantia

Circa secundum *De anima* secundum ordinem Philosopphi procedamus, primo querendo utrum anima sit substantia.

Arguitur quod non quia: quod est substantia est per se subsistens; anima non est per se subsistens; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia proprietate substantiae est per se subsistere, quia substantia dicitur a stare. Minor patet, quia quod est per se subsistens est ens actu; modo anima non est ens actu, ymmo est actus; ideo etc.

Item quod est ens in alio non est substantia; anima est ens in alio; ergo non est substantia. Maior patet, quia substantia non est ens in alio, ymmo est ens in se. Per hoc enim distinguitor ab accidente. Minor patet, quia anima est in corpore.

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106 AA 2:29; Aristoteles, *Physica* 1.7, 191a8–11
Item quod advenit alicui enti in actu non est substantia; sed anima advenit alicui enti in actu; ideo etc. Maior patet per Commentatorem in illo secundo. Vult enim quod hec est differentia inter formas accidentales et substantiales, quia forma substantialis advenit enti in potentia, sed forma accidentalis advenit enti in actu. Minor declaratur quia: anima advenit corpori disposito et organico, sicut patet per diffinitionem anime qua dicitur quod anima est actus corporis organici phisici etc.; modo corpus organicum est ens actu, quia iste organizationes presupponunt formam substantialem per quam est ens actu; ideo etc.

Item illud quod diffiniitur per additamentum est accidens; anima est huiusmodi, quia in diffinitione anime ponitur corpus, quod est additum extra essentiam anime.

**In oppositum est Philosophus et Commentator**

Dicendum quod anima est substantia, quia sicut dicit Commentator ‘dignitas est in natura, quia substantia dignior est quolibet accidente’; modo anima quibusdam substantiis est dignior; ergo multo fortius anima est dignior quolibet accidente. Sed tale non est accidens. Ergo relinquitur quod anima sit substantia.

Item hoc probatur per Avicennam *Sexto naturalium*, quia quod est principium multarum operationum que non possunt reduci ad aliquod accidens est forma substantialis; modo anima est principium talium operationum, quia est principium sentiendi, vivendi et intelligendi et ille operationes non possunt reduci in aliquod accidens, et hoc principaliter. Et dico ‘principaliter’, quia aliqua potentia anime bene est principium talium operationum, tamen non est principale et primum principium; ergo anima est substantia.

Item ex non substantiis non fit substantia; sed ex anima et corpore fit substantia composita, sicut animal; ergo anima est substantia.

**Tunc ad rationes.**

Ad primam. Cum dicitur ‘quod est substantia est per se subsistens’, verum est quod est substantia composita, vel substantia que est per se ens, vel...
ens actu. Sed substantia que est pars substantie, cuiusmodi est forma vel materia, non est per se subsistens. Unde nomen 'substantie' per prius dicitur de substantia composita quam de materia vel forma.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod est in alio' etc., dico quod aliquid potest esse ens in alio dupliciter. Vel sicut accidens in subiecto, quod est in aliquo ente in actu; et tale non est substantia. Vel sicut perfectio in perfectibili, vel forma substantialis in materia; et tale quod est ens in aliquo ente in potentia bene est substantia; modo anima illo modo est ens in alio.

Ad aliud. Cum dicitur 'quod advenit enti in actu non est substantia', verum est si maneat in sua actualitate in adventu eius. Et cum dicitur 'anima advenit enti in actu', falsum est modo quo dictum est. Et cum dicitur 'advenit corpori organico', dico quod in adventu anime omnes iste organizationes et dispositiones corrumpuntur et consimiles introducuntur dispositionibus precedentibus. Perfectiores tamen sunt quam precedentes.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod diffinitur per additamentum' etc., dicendum quod maior non est vera in substantiis imperfectis, que per se non subsistunt, sed solum inquantum sunt partes alciuius quod per se subsistit; et talis est anima; ideo etc.

II.2 Utrum anima sit materia vel compositum

Consequenter queritur utrum anima sit materia vel compositum.

Arguitur quod sit materia quia: quicquid est ens in potentia est materia; sed anima est ens in potentia; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia materia substantivatur per posse, ut vult Commentator in De substantia orbis. Et ideo quod est in potentia est materia. Minor patet, quia anima sensitiva est in potentia ad sensibilia, et anima intellectiva est in potentia ad intelligibilia. Et hoc etiam vult Philosophus in secundo huius et tertio.

Item quod habet proprietates materie est materia vel habens materiam; sed anima habet proprietates materie; quare etc. Maior patet, quia proprietas non est sine eo cuius est proprietas. Minor apparat saltem de intellectiva et

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4 AA 10:7; Averroes, De substantia orbis I, f. 3 L 7 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima II.5, 418a3–4; De anima III.4, 429a15–16
sensitiva, quia proprietas materie est recipere et pati, et illa conveniunt anime sensitive et intellectiva, quia anima sensitiva recipit species sensibiles et anima intellectiva recipit species intelligibiles. Etiam habent pati, quia intelligere est pati et etiam sentire est pati.

Deinde probatur quod anima sit aggregatum corpus ex materia et forma quia: quod movetur est corpus; anima movetur; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia mobile est ens actu et tale est compositum ex materia et forma. †Et hec est materia in istis inferioribus. Minor patet quia, moto corpore movetur anima.† Item quod habet cognoscere corpus compositum est corpus; sed anima habet cognoscere corpus; quare etc. Maior patet, quia simile simili cognoscitur. Minor patet de se.

In oppositum utriusque est Philosophus.

Dicendum quod anima est forma et non materia neque compositum. Primum apparret sic, quia illud quo vivimus, sentimus et intelligimus principaliter est forma; modo anima est huiusmodi; ideo etc. Maior apparret in isto secundo, quia illud quo operamur est duplex, sicut illud quo sanamur est duplex, quia sanamur corpore sicut materia et sanitate sicut forma. Et ideo illud quo vivimus et sentimus et intelligimus principaliter est forma. Etiam quia operatio procedit a forma, sicut apparret secundo De generatione, ubi dictur 'forme est agere, materie vero pati'. Hoc etiam vult Commentator, qui dictur quod operatio facit scire formam, sicut transmutatio materialium. Et ideo illud quo vivimus etc. est forma, cum iste sunt operationes quedam; modo anima est huiusmodi, ut habetur in isto secundo; ideo etc.

Item ostendendo quod anima vegetativa non sit materia, quia materia est ens in potentia; sed anima vegetativa est potentia activa — est enim principium activum operationum; quare etc. Item anima sensitiva et intellectiva non sunt materia, quia materia est in potentia ad formas reales sub esse reali; sed anima sensitiva est in potentia ad formas intentionales, anima autem intellectiva est in potentia ad formas intelligibiles; quare etc.

Item neque anima est corpus, quia corpus uno modo accipitur ut est trina dimensio, scilicet longum, latum et profundum. Et sic corpus est de genere quantitatis; modo anima non est de genere quantitatis; ideo etc. Alio modo

25 Cf. AA 6:53; Aristoteles, De anima II.2, 414a4–8 29 AA 4:39; Aristoteles, De generatione II.9, 335b29–31, 35 30 AA f.216; Averroes, In XII Metaphyscorum VIII, com. 12, f. 220 G

12³ F

12² V
dicitur corpus ut est aggregatum ex materia et forma sub ratione intelligendi
sumpta essentialiter ab illo apparenti quod est esse corporeum vel dimensio-
natum. Et sic corpus est de genere substantie et est genus animalis. Et anima
isto modo non est corpus, quia corpus illo modo est ens actu; sed anima non
est ens actu, sed est actus quidam; ideo etc. Alio modo dicitur corpus ut di-
cit alteram partem aggregati distinctam contra animam. Et sic anima non est
corpus, quia anima illo modo non est materia; sed corpus isto modo dicit
materiam; ideo etc. Relinquitur ergo quod sit forma.

Tunc ad rationes in oppositum.

Ad primam. Cum dicitur ‘quod est ens in potentia est materia’, verum
est si sit ens in potentia ad formas sensibiles sub esse reali. Si autem non sit
in potentia ad formas sensibiles, vel non sit in potentia ad istas sub esse reali,
non oportet; modo anima quantum ad intellectivam non est in potentia ad
formas sensibiles sub esse reali, sed sub esse intentionalis vel intelligibilis.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘quod habet proprietates materie est materia’ etc.,
verum est si habeat eas eo modo quo sunt materie. Sed si alio modo, non
oporet. Et cum dicitur ‘anima habet recipere et pati’ etc., dico quod materia
habet recipere formas reales sub esse reali. Sed anima recipit formas sensibiles
et intelligibiles sub esse intentionalis. Eodem modo pati cum abiectione forme
contrarie est proprietatis materie Passione proprie dixt. Sed anima non pati-
tur passione proprie dixta, que est cum abiectione forme contrarie, set magis
passione improprie dixta, que est receptio perfectionis. Unde talis passio est
salus et perfectio, ut Philosophus dicit secundo huius.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘quod movetur est corpus’, verum est quod per
se movetur. Sed si moveatur ad motum alterius et per accidens, non oportet;
modo anima movetur per accidens ad motum alterius, quia ad motum totius
aggregati.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘quod habet cognoscere corpus est corpus’, falsum
est. Et cum dicitur quod similis similis cognoscitur, verum est quod illud quod
cognoscitur similis est aliquo modo cognoscenti, non quantum ad esse reale,
sed quantum ad esse speciem sub esse intentionalis receptam in cognoscenti.
Et non oportet quod quantum ad esse reale sit simile sibi. Ideo etc.

65 Cf AA 6.94–95, Aristoteles, De anima II.5, 417b2–16

43 intelligendi | et add V 46 non | nisi F modo | om V 47–48 dicit | habet F
49 non est. isto modo | om (hom) F 50 materiam | materia V quod | anima add
51 rationes | rationem V in oppositum | om V 52 ad | om V 53 reali | tali
F 56 sensibiles | nec etiam anima sensitiva est in potentia ad formas sensibiles add V vel
intelligibili | om V 57 ad | om V 58 quo | quod F si | om V 60 reales | et add V
60–61 sed anima esse intentionalis | om V 61 abiectione | abiectione F 62 materie | et
add V 65 dicit | in add V 70 cum dicitur | om F 71 cognoscitur | cognoscimus V
73 ad esse speciem | om F 74 idee etc | om V

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II.3 Utrum anima sit forma substantialis corporis

Consequenter queritur utrum anima sit forma substantialis corporis.

Arguitur quod non quia: quod advenit enti in actu non est forma substantialis; sed anima advenit enti in actu; ideo etc. Maior patet per Commentatorem supra secundum huius. Minor patet, quia anima advenit enti in actu, scilicet corpori organizato. Modo organizatum est in actu, quia organizationes iste presupponunt formam substantialem.

Item nulla substantia diffinitur per additamentum; sed anima diffinitur per additamentum; ergo non est substantia. Maior patet per Philosophum septimo Metaphysice, qui dicit quod diffinitiones accidentium | dantur per additamenta et non diffinitiones substantiarum. Minor patet, quia diffinitur sic: anima est actus corporis etc.; igitur ponitur aliquod additum extra essentiam anime, scilicet corpus.

Item illa forma qua ablata remanet idem corpus numero quod prius non est forma substantialis; anima est huiusmodi; quare etc. Maior patet per Philosophum in littera, qui dicit quod si dolabra esset corpus, acuties esset sua forma substantialis, et ista acutie remota non remanet dolabra nisi equivoce. Minor patet, quia corpus mortuum idem numero est cum vivo. Et hoc probatur quia: eadem accidentia numero remanent in vivo et mortuo, sicut color. Etiam et eadem compago membrorum et eedem cicatrices. Et sensus hoc iudicat; modo accidens unum numero non transfertur de subiecto in subiectum; ergo manet idem corpus numero quod prius ablata ipsa anima.

Item quod advenit alicui habenti formam quae non corrumpatur in eius adventu advenit enti in actu, et per consequens non est forma substantialis; modo anima advenit alicui habenti formam quae non corrumpitur in eius adventu; ergo etc. Minor patet, quia anima advenit corpori organico. Modo probatio quod forma istius non corrumpitur in adventu anime, neque iste organizationes, quia: quicquid corrumpitur a suo contrario corrumpitur. Modo forme precedenti non contrariatur forma sequens, quia forma sequens est si-
cut perficiens formam precedentem et complens eam. Neque organizationes sequentes sunt contrarie precedentibus, quia sunt similes sibi. Neque etiam generans contrariatur forma, quia illud quod inducit formam non est contrarium illi forma, quia generans generat sibi simile; sed generans inducit illam precedentem formam et suas organizationes. Quare etc.

Item si ille dispositiones corrumpentur, tunc frustra fuissent introducte in materia; modo hoc est inconveniens; ergo anima advenit enti in actu.

In oppositum est Philosophus, qui vult quod anima est substantia que est forma substantialis corporis.

Et dicendum quod anima est forma substantialis corporis. Et hoc probatur tripliciter vel quadrupliciter. Primo sic quia: illa forma est forma substantialis corporis qua remota non remanet idem corpus numero quod prius nisi equivoco; sed remota anima a corpore non remanet idem corpus numero quod prius; ideo etc. Maior patet per Philosophum in littera, qui dicit quod si dolabra esset corpus naturale acuties esset sua forma substantialis qua remota non remaneret dolabra nisi equivoco. Sed quia ita non est, scilicet quod dolabra non est corpus physicum, sed artificiale, ideo remota acutie adhuc remanet dolabra quantum ad eius substantiam, quia tota substantia artificialium est sua materia. Ergo intentio sua est quod idem est forma substantialis corporis qua remota non remanet idem corpus numero quod prius. Minor patet, quia remota anima a corpore amplius non potest in suam operationem, sicut non potest nutriri, augmentari, neque sentire, neque intelligere. Ergo non est idem quod prius nisi equivoco, quia sicut apparebat quarto Meteororum unumquodque ens habet suam operationem propria in qua, cum potest, est illud, cum autem non potest, non est illud nisi equivoco, sicut oculus cum potest videre est oculus, cum autem non potest videre non est oculus nisi equivoco, sicut lapideus sive depictus.

Item illud per quod distinguuit aliquid ab alio essentialiter est forma substantialis eius, quia forma distinguuit et separat; ergo actus substantialis est qui distinguitt et separat substantialiter; modo animatum distinguittur ab inanimato per animam; quare etc.
APPENDIX A. RADULPHI BRITONIS Questiones super librum de anima

60 Item illud quo primo et principaliter vivimus et sentimus et intelligimus est | forma substantialis; sed anima est illud quo vivimus principaliter quantum ad animam vegetativam, quo sentimus quantum ad animam sensitivam, et intelligimus quantum ad animam intellectivam; quare etc. Maior patet, quia illud quo aliquod operatur duplex est. Unum sicut materia et aliud sicut forma. Et ideo cum anima sit illud quo principaliter operamur, erit forma substantialis et ab ipsa procedet operatio substantialis.

Item ex quo anima est substantia et est forma, ergo est forma substantialis.

Tunc ad rationes.

Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'quod advenit enti in actu', verum est si maneat ens in actu in adventu eius, sed si corrunderetur eius actualitas non est verum. Et cum dicitur 'anima advenit enti in actu', dico quod illa actualitas in adventu anime corrumpitur et consimilis forma et consimiles dispositiones introducuntur.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'nulla substantia habet diffiniri per additamentum', verum est de substantia composita. Sed substantia que non est composita, que non est per se ens, sicut materia vel forma, bene habet diffiniri per additamentum; modo anima est substantia non composita, sed substantia simplex; ideo habet diffiniri per corpus cuius est forma et perfectio.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'illud quo ablato remanet idem corpus quod prius' etc., concedatur. Et cum dicitur 'anima ablata remanet idem corpus quod prius', falsum est. Et cum probatur quia: remanent eadem accidentia in vi vo et mortuo, dico quod non manent eadem accidentia numero, sed solum similia. Et cum dicitur quod sensus hoc iudicat, dico quod sensum non est credendum de ydemptitate accidentium, sed solum de similitudine, quia quiditas rei solum ab intellectu percipitur et non a sensu. Modo esse sensibile non est quiditas coloris, ymmo est accidens eius, quia illa est in secundo modo dicendi per se: 'color est visibilis', ut dicit Philosophus in illo secundo. Et ideo de ydemptitate coloris vel alicuius alterius sensibilis non est credendum sensum.

Sed tu dices: unde ergo sunt illa consimilia accidentia in mortuo de novo creata? Non enim apparat aliquod generans quod sit causa omnium istorum

87 Cf. AA 6:67; Aristoteles, De anima II.7, 418a29–30
accidentium. Hoc non est contra sensum, sicut si aliquis habeat vulnus et non sit ibi aliquod vulnerans. Unde etiam hoc est quod accidentia casualia, sicut cicatrix et similia, semper manent similia in vivo et mortuo, quia illa accidentia casualia, sicut cicatrix, non sunt maioris necessitatis in mortuo quam in vivo; modo ista possunt inesse et non inesse vivo; ergo etiam possunt inesse mortuo et non inesse mortuo. Et sic non semper erunt eadem in vivo et mortuo. Cuius oppositum patet, quia si aliquis habeat cicatricem vivus, habet cicatricem etiam mortuos.

Dicendum est ad illa: quando primo queritur a quo sunt ilia accidentia in mortuo, dicendum quod sunt a generante formam illam sequentem, quia quicumque dat formam dat omnia accidentia consequentia formam, secundum intentionem Commentatoris tertio De celo et mundo, sicut qui dat formam gravis dat omnia accidentia consequentia formam gravis. Ideo cum illa accidentia sint consequentia illam formam sequentem, ideo generans qui illam formam introducit habet illa accidentia introducere.

Et tu dices: verum est de accidentibus propriis que sunt consequentia formam. Sed de accidentibus casualibus que non consequuntur formam, sicut est color et similia, quare est quod illa manent eadem?

De colore facile est solvere, quia non manet idem color in mortuo et vivo, nisi rarissime hoc contingat, ymmo si aliquis dum erat vivus est albus vel rubeus, mortuus est magis pallidus. Tamen si queras quare est similis color in vivo et mortuo, dico quod color causatur in corpore ex commixtione elementorum in mixto, nisi sit color artificialis, sicut per picturam, sicut apparebat libro De sensu et sensato. Modo talis vel talis commixtio elementorum consequitur formam mixtun et consimiles dispositiones consequuntur similes formas. Modo forma precedens et forma consequens in materia sunt propinquae in perfectione, quia secundum Philosophum forme secundum quemdam ordinem habent introduci in materia, quia secundum Commentatorem primo Metaphysics primo introducuntur forme magis universales et deinde minus universales. Ex hoc ergo patet quod forme habent ordinem in materia. Unde non quecumque forma est in quacumque materia, sed determinata post deter-
minatam, sicut apparat octavo *Metaphysice*, quia sicut ibi dicitur post formam vini non introducitur forma quecumque, set forma aceti que similis est ei in gradu perfectionis, sicut forma ordinate sequens est similis forme vini; et forma non introducitur nisi in materia disposita, ut apparat secundo *huus*, quia actus activorum sunt in patiente disposito. Ideo dispositiones que sunt in materia cum forma sequenti sunt similes dispositionibus que sunt in materia cum forma precedenti. Et ideo cum color sequatur formam ratione commixtionis elementorum et consimilis commixtio sit in mortuo et vivo, consimilis color est in vivo et mortuo.

Sed de accidentibus casualibus est difficile quare manent similia sicut de cicatrice semper in mortuo et vivo. Et dico ad hoc quod, sicut apparat ex intentione actorum medicine, cum sit solutio continui, natura, inquantum potest, intendit consolidare partes et reunire. Unde herbe et emplastra que ibi ponuntur sunt sicut coadiuvantia naturam removentia humores qui occurrunt ad locum lesionis ne ibi putrefiant. Et propter hoc illas medicinas oportet ibi apponere, neque propter aliud illa apponuntur nisi ad removendum illa impedimenta ut fiat reunitio per naturam. Cicatrix ergo que est factura per consolidationem partium est operata per naturam rei, quia natura intendent consolidare partem lesam dispositioni quam prius habeat maius quantum potest. Ergo illud illud opus est a natura et forma rei, licet vulnerans sit causa, tamen rei consolidatio est consequens formam. Et ideo quia iste forme sunt propinque in gradu perfectionis, ideo oportet quod iste perfectiones utriusque sint similes. Et idem dico de vulnere quod consimile vulnus manet in vivo et mortuo propter similem causam, quia sunt forme similis et ideo debent habere dispositiones similis. Et ideo sicut quando erat vivus non erant consolidate, multo minus in mortuo sunt consolidate vel reiuncte. Vel aliter potest dici quod vulnus est dispositio ad corruptionem | forme prioris faciens etiam ad introductionem forme sequentis. Ideo manet consimilis dispositio in materia sub forma sequenti sine novo vulnerante, sicut in aliis corporibus dispositiones facientes ad corruptionem prioris forme et ad generationem

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123 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* VIII.5, 1044b34–35 126 AA 6:55; Aristoteles, *De anima* II 2, 414a11–12

124 forma | om V 125 sicut | sic V ordinare | ordinata F 126 nisi in materia disposita | in materia nisi disposita V 127 sunt | est V patente | et add V 128 cum forma sequenti | sequenti cum forma F 129 sequatur | consequatur V 130 commixtio | mixtio elementorum V sit | est V 132 casualibus | causalis V 135 reiuncte | removere V emplastra | amplastra V 136 coadiuvantia | ca adjuvanta scrips. V removentia | removentis V qui | que V 138 oportet | oportet V alud hoc F 139 illa | ibi V 140 operata | comparata V 141 consolidare | assimilare V habeat | habebat V maius | melius V quantum | quam V 142 a natura | materia F et forma | om V 143 rei | ista V 144 idee | om V 145 etat | erat V 148 minus | etiam neque add F reiuncte | remxe(?) F 150 etiam | et V introductionem | introductio F dispositio | d’io scrips V 152 ad | om V
sequentis manent consimiles post corruptionem prioris forme, sicut patet cuilibet consideranti.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'adveniens alicui habenti formam que non corrumpitur' etc., concedatur. Et cum dicitur quod advenit corpori organizato, et tales dispositiones non corrumpuntur, neque forma precedens, quia nihil contrariatur eis, dico quod ista forma precedens et ille dispositiones precedentes corrumpuntur per accidens ex introductione forme sequentis. Et ad hoc declarandum suppono quod forma non introducatur in materia nisi sit disposita ad receptionem talis forme, ut habetur in hoc seundo, sicut sepe est preallegatum, ita quod si corrumpuntur dispositiones quas requirit forma in materia, et corrumpit illa forma. Secundo suppono quod genera

rans semper intendit inducere in materia formam sibi similem. Modo sicut vult Avicenna primo Canonis et tertio Canonis: virtus formativa existens in homine primo est coagulativa menstrui, postea vero virtute caloris et virtutis plasmative membra formantur et consolidantur in illa materia. Et postea continue per virtutem caloris astringuitur humidum superfluum et membra consolidantur in tantum quod dispositiones ille, quae erant sub forma inanimati sive sub forma menstrui, amplius non sunt proportionales ut forma inanimati amplius possit ibi stare, ita quod ad tantum gradum perfectionis deducitur istud menstruum quod forma menstrui vel inanimati corrumpitur et postea forma animati ibi introducitur, quia propinque sunt iste forme in perfectione. Quando ergo queritur: quid corrumpit istam formam precedentem et dispositiones precedentes, dico quod generans per accidens, quia per alterationem semper indicit perfectiores dispositiones in materia, ita tamen quod forma precedens non potest stare cum talibus dispositionibus, quia cum corrumpuntur dispositiones proportionales forme precedenti, oportet ipsum corrumpi. Et cum dicitur 'omne quod corrumpitur a suo contrario corrumpitur', verum est quod corrumpitur per se. Sed quod corrumpitur per accidens non oportet. Modo forma precedens corrumpitur per accidens ex hoc quod corrumpuntur dispositiones proportionales sibi. Sed tu dices quod non oport-

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tet formam precedentem corrumpi in adventu sequentis forme, quia forma sequens est sicut perfectio perficiens primam. Modo due forme substantialia habentes ordinem, quarum una est completa alia incompleta, possunt simul bene stare. Licet illud dicatur probabiliter, tamen non valet, quia omnis forma substantialis quantumcumque sit incompleta dat esse actualis et simpliciter — quod appareat, quia inter formas substantialia forma elementorum est incompletissima — et tamen illa dat esse simpliciter et actualis; modo omnis forma adveniens enti in actu est forma accidentalis; ergo anima adveniens habenti talem formam precedentem, si illa maneat, erit forma accidentalis. Et ideo non stant tales forme substantialia simul quarum una est completa et alia incompleta.

Cum dicitur quod si illa forma precedens corrumpitur, tunc frustra fuisset introducta in materia, dico quod non est verum, quia natura non potest introducere formam quacumquae post quacumquae immediate, sed determinatam post determinatum. Unde ibi est quidam ordo ex parte formarum et non ex parte materie, quia materia est indifferens ad quamlibet formam. Et ideo ut materia esset disposita ad recipiendum talem formam, scilicet animam, oportunius istam formam precedentem et tales dispositiones precedere.

II.4 Utrum ex anima et corpore fiat unum essentialiter

Consequenter queritur utrum ex anima et corpore fiat unum essentialiter.

Arguitur quod non quia: magis differunt actus et potentia quam duo contraria; sed ex duobus contrariis non fit unum essentialiter; ergo neque ex actu et potentia fit unum essentialiter. Sed anima est sicut actus et corpus est sicut potentia. Ergo ex corpore et anima non fit unum essentialiter. Maior patet, quia ambo contraria sunt entia in actu. Sed potentia et actus sunt unum in actu et alterum in potentia. Et ille differentie sunt maxime opposite, ut vult Commentator in prohemio huius.

Item ex diversis essentialiter non fit unum essentialiter; actus et potentia sunt diversa essentialiter; quare etc. Maior patet, quia hoc implicat contradictionem quod diversa essentialiter sint unum essentialiter. Minor patet,
quia actus et potentia sunt differentie maxime opposite. Talia autem differunt essentialiter.

Oppositum arguitur quia: sicut Philosophus dicit: non est querenda causa quare ex materia et forma fit unum, nisi quia unum est in actu et alterum est in potentia; modo anima est actus et corpus est in potentia; quare etc.

Dicendum quod ex anima et corpore fit unum per se. Secundo dico quod non est querenda causa intrinsea quare ex corpore et anima fit unum per se. Tamen bene est querenda causa extrinsea quae ex istis fit unum.

Primum declaratur quia: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent quod unum est actus et alterum in potentia, ex illis fit unum per se; sed anima et corpus sunt huiusmodi secundum quod ‘corpus’ dicit alteram partem aggregati; ergo ex istis fit unum per se. Maior patet per Philosophum. Minor etiam patet per Philosophum, qui dicit quod anima est actus, et corpus, ut dicit alteram partem aggregati, est in potentia ad illum actum et ad esse quod dat sibi iste actus.

Secundum declaratur, scilicet quod non est querenda causa intrinsea quare ex anima et corpore fit unum, quia: illa causa intrinsea vel esset materia vel forma. Non materia, quia materia est ens in potentia; sed quod est ens in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi non est causa unionis materie cum forma; ergo ista causa intrinsea non est materia. Neque etiam forma, quia illa forma vel esset substantialis vel accidentalis. Non est forma substantialis, quia tunc due forme substantiales essent in materia, scilicet illa que unitur materie et illa que esset causa illius unionis. Et tunc ex anima et corpore non esset unum essentialiter. Neque est forma accidentalis, quia forma accidentalis presupponit formam essentialem vel substantialiæm. Et tunc sequeretur idem inconveniens quod prius: quod due forme substantiales essent perficientes materiam.

Tamen querenda est causa aliqua extrinsea quare ex materia et forma fit unum, quia illa est que inducit formam in materia; modo istud est generans; ideo generans est causa extrinsea quare ex materia et forma fit unum.

Tunc ad rationes.

14 Cf AA 6:43; Aristoteles, De anima II 1, 412b6–8

14 quia | quod V 16 modo | m° scrips F 19 querenda | est add F 20 quandocumque | quando oportet F 21 actus [ in actu V 23 istsis ] ipsis V philosophum | quia dicit add V etiam | om V 24–25 dicit alteram partem | est altera pars V 28 causa | om F 30 huiusmodi | philosophus V 36 formam | om F 40 est | om V
Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'magis differant actus et potentia' etc., dico quod aliqua differe potest esse dupliciter. Vel secundum se et absolute, vel per comparationem ad aliquid tertium constitutum ex illis. Modo quando dicitur 'magis differant actus et potentia' etc., verum est secundum se et absolute, sed non magis differant per comparationem ad tertium compositum ex illis, quia duo contraria sunt duo entia que habent duo esse. Et ideo non possunt constituere tertium. Sed actus et potentia non habent duo esse, quia ens in potentia non habet aliud esse nisi illud quod dat sibi forma. Et ideo actus et potentia magis possunt facere unum per se quam duo contraria, quia duo contraria non habent unum esse.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'ex diversis essentialiter non fit unum essentialiter', verum est si sint actu distincta. Sed si unum est in potentia ad alterum que non habent nisi unum esse, ex istis fit unum; modo materia et forma sunt huiusmodi, sive actus et potentia; ideo ex istis fit unum per se.

II.5 Utrum diffinitio anime sit bene data

Consequenter queritur circa diffinitionem anime qua dicitur quod anima est actus corporis organici physici potentia vitam habentis, utrum sit bene data.

Arguitur quod non. Et primo quod non sit actus corporis quia: quod est actus materie non est actus corporis; anima est actus materie; quare etc. Maior patet, quia corpus 'dicit' aliquid in actu et non materiam primam; ergo quod est actus materie non est actus corporis. Minor patet, quia anima est forma substantialis que est materie prime.

Deinde arguitur quod non sit actus corporis physici. Actus corporis physici est natura; anima non est natura; quare etc. Maior patet. Probatio minoris quia: natura est principium motus ad unam differentiam positionis tantum; anima non est huiusmodi; quare etc. Maior patet in istis que moventur, sicut gravia et levia non moventur ad quamlibet differentiam positionis, sed sursum solum et deorsum solum. Minor patet per Philosophum in illo secundo, qui dicit quod anima est principium motus ad quamlibet differentiam positionis, sicut ante et retro, sursum et deorsum etc.

13 AA 6:47; Aristoteles, De anima II 2, 413b1–5
Item de hoc quod dicit quod est actus corporis organici. Contra quia: forma debet proportionari materie; sed anima est forma simplex simpliciter; ergo materia sibi proportionata debet esse simplex substantia. Modo corpus organicum non est simplex substantia. Quare etc. Maior patet, quia sicut dicitur in isto secundo 'actus activorum sunt in patiente et disposto'. Minor patet de se.

Item contra illam partem 'habentis vitam in potentia' quia: illud quod habet principium vite in actu non est in potentia ad vitam; sed corpus cuius anima est actus habet actu principium vite; quare etc. Maior de se patet. Probatio minoris quia: tale corpus actu habet animam; modo anima est principium vite; quare etc.

In oppositum est Philosophus, qui dicit quod anima est actus corporis organici physici potentia vitam habentis.

Dicendum quod illa diffinitio bene data est de anima. Propert quod intelligendum quod in diffinitione forme — sive sit substantialis sive accidentalis — debet poni subiectum illius forme et aliud aliud quod pertineat ad essentialiam illius forme. Modo illa ponuntur in illa. Primo ponitur quod est actus substantialis ex parte animae. Ibi etiam ponitur 'corporis physici' etc. ex parte corporis. Ideo illa diffinitio est bene data de anima, cum sit quedam forma. Unde si forma diffiniatur in abstracto, subiectum habet poni ibi loco differentie et aliud sui generis loco generis. Si autem in concreto, tunc habet poni loco generis suum subiectum.

Item probatio quod sit forma corporis vel actus quia: forma magis perfecta exigit materiam magis perfectam; modo anima est magis perfecta quam forma elementorum vel quam forma inanimatorum; ergo exigit materiam magis perfectam quam illa forma. Illa autem materia non est aliud quam corpus. Ergo anima est actus corporis. Sed iuxta hoc est notandum quod ibi non accipitur corpus ut dicit aggregatum ex materia et forma sub ratione dimensionati. Nam corpus isto modo est genus ad animal. Alio modo potest accipiri corpus ut est trina dimensio, scilicet longum, latum et profundum. Et sic corpus non est materia anime, sed est de genere quantitatis. Tertio modo potest accipiri corpus ut est materiam habens ordinem ad determinatam formam. Et
sic, ut corpus 'dicit' materiam primam ut est in ordine ad formam determinatam, anima est actus corporis. Sed est intelligendum, quia dictum est quod subiectum anime est magis perfectum quam subiectum vel materia aliarum formarum, quia ista perfectio que est in materia anime non est ita perfecta ex parte qua corpus est, sed est ita ex respectu ad determinatam formam, scilicet ad animam.

Secundum probatur quod sit actus corporis physici quia: anima vel est actus corporis naturalis vel artificialis. Non est actus corporis artificialis, quia actus istius est accidens secundum quod artificiali. Etiam non est actus corporis artificialis, quia actus istius secundum quod artificialis est introducitur ab arte, non ab aliquo generante vel ab aliquo extrinseco. Ergo anima est actus corporis naturalis.

Tertio dico quod anima est actus corporis organici quia: omnis forma que habet diversas potentias et operationes mediantibus illis potentiiis exiguit plura organa in subiecto cuius est ad exercendum illas operationes; modo anima est habens diversas potentias et diversas operationes; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia si per unam partem diverse operationes fieren, una operatio impediret aliam et non operaret distincte secundum operationes. Minor patet, quia potentia vegetativa habet potentiam nutritivam, augmentativam et generativam; et iste potentie habent diversas operationes, sicut nutritiva habet conservare substantiam nutriti, augmentativa habet ipsum ducere ad perfectam quantitatem, potentia generativa habet speciem conservare. Anima sensitiva habet etiam multas potentias, sicut potentiam visivam, auditivam, odoratifam et sic de aliis, que habent diversas operationes. Etiam sensus communis habet diversas potentias, sicut yimaginativam et memorativam. Ergo anima exigit plura organa in corpore cuius est ad exercendum istas operationes. Etiam anima intellectiva secundum quod intellectiva est non habet organum in corpore, tamen in sua operatione dependet ex virtute aliqua corporali que est in organo sicut ex fantasia.

Item anima est actus corporis habentis vitam in potentia, quia duplex est potentia. Quedam est separata ab actu precedens actum, alia est conjuncta <actui>, sicut apparret intentione Philosophi secundo Perhermeneas versus finem, ubi dicit quomodo possibile sequitur ad necesse. Quod ergo habet vi-

48 sic | sicut F 49 anima | autem add V dictum | dicendum F 51 perfecta | om V 54 secundum | secundo V 55 artificialis | modo add V 56 artificiale | est add V non | om F est | om V 57 quia actus istius | om V secundum quod artificialis | om F 60 anima | om V 64 fieren | fient V 65 operaret | operaretur V secundum | sup lin V 65-66 potenstia | anima V 68 ipsum | ipse V 70 etiam | om F 72 ymaginativam | estumativam add V 74 est | et add F om V 75 virtute aliqua | alia virtute F 78 separata | separatam V 79 actui | suppl. P 79-85 sicut apparret . potentia conjuncta | om (hom ) F
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tam in actu habet vitam in potentia, loquendo de potentia coniuncta actui, quia si Sortes esset, possibile est ipsum currere, et est in potentia ad currendum potentia coniuncta actui. Des enim oppositum | quod non potest currere, ergo non esset; modo corpus cuius actus est anima habet vitam; ergo habet vitam in potentia coniuncta actui. Aliter autem exponitur illa pars 'habentis vitam in potentia' secundum communem expositionem. Non quod sit abiciens vitam, ut Philosophus dicit, vel animam, immo habet actum principium vite, vel in potentia precedentem actum, vel in potentia coniuncta actui. In potentia precedentem sicut in scientia; modo ille qui habet scientiam est in potentia ad considerare secundum illam scientiam; ergo eodem modo, qui habet animam sensitivam et intellectivam est in potentia ad operari secundum illas. Sed de anima vegetativa non est ita, quia ista est semper in suo actu. Et illud quod habet animam est in potentia coniuncta actui ad operationem et non in potentia precedentem actum. Vel aliter potest exponi quod anima est actus corporis habentis vitam in potentia, quia corpus illud cuius actu est | anima de se non habet vitam, sed de se est in potentia ad vitam, quam habet per animam.

Tunc ad rationes.

Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'quod est actus materie non est actus corporis', falsum est, quia corpus non accipitur ibi ut est actu aggregatum, sed ut est pars aggregati vel pro materia prima sub ordine ad determinatam formam.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod est actus corporis physici est natura', concedatur. Et cum dicitur 'anima non est natura', falsum est. Et cum dicitur 'natura est principium motus ad unam differentiam positionis tantum', dico quod natura potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo ut est principium motus ad ubi tantum. Et illa natura est principium motus ad unam differentiam positionis. Alia est natura que non solum est principium motus, immo est principium vivendi. Et talis natura bene est principium movendi ad omnes differentias positionis. Et illa natura magis est perfecta quam alia; talis est anima; ideo etc.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'forma debet proportionari materie', concedatur. Et cum dicitur 'anima est simplex', verum est. Tamen habet multas potentias et operationes. Et ideo oportet quod habeat diversas partes in corpore cuius est et diversa organa ad exercendum illas operationes, ita quod ratio magis potest deduci ad oppositum quam ad propositum.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod habet vitam in actu', verum est, non habet vitam in potentia remota ab actu, sed bene potest habere vitam in potentia
coniuncta actui. Vel aliter, sicut dictum est in positione: verum est quod non est in potentia ad actum primum vitae, sed bene est in potentia ad actum secundum, qui est operari quantum ad animam sensitivam et intellectivam. Et quantum ad vegetativam est in potentia coniuncta actui ad actum secundum, quia illa numquam cessat a sua operatione.

II.6 Utrum in partibus animalis anulosi decisis sit anima

Consequenter queritur utrum in partibus animalis anulosi decisis sit anima.

Arguitur quod non quia: si in partibus animalis decisis anulosi esset anima, tunc quolibet pars animalis ipsius esset animal, sicut quolibet pars anguillae esset anguilla; modo hoc est falsum, quia tunc unum animal esset multa animalia, quod est inconveniens; quare etc. Maior patet, quia quod habet animam saltim sensitivam est animal. Et ideo si partes animalis anulosi haberent animam, essent animalia.

Item si in partibus animalis anulosi esset anima, sicut in partibus anguillae, tunc eodem modo in partibus hominis decisis esset anima, vel in partibus leonis; modo istud est falsum; ergo etc. Probatio consequentie quia: anima hominis vel leonis est magis perfecta quam anima animalis anulosi; modo forma magis perfecta est maioris virtutis et potentiae quam forma minus perfecta; ergo si anima animalis anulosi potest stare in parte decisa, multo fortius anima hominis poterit stare in partibus hominis decisis.

Item in toto animali anuloso aut sunt plures anime in actu aut una in actu et plures in potentia. Non potest dici quod sint plures anime in actu, [sed plures in potentia] quia tunc unum animal esset plura animalia quod est impossibile. Tunc arguitur: forma substantialis que educitur de potentia ad actum introducitur a generante; ergo anima, si sit actu in parte animalis anulosi decisa, cum prius esset in toto in potentia, introduceretur in <illa> ab aliquo generante; modo dividens partes animalis non est generans; ergo per divisionem, anima que prius erat in toto animali in potentia reduceretur ad actum; quare etc.

In oppositum est Philosophus in littera.

Dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod in partibus animalis anulosi decisis non est anima. Et si dicatur eis quod ille partes decise moventur localiter, et...
si pungantur retrahunt se, et sic habent sensum et motum et per consequens animam, dicunt ad hoc quod ille motus non est ab anima, sed est a calore et spiritu ibi remanente, quia quando calor et spiritus vult exire, propter viscositatem humoris sui non potest exire. Et tunc facit quamdiu est in corpore quemdam motum. Sed illud non valet, quia agens instrumentale non agit nisi in virtute agentis naturalis principalis; modo calor et spiritus sunt agentia instrumentalia respectu ipsius anime; ergo non agunt nisi in virtute anime. Et ideo si in partibus animalis anulosi decisis non manet anima, amplius non manet calor, vel si manet aliquis calor, non est eiusmodem speciei. Tamen non poterit movere motu convenienti animato et sic non possunt ibi agere.

Ideo dico quod in partibus animalis anulosi decisis et in partibus plantarum decisis est anima, quia propria operatio alicuius forme arguit illam formam; modo in partibus animalis anulosi decisis et etiam plantarum est propria operatio anime, quia propria operatio anime est sentire et movere secundum locum; ergo ubi iste operationes sunt, ibi est illa forma, scilicet anima; modo partes animalis anulosi decise sentiunt, sicut partes anguilli decise, si pungantur, retrahunt se, et si apponuntur sibi aliqua congaudentia, dilatant se et movent se, sicut in aqua; sic etiam est in multis alii animalibus, sicut in muscis, quia partes istorum decise moventur dummodo maneat partes circa capud, et in alii animalibus que sunt ad modum aranearum que habent longas tybias; ergo in multis partibus decisis est anima. Et etiam partes plantarum decise, si transferantur alibi, vivunt et fructificant.

Set tria sunt notanda. Primo quod si qualitercumque illa animalia dividantur, non salvatur ibi anima, sed oportet quod ex transverso dividamus et secundum quantitatem notabilem, quia si dividantur secundum partes minutas, tunc non esset ibi sensus neque motus, quia tales partes non sunt sufficienter dispositae ut anima possit ibi salvari per aliquod tempus. Etiam si dividantur ex longo per medium spine, ibi non manet anima. Eodem modo est in plantis. Si dividantur per medium medulle, non possunt iste partes viverere. Et causa huius est quia in istorum animalibus et plantis illud quod est ibi sicut medulla vel spina est loco cordis in quo est principium vite. Et ideo, si dividantur ex longo, non manet ibi proportionale cordi in quo est principium vitae.
vite. Sed si ex transverso dividantur, adhuc manet ibi aliquid cordis et ideo habent aniam.

Secundo est notandum quod partes animalium decise non possunt diu vivere sicut partes plantarum, quia ad conservationem forme animalis plures organizationes requiruntur in materia quam ad conservationem forme plante. Unde in partibus animalis decisis non est proportio in dispositionibus requisitis ad divisionem sufficientem ipsius. Non enim ipsa pars sufficienter est organizata ut anima possit ibi stare. Sed in partibus plantae decisis bene potest stare anima. Si enim transplantentur, possunt vivere, quia possunt reformare sibi organa per que suscipiant vel trahant sibi alimentum secundum radices, quia minores organizationes requirunt in materia quam anima sensitiva.

Tertio est notandum quod partes animalium perfectorum maiorem organizationem requirunt in materia quam anima animalium imperfectorum. Et ideo, licet in partibus animalis anulosi decisis per aliquod tempus sit anima, tamen in partibus animalium perfectorum non habet esse, quia propter eorum perfectionem maiorem organizationem requirunt in substantia.

Tunc ad rationes

Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'si in partibus animalis decisis etc., tunc quelimet pars animalis esset animal', verum est incompletum. Tamen animal secundum se est animal completum et perfectum. Et cum dicitur quod pars anguille esset anguilla, verum est incompleta et imperfecta.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur quod tunc in partibus hominis et sic de aliis esset etc., dico quod non sequitur, quia anima animalis anulosi minorem organizationem requirit ad hoc ut salvetur in materia quam anima animalis perfecti, sicut hominis vel leonis. Et cum dicitur quod anima hominis vel leonis est magis perfecta quam anima animalis anulosi, verum est. Et cum dicitur quod forma magis perfecta est maioris potentiae, concedatur. 'Ergo magis poterit salvari in partibus decisis animalis perfecti' non sequitur, quia posse salvari in partibus decisis non pertinet ad perfectionem eius et potentiam, ymmo ad eius imperfectionem.

| Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'omnis forma que educitur de potentia ad actum' etc., propter solutionem istius rationis intelligendum quod ille forme, scilicet animalium anulosorum et plantarum, sunt propinque multum formis inanimatorum. Et ideo, sicut in illis formis [illa] que sunt in toto in actu permixto potentie per solam divisionem una forma fit due forme, sicut per


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solum dividens unum lignum fit duo ligna, sic etiam fit in istis propter sui imperfectionem. Tunc ad rationem. Cum dicitur ‘omnis forma substantialis que educit ad actum educitur a generante’, dico quod quedam sunt forme educte de potentia materie prime ad actum, et de tali forma verum est quod habet educi a generante. Alia est potentia non illo modo potentia permixta actu, et forma que sic est in potentia potest reduci ad actum per solum dividens. Talis autem est forma animalium anulosorum et plantarum.

II.7 Utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis animati

Consequenter queritur utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis animati.

Arguitur quod non quia: si tota anima esset in qualibet parte corporis, quelibet pars animalis esset animal et quelibet pars plante esset planta; istud est inconveniens; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia ubicunque est tota anima, ibi est totum animal. Et confirmatur quia: sicut dicit Philosophus secundo humus: sicut se habet pars ad partem, ita totum ad totum; ergo sicut tota anima est perfectio totius corporis, sic pars animae est perfectio partis corporis; et si ita est, non ergo tota anima est in qualibet parte corporis.

Item anima est actus corporis organici; modo quelibet pars animalis vel plante non est <sufficienter> organica ad recipiendum totam animam; ergo tota anima non est in qualibet parte corporis. Maior patet per diffinitionem anime. Minor patet de se.

Item illud quod est extensum extensione corporis non est totum in qualibet parte corporis; modo anima est extensa extensione corporis; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia enim albedo est extensa extensione parietis, ideo tota albedo non est in qualibet parte parietis. Minor patet, quia anima est perfectio corporis.

Item ab ipsa essentia anime fluunt potentiae anime. Ergo si tota essentia anime esset in qualibet parte corporis, tunc etiam potentiae anime essent in qualibet parte corporis. Modo hoc est falsum, quia in alia parte est potentia auditiva et in alia potentia visiva, et sic de aliiis sicut appareat. Quare etc.

Item anima tota est perfectio totius corporis; ergo ipsa tota non est perfectio partis corporis. Antecedens patet de se. Probatio consequentie quia:

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*Aristoteles, De anima* II 1, 412b22-24

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APPENDIX A. RADULPHI BRITONIS Questiones super librum de anima

diversorum non est una perfectio; modo totum corpus et pars corporis sunt diversa; quare etc.

Oppositum arguitur quod omnes partes totius sunt sub forma totius. Tunc arguitur: forma que perficit aliquod totum corpus perficit quamlibet partem totius; sed tota anima est perficiens totum corpus animatum; ergo anima est in qualibet parte.

Item illud idem vult Albertus.

Et hoc etiam probatur quia: quamlibet pars corporis habet operationes animae, quia nutritur, augmentatur. Cum ergo operationes anime non possunt esse sine essentia anime, tota essentia est in qualibet parte corporis, cum sit forma impartibilis.

Dicendum quod tota anima vel potest esse tota totalitate quantitativa, vel totalitate potestativa, vel totalitate essentie. Totalitas quantitativa est secundum extensionem quam habet per accidens extensione corporis in quo est, quia forma que est perfectio materie, si sit educta de potentia materie. Et de hoc infra videbitur. Modo anima non est tota in qualibet parte corporis loquendo de ista totalitate, quia illum quod est extensum extensione corporis non est totum totalitate quantitativa in qualibet parte corporis, sicut albedo quia est extensa extensione parietis non est tota totalitate quantitativa in una parte corporis. Modo anima est extensa extensione corporis cum sit perfectio eius, saltem illa que est educta de potentia materie secundum unam opinnionem. Quare etc. Neque intelligo quod anima habeat totalitatem quantitatis per se, sed per accidens, scilicet extensione corporis in quo est.

Secundo dico quod anima tota totalitate potestativa non est tota in qualibet parte corporis. Et intelligo per totalitem potestativam animam totam cum eius potentiis. Modo illo modo non est tota in qualibet parte corporis. Cuius ratio est quia: si anima tota esset in qualibet parte corporis isto modo, tunc secundum quamlibet partem corporis posset operari omnes suas operationes, sicut videre, audire, odorare, et sic de aliis; sed hoc est falso, quia secundum partem determinatam alicam et alicam exercet operationem, quia secundum oculum videt et per aurem audit et sic de aliis; quare etc. Maior patet, quia ubicumque est principium operationum ibi possunt esse operationes; ergo si in qualibet parte corporis esset tota anima quantum ad eius omnes operationes non possit.
potentias, que sunt operationis principium, tunc secundum quamlibet par-tem anima posset operari, quod est inconvenient; quare etc.

Item tertio, loquendo de totalitate essential, dico quod isto modo tota anima est in qualibet parte corporis, quia operationes anime que sunt nutrire, augmentari et sentire sunt in qualibet parte corporis; modo operations anime non sunt sine anima; ergo in qualibet parte corporis est essentia anime. Tunc arguo: ubicumque est essentia anime ibi est tota essentia anime, quia essentia anime non est partibilis; modo in qualibet parte corporis est essentia anime; quare etc. Et est simile quia sicut tota essentia albedinis salvatur in qualibet parte vel in quolibet gradu, licet non salvetur eius tota quantitas. Sed nota quod anima primo est corporis animati perfectio, sed est perfectio partium ut sunt sub forma totius.

Tunc ad rationes.

Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'si tota anima etc., tunc quelibet pars animalis esset animal', dico quod non sequitur, quia licet anima sit tota in qualibet parte corporis essentialiter, tamen non est in qualibet parte corporis potestative; modo anima totalitate potential facit totum animal vel plantam totam. Vel potest dici aliter quod non sequitur, quamvis anima tota sit in qualibet parte corporis, quod quelibet pars corporis sit animal, quia licet tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis, tamen non est in qualibet parte sicut in eo quod perfectit primo. Ymmo primo perfectit animal totum; et quia partes sunt in toto, ideo perfectit partes. Unde ad hoc quod sit animal oportet quod sit primum perfectibile ab anima. Ideo non oportet quod pars animalis sit animal. Et cum dicitur 'sicut se habet pars ad partem, ita totum ad totum', verum est accipiendo partem potestativam et totum potestativum. Et de isto loquitur Aristoteles ibi. Quod appareat, quia dicit quod si oculus esset animal, visus esset sua forma vel anima. Loquitur ergo ibi de parte potential et toto potential. Et cum dicitur 'in tota anima est perfectio totius corporis, ergo etc.', bene probat ista ratio quod tota anima totalitate potestativa perfectit totum corpus et non partes corporis. Sed non probat quin perficiat partem totalitate essentiali.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'anima est actus corporis organici', verum est tamquam eius quod primo perfectit. Et cum dicitur 'quelibet pars corporis non est sufficienter organica' etc., verum est respectu totius anime quantum ad suam totalitatem potestativam. Et ideo sic tota anima non est in qualibet parte.

82-83 AA 6:44; Aristoteles, De anima II.1, 412b18-19

58 quamlibet | qualibet V | 61 que | om. V | nutrire | nutriri V | 63 anime | et add. V
68 sed | hec F | 72 quia | quod F | 73 est | om. V | potestative | predicative V | 74 anima | animal V | tota F | 76 animal | animalis V | 78 primo | om. V | 79 unde | modo V quod | aliiquid add. V | 81 ita | sic V | 82 potestativam | predicativam V | potestativum | predicativum V | 86 potestativa | predicativa V | 91 potestativam | predicativam V | sic | sicut V

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aliter concedatur maior, sicut prius, et cum dicitur ‘quelibet pars’ etc., verum est ut sigillatim accepta, tamen ut partes sunt in toto perficiuntur ab essentia anime, ita quod totum animal est quod primo perficitur; et partes secundario perficiuntur ut sunt in toto.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘illud quod est extensum’ etc., illa ratio sua via procedit. Bene enim probat quod anima que est extensa extensione corporis, de qua postea videbitur, totalitate quantitativa non est in qualibet parte corporis ut extensa extensione corporis.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur quod potentie anime fluunt ab essentia anime, dico quod non fluunt ab essentia immediate, sed mediate, quia mediantibus determinatis organis. Et ideo non oporet quod potentie anime sint in qualibet parte corporis, quia in qualibet parte corporis non sunt organa habilitata ad istas potentias anime. Et si dicas quod Philosophus dicit in *De motibus animalium* quod anima est in corporis medio, scilicet in corde, sicut monasteria in medio civitatis, dico quod loquitur ibi de anima quantum ad suam potentiam motivam; et verum est quod illa potentia motiva est in determinata parte corporis, scilicet in corde.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘tota anima est perfectio totius corporis’, dico quod non primo sequitur, sed magis e converso sequitur quod sit perfectio partis. Et cum dicitur quod pars et totum sunt diversa, dico quod quodam modo sunt diversa et quodam modo non sunt diversa. Unde illud quod est pars et illud quod est totum sunt diversa, tamen illud quod est pars ut pars est sub forma totius et est in potentia in toto, †non sunt diversa sic faciunt idem†. Et ideo est actus totius et partis. Et ideo ratio non valet.

II.8 Utrum anime brutorum sint extense per accidens quantum ad essentiam extensione corporis

Et quia suppositum est quod anime brutorum, que sunt educte de potentia materie, sunt extense per accidens quantum ad essentiam extensione corporis, queritur de hoc utrum hoc sit verum.

104–105 Cf. AA 8:8, 8:10; Aristoteles, *De motibus animalium* 10, 703a14, 29–32, 36–37
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Et arguitur quod non quia: si anima istorum animalium esset extensa extensione totius, tunc equaliter ipsa anima nominaret quamlibet partem; sed hoc est falsum. Non enim quelibet pars asini est asinus. Maior patet, quia propter quod anima plante est extensa extensione plante, ideo quelibet pars plante est planta et quelibet pars vivi est vivum. Minor appareat de se.

Item ille forme que non habent indifferenter habitudinem ad totum perfectibile et ad partes non sunt extense extensione totius cuius sunt; sed forme animalium brutorum saltem perfectorum non habent eandem habitudinem ad totum et ad partes; ergo non est extensa per accidens essentia anime istorum animalium perfectorum. Maior patet, quia nos videmus quod forme que | secundum essentiam suam indifferenter possunt esse in toto et in parte dividuntur per accidens divisione eius in quo sunt, sicut patet de albedine que quantum ad essentiam totam salvatur indifferenter in toto et in parte; et ideo dividitur sua essentia per accidens divisione quantitatis. Minor patet, quia non indifferenter se habet tota essentia anime brutorum perfectorum in toto et in qualibet parte, quia in tota essentia anime consistit totum animal; modo totum animal non est in qualibet parte animalis; ideo etc.

In oppositum arguitur quia: receptum in aliquo recipitur ad modum recipientis; sed anima recipitur in subjecto extenso per quantitatem; ergo ille forme sunt per accidens extense.

Ad hoc est intelligendum quod quedam sunt forme non educte de potentia materie et quedam sunt educte de potentia materie; modo ille forme que non sunt educte de potentia materie, cuiusmodi est anima intellectiva, ista non est extensa extensione subjecti in quo est, quia talis forma non educitur de potentia materie extense; et ideo talis forma non est extensa per accidens extensione subjecti in quo est.

Item anima intellectiva potest per se subsistere separata; sed talis forma non videtur de necessitate extensa secundum essentiam extensione quantitatis; ideo etc. Sed anime brutorum quedam sunt magis imperfecte que eodem modo respicient totum et partes, sicut anime animalium anulosorum ut anguille et consimilium. Et de ipsis non est dubium quod dividuntur divisione facta in toto, ut patet de se et per Aristotelem. Et ideo iste sunt extense per accidens extensione totius in quo sunt. Sed alie sunt anime brutorum perfectorum, sicut equi et asini. Et de istis est dubitatio. Et una positio ponit quod non extenduntur per accidens extensione quantitatis subjecti, et ratio huius


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positionis tacta est. Alia est positio que ponit quod tales forme sunt per accidens extense extensione subjecti. Et rationes huius sunt primo: supponendo quod tales forme educuntur ab agente naturali per transmutationem materie de potentia materie. Modo materia prima non subicitur actioni vel transmutationi agentis naturalis, sed materia quanta sive sub aliqua quantitate, quia agens naturale agit perconiunctum et per motum. Modo materia que est subjecta motui est materia quaedam sub aliqua forma existens. Tunc arguitur sic: illa forma que in fieri dependet ex materia extensa et educitur de potentia materie extense videtur extendi extensione eius cuius est; sed anima talium animalium est huiusmodi, sicut patet ex dictis; ideo, quia educitur de potentia materie extense prius quam perquantitatem aliquam, ideo etc.

Item si materia talium esset extensa et non forma, tunc aliqua pars materia esset extensa in qua non esset forma substantialis; et sic illa pars compositi non esset aliquid substantialiter per aliquam formam, quod est impossibile; ideo etc. Set notandum quod non eodem modo iste forme sunt extense per accidens sicut anime animalium anulosorum, quia essentia illius est extensa peraccidens et secundum essentiam et secundum virtutes saltem inaliquis. Et in aliis animalibus anulosis alique virtutes sunt extense, sicut virtus motiva in anguillus et consimilibus animalibus. Sed in istis, licet essentia peraccidens sit extensa per totum, tamen quelibet eius virtus non est extensa per totum, quia non in qualibet parte asinus vel equus videt vel audit. Sed de tactu est alia ratio quare per totum corpus animalia sentiunt tactu, quia hoc est propter necessitatem, ut patet secundo De anima. Sine enim tactu non potest esse animal. Et ideo indiget animal habere tactum in qualibet parte ne ab excelenti tangibili secundum aliquam partem corruptatur.

Ad rationes.

Quando dicitur quod tunc quelibet pars denominaretur ab ipsa anima etc., dicendum quod asinus vel equus et alia animalia perfecta non solum dicunt aliquid totum habens essentiam anime in quallibet parte, sed dicunt aliquid totum habens diversa organa ad exercendum diversas operationes secundum diversas potentias. Et ideo non oportet quod quamvis anima eorum sit extensa, quod eodem modo quelibet pars dicatur asinus vel equus totus.

61 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima II.2, 413b4–9
Nec simile est de animalibus anulosis, sicut visum est in positione, quia in aliquibus virtus et potentia per totum dividuntur secundum divisionem et extensionem totius. Et sic non est de istis.

Ad alium dicendum quod essentia anime istorum animalium indifferenter potest esse in toto et in qualibet parte quantum ad essentiam. Sed quantum ad hoc quod quantitas per accidentes istarum animarum perficiat tota totum et tota quantitative quamlibet partem, non est indifferenter se habens ad totum et ad partes. Similiter quantum ad virtutes vel potentias non equaliter se habent anime istorum animalium tote totalitate virtuali vel potestativa ad totum animal vel ad partes. Et ad illud quod dicitur de albedine, dicendum quod salvatur tota sua essentia in qualibet parte. Sed tota sua virtus motiva non salvatur in qualibet parte respectu sensus, quia plus potest movere visum maior albedo quam minor. Et cum dicitur quod anime brutorum non indifferenter se habent etc., dicendum, sicut prius dictum est, quod tota essentia anime non constituat totum animal, sed tota essentia anime totalitate essentia et virtuali sive potestativa. Et illa non est in qualibet parte, ut visum est prius. Ideo ratio non valet.

Ratio in oppositum procedit sua via de forma educta de potentia materie. Et ideo, licet anima intellectiva sit forma in materia extensa, tamen quia a materia non dependet in esse neque de potentia materie educitur, non oportet quod sit extensione materie extensa.

II.9 Utrum potentia anime sint aliquid additum supra essentiam anime

Consequenter queritur utrum potentia anime sint aliquid additum supra essentiam anime.

Arguitur quod non quia: sicut se habet potentia materie ad materiam, ita se habet potentia anime ad animam; modo potentia materie nichil addit supra materiam; quare etc. Minor apparebt per Commentatorem in De substantia orbis, qui vult quod materia substantiatur per posse. Et hoc probatur per rationem quia: si potentia materie aliquid adderet supra essentiam materie, ita quod esset aliquod accidentis additum essentiae materie, tunc aliqua forma accidentalis esset | prior in materia quam forma substantialis. Modo hoc est

5–6 AA 10:7; Averroes, De substantia orbis I, f. 3 I.
impossible, quia nulla forma accidentalis potest esse prior in materia nisi presupposita forma substantiali. Maior patet, quia illa potentia in materia precedit quamlibet formam substantiali. Ergo si illa potentia aliquid addit essentie materie, tunc forma accidentalis precedet substantiali.

Item si potentia anime aliquid adderet supra essentiam anime, tunc anima esset in potentia ad istas potentias. Et tunc queratur de illa potentia per quam est in potentia ad illas potentias: aut est de essentia anime aut est additum sibi? Si sit de essentia anime, eadem ratione standum fuit in prima potentia. Si autem sit aliquid additum essentie anime, tunc anima erit in potentia ad illum potentiam, quia anima est in potentia ad illud quod non est de sua essentia. Item si potentia anime aliquid addemerit supra essentiam anime, tunc anima esset in potentia ad illas potentias. Et tunc queratur de ilia potentia per quam est in potentia ad illas potentias: aut est de essentia anime aut aliquid additum essentie anime, tunc anima erit in potentia ad illam potentiam, quia anima est in potentia ad illud quod non est de sua essentia.

| Et tunc queratur de illa alia potentia: aut est de essentia anime aut non? Si sic, pari ratione standum fuit in prima. Si non est de sua essentia, tunc ergo est in potentia ad illam. Et tunc queratur de illa potentia; et sic procederet in infinitum in potentis anime. Cum ergo hoc sit inconveniens, inconveniens est dicere quod potentia anime aliquid addit supra animam.

Item illud quod est principium operationum non distinguitor ab essentia anime; modo potentie sunt principium operationum, sicut potentia vegetativa est principium nutriendi, augmentandi et generandi, et potentia sensitiva est principium sentiendi; quare etc. Maior patet, quia illud quod est principium operationum anime est ipsa anima.

Item illud per quod animatum distinguitur ab inanimato est forma et nihil additum supra formam, quia actus est qui distinguet et separat, ut appareat septimo Metaphysice; modo per potentiam anime animatum differt ab inanimato et etiam unum animatum ab alio, sicut planta ab animali; quare etc.

Oppositum arguitur quia: quod est de genere relationis est aliquid additum supra essentiam anime; modo potentia est de genere relationis; quare etc. Maior patet, quia essentia anime est in genere substantie et genus relationis est aliquid additum ipsi substantie. Minor patet de se.

Item illud quod multiplicatur manente una essentia anime est aliquid additum supra essentiam anime; sed potentie anime multiplicantur manente

32 AA 1:187; Aristoteles, Metaphysica VII.13, 1039a7
una essentia anime; quare etc. Maior patet, quia si nichil adderet supra essentiam, tunc multiplicata potentia multiplicaretur substantia anime.

Ad istam questionem aliqui dixerunt quod potentia anime nichil addit supra essentiam anime, sicut potentia materie nichil addit supra materiam. Aliqui autem dicunt quod 'potentia anime' potest summ dupliciter: vel pro subiecto ipsius potentie vel respectus, vel pro ipso respectu. Et primo modo nichil addit. Sed secundo modo, sic dicunt quod addit aliquid supra essentiam. Sed istud non videtur valere, quia sicut iam apparebit potentia anime non est respectus. Et de hoc quod dicunt quod subiectum potentie potest accipi pro potentia, istud non videtur possibile, quia subiectum potentie debet dici potens et non potentia. Ideo dico quod potentie anime sunt aliquid additum supra essentiam anime, quia potentie anime sunt principium operationum activum vel passivum; modo illud quod est principium operationum est naturalis potentia de secunda specie qualitatis; tale autem est aliquid additum supra essentiam anime; ergo etc. Maior patet per Philosophum in illo secundo, qui dicit quod sensus est quo sentimus, potentia vegetativa est qua nutrimur et augmentamur, et sic de aliis. Ergo potentia anime sunt principium operationum activum ad potentiam vegetativam, vel passivum quantum ad potentiam sensitivam et intellectivam. Minor patet, quia naturalis potentia secundum quam aliquid habet naturalem potentiam aliquid facile faciendi est de secunda specie qualitatis; modo tale est aliquid additum supra essentiam anime, quia qualitas est aliquid additum essentie anime.

Item si potentie anime non differrent ab essentia anime, tunc in realitate potentia non differrent potentia vegetativa et intellectiva, auditiva et visiva, quia realiter non essent aliud quam essentia anime que simplex in essentia est et indivisibilis; sed hoc est falsum; ergo etc. Falsitas consequentis apparat de se, quia si potentia visiva et auditiva non differrent, ubi esset auditus esset visus et e converso. Et similiter, si voluntas et intellectus non differrent realiter, tunc sicut intellectus est potentia cognoscitiva, sic voluntas esset potentia cognoscitiva. Sed probatio consequentia quia: si nichil realiter addunt supra essentiam anime, queram per quid realiter differrent. Non per essentiam anime, quia in hoc omnes conveniunt. Non per respectum ad operationem, quia ille respectus sequitatem potentie et etiam sequitur actum naturaliter,
quia prius est considerare extrema relationis quam relationem. Ergo prius est
considerare potentiam (que est principium operationis) et operationem quam
intelligatur talis respectus.

Item potentia dicit principium operationis. Sed respectus non est princi-
pium operationis, neque substantia sub respectu, ita quod respectus sit causa
operationis. Si autem dicatur quod ille respectus concomitatur principium
operationis, tunc ille respectus non invidit in ratione potentie, sed sola
essentia anime est potentia. Et tunc, sicut prius dictum est, potentie anime
realiter non different.

Tunc ad rationes.

Ad primam. Cum dicitur quod sicut se habet potentia materie etc., dico
quod non est simile, quia potentia anime non est respectus quidam, ymmo
est virtus quae est principium operationis; sed potentia materie est respectus
ad actum; ideo non est maioris entitatis quam ille actus. Etiam, dato quod
potentie anime essent respectus quidam, quod tamen non est verum, adhuc
non est simile de potentia materie et de potentia anime, quia potentie anime
sunt ad actum accidentalem, sed potentia materie est ad actum substantialem.
Etiam potest negari minor, quia potentia materie non est de essentia materie.
Et cum dicitur quod materia substantiatur per posse, verum est, quia imme-
diate ad essentiam materie consequitur potentia. Et cum dicitur ‘tunc forma
accidentalis precederet substantialem’ etc., dico quod iste respectus non est
aliquid reale, quia non est maioris entitatis quam actus ille ad quam est et ille
actus non est ens reale. Quare etc.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘si potentie anime essent aliquid additum essentie
anime, tunc anima esset in potentia ad illas’, verum est in potentia coniuncta
actui, quia non est impossible animam habere suas potentias. Et cum dicitur
‘illa potentia per quam est in potentia ad suas potencias aut est aliquid sibi ad-
ditum’ etc., dico quod nichil est sibi additum, quia anima per suam essentiam
habet suas potencias, ita quod potentia anime ad suas potencias non est ali-
quid additum sue essentiae, ymmo per suam essentiem est in potentia ad suas
potencias, sicut homo per suam essentiam habet risibilitatem, scilicet per for-
nam immediate. Vel potest dici quod potentia que est ipsius anime ad suas
potencias non est alia nisi illa quam habet materie ad formam substantialem
(que est anima), que ab ipso generante in]troducitur, quia generans introdu-

74 considerare | construere F est | om V 75 considerare | construere F et | vel V
81 potente | potentia V 83 ad rationes | om. F 84 quod | om V 88 potente | potentia
V adhuc | ad hoc V 89 materie | anime V anime | materie V 90 sunt | sunt add F
ad | autem (?) | add V 91 quia | quod V potentia | potentie F 93 dicitur | quod add V
95–96 et ille actus | eatam F 96 non | om V 97 potente | potentia V essent | esset
V 98 illas | illam V coniuncta | conucta scrips F 103 suam essentiem | sua essentia F
104 risibilitatem | tribuli scrips F
APPENDIX A. RADULPHI BRITONIS *Questiones super librum de anima*

cens animam introducit potentias medianti anima. Et sic non eadem ratione fuit standum in prima sicut in illa.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'illud quod est principium operationum' etc., verum est principium primum, sed quod est principium instrumentale operationum differt ab anima ipsa; modo potentie anime non sunt principium primum operationum, sed magis sunt principium instrumentale.

Per idem ad aliam. Cum dicitur quod animatum distinguitor ab inanimato per potentiam anime, dico quod non primo, ymmo per essentiam anime distinguitor primo. Item solet sic argui: forma substantialis est potentior et perfectior quam accidentalis; sed forma accidentalis est sua potentia, sicut calor est sua potentia calefactoria; ideo etc. Et ad hoc potest dici per interemptionem minoris, quia potentia calefactoria est aggregati ex subiecto et caliditate ratione caloris que differt a caliditate. Vel potest dici quod non est idem iudicium utrobiique, quia forma accidentalis est subjecti entis actu cuius est agere per talem formam, sicut calidum agit per calorem, et sic calor est potentia activa calidi vel ignis. Sed forma substantialis est materie, que est in pura potentia et per consequens non potest agere. Ideo non est simile. Neque ad perfectionem forme pertinet quod immediate aliquis agat per eam, sicut patet ex dictis, considerando ea interius.

II.10 Utrum potentie anime sint in anima sicut in subiecto vel in corpore

Consequenter queritur utrum potentie anime sint in anima sicut in subiecto vel in corpore.

Arguitur quod sint in anima quia: sicut se habet potentia corporis ad corpus, sic se habent potentie anime ad animam; modo potentie corporis sunt in corpore sicut in subiecto, sicut potentia calefactoria ignis est in igne sicut in subiecto; ergo potentie anime sunt in anima sicut in subiecto. Maior patet per locum a simili. Minor patet de se.

Item in illo est potentia anime sicut in subiecto cuius est operari secundum illam potentiam; modo operari secundum potentiam anime debetur ipsi anime. Et maxime hoc est verum in ista operatione que est intelligere, quia anima est intelligens secundum se sine corpore, quia si anima non operaretur secundum se, tunc non posset separari a corpore, quia si esset separata a corpore et
non haberet operationem propriam, esset otiosa; quod est inconveniens, quia in natura nichil est otiosum.

Oppositum arguitur quia: cuius est actus eius est potentia; modo actus et operatio anime totius coniuncti est et non anime; ergo potentia erit totius coniuncti et non anime. Maior patet per Philosophum in De somnpo et vigilia. Minor patet, quia Philosophus dicit capitulo de herroribus | quod simile est dicere animam gaudere vel tristari et dicere eam texere vel edificare. Et in De sensu vult quod ille potentie anime sunt in organo corporali.

Ad istam questionem dico quod potentie anime distinguuntur per operationes. Modo ille operationes anime quedam sunt que sunt exercite per organum corporale, sicut videre, sentire et sic de alii, alie sunt operationes que non sunt exercite per organum corporale. Tamen licet ita sit, sunt totius coniuncti per animam, sicut intelligere est totius coniuncti, licet non sit exercitum per organum corporale, quia dicimus quod homo per se intelligit. Tunc dico quod in potentii illis que sunt principium operationum mediante organo corporali, ille non fundantur in essentia anime immediate, sed in toto coniuncto sunt ratione anime, quia eius cuius est operari secundum aliquam potentiam est illa potentia cum eo modo quo eius est operari; modo operari secundum illam potentiam est totius coniuncti mediante organo et ratione anime, ut homo audit per aurem et per oculum videt; ergo talis potentia est in organo vel in toto coniuncto mediante organo et ratione anime. Si autem queratur de illis potentii quarum operationes non sunt exercite per organum corporale, sicut est potentia volitiva et intellectiva, dico quod illa potentia anime fundatur in essentia anime, quia ille potentie quarum operationes sunt exercite per organum corporale sunt in toto coniuncto mediante organo. Ergo per oppositum: ille potentie quarum operationes non sunt exercite per organum corporale non fundantur in aliqua parte corporis, sed in essentia anime immediate. Sed talis est potentia intellectiva et volitiva. Ergo fundantur in essentia anime immediate. Tamen in hac vita semper est talis potentia in toto coniuncto sicut intelligere que est totius coniuncti. Sed in alia vita alium modum intelligendi habet anima sicut per revelationem superioris intelligentie vel per aliquem alium modum qui magis pertinet ad theologos.

17 AA 7:70; Aristoteles, De somnpo et vigila 1, 454a8 18 AA 6:14; Aristoteles, De anima 1.4, 408b11–13 19–20 Aristoteles, De sensu et sensato 1.2, 437a19–21
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Tunc ad rationes.

Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'sicut se habent potentia corporis ad corpus' etc., dico quod non est simile, quia potentia corporis est totius coniuncti, accipienduo corpus ut dicit totum aggregatum et non ut est materia pura (quia illo modo non habet aliquod accidens), quia ad operationes corporis sufficit corpus. Sed ad operationes anime non sufficit anima, quia anima non est sufficiens principium illarum nisi mediante organo. Bene tamen dicuntur potentie anime que sunt totius coniuncti per animam.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'in illo sunt potentie anime' etc., concedatur. Et cum dicitur quod anime est operari, falsum est, ymmo totius coniuncti est operari mediante determinato organo, sicut videre est totius coniuncti mediante oculo. Et cum dicitur quod anima potest etc., dico quod illa operatio non est exercita per organum corporale, ideo potest esse anime separate, ut dictum est.

II.11 Utrum potentie anime fluant ab essentia anime

Consequenter queritur utrum potentie anime fluant ab essentia anime.

Arguitur quod non quia: illud a quo aliquid fluet est transmutabile; essentia anime non est transmutabilis; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia fluxus est quedam transmutatio. Minor patet, quia essentia anime est simplex et indivisibilis, transmutabile autem est divisibile.

Item ab eodem indivisibili non possunt plura procedere, sicut appararet secundo De generatione versus finem, ubi dicitur quod idem secundum quod idem natum est facere idem; modo essentia anime est una et indivisibilis; ergo ab una essentia anime non possunt plures potentie procedere.

Item si potentie anime procederent ab essentia anime, aut fluerent ab essentia anime sicut a causa materiali, vel formali, vel efficienti, vel finali; sed nullo istorum modorum fluunt ab essentia anime; quare etc. Probatio minoris. Primo quod non fluant ab ea sicut a causa materiali quia: ille potentie anime non habent fundari in essentia anime sicut in subiecto, ymmo in toto coniuncto. Neque etiam sicut a causa efficiente quia: causa efficiens est unum principium motus, sicut appararet secundo Physicorum; modo potentie
non procedunt ab anima per motum | et transmutationem. Neque etiam sicut a causa formali quia: ille potentie sunt quedam accidentia anime; modo ali- quid non est de forma suorum accidentium; quare etc. Neque | sicut a causa finali quia: anima ordinatur ad suas operationes; modo non potest ordinari ad suas operationes nisi mediantibus suis potentiiis; ergo anima ordinatur ad potentias et non e converso. Ergo potentie anime nullo modo fluunt ab essentia anime.

Oppositum arguitur quia: illud quod est causatum ab essentia anime fluit ab essentia anime; potentie anime sunt causate ab essentia anime; ideo etc. Et confirmatur quia: a quocumque fluit operatio, ab eodem fluit potentia que est principium illius operationis; modo operationes anime fluunt ab essentia anime sicut, sentire et intelligere; quare etc.

Dico quod 'fluere ab aliquo' potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo cum quodam motu et transmutatione et proprio fluxu. Alio modo potest accipi 'fluxus' pro omni emanatione vel causalitate aliquid ab aliquo, et sic est improprie fluxus. Modo potentie anime non fluunt ab anima proprio fluxu, quia quandocumque aliquid fluit ab aliquo illo modo, illud a quo fluit est in potentia et reducitur ad actum per transmutationem et motum ab aliquo agente; modo anima non est sic in potentia ad suas potencias quod reducatur de potentia ad actum tamquam a generante per transmutationem et motum, ymmo illa potentia qua anima est in potentia ad suas potencias est potentia coniuncta actui, quia cum anima est introducta a generante, statim habet suas potencias ab eodem agente, mediate tamen anima; ergo potentie anime non fluunt ab essentia anime proprio fluxu.

Secundo dico quod potentie anime fluunt ab essentia anime accipiendo 'fluxum' improprie, sicut dictum est. Cuius ratio est quia: illud quod causatur ab anima aliquo modo fluit ab anima sive ab essentia anime fluxu improprie dicto, qui est causalitas quedam; modo potentie anime sunt causate ab anima; quare etc. Maior patet. Probatio minoris. Primo quod sint causate ab anima sicut a causa finali quia: potentie anime sunt sicut instrumenta anime mediantibus quibus anima est principium operationum (unde iste potentie anime sunt fundate in organo sicut instrumento); modo agens instrumentale ordinatur ad agens principale; ergo ille potentie et organa in quibus sunt ordinantur ad animam sicut ad finem. Etiam aliquo modo fluunt ab anima sicut a causa materiali, quia iste sunt in toto coniuncto mediante organo; er-
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go aliquo modo sunt in anima sicut in subiecto secundum quod anima est pars totius coniuncti. De potentia intellectiva non est dubium, quia illa immediate fundatur in essentia anime. Etiam fluunt ab anima sicut a causa efficiente secundum unam oppinionem, quia omnes operationes anime sunt in toto coniuncto per animam effective; ergo et potentie que sunt principium operationum sunt in toto coniuncto per animam. Et hoc dicitur communiter quod anima est principium suarum operationum, quia totum coniunctum per animam habet suas operationes. Alia oppinio ponit quod anima nullo modo est principium effectivum suarum potentiarum, quia tunc idem esset in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem, quia anima esset in actu respectu suarum potentiarum inquantum eas efficeret, et esset in potentia inquantum eis substaret.

Sed circa hoc est difficultas, quia si solum subiectum esset susceptivum suarum passionum, et eodem modo anima respectu suarum potentiarum, tunc non esset alia ratio quare passio determinate esset in subiecto sive potentie anime in anima, sicut videmus de aere qui solum est receptivus luminis, et ideo solum habet lumen in presentia corporis illuminantis. Ergo cum subiectum determinet sibi suam passionem et anima suas potentias, videtur quod aliquam rationem habet †predicandi(?) effective respectu eorum. Item generans non causat potentias anime vel alias passiones propias consequentes essentiam anime vel alterius subjecti, nisi mediante anima vel alia forma substantiali subjecti cuius sunt passiones. Ergo oportet quod illa forma (que est media in isto ordine causalitatis) aliquam causalitatem habet per quam determinatur talis passio in subiecto. Quare non est sola causalitas materialis, quia illud quod est in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi non determinat sibi aliquam passionem; ergo etc. Notandum tamen quod ibi non est propria causalitas efficientis, quia talis est per transmutationem | et motum. Sed est ibi quemad simplex originatio vel emanatio ad modum efficientis, quia hoc consequitur ex illo et habet esse ex esse illius secundum determinatum ordinem. Et si sic dicatur, potest dici ad rationem quod talis potentia anime ad suas potentias est semper coniuncta actui. Et ideo non est inconveniens sic aliquid esse in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem. Sed sic non est de potentia anime respectu operationis que est sentire et intelligere, quia illa potentia est remota aliquando ab actu. Et ideo non potest anima se ipsam ad talem actum reducere in tali operatione.

Tunc ad rationes.

Tunc ad rationes.
Ad primam. Cum dicitur ‘illud a quo aliquid fluit’ etc., illa ratio sua via procedit, quia bene probat quod potentie anime non fluunt ab essentia anime proprio fluxu, ymmo per simplicem emanationem, ut dictum est.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘ab eodem non procedit nisi idem’ etc., verum est immediate. Sed ab eodem indivisibili bene possunt plura procedere mediantibus diversis organis et secundum ordinem quemdam; modo sic procedunt iste potentie anime, quia ille potentie procedunt ab essentia anime secundum quemdam ordinem, quia primo est potentia vegetativa via generationis, deinde sensitiva et deinde intellectiva. Via perfectionis est e converso.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘aut fluere ab essentia anime sicut a causa materiali’ etc., dico quod fluunt a causa materiali aliquo modo, ut visum est. Et cum dicitur quod ille potentie non habent fundari in essentia anime, verum est precise, sed fundantur in toto conjuncto, tamen per animam. Et cum dicitur quod non sunt a causa efficiente, quia causa efficientis est unum principium motus etc., verum est de efficiente per motum et transmutationem. Sed aliud est efficientis unum principale esse; modo anima non est efficienti respectu potentiarum per transmutationem et motum, sed per simplicem emanationem.

Et cum dicitur ‘neque sunt a causa formali’, verum est, quia forme non est forma; sed anima est forma; quare etc. Et cum dicitur quod neque sunt a causa finali, falsum est, ymmo sunt sicut instrumenta ad essentiam anime. Et cum dicitur ‘anima est propter operationes’, verum est, sicut causa propter effectum, quia operationes sunt effectus anime.

II.12 Utrum potentie anime habeant ordinem inter se

Consequenter queritur utrum potentie anime habeant ordinem inter se.

Arguitur quod non | quia: illa que ex opposito distinguuntur sub aliquo non habent ordinem prioris et posterioris; sed potentie anime ex opposito distinguuntur sub anima; quare etc. Maior patet, quia talia sunt coequeva sub illo. Neque sunt ordinata secundum prius et posterius. Minor patet quia: Philosophus distinguist animam in diversas potentias eius.

Item si potentie anime haberent ordinem, aut hoc esset ex parte anime aut ex parte obiectorum aut ex parte operationum; nullo istorum modorum haberent ordinem; quare etc. Probatio minoris. Quod non ex parte anime primo quia: anima est indivisibilis; modo in eo quod est indivisibile non est aliquis ordo. Neque etiam ex parte obiectorum, quia obiecta sunt disparata non ha-buunt ordinem prioris et posterioris; sed potentie anime ex opposito distinguuntur sub anima; quare etc. Maior patet, quia talia sunt coequeva sub illo. Neque sunt ordinata secundum prius et posterius. Minor patet quia: Philosophus distinguist animam in diversas potentias eius.

Item si potentie anime haberent ordinem, aut hoc esset ex parte anime aut ex parte obiectorum aut ex parte operationum; nullo istorum modorum haberent ordinem; quare etc. Probatio minoris. Quod non ex parte anime primo quia: anima est indivisibilis; modo in eo quod est indivisibile non est aliquis ordo. Neque etiam ex parte obiectorum, quia obiecta sunt disparata non habe-
bentia ordinem ad invicem, sicut alimentum et sensibile. Neque etiam ex parte operationum, quia ille etiam sunt disparate et diverse, sicut alia est operatio sensus et intellectus.

In oppositum est Philosophus, qui dicit quod potentie anime se habent sicut figure, quia sicut figure se habent consequenter et una aliam includit, ut trigonum in tetragono, etiam vegetativum includitur in sensitivo et sensitivum in intellectivo.

Ad istam questionem dico quod potentie anime habent ordinem inter se et per comparationem ad animam et ad obiectum et ad operationes. Primo: quod habeant ordinem inter se apparat, quia illa habent ordinem inter se quorum unum precedit alterum et includitur in subjecto cuius est alterum; modo potentie anime sunt huiusmodi, quia una precedit aliam et includit eam, sicut subjectum cuius est potentia perfectior includit aliam potentiam minus perfectam, sicut trigonum includitur in tetragono; quare etc. Unde duplex est ibi ordo: unus via generationis, alius via perfectionis. Via generationis potentia vegetativa est prior, postea sensitiva, deinde appetitiva, motiva secundum locum et intellectiva. Sed via perfectionis est e converso, quia posterius in generatione est prius in perfectione. Etiam habent ordinem per comparationem ad animam, quia ille potentie anime non immediate fluunt ab anima, sed secundum quemdam ordinem, quia primo ordine generationis fluit potentia vegetativa, que est propter esse individui vel speciei (individui quantum ad potentiam nutritivam et augmentativam vel speciei quantum ad potentiam generativam), deinde est potentia sensitiva via generationis et deinde intellectiva. Habent etiam ordinem per comparationem ad obiecta, et iste ordo est penes communitatem maiorem vel minorem obiectorum. Et sic potentia intellectiva est prior, quia obiectum eius est communius, quia quicquid est sensibile est intelligibile et non e converso, quia multa sunt intelligibilia que non sunt sensibilia, sicut substantie separate et alia que intelliguntur ex intellectione aliorum. Deinde est potentia sensitiva, quia eius obiectum est communius obiecto potentie vegetative, quia multa sunt sensibilia que non sunt alimentum; et potentia visiva sic est prior quam alii sensus, quia obiec-

15 Aristoteles, De anima II.3, 414b28–32
tum visus est in substantiis superioribus et inferioribus. Habent etiam ordinem ex parte operationum, quia operatio unius presupponit operationem alterius, sicut operatio sensus presupponit operationem potentie vegetative. Ad hoc enim quod quis sentiat, oportet quod habeat vitam. Et operatio potentie intellective presupponit etiam operationem potentie sensitive. Quare etc.

Tunc ad rationes.

Ad primam. Cum dicitur ‘illa que ex opposite distinguuntur’ etc., dico quod aliqua bene possunt esse ex opposite distincta sub aliquo genere, tamen inter se comparata possunt habere ordinem, sicut species numeri sub numero sunt distincte ex opposite, et tamen numeri inter se comparati bene habent ordinem, quia ternarius precedit quaternarium et sic de aliis. Etiam potentie anime non sunt sub anima sicut species sub genere.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘aut haberent ordinem ex parte anime’ etc., dico quod habent ordinem ex parte omnium istorum. Et cum dicitur quod essentia anime est indivisibilis etc., dico quod licet anima sit indivisibilis quantum ad suam essentiam, tamen per comparationem ad ipsam aliqua possunt esse ordinata secundum quod prius et posterius recedunt ab essentia anime. Et cum dicitur ‘in indivisibili non est ordo’, verum est in essentia indivisibilis, tamen in hiis que procedunt ab ipso indivisibili bene potest esse ordo. Et cum dicitur quod neque ex parte obiectorum, quia objecta diversa sunt, dico quod <non> accipitur ibi ordo ex parte obiectorum eo quod objecta sunt diversa, sed eo quod objectum unius potentie potest esse communius quam objectum alterius. Et cum dicitur quod neque ex parte operationum, quia ille sunt diverse, verum est quod sunt diverse. Tamen una presupponit aliam, et ideo sunt ordinate.

II.13 Utrum potentie distinguantur per actus et actus per obiecta

Consequenter queritur utrum potentie distinguantur per actus et actus per obiecta.

Arguitur quod non quia: prius non distinguitur per posterius; potentia prior est quam operatio; ergo potentie non distinguuntur per actus. Maior patet
de se. Probatio minoris quia: causa prior est suo effectu; potentia est causa operationum; quare etc.

Item si potentie distinguerentur per actus et actus per objecta, tunc ubicumque essent diversa objecta secundum speciem essent diverse potentie. Modo hoc est falsum, quia album et nigrum sunt diversa objecta formaliter et tamen percipiuntur ab una potentia, scilicet a potentia visiva.

In oppositum est Philosophus.

Dicendum quod potentie distinguuntur per actus et actus per objecta. Propter quod est intelligendum quod quaedam sunt potentie anime active et quaedam passive. Potentie passive sunt sicut potentia sensitiva et intellectiva. Modo iste potentie passive distinguuntur per objecta,quia per illud aliquid distinguitur quod educit ipsum de potentia ad actum; modo objectum potentie passive educit ipsum de potentia ad actum, sicut visibile educit visum de potentia ad actum et intelligibile intellectum; quare etc. Maior patet, quia unumquodque distinguitur secundum quod ens actu; et ideo per quod aliquid est ens actu, per illud distinguitur, quia actus distinguet et separat, ut videtur nonno Metaphysice. Minor patet per Philosophum secundo huius, qui dicit quod sensibile educit sensum de potentia ad actum et intelligibile intellectum. Et potentie active habent distinguui per objecta et operationes. Propter hoc est intelligendum quod ille potentie active ordinantur ad operationes suas et objecta, sicut potentia nutritiva et augmentativa ad conservationem individui, potentia generativa ordinatur ad conservationem speciei. Sunt ergo propter operationem sicut propter finem. Etiam sunt propter objectum sicut propter finem, quia sicut apparet primo Ethcorum ubicumque preter operationem est operatum, operatum habet rationem finis, sicut in domo preter edificationem est aliquod operatum, scilicet ipsa domus, que habet ibi rationem finis. Et ideo in istis operationibus objectum habet rationem finis respectu potentie.

Tunc arguo: quandocumque est aliquid ordinatum in alterum tamquam in finem, per illud habet distinguui; modo potentie ordinantur ad actus et actus ad objecta tamquam ad finem, ut visum est; ideo etc.

11 Forsan AA 6.56; Aristoteles, De anima II.4, 415a16-21 20-21 Locus non inventus 21 Cf Aristoteles, De anima II.5, 418a3-4 28 Aristoteles, Ethica ad Nicomachum I.1, 1094a5-6

10 visiva | visuali V 14 potentie passive | om V 14-15 modo iste potentie | manifeste et vere V 16 quod | per ipsum V ipsum | om V 19 quod | est add V 20 videtur | habetur V 25 sicut | sunt F 27 etiam | et V 30 aliquod | aliquid V 30-31 et ideo rationem finis | om (hom ) F et ideo in istis operationibus objectum habet rationem finis add V 33-34 actus ad | om V
Item illud quod est prius quoad nos est principium distinguendi via doctrine respectu eius quod est posterius quoad nos; modo operationes quoad nos sunt priores potentis, et obiecta operationibus; quare etc.

Tunc ad rationes.

Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'prius non distinguitur per posterius', verum est simpliciter prius et etiam quoad nos. Tamen illud quod est simpliciter prius, posterius tamen quoad nos, potest distinguiri per posterius simpliciter, prius tamen quoad nos. Et sic potentie distinguuntur per operationes, quia operationes sunt priores quoad nos quam potentie. Etiam potest negari minor, quia obiecta et operationes habent se in ratione finis in potentie activis, et in passivis se habent sicut efficiens educens ipsas de potentie ad actum.

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'si ita esset etc., tunc ubicumque essent diversa obiecta' etc., verum est diversa obiecta per se et prima. Et cum dicitur quod hoc est falsum, quia album et nigrum sunt diversa obiecta, dico quod album et nigrum non sunt diversa obiecta visus, ymmo lumen vel color ad quam habent reduci album et nigrum est primum obiectum visus.
Some remarks on Buridan’s (?) *prima lectura*

In 1991, Benoît Patar published two commentaries on Aristotle’s *De anima*, an *expositio* and a commentary *per modum quaestionis*, under the title *Le Traité de l’âme de Jean Buridan* [De prima lectura].\(^1\) According to Patar, both commentaries — which are not ascribed to any author in the manuscripts — should be ascribed to John Buridan and taken together constitute the first of three sets of lectures on the *De anima*, the so-called *prima lectura*.\(^2\) The text has been used in a number of articles and books, sometimes to show how Buridan’s views changed over the years.\(^3\)

Although the commentary has been used to document developments in Buridan’s thought, Patar’s proof of its authenticity has not been accepted by everyone. The three scholars who reviewed the work, Sten Ebbesen,\(^4\) Zénon Kaluza,\(^5\) and Christoph Flüeler\(^6\), all expressed their doubts. In addition to these doubts formulated by the reviewers, the text has a long history of ascriptions. John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, Blasius of Parma, and Dominicus de Clavasio have all been considered to be the author at one time or another.\(^7\)

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\(^2\) The ms Tonno, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, H.III.30, which Patar uses to supplement the missing parts of the so-called *prima lectura* does contain an attribution. But besides the fact that the text contained in this manuscript is probably a compilation of several lectures, the ascription is extremely difficult to read, and there is no consensus about how to read it. The ascription looks like ‘?lasio’, however, so it certainly is not ascribed to Buridan.

\(^3\) The most important of these is Zupko’s monograph on Buridan, where it is included in the list of authentic works. See Zupko, *John Buridan*. See also J. Zupko, ‘John Buridan’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/buridan/> (accessed October 1, 2010). But the text is also used, for example, in Klíma, ‘Buridan’s Theory of Definitions’.


\(^7\) See Patar’s introduction to the edition, pp. 66*–70*
According to Patar, however, as stated in the introduction to his French transla-
tion of the text, most of the serious scholars now accept Buridan as the au-
thor.\(^8\)

Both the \textit{expositio} and the \textit{quaestiones} of the \textit{prima lectura} are based on
two manuscripts, the most important of which is ms Brugge, Stadsbibliotheek,
477 — the only manuscript that contains both texts. Unfortunately, how-
ever, this manuscript is missing several pages, stopping abruptly in the middle
of question II.15 and resuming in the middle of what may be question III.3.
Patar collated the \textit{expositio} with ms Avignon, Bibliothèque municipale, 1093.
He collated the \textit{quaestiones} with ms Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale Universi-
taria, H.III.30. This Torino manuscript contains a commentary \textit{per modum
quaestiones} on the \textit{De anima} that is similar in some, but not all respects to the
commentary contained in Brugge, 477. According to Patar, the Torino com-
mentary is a compilation of multiple lectures on the \textit{De anima} by Buridan that
often corresponds, especially in the first two books, to the text in Brugge, 477.\(^9\)

Because of the missing pages in the Brugge manuscript, the edition
of the \textit{quaestiones} is in fact a compilation of two commentaries from two
manuscripts. Following Brugge up until its abrupt end in II.13, Patar
continues his edition by using the text of Torino, switching to Brugge again
an soon as possible, that is, in question III.3.\(^{10}\) Strangely enough, on several
occasions where both Brugge and Torino fail — according to Patar —
to give an adequate text, the text is emended by using Nicole Oresme's(!)
commentary on the \textit{De anima}.\(^{11}\)

Patar's argument for Buridan's authorship is long and detailed, but it
roughly consists of three steps. The first step is the establishment of a shared
authorship of the \textit{expositio} and the \textit{quaestiones}. The second step is proving that
Buridan is the author of the \textit{expositio}. The final step is the inference that Burid-
man must also be the author of the \textit{quaestiones}. Patar establishes the shared
authorship of the \textit{expositio} and the \textit{quaestiones} by tracing the references in the
\textit{expositio} to corresponding \textit{quaestiones}. He found ten of these reference, for
example on f. 239\(^{va}\): “unde, sicut oculus est alterius rationis a pede, ita illa

\(^8\)B. \textit{Patar}, \textit{Jean Buridan Commentaire et Questions sur le Traitée de l’âme.}
l’autenticité du \textit{Traitée de l’âme} contenu dans le manuscrit 477 de Bruges est aujourd’hui admise par
les meilleurs experts. La plupart des chercheurs sérieux admettent effectivement qu’il
s’agit bien d’une œuvre de Buridan.”

\(^9\)Anonymus \textit{Patar}, QdA, 95*-97*.

\(^{10}\)Patar made the decision to indicate the switch of manuscripts in the edition by the use of
a slightly different font and the addition of ‘(T)’ to the header of the \textit{verso} pages; an unfortunate
decision, since this indication is very easily overlooked if one is unaware of the fact that it will
occur in the middle of book II, on p. 352

\(^{11}\)For instance, on p. 364, lines 47–8, 372, lines 46–7, 378, line 92, 400–401, lines 29–31, etc.
pars animae quae est in oculo est alterius rationis ab illa parte animae equi quae est in pede. De hoc magis in quaestione.”

Having established the shared authorship of the two commentaries, Patar proceeds to demonstrate that the *expositio* was written by Buridan. He does this by showing that several passages from the *expositio* in ms Brugge, 477 to a large extent match an *expositio* that we know was written by Buridan, contained in ms Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 2162. In addition, he shows that there are three passages in the *quaestiones* that match with questions in Buridan’s commentaries on the *De generatione et corruptione*, the *Ethica*, and the *Meteora*.

The arguments that establish a shared authorship between the *expositio* and the *quaestiones* are reasonably convincing, although not as conclusive as Patar makes it appear. The evidence that is presented is not sufficient to establish a shared authorship with certainty, but there are indeed some indications that point to a relation between the two texts. The same, however, cannot be said for his arguments that Buridan is the author. The demonstration that tries to connect the *expositio* to a known *expositio* written by Buridan fails to take into account that *expositiones* tend to be very similar even between different authors. Because the structure is dictated by Aristotle’s text — and because virtually all commentators agreed on at least a substantial set of the distinctions and explanations that needed to be introduced —, the *expositiones* genre left little room to be original. The demonstration that begins with the *quaestiones*, on the other hand, is based on references that are too general to link the commentary conclusively to Buridan, or any other commentator for that matter.12

Patar seems to be aware that his deductive arguments might not convince everyone, at least not immediately, and also uses a supportive argument that, if true, certainly adds plausibility to his thesis: “En examinant attentivement les 5 versions connues, on constate que dans chacune on retrouve la même doctrine, les mêmes prises de position, les mêmes arguments.”13 Doctrinal similarity, even if it can never prove a particular authorship, should be accepted as important evidence to support it. But in spite of Patar’s claim, it is precisely the doctrinal similarity that is lacking on a number of key issues. The localization of the vital powers in the body, the (non)identity of the sensitive and intellective soul in man, and the number of common sensibles, all of these are topics where the alleged *prima lectura* differs substantially from Buridan’s position in his other known commentaries on *De anima*. This in itself nei-

12 Paul Bakker and I are working on an article in which we examine the question of the authorship of the Anonymus Patar in detail. See P. J. J. M. Bakker and S. W. de Boer, ‘Buridan’s commentaries on the *De anima*’ (in preparation).

13 Anonymus Patar, QdA, 81.
ther proves nor disproves that Buridan is the author, but it does refute Patar’s supporting argument of doctrinal similarity.

Let me give just one example, which I discuss in detail in section 5.4.4:

Sexta conclusio: in eodem, sicut in bruto, sunt plures animae partiales. Patet ex dictis, nam alia est anima ossis et alia est anima carnis; istae autem animae sunt animae partiales. Sequitur corollarie quod, si illa pars animae quae est in pede equi esset in oculo equi, non videret: patet, quia illa pars animae equi quae est in pede non est apta nata nec ordi-nata ad videndum. Sequitur etiam hoc esse falsum quod aliqui dicunt de anima equi quod ita anima equi quae est in pede videret, si haberet organum sicut illa quae est in oculo.14

This passage alone already counts as strong evidence against the identification of what I refer to as Anonymus Patar with John Buridan. Buridan explicitly defends that we should give the opposite answer. In fact, that we should give the opposite answer forms a crucial element of his project of describing how the soul is internally structured and how it relates to the body. In another known set of lectures on the De anima, Buridan gives the same answer to the thought experiment as he gives in his ultima lectura.15

At the same time, it cannot be denied that this anonymous commentary is closely related to Buridan’s commentary. Some parts of it are practically verbatim the same as passages from Buridan’s commentary. On the other hand, the same situation applies to Oresme’s commentary. For example, the questions on the possibility of self-knowledge that can be found in the third book of both Oresme’s and Anonymus Patar’s commentaries are virtually identical. And more importantly, in those places where Oresme and Buridan defend different positions, Anonymus Patar usually defends the same position as Oresme.

Given the importance of this commentary in documenting developments in the De anima tradition in the fourteenth century, I need to take at least a preliminary stand on the status of the alleged prima lectura. I see no reason to attribute the commentaries to Buridan. Patar’s own arguments for the authorship are inconclusive at best, and there is substantial additional evidence against the attribution. Given that there is not enough evidence to conclusively assign an author, I will simply treat the commentary as an anonymous

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14 Anonymus Patar, QdA, II.5, 2706-67.
15 This set is sometimes referred to as the secunda lectura, but that qualification is not found in the manuscripts. Michael, Johannes Buridan: Studien, 684, refers to it as quaestiones (sed non de ultima lectura). John Buridan, Questiones de anima (sed non de ultima lectura), MS Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. Lat. 1045, 98vb-99ra: “Sed potentia visiva principalis est in pede. Ideo si fieret oculus in pede, videret in pede. Nec propter hoc est frustra in pede, quia ibi exercet aliam operationem.”
commentary on the *De anima* written probably around the middle of the fourteenth century. My hypothesis is that the so-called *prima lectura* is a compilation work, based partly on Oresme and partly on Buridan, but this can be nothing more than a hypothesis at this moment. In any case, I will consider it to be exactly what it is: an anonymous commentary on *De anima*, written in the same context and around the same time in which the commentaries by Oresme and Buridan were also written. As with all other anonymous commentaries, I will refer to it by using the name of its editor, as the Anonymus Patar.
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Samenvatting

In dit proefschrift ontwikkel ik een duiding van de transformaties van de De anima traditie in de periode van c. 1260 tot c. 1360. Na een inleidend hoofdstuk (hoofdstuk 2) waarin ik de receptie van De anima in de dertiende eeuw beschrijf, documenteer ik drie van deze transformaties in detail in de daarop volgende hoofdstukken. De achtergrond daarbij wordt gevormd door een interpretatie van de ontwikkelingen in de veertiende eeuw die al eerder door Jack Zupko is ontwikkeld. De veertiende eeuw, zo stelt hij, laat een toenemende empirisering zien. Dat wil zeggen, er is een beweging gaande waarbij men steeds minder geïnteresseerd is in discussies over de (onzichtbare) essentie van de ziel en zich in plaats daarvan steeds meer richt op discussies over de waarneembare activiteiten van levende wezens.

In hoofdstuk 3 bespreek ik een aantal methodologische vragen die binnen De anima commentaren werden behandeld. Het gaat daarbij met name om de volgende kwesties: (1) is een wetenschap die de ziel bestudeert eigenlijk wel mogelijk, en zo ja, wat voor soort wetenschap is het dan? (2) wat wordt er door zo’n wetenschap precies bestudeerd? (3) is deze wetenschap inderdaad zo moeilijk en tegelijkertijd zo zeker als Aristoteles beweert? Dergelijke vragen komen in bijna alle commentaren op De anima voor, maar er blijkt iets merkwaardigs mee aan de hand te zijn. In tegenstelling tot wat ze lijken te suggereren wordt er helemaal geen methodologie ontwikkeld die vervolgens in de rest van het commentaar wordt toegepast. Ik probeer te laten zien dat deze methodologische vragen beter anders gelezen kunnen worden, namelijk als manieren om om te gaan met interne spanningen binnen De anima. De op het eerste gezicht methodologische vragen blijken vooral manieren te zijn om de fragiele eenheid van de scientia de anima in stand te houden. Bij de behandeling van deze vragen draait het er telkens om, te garanderen dat ook het bestuderen van de mensenziel binnen deze wetenschap kan plaatsvinden.

In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik vervolgens hoe de middeleeuwse commentatoren Aristoteles’ definitie van de ziel als ‘eerste act van een fysisch organisch lichaam dat in potentie leeft’ opvatten. Ik doe dit aan de hand van twee modernere exegeten, namelijk John Ackrill en Jennifer Whiting. In 1973 publi-
ceerde Ackrill een artikel waarin hij aantoonde dat de aristotelische definitie van de ziel problematisch is. Het probleem komt voort uit Aristoteles' beschrijving van de ziel – lichaamverhouding in termen van vorm en materie. Net zoals een standbeeld bestaat uit een materie, bijvoorbeeld brons, en een vorm, bijvoorbeeld de vorm van een paard, zo bestaan levende wezens uit een materie, namelijk het lichaam, en een vorm, namelijk de ziel. Deze analogie is uitermate geschikt om duidelijk te maken dat ziel en lichaam niet twee zelfstandige, afzonderlijke entiteiten zijn, net zo min als de vorm en materie van het standbeeld dat zijn. De ziel bestaat als vorm van het lichaam en niet op zichzelf, net zoals de vorm van het beeld enkel als vorm van het brons bestaat en niet op zichzelf. De analogie, zo beweert Ackrill, loopt echter stuk zodra we wat scherper kijken naar de materiekant van het verhaal.

De materie van een standbeeld kan ook op zichzelf bestaan. Wanneer we het beeld omsmelten houden we immers nog steeds het brons over. Enkel de vorm van het beeld is dan verdwenen. Bij het levende lichaam werkt dit echter anders. Als de vorm van het lichaam verdwijnt, namelijk bij overlijden, dan is niet alleen de ziel weg, maar is ook het lichaam geen lichaam meer. Althans, dat is wat Aristoteles keer op keer beklemtont. Een lijk is geen lichaam, tenzij we de term lichaam dubbelzinnig toepassen. Maar als dat zo is, dan kan het lichaam niet de materie van de ziel zijn op dezelfde wijze als het brons de materie van de paardenvorm was bij het standbeeld. De vorm – materietermiologie blijkt, aldus Ackrill, slecht toepasbaar op de ziel – lichaamverhouding. Dit artikel heeft veel reacties losgemaakt waaronder die van Whiting. Zij brengt tegen Ackrill in dat Aristoteles ‘lichaam’ op twee manieren gebruikt in zijn teksten. Aan de ene kant is er het lichaam als iets dat leeft. Dit lichaam blijft inderdaad niet bestaan als de vorm, de ziel, verdwijnt. Maar er is ook het lichaam als het fysische materiaal waaruit levende wezens zijn opgebouwd. En dit lichaam blijft wel (een tijdlang) bestaan na overlijden. Aristoteles ontloopt met dit onderscheid, aldus Whiting, het probleem waar Ackrill op wees.

Ik laat zien dat varianten op de interpretaties van Ackrill en Whiting al in de Middeleeuwen zijn ontwikkeld. Met name de veertiende-eeuwse commentatoren zijn zich scherp bewust van de problemen die samenhangen met het toepassen van het vorm – materiekader op de ziel – lichaamverhouding. Ze besteden om die reden steeds meer aandacht aan de vraag in hoeverre het levende lichaam identiek is met het lijk. Ik laat bovendien zien hoe de ontwikkeling van deze discussies gestuurd wordt door twee andere tradities. Vanuit de theologie worden de problemen op scherp gesteld in Quodlibeta discussies en in de zogenaamde Correctoria literatuur. En aan een andere natuurfilosofische traditie, die van de commentaren op De generatione et corruptione, worden veel van de argumenten ontleend. Dit leidt ertoe dat steeds meer materiaal uit De generatione zijn weg vindt naar De anima en omgekeerd.
In hoofdstuk 5, tenslotte, onderzoek ik hoe de commentatoren de ziel en haar verhouding tot het lichaam beschrijven in termen van haar essentie, vermogens, en acten. De rode draad daarbij is een gedachte-experiment dat in de loop van de veertiende eeuw erg populair wordt. Dit experiment gaat als volgt: we weten allemaal dat het gezichtsvermogen van een paard gelokaliseerd is in zijn oog. Immers, alleen door zijn ogen te gebruiken kan het paard iets zien. Maar stel nu dat door goddelijk ingrijpen — of, zo zouden we ook kunnen zeggen, door genetische manipulatie — er een oog gevormd wordt in de voet van dat paard. Kan dat paard dan ook iets zien met dat oog in zijn voet? De meningen over het juiste antwoord op die vraag lopen in de veertiende eeuw uiteen. Johannes Buridanus antwoordt bevestigend, terwijl Nicole Oresme en de Anonymus Patar juist ontkennend antwoorden. Deze commentatoren blijken een fundamenteel verschil van mening te hebben over de wijze waarop de ziel in een levend wezen tegenwoordig is, ondanks de vele overeenkomsten in hun theorieën. Ik laat daarbij zien dat de Parijse commentaartraditie op *De anima* in het midden van de veertiende eeuw sterk beïnvloed is door de theorieën die Willem van Ockham in zijn Sententieëncommentaren heeft ontwikkeld. Zo stelt bijvoorbeeld iedereen in de periode voor Ockham dat de ziel en haar vermogens ontologisch onderscheiden zijn, terwijl iedereen vanaf Ockham stelt dat er tussen beide geen ontologisch onderscheid bestaat. Ook in de details van de discussies halverwege de veertiende eeuw is de invloed van Ockham aan te wijzen.

Daarnaast toon ik aan dat er nog een belangrijke transformatie plaatsvindt in de veertiende eeuw, welke begint met het commentaar van Radulphus Brito. Vanaf dat moment brengen commentatoren een nieuwe volgorde aan in het bepalen van de wijze waarop de ziel tegenwoordig is in het lichaam. Ze kiezen ervoor om te beginnen met die planten en dieren waarbij het mogelijk is om een stuk af te snijden zodanig dat er twee levende wezens ontstaan. Denk daarbij aan het stekken van een plant, of het doormidden snijden van een regenworm. Pas wanneer voor deze groep van betrekkelijk eenvoudige organismen de wijze waarop de ziel tegenwoordig is in het lichaam is vastgesteld, kijken ze naar de tweede groep. Deze groep bestaat uit de complexere dieren die we niet doormidden kunnen snijden met eenzelfde resultaat. Mede op basis van de conclusies van de analyse van de eerste groep wordt vervolgens ook hier de ziel – lichaamrelatie vastgesteld. Pas dan wordt er gekeken naar de laatste groep, die van de mensen. Ik laat zien dat veel van de doctrinaire verschillen in de veertiende eeuw met betrekking tot de ziel – lichaamverhouding terug te voeren zijn op een onderliggend, en impliciet verschil van mening over de criteria op basis waarvan we conclusies over de ene groep mogen doortrekken naar de volgende groep. Ook laat ik zien dat in de veertiende eeuw de ziel – lichaamverhouding bij de mens meer en meer wordt beschouwd.
als uitzonderlijk. Zo uitzonderlijk zelfs dat praktisch geen van de conclusies die we bereiken in het onderzoek naar de eerste twee groepen doorgetrokken mag worden naar de mens.

De consequentie van de transformaties die ik in deze drie hoofdstukken heb beschreven is, dat aan het eind van de veertiende eeuw het haast onmogelijk is geworden om de \textit{scientia de anima} nog als een eenheid te denken. Aan de ene kant zijn de discussies over de ziel – lichaamrelatie in de loop van de veertiende eeuw steeds technischer en gedetailleerder geworden. Aan de andere kant is in diezelfde periode steeds meer nadruk gelegd op de manieren waarop mensenzielen verschillen van alle andere zielen. De combinatie van deze twee factoren leidt ertoe dat het haast onmogelijk is geworden om nog vol te houden dat de \textit{scientia de anima} een enkele natuurfilosofische wetenschap is waarin alle zielen, inclusief de mensenzielen, bestudeerd worden. De veertiende-eeuwse traditie eindigt daarom in een impasse. Het blijkt geen periode van een toenemende empirisering te zijn, maar eerder een periode waarin de breekbare eenheid van de \textit{De anima} traditie verloren gaat. Er lijken slechts twee mogelijkheden over te blijven wanneer we willen blijven vasthouden aan de stelling dat de \textit{scientia de anima} ook de menselijke ziel bestudeert. Ofwel deze wetenschap behoort niet tot de natuurfilosofie, maar bijvoorbeeld tot de metafysica, of vormt zelfs een soort tussenwetenschap (\textit{scientia media}). Ofwel, we moeten weer de overeenkomsten tussen de mensenziel en de andere zielen gaan benadrukken, met als risico dat de menselijke ziel haar unieke status verliest. Beide bewegingen zijn inderdaad waarneembaar in de vijftiende eeuw.
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